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
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
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bulletin

Vol. XXV, No.  627

July 2, 1951

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The Department of State bulletin

VOL. XXV, No. 627 • PUBLICATION 4278

July 2, 1951

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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
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Working Together for Peace

Address by the President¹

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I am glad to be here in Tennessee to dedicate this great aviation development center. The great industrial progress of Tennessee, and of the whole south, makes it possible to build this key defense installation in this area. I am sure that the presence of this center here will contribute further to the growth and prosperity of this region.

It is most appropriate that this center for pioneering in the science of flight should bear the name of Gen. Henry H. Arnold. "Hap" Arnold was a great pioneer in the development of our air force.

He was one of the first three officers in our Armed Forces to learn to fly a plane. He won his first flying trophy in a Wright biplane that had a 40-horsepower engine turning two propellers by the chain and sprocket method—the same kind of power transmission a bicycle has.

General Arnold lived to command a mighty air force of 80 thousand planes. Instead of 40 horsepower, some of the planes in that air force had 40 thousand horsepower. And the power transmission system of some of those planes was more like a skyrocket than a bicycle.

General Arnold had a lot to do with those improvements. He knew that you can't have a first-class air force with second-class aircraft. He would have been delighted with this air research center, which will do so much to make further improvements possible.

I am happy to dedicate this center to his memory and to name it, the "Arnold Engineering Development Center."

The scientists who work here will explore what lies on the other side of the speed of sound. This is part of our effort to make our air power the best in the world—and to keep it the best in the world. This applies to the planes of our Air Force, our Navy, and our Marines. It applies to

our guided missiles, and all the future developments that science may bring.

The purpose of our air power is to help keep peace in the world. This is our fundamental objective. A large and powerful air force is one of the essential weapons we must have to prevent aggression—or to crush aggression if it is launched.

We need many other weapons as well—military, economic, and psychological weapons—if we are to prevent a third world war. And we must keep finding new and better methods in each of these fields, just as we must keep developing faster and more powerful planes.

We must use every possible means of securing and maintaining peace. Our whole policy is based on world peace. That has been our policy all along and it is still our policy. This has not changed one bit.

Since World War II, we have done our utmost to build an international organization to keep peace in the world. We have done that in the interest of the United States, because the only sure way to keep our own country safe and secure is to have world peace. The United Nations is the most far-reaching attempt that man has ever made to protect himself against the scourge of war.

But the rulers of the Soviet Union had a different idea. They did not want to cooperate in keeping the peace. The people of Russia want peace just as much as anyone else, but their rulers in the Kremlin saw that the nations of the world had been weakened and demoralized by the agonies of the war. They saw a chance to move in and impose their own system of slavery on other nations.

We tried to settle postwar problems with the Soviet Union on a decent and honorable basis. But they broke one agreement after another. We offered to place the means of atomic warfare under effective international control. That was an offer to save mankind forever from the horror of atomic war. But the Soviet Union refused to accept it.

Our actions showed that we were for peace.

¹ Made at the dedication of the Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tullahoma, Tenn., on June 25. Also printed as Department of State publication 4288.

Even though our efforts were rejected by the Soviet rulers, our actions won for us the confidence and trust of other free nations. In spite of all the false and lying propaganda of the Kremlin, it was clear to all the world that we wanted peace.

Peace—But Not Appeasement

At the same time, we made it clear to all the world that we would not engage in appeasement. When the Soviet Union began its campaign of undermining and destroying other free nations, we did not sit idly by.

We came to the aid of Greece and Turkey when they stood in danger of being taken over by Communist aggression in 1947. As a result, these countries today are free and strong and independent.

We came to the aid of the peoples of France and Italy in their struggle against the political onslaught of communism. In each of these countries, communism has been defeated in two free elections since 1947. There is no longer any danger that they will vote themselves into the hands of the Soviet Union.

We came to the aid of the brave people of Berlin when the Kremlin tried to take them over. We and our allies kept Berlin alive by the airlift and it is still free today.

We came to the aid of China when it was threatened by Communist civil war. We put billions of dollars worth of arms and supplies into China to aid the Chinese Nationalist Government. We gave them more help than we gave Greece or Italy or Berlin. The Government of Greece took our aid and fought for freedom. But many of the generals of Nationalist China took our aid and surrendered.

We can investigate the situation in China from now until doomsday, but the facts will always remain the same: China was taken over by the Communists because of the failure of the Nationalist Government to mobilize the strength of China to maintain its freedom.

After all, our aid can be effective only when people help themselves. We are continuing to give aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, and that aid will be effective if they are now willing to do their part.

On June 25, 1950, one year ago today, the Communist rulers resorted to outright war. They sent Communist armies on a mission of conquest against a small and peaceful country.

That act struck at the very life of the United Nations. It struck at all our hopes for peace.

There was only one thing to do in that situation—and we did it. If we had given in—if we had let the Republic of Korea go under—no nation in the world would have felt safe. The whole idea of a world organization for peace would have melted away. The spirit of resistance would have been broken and the free nations would have been open to conquest one by one.

We did not let that happen. For the first time in history, a world organization of nations took collective military action to halt aggression. And, acting together, we halted it.

A year ago today, Korea looked like an easy conquest to the Soviet rulers in Moscow and their agents in the Far East. But they were wrong. Today, after more than a million Communist casualties—after the destruction of one Communist army after another—the forces of aggression have been thrown back on their heels. They are back behind the line they started from.

Things have not turned out the way the Communists expected.

The United Nations has not been shattered. Instead, it is stronger today than it was a year ago.

The free nations are not demoralized. Instead, they are stronger and more confident today than they were a year ago.

The cause of world peace has not been defeated. On the contrary, the cause of world peace is stronger than it was a year ago.

We have been fighting this conflict in Korea to prevent a third world war. So far we have succeeded. We have blocked aggression. And we have kept the conflict from spreading.

Men from the United States and from many other free countries have fought together in Korea. They have fought bravely, heroically, often against overwhelming odds. Many have given their lives.

No men ever did more for their country or for peace and freedom in the world.

Positive Measures for Peace

The attack on Korea has stimulated the free nations to build up their defenses in dead earnest. Korea convinced the free nations that they had to have armies and equipment ready to defend themselves.

The United States is leading the way, with defense expenditures of 40 billion dollars. Other nations are devoting a large share of their national effort to our mutual defense.

Never before in history have we taken such measures to keep the peace. Never have the odds against an aggressor been made so clear before the attack was launched.

The Kaiser, and Hitler, when they started their great wars of aggression, believed that the United States would not come in. They counted on being able to divide the free nations and pick them off one at a time. There could be no excuse for making that mistake today.

We have the United Nations—which expresses the conscience and the collective will of the free world.

We have the Organization of American States—which is building the strength of this hemisphere.

We have the North Atlantic Treaty—which

commits all the nations of the Atlantic community to fight together against aggression.

We have unified land, sea, and air forces in Europe, under the command of General Eisenhower.

We are strengthening the free nations of the Far East and setting up collective security arrangements in the Pacific.

We are building up our defenses and the defenses of other free nations, rapidly and effectively.

Most important of all, we have shown that we will fight to resist aggression. The free nations are fighting—and winning—in Korea.

Never before has an aggressor been confronted with such a series of positive measures to keep the peace. Never before in history have there been such deterrents to the outbreak of world war.

Of course, we cannot promise that there will not be a world war. The Kremlin has it in its power to bring about such a war if it desires. It has a powerful military machine, and its rulers are absolute tyrants.

We cannot be sure what the Soviet rulers will do.

But we can put ourselves in a position to say to them: Attack—and you will have the united resources of the free nations thrown against you; attack—and you will be confronted by a war you cannot possibly win.

If we could have said that to the Kaiser, or to Hitler, or to Tojo, the history of the world would have been very different.

It hasn't been easy to bring the free nations together into this united effort to resist aggression. It hasn't been easy to work out these alliances, and to build up our defenses, and to hold the line against great odds and discouragement in Korea. It hasn't been easy—but it is a record of tremendous progress in man's age-old struggle for peace and security.

We have made great progress, but we are not out of danger yet.

The Kremlin is still trying to divide the free nations. The thing that the Kremlin fears most is the unity of the free world.

The rulers of the Soviet Union have been trying to split up the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty. They have been trying to sow distrust between us and other free countries. Their great objective is to strip us of our allies—to force us to "go it alone."

If they could do that, they could go ahead with their plan of taking over the world, nation by nation.

Partisan Attacks on Foreign Policy

Unfortunately, it isn't only the Kremlin that has been trying to separate us from our allies. There are some people in this country, too, who have been trying to get us to "go it alone." There are people here who have been sowing distrust of our allies

and magnifying our differences with them. Some of these people are sincere but misguided. Others are deliberately putting politics ahead of their country.

Now, I have no objection to honest political debate. That's the way things get decided in this country.

But some of the people who are trying to get us to "go it alone" aren't engaging in honest political debate. They know they couldn't win that way. So they have launched a campaign to destroy the trust and confidence of the people in their Government.

They are trying to set the people against the Government by spreading fear and slander and lies. They have attacked the integrity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have maliciously attacked General Bradley, who is one of the greatest soldiers this country ever produced. They have tried to besmirch the loyalty of General Marshall, who directed our strategy in winning the greatest war in history. They have deliberately tried to destroy Dean Acheson—one of the greatest Secretaries of State in our history.

That political smear campaign is doing this country no good. It's playing right into the hands of the Russians.

Lies, slander, mud slinging are the weapons of the totalitarians. No man of morals or ethics will use them.

It's time that smear campaign was stopped.

As far as I am concerned, there ought to be no Democrats and no Republicans in the field of foreign policy. We are all Americans, all citizens of the same great Republic. We have had a bipartisan foreign policy in this country since Pearl Harbor. I would like to keep it that way. I know a great many Republicans who want to keep it that way, too.

I say to them—this is the time, now, to show the real loyalty of the Republican Party to the great ideals on which this country is founded. Now is the time to put a stop to the sordid efforts to make political gains by stirring up fear and distrust about our foreign policy. Now is the time to say to the dividers and confusers: No political party ever got anywhere in the long run by playing fast and loose with the security of the nation in a time of great peril.

Partisan efforts to label our foreign policy as "appeasement"—to tag it as a policy of "fear" or "timidity"—point to only one thing. They point to our "going it alone," down the road to World War III.

Is it a policy of fear to bring the free nations of the world together in a great unified movement to maintain peace? Is it a policy of timidity to come to the aid of the Greeks and the Turks and the other free people who are fighting back against the Communist threat? Is it a policy of appeasement to fight armed aggression and hurl it back in Korea?

Of course it is not. Everybody with any common sense knows it is not.

And look at the alternatives these critics have to present. Here is what they say. Take a chance on spreading the conflict in Korea. Take a chance on tying up all our resources in a vast war in Asia. Take a chance on losing our allies in Europe. Take a chance the Soviet Union won't fight in the Far East. Take a chance we won't have a third world war.

They want us to play Russian roulette with the foreign policy of the United States—and with all the chambers of the pistols loaded.

That's the kind of wisdom and thinking that has been coming out of the dividers and confusers in the last few months.

That is not a policy. That is not the way to defend this country and the cause of world peace in these dangerous times. No President who has any sense of responsibility for the welfare of this great country is going to meet the grave issues of war and peace on such a foolish basis as that.

I am glad that we have had the recent hearings in the Senate on our foreign policy. These hearings have been thorough and have been conducted fairly. They have done a great deal to explain to our people the situation the world is in, and the way we are meeting it. They have demonstrated, again, that we are on the right course.

The Problem of the Future

But the important problem right now is not the past; it is the future. The world will not stand still while we examine the whole course of our foreign policy since 1941.

We are right in the middle of a great effort to build up our defenses and to check aggression. We can't go on with this effort unless the Congress enacts certain basic legislation.

Every group in the country has a vital part to play in our great effort for peace. The part of the Congress is to give the country the legislation we need to go forward. Without that, none of the rest of us can do our job.

We must have effective laws to curb inflation and to boost defense production.

We must have the appropriations needed to build up our defense forces.

We must have legislation to enable us to continue our policy of military and economic aid to our allies.

To make our Nation safe, we must have strong allies. We cannot have them unless we help other free countries to defend themselves. Time is too

short, and the danger too pressing to wait for these war-weakened countries to build up their own defenses without help from us. This aid is vital to our plans for defense, to our national security, to our hopes for peace.

Let me show you how essential it is. We all know that our Air Force is very important. But did you ever stop to think how much its effectiveness depends on our allies?

The Air Force has to have bases overseas to be in the right place to give full protection to our own country, as well as to our allies. This is a clear example of how joining with other free nations for mutual defense helps all of us.

Our allies cannot maintain and defend the necessary bases unless we give them aid. Giving aid to our allies is just as necessary as building airplanes if we are to have world peace.

Our military build-up, our development of weapons, our economic strength at home, our foreign aid programs, our efforts in the United Nations, are all parts of a whole. They are all essential to our program of peace.

There is no one weapon—no single service—no particular military or diplomatic device—that can save us by itself. All our efforts are needed.

We now have a program that is using all these elements of our national policy for the great purpose of peace. We are improving it as we go along. We are getting good results.

We must get on with the job.

We must build up our strength, but we must always keep the door open to the peaceful settlement of differences.

We are ready to join in a peaceful settlement in Korea now as we have always been. But it must be a real settlement which fully ends the aggression and restores peace and security to the area and to the gallant Korean people.

In Korea and in the rest of the world we must be ready to take any steps which truly advance us toward world peace. But we must avoid like the plague rash actions which would take unnecessary risks of world war or weak actions which would reward aggression.

We must be firm and consistent and level-headed. If we get discouraged or impatient, we can lose everything we are working for. If we carry on with faith and courage, we can succeed.

And if we succeed, we will have marked one of the most important turning points in the history of man. We will have established a firm peace for the whole world to last for years to come.

That is a goal to challenge the best that is in us. Let us move toward it resolutely with faith in God and with confidence in ourselves.

First Anniversary of Unprovoked Attack Upon the Republic of Korea

Statement by Secretary Acheson

Released to the press June 24]

A year has passed since the Communists launched their unprovoked attack upon the Republic of Korea.

As we look back over the year, there are four thoughts which come clearly to mind.

First—we think of the brave and heroic fighting men, living and dead, of 16 nations who have served under the United Nations banner. They have given us a standard of devotion by which to measure our conduct here at home.

Second—the United Nations action in Korea has been a success. Aggression has been effectively repelled. The Communists have failed to achieve their objective.

Third—an historic step forward in building an effective system of collective security has brought us closer to our goal of preventing World War III. The free nations are stronger, and more unified than a year ago.

Fourth—Korea has exposed the falsity of Communist peace propaganda. They talk of peace and plan for war. The free world has shown that it is not deceived by this.

These thoughts are before us as we face the task ahead. The task is difficult, but our success is so crucial to the hopes of all mankind that we must and shall persevere in our efforts to build world peace.

STATEMENT BY JOHN J. MUCCIO AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO KOREA

[Released to the press on June 25 at Pusan]

One year ago today the people of the Republic of Korea were—without warning—faced by an aggressive and unprovoked attack by the Communist North Korean forces. The enemy leaders expected an easy and quick victory. They were wrong. The people of the Republic of Korea rallied to the support of their Government and to the defense of their country. Undaunted by superior numbers, arms, and equipment, Republic of Korea armed forces resisted gallantly. Meanwhile the free nations of the world, recognizing the seriousness to the peace, rallied to defend Korea against the aggressors. However, as it takes a giant steam locomotive time to build up power and speed, the United Nations required time to muster their collective strength to meet the Communist onslaught. By holding on tenaciously and courageously, the army and people of

the Republic of Korea provided this time. In a few months the aggressors were practically driven from the Korean peninsula.

At this point another Soviet satellite state entered the fray. The Chinese Communists put into the field huge numbers of troops against the United Nations and Republic of Korea forces. It was necessary to regroup and fall back in order to cope with this second Communist thrust. And once more the free nations, through the collective actions of the majority of the members of the United Nations organization, are proving that aggression is a very costly and profitless venture.

From the start of the Communist invasion of Korea, the United Nations organization has worked strenuously to discharge its responsibilities as outlined in its Charter—the maintenance of international peace and security and the achievement of international cooperation on solving international problems. To this end, an unrelenting effort has been made and will continue to be made to accomplish the objectives which the United Nations has set for itself in Korea. As recently reiterated by Secretary-General Trygve Lie these are

... to repel aggression and to restore peace and security and to make possible a united, independent, free and democratic Korea in which the Korean people, without outside interference of any kind, may settle their affairs for themselves, with such assistance in the restoration of their ravaged land and the establishment of a unified government of their own choosing as the United States can render.

The American people believe in collective security and in the ideas and purposes of the United Nations and they and their Government wholeheartedly back the United Nations' objectives in Korea. I am sure that, with the continued cooperation of all the nations participating in the defense of freedom in Korea, peace and stability will be secured for the Korean people.

Letters of Credence

Cambodia

The newly appointed Minister of Cambodia, Nong Kimny, presented his credentials to the President on June 20, 1951. For a text of the Minister's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 531 of June 20.

Finland

The newly appointed Minister of Finland, Johan Albert Nykopp, presented his credentials to the President on June 20, 1951. For a text of the Minister's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 530 of June 20.

Some Reflections on Russian-American Relations

by Foy D. Kohler

Chief, International Broadcasting Division¹

Whatever trend events may take in the world, or even within the Soviet Union or in the United States, the relations between these two great nations will be the major theme of the history of at least the next 100 years. These relations will affect the lives not only of every American citizen but also of every inhabitant of the globe.

Most of the inhabitants of that globe are already looking to America for the leadership which corresponds to our power. Only by providing education and training—and that on an ever-increasing scale—can we prepare ourselves to meet the responsibilities they place upon us.

Now, within the context of these remarks and at a considerable risk of oversimplification, I should like to suggest what I consider to be a couple of basic considerations connected with this subject of Russian-American relations.

Inevitability of Revolution in Soviet Union

I have tried to follow developments in the Soviet Union for some years, as well as my various operational assignments would allow. I lived there for nearly 3 years, from 1947 through 1949. I believe the strongest conviction that has come out of this experience for me—and one I share with many colleagues—is the conviction that a Russian political and social revolution is absolutely inevitable. I hasten to add that I should not like to predict whether that revolution will take place in 5 years, or in 25 years, or only after a hundred years. I would add also that the result of that revolution will not be the sudden flowering in the Soviet Union of the real democracy we know, or of our free enterprise economic system.

The Russians and the other peoples living in the Soviet Union have been subjected to long conditioning in tyranny and despotism. Today's observer in the Soviet Union is frequently utterly discouraged by the apparent political apathy of the Soviet population and manifestations of un-

critical acquiescence in the regime's totalitarian controls and manipulation of the populace toward its own power ends. But, in the long view, the clock of civilization cannot be turned back and held back successfully for any great length of time. The contrast between conditions during the reign of Nicholas the First—so cogently described by the Marquis de Custine and so unhappily applicable to the Stalinist regime today—and the great forward surge of Russian civilization after 1860 vividly illustrates this point. Today even more than a century ago, evidence abounds of a basic disharmony between the reactionary nature of the Stalinist dictatorship and the aspirations of the Soviet peoples for a better and freer life.

The more obvious manifestations of this disharmony have been widely reported and discussed. For this reason, but not to minimize their importance, I shall not dwell on them. These include, of course, the tremendous police and informer apparatus which the Soviet regime feels obliged to maintain; the large-scale desertions from the Red army during World War II; the incarceration of many millions of Soviet citizens in slave-labor camps; and the countless controls imposed on the Soviet citizen.

I may say parenthetically that during my stay in Russia I discussed many of these things with a Russian friend and got varying responses from him. Strangely enough, the thing that impressed him most in these discussions was the question of freedom of internal movement. I was never able really to convince him that it is not only possible but entirely customary to travel anywhere in the United States and even to settle anywhere in the United States without the necessity of carrying an internal passport and securing police visas.

These major phenomena certainly indicate fear on the part of the regime and real or potential unrest on the part of the population. More significantly, they are a reflection of persisting or developing attitudes among the people; and it is these attitudes which will determine the course of events in the long run. I think it is clear that practically everyone in the Soviet Union now real-

¹ This article is based on an address made before the Russian Institute of Columbia University, New York City, on May 26.

zes he is being ruled not by revolution but by reaction. I know of no observer who has lived in the Soviet Union in recent years who has detected any evidence of a revolutionary spirit. The plan and the enthusiasm of 30 years ago have completely disappeared.

Stalin's dictatorship has overpromised and underperformed. In all major respects—equality and freedom for the individual, production for the use of the people, the withering away of the state—its performance has actually been the direct opposite of its promises. It has cried, "Wolf, wolf!" too often. The Soviet peoples have obviously lost their early faith in its pronouncements. The regime in the Kremlin is no longer capable of arousing and sustaining the people's hopes for the future. The "new Soviet society" has rapidly developed into what everyone recognizes to be an old-fashioned class society. As it goes into its second generation, class distinctions become increasingly more pronounced and class conflict increasingly likely.

Probably the most significant and hopeful phenomenon is the persistent dependence of the Russian people for spiritual nourishment on the great body of classics produced by the flowering of Russian culture during the century before the revolution and on the Western classics to which they still have access. Happily, the Soviet regime has greatly extended the range of literacy among the Russian peoples. While it has done so for its own propaganda purposes, it has thus unlocked for millions the treasures of this Russian culture. Pushkin, Lermontov, Krylov, Gogol, Belinsky, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Tolstoy—beside these great masters the regimented literary production of today falls flat indeed. Parts of this great heritage have been suppressed, it is true, but the bulk cannot be suppressed. And these great masters do not propagate the ideas of Soviet despotism. On the contrary, they offer a diet of subtle social protest and exalt the dignity of the individual. They stirred revolution once; they may well stir it again.

It is observedly true that the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and their minions receive a tremendous circulation and that they are widely read. But it is obvious that the motivation of the readers is artificial; that protective self-interest is the guide rather than honest enthusiasm. Moreover, even these works are not wholly misleading to the quick Russian intelligence. One of the most interesting papers I have read in a long time was an analysis of the Soviet social and economic system written by a young Soviet defector in purely Marxist terms. He very aptly described the draining off of the "surplus value" of Soviet production for the benefit and purposes of the Soviet elite and the operation of this system in grinding down the level of the workers.

A seeming contradiction in this general rule of the unpopularity of Soviet propaganda works as

compared with Russian classics is worth noting. Although a play exalting the glories of life of the new Soviet man on a *kolkhoz*, for example, clearly lacks box office appeal, strictly anti-American propaganda seems to be very popular. This reaction was certainly true of the first major propaganda vehicle, the film version of *Russki Vopros*, which played throughout the Soviet Union while I was there. I went to see it in an extremely crowded public theater. I was interested in the reaction of the audience. The film opened with some old newsreel shots of life in the United States during the great depression. A negro woman was shown doing her washing in a "Hooverville," in the very shadow of the great New York skyscrapers. A murmur ran throughout the audience. It was not, as you might expect, a murmur of social protest against the conditions of life being shown; the "Hooverville," in fact, very closely resembled large sections of Moscow. No, the murmur was one of awe at the quantity of clothing the negro woman was hanging on the line. There was a similar reaction to the neat-looking Long Island cottage in which the play's hero lived, and still another when a great mass meeting was portrayed in Madison Square Garden where the policy of the American Government was openly opposed. The lessons were not lost on the audience.

The Soviet citizen apparently has the same sort of reaction when he reads the modern American books available to him. Generally speaking, these are limited to works of social criticism by such authors as Theodore Dreiser, Upton Sinclair, Ernest Hemingway, Erskine Caldwell. Not only do such works give him some real glimpses of American life, but they also raise in his mind the question as to how such works could have been published in the United States if our system were in fact that pictured in Kremlin propaganda.

American Revolution Valid and Permanent

These reflections on the nature of the Stalinist dictatorship and the attitudes of the Soviet citizen lead me to the second principle point which I should like to emphasize.

The valid revolution for our time in history is the American Revolution.

I do not speak here solely in the narrow terms of our war for independence, glorious as that event was and inspiring as it should be to other peoples who are today in the stage of development that we were two centuries ago. I am referring rather to the dynamic political, social, and economic concepts which flowed from that great liberating movement and have been incorporated in our social organization. These concepts have given us what may, in truth, be called the permanent revolution.

Now, the beginning of our national life coincided with the early years of the Industrial Revolution. I think the least that we can say for Karl

Marx is that, somewhat belatedly, he described the evils of that era more graphically and more effectively than any other man. His prejudices and limitations, however, led him to the conclusion that these evils were incurable by any means other than a revolutionary upheaval. The very position of the United States in the world today is the negation of Marx' faulty analysis. We have demonstrated that monopoly can be curbed and competition and production stimulated by effective antitrust laws. We have shown that society can successfully impose decent standards for working conditions and hours of labor. We have proved that labor, free to organize, will not be ground down into increasing poverty; that, on the contrary, labor can become so powerful an element in the productive system that it must itself be subjected to restrictions on any abuse of its power. We have shown that a free society can insure a high degree of equality and investment of its funds for the general welfare through such devices as credit controls and steeply progressive income taxes. We have shown that this permanent revolution is the way to a better life for more and more of the earth's population.

I think the Kremlin leaders probably appreciate these facts better than we do. I think Lenin realized this when he wrote, many years ago, that the American Revolution was one of the epochal liberating and progressive forces in the history of the world. I think the Kremlin censors realized this when they removed Lenin's words on this subject from an article to be published in our Russian-language magazine *Amerika*. I think that Soviet propaganda which attempts to beguile and mislead the outer world shows its awareness of this truth every day. Those of us who follow that propaganda cannot fail to be struck by the fact that it relies almost exclusively on our special vocabulary. This propaganda is loaded, in its upside-down way, with such borrowed terms as democracy and peace. There is little overt appeal for Marxist revolution. Inside the Soviet Union, elaborate hoaxes are contrived in an attempt to cover the nakedness of totalitarianism with the mantle of democratic procedures. A constitution is promulgated, 90 percent of which might have been written by you or me or indeed by our founding fathers. The 10 percent—the jokers like the single party provisions—which falsifies the whole document is usually glossed over. Stupendous elections are organized, with great fanfare and reference to such Western devices as "political speeches" and the "secret ballot." As an eminent Frenchman put it: "Hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue."

Yes, I think the Kremlin is probably more aware of our great revolutionary tradition than we are ourselves. We tend to take it for granted. Sometimes worse, we tend to hide it under obsolete and misleading labels. We continue, for example, to call this dynamic system "capitalism." Thus we

evoke in the mind of others the image of the terrible conditions portrayed by Marx, or at least the conditions which go under the name of capitalism in their own countries, or indeed even the conditions which went under this name in the late years of czarist rule in Russia.

We continue to talk of "rugged individualism" as characteristic of our society. It is true that we do try to develop independence and self-reliance; but every American schoolboy learns that the first condition of liberty is that the individual's freedom ends where the other man's nose begins. We are the joiningest and cooperatingest people on earth; and we are socially disciplined like no one else, except perhaps our British cousins. Where else does a man wait for a light to change before crossing the street? Where else is merchandise left on open counters?

Let us, then, in studying the nature of Russian society not forget to study the nature of our own.

The Task Ahead

We Americans have devoted our first 175 years to developing this permanent revolution, to building up this system which provides for man's freedom in his personal life and opportunity in his individual development better than any system so far prevailing on this earth. We were able to do so because the security of the world was assured principally by others; because we were geographically remote. Suddenly we find that this situation no longer prevails. No longer are we able to preoccupy ourselves exclusively with our own development. Without having asked for it or desired it, we have had the position of world leadership thrust upon us, together with a whole range of problems with which we are little familiar and for which—it must be said—we are badly prepared. First of all, we do not have enough people with training and experience in history, geography, economics, and languages even to cope with these problems on a day-to-day basis. These are a first requirement and one which cannot be met overnight. The fact that such institutions as the Russian Institute have developed since the war shows that we are not unaware of our lack of preparedness, but even the specialists they train are not enough.

In our kind of democracy, the conduct of foreign affairs is dependent on awareness of the problems and support of the policies adopted with respect to them, on the part of the entire population. Our educational system must be geared not only to provide specialists but also to instill in millions and millions of Americans the consciousness of our position in the world and of the problems and responsibility that flow therefrom. This is a task which will take some time. Until it is accomplished, we will inevitably go through a difficult growing period and suffer many of the kind of pains we are experiencing today.

The sheltered existence which we have been

privileged to lead in the past has helped us develop a domestic system capable of solving our problems efficiently and neatly. We have still to learn that the same machinery does not exist throughout the rest of the world and that some of our new global problems are simply not susceptible of easy and rapid solution. We still have to learn that we cannot just put our money on the barrel head and take away the goods all wrapped up in a nice package.

Similarly, in our lack of knowledge of the outside world, we tend to create it in our own image; to think of others as being like ourselves. I recall that when I was in school a pacifist movement was sweeping the campuses. It was very seductive. It attracted many adherents in my student generation. It was generally assumed, I think, that if we were disarmed and unprepared and thus unprovocative we would be safe; obviously, nobody would attack such a creature, just as nobody would strike a man with glasses on. Hitler disabused us before long of this idea. But I fear the basic fallacy still persists. How many times do we hear it said with a sigh: "If only the President would sit down and talk things out with Stalin!"

Sometimes we show the reverse of this particular medal. Instead of projecting our own image on others, we fail to think of them as human beings at all, with their own very real sentiments and emotions, and historic and cultural traditions. Perhaps the best illustration of this faulty thinking, in combination with our characteristic impatience, is to be found in the small school which from time to time advocates preventive war on the Soviet Union.

Happily, such a proposal is impossible under our constitutional system, as the Kremlin well knows, but let us examine it anyway, within our present frame of reference. I think it is probably true that from a strictly military point of view we could wreak utter destruction on the Soviet Union—such destruction, in fact, as would make any menace from that quarter out of the question for possibly as much as a generation. If it were possible for a great nation to think in terms of such short-range solutions of its immediate problems, then preventive war might be a good idea. But I am afraid that those who advocate such a course have not paused to consider the fury of revenge which would thus be engendered in the Russian peoples. It would live and grow to pursue our sons and grandsons—yes, even beyond the seventh generation. All hope of ever securing the

world in which Russians and Americans might live as brothers, in peace, would be forfeit. Such a course would be a final denial of faith in our own democracy and of the moral principles for which we stand.

A basic feature of the great debate on United States policy toward China during these recent years has been the question of whether the Communist ruler of China, Mao Tse-tung, is or is not purely a puppet of the Kremlin. I think it has been amply demonstrated that for all practical purposes we must consider Mao such a Kremlin puppet and that we must guide our policy accordingly for the presently foreseeable future. But if we take a really long view, I believe we must conclude that it is unthinkable that the Chinese people, over any extended period of time, would be satisfied to remain slaves and victims of a foreign regime. Eventually that people will insist on coming into its own. Indeed, as we look further around the world, we must realize that many factors will inevitably work toward a better distribution and equilibrium of power among the various peoples who inhabit the earth, and a lessening of the dangerous polarization of world power between the United States and the U.S.S.R., Germany, and Japan are on their way toward regaining their position in international society; new and potentially powerful nations are arising in the East. None of these will be denied, but if we do the wise and right things, we can beneficially influence the direction of their development.

Meanwhile, we are experimenting with a world organization. In the 5 short years since the war, the United Nations has already progressed much further than the League did in the 20 years of its existence. It has, in fact, already cleared some of the obstacles which wrecked that organization. We are impatient because it will not solve all of our new problems at once. But if we pause to survey its short history against the deep background of historical perspective, then we can indeed take heart.

There will be many and even greater debates than that now taking place before we, as a people, achieve enough patience and knowledge and understanding worthily to play the leading role thrust upon us. I have tried to suggest to you the nature of some of the problems we shall face, and a few guiding lines I think might help in their solution. They are the most challenging problems which have faced any American generation since the days of our founding fathers.

U.S. Answers Czechoslovak Charges of Border Violations and False Broadcasts

[Released to the press July 20]

The following is the text of a note sent by the American Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 19, and released to the press at Prague today, in reply to the Czechoslovak Government's note of May 21 making various charges against the United States with reference to border violations, broadcasts, and other matters:

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with reference to the Ministry's note of May 21, 1951, concerning the question of border violations, certain broadcasts in Czech and Slovak languages, and related matters, has the honor, pursuant to instructions of the United States Government, to make the following reply:

With respect to the charges of violations of the border between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany by United States military personnel, the Ministry's note states that on May 4, at 6 or 7 a. m., military personnel in two autos crossed the Czechoslovak frontier between frontier markers 22 and 23, drove around frontier barriers on both sides of the frontier, studied frontier installations, used field glasses and photographed certain objects.

The Embassy informs the Ministry that the United States Government does not condone any violation of the Czechoslovak frontier by members of its armed forces whether on the ground or in the air.

An investigation of the incident referred to in the Ministry's note has been made. The results of this investigation indicate that the crossing of the Czechoslovak frontier by American military personnel at the place indicated did in fact take place and that it was unintentional and inadvertent. The American military personnel in question entered Czechoslovak territory to the maximum depth of 95 yards and remained there approximately 5 minutes.

The report received by the Ministry is inaccurate in two respects: Members of the American patrol, which numbered six men, took no photographs; furthermore, they drove around one road barrier but not two, as they stopped before reaching the second barrier.

The explanation of this unwitting crossing of the Czechoslovak frontier appears to be that all members of the patrol, including the leader, were

unfamiliar with this segment of the frontier and were carrying out their first patrol in this area. Furthermore, there was no sign indicating the presence of the border which led the patrol leader to assume that the second barrier marked the international boundary. He, as well as members of his patrol, failed to see the unpainted border stones in line with the first barrier. No member of this patrol realized he had been in Czechoslovakia until so informed later by the investigating officer.

Although the border crossing was unintentional, the investigating officer has recommended that disciplinary action be taken against the patrol leader on the grounds that his failure to make reconnaissance before passing the first barrier constituted a failure to exercise good judgment.

The Embassy assures the Ministry that all possible steps are being taken by the appropriate United States authorities to prevent the recurrence of such an incident.

As stated, the United States Government does not tolerate any violation of the Czechoslovak frontier by members of its armed forces and by the same token will not tolerate the violation of the United States Zone of Germany by Czechoslovak personnel. In this connection the United States Government calls the attention of the Czechoslovak Government to two recent violations in which armed members of the Czechoslovak armed forces crossed the border. On May 24 from approximately 0930 to 1000 hours six Czechoslovak soldiers were illegally within the United States Zone of Germany at the Regnitz River east of Hof in the American area. Furthermore one of these soldiers threatened a German national, Margarete Rausch, with a machine-pistol while within the United States Zone of Germany.

At approximately 0930 May 24 two Czechoslovak soldiers dismounted from vehicles in Czechoslovakia, crossed the border and the Regnitz River and penetrated into the territory of the United States Zone of Germany to the depth of approximately 35 yards. The soldiers told Mrs. Rausch that she had been cutting grass in Czechoslovakia and must return with them. Despite her insistence that at no time had she been in Czechoslovakia, one of the soldiers pushed a machine-pistol into her back and forced her to return across

a stream to a place, likewise in Germany, where she had been working. Four more Czechoslovak soldiers joined the group and laughed when she told them they were all standing in Germany. Her husband, Max Rausch, came up and also told the soldiers they were in Germany. During the course of this conversation a seventh Czechoslovak soldier, presumably the one in command, remained in Czechoslovak territory near one of the border markers and finally signalled to the six soldiers who thereupon left the United States Zone.

The American military authorities were immediately notified of this violation of the United States Zone of Germany and on the same morning (May 24) undertook an investigation. The investigating officer and a sergeant while standing at the spot in Germany where the Czechoslovak soldiers first intercepted Mrs. Rausch noticed two Czechoslovak soldiers partially concealed in the brush on the Czechoslovak side of the border with their weapons aimed at them. As the American soldiers started towards the Rausch house, the Czechoslovak soldiers fired two shots, apparently not aimed at the American soldiers.

From the circumstances in which this frontier violation occurred, particularly the fact that the Czechoslovak soldier who was apparently directing this operation took care to remain inside of Czechoslovakia, the Embassy is justified in drawing the conclusion that this was an intentional violation of the territory of the United States Zone of Germany.

Between 11:00 and noon on June 6 a tractor dragging logs and carrying three unarmed civilians and a member of the uniformed Czechoslovak Security Police armed with a machine pistol, was observed crossing the border twice and penetrating the United States Zone each time to a depth of 10 or 15 yards near Wies. The improvised road used by the Czechoslovak personnel was clearly in the United States Zone. After the second unauthorized entry of the armed member of the Security Police, he was apprehended by a patrol of the United States constabulary. He was returned to Czechoslovak authorities at approximately 2330 on June 7.

The United States Government considers these actions as entirely uncalled for and regards the first incident as particularly flagrant. The Ministry is requested to undertake a careful investigation to determine who was responsible for these border violations and to insure that the guilty person or persons be appropriately disciplined. The Embassy expects the Ministry to show the same diligence in informing it of the results of the investigation and in assuring it that measures to prevent recurrence have been taken, as was shown by United States authorities in connection with the incident which is the subject of the first part of this note.

As to radio broadcasts, the Czechoslovak Government asserts that the United States Govern-

ment utilizes broadcasting stations for activities hostile to Czechoslovakia and in so doing broadcasts false news and propaganda of incitement against Czechoslovakia and its people. Although the Ministry may by this reference intend to make accusations against the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe as well as purely commercial broadcasting stations, its statements on the subject appear to relate chiefly to Radio Free Europe. It should be made clear at once that the Voice of America represents a radio broadcasting organization of the United States Government while Radio Free Europe was organized and is operated by a group of private citizens. It is a division of a corporate body, the Natural Committee for a Free Europe, which is incorporated in the State of New York. More than 16 million American citizens are supporting Radio Free Europe. Thus while the American people have a direct interest in the activities of Radio Free Europe, the United States Government does not.

Since Radio Free Europe has established broadcasting stations in Germany the interest of the United States Government as an occupying power is involved but it is limited to matters concerning frequency usage and observance by Radio Free Europe of any laws and regulations of the Allied High Commission that may be applicable. Radio censorship does not exist in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and freedom of speech prevails there as in the United States. It is believed that this policy is fully in accordance with the obligations of international law.

The United States Government cannot accept the view that a responsibility exists to require the Radio Free Europe or any private American radio organization to transmit only what will please the Czechoslovak authorities. The Czechoslovak Government will doubtless appreciate that freedom of expression, whether of the press, radio, or individual utterance, constitutes a fundamental principle of American democracy, indeed of the Western democracies generally. Faithfully observing the principle of freedom of information the United States Government does not attempt to censor the American press, or nonofficial radio transmissions either from the United States or the United States Zone of Germany. It is not, therefore, possible or desirable to exercise control over these organizations in violation of the principle of freedom of information.

Nothing in this policy violates any international agreement concerning Germany, or any other international agreement to which the United States Government is a party, or is contrary to any principle of international law in connection with broadcasting activities. The United States Government, therefore, fails to find any foundation for the charges of the Czechoslovak Government in this connection. On the contrary in observing the principle of freedom of information the

(Continued on page 35)

U.S.-U.K.-French Declaration Expresses Hope For U.S.S.R. Agreement On Foreign Ministers Meeting

JOINT DECLARATION

[Released to the press June 21]

The following is the text of a joint declaration delivered by the United States, British, and French representatives this afternoon at the deputies meeting at Paris:

1. On June 15 the three western governments communicated a renewed invitation to the Soviet Government to attend a meeting of the four foreign ministers on the basis of the large measure of agreement reached at the Paris conference on an agenda and taking into account the views of the Soviet Government and the three western governments concerning the chief point in disagreement.

2. As has been fully explained by the three representatives today, the Soviet Government's reply of June 19 constitutes a rejection of this invitation since it is a reaffirmation of the position previously taken up by the Soviet Government. The experience of the deputies in resuming their meetings in accordance with the proposal made in the Soviet note of June 4 shows that the continuation of this discussion has no practical utility.

3. The invitation to the Soviet Government for a meeting of the four foreign ministers, in accordance either with the notes of the three western governments of May 31 or those of June 15, 1951, remains open and the three governments express the hope that the Soviet Government, after further consideration, will find it possible to transmit through the diplomatic channel its acceptance of this invitation. In this case, if necessary, representatives of the four governments could meet immediately in order to settle the date and other detailed arrangements for the meeting of ministers.

STATEMENT BY PHILIP C. JESSUP AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE¹

The United States Government has examined the note of the Soviet Government dated June 20. It regrets to find that this note instead of indicating the willingness of the Soviet Government to accept the invitation to attend a meeting of the four foreign ministers in fact rejects that invita-

tion. In contrast to the attitude of the Governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom which, as they have stated in their notes of June 15, are ready to have the ministers proceed to their task of seeking to reduce the existing tensions in Europe, the Soviet Government still persists in raising obstacles to prevent such a meeting from taking place.

It is necessary to review the situation that has been created by the attitude of the Soviet representative in the 73 meetings which have been held in Paris since the fifth of March.

The purpose of this preliminary meeting of deputies was to draw up an agenda for a meeting of the four foreign ministers. From the outset, the representatives of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have tried to secure a simple listing of headings which would identify the problems to be discussed by the ministers. The Soviet representative, on the other hand, throughout the meetings has endeavored to draft the agenda in such a way as to prejudice the issues which the ministers would discuss or to advance some propaganda theme of the Soviet Government. The three representatives have refused to permit the discussion of drafting the agenda to be distorted in this way to serve the purposes of the Soviet Union. They have repeatedly pointed out the true nature of the task for which the Paris meeting was convoked. They have stated frankly that this preliminary meeting was not the place at which governmental decisions on questions of policy were to be made.

Since it became apparent that the Soviet representative was not willing to cooperate in bringing to a conclusion the preparatory work in Paris, the Government of the United States, together with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, addressed communications to the Soviet Government on May 31 and on June 15. These notes contained an invitation to the Soviet Government to attend a meeting of the four foreign ministers in Washington on the basis of any one

¹ Made before an afternoon session of the Four-Power Deputies Meeting at Paris on June 21 and released to the press simultaneously at Washington.

of several alternatives among which the Soviet Government was free to choose. In the note of June 15, after the Soviet rejection of the first proposal, it was proposed that the ministers should meet on the basis of the large measure of agreement already reached in Paris, the ministers taking into account the agenda known as alternative B and the exchange of notes in which the outstanding point of disagreement was set forth.

The Soviet Government has again suggested that the deputies should continue their discussion concerning the inclusion of the Soviet proposal on "Atlantic treaty and American military bases." The positions of all four delegates in regard to this proposal have been fully stated and required no further clarification. The experience of the deputies in resuming their meetings in accordance with the Soviet proposal in its note of June 4 proves that the continuance of this discussion has no practical utility and merely delays the Ministers from proceeding with their task of seeking to reduce the existing tensions in Europe.

In its note the Soviet Government asserts that it would be prepared to have its treaties of mutual assistance considered by the Foreign Ministers when they meet. The three delegates have not proposed that these treaties should be placed on the agenda. The Governments of the three Western Powers have always considered that their Foreign Ministers would be entitled to discuss the question of the Soviet treaties of mutual assistance with other countries, if they so desired, under the general clause of item I. The Soviet Foreign Minister, as has been frequently pointed out, is similarly entitled to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty. The general clause of item I in the agenda was included specifically for the purpose of permitting any of the Foreign Ministers to expound his point of view concerning the causes and effects of existing international tensions. What the three Western powers do not propose and will not do is to agree to include as a specific item on the agenda any item such as the North Atlantic Treaty or the Soviet treaties of mutual assistance, in regard to which the meeting of the four Ministers is not competent to negotiate and take action.

The allegations in the note of the Soviet Government re inequality are wholly specious. During the discussions in Paris there has been free and equal negotiation. The results embodied in the agenda alternative B do not correspond entirely either with the original proposals of the Soviet delegates or with those of the other three delegates. Adjustments have been made on both sides. It is utterly fallacious to argue that, unless every proposal of the Soviet delegate is accepted, a position of inequality is created. No such principle has ever been thought to apply to an international negotiation. On the other hand, as already pointed out, each of the four Foreign Ministers without discrimination will be able to

bring up and express his views on any question which he considers pertinent, whether it be the North Atlantic Treaty or military bases or the network of Soviet military treaties, the subversive activities of the Cominform or any other aspect of the international situation in Europe. The Western proposals provide, therefore, for complete equality of treatment of topics not suitable for specific listing on the agenda. This equal freedom, which has never been questioned, has nothing whatever to do with the drafting of the agenda or with agreement upon proceeding to a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in accordance with the invitations and suggestions of the three Western Governments.

The statement in the Soviet note, that the United States has placed any condition upon the holding of the meeting of the four Ministers, is not correct. The proposal of the United States in its note of June 15 was that without any further preliminaries whatsoever the Foreign Ministers should meet on the basis of the results already obtained at Paris. It is the Soviet Government, on the other hand, which seeks to make the meeting of the Ministers conditional upon the acceptance of an additional proposal advanced by the Soviet Government.

Why does the Soviet Government now insist on this condition to a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers? Is it for the purpose of interposing an obstacle to the holding of a meeting? Is it for the purpose of creating in some way the false impression that the Government of the United States would let the hopes and efforts of the people of 12 Allied nations to achieve security for themselves and to build their defenses become a subject for bargaining with the U.S.S.R.? The individual and collective right of self-defense is inalienable. It is not for sale to the Soviet Union. No agenda which seeks to convey a contrary impression is acceptable. The efforts under the North Atlantic Treaty to achieve security and build a defense threaten no one.

The United States Government has frequently proved and is prepared to demonstrate on any occasion that these efforts are undertaken in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and that they hold no menace of any kind for any nation that desires peace. It is not in these efforts that any cause of tension is to be found.

What then is the obstacle to holding a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers? It is not that the Soviet Union will be prevented from saying what it wishes to at the meeting; it is not that any cause or effect of existing tension, real or imagined, is precluded from the discussion; it is not that the broadest possible avenue is lacking for a consideration of proposals for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces and other important subjects. The obstacle is that the Soviet Government wishes to impose a condition which it knows is unacceptable.

It is a complete deception for the Soviet Government to pretend that there is any reason why the Foreign Ministers themselves should not proceed to meet and deal as they see fit with any questions remaining unresolved as a result of the preliminary meetings in Paris. The Foreign Ministers could have met without any such preliminary meetings taking place. It was the hope of the United States Government that the meetings would facilitate the work of the Ministers. It is the belief of the United States Government that the results already achieved at Paris would to a very large extent facilitate that work. As stated in the United States Government's note of June 15, the Ministers should be able on this basis to proceed without delay to their task of seeking to reduce the existing tensions in Europe. It is only the stubborn obstructionist attitude of the Soviet Government which prevents this work of the Ministers from going forward.

The United States Government hopes that the Soviet Government will reconsider its attitude and that its Foreign Minister will be prepared to join the other three Ministers in their effort to make a contribution to the cause of peace.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press June 21]

Today in Paris the United States, Britain, and France renewed the invitation twice extended to the Soviet Government to join in a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Washington at an early date.²

I earnestly hope that the Soviet Government will accept this invitation so that the Foreign Ministers may proceed without further delay to discuss the important problems causing trouble in Europe.

We believe that because of the stalling tactics adopted by the U.S.S.R. through 74 sessions in Paris, continued meetings of the deputies serve no useful purpose. On the contrary, further meetings there would only cause delay.

NAC Signs Treaty on Armed Forces Status

[Released to the press June 19]

The North Atlantic Council deputies at London today signed a treaty concerning the status of their military forces. The basic purpose is to define the juridical status of the forces of one North Atlantic Treaty country when stationed in the territory of another treaty country. The most

important provisions lay down the rules concerning jurisdiction of offenses, claims, customs, taxation, and immigration. In general, all persons covered by military law, whether military personnel or civilians, will come under the provisions of the agreement.

Statement by U.S. Ambassador Charles Spofford, member and chairman NAC deputies:

The agreement on the status of armed forces which the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) governments have signed today is an important addition to the structural framework of NATO. We believe we have developed a multilateral charter that provides a uniform and administratively workable basis for an orderly, consistent, and fair relationship between forces from one NAT country and any other NAT country where they may be assigned to serve.

The agreement is part of the collective defense effort and is essential for the development of the integrated force under General Eisenhower's command. It gives the governments and the military authorities simple, practical procedures for regulating a complex relationship. It guarantees the members of the armed forces adequate legal protection, and at the same time, without infringing on the authority of the military command, fully recognizes the peacetime rights and responsibilities of the civilian authorities in the host countries.

The development of collective defense in peacetime requires that forces of various countries which form part of the integrated force for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area be stationed in various other countries. They must be free to move from one country to another, in accordance with the demands of strategy and the orders of the Supreme Command. It is essential that there be uniformity of arrangements governing their status in countries other than their own and their relationship to the authorities and people of those countries. The conclusion of this agreement is an important step in our common effort to organize integrated strength adequate to keep the peace.

Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 Signed

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House June 16]

I have today signed H. R. 1612, the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. The act extends until June 12, 1953, the authority of the President to enter into reciprocal trade agreements with other countries and, in connection with these agreements, to make certain changes in United States tariff rates.

By extending this authority by an overwhelming majority, the Congress has reaffirmed its continued adherence to a program which has been a cornerstone of United States foreign policy for 17 years. Under this authority, the trade agreements program will be administered with the same spirit and the same objectives that have animated it from the beginning. Through our trade agreements with other nations, and in particular through the multilateral trade agreement known

² BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 933, and June 25, 1951, p. 1021.

s the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United States will continue its efforts with other countries to expand trade by the reduction or elimination of barriers, and thus to build up the strength of the free world.

In signing the Trade Agreements Extension Act, however, I must point out that some of the new procedural provisions are cumbersome and superfluous. Although these provisions are intended to insure that American producers will not suffer serious injury from the operation of the program, they do not materially add to the safeguards which already exist under present administrative procedures.

I am very much concerned at the fact that some of these new provisions single out particular types of products for special consideration. One of the basic principles of the trade agreements program, repeatedly enunciated in the Congress, is that the Congress should confine its legislative mandate in this field to general principles. The dangers of reverting to product-by-product legislation in the field of tariffs are obvious.

Renegotiations With Venezuela on Trade Agreement Announced

[Released to the press June 18]

During his recent visit to the United States, the Minister of Foreign Relations of Venezuela, Dr. Louis E. Gomez Ruiz, informed the Department of State that his Government considered certain provisions of the trade agreement of November 6, 1939, should be changed to conform to new conditions and that negotiations to this end should be commenced as soon as possible. Thereafter, the Venezuelan Foreign Office, in a note dated June 7, 1951, formally requested that negotiations be undertaken.

The Government of the United States is pleased to accede to the Venezuelan Government's desire to negotiate and has accordingly agreed to take the necessary steps to initiate proceedings. The usual formal notice of intention to negotiate, including notice of public hearings and the list of products imported into the United States on which United States concessions may be considered during the negotiations, will be issued at an early date.

Countries Acceding to Torquay Protocol

[Released to the press June 22]

The United States has been informed by the headquarters of the United Nations at New York

that by June 20, 1951, more than the required number—21—of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had signed the decisions agreeing to accession of Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Korea, Peru, the Republic of the Philippines, and Turkey, to the General Agreement. These countries negotiated at Torquay, England, for such accession. Under the Agreement, at least two-thirds of the existing contracting parties must agree in the case of each new country in order to permit its accession.

The newly acceding countries have until October 21, 1951, to sign the Torquay Protocol and thus become contracting parties to the Agreement.

Under the terms of the Protocol, concessions negotiated between an acceding country and other contracting parties are to be put into force 30 days after that government signs the Protocol.

Procedure for Filing War Claims With Belgium Changed

[Released to the press June 19]

American nationals seeking indemnification from the Belgian Government for war damage to private property in Belgium have, as announced on June 7, 1951, until September 2, 1951, to file their applications with the competent Belgian authorities.¹ However, the Department stated in that announcement that American nationals may file their applications with the Belgian Ministry of Reconstruction.

The American Embassy has now been informed by the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the applications should be filed with the provincial director of the War Damage Department of the province in which the damage occurred, that forms and information may be obtained from the competent provincial authorities, and that the application must be made by the claimant to the exclusion of any agency or proxy.

The addresses of the nine provincial war damage offices are as follows:

BRABANT	NAMUR
4 Place du Petit Sablon	10 Avenue de Stassart
Brussels	Namur
HAINAUT	ANTWERPEN
31 Avenue Reine Astrid	Frankrijklei, 71
Mons	Antwerpen
LIEGE	WEST-VLAANDEREN
192 Boulevard d'Avroy	August Reynaertstraat 2,
Liege	Kortrijk
LUXEMBOURG	OOST-VLAANDEREN
Clos des Seigneurs	Sint Pieters Aalststraat, 60
Neufchateau	Gent
	LIMBURG
	Koning Albertstraat, 48
	Hasselt

¹ BULLETIN of June 18, 1951, p. 987.

If the damage was sustained to property temporarily in Belgium, such as goods in transit, the application must be filed with the provincial authorities wherein the applicant is domiciled and if, in such cases, the applicant has no domicile in Belgium, the application must be filed with the Brabant Provincial War Damage authorities.

The Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs adds that claimants should apply to the competent provincial authorities without delay for (a) the forms requesting the intervention of the state, (b) the forms requesting priority, and (c) all useful information pertaining to the manner in which the intervention of the state is requested.

Point 4 Agreement With Ethiopia Signed

[Released to the press June 19]

Ethiopia and the United States on June 16 signed a technical cooperation agreement under President Truman's Point 4 program. The pact was signed at Addis Ababa by American Ambassador J. Rives Childs and Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Aklilou.

The pact just signed is a general or "umbrella" agreement under which specific projects will be set up when careful surveys of Ethiopia's needs have been made.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Point 4 Administrator, who served as agriculture adviser to the Ethiopian Emperor in the spring of 1950, welcomed the new agreement. Dr. Bennett said:

We have watched sympathetically the efforts of Emperor Haile Selassie to bring to his people a higher standard of living and improved health. Under the agreement just signed, American technicians will help in this undertaking.

When I was in Ethiopia last spring, I saw evidence of great potential development in this remarkable country. Huge sources of untapped hydroelectric power are there. These will be studied by United States and Ethiopian experts and plans will be made to harness them to development of other rich resources. I saw countless herds of cattle, a potential source of meat for Europe and of income for the Ethiopians. Yet there the cattle remain, for lack of packing plants, refrigerated cars—and the rails to run them to the seaports. Because these things are not at hand, the cattle are killed for their hides—the only exportable item. And these hides arrive at the markets in such poor condition that they bring little return, after being transported a thousand miles on muleback. Thus another of the areas where our mutual efforts will be concentrated is in that of transportation and refrigeration.

The Ethiopian Government, realizing the gravity of this situation, in September of last year negotiated two loans for a total of 7 million dollars from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This sum is to be spent in the development of the nation's highways and transportation systems. The Government, in accordance with the terms of the loans, has set up an Imperial Highway Authority, and it is with this organization that the Point 4 specialists will collaborate.

In some sections of the country health and sanitation conditions represent a serious problem. In the low-lying

tropical areas, malaria, typhus, dysentery, trachoma and tuberculosis are prevalent. Here doctors and sanitary engineers will be invaluable in teaching health education and in introducing clean water supplies to improve the living conditions and health of the worker. Crop diversification is also important with the view of providing more food and clothing for home consumption and more materials for export.

The Ethiopian Government has made formal requests for technical assistance in a rural development project in the Harar province; the establishment of an agricultural college; aid to primary and secondary schools, including the establishment of an Ethiopian-American educational service separate from the Ministry of Education in undertaking teacher training work with materials prepared in the United States and under the direction of American educators; equipping 20 secondary schools with science equipment and library books; vocational education for nurses and midwives; assistance in analyzing Ethiopian resources for new development projects; the establishment of a governmental statistical unit; land registration; livestock census; mineral surveys; the establishment of marketing grades and standards; the analysis of specific industries and fellowships for training along these lines; and a public health assistance program.

The transportation problem will be studied with the idea of building a highway between the capital city and the sea, thus ending dependence on the one French-owned railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti.

At present there are some primary and secondary schools in such principal cities as Addis Ababa, Dessie, and Jimma and government schools for Moslems also exist but there is need for sizeable expansion of the nation's education facilities. In this connection, an education program to erase illiteracy with emphasis on adult education is under consideration.

Lt. Gen. C. L. Bolte Sent on Good-will Mission to Ethiopia

On June 11, the White House announced that the President is sending Lt. Gen. Charles Lawrence Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, to Ethiopia as his personal representative. General Bolte is proceeding on a good-will mission and will present to Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, a message of friendship from the President. The Emperor has strongly supported by acts, as well as words, the principle of collective security through the United Nations.

Last summer, Ethiopia contributed \$100,000 (Ethiopian) for medical assistance for the United Nations forces in Korea. On May 6, 1951, nearly 1,200 officers and men of the Ethiopian Expeditionary Force arrived in Korea to participate, as

the Emperor stated in his address to the departing troops, in a "Crusade in defense of that very principle for which we have so long fought—freedom and respect for the freedom of others." In this connection, General Bolte is authorized to discuss with the Emperor military matters of mutual interest to the Governments of the United States and Ethiopia.

General Bolte is traveling by military aircraft and expects to arrive in Addis Ababa on June 12. The General will be accompanied by Lt. Colonels William J. Gallagher, Burton R. Brown, and Thomas R. Davis of the Army, and by Alfred E. Wellons of the State Department. General Bolte plans to depart from Addis Ababa on June 16 and return to Washington via Asmara, Eritrea; Cairo, Egypt and North Africa.

Point 4 Agreements With Libya and Eritrea Signed

Released to the press June 18]

The United States Government on June 15 concluded two Point 4 general agreements for Libya and Eritrea. Both agreements were signed at London by Ambassador Walter S. Gifford. Libya will receive 150 thousand dollars to carry on an agricultural education program and a soil and water survey. Eritrea is also sponsoring an agricultural education program and will receive 50 thousand dollars.

The agreement for Eritrea was between the United States and Great Britain. The one for Libya received the signatures of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Both Libya and Eritrea are under temporary United Nations trusteeship. The administration of Libya was entrusted by the United Nations to Great Britain and France. Great Britain is the sole temporary trustee for Eritrea.

On November 21, 1949, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution providing that Libya (composed of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan) should become an independent state not later than January 1, 1952. Libya's transition to independence is taking place under the guidance of a United Nations Commissioner, advised by a council of six nations (Egypt, France, Italy, Pakistan, Great Britain, and the United States) and four Libyan representatives. A constituent assembly has been set up to draft a national constitution as a first step toward self-government.

Since World War II, Eritrea has been administered by Great Britain. In December 1950, the United Nations General Assembly decided that Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia. This federation is scheduled to take place by September

1952. Both countries were liberated from Italian control during World War II.

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett said:

The Point 4 Program offers both peoples an opportunity of building a more stable and prosperous future for themselves. The economies of both are predominantly agricultural. Their main problem is to produce enough food for their own needs. The United States is happy to cooperate with them, under the Point 4 Program.

In Libya, there is an urgent problem of soil erosion brought about by the destructive effects of the desert winds and the overgrazing of the "island" meadows scattered through the arid land. Eritrea faces a problem of conserving its water resources for purposes of irrigation and flood control.

Point 4 Agreement With Cuba Signed

[Released to the press June 20]

A Point 4 general agreement between the Governments of Cuba and the United States was concluded in Havana today by an exchange of notes between the Cuban Ministry of State and the American Embassy.

Technical Cooperation Administrator, Henry G. Bennett, said he is particularly glad to welcome Cuba into the Point 4 family because of the friendly relations which have been maintained between the two countries ever since Cuba gained her independence. The new agreement, he said, makes it possible to continue and expand the successful experiments in the production and processing of kenaf which promise to add a major source of income to Cuba's economy. Dr. Bennett added:

Cuba has depended for years on one crop to produce most of its income and to provide employment for its rural workers. This crop, of course, is sugar cane. Cuba is the largest producer of sugar in the world today and the largest exporting country. But in the fibre, kenaf, our neighbor now has another source of agriculture income which will become increasingly important as it is developed.

Agronomists and botanists studying kenaf discovered that it grows taller and produces more fibre during the time when it is not blooming. When not exposed to more than 12½ hours of sunshine daily, the plant blooms almost constantly. Cuba, even during the rainy season, has longer days which retard the blooming and produce more fibre.

Cuba's first commercial crop of kenaf was grown in 1948 and was sold to spinners in the United States who have shown sustained interest in the fibre. In 1949 they bought almost all of the 40,000 pounds of fibre grown.

One of the major problems still facing kenaf growers is the finding of a way to efficiently extract the fibre, which grows in the bark of the stalk. Considerable progress is being made in developing a completely mechanical process but,

until that becomes a reality, growers still are forced to use machinery intended for henequen fibre or a two-process method of first stripping the bark in the field and then hauling the bark ribbons to retting tanks for removal of the fibre.

From the beginning, the work with kenaf in Cuba has been one of cooperation between technicians from the United States and Cuba as members of the Cooperative Fibre Commission, which coordinates the work. The Cuban Government provided facilities at its agriculture experiment station, including laboratories, fields, and machinery, and appropriated funds for labor, local transportation, and special equipment, while the United States Government provided the salaries, expenses, and international transportation of American technicians. Private industries in both the United States and Cuba have also made substantial contributions to the subject.

The strategy of developing a soft-fibre crop in the Western Hemisphere is apparent. American markets are large and raw materials could become scarce in crises that clog world trade.

The United States Department of Agriculture, at the request of the Cuban Government, sent an agricultural mission to Cuba in 1942. It had sent a small exploratory mission 3 years earlier. This first mission reported the potential value of kenaf and a permanent mission was dispatched to continue the studies. Joe E. Walker, of Ola, Ark., is head of the three-man party now in Cuba. He has been there since 1945.

With increased production and better methods of processing the kenaf fibre, more people will be employed and the problem of unemployment, which has faced the sugar cane workers in the off-seasons, will be relieved to some extent.

Also under a Point 4 grant, a group of 10 Cuban students will come to the United States for advanced study. Six will specialize in fibre research, animal husbandry, dairy industry, poultry husbandry, and vocational agriculture. Six will train in the field of rural education.

Other trainees will come to specialize in child health and welfare, national income accounting, in-service agricultural training, and social security and social services.

Farm Youth Delegation Commissioned as "Grass Roots Ambassadors"

[Released to the press June 20]

A delegation of 48 young Americans from farms in 33 States and Alaska were commissioned today by Francis H. Russell, Director of the Office of Public Affairs as "grass roots ambassadors." These young people are among 58 Americans who

will leave on June 27 from New York on the *SS Georgic* for a 4-months stay on farms in 22 foreign countries. Young farmers from the same countries are coming to the United States to stay on American farms this summer. The International Farm Youth Exchange program, now in its fourth year of operation, is sponsored by the Extension Service of the United States Department of Agriculture in cooperation with the Department of State. Expenses of the young delegates, who are now receiving orientation in Washington before embarking on their trip, are paid by local organizations and individuals here and abroad.

Students Receive Fulbright Scholarships for Study Abroad

On June 15, the Department of State announced awards to 643 Americans for study abroad under the terms of the Fulbright Act. Selected by the presidentially appointed Board of Foreign Scholarships, these students will spend a year of study or research in 18 countries which have signed agreements with the United States to utilize some of the foreign currencies accruing from surplus property sales for educational exchanges. This year's awards bring to a total of 1,866 the scholarships received by Americans for study abroad under the act since the beginning of its operation in 1948.

The distribution of this year's awards by country is as follows: Australia, 20; Austria, 50; Belgium, 20; Burma, 2; Egypt, 8; France, 166; Greece, 12; India, 16; Iran, 3; Italy, 101; Netherlands, 30; New Zealand, 10; Norway, 23; Pakistan, 1; Philippines, 6; Thailand, 1; Turkey, 4; United Kingdom, 170. About 100 additional awards to American students will be announced in the near future.

Competition for next year's awards was announced on May 5, 1951. Americans interested in applying for these scholarships should do so through the Fulbright advisers on their campuses, or directly to the Institute of International Education, 2 West 45th Street, New York 19, New York. The deadline for applications is October 15, 1951.

Appointment of Officers

Charles R. Burrows as Deputy Director, Office of Regional American Affairs, and alternate to the United States representative to the Council of the Organization of American States, effective May 21, 1951.

William J. Sheppard as Executive Assistant to the Director, International Security Affairs, effective June 8, 1951.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MEETINGS

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During June 1951

Actuaries, 13th International Congress of	The Hague	June 7-12
Aviation Organization, International, Civil (ICAO):		
Assembly: Fifth Session	Montreal	June 5-18
Canadian Trade Fair, Fourth International	Toronto	May 28-June 8
Food and Agriculture Organization, of the United Nations (FAO):		
Council: Twelfth Session	Rome	June 11-25
Working Party on Long-Term Program	Rome	May 28-June 9
Foreign Ministers, Council of:		
Meeting of Deputies	Paris	March 5-June 21
Journées Médicales: 25th Session	Brussels	June 9-13
Labor Organization, International (ILO):		
34th International Labor Conference	Geneva	June 6-30
Governing Body: 115th Session	Geneva	May 28-June 2
Medicine and Pharmacy, Thirteenth International Congress on		
Military	Paris	June 17-23
Statistical Institute, Inter-American:		
Committee on the 1950 Census of the Americas: Fourth Session . .	Washington	June 11-15
Committee for the Improvement of National Statistics	Geneva	June 2-8
Textile Arts and Fashion, International Exhibition of:		
Art Exhibit	Turin	April 1-June 30
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic, Employment and Development Commission	New York	May 14-June 1
Economic Commission for Europe: Sixth Session	Geneva	May 29-June 16
Economic Commission for Latin America: Fourth Session	Mexico City	May 28-June 16
Universal Postal Union:		
Executive and Liaison Committee:		
14th Session	St. Gallen	May 21-June 1
Wheat Council, International:		
Fifth Session	London	June 13-16
Women, Inter-American Commission of:		
Second Assembly	Santiago	May 30-June 14
World Health Organization (WHO):		
Executive Board: Eighth Session	Geneva	June 4-9
In Session as of June 30, 1951		
Aeronautical Exposition, 19th International	Paris	June 15-
Arts and Modern Architecture, Ninth International Exhibition of		
Decorative and Industrial	Milan	May 5-
Crystallography, International Union of:		
Second General Assembly	Stockholm	June 27-
Festival of Britain	England	May 3-
German Debts, Tripartite Commission on	London	May 24-
Materials Conference, International	Washington	February 26-
Sugar Council, International	London	June 25-
Swiss-Allied Accord, Four Power Conference on	Bern	March 5-
Telecommunication Union, International (ITU):		
International Radio Consultative Committee: Sixth Plenary As-		
sembly	Geneva	June 5-
United Nations:		
General Assembly: Fifth Regular Session	New York	September 19,
Trusteeship Council: Ninth Session	New York	1950-
International Law Commission: Third Session	Geneva	June 11-
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization		
(UNESCO):		
General Conference: Sixth Session	Paris	June 18-

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled July 1–August 31, 1951

American States, Organization of (OAS):		
Inter-American Cultural Council: First Meeting	Mexico City	September 10
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: Special Meeting . .	Mexico City	August*
Aviation Organization, International Civil (ICAO):		
Legal Committee: Eighth Session	Montreal	September 11–
Search and Rescue Division: Third Session	Montreal	September 4–
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International—and		
International Monetary Fund:		
Sixth Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors	Washington	September
Building Exhibition, "Constructa": the 25th.	Hannover	July 3–
Chemistry, International Union of Pure and Applied:		
Sixteenth General Conference	New York	September 8–
Chemistry, 12th International Congress on Pure and Applied . . .	New York and Washington .	September 8–9
		and 14–15
Chemists and Chemical Engineers, International Conclave of . . .	New York and Washington .	September 3–
Cinematographic Art, Twelfth International Festival of	Venice	August 8–
Education, 14th International Congress on Public	Geneva	July 12–
Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	August 19–
Entomology, Ninth International Congress of	Amsterdam	August 17–
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO):		
Second Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology	Igls, Austria	August 6–
Regional Meeting on Land Utilization in Tropical Areas of Asia and	Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon . . .	September 17–
the Far East.		
Geodesy and Geophysics: International Union of:		
Ninth General Assembly	Brussels	August 21–
Interparliamentary Union, XL General Assembly	Istanbul	September 6–
Izmir International Fair	Izmir, Turkey	August 20–
Labor Organization, International (ILO):		
Meeting of Committee of Experts on the Status and Conditions of		
Employment of Domestic Workers	Geneva	July 2–
Governing Body: 116th Session.	Geneva	July 2–
Lifeboat Conference, Sixth International.	Ostend	July 22–
Penal and Penitentiary Commission, Meeting of International. . .	Bern	July 2–
Physics, International Union of Pure and Applied:		
Seventh General Assembly.	Copenhagen	July 11–
Physics, Conference on Problems in Quantum	Copenhagen	July 6–
Poultry Congress, Ninth World's	Paris	August 2–
Sanitary Organization, Pan American (Paso):		
Fifth Session of the Directing Council and the Regional Committee		
of the World Health Organization.	Washington	September 24–
14th Meeting of the Executive Committee	Washington	September 20–
Survey Officers, Conference of British Commonwealth.	London	July 9–
Tariffs and Trade, Sixth Session of the Contracting Parties to the		
General Agreement on.	Geneva	September 17–
Telecommunication Union, International (ITU):		
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	August 16–
United Nations:		
Economic and Social Council:		
13th Session	Geneva	July 30–
Agenda Committee	Geneva	July 23–
Economic Committee	Geneva	July 23–
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Draft Convention Relating		
to the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons	Geneva	July 2–
Regional Conference of Non-governmental Organizations on		
United Nations Information	Indonesia	July 10–
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction	Geneva	August 1–
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization		
(UNESCO):		
Executive Board: 26th Session	Paris	July 11–
Seminar on Teaching of Visual Arts in General Education	Bristol	July 7–
Seminar on Teaching of History	Sevres	July 11–
Whaling, International Commission for the Regulation of:		
Third Meeting	Capetown	July 23–

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, June 22, 1951.

*Tentative.

THE INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS CONFERENCE

*by Willis C. Armstrong,
Acting Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy*

The industry of the world depends upon a wide range of raw materials. During the past decade, as a result of wartime and reconstruction needs, the capacity of the world to process raw materials has very greatly increased. This of course is a necessary development, if the output of finished goods is to keep pace with the growth of the world's population.

The supply of most raw materials has also increased, but in some cases it has not kept up with the increase of processing capacity, or with the great expansion of demand on the part of the economies and peoples of the world.

In times of depression, the producers of raw materials frequently experience much distress. This is because mines and plantations have relatively fixed production costs and because a collapse in demand for raw materials may mean a sharp reduction in price. This situation existed during part of the 1930's, and raw material prices and production were at a relatively low level for several years.

Military preparations in the late thirties greatly stimulated the demand for raw materials, and prices and production rose accordingly. During the war the industrial capacity of the United States increased greatly, and since the war there has been heavy expansion in the industries of other countries. This means that the world has continued to require raw materials at a rate much higher than that which prevailed before World War II.

The United States is fortunate in possessing large supplies of some of the most important agricultural and mineral raw materials. But there are many raw materials which are located pre-

The International Materials Conference is the collective title of a group of separate international commodity committees charged with reviewing the supply position for essential materials which are in short supply, or in danger of becoming so, and with recommending to governments measures for increasing supplies and insuring equitable distribution of such materials throughout the free world. The U.S., U.K., and France invited interested countries to participate in the new organization in January 1951. The first committee met at Washington on February 25. To date seven committees have been formed, with 27 countries participating. Edwin T. Gibson, Acting Administrator of the Defense Production Administration, is Chairman of the Central Group; Charles W. Jeffers is Executive Secretary.

dominantly in other parts of the world. Consequently if our industry is to flourish, we must import an ever widening range of essential supplies, primarily from Asia, Africa, and South America.

At the same time, other manufacturing countries, primarily in Western Europe, look to us as an exporter of some of the raw materials which they require for their industrial establishments. A very high level of international trade in raw materials is therefore essential if the industries of the United States and the Western European countries are to maintain their output of finished goods. Countries in other parts of the world which are primarily engaged in producing raw materials must import finished goods from Europe and the United States, especially if they are to continue and expand their production of the raw materials which we need.

The United States has the largest demand for raw materials of any of the manufacturing countries, because of our high standard of living and

the very size of our country. In addition, many countries look to us for material and financial assistance and expect to be able to buy from us the most highly developed instruments of production and capital equipment, so that they may proceed with the development of their own economies. Because we are deficient in many materials, and because we must be prepared to mobilize quickly for defense and to assist our friends in their defense, we decided several years ago to establish and maintain stockpiles of critical items. These would be available, in the event of war, to supply our industry in a full-scale war effort. Our stockpiling program thus is an additional factor in determining our general requirements for raw materials.

World War II Controls

During World War II the United States and its allies established firm controls over raw materials which originated in their territories. In addition, arrangements were made for the orderly buying of raw materials which came from other territories not under the political control of either side. Much effort and money were put into expanding the production of goods needed for the war effort, and careful arrangements were made for internal rationing of essential goods in the allied countries, and for an equitable distribution of available supplies among them. At the beginning of the war there was considerable scope for expanding the output of raw materials, and full advantage was taken of this possibility. By effective government controls, fixed prices were maintained, production was frequently subsidized, and competition in acquiring raw materials was eliminated or reduced.

After the war, most countries dropped their price controls. In cases in which there had been government buying of raw materials and government control over raw material stocks, these too were eliminated, and business went back to private hands. The whole mechanism of interallied controls and allocations was scrapped and it was assumed that such extraordinary measures were no longer necessary. Some raw material producers expected a great decline in demand, but this did not develop as they anticipated. Instead, most raw materials maintained a rather firm price level, and the world demonstrated its ability to absorb much higher quantities than was the case in the preceding decade.

In addition, major changes in the political complexion of the world led to less concentration of control over important sources of raw materials. Whereas it had been possible during World War II for a small number of countries to control large supplies of raw materials, through their control over territories in Asia and Africa, and through wartime controls over private enterprise, particularly shipping, the situation changed quite markedly. A number of countries which are primary producers of raw materials achieved political independence, and began to concern themselves with the important resources which were at their disposal and which are required by the industrial countries of North America and Europe.

Why International Cooperation?

The interdependence of the modern world is at no point illustrated more forcefully than in the case of raw materials. Europe and North America needs the goods which are produced by Indonesia, Thailand, India, Africa, and South America, if they are to maintain their industrial output and support their populations. By the same token, the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America cannot live without obtaining goods from Europe and North America. The development of new sovereign nations, particularly in Asia, means that any effort to solve problems of shortage or surplus in raw materials must be developed on a basis of genuine effective cooperation among a fairly large number of sovereign states and peoples. If such a cooperative approach is not developed, countries may tend to bargain the raw materials they possess against the raw materials and manufactured goods they need; but to do this on a narrow bilateral basis leads only to holding back supplies, reducing levels of production and standards of living, and increasing international animosity.

The free world faces a situation of danger because of the threat of aggression. In order to meet this threat, the free world must be strong enough militarily to beat off actual aggression, must be strong enough economically to provide for maintaining and improving levels of living, and must be able to accomplish all this on the basis of free and willing international cooperation. In raw materials this means that each country of the free world has a responsibility to manage its own resources and deal with other

countries in such a way that the free world obtains the most efficient use of supplies which are available. The needs of defense must be met, and so must the essential civilian needs of the peoples of the free world. No one country can accomplish this by itself, and all must work in cooperation. Instead of trading one specific commodity or resource against another, countries must trade general cooperation in all commodities for general cooperation on the part of other countries.

Korea and the Raw Materials Problem

In the summer of 1950, the raw materials markets of the world were disrupted by a rush of buying set off by the aggression in Korea. The surge in demand came in part from speculation, in part from emerging defense requirements, in part from consumers' efforts to lay in stocks against future shortages. Prices rose steadily during the summer and fall. Delivery dates lengthened. Widespread concern began to be felt among the free nations, as they saw they would no longer be able to assure themselves of deliveries of needed materials on time and at reasonable prices if conditions were allowed to go unchecked. Speculation and scare buying could be expected to subside, but because of mounting defense requirements no significant decline in demand seemed probable. Acquisition of essential goods in this sellers' market would continue to be determined by the bargaining power of consumers, without regard to the end use served. A threat was seen to the success of newly launched military production programs, the maintenance of stable economies, and the continuation of economic development programs, all objectives of paramount importance in the defense of the free world against the Soviet menace.

Throughout the fall of 1950, governments took a number of first steps to meet specific and general problems of raw materials shortages. The United States, in September, imposed export controls on cotton, to insure equitable distribution among importing countries. (The shortage in this case was due chiefly to a poor crop in the United States.) The Congress of the United States passed and the President approved the Defense Production Act of 1950, which gave the Government authority to stabilize prices and wages, allocate materials, reduce or eliminate non-essential consumption, and expand production of

scarce materials and of essential goods and services. At about the same time, the United States took the initiative in bringing together major wool-producing countries to determine whether a serious shortage was imminent, and if so, whether international allocation should be instituted. This conference was inconclusive, but it indicated how future international action on commodity problems could be planned. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) directed its commodity committees to begin comprehensive studies of the supply and demand outlook in their respective fields. The Organization of American States (OAS) evidenced a similar interest. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also began to examine the raw materials problem, as it had a bearing upon the military production programs of member nations. In November and December, initial plans were drawn by interested governments for an intergovernmental conference to study the need for international action on rubber.

These scattered efforts confirmed and emphasized the need for a standing international organization to deal promptly with commodity shortages of all types in accordance with uniform principles. They also revealed that such an organization should be built upon a broader geographic base than was provided by the OEEC, OAS, NATO, or by any other existing international organization equipped to deal with both industrial and agricultural commodity problems. The geography of raw materials is a matter of chance, with no country or area self-sufficient in the materials it needs and with each controlling some resources to which others must have access. The United States and her Western European military allies do not by any means control all of the materials that are necessary to modern industry. The United States is certainly the most fortunate country in this respect. Yet we must, for example, import all our natural rubber, from such remote areas as Malaya, Indonesia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Thailand, and Liberia; our tin from Malaya, Indonesia, and Bolivia; our industrial diamonds from the Belgian Congo and South Africa. At the same time, the United States is the major source not only of manufactured goods, but of some of the raw materials, such as cotton, sulphur, and molybdenum, which other areas must import. An organization wide enough to embrace free countries in all areas of the world was required.

Formation of the International Materials Conference

The way in which international action on raw materials could best be organized was widely discussed within and among governments throughout the fall. Guided by the results of this study and recognizing that circumstances required action without additional delay, Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman, during the former's visit to Washington in November-December 1950, reached tentative agreement upon plans for an *ad hoc* intergovernmental organization specifically designed to handle the raw materials problems of the current period. These plans were then discussed with the government of France.

On January 12, 1951, the three governments issued a joint statement reporting their agreement that:

Proposals should be made to other interested governments for the creation of a number of standing international commodity groups, representing the governments of producing and consuming countries throughout the free world which have a substantial interest in the commodities concerned. These commodity groups would consider and recommend to governments the specific action which should be taken, in the case of each commodity, in order to expand production, increase availabilities, conserve supplies, and assure the most effective distribution and utilization of supplies among consuming countries.

Early action is called for with respect to certain commodities. The Government of the United States has therefore agreed to send invitations immediately to other interested friendly governments for the establishment of certain of the standing commodity groups referred to above. Others can be created as the needs of the free world require. Also, the three governments will establish immediately in Washington a temporary Central Group to provide a servicing mechanism for the standing commodity groups. There will be early consultations with interested governments and appropriate international organizations with respect to the continuing functions and membership of the Central Group.

This was the start of the International Materials Conference.

Organization and Activities of the IMC

The temporary Central Group has now been supplanted by a group of enlarged membership that is representative of the world-wide scope of the IMC. In addition to the original members, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, representatives of Canada, Italy, India, Australia, Brazil, and of the OEEC and OAS now serve on the Central Group. This group has two principal functions: to service, although not to supervise, the work of the individual commodity committees and to issue invitations for new committees as the need is shown.

To date, seven standing committees have been formed. They are virtually autonomous bodies, free to consider any aspect of the problem of world shortages in the commodities concerned. They have no sanctions, however, and are empowered only to make recommendations to governments. No government has delegated to a committee authority to decide for it how much of the commodity it must make available or show much it shall be permitted to consume. It is the function of the committees to examine all possibilities for a better balancing of supply and demand, and it is their responsibility to devise solutions that will be acceptable to enough of the important producers and consumers of the commodity to achieve the necessary results. They are not specifically concerned with problems of price, but indirectly, through restoring order to world markets, they may be expected to make a considerable contribution to the stabilization of prices.

Membership in each committee is limited to those countries which have a substantial producing or consuming interest in the commodities concerned. In all, 27 countries are now directly represented upon one or more committees. The table shows the country participation on the committees and the Central Group as of June 20, 1951. For most commodities covered by the IMC, member countries together account for between 80 and 90 percent of production and consumption in the free world.

One of the purposes of the IMC would be nullified, however, if the opportunity to participate in the work of the committees and share in the benefits were extended only to member countries. Therefore, each committee has taken steps to protect the interests of nonmember governments in the free world. Questionnaires are circulated to these nonmember countries, just as they are to members, and the opportunity is extended to them to appear before the committees if they wish to explain their needs orally. Where allocation systems are drawn up, supplies for both nonmember and member governments will be provided on an equitable basis. The weekly reports on the progress of IMC are drafted with the information needs of nonmember governments specifically in mind and the Central Group has recently recommended that periodic restricted reports be prepared for nonmember governments. Much of the data with which the IMC deals would, if publicly

PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS CONFERENCE

Countries and organizations	Central group	Commodity Committees						
		Copper-zinc-lead	Sulphur	Cotton-cotton linters	Tungsten-molybdenum	Manganese-nickel-cobalt	Wool	Pulp-paper
Austria								X
Australia	X	X	X		X		X	X
Belgium		X	X	X		X	X	X
Bolivia					X			
Brazil	X		X	X	X	X		X
Canada	X	X	X	X		X		X
Chile		X			X			
Cuba						X		
France	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Germany, Federal Republic of		X		X	X	X	X	X
India	X			X		X		
Italy	X	X	X	X			X	X
Japan				X				
Mexico	X		X					
Netherlands								X
New Zealand			X				X	
Norway		X				X		X
Peru		X		X				
Portugal					X			
Spain					X			
Sweden					X			X
Switzerland			X					
Turkey				X				
Union of South Africa			X			X	X	
United Kingdom	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
United States	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguay							X	
Organization of American States	X							
Organization for European Economic Co-operation	X							

revealed, have an important impact on commodity markets. Therefore, until action is ready to be taken, much information regarding the work of the conference must be held on a confidential basis.

The Commodity Committees

The seven committees now operating are:

- Copper, zinc and lead
- Sulphur
- Cotton and cotton linters
- Tungsten-molybdenum
- Manganese-nickel-cobalt
- Wool
- Pulp and paper

Behind each of these committees is a story of acute shortages jeopardizing essential civilian industries or defense preparations. Each commodity covered is basic to our world today. Each is needed by countries around the world but produced in adequate quantity by comparatively few of them.

Copper, zinc, and lead are the basic nonferrous metals, used in one form or another in almost every segment of an industrial economy. Re-

armament adds a further heavy demand for these materials. Ammunition requires brass, for instance, and brass cannot be made without copper and zinc. The United States has a large domestic production but must still import one-third of its requirements. Most of the other industrialized countries also import much of their copper, lead, and zinc. For a country like Chile, which is a major source of these imports, copper mining and trade are the very foundations of the economy.

Manganese, nickel, cobalt, tungsten, and molybdenum are all steel alloying materials required to make such products as tool steel and armor plate and are thus essential to the two main aspects of the mobilization program: the retooling of industry for defense production and the manufacture of armament items. Manganese, in fact, is required for the manufacture of even the ordinary grades of steel which are needed for everything from zippers and nails to ships. The concentration of world resources in a few locations, often far removed from the points of consumption, is well illustrated by several of these metals. The United States, which accounts for one-half to three-fourths of the world's consumption of these ma-

terials, has to import all or a large part of its supplies of each, excepting molybdenum. The free world's manganese comes from India, South Africa, and Brazil; its cobalt from the Belgian Congo; its nickel from Canada and New Caledonia. The major source of tungsten has been China; new sources in such widely separated places as Portugal, Peru, Thailand, and Australia must be opened up. Of the world's resources of molybdenum, on the other hand, the United States controls close to 95 percent. Here, where we are self-sufficient, we have a responsibility for supplying others.

Sulphur has been perhaps the most troubling shortage for the largest number of countries in the current period. The uses of sulphur and its derivatives are legion. To cite a few diverse examples, the production of newsprint, rayon, phosphate fertilizers, aviation gasoline, DDT, and even such an everyday item as jello is dependent upon sulphur. There are a number of materials from which sulphur can be obtained but consumers are often not equipped to use anything but native sulphur. The United States is virtually the world's only source of native sulphur. Its product is shipped in normal times to virtually every country in the world that has any degree of industrial development.

Little need be said on the uses of cotton, wool, pulp, and paper. The sources of these commodities for deficient countries are again few and scattered. The United States supplies almost half of the cotton in world trade. The second large exporter is Egypt, which can supply extra long staple cotton which the United States itself must import. American cotton finds its way directly or indirectly to nearly every country. The bulk of raw cotton exports are to the mills of Western Europe (particularly the United Kingdom) and of Japan, but the textiles produced there are exported to markets around the world. The United States, in addition, ships substantial quantities of raw cotton to various countries in Latin America and the Far East. For wool, Australia, Argentina, New Zealand, South Africa, and Uruguay are the world's principal exporters. The United States is the world's fourth largest producer but is still a deficit area, dependent upon imports for more than two-thirds of its supplies of apparel wool and all its carpet wool. Canada, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Austria are the exporters to the free world of pulp, paper, and newsprint.

The Soviet bloc is another rich source, but one upon which the free world cannot depend in the present period. It is in part because Western European mills no longer receive their usual supplies of pulpwood and woodpulp from Eastern Europe that a shortage of pulp and paper products has developed.

There may be surprise that tin and rubber are not among the commodities dealt with by the Imc, since both are world trade items currently in short supply. Procedures for international consultation on these two commodities were already in use, however, at the time of the formation of the Imc and it was felt that there was no advantage in abandoning the approach already agreed upon.

In the 4-month period during which the Imc committees have operated, a large amount of time has necessarily been devoted to two fundamental tasks, organization and the assembly of facts concerning supplies and requirements of member and non-member countries. For only a few commodities were there existing statistics that covered any large part of the field, even on a historical basis. Therefore, questionnaires have had to be distributed to determine production and consumption requirements, past, present, and projected for the future.

Concurrently with their study of the probable supply requirements relationship, the committees have been looking into possibilities of increasing production and conserving supplies. Generally, subcommittees have been formed to deal with these problems. The two committees which deal with steel-alloying materials have a joint subcommittee of experts, to study means of reducing requirements for these materials, through improvements in metallurgical practices, changes in specifications, and increased use of substitutes and waste materials. The Sulphur Committee, within two months, made initial recommendations to Governments on measures for increasing and conserving supplies of sulphur-bearing materials.

It is already clear that in many cases the deficit will be too large to be covered by increased production and by conservation. A need for some system of international allocation in these cases is indicated. Several committees are well advanced in the development of plans for a system of distribution that will fulfill the purposes of the Imc and be acceptable to interested Governments. They have identified, as problems that must be dealt with or considered before agreement

can be reached on a method of allocation, such factors as the principles of treating stockpile requirements, definitions of defense requirements, relative priorities of various types of civilian requirements, and the possible impact of allocations upon normal trading procedures and price mechanisms.

When the Pulp and Paper Committee was formed, a newsprint shortage threatened to limit the ability of the free world's press to defend its institutions against the onslaught of Cominform and aggressor propaganda. As a first order of business therefore, the Committee created a Subcommittee on Emergency Supplies of Newsprint to investigate and provide relief to these countries. As a stopgap measure in cases which could not wait until plans for a general system of allocation are completed, the Subcommittee has recommended and the full Committee has approved two emergency allocations: 3,000 tons to France for urgent needs connected with the recent election campaign, and 9,550 tons to Greece, India, Malaya, Singapore, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia, countries which normally have no domestic newsprint production, and which were found to be in a desperately difficult position. These allocations reveal vividly, if in miniature, what useful work the Imc can do.

Thus the free world has begun to deal with the shortage problems of important raw materials on a multilateral international basis. Obviously, however, there are additional commodities which are in short supply, and problems also arise in the production and distribution of finished goods. Some of these issues can be settled effectively by bilateral negotiation or agreement, particularly in cases where only one or two countries are involved in both the importing and exporting sides; some of them can be solved by the adoption of a uniform and comprehensive policy by the country which is the major or sole exporter. In the field of manufactured goods, priorities and scheduling are important. These goods cannot be created effectively by allocation methods alone, and they are not susceptible to much multilateral treatment, because of the variety of types and the marketing procedures normally in use.

U.S. Foreign Allocations Policy

In the course of the past several months, the United States has been gathering experience in

these matters, and has been developing a general policy on the allocation of goods to other countries. The policy expresses the United States attitude toward the international negotiations in the Imc, as well as covering cases in which the United States acts unilaterally. It was issued by Charles E. Wilson, director of Defense Mobilization, on May 29, 1951, as guidance to all agencies operating under the defense mobilization program. The text follows:

The President, in his message to Congress, on May 24, 1951, outlined our basic policy to strengthen the free nations of the world.

In carrying out that policy, the following specific guides to the allocation of resources which are to be devoted by the United States to foreign needs should be followed:

(1) When there are competing requirements of similar high essentiality in terms of the over-all objective, allocations policy should attempt to satisfy such requirements according to the degree to which they will contribute to the following results:

(a) military production of the free world, and direct support for the expansion or improvement thereof;

(b) promotion of increased supplies of all materials essential to strengthening the free world, and in particular the production and acquisition of those materials required for the current mobilization effort of the United States (including military reserves and immediately necessary additions to stockpiles) and for similar mobilization efforts of nations actively associated with the United States in the defense of the free world;

(c) maintenance and necessary expansion of essential services and production facilities, and maintenance of minimum essential civilian consumption requirements, in the free nations and in areas which they control;

(d) direct progress toward reduced future dependence upon military and economic assistance from the United States;

(e) lessened dependence of the free nations upon supplies from areas or countries within the Soviet bloc;

(f) prevention of political deterioration in nations or areas essential to the combined strength of the free world.

(2) Allocations by the United States form part of a wider give-and-take among the free nations. Among the countries sharing in such allocations the principles of self-help, mutual aid, and similarly effective application of internal policies governing the allocation and use of scarce materials should prevail.

After requirements of high essentiality have been met, the inter-country allocation of remaining supplies by the United States (including allocation to American domestic consumers) should take into account the effects upon the respective civilian economies of the broad contribution of each area or country toward common defense, in direct military production or in increased political and economic strength, including the common aim of controlling inflation of world prices. Individual countries differ widely in their ability to make such contributions; the objective should be to bring about an equitable distribution of the resulting burdens and sacrifices. This objective clearly excludes any mechanical formula, or any mere leveling down to a uniform standard of lowered consumption.

The foregoing principle is admittedly difficult to apply, since standards of consumption in different areas of the world are determined by a complexity of factors, such as normal levels of real incomes, customs, cultures, and climate. But its application is of high importance for the attainment of the over-all objective of economic strength and morale in the free countries.

(3) The establishment of adequate export quotas from

the United States for materials and commodities under export control will not meet the criteria outlined above, if foreign purchasers cannot place orders or secure delivery because United States suppliers prefer to satisfy their domestic customers. Commercial channels of trade should normally be used, but exports should be assured by priorities and/or directives to producers whenever necessary. When such assistance to exports is thus given, care should be exercised that corresponding assistance for domestic orders of similar essentiality is extended, if necessary.

(4) Corresponding allocation objectives and policies

on the part of other free countries should be promoted by the United States by all practicable means; agreement on and implementation of such policies on the part of other countries is especially important to the development of adequate supplies of the materials, facilities, or services of which they control substantial portions of the total available world supply.

(5) Allocations of available supplies for abroad shall be administered in conformity with statutory and executive policy designed to prevent shipment or trans-shipment to the Soviet bloc of war-potential materials and products.

Twenty-first Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1-15, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2204
Transmitted June 19, 1951

I herewith submit report number 21 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 May, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 870-884, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

During the period of this report United Nations ground force operations consisted primarily of aggressive patrol activities in force designed to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, to determine the enemy's intentions, and to inflict maximum casualties.

On the extreme eastern front from Umyang to the coast, United Nations forces advanced 5 to 7 miles against variable resistance. Enemy forces resisted strongly in the Yonggok area, where fighting was virtually continuous, and numerous

small engagements took place in the Umyang area from 6 to 12 May, as enemy screening forces were driven north of the Choyang River. The enemy offered somewhat less vigorous resistance to United Nations advances on the Nodong sector, until 13 May. However, by 14 May, in a series of heavy attacks, the enemy had forced United Nations units to shorten their lines and to displace 12 miles southward along the east coast to the vicinity of Hupchi.

On the western and east-central fronts, enemy covering forces were driven northward 5 to 12 miles by strong United Nations combat patrols which maintained firm contact and employed close air support, artillery, and tank fire to inflict heavy enemy casualties. The most intense fighting on the western front took place in the vicinity of Koyang and Uijongbu, about 10 miles north of Seoul. On the east central front, the most intense action occurred along the Choyang River between Chunchon and Naepyong. In these holding actions, enemy covering forces consisted primarily of company and battalion-size units backed by somewhat more generous artillery and mortar support than has been experienced in previous defensive actions, indicating that the enemy has made a considerable effort to overcome his deficiency in supporting weapons. In spite of this, United Nations forces continued the attack and the line of contact at the close of the period ran generally from Suyuhyon eastward through Uijongbu to Chunchon, and thence northeast through Umyang to Hupchi.

The preponderance of enemy forces is still arrayed on the 55-mile front to the west of Chunchon, where there appear to be 12 to 14 corps, probably totalling more than 40 divisions. In

¹Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on May 25. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the nineteenth report in BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; and the twentieth in BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948.

the central portion of this sector, a dense concentration of 7 to 9 Chinese Communist forces armies is poised on a 22-mile front about 15 miles to the north and northeast of Seoul. On the 55-mile front from Chuncheon to the east, there are believed to be only four enemy corps in forward areas, of which all but one are north Korean.

In conjunction with the strong enemy build-up on the western front, there was a marked increase in vehicle sightings. An average of slightly more than 1,000 daily in April grew to more than 2,500 from 1 through 10 May. Most of the traffic was on the western routes. There was also indication of increased activity and troop movements in forward areas, some of which the enemy attempted to conceal by means of smoke screens. Despite the failure of his costly April offensive, it is probable that the enemy will soon make another attack against the United Nations forces. The main effort of such an offensive would probably be directed through the central portion of the western front.

United Nations security forces continued to seek out and destroy enemy guerrilla bands in rear areas. The fact that there were no guerrilla forays against the United Nations rear area installations during the period is a tribute to the success of these operations.

United Nations aircraft have retarded the nightly movement of enemy ground forces and supplies by increased attacks during hours of darkness. The use of flares for night observation and attack, while not new in air warfare, has been intensified many times in Korean operations. The employment of a new radar technique now permits close support attacks by medium and light bombers during periods of inclement weather or darkness with an accuracy which compares favorably with that of visual bombing. Prisoners of war tell of an increasing sense of helplessness and futility among Communist front line units which heretofore have been moving with relative freedom at night or in bad weather, and then concealing themselves during the day.

The wars most concentrated attack on enemy air installations was delivered by approximately 300 United Nations fighters and bombers on 9 May. They bombed, strafed, and rocketed the facilities and an undetermined number of aircraft on the ground at Sinuiju. Extensive destruction was inflicted, but immediate evaluation was difficult because of the many fires which cast a pall of smoke over the entire area. This attack was part of a continuing air campaign to keep enemy held Korean airfields inoperable. Close air support missions continued and powerful blows against the enemy's transportation and supply system were concentrated on western supply routes

converging on Pyongyang and on the network behind enemy front lines in central Korea.

United Nations naval forces conducted patrol and reconnaissance operations which continued to deny to the enemy the waters surrounding Korea and to safeguard the movement of United Nations shipping in those waters. During the period of this report, the Republic of Colombia frigate *Almirante Padilla* joined the United Nations fleet.

Coordinated United Nations surface ship-carrier based aircraft interdiction operations were continued against the enemy main lines of communication in northeastern Korea with highly effective results. The surface units concentrated their main efforts against road and rail crossings, tunnels and bridges in the Wonsan, Songjin, and Chongjin areas. On the west coast, United Nations carrier based aircraft interdiction operations were directed at the main highways and rail lines between Seoul and Pyongyang.

United Nations carrier based and Marine shore based aircraft furnished daily close air support to United Nations ground elements, exacting a heavy toll of damage to enemy personnel and equipment.

Naval gunfire support of United Nations ground forces was furnished by cruisers in the Seoul-Inchon area and by destroyers and cruisers on the east coast.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea, particularly in the Wonsan area and in the Chinnampo estuary. Considerable numbers of drifting mines were sighted and destroyed by United Nations forces during the period of this report.

Early in May, following the enemy's unsuccessful April offensive, an intensive campaign was launched to impress upon enemy soldiers in Korea the futility of the exorbitant sacrifice of life which their leaders have called upon them to sustain. United Nations leaflets, widely disseminated behind the lines as well as at the front, have emphasized the extremely high enemy casualty rate in the April offensive, the continuing matériel superiority of the United Nations forces, and the United Nations guarantee of humane treatment for all prisoners of war. Total dissemination of United Nations leaflets in Korea now stands at more than 388,000,000. United Nations radio broadcasts in Korean language continue to exploit United Nations constructive endeavors, provide world news, and explain the pattern of Chinese Communist aggression as related to the worldwide Communist program of aggression. Among recent program additions is a weekly quarter hour program presenting pertinent material concerning the United Nations.

U.S. Views Expressed on Staggering Problems in Somaliland

*Statement by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre
U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council*¹

During the Council's examination of this report,² I have been impressed, as I am sure other representatives here have been, by the full and forthright answers which the Special Representative, Ambassador Fornari, has given to the many questions addressed to him. He has shown a ready desire to give every assistance to the Council in its examination of this newest trust territory.

I do not feel that it is incumbent upon my delegation or indeed upon the Trusteeship Council to point out to the administering authority the nature of the staggering problems which it faces in Somaliland. The administering authority has shown that it is acutely aware of the problems of illiteracy, of the meagerness of educational facilities in the territory of nomadism, of the highly unfavorable balance of trade, and of the present inability of the people of the territory to maintain and finance their own governmental institutions—to mention only a few of the major difficulties. Similarly, the administering authority has evidenced its willingness—indeed its desire—to receive advice and assistance from any responsible quarters in its efforts to advance toward the objectives set out in the trusteeship agreement. It is in such a spirit of friendly assistance that my delegation desires to make certain observations and suggestions with regard to the present situation in the trust territory.

In the field of political advancement, my delegation welcomes the action of the administering authority in setting up at an early date the territorial council envisaged by article 4 of the Declaration of Constitutional Principles. The Trusteeship Council may wish to take note of the establishment of the territorial council and of the significant statement of the special representative that since January 1 no legislative ordinances have been promulgated without having first obtained the advice of the Territorial Council. It may

wish to express the hope that the administering authority will progressively extend legislative authority to the Territorial Council. The administering authority should also, in the view of my delegation, be encouraged to proceed with its program for the establishment of municipal councils in the trust territory, since, in these bodies, democratic government may be fostered and established in ways not possible under the existing tribal basis. Somali Youth League and the Conferenza are participating in the work of the territorial council and hope that the administering authority will continue to promote the participation of all parties which responsibly represent public opinion in the councils within the territory.

The special representative has informed the Council that since the month May 1950, there have been no cases of collective violence or disorder in Somaliland and that, in his opinion, there is no likelihood of collective violence repeating itself. Accordingly, the internal security situation in the trust territory may be regarded as "normal." My delegation feels that this constitutes a tribute to the administration. We have noted with interest consequent decisions of the administering authority to reduce substantially the Italian component of the Security Corps in Somaliland.

In the economic field, it is noted that the administration has requested from the United Nations a technical assistance mission to carry out certain studies, the results of which are intended to guide requests for assistance for specific projects. My delegation feels that every possible method of gaining economic strength for the trust territory must be explored. We should also hope that the various surveys undertaken will be integrated into a comprehensive economic survey which will provide the basis for the preparation of an over-all economic development program.

The special representative has informed the Council that about 50 percent of the sugar consumed in Somaliland is processed in the territory. He has mentioned also that sugar can be produced

¹ Made on June 14 and released to the press by the U.S. mission to the United Nations on the same date.

² U.N. doc T/902.

on a remunerative basis in Somaliland and that the construction of another factory would not only permit the full satisfaction of the internal requirements of the territory but also might permit exportation to neighboring territories. In view of the tangible benefits which would be derived from the construction of such a factory, my delegation feels that it would be to the best interests of the territory if the administering authority, failing to find private capital willing to undertake the venture, should make every effort to finance the project through its own or through international banking and development facilities.

My delegation has noted that, in its efforts to bring about a reduction in the adverse balance of trade, the administration has endeavored to find a means of increasing the amount of those few products which the territory currently exports. The special representative has informed the Council that a school designed to instruct the inhabitants in better methods of preparing hides and skins for the world market is being established and that it is anticipated that this project is expected to bring about a considerable increase in the value of this exported product. The Council will no doubt wish to take note of this project, to encourage its extension, and to be informed in due course as to its results.

My delegation has noted in the report and in the remarks of the special representative that the territory is sorely deficient in its water supply and that, as a result, agricultural and pastoral activities are curtailed in many areas. We have learned with satisfaction that the administration has already taken measures to deal with this situation and that a water survey mission is now in Somaliland.

Of particular concern to my delegation is the very high percentage of the Somaliland budget which is met by the Italian Government. We realize full well that at this early stage such generous grants are necessary for the initiation of fundamental developmental programs. It is felt, however, that the administering authority must be guided by the consciousness that in less than 10 years the territory should be in a position to meet its budgetary requirements without outside assistance. Therefore, my delegation feels that the administering authority should thoroughly explore the possibility of reducing administrative costs without impairing the quality of governmental services and also the means by which the inhabitants may bear an increasing share of the costs of their own governmental institutions.

The administering authority recognizes, as we all do, that nomadism is a fundamental problem in the territory, affecting adversely efforts to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants. However, it cannot be legislated away and I know of no high road to a rapid solution of this problem.

In the field of health, I endorse the suggestion

of my New Zealand colleague, Carl Berendsen, relating to the possible use of displaced persons as physicians in the trust territory. I hope that this may be found to be a practicable method of increasing the number of trained doctors in Somaliland. Also, with regard to the training of medical personnel, the administering authority should be urged to proceed with its plans to establish a school for the training of indigenous inhabitants as medical practitioners and nurses.

It is obvious that intensified efforts in this field (education) are particularly necessary and that such efforts are basic to advancement in all other aspects of the territory's life. We recognize with the administering authority that the problems in the educational field, as in other fields, are very great, but it is a field where increased effort and expenditure now will pay rich dividends, within the period of trusteeship, by rendering the territory more nearly self-sufficient in terms of trained manpower. We cannot but feel that the provision of about one million somolos in the 1950-51 budget for education is small in relation to the total of expenditures and in relation to the problem faced, and that the Council may wish to urge the administering authority to devote an increasing proportion of government expenditure to education.

We realize that the increase of expenditure of itself will not solve these problems. As in most of the trust territories, the fundamental need is for trained teachers. In a territory having a population of 1¼ million people, no final solution can be sought through increased recruitment of teachers from Italy. The only effective solution must lie in a greatly expanded indigenous teacher-training program. My delegation is glad to note that a start has been made in such a program. But in a territory having probably more than 200 thousand children of school age, an increase of 60 or 70 teacher-trainees is, as I am sure the administering authority recognizes, far from adequate; and my delegation feels that the Council may wish to urge the administering authority to place still greater emphasis on expanding this program.

My delegation is gratified to note the establishment of a central educational council, with substantial indigenous representation, as well as residency educational committees. We should like to express the hope that this council and these committees will form the nucleus of an increasing participation, an increasing sense of responsibility, in educational matters on the part of the indigenous inhabitants, as well as give them an opportunity to make their views felt in the development of educational policies.

A specialized aspect of the administering authority's education program which my delegation feels is particularly worthy of commendation and encouragement is the School of Political Administration. This institution derives directly, of course, from the urgent need of preparing qualified Somali administrative officials to take over

the tasks of administration in 10 years. Progress along this line must necessarily be gradual; but its high importance calls for redoubled effort.

There has been much discussion in this Council of the difficult problem of the language of instruction in the schools. My delegation does not feel prepared at this stage to pass definitive judgment. It cannot but express its concern, however, over the possible consequences of a decision, however seemingly justified at the moment by practical considerations, to omit from the languages of instruction the inhabitants' native tongue. My delegation quite appreciates the reasons for this decision and for its support by representatives of the population. It recognizes also the tentative nature of the decision. It will follow with much interest the technical studies made of the problem of reducing Somali to written form and expresses the hope that information as to any conclusions reached will be made available to the Council when it considers the next report on Somaliland. My delegation feels that the linguistic values of the indigenous culture and their importance as a unifying element in the indigenous social structure will not be overlooked by the administering authority and that they will be given due consideration before a definitive solution to the problem of language of instruction is evolved.

Charter of OAS in Operation

Statement by President Truman

[Released to the press by the White House June 16]

It has been very gratifying to me to sign the instrument of ratification of the Charter of the Organization of American States. This Charter, drawn up and signed for the 21 American Republics by their representatives at the Bogotá conference in 1948, provides the constitutional basis for Western Hemisphere unity, through consultation and joint action within the framework of the United Nations.

In the present period of world tension that unity assumes an even greater importance. Fortunately, the organization which the countries of this hemisphere have developed since 1890 has now been given a permanent structure, in this Charter, at a time when inter-American cooperation is increasingly important. The unity of the Western Hemisphere, which found its full wartime expression in the Act of Chapultepec in 1945, was reaffirmed and implemented by the Rio treaty in 1947. It was demonstrated more recently by the achievements of the Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Washington a little over 2 months ago.

The moral, material, and military strength of the Western Hemisphere is rooted in this unity in the cause of freedom. The destinies of our 21

nations are closely linked together for the security and for the well-being of our respective peoples. We are bound together by a common past and by common beliefs; we must move forward together working always in close cooperation.

The benefits of over a century of friendly association of the nations of the Western Hemisphere are today providing an example for free sovereign peoples over the world. If there ever was a time for such an example, it is now. The foundations of inter-American unity, which are mutual respect and dignity among countries of sovereign equality, are just as vital to the maintenance of world peace. This is the true meaning and significance of the policy of the good neighbor.

U.S. Ratification of OAS Charter Deposited With PAU

*Statement by Ambassador John C. Dreier
U. S. Representative on OAS Council*

[Released to the press June 19]

It has been an honor for me to deposit with the Pan American Union, on behalf of the Government of the United States, the instrument ratifying the Charter of the Organization of American States.

This instrument of ratification was signed by President Truman last Saturday. At that time the President expressed in his own words the importance which he and the Government of the United States attached to the ratification of this document which "provides the constitutional basis for Western Hemisphere unity, through consultation and joint action." Reaffirming the policy of the good neighbor, and the traditional ties which link our American countries, President Truman described the benefits of our inter-American association today as an example for the cooperation of sovereign peoples everywhere.

For me the act of deposit which I have been privileged to perform today has a personal as well as an official significance. The Charter of the Organization of American States means to me in a very real sense the cooperation of the Americas, for I had the opportunity to participate with representatives of the other American Republics in drawing up the first drafts of this Charter. Later as a delegate to the Bogotá Conference I participated in the final determination of its provisions. Every step in this process has been marked by a splendid spirit of cooperation and of devotion to the traditional principles of inter-American friendship.

It is my sincere conviction that the Organization established in this Charter will constitute a growing force in support of the peace, solidarity and cooperation of the American states.

U. S. APPOINTMENT TO TRIPARTITE COMMISSION ON GERMAN DEBTS

On June 19, the Department of State announced that the President on June 16 appointed Warren Lee Pierson, chairman of the Board of Trans-World Airlines, as the United States representative on the Tripartite Commission on German Debts with the personal rank of Ambassador. Mr. Pierson was sworn in as United States representative on the Tripartite Commission at Rome by Ambassador James C. Dunn. The Tripartite Commission was established on May 24, 1951¹ to represent the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the negotiations relative to the settlement of German prewar external debts and the claims of the three Governments against the German Federal Republic on account of postwar economic assistance.

The establishment of the Tripartite Commission on German Debts stems from the decision reached by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States at their meeting at London in May 1950 to develop a plan for the settlement of German prewar external debts. The three Foreign Ministers referred the problem to the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany which was set up at London after the May meeting. On the basis of recommendations of the Intergovernmental Study Group, the Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in New York at the Waldorf-Astoria during September 1950, agreed upon the principles and scope of the settlement plan, stating that it would be in the interest of the reestablishment of normal economic relations between the German Federal Republic and other countries to work out such a plan as soon as possible. The Government of the German Federal Republic has in turn expressed its desire to resume payments on the German external debt and has agreed to cooperate in the working out of the settlement plan. It is recognized by the Governments concerned that the plan should take into account the general economic position of the German Federal Republic and should be subject to revision as soon as Germany is reunited and a final peace settlement becomes possible.

In his assignment as the United States representative on the Tripartite Commission on German Debts, Mr. Pierson will be concerned with the largest international debt problem which has arisen since the end of World War II. The settlement plan will deal with the liability of the Federal Republic on the prewar external debt of the German Government, including the Dawes and Young Loans. It will also deal with the prewar external debts of states, municipalities, corporations, and individuals located in the German Federal Republic. The latter involves in the neighborhood of 100 issues of foreign currency bonds which were floated during the 1920's, as

well as commercial and bank debts, including those involved in the Hoover moratorium. These obligations are held principally in the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland, and Sweden. In addition, some 15 other countries hold lesser amounts. While it has not been possible to determine the exact amount of debts outstanding, estimates range from the equivalent of 1 billion dollars to 2 billion dollars, exclusive of interest.

The Tripartite Commission on German Debts will also deal with the settlement of the claims of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France against the German Federal Republic arising out of postwar economic assistance.

U.S. Answers Charges—Continued from page 13

United States Government considers that it is faithfully adhering to principles generally recognized among nations. If the Czechoslovak Government refers in this accusation to the use of wave lengths by Radio Free Europe allocated in accordance with the "Copenhagen Plan" it should be noted that neither the United States Government nor the United States authorities in Germany were signatories to the Copenhagen agreement and that it is in no way binding upon them. It should also be noted that even some of the countries which signed this agreement have deviated from its frequency assignments.

Objection is found by the Czechoslovak Government to the employment by Radio Free Europe of those persons described in the Ministry's note as "traitors of the Czechoslovak people from the ranks of the mercenary Czechoslovak emigration." These men are generally recognized by the world as political refugees simply desiring a free and democratic government. Moreover whom the Radio Free Europe employs seems an irrelevant matter clearly not appropriate for consideration by the Czechoslovak Government, as it is not by the United States Government.

The Ministry's note finally refers to a regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany dated February 10, 1951, allegedly on the treatment of persons claiming to be agents of the Western occupation powers upon entering the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States Government is not aware that any such notice had been officially promulgated by the Federal Republic of Germany on a matter presumably directed exclusively to its own administrative officials and, before considering the question further, would be greatly interested in receiving a copy of the document in the possession of the Czechoslovak authorities together with an explanation of how it was acquired and what means the Czechoslovak Government has established in Western Germany for the gathering of such matter.

¹ BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 901.

THE DEPARTMENT

Establishment of Psychological Strategy Board

[Released to the press by the White House June 20]

Following is the directive of the President establishing the Psychological Strategy Board:

DIRECTIVE TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

It is the purpose of this directive to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct, within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations.

There is hereby established a Psychological Strategy Board responsible, within the purposes and terms of this directive, for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

The Board will report to the National Security Council on the Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned.

The Board shall be composed of:

a. The Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, or, in their absence, their appropriate designees;

b. An appropriate representative of the head of each such other department or agency of the Government as may, from time to time, be determined by the Board.

The Board shall designate one of its members as chairman.

A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall sit with the Board as its principal military adviser in order that the Board may ensure that its objectives, policies, and programs shall be related to approved plans for military operations.

There is established under the Board, a director, who shall be designated by the President and who shall receive compensation of 16 thousand dollars per year.

The director, within the limits of funds and personnel made available by the Board for this purpose, shall organize and direct a staff to assist in carrying out his responsibilities. The director shall determine the organization and qualifications of the staff, which may include individuals employed for this purpose, including part-time experts, and/or individuals detailed from the participating departments and agencies for assignment to full-time duty or on an ad hoc task force basis. Personnel detailed for assignment to duty under the terms of this directive shall be under the control of the director, subject only to necessary personnel procedures within their respective departments and agencies.

The participating departments and agencies shall afford to the director and the staff such assistance and access to information as may be specifically requested by the director in carrying out his assigned duties.

The heads of the departments and agencies concerned shall examine into present arrangements within their departments and agencies for the conduct, direction, and coordination of psychological operations with a view toward readjusting or strengthening them if necessary to carry out the purposes of this directive.

In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Statement by Under Secretary Webb

[Released to the press June 20]

In answer to questions as to the relationship between the Psychological Strategy Board, announced today by the President, and the Interdepartmental Committee which has been working in this field under the chairmanship of Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, the following statement was issued by Under Secretary James E. Webb:

By agreement with my two colleagues on the Psychological Strategy Board, I can state it is now planned that the Interdepartmental Committee which has been serving under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs will continue in existence with responsibility for coordinating the execution of the United States foreign information programs under the name "Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee." This Committee, which has been serving in this field for the past year, includes representatives from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the Department of State.

Other activities in the Department of State will continue as presently organized under the broad guidance of the new Psychological Strategy Board announced by the President.

THE CONGRESS

Act for Food Aid to India Signed

*Statement by the President*¹

I am delighted to be able to sign this act of Congress which will make it possible for the United States to send to the people of India up to 2 million tons of food grains.

This act is an expression of the spontaneous, heartfelt desire of the American people to help the Indian people in their time of need. We are deeply grateful to divine providence that we can provide that help.

India suffered a series of terrible natural disasters last year—earthquakes, floods, droughts, and locust plagues—which seriously cut down India's food production and threatened millions of the Indian people with famine.

India has bought all the food she can with the funds she has. The United States alone is already sending India about a million, five-hundred thousand tons of food grains, much of it at reduced cost. This food is flowing toward Indian ports at the rate of 250,000 tons a month.

Under this act, we shall be able to supply India on special and easy credit terms the additional food which India needs but for which India does not now have funds available.

These shipments of food from the United States will supply nearly two-thirds of all the food which India is buying abroad to meet its emergency. These shipments will save untold millions of our fellow human beings in India from great suffering.

I note with particular satisfaction two provisions of the act. The first of these is designed to strengthen Indian-American understanding and friendship by permitting the use of 5 million dollars of the interest to be paid by India on the loan to bring a greater number of Indian students, professors, and technicians to the United States for study and to send more Americans to India.

The other provision authorizes free ocean transportation for relief supplies to India given by individuals and private organizations. This kind of help to stricken humanity is a tradition of the American people—whether to the sufferers of the great Russian famine and the victims of the Japanese earthquake in the early 20's or to the starving in Rumania in the late 40's. In India today American voluntary help is providing highly nutritional foods, vitamins, and medicines to the needy in the famine-threatened areas. The American Red Cross is forwarding supplies for

community services in cooperation with and at the request of the Indian Red Cross. CROP—the Christian Rural Overseas Program—a union of Protestant and Catholic relief agencies—is collecting gifts in kind primarily for hospitals, orphanages, and welfare centers. CARE, a federation of many voluntary organizations, is delivering packages including food, hand plows, and tools to further food production.

This collective effort of the United States Government and American voluntary agencies shows our humanitarian concern for all distressed people. In view of the great need in India, I urge that we continue and expand the voluntary aid being given by the American people through the voluntary agencies.

In signing this act, I extend the heartfelt best wishes of the American people to the people of India and express our admiration for the courage and fortitude with which the Indian Government and people are moving ahead to solve the problems thrust upon them by natural disasters.

A PROCLAMATION²

Activation and Operation of Vessels for Transportation of Supplies Under Section 5 of the India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951

WHEREAS section 5 of the India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951, approved June 15, 1951, provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, to the extent that the President, after consultation with appropriate Government officials and representatives of private shipping, finds and proclaims that private shipping is not available on reasonable terms and conditions for transportation of supplies made available under the said Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed to make certain advances to the Department of Commerce as the President shall determine, for activation and operation of vessels for such transportation under the conditions specified in the said section 5; and

WHEREAS I have consulted with appropriate Government officials and representatives of private shipping concerning the availability on reasonable terms and conditions of private shipping for transportation of supplies made available under the said Act, as required by section 5 thereof; and

WHEREAS AS A result of such consultation it appears that private shipping is not available on reasonable terms and conditions for transportation of supplies made available under the said Act; and

WHEREAS I accordingly deem it necessary and appropriate to exercise the authority set forth in section 5 of the said Act, in effectuation of the purposes of the Act:

NOW, THEREFORE, I Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including the said India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the act of August 8, 1950, c. 646, 64 Stat. 419, do find and proclaim as follows:

1. After consultation with appropriate Government officials and representatives of private shipping, I find and proclaim that private shipping is not available on reasonable terms and conditions for transportation of supplies made available under the India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951.

2. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is hereby

¹ Made on June 15 on the occasion of signing S. 672, "An Act To Furnish Emergency Food Aid to India," and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

² Proc. 2931, 16 Fed. Reg. 5969.

authorized and directed to make advances not to exceed in the aggregate \$20,000,000 to the Department of Commerce for activation and operation of vessels for such transportation, subject to the terms and conditions of the Act, and in the manner hereinafter specified.


3. The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is hereby authorized and directed to determine the amounts of such advances and the times when they may be made, subject to the limitations and provisions of section 5 of the Act, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall make advances thereunder pursuant only to such determinations by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

4. The Secretary of Commerce may place such advances in any funds or accounts available for such purposes, and, pending repayment of such advances, may place receipts from vessel operations in such funds or accounts and may use such receipts for activating and operating vessels.

5. Each officer or agency mentioned in this proclamation may issue such regulations or orders as are deemed necessary to carry out his or its functions under the provisions of the Act and this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this nineteenth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-fifth.



By the President:
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State.

PUBLIC LAW 48

AN ACT to furnish emergency food aid to India

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951".

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Administrator for Economic Cooperation is authorized and directed to provide emergency food relief assistance to India on credit terms as provided in section 111 (c) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, including payment by transfer to the United States (under such terms and in such quantities as may be agreed to between the Administrator and the Government of India) of materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies, actual or potential, in its own resources. The Administrator is directed and instructed that in his negotiations with the Government of India he shall, so far as practicable and possible, obtain for the United States the immediate and continuing transfer of substantial quantities of such materials particularly those found to be strategic and critical.

SEC. 3. For purposes of this Act the President is authorized to utilize not in excess of \$190,000,000 during the period ending June 30, 1952, of which sum (1) not less than \$100,000,000 shall be made available immediately from funds heretofore appropriated by Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress, for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended; and (2) \$90,000,000 shall be available from any balance of such funds unallotted and unobligated as of June 30, 1951: *Provided*, That if such amount unallotted

and unobligated is less than \$90,000,000 an amount equal to the difference shall be obtained from the issuance of notes in such amount by the Administrator for the Economic Cooperation Administration, who is hereby authorized and directed to issue such notes from time to time during fiscal years 1951 and 1952 for purchase by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed to purchase such notes and, in making such purchases to use, as a public debt transaction, the proceeds of any public debt issue pursuant to the Second Liberty Loan Act as amended: *And provided further*, That \$50,000,000 reserved by the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to section 1214 of Public Law 759 of the Eighty-first Congress from funds appropriated by the Act for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, shall not be available for purposes of this section.

SEC. 4. (a) Funds made available for purposes of this Act shall be used only for the purchase of food grains or equivalents in the United States.

(b) No procurement of any agricultural product within the United States for the purpose of this Act shall be made unless the Secretary of Agriculture shall find and certify that such procurement will not impair the fulfillment of the vital needs of the United States.

(c) The assistance provided under this Act shall be for the sole purpose of providing food grains, or equivalents, to meet the emergency need arising from the extraordinary sequence of flood, drought, and other conditions existing in India in 1950.

(d) The assistance provided under this Act shall be provided under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, applicable to and consistent with the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 5. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, to the extent that the President, after consultation with appropriate Government officials and representatives of private shipping, finds and proclaims that private shipping is not available on reasonable terms and conditions for transportation of supplies made available under this Act, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is authorized and directed to make advances not to exceed in the aggregate \$20,000,000 to the Department of Commerce, in such manner, at such times, and in such amounts as the President shall determine, for activation and operation of vessels for such transportation, and these advances may be placed in any funds or accounts available for such purposes, and no interest shall be charged on advances made by the Treasury to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for these purposes: *Provided*, That pursuant to agreements made between the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Department of Commerce, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation shall be repaid without interest not later than June 30, 1952, for such advances either from funds hereafter made available to the Department of Commerce for the activation and operation of vessels, or notwithstanding the provisions of any other Act, from receipts from vessel operations: *Provided further*, That pending such repayment receipts from vessel operations may be placed in such funds or accounts and used for activating and operating vessels.

SEC. 6. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Administrator for Economic Cooperation is authorized to pay ocean freight charges from United States ports to designated ports of entry in India of relief packages and supplies under the provisions of section 117 (c) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, including the relief packages and supplies of the American Red Cross. Funds now or hereafter available during the period ending June 30, 1952, for furnishing assistance under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, may be used to carry out the purposes of this section.

SEC. 7. (a) Any sums payable by the Government of India, under the interest terms agreed to between the Government of the United States and the Government of

India, on or before January 1, 1957, as interest on the principal of any debt incurred under this Act, and not to exceed a total of \$5,000,000, shall, when paid, be placed in a special deposit account in the Treasury of the United States, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, to remain available until expended. This account shall be available to the Department of State for the following uses:

(1) Studies, instruction, technical training, and other educational activities in the United States and in its Territories or possessions (A) for students, professors, other academic persons, and technicians who are citizens of India, and (B) with the approval of appropriate agencies, institutions, or organizations in India, for students, professors, other academic persons, and technicians who are citizens of the United States to participate in similar activities in India, including in both cases travel expenses, tuition, subsistence and other allowances and expenses incident to such activities; and

(2) The selection, purchase, and shipment of (A) American scientific, technical, and scholarly books and books of American literature for higher educational and research institutions of India, (B) American laboratory and technical equipment for higher education and research in India, and (C) the interchange of similar materials and equipment from India for higher education and research in the United States.

(b) Funds made available in accordance with the provisions stated above may be used to defray costs of administering the program authorized herein.

(c) Disbursements from the special deposit account shall be made by the Division of Disbursement of the Treasury Department, upon vouchers duly certified by the Secretary of State or by authorized certifying officers of the Department of State.

Approved June 15, 1951.

FIRST SHIPMENT OF GRAIN TO INDIA

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press June 20]

Yesterday, at Philadelphia, 4 days after the act to furnish Emergency Food Aid to India was signed by the President, the first shipment of grain was loaded aboard a ship destined for India. The loading ceremony was attended by the Ambassador of India, Madame Pandit, and by our Ambassador to India, Loy W. Henderson, by members of the Congress and representatives of ECA and other government agencies, as well as by private citizens who have taken an active part in bringing United States help to the people of India.

With the beginning yesterday of grain shipments under the act, the flow of United States grain to India will jump from the rate of approximately 250,000 tons a month to about 400,000 tons a month. I understand that when news reached India that United States aid was forthcoming, food rations were increased. I am gratified to know that this has now been made possible. The fact that the United States Government and private organizations are playing a leading role in assisting India to meet and overcome the danger of famine and suffering is a source of deep satisfaction.

July 2, 1951

Legislation

Fourth Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1951. S. Rept. 329, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3842] 15 pp.

Federal Wildlife Conservation Activities, 1950. Report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. S. Rept. 317, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 232 pp.

Restoration of Citizenship (Italian Elections) S. Rept. 351, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 400] 4 pp.

Granting of Permanent Residence to Certain Aliens. S. Rept. 354, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 90] 2 pp.

Amending Chapter 213 of Title 18 of the United States Code. S. Rept. 384, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2396] 2 pp.

Tensions Within the Soviet Union. S. Doc. 41, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 69 pp.

Protocol Regarding the Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar, Signed in London, August 31, 1950. Message from the President of United States transmitting a certified copy of a protocol dated in London, August 31, 1950, prolonging for 1 year after August 31, 1950, the international agreement, regarding the regulation of production and marketing of sugar, signed at London on May 6, 1937. S. Ex. 1, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 6 pp.

Study of Monopoly Power. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 82d Cong. 1st session, containing the proceedings of January 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, and February 1, 2, 5, 7, and 9, 1951. [Department of State, pp. 363-370] 916 pp.

Submerged Lands. Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 82d Cong. 1st session on S. J. Res. 20. . . . Including Conferences with Executive Departments on S. 940 . . . March 28 and April 10, 1951. [Department of State, p. 440] 525 pp.

St. Lawrence Seaway. Hearings before the Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives, 82d Congress, first session on H. J. Res. 2, H. J. Res. 3, H. J. Res. 4, H. J. Res. 15, H. J. Res. 102, H. J. Res. 122, H. J. Res. 159, and H. R. 2536 . . . Part 1, February 20-23, 26-28, March 1, 2, 5-7, 1951. 630 pp.

Military Situation in the Far East. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area. Part 1, May 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14, 1951. 724 pp.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

On June 19, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Willard L. Beaulac to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Cuba.

One June 19, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of John C. Wiley to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Panama.

The United States in the United Nations,

a weekly feature, does not appear in this issue, but will be resumed in the issue of July 9.

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The Department of State bulletin

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July 9, 1951

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Arrangements Completed for Meeting To Discuss Truce in Korea

*The following is the text of a communiqué issued by the Unified Command July 8 (Tokyo time) after the meeting between U.N. representatives and Communist officers at Kaesong:*¹

The United Nations liaison group composed of Col. A. J. Kinney, United States Air Force; Col. J. C. Murray, United States Marine Corps, and Col. Soo Young Lee, Republic of Korea Army, crossed the Imjin River by helicopter at 0900 8 July.

The party landed at Kaesong at 0922 and was conducted by jeep to the location of the meeting. The meeting was held in a conference room eighteen by fifteen feet at Kwangmun Dong, north of the center of Kaesong.

The Communist liaison group consisted of three officers: Colonel Chang, North Korean Army; Lieutenant Colonel Chai, Chinese Communist Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Kim, North Korean Army.

After exchanging credentials, the two liaison groups conferred on arrangements for the first meeting. The first meeting will be held on 10 July at the same location as the preliminary meeting.

The United Nations delegation to the first meeting will be composed as follows: Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, United States Navy; Maj. Gen. L. C. Craigie, United States Air Force; Maj. Gen. H. I. Hodes, Eighth United States Army; Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, United States Navy; Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Republic of Korea Army.

The Communist delegation to the first meeting will be composed of the following: Gen. Nam Il, North Korean Army; Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, North Korean Army; Gen. Tung Hua, Chinese Communist forces, and Gen. Hsieh Fang, Chinese Communist forces.

The negotiations were carried out without incident, and the United Nations liaison group returned by helicopter at the conclusion of the conference, landing at approximately 1640 8 July. The meeting was harmonious throughout.

Exchange of Messages Between the U.N. Commander-in-Chief And the North Korean and Chinese Communist Commanders²

[JUNE 30]

Message to the Commander in Chief, Communist Forces in Korea

As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative.

¹ This communiqué, released to the press in Tokyo, was received as the BULLETIN went to press.

² General Ridgway's messages were broadcast over the Armed Forces Radio; those of the Communist commanders, over the Peiping and Pyongyang senders. All dates are Tokyo time. For additional material, see "The United States in the United Nations," p. 78.

I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship [*Jutlandia*] in Wonsan harbor.

M. B. RIDGWAY

General, U. S. Army,

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

[JULY 2]

GENERAL RIDGWAY,
Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces:

Your statement of June 30 this year concerning peace talks has been received.

We are authorized to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace.

We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the Thirty-eighth Parallel. If you agree, our representatives are prepared to

meet your representative between July 10 and July 15, 1951.

KIM IL SUNG,
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.

PENG TEH-HUAI,
Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces.

[JULY 3]

To General KIM IL SUNG
General PENG TEH-HUAI

I have received your reply to my message of 30 June. I am prepared for my representatives to meet yours at Kaesong on July 10, or at an earlier date if your representatives complete their preparations before that date. Since agreement on armistice terms has to precede cessation of hostilities, delay in initiating the meetings and in reaching agreement will prolong the fighting and increase the losses. To insure efficient arrangement of the many details connected with the first meeting, I propose that not to exceed 3 of my liaison officers have a preliminary meeting with an equal number of yours in Kaesong on 5 July, or as soon thereafter as practicable. If you concur, my liaison officers, the senior of whom will not be above the rank of Colonel will depart Kimpo Airfield, southwest of Seoul by helicopter at 2300 GMT on 4 July (0900, 5 July, Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting, proceeding direct to Kaesong.

In the event of bad weather, these officers will proceed in a convoy of 3 unarmed 1-quarter ton trucks, commonly known as jeeps, along the main road from Seoul to Kaesong. Each vehicle will bear a large white flag. The convoy will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at about 2300 hours GMT, 4 July (0900, 5 July, Tokyo time) or at the same hour on the day agreed upon for this meeting. The convoy bearing your liaison officers to and from the meeting will be granted immunity from attack by my forces, providing you advise me of its route and schedule, and the manner by which my forces may identify it.

Your reply is requested.

M. B. RIDGWAY
*General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
United Nations Command*

[JULY 4]

General Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the U.N. Forces. Your reply of July 3 to us has been received. In order to guarantee effectively steps regarding various processes for the first conference of representatives of both sides, we agree to the despatching of (3) liaison officers by each side to hold a preparatory conference in the Kaesong area as you proposed. If you agree to our proposal for setting the date for the conference of

liaison officers as July 8, we will notify you of further business preparations for the meeting of liaison officers from both sides.

KIM IL SUNG, *Supreme Commander of Korean Peoples Armed Forces.*

PENG PE-HUAI, *Commander of the Peoples Volunteer Forces.
Pyongyang City. July 4, 1951.*

[JULY 5]

General KIM IL SUNG
General PENG TEH-HUAI

I have received your reply dated 4 July.

The date of 8 July for an initial meeting is acceptable. Reference is made to my message dated 3 July. In addition to the 3 Liaison Officers specified in that message, 2 interpreters will be sent. Positive assurance of safe conduct for this personnel is requested.

Your reply is requested.

M. B. RIDGWAY
*General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
United Nations Command.*

[JULY 6]

General RIDGWAY, *Commander in Chief of the U. N. Forces.*

We have received your second reply dated July 5. We agree to the number of liaison officers and their aides that you are sending and the time of their departure for Kaesong.

We undertake to assure their safe conduct, but for their more certain safety and to cut down the possibility of misunderstanding we suggest that they proceed to Kaesong by a convoy of jeeps.

At the same time, we inform you that our three liaison officers, one of whom is a colonel, together with two interpreters and reception personnel, will set out at 5:00 p. m. Pyongyang time on July 7 the day before the preliminary meeting from the Pyongyang area on five jeeps and five motor trucks for the Kaesong area via Sariwon and Namchonjom to prepare and take part in the preliminary meeting agreed upon by both parties.

Each motor vehicle will have a white flag set on top of it. Please take note of this information.

KIM IL SUNG, *Supreme Commander of Korean Peoples Armed Forces.*

PENG TEH-HUAI, *Commander of the Peoples Volunteer Forces.*

To General KIM IL SUNG
General PENG TEH-HUAI

I have received your message dated 6 July. I agree to your plan of movement of your Liaison Group from Pyongyang via Sariwon and Nam-

chongjom to Kaesong, leaving Pyongyang time on 7 July in 5 jeeps and 5 motor transports carrying white flags. This convoy will be immune from attack by my forces during its travel from Pyongyang to Kaesong. In addition, the area within a 5 mile radius from the center of Kaesong will be observed by me as a neutral zone from the time of arrival of your delegates in Kaesong. My delegates will proceed by helicopter or jeep as dictated by the weather. In either case they will cross the Imjin River on the Seoul-Kaesong road at 0900 Tokyo time, 8 July, and proceed to Kaesong along this route. Your assurance of safe conduct for these delegates is accepted.

M. B. RIDGWAY
General United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
United Nations Command

Developments Leading to Preliminary Truce Talk in Korea

STATEMENT CONCERNING MALIK BROADCAST OF JUNE 23¹

[Released to the press June 23]

If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are now willing to end the aggression in Korea, we are, as we have always been, ready to play our part in bringing an end to hostilities and in assuring against their resumption. But the tenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to whether this is more than propaganda. If it is more than propaganda, adequate means for discussing an end to the conflict are available.

RIDGWAY'S STATEMENT GIVEN WIDE CIRCULATION

[Released to the Press June 30]

A special Wireless Bulletin has been set up today by the State Department's International Information Program to carry throughout the world latest development and comments on General Ridgway's offer of an armistice in Korea.

¹The broadcast by Jacob A. Malik, U.S.S.R. delegate to the United Nations, was the thirteenth in the series, "Price of Peace", produced by the United Nations radio. At the conclusion of his talk, Mr. Malik said:

The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of armed conflict in Korea—could also be settled.

This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.

Can such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea.

The International Broadcasting Division, in Voice of America programs, carried the Ridgway statement in 45 languages, with heaviest emphasis on its output to Korea and China.

The statement is being stressed in each of three daily Korean language programs, which are relayed simultaneously by transmitters in Korea, Japan, Honolulu, and Manila. The Korean broadcasts are also relayed by additional transmitters in Japan at later hours.

The Chinese language service is carrying the Ridgway offer in four dialects—Mandarin, Cantonese, Amoy, and Swatow.

The special Wireless Bulletin transmission today, monitored by 66 USMC missions throughout the world, is expected to carry a round-up of U.S. editorial comment, Congressional comment, and any further news developments on the Allied Supreme Commander's offer.

U.S. SEEKS CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET DELEGATE'S STATEMENT

[Released to the press June 28]

The United States has sought in New York and in Moscow a clarification on certain aspects of the statement made by Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, on June 23.

Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko received the United States Ambassador in Moscow on June 27. In discussing Mr. Malik's statement, Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military representatives of the Unified Command and of the Korean Republic Command, on the one hand, and the military representatives of the North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units," on the other, to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Malik's statement. The armistice, Mr. Gromyko pointed out, would include a cease-fire and would be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial matters; the military representatives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption of hostilities.

Beyond the conclusion of an armistice, the Soviet Government had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement to which Mr. Malik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however, that it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subsequent special arrangements would have to be made for a political and territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik's statement.

The implications of Mr. Gromyko's observations are being studied. The Department of State is consulting with the representatives of other countries having armed forces in Korea under the Unified Command.

Defenses Against Menace of External and Internal Attack

A PROGRAM FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

*Statement by Secretary Acheson*¹

The Mutual Security Program is an essential part of the total national effort to build our national security.

I believe it represents an economical, practical, and efficient program, carefully worked out to give this country maximum security per dollar cost.

The funds requested total 8.5 billion dollars, of which 6.3 billion dollars are for military aid and 2.2 billion dollars are for economic aid. This assistance to other free nations will yield a larger and faster return in terms of our national security than we could obtain by increasing the budget for our own armed forces by the same amount. I urge you to judge the program by that test. It is the test we have applied in working it out.

This program has been developed to protect the immediate and long-term interests of the United States. The practical steps to help build strength abroad under this program are essential to our own safety and well-being, as well as to the security of our allies abroad.

This national program is part of a great effort by the free nations to rid the world of war and to make peace secure.

That is our positive goal. That is the purpose which unifies the free nations.

Weakness invites aggression. Now and in the future, strength is the precondition of peace. The free nations must be militarily strong to deter attack by the enemies of freedom. They must be politically and economically strong to support the military forces needed for defense and to defeat attempts to subvert their institutions. They must also be strong of spirit, to keep on with their efforts to bridge the present dangers and to build toward a better and a safer future.

These factors of strength—military, political, economic, and spiritual—depend on each other. That is why we have brought together in the Mu-

tual Security Program the continuing elements of our various aid programs.

This is not essentially a new program. What is new is the pulling together of economic, technical, and military assistance programs into one bill which directs all these going programs into the building of strength, adapts them for flexibility and efficiency in meeting changes in the situation, and requires the administering agencies to employ these resources in a single-purposed drive for peace and security.

I want to underline the interdependence of these different factors of strength. Military strength is important and costly, and military assistance is the largest component of the Mutual Security Program. But we have seen time and again how political and economic deterioration and loss of morale can rot the fibers of military strength. We have also seen how political and economic recovery brings an upsurge of morale and an increase of military strength.

Economic and Technical Aid Essential

While it is necessary to consider the needs of individual countries and areas separately, the relation of the parts of the program to the program as a whole should not be lost sight of. The parts interlock—between countries and areas, and within them. Frankly, what concerns me most at this time is that too narrow a view might be taken of this problem of building strength, and that economic and technical assistance might be reduced because of a failure to demonstrate or recognize how essential this aid is in underpinning military strength.

This program has been developed over a period of many months by teamwork between all the departments and agencies concerned. They had available to them a vast amount of information assembled by them here and abroad, as well as the plans and data of many international agencies in

¹ Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 26 and released to the press on the same date.

which the United States is represented—such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Inter-American Defense Board, and various United Nations agencies.

This program as it stands is the result of the screening of this material and its coordination with our own plans and programs. The judgment of our highest authorities in military, economic, and foreign affairs is that the program is needed in our own interests, that it will efficiently contribute to our own security, and that we have the means to carry it out.

The presentation of the program to your Committee will, like the preparatory work, be a teamwork job. Following me, you will hear General Marshall, Mr. Foster, General Bradley, Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Cabot. Then the political, military, economic, and administrative aspects of the program in Europe, the Near East, the Far East, and the Western Hemisphere will be presented by officials of State, Defense, and ECA, with assistance from other agencies on particular subjects of concern to them. Several witnesses from overseas will give on-the-spot reports on conditions and prospects abroad and will discuss how the program will work in their areas.

This teamwork will be carried over into the administration of the program, and will obtain a continuity of thought and of action which will result in a single-minded application of funds to promote the security of our Nation and of the free world as a whole.

We are proposing that the Mutual Security Program be administered under existing legislation, brought together and amended to further the objectives of the program. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the Economic Cooperation Act, the Act for International Development, and other assistance acts provide adequate foundation for a mutual security program. They were all designed to further the national interests and national security of our country, and they can be linked together to increase their effectiveness.

The organizational arrangements under which the program will be operated also link to the arrangements under which these Acts have been administered in the past. Using the interdepartmental International Security Affairs Committee, we intend to make use of the valuable experience gained in operations under existing legislation, and permit the new program to be carried out with minimum disruption of current operations but with maximum speed and efficiency.

The amendments proposed to the existing Acts are not many in number, but they are important. All are designed to make the application of our resources more effective in furthering mutual security.

The men who will testify in support of this program and who will be entrusted with its administration will not assert that it is a perfect program.

In a task as large and complex as this there will always be room for improvement and development, which is the reason why we seek some flexibility in the use of the funds requested.

What we are prepared to show is that requirements exceed resources; that they have been trimmed to fit our capabilities; and that funds have been requested only where there is a need, a clear opportunity, and the means to build strength. This strength is important to our own security; it could not be obtained without our aid; and it could not be matched by any use of the same funds here at home. These are the tests.

The basic idea of this program, as of our foreign policy as a whole, is that time is on our side if we make good use of it. The vast potential of the free world is adequate to the job. The Mutual Security Program is part of our effort to make the best use of the time we have, and to lead the way in using the potential of the free world to rid the world of war and make peace secure.

I would like to review with you, very briefly, the ways in which this Mutual Security Program is designed to support the basic elements of our foreign policy.

All our actions abroad, whatever form they may take, have a single purpose. That purpose is to advance the security and welfare of this country. There is no other possible justification for any policy or program. There is no other justification for asking the American taxpayer to finance any foreign policy or program.

To recognize the enlightened self-interest in these activities does not detract from the humanitarian character of some of them, nor from their contribution to the common goal of peace and security.

Strong Allied Defenses Against Aggression

Security begins at home. No foreign policy can ensure national security unless the nation has adequate defense forces. But in the world in which we live, no national defense policy can ensure security unless the nation has strong and reliable friends and allies.

We cannot afford to underestimate the importance of our friends and allies to our own security. The United States is a rich and powerful Nation. We have an energetic, courageous, and resourceful population, loyal to our institutions and ideals, and fiercely determined to defend the way of life which we have created here. The United States occupies a favorable geographical position. Its total strength, actual and potential, is perhaps greater than that of any other country in the history of mankind.

And yet no nation, including our own, is strong enough to stand alone in the modern world. Despite the great advantages with which our country has been blessed, we are not self-sufficient. Our population is limited in numbers. We are depend-

ent on other areas for many vital raw materials. The oceans which have shielded us in the past have dwindled to lakes in the sweep of modern technology. Even our unparalleled industrial establishment, mighty as it is, could not match the industrial power which would be leveled against us if a major part of the free world should be incorporated within the Soviet empire. Finally, we know that we could not continue to be the kind of a country we are, if we were to withdraw into a cave of isolation.

The great majority of our people fully understand and appreciate these facts. But we must be sobered by the realization that the men in the Kremlin are no less aware of them. They have shown this by their persistent efforts to split us off from our allies. Using a combination of political, psychological, economic, and military tactics, the Soviet rulers are out to divide and conquer. In the case of the United States particularly, their first effort appears to be to isolate us.

To put it bluntly, the Soviet Union wants to see the United States try to "go it alone." By sporadic aggression, by cautious retreat, by unending propaganda, by economic sabotage, by seizing control in one area, by playing on differences in another—by all such acts, the Kremlin seeks to produce a situation in which the United States will ultimately be pushed into a position of trying to "go it alone."

That is why, at the same time we are converting some of our potential military strength into actual military strength, our security program requires us to make sure that we have strong and reliable friends and allies.

This interlocking character of foreign policy and national defense policy was formally recognized by the Congress when it established the National Security Council. The foreign policies and programs of the United States have been adopted by the President after all the interdependent factors, domestic and foreign, political and military, have been fully considered by the members of the Council. They are continuously reviewed and, when necessary, revised; policies and programs cannot remain static in a dynamic world.

In reviewing our policy, we might begin with our own country, a center of strength in the free world, and work outward from it to the other areas affected by this program.

The supreme test of our ability to survive is our ability to win if war is forced upon us. We must be prepared for that supreme test, and preparation for it offers the best chance of avoiding it. The danger of war can be measured by the readiness or lack of readiness to meet an attack upon our vital interest. The history of recent years should teach us that a dictator does not launch an attack against a state or a coalition of states unless he can calculate that he has the power to win and hold his objectives. His calculations are sometimes wrong, as Hitler's were. But the error is

usually an error of political judgment. He thinks that the free nations are disunited, or will not unite against him, and that he can pick off his victims one or two at a time. Or he thinks they will not have the determination to resist him in his conquests.

I do not think that the rulers of the Soviet Union will make this mistake. The reaction to the attack on Korea has made it clear that the free nations will not acquiesce in a strategy of piecemeal conquest. It has reduced the likelihood of further creeping aggressions.

The determined effort by the United States and other countries to prepare for defense against aggression, preparations which have been greatly speeded up by the provocative action in Korea, can reduce the danger of general war. That danger requires, however, greatly increased preparedness before we can be confident that the strength of our defenses will be so clear as to prevent foolhardy calculations by the Soviet rulers.

The core of our national policy is a rapid development of strength in our country, and the maintenance of that strength so long as the threat continues. That is the purpose of the 60 billion dollar defense budget which the President has requested for the coming fiscal year.²

The record of our accomplishment in building strength has the most direct and significant bearing on foreign policy and the world position of this country. It heartens our friends and discourages our foes. It reenforces the means of winning through to a successful conclusion of the Korean conflict and of preventing new outbreaks of violence. It is a solid backstop for our foreign policy efforts abroad to guard the nation's security.

Let us look now at the world with which our foreign policy is concerned.

In the present state of the world, the crucial problem of war and peace centers around the challenge presented to the rest of the world by the policies of the Soviet Government.

Challenge of Russian Expansionism

Historically, the Russian State has had three great drives—to the West into Europe, to the South into the Middle East, and to the East into Asia. When it has been held in one area, it has sought opportunities in another. We have seen examples of this in the postwar period—in Czechoslovakia, Iran, China, and Korea. Historically also the Russian State has displayed considerable caution in carrying out those drives. The Russian rulers liked to bet on sure things; to be in a position to cut their losses when events showed that they had overreached themselves. They have not wanted to risk everything on a single throw of the dice.

The Politburo has acted in this same way. It has carried on and built on the imperialist tradition. What it has added consists mainly of new

² BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 883.

weapons and new tactics—the weapons of conspiracy, subversion, psychological and ideological warfare, and indirect aggression, and tactics skillfully designed to employ these weapons. It has been, given its aims and its power, cautious in its strategy. It still prefers to bet on a sure thing. Their discovery that Korea was not a sure thing was undoubtedly a great shock to the Politburo, which called for some sudden changes in their planning.

Three other aspects of Soviet policy need to be mentioned. First, Russian policy makers, Tsarist or Communist, have always taken a very long view. They think in generations where others may think in terms of a few years or a decade at most. Second, they are landminded and have a deep and abiding and, on the historical view, justified confidence in the vastness of Russia as a factor in their security. Third, the ruling power in Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules a greatly extended empire. It cannot escape the difficulties that history teaches us befall all empires.

This is the challenge our foreign policy is required to meet.

It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last 500 years from the Duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped. This means that we have to hold, if possible, against its drives wherever they may be made. To hold means to hold against armed attack; it equally means to hold against internal attack, which is the new weapon added to the Russian arsenal by the Communists.

This also means that we have to develop collective strength and the political relationships which support collective strength so as to deter Soviet drives against nations which, if they were standing alone, might fall easy prey.

Meanwhile, doing all in our power to deter and to hold, we have to proceed confidently and positively with the orderly development of our political, social, and economic institutions in the free world. If we push ahead vigorously with this part of our program, and demonstrate the superiority of the free way of life, we shall be able to face the future with confidence. Although we cannot predict the final outcome of this conflict, we can be confident that free societies can out-build, out-produce, and out-last societies based on tyranny and oppression.

The strength of the free nations is potentially so much greater than that of the Soviet Union that it would be folly for all our nations to invite war by leaving this potential of strength undeveloped and unorganized. The free world includes over two-thirds of the total population of the earth. The free world encompasses nearly three-quarters of the world's land area. The total productivity of the free world is many times that of the Soviet Empire. And, most importantly, the free world has resources of mind and spirit incal-

culably greater than those under the totalitarian control of the Kremlin.

The countries and the regions of the free world are interdependent, and if there can be created unity of purpose, resolution to meet the present danger, and the great strength that can come from mutual security efforts—and this is what we are now doing—then the threat that faces us can be reduced to manageable proportions. Our United States policies are aimed at helping to bring about these conditions.

Collective Security in the Americas

Let us take the situation in the Western Hemisphere.

No one should misinterpret our interest in the defensibility of the Americas. They are a vital base area for the free world's effort to achieve collective security. It is the part of prudence and sound strategy to ensure the defense of this base and to develop its potential.

We are blessed with good neighbors to the north and south. Our relations with them are so close and are based on such deep common interests and shared experience that our energies can be devoted to working cooperatively on such problems as arise. This is a unique and highly advantageous situation.

The American states have long been engaged in developing a set of international relationships which are a model of what is possible when states approach their problems with firm respect for and trust in each other and with determination that adjustments of difficulties should be accomplished by peaceful means. This did not just happen. It is not just an historical accident. It should not be taken for granted. It is the result of good will, patience, fair dealing, and hard work. Our foreign policy toward our neighbors in the Americas is to develop and strengthen these relationships so that the Western Hemisphere shall have the security which will enable all of us to pursue our national ideals and purposes free from external and internal threats.

Canada is a partner with us in the North Atlantic Treaty, is associated with us in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and has sent forces to Korea. She has been, along with us, a large provider of aid to our European allies in the postwar years. She is a bulwark of strength to the north.

We and our neighbors to the south are members of the Organization of American States. That organization has a history extending back over 6 decades and is founded on common interests which were recognized far earlier. The ties of cooperation are close.

Inter-American cooperation in military and other defense preparations was emphatically reaffirmed at the recently concluded Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington, where it was agreed that the American republics should, through self-

help and mutual aid, direct their military preparations so that those armed forces best adapted to collective defense would be strengthened. The decisions of this meeting, which build upon the solid foundation for cooperative action previously established in the Rio treaty, also include the approval of a directive to the Inter-American Defense Board to prepare military plans for the common defense of the hemisphere as rapidly as possible.

There are certain tasks of hemisphere defense, such as the protection of key installations and key sources of raw materials, which we believe our partners to the south are ready and willing to take over. Coordinated plans are being developed by the Inter-American Defense Board. The Mutual Security Program provides for the first time for military assistance on a grant basis to the Latin American countries which conclude bilateral agreements to undertake defense tasks in the Western Hemisphere. By performing such tasks, they will serve their interests and ours. This will relieve our forces so that they can perform essential defense tasks elsewhere.

Many of the Latin American republics are relatively underdeveloped economically. The bulk of the job of economic development, so far as outsiders can help, can and will be done by private investment on a risk basis supplemented by private and public loans. These countries are now very important suppliers of materials to us, having furnished us in 1950 with 35 percent of our total imports, including nearly half our wool imports, three-fifths of our oil imports, and more than half our imports of copper, lead, and nitrates. They can and will become even more important suppliers in the years ahead.

Certain loans from the Export-Import Bank and some of the technical assistance to be provided under the Mutual Security Program are directly or indirectly related to the expansion of production of these basic materials needed by our economy. And for our part, we will have to make sure that the Latin American republics get a fair deal in obtaining the goods they need from us to keep their economies healthy.

The greatest part of the small technical assistance program will be used to help the governments of our sister republics improve agriculture and food production, health, education, and other essential services. I wish that I had time to illustrate the great benefits which have flowed from past programs of this kind. It is a story full of hope and challenge. These advances are the positive and promising way to meet the future and the surest way to combat the efforts of subversive elements to exploit present tensions and economic difficulties. There are areas of unrest and dissatisfaction which could become troublesome if neglected. This part of the program falls in the ounce of prevention category. I wish that we had acted in this way in similar situations before the

Second World War, and I believe that if we had, our problems might be much simpler today.

This part of the program, amounting in all to 62 million dollars, will help to keep the New World a symbol of hope for men everywhere, an evidence of man's ability to build a peaceful and secure and progressive way of life. It is well worth while.

Strengthening Western Europe

Let us look now at Europe, where there has been a substantially new development of United States policy in the postwar years. We are all familiar with the evolution of this policy from the Greek-Turkish programs through the European Recovery Program to the North Atlantic Treaty, and which now finds American units participating in an integrated force for the defense of Western Europe, with General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of that force.

Every reading of American public opinion shows that our people recognize the strength of the policy we have been following. They support this policy as essential to our national security because they are aware that Europe is one of the most decisive and critical areas. Europe contains the greatest pool of skilled labor in the world and industrial capacity second only to our own, and its more than 200 million people share with us a fundamental community of interest which extends to every sphere of activity. Moreover, what happens in Europe has direct and profound political, economic, and military repercussions elsewhere in the world—in Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America. A Europe united in purpose, and strong economically, spiritually and militarily, can serve, particularly when associated with us, as a strong deterrent to all forms of aggression, not only in Europe, but in other areas as well.

The primary emphasis in our policy toward our European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty is to make common use of the foundation of economic recovery to build up collective armed defenses rapidly to the point where Soviet aggression would be foolhardy—where all Western Europe can be held.

The Soviet rulers make a great to-do about what they call the aggressive character of the North Atlantic alliance. This commotion is a clue to their ambitions but not to our intentions. They do not want Western Europe to be defensible. They know that the North Atlantic Treaty countries are not even trying to build a force which could be used to invade the Soviet Union. They know that the force being built will be strong enough to hold on the ground and is already strong enough to retaliate with prompt and terrible power if Western Europe is attacked.

In Europe as elsewhere, the basic idea of our policy is that the future belongs to freedom if free men will make good use of their time.

The program of aid to Europe totals nearly 7.0 billion dollars, of which 5.3 billion dollars is for military aid and 1.7 billion dollars is for economic aid. The former is composed almost entirely of military end-items which will be used to equip forces now being raised and trained to use them. Most of the latter is also directly related to defense, for they are primarily concerned with the resources and the political and economic stability necessary to support the defense effort.

We are encouraged by the significant increases which our European partners have made in their military budgets over the past year. We understand and appreciate the problems created for our partners by the impact on their economies of great increases in defense expenditures. We feel that progress has been made toward dealing with these problems, but even larger effort is necessary. We believe that we can, by cooperation and the utmost effort by all of us, achieve greater progress toward a level of military expenditure and production which will be adequate to ensure our common safety.

Security Needs of Near and Middle East

Along the southeastern reaches of Europe and into the Near and Middle East, the problems of foreign policy are to make even stronger the several strong points, and to help other countries to strengthen themselves against the dangers of internal subversion. We are proposing military aid of 415 million dollars and economic aid of 125 million dollars for these purposes.

Russian ambitions in this area are centuries old; so too are the internal problems which threaten the stability and security of this area. Our policy toward this vital area of the Near East is to help the governments and peoples of this area to build the kinds of military, political, and economic strength that will discourage aggression from without, protect them against subversion from within, strengthen their will to achieve stability and progress, and help to remove some of the causes of unrest. It is our aim to provide aid programs of an impartial character, that will enable the governments and peoples of this area to work out their own solutions to their problems.

We have long recognized the vital importance of Greece and Turkey and are ready to assist them further in developing their armed forces and in maintaining economic stability. Economic aid for Greece and Turkey is included in the total for Europe.

The program takes into account the possible need for limited military assistance to countries of the Near East for the development of internal security forces. We are also proposing to help the governments and peoples of this important area through the provision of some technical and developmental assistance. This impartial aid will strike at the conditions of unrest and instability

in which the agents of the Kremlin find opportunities for subversion.

We continued to strive for an adjustment of the current dispute between Iran and the United Kingdom which will recognize the right of the Iranian people to control their oil resources and at the same time protect legitimate British economic interests, thus ensuring continued flow of Iranian oil to the free world. We reaffirm our interest in and concern for the independence and security of Iran and our readiness to assist the Iranian Government in building conditions of political and economic stability and resisting Communist subversion.

We also have reason to be concerned with the importance of developing important resources in Africa, and the Mutual Security Program includes modest sums for that purpose.

Significance of Asia and the Pacific Area to Defense

The remaining part of the program consists of 930 million dollars, for military and economic aid to Asia and the Pacific area.

In the great crescent which reaches from Japan to Afghanistan, there live almost 700 million people, about three out of ten people who inhabit the earth.

This area includes South Asia: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal; Southeast Asia: Thailand, Burma, Indonesia and the Associated States of Indochina; and the Philippines, Formosa, and Korea.

But it is not only its large population which gives this area significance in a survey of the defenses of the free world. In this crescent are large resources of strategic materials essential to the productivity of the free world: tin, rubber, jute, petroleum, and many other materials. The location of this crescent is also of significant importance; astride the vital Pacific Ocean lines of communication, and bordering the Communist-dominated central land-mass of Asia.

Of key importance too is the industrial potential of Japan, which lies within this region but is not included in this aid program, since its needs are met in other ways.

Our broad national objective in this area is to help the people develop independent and stable governments, friendly to the United States.

The several elements of the Mutual Security Program for this area have been carefully worked out to further this aim. According to the different needs of these countries, both military aid amounting to 555 million dollars and total economic aid of 375 million dollars are proposed under the program.

The entire area is under direct threat of Communist-imperialist pressures. In addition to the internal pressures of subversion and political penetration, the area is now confronted with the rise of a militant, Chinese Communist imperialism.

The immediacy of the military need is apparent. Open armed conflict is a reality in Indochina as well as Korea. The arms and ammunition being provided under this program to our friends and allies in Indochina and the Philippines are in actual and immediate use against the enemies of freedom. Without the aid that we have sent during the current year to Indochina, there is little doubt but that Indochina would long since have been overrun by the Communist forces of aggression, and the whole of Southeast Asia might either have been absorbed by this Communist force or be in immediate peril of such absorption.

Substantial military aid is also proposed for Formosa, pursuant to the President's policy statement of June 27, 1950.³ Supplementing this aid, which is deemed essential for the military defense of the island, it is proposed that economic assistance also be provided, in further support of the military effort.

But military aid to these countries I have mentioned, and to Thailand, is only part of the problem of strengthening the security of this crescent in relation to the Communist landmass which it borders. The other part of the problem relates to the way people live, and in many respects, this part of the program affects not only the people with whom we deal directly, but also those millions whom we cannot reach directly, but who are watching what we do in Asia.

As the false champion of Asian nationalism and economic improvement, the Communist movement has been successful in capturing some of the leadership of the nationalist movements in these countries. Communism thrives on the wretchedly low standards of living that prevail in most parts of this area.

Poverty, disease, illiteracy, and resentments against former colonial exploitations—these are the turbulent forces that seethe in Asia, that move people powerfully. The Communist movement has exploited these forces, and in the vital crescent I have described, it seeks to create attitudes ranging from neutralism to subversion, as part of its expansionist drive.

Our first job, if we are to achieve our objective of helping the people of this area to maintain independent governments friendly to us, is to understand these forces at work in Asia, and to assure that the forces of nationalism and of the drive for economic improvement are associated with the rest of the free world instead of with communism.

That is why an essential part of the Mutual Security Program in this area is designed to help the people of Asia to create social and economic conditions that will encourage the growth and survival of non-Communist political institutions, dedicated to the honest fulfillment of their basic needs and aspirations.

Vast and challenging demands are now being made upon the leadership of free Asia arising from

the new and heavy responsibilities of national independence. There are serious economic dislocations in the area resulting from the recent war and from changing production and trade patterns. There is a great lack of teachers and of schools, and a lack of trained technicians and administrators both in the governments and in economic life.

The pressure of population on food supply, antiquated agricultural methods, disease, the lack of capital—these and the other difficulties I have described combine to threaten freedom and independence and to create opportunities for subversion.

American materials and technical aid are needed to help the people of the area in dealing with these urgent economic problems. Our programs are designed to help build the economic, political, and social components of national strength and will provide a stimulus to maximum self-help in the area. This aid will enable the people of this area to develop their own rich resources for their own benefit, as well as that of the rest of the free world.

The Mutual Security Program in Asia complements United States policies in the Pacific. In relation to the conflict now raging in Korea, there is included in the program that you are considering a recommendation that authorization be given for 112.5 million dollars in support of the United Nations Korean Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. It is planned that the approach to the relief and rehabilitation operations in Korea will be made on an international basis in cooperation with other members of the United Nations which are contributing funds and supplies to the program.

In considering the over-all security of the Pacific, as it relates to the Mutual Security Program, we also have in mind the importance of restoring sovereignty to Japan. The Committee is familiar with the progress we are making in the preparation of a Treaty of Peace for Japan as the essential first step in this direction.

Deter, defend, and develop. These are the lines of foreign policy which the Mutual Security Program is designed to support. We seek to deter war, for peace, not war, is the only full answer to our present danger. We shall do what we can and shall cooperate with others to defend the free nations against the twin menaces of external and internal attack. We shall do what we can and cooperate with others in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations to develop the economic, political, and military strength of free men and the extent of free institutions.

By comparison with any other course, this approach is more promising of success and it is more conservative of the lives and resources and ideals of free men than any other open to us. No guarantee of success goes with it. But no other course will do as much, with the vast but not yet realized potential we of the free world have, to build the conditions of success, whatever turn events may take.

³ BULLETIN of July 24, 1950, p. 123.

Presentation of Mutual Security Program to Congress¹

1. The preparation of material for the presentation of the Mutual Security Program (MSP) to Congress is virtually complete. The Executive Group has consequently been dissolved and Col. C. H. Bonesteel will shortly return to London.

2. Mr. Thomas Cabot, Director of International Security Affairs, will, from now on be responsible within the Department for (a) the direction of the presentation of the Mutual Security Program to Congress; (b) assuring that all necessary work by the Department in connection therewith is properly performed and properly coordinated (including the preparation of testimony, the briefing of witnesses, the gathering of information requested by committees, etc.); and (c) assuring appropriate coordination of the work of the Department with that of other governmental agencies. All bureaus and offices of the Department are directed to provide him with such assistance and to carry out such tasks as he may request. Mr. Cabot has designated Mr. Charles Coolidge, Deputy Director, International Security Affairs, as his full-time deputy to discharge these responsibilities, and has named Messrs. Ben Brown, (Assistant Secretary), and John H. Ohly, (International Security Affairs), to assist Mr. Coolidge.

3. The Department of Defense has designated Sam Efron and Lt. Col. Frank Murdock, and the Economic Cooperation Administration has designated Ambassador C. Tyler Wood, with Messrs. Najeeb Halaby and James Cooley assisting him, to perform, within their respective agencies, the same general types of duties and functions which Mr. Coolidge will perform in the Department of State. These individuals, together with Mr. Coolidge and his aides, will be responsible, as a group, under the Committee on International Security Affairs for assuring from a total, Executive Branch standpoint, an effective and coordinated presentation of the entire program.

4. This group, in addition to discharging the general duties indicated above, will resolve itself into two informal, complementary subgroups, one of which, consisting of Messrs. Coolidge, Brown, Cooley and Efron, will constitute an interdepartmental legislative liaison team, and the other of which comprised of Mr. Ohly, Ambassador Wood (Mr. Halaby, alternate), and Lt. Col. Murdock, will make certain that the presentation is properly backstopped by their agencies.

5. The interdepartmental legislative liaison team will make the necessary contacts with Congressional committees and their staffs, arrange the details of hearings, constitute the sole channel through which information and materials are transmitted to the Congress, and, in general, perform all other tasks that need to be carried out at the Capitol.

6. The interdepartmental backstopping team will see that testimony is prepared and properly coordinated, that information requested by the legislative liaison team is obtained, that witnesses are briefed, that issues requiring policy decisions are decided, and, in general, arrange for the performance of such other tasks as need to be carried out within each of the agencies concerned.

7. Further to assist Mr. Coolidge, certain offices and bureaus which have a direct concern with all or some major portion of the presentation have each designated, or will be asked to designate, one individual who will be directly responsible to Mr. Coolidge for assuring the performance of all presentation work relating to or affecting such office or bureau (or with respect to a particular area or subject). Messrs. Martin, Gardiner, Merchant, and Cale have already been named to perform such responsibilities with respect to Titles I, II, III and IV of the Mutual Security Bill, respectively. Comparable designations have been made within the Department of Defense

and the Economic Cooperation Administration, and these Defense and Economic Cooperation Administration designees, together with the above State Department designees, will constitute four working groups which will be directly responsible to the central interdepartmental group for assuring, as to each of the four Titles, that there is an effective, coordinated presentation. These groups in effect represent continuations of Task Force I (insofar as Europe is concerned) and the working groups established to handle the appeals to the Bureau of the Budget.

Unified Command Requests Additional Forces for Korea

[Released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. June 21]

Communication from the Unified Command to Secretary-General Trygve Lie on a new appeal for forces for Korea—June 21, 1951

The acting representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to address a communication on behalf of the United States, acting in its capacity as the Unified Command, concerning the need for additional ground troops from Member Governments of the United Nations for the collective effort in Korea.

The Unified Command has conducted and is now conducting extensive bilateral conversations in connection with this problem with various Member States and, in particular, is conducting conversations with States which have already contributed armed forces.

In order to further efforts of the Unified Command in this respect, the Secretary-General is requested to send communications on behalf of the Unified Command to Member Governments which previously gave a favorable reply either to the Security Council's resolution of June 25, 1950, or to its resolution of June 27, 1950, but which have not yet contributed armed forces for the collective effort in Korea, advising the aforementioned Members of the need for further ground assistance in Korea. There is a real need for additional forces from Member States in the light of massive Chinese Communist concentrations in the area and of their continuing aggression. The Unified Command therefore requests the Secretary-General in his communication to appeal to Member Governments which have given their support to the Security Council resolutions but have not made contributions of armed forces that they give immediate consideration to making an initial contribution of ground forces of substantial character, consonant with their respective capabilities and other responsibilities.

Further, it is requested that Member Governments be asked to notify the Secretary-General of offers in general terms, detailed arrangements to be made by the respective Member Governments and the Unified Command.

¹ Effective June 13, 1951.

U.N. Embargo Action Against Chinese Will Shorten Hostilities

U.S. SUBMITS REPORT

*By Ambassador Ernest A. Gross
Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The United States is now submitting its first report to the Additional Measures Committee established by the General Assembly last May to support United Nations action against the aggression in Korea.²

The practical effectiveness of the collective effort to deprive the aggressors of imports useful to their war-making power is clearly shown by reports such as this from the member countries. In addition, discussion and review by the United Nations of these reports are a positive method of achieving the purpose of the United Nations resolution.

In other words, the United Nations is not depending upon a paper resolution expressing intent and defining the terms of an embargo. Through the Additional Measures Committee the United Nations will follow through, in close consultation among the members of the United Nations, to insure that the loopholes are closed and that every practical device is used to carry out the embargo.

I believe that this procedure is an important expression of the United Nations in action. It will demonstrate to the world the effectiveness of collective action and the value of continuous collaboration through international machinery.

In my judgment the economic measures being taken against the Chinese Communist aggressors will not only be impressive but, so far as the free world is concerned, very close to 100 percent efficient.

By denying the aggressors the means to wage war, the 53 members of the United Nations who support United Nations action in Korea help bring closer the day when hostilities will be ended and United Nations objectives achieved through peaceful processes.

This expression of unity of the loyal supporters of the United Nations Charter will, if anything can, convince the aggressors of the folly of their present course.

Following is the text of the first report of the United States to the Additional Measures Committee taken in accordance with Resolution 500 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on May 18, 1951:

PART I

The controls applied by the United States on shipments to the Chinese Communists and the North Korean authorities are more comprehensive than those called for by Resolution 500(V) and were placed in effect before that Resolution was passed. Exports from the United States of arms, ammunition and implements of war (Annex I) and atomic energy materials (Annex II) to North Korea and to Communist China have not been authorized at any time, and exports of a number of other strategic articles were severely restricted and in some instances embargoed for some time prior to June 1950. Since the end of June 1950, the United States Government has permitted no shipments to North Korea and applied an embargo on shipments to Communist China not only of arms and munitions but also of atomic energy materials, petroleum products, and other items of strategic value included in the United States Positive List. (Annex III).

The scope of the economic measures applied against the Chinese Communists by the United States was greatly extended when it became unmistakably clear that they were engaged in large-scale military operations against United Nations forces in Korea. Since December 1950, the United States has not exported any materials whatever to Communist China. Vessels and aircraft documented or registered under United States laws have not been permitted to touch at any Chinese Communist port or area or to carry any cargo destined directly or indirectly for Communist China. Strict control has been exercised over commodities in transit through the United States destined for Communist China. All Communist China and North Korea assets within the United States have been blocked and subjected to stringent controls.

The United States believes that the United States Positive List contains items which would meet the intent of the General Assembly Resolution of May 18. Not all these items are included within the scope of paragraph 1 (A) of the Resolution. Nevertheless, the United States believes that the control of such items furthers the basic purpose of the Resolution.

¹ Comments accompanying U.S. report to the Additional Measures Committee June 16 and released to the press on the same date.

² BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 848.

The scope and detail of the United States Munitions List, the list of atomic energy materials, and the United States Positive List may assist cooperating States in effecting the embargo by providing a basis for that efficient customs administration, control of transit trade, and control over transport of prohibited cargoes which it is the purpose of the Resolution to accomplish. It may also contribute to the working out of such further measures in the field of economic controls as may become appropriate or necessary.

The United States will prevent by all means within its jurisdiction the circumvention of controls on shipments applied by other States under the Resolution and cooperate fully with other States and the Additional Measures Committee in carrying out the purposes of this embargo.

PART II

The following is a summary of the measures taken by the United States to control its trade with the aggressors.

The export of arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined by Presidential Proclamation 2776, of April 13, 1948, is controlled by the Secretary of State (Annex I). The export of atomic energy materials as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is controlled by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Annex II). Shipments of such materials to Communist China and North Korea have not been authorized at any time. In November 1949, this policy was extended to include Hong Kong and Macao, as possible transshipment points, and only very limited materials for the use of these governments have been licensed since that time.

The export from the United States to foreign destinations of commodities in short supply and of strategic materials is controlled through the Positive List administered by the Department of Commerce under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 (Annex III). Commodities which appear on the Positive List are placed there after determination by the United States Government that they possess sufficient strategic value or are in such critical supply as to justify careful screening of destination and end-use. Such commodities cannot be exported to foreign destinations without validated export licenses.

From June 1950, shortly after the North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea, until December 1950, the United States Government was applying an embargo over shipments to Communist China of arms and munitions, petroleum products, atomic energy materials, and all other items on the United States Positive List.

Since June 1950, no shipments of any kind have been permitted to go to North Korea, and the subsequent measures outlined below have been applied to North Korea as well as Communist China.

As a precaution, in the light of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean struggle, the Department of Commerce issued an order, effective December 3, 1950, subjecting all proposed exports from the United States to the mainland of China or to Hong Kong and Macao (as possible transshipment points) to a screening procedure in order to prevent Communist China from obtaining materials, the receipt of which by Communist China would be contrary to the objectives of the United Nations in Korea. The order revoked all General Licenses for the exportation of any commodity, whether or not included on the Positive List, to Communist China and to Hong Kong and Macao.

On December 7, 1950, an additional Department of Commerce order was issued providing authorization for United States officials to stop shipments loaded under General Licenses if the ships came into United States ports en route. Since that date, accordingly, validated export licenses are required for all commodities intended for the destinations noted above if a vessel, whatever its registry, has not obtained clearance from the final port of departure in the United States for a foreign port or if, after receiving final clearance, the vessel transits the Panama Canal Zone. The order directed that shipments which were not licensed were required to be off-loaded

prior to final clearance or proceeding through the Canal Zone. Under Department of Commerce orders effective December 4, and 6, 1950, shipments of all commodities, whether or not on the Positive List, originating in any foreign country moving in transit through the United States or using the facilities of a foreign trade zone or manifested to the United States may not be exported to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong or Macao without a validated export license. The foregoing actions were taken under the authority of the Export Control Act of 1949 (See Annex IV).

On December 8, 1950, the Department of Commerce, Under Secretary for Transportation, under the authority granted by Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, issued Transportation Order T-1. This order directed that no person should transport in any ship documented under the laws of the United States or in any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States any commodities at the time on the Positive List, or any article on the Munitions List, or any article controlled for export under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong or Macao; and no person should discharge from any such ship or aircraft any such commodity at these ports or areas, or at any other ports in transit to such destinations, without a validated export license, or unless authorization had been obtained from the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation. The prohibition applied to the ship or aircraft owner, master or any other officer or employee of the owner (Annex V).

On December 16, 1950, the Department of State announced that the United States was taking measures to place under control all Chinese Communist assets within United States jurisdiction and was issuing regulations to prohibit ships of United States registry from calling at Chinese Communist ports until further notice. These actions were necessary to accomplish the effective control of the economic relationships between the United States and Communist China-North Korea envisaged by the December 3 requirement that no exports would be permitted to these destinations from the United States without validated export licenses (Annex VI).

The Department of the Treasury accomplished this financial control by action under the Foreign Assets Regulations (pursuant to the first War Powers Act of 1941 and the Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as amended) blocking the United States assets of residents of China and North Korea. The blocking regulations forbade all transactions involving bank accounts and United States assets of the Communist Chinese and the North Korean regimes and their nationals unless Treasury approval was obtained. A series of blanket authorizations were included in the regulations, protecting individual Chinese and Koreans in the United States and abroad, where these persons were not acting on behalf of the North Korean or Chinese Communist regimes (Annex VII).

The Department of Commerce accomplished its shipping controls by the issuance of Transportation Order T-2, under the authority of Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. This order provided, in substance, that no person should take any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the United States to any Chinese Communist port or area; that no person should transport, in any ship or aircraft documented or registered under the laws of the United States, cargo of any kind to Communist ports or to any other places under the control of the Chinese Communists; that no person should take on board any such ship or aircraft any cargo if he knows or has reason to believe that it is destined, directly or indirectly, for Communist China; and that no person should discharge from any such ship or aircraft any such cargo so destined at any place other than the port where the cargo was loaded, or within territory under United States jurisdiction, or in Japan. This order was made applicable to the owner, master, or any other officer, employee or agent of the owner of the ship or aircraft. (Annex VIII).

List of Annexes

- I Enumeration of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War (Proclamation 2776 issued by the President of the United States on March 26, 1948) [See 13 Fed. Reg. 1623, also Munitions Division Bulletin No. 1, Dept. of State April 1, 1948].
- II List of Atomic Energy Materials. [Not here printed. See 12 Fed. Reg. 1855 and Amendment 14 Fed. Reg. 1156 for List A. See 12 Fed. Reg. 7651 for List B.]
- III Positive List of Commodities. [Not here printed. See Sec. 399.1, Appendix A, Comprehensive Export Schedule, Office of International Trade, Dept. of Commerce.]
- IV Excerpts from Comprehensive Export Schedule. [For 384.4 see 15 Fed. Reg. 4744; for 384.5 and 384.6 see 15 Fed. Reg. 8562, 8563; for 384.7 see 15 Fed. Reg. 9140.]
- V Transportation Order T-1. [See 15 Fed. Reg. 8777, Interpretation 15 Fed. Reg. 9145.]
- VI Statement issued by the Department of State on December 16, 1950 regarding control of United States economic relationships with Communist China. [Not here printed. See BULLETIN of December 25, 1950, p. 1004.]
- VII Foreign Assets Control Regulations. [Not here printed. See 15 Fed. Reg. 9040.]
- VIII Transportation Order T-2. [See 15 Fed. Reg. 9063.]

ANNEX I

PROCLAMATION 2776

Enumeration of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War by the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS section 12 (i) of the joint resolution of Congress approved November 4, 1939, provides in part as follows (54 Stat. 11; 22 U. S. C. 452 (i)):

The President is hereby authorized to proclaim upon recommendation of the (National Munitions Control) Board from time to time a list of articles which shall be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of this section * * *

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the said joint resolution of Congress, and pursuant to the recommendation of the National Munitions Control Board, and in the interest of the foreign-affairs functions of the United States, hereby declare and proclaim that the articles listed below shall, on and after April 15, 1948, be considered arms, ammunition, and implements of war for the purposes of section 12 of the said joint resolution of Congress:

Category I—Small Arms and Machine Guns

Rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, machine pistols, and machine guns (using ammunition of caliber .22 or over); barrels, mounts, breech mechanisms and stocks therefor.

Category II—Artillery and Projectors

Guns, howitzers, cannon, mortars, and rocket launchers (of all calibers) military flame throwers, military smoke, gas, or pyrotechnic projectors; barrels, mounts and other components thereof.

Category III—Ammunition

Ammunition of caliber .22 or over for the arms enumerated under (I) and (II) above; cartridge cases, powder bags, bullets, jackets, cores, shells (excluding shotgun); projectiles and other missiles; percussion caps, fuses, primers and other detonating devices for such ammunition.

Category IV—Bombs, Torpedoes and Rockets

Bombs, torpedoes, grenades, rockets, mines, guided missiles, depth charges, and components thereof; apparatus and devices for the handling, control, discharge, detonation or detection thereof.

Category V—Fire Control Equipment and Range Finders

Fire control equipment, range, position and height finders, spotting instruments, aiming devices (gyroscopic, optic, acoustic, atmospheric or flash), bombsights, gun sights and periscopes for the arms, ammunition and implements of war enumerated in this proclamation.

Category VI—Tanks and Ordnance Vehicles

Tanks, armed or armored vehicles, armored trains, artillery and small arms repair trucks, military half tracks, tank recovery vehicles, tank destroyers; armor plate, turrets, tank engines, tank tread shoes, tank bogie wheels and idlers therefor.

Category VII—Poison Gases and Toxicological Agents

All military toxicological and lethal agents and gases; military equipment for the dissemination and detection thereof and defense therefrom.

Category VIII—Propellants and Explosives

Propellants for the articles enumerated in Categories III, IV, and VII: military high explosives.

Category IX—Vessels of War

Vessels of war of all kinds, including amphibious craft, landing craft, naval tenders, naval transports and naval patrol craft, armor plate and turrets therefor; submarine batteries and nets, and equipment for the laying, detection, and detonation of mines.

Category X—Aircraft

Aircraft; components, parts and accessories therefor.


Category XI—Miscellaneous Equipment

(a) Military radar equipment, including components thereof, radar countermeasures and radar jamming equipment; (b) Military stereoscopic plotting and photo interpretation equipment; (c) Military photo theodolites, telemetering and Doppler equipment; (d) Military super-high speed ballistic cameras; (e) Military radio-sondes; (f) Military interference suppression equipment; (g) Military electronic computing devices; (h) Military miniature and sub-miniature vacuum tubes and photo-emissive tubes; (i) Military armor plate; (j) Military steel helmets; (k) Military pyrotechnics; (l) Synthetic training devices for military equipment; (m) Military ultra-sonic generators; (n) All other material used in warfare which is classified from the standpoint of military security.

Effective April 15, 1948, this proclamation shall supersede Proclamation 2717, dated February 14, 1947.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 26th day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty-eight, (SEAL) and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-second.



By the President:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Secretary of State

New Requirements Relating to the Licensing for Export and Import of Articles Defines as Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War

Effective April 15, 1948, the attached Presidential Proclamation 2776, defining arms, ammunition, and implements of war will supersede Proclamation 2717 of February 14, 1947. ALL ARTICLES INCLUDED THEREIN WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPORT AND IMPORT LICENSING REQUIREMENTS.

The principal changes in the new proclamation are the addition of:

All commercial type aircraft and all aircraft components, parts and accessories; fire control and range finding equipment; certain military electronic devices including radar; various military defence apparatus and training equipment; arms and ammunition of caliber .22.

It should be noted that the new proclamation represents an extensive rearrangement of the categories listed in Proclamation 2717.

Pending the issuance of a revised edition of the pamphlet, "International Traffic in Arms" (Title 22, Sections 201.1 to 201.41 Code of Fed. Reg.) this Bulletin is being circulated for the guidance of Collectors of Customs and shippers of arms, ammunition, and implements of war.

A tentative interpretation of the various categories is set forth herein. Additions or deletions will be made from time to time. If an exporter or importer is unable to determine whether a particular article comes within the scope of the new proclamation, he may submit the pertinent facts to the Munitions Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C., for a decision. Collectors are requested to do likewise.

Application for export and import licenses should be made on current Department of State forms.

TENTATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW PROCLAMATION BY CATEGORIES

Category I. Small Arms and Machine Guns.

Note that caliber .22 weapons, and stocks and complete breech mechanisms for all weapons, now require a license.

Category II. Artillery and Projectors.

Under this category there have been added rocket launchers and military smoke, gas and pyrotechnic projectors. The term "other components thereof" shall be interpreted to consist of complete breech mechanisms, carriages, and hub assemblies.

Category III. Ammunition.

Note that caliber .22 ammunition now requires a license; also jackets; cores; percussion caps; fuses; primers; other detonating-devices; and powder bags.

Category IV. Bombs, Torpedoes, and Rockets.

Note that rockets and the major components of bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and guided missiles have been added.

Category V. Fire Control Equipment and Range Finders.

All the articles in this category have been added to the list of licensable articles.

Category VI. Tanks and Ordnance Vehicles.

The articles added in this category are: armed vehicles; artillery and small arms repair trucks; military half tracks, tank recovery vehicles; tank destroyers; tank engines; tank tread shoes; tank bogie wheels and idlers. An "armed vehicle" shall be interpreted to be any vehicle which has a fixed gun on it, while an "armored vehicle"

shall be one offering protection, and may be either armed or unarmed.

Category VII. Poison Gases and Toxicological Agents.

The term "lethal gases" shall be interpreted to mean: cyanogen chloride; diphos; diphosgene; fluorine (but not fluorene); Lewisite gas; mustard gas (dichlorodiethyl sulfide); phenylcarbylamine chloride; phosgene.

The term "toxicological agents" (gases) shall be interpreted to mean: Adamsite (diphenylaminechlorarsine); dibromodimethyl ether; dichlorodimethyl ether; diphenylchloroarsine; diphenylcyanarsine; ethyl dibromarsine; ethyl dichlorarsine; methyldichloroarsine; phenyldibromoarsine; phenyldichloroarsine.

The term "military equipment for the dissemination and detection thereof and defence therefrom" shall be interpreted to mean: military gas masks; filters for military gas masks; military gas detection kits.

Category VIII. Propellants and Explosives.

The articles included in this category are: propellant powders; rocket and guided missile fuel, the following military high explosives: ammonium picrate; black soda powder, potassium nitrate powder, hexanitrodiphenylamine; pentaerythritetranitrate (penthrate, pentrite or PETN); nitrocellulose having a nitrogen content of more than 12.20 percent; tetryl (trinitrophenylmethylnitramine or "tetranitromethylaniline"); trimethylenetrinitramine (RDX, Cyclonite, Hexogen or T4); trinitroanisole; trinitronaphthalene; dinitronaphthalene; tetranitronaphthalene; trinitrotoluene; trinitroxyline.

Category IX. Vessels of War.

Under this category the following are considered vessels of war:

Combat Type Vessels:

Battleship (BB); Battle Cruiser (CC); Flight Deck Cruiser (CF); Heavy Cruiser (CA); Large Cruiser (CB); Light Cruiser (CL); Aircraft Carrier (CV); Aircraft Carrier, Escort (CVE); Aircraft Carrier, Large (CVB); Aircraft Carrier, Small (CVL); British Aircraft Carrier, Escort (BAVG); Seaplane Carrier (CVS); Destroyer (DD); Destroyer, Escort Vessel (DE); Destroyer Leader (DL); Submarine (SS); Submarine Mine Layer (SM); Minelaying Cruiser (CM); Mine Sweeper, High Speed (DMS); Mine Vessel, Light Mine Layer (DM); Crane Ship (AB); High Speed Transport (APD); and Seaplane Tender (Destroyer) (AVD).

Amphibious and Landing Vessels:

Weasels (M-24); Landing Vehicle (LVT); Landing Vehicle, Armored (LVT-A); Landing Vehicles, Wheeled (LVW-DUKW). Landing Craft (LCC, LCM-3, LCM-6, LC-FF, LCI-L, LCI-M, LCI-R, LCS-L-3, LCVF, LCT-5, LCT-6, LCP-L, LCP-R, LCR-S, LCR-L, LCV). Landing Ships: (LSD, LSM, LSM-R, LST, LSV).

Naval Tenders and Service Vessels:

Airship Tender (AZ); Ammunition Ship (AE); Auxiliary Miscellaneous (AG); Barge, Torpedo Testing (YTT); Barracks Ship, Self Propelled (APB); Cargo Ship Attack (AKA); Cargo Ship, Net (AKN); Cargo Ship and Aircraft Ferry (AKV); Destroyer Tender (AD); Distribution Box Boat (L); Dock, Advance Base (ABD); Dock, Advance Base Section (ABSD); Drydock, Floating (AFD, AFDL, AFDL-C, AFDM, AFDB); Lighter Catapult (AVC); Lighthouse Tender (AGL); Mine Layer (converted to merchant use) (CM); Mine Layer, Auxiliary (ACM); Mine Layer Coastal (CMc); Mine Planter (MP); Junior Mine Planter (JMP); Mine Sweeper (AM, AMc, AMb); Mine Sweeper, Motor (YMS); Motor Torpedo Boat Tender (AGP); Net Laying Ship (AN); Net Tender (YN); Repair Ship (ARV-A, ARV-E, ARR, ARL); Repair Dock (ARD, ARD-C); Rescue Boat, Aircraft (AVR); Salvage Craft Tender (ARS-T); Salvage Lifting Vessel (ARS-D); Seaplane Tender (AV, AVP); Submarine Rescue Vessel (ASR); Submarine Tender (AS); and Surveying Ships (AGS, AGSc).

Naval Transports:

Administrative Flagship (APF); Aircraft Transport, Lighter (YCBO); Amphibian Force, Flagship (AGC); Artillery Transport, Mechanized (APM); Artillery Transport, non-Mechanized (APN); Attack Transport (APA); Barge, Troop Class A (APP); Barge, Navy Troop Class B (APT); Coastal Transport, (APc); Ferry, Transport and Aircraft (APV); Rescue Transport (APR); Submarine Transport (ATS); Supporting Gunnery Ship, Transport (APG); Transport (AP); and Wounded Evacuation, Transport (APH).

Patrol Vessels:

Coast Guard Gun Boat (WPG); Coast Guard Gun Boat (WPR); Coast Guard Subchaser (WSC); Coast Guard District Patrol Vessel (WYP); Coast Guard Cutter (CGC); Coast Guard Light Ship (WAL); Escort 180' (PCE, PCE-C); Escort, Rescue 180' (PCE-R); Patrol Vessel, Eagle (PE); Patrol Vessel, Frigate (PF); Patrol Vessel, Gunboat (PG); Patrol Vessel, Motor (PGM); Patrol Vessel, Motor Torpedo Boat (PT); Patrol Vessel, River Gunboat (PR); Patrol Chaser, Submarine Chaser (PTC); Patrol Boat (AD); Patrol Vessel, Coastal Yacht (PYC); Patrol Vessel, Yacht (PY); Submarine Chaser, 173' (PC, PC-C); Submarine Chaser 110' (SC, SC-C); Submarine Chaser 136' (PCS, PCS-C); Submarine Chaser 174' Control (PCC); and other Patrol Craft larger than 100' or in excess of 300 horsepower capacity.

(The Munitions Division Circular entitled "List of Vessels Coming Within the Classification of 'Vessels of War'" is no longer effective)

In addition to vessels of war this category includes the following special naval equipment:

Armor plate; turrets; submarine storage batteries and electric batteries of 1,000 ampere hour capacity and over; anti-submarine nets; mine locating equipment towed from ships including: ordnance detector, Mark 2, pipe; ordnance detector Mark 2, gear; power supplies, Mark 2; ordnance detector, Mark 3, and mine detonating equipment.

Category X. Aircraft.

It should be noted that all aircraft, components, parts and accessories are included in the Proclamation.

Aircraft ground handling and maintenance equipment, such as is listed in the Department of Commerce Schedule B under Commodity code No. 794960, and radio ground equipment used for the direction and navigation of aircraft, as listed under Schedule B 707640, are not listed.

(The Munitions Division Circular MD-2/20/47 entitled "New Requirements Relating To The Licensing For Export and Import of Aircraft, Components and Parts" and supplements thereto, are no longer in effect.)

Category XI. Miscellaneous Equipment.

All Articles (except armor plate) enumerated in this category have been added, and shall be interpreted to mean:

(a) All Radar and components as follows: (1) Antenna, micro-wave (i. e. frequency over 500 megacycles, or wavelength under 6/10 meter) or highly directional antenna, such as dish, parabolic or horn type antennae. (2) Receiver, micro-wave or broadband. (3) Transmitter, micro-wave or pulse modulated. (4) Modulator, pulsed (peak power rated). (5) Indicator, cathode ray tube. (6) Test equipment, as follows: echo box (ring or resonance chamber), synthesizer, range calibrator, radio frequency-oscillator (micro-wave), radio frequency meters. (7) Micro-wave wave-guide (pipe) or any instrument containing it.

Radar countermeasures and jamming equipment include:

Resnatron tubes; electronic noise generators; and spectrum analyzers.

(b) Only complete sets of equipment used for military

measurements of maps and stereoscopic (three demention) aerial photographs.

(c) A Military photo theodolite is a transit type instrument for photographing an object or target. Telemetering and Doppler equipment are radio locating devices functioning simultaneously on the ground and in an aircraft.

(d) The term "super high speed" shall apply to cameras with a speed exceeding 64 frames a second.

(e) A radiosonde is a set of meteorological recording instruments attached to a radio transmitter and carried by a balloon to transmit weather data to the ground.

(f) Very high frequency (30 megacycles and above) filters, chokes and wave-traps.

(1) Synthetic training devices will include Link-type trainers and similar apparatus.

ANNEX IV

Excerpts From Comprehensive Export Schedule

384.4

ORDER REVOKING VALIDATED LICENSES TO MANCHURIA AND CHINA

Effective 4:00 p. m., eastern daylight time, July 20, 1950, all outstanding validated licenses issued prior to the effective date hereof authorizing exportation of any commodity to Manchuria (including the Port Arthur Naval Base Area and Liaoning Province) and China (including the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, Ningsia and Jehol, sometimes referred to as Inner Mongolia; the provinces of Chinghai (Tsinghai) and Sikang; Sinkiang; Tibet; and Outer Mongolia), as described in Schedule C of the Bureau of the Census, are revoked.

Holders of such outstanding validated licenses shall immediately return them to the Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D. C.

This order shall not apply to exportations to the above destinations which have been laden aboard the exporting carrier prior to its effective date.

384.5

ORDER REVOKING CERTAIN GENERAL LICENSES TO MAINLAND OF CHINA (INCLUDING MANCHURIA), HONG KONG, AND MACAO³

General Licenses GRO, GLR, GMC, and GCC, authorizing exportation of any commodity, whether or not included on the Positive List of Commodities (399.1), are revoked to the following destinations: Manchuria (including the Port Arthur Naval Base Area and Liaoning Province), and China (including the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, Ningsia, and Jehol, sometimes referred to as Inner Mongolia; the provinces of Chinghai (Tsinghai) and Sikang; Sinkiang; Tibet; and Outer Mongolia), and Hong Kong and Macao, but excluding Taiwan (Formosa) as described in Schedule C of the Bureau of the Census.

This order also applies to shipments through United States foreign trade zones to the foregoing destinations. It shall apply to all shipments whether or not laden on exporting carrier. Validated licenses are required for all commodities to these destinations if vessel has not obtained clearance from the final port of departure in the United States for a foreign port, or after receiving final clearance transits the Panama Canal Zone. Shipments not licensed must be off-loaded prior to final clearance or proceeding through Canal Zone.

Shipments of perishable food products, not including frozen food products, ultimately destined to Hong Kong and Macao may continue to be made under General License (GRO up to 12:01 a. m., eastern standard time, January 2, 1951).

³ Order effective 12:01 a. m., eastern standard time, December 4, 1950, and amendment thereof issued and announced December 6, 1950.

ORDER EXTENDING VALIDATED LICENSE REQUIREMENTS TO IN-TRANSIT SHIPMENTS TO CERTAIN DESTINATIONS³

Notwithstanding any other provision of the export regulations, except 371.9 (b) (1), shipments of Positive List commodities originating in any foreign country moving in transit through the United States, or using the facilities of a foreign trade zone, or manifested to the United States, may not be exported to any destination in Subgroup A (371.3), Hong Kong, or Macao, without a validated export license.

Shipments of all commodities, whether or not on the Positive List, moving in transit through the United States, or using the facilities of a foreign trade zone, or manifested to the United States, may not be exported to China, Manchuria, Hong Kong, or Macao without a validated export license. This provision shall apply to in-transit shipment to such destinations if vessel has not obtained clearance from the final port of departure in the United States for a foreign port.

ORDER SUSPENDING VALIDATED LICENSES TO HONG KONG AND MACAO

Effective 9:00 p. m., eastern standard time, December 8, 1950, all outstanding validated export licenses authorizing exportation of any commodity to Hong Kong or Macao are suspended.

This order applies to commodities laden aboard the exporting carrier but not departed from final United States port of call.

ANNEX V

Title 32A—National Defense

APPENDIX

Chapter 9—Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce
(Transportation Order T-1)

Part 1101—*Shipping Restrictions.*

This Order is found necessary and appropriate to promote the national defense and is issued pursuant to the authority granted by Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Consultation with industry in advance of the issuance of this Order has been rendered impracticable by the need for immediate issuance.

AUTHORITY. Sections 1101.1 to 1101.6, issued under Sec. 704, Pub. Law 774, 81st Cong. Interpret or apply Secs. 101, 705, Pub. Law 774, 81st Cong. Sec. 101, E. O. 10161, September 9, 1950, 15 F. R. 6105.

Sec.

1101.1 Prohibited transportation and discharge.

1101.2 Applications for adjustment or exceptions.

1101.3 Reports.

1101.4 Records.

1101.5 Defense against claims for damages.

1101.6 Violations.

Sec. 1101.1 *Prohibited transportation and discharge.* No person shall transport in any ship documented under the laws of the United States or in any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States any commodity at the time on the Positive List (as amended from time to time) of the Comprehensive Export Schedule of the Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce (15 C. F. R. Parts 370-399), any article on the list of arms, ammunition, and implements of war coming within the meaning of Proclamation No. 2776 of April 15, 1948

issued pursuant to Section 12 of the Joint Resolution approved November 4, 1939 (54 Stat. 10, 22 U. S. C. 452), or any commodity, including fissionable materials, controlled for export under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (10 C. F. R. Parts 40 and 50), to any destination at the time in Sub-Group A of the Comprehensive Export Schedule (15 C. F. R. Part 371.3 (a)), to Hong Kong, or to Macao, and no person shall discharge from any such ship or any such aircraft any such commodity or article at any such port or at any other port in transit to any such destination, unless a validated export license under the Export Control Act of 1949 or under Section 12 of said Joint Resolution approved November 4, 1939, has been obtained for the shipment, or unless authorization for the shipment has been obtained from the Under Secretary for Transportation. This prohibition applies to the owner of the ship or aircraft, the master of the ship or aircraft, and any other officer, employee or agent of the owner of the ship or aircraft who participates in the transportation. The consular officers of the United States are furnished with current information as to commodities on the Positive List and will advise whether commodities are currently on that List.

Sec. 1101.2 *Applications for adjustment or exceptions.* Any person affected by any provision of this part may file an application for an adjustment or exception upon the ground that such provision works an exceptional hardship upon him, not suffered by others, or that its enforcement against him would not be in the interest of the national defense program. Such an application may be made by letter or telegram addressed to the Under Secretary for Transportation, Washington 25, D. C., reference T-1. If authorization is requested, any such application should specify in detail the material to be shipped, the name and address of the shipper and of the recipient of the shipment, the ports from which and to which the shipment is being made and the use to which the material shipped will be put. The application should also specify in detail the facts which support the applicant's claim for an exception.

Sec. 1101.3 *Reports.* Persons subject to this part shall submit such reports to the Under Secretary for Transportation as he shall require, subject to the terms of the Federal Reports Act.

Sec. 1101.4 *Records.* Each person participating in any transaction covered by this part shall retain in his possession, for at least two years, records of shipments in sufficient detail to permit an audit that determines for each transaction that the provisions of this part have been met. This does not specify any particular accounting method and does not require alteration of the system of records customarily maintained, provided such records supply an adequate basis for audit. Records may be retained in the form of microfilm or other photographic copies instead of the originals.

Sec. 1101.5 *Defense against claims for damages.* No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any default under any contract or order which shall result directly or indirectly from compliance with this part or any provision thereof, notwithstanding that this part or such provision shall thereafter be declared by judicial or other competent authority to be invalid.

Sec. 1101.6 *Violations.* Any person who wilfully violates any provisions of this part or wilfully conceals a material fact or furnishes false information in the course of operation under this part is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both. In addition, administrative action may be taken against any such person, denying him the privileges generally accorded under this part.

This part shall take effect on December 8, 1950

PHILIP B. FLEMING
Under Secretary for Transportation

³ Order effective 12:01 a. m., eastern standard time, December 4, 1950, and amendment thereof issued and announced December 6, 1950.

ANNEX VIII

Title 32A—National Defense

APPENDIX

Chapter 9—Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce (Transportation Order T-2)

Part 1101—Shipping Restrictions.

This Order is found necessary and appropriate to promote the national defense and is issued pursuant to the authority granted by Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Consultation with industry in advance of the issuance of this Order has been rendered impracticable by the need for immediate issuance.

AUTHORITY. Sections 1101.10 to 1101.17, issued under Sec. 704, Pub. Law 774, 81st Cong. Interpret or apply Secs. 101, 705, Pub. Law 774, 81st Cong. Sec. 101, E. O. 10161, September 9, 1950, 15 F. R. 6105.

Sec.

- 1101.10 Prohibition of movement of American carriers to Communist China.
- 1101.11 Prohibition of transportation of goods destined for Communist China.
- 1101.12 Persons affected.
- 1101.13 Reports.
- 1101.14 Records.
- 1101.15 Defense against claims for damages.
- 1101.16 Violations.
- 1101.17 Amendments.

Sec. 1101.10 *Prohibition of movement of American carriers to Communist China.* No person shall sail, fly, navigate or otherwise take any ship documented under the laws of the United States or any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States to any Chinese Communist port or to any other place under the control of the Chinese Communists.

Sec. 1101.11 *Prohibition on transportation of goods destined for Communist China.* No person shall transport, in any ship documented under the laws of the United States or in any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States, to Communist Chinese ports or to any other place under the control of the Chinese Communists, any material, commodity, or cargo of any kind. No person shall take on board any ship documented under the laws of the United States or any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States any material, commodity, or cargo of any kind if he knows or has reason to believe that the material, commodity, or cargo is destined, directly or indirectly, for Communist China. No person shall discharge from any ship documented under the laws of the United States or from any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States, at any place other than the port where the cargo was loaded, or within territory under the jurisdiction of the United States, or in Japan, any material, commodity, or cargo of any kind which he knows or has reason to believe is destined for Communist China.

Sec. 1101.12 *Persons affected.* The prohibitions of Sections 1101.10 and 1101.11 of this part apply to the owner of the ship or aircraft, to the master of the ship or aircraft, and to any other officer, employee, or agent of the owner of the ship or to any other person who participates in the prohibited activities.

Sec. 1101.13 *Reports.* The owner of any ship documented under the laws of the United States or any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States which is making a voyage to Communist China at the time this Order is issued shall report this fact promptly to the Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D. C., and advise what steps he has taken to comply with the requirements of Section 1101.10 of this part. The owner of any ship documented under the laws of the United States or any aircraft registered under the laws of the United States which, at the time this Order is issued, is carrying any material, commodity, or cargo

which the owner, the master of the ship or aircraft, or any other officer, employee or agent of the owner, knew or had reason to believe was destined for Communist China shall report this fact promptly to the Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D. C., and advise what disposition has been or will be made of such cargo. (The above reporting requirements have been approved by the Bureau of the Budget under the Federal Reports Act.) Persons subject to this part shall submit such reports to the Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce, as he shall require, subject to the terms of the Federal Reports Act.

Sec. 1101.14 *Records.* Each person participating in any transaction covered by this part shall retain in his possession, for at least two years, records of voyages and shipments in sufficient detail to permit an audit that will determine for each transaction that the provisions of this part have been met. This provision does not require any particular accounting method and does not require alteration of the system customarily maintained, provided such records supply an adequate basis for audit. Records may be retained in the form of microfilm or other photographic copies instead of the originals.

Sec. 1101.15 *Defense against claims for damages.* No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any default under any contract or order which shall result directly or indirectly from compliance with this part or any provision thereof, notwithstanding that this part or such provision shall thereafter be declared by judicial or other competent authority to be invalid.

Sec. 1101.16 *Violations.* Any person who wilfully violates any provisions of this part or wilfully conceals a material fact or furnishes false information in the course of operation under this part is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be punished by fine or imprisonment or both. In addition, administrative action may be taken against any such person, denying him the privileges generally accorded under this part.

Sec. 1101.17 *Amendments.* This part may be amended by the Under Secretary for Transportation, Department of Commerce, pursuant to delegation previously made to him. (15 F. R. 8739).

This part shall take effect immediately, subject to Section 7 of the Federal Register Act (49 Stat. 502, 44 U. S. C., Sec. 307).

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Interim Commission for ITO

The Attack on Trade Barriers. A Progress Report on the Operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from January 1948 to August 1949. 32 pp. printed, 15¢.

Security Council

Decisions Taken and Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council During the Year 1950. S/INF/4, February 1, 1951. 24 pp. mimeo.

Copper Import-Tax Suspension. S. Rept. 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3336] 3 pp.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Tripartite Commission and Creditors to Discuss German Debts

[Released to the press June 25]

A series of preliminary discussions between the tripartite Commission on German Debts and representatives of creditors will begin at London today. A list of those taking part is given below. The meetings will take place in Lancaster House. They are in preparation for the fuller discussions which will follow early in July, when representatives of the German Federal Government and of German debtors will also participate. Membership of the Tripartite Commission is as follows:

FRANCE

representatives: F. D. Gregh, R. Sergent

UNITED KINGDOM

representatives: Sir George Rendel, Sir David Waley

UNITED STATES

representatives: Warren Lee Pierson, John W. Gunter

The following will represent the creditors:

FRANCE

representatives: Léon Martin, Association Nationale des Porteurs Français de valeurs Mobilières; M. Barrault, Office des Biens et Intérêts Privés; Jean Velay, M. De Peyrecave, Pascal Lebé, Banques et Instituts financiers; Louis Bougenot, Fédération Française des Sociétés d'Assurances; M. Eude, Chambres de Commerce; M. Vienot, Association Française pour la Sauvegarde des Biens et Intérêts Français à l'Étranger

UNITED KINGDOM

representatives: Earl of Bessborough, Sir Otto Niemeyer, Mr. Lochhead, N. J. Leggett, E. F. M. Butler, Committee of Long-Term and Medium-Term Creditors; Sir Edward Reid, E. G. Kleinwort, L. St. C. Ingrams, R. A. Houseman, Committee of British Standstill Creditors; J. A. Pollen, L. Ward, British Insurance Interests; V. Cavandish-Bentnick, F. Taylor, British Commercial Creditors

UNITED STATES

representatives: James Grafton Rogers, Kenneth M. Spang, Dudley B. Bonsal, Foreign Bondholders Protective Council; Andrew L. Gomory, U. S. Standstill Creditors; H. Struve Hensel, Holders of Corporate Bonds

The meetings will also be attended by representatives of the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, who will be present as observers.

Delegate Appointed to U.N. Conference on Status of Refugees

[Released to the press June 29]

George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State, has been designated United States delegate to the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries to consider the draft convention relative to the status of refugees which is to convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 2, 1951.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has invited governments which are not members of the United Nations, as well as governments which are members, to participate in the forthcoming Conference for the purpose of completing the drafting of, and of adopting (1) a convention on the status of refugees and (2) a protocol on the status of stateless persons.

A draft convention and a draft protocol have been prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons which was established in August 1949 by the United Nations Economic and Social Council for the purpose of making recommendations for the legal protection of refugees and of persons who do not enjoy the protection of governments. Pursuant to a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1950, the Conference will make a detailed examination of those two instruments and will also give special attention to the problem of arriving at a suitable definition of the term "refugees."


Extension for Claims-Filing Against Closed Institutions in Japan

[Released to the press June 27]

According to a recent announcement by the Closed Institutions Liquidating Commission, an agency of the Japanese Government, the time limit for the filing of claims arising outside Japan against closed financial institutions now being liquidated by the Commission has been extended from July 16 to October 16, 1951.¹

¹ For previous information see BULLETIN of Apr. 9, 1951, p. 580.

Organization of German Federal Government



STATE PARLIAMENTS											
BAVARIA U.S. ZONE Hans Ehard (CSU)	BREMEN U.S. ZONE Wilhelm Kosen (SPD)	HESSE U.S. ZONE Georg August Zinn (SPD)	WÜRTTEMBERG-BADEN U.S. ZONE Reinhold Maser (FDP)	HAMBURG BR. ZONE Max Brauer (SPD)	LOWER SAXONY BR. ZONE Herrich Kopf (SPD)	NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA BR. ZONE Karl Arnold (CDU)	SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN BR. ZONE Walter Götting (CDU)	RHINELAND-PALZ FR. ZONE Friedrich Kasper (CDU)	BADEN FR. ZONE Leo Wohleb (CDU)	WÜRTTEMBERG-HOENZOLLERN FR. ZONE Gebhard Müller (CDU)	BERLIN Sends observers to both Houses

Political Parties in Western Germany

BHE/DG = Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (Refugee Party)	DP = Deutsche Partei (Germany Party)	SPD = Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
BP = Bayerische Volkspartei (Bavarian People's Party)	DDP = Demokratische Partei (Democratic Party)	SSW = Süddeutsche Volkspartei (South German People's Party)
CDU = Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)	FDP = Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)	WAV = Wirtschaftliche Aufbau Vereinigung (Economic Reconstruction Association)
CSU = Christlich-Sozialer Union (Christian Social Union)	KPD = Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)	Z = Zentrumspartei (Center Party)

Assisting Germany To Become a Peaceful Democracy

by John J. McCloy

U. S. High Commissioner for Germany¹

I am very happy to be back in this country for a short visit and to have this opportunity to give you a brief account of the situation in Germany as I see it.

When Germany is discussed, I think three major questions come to everyone's mind:

1. Why is Germany important to the United States?
2. Where does Germany stand in the great East-West struggle?
3. What progress has been made toward achieving a democratic state in Germany?

Germany is important to the United States for many reasons. Twice, within the lifetimes of many of us, Germany has compelled the United States to send troops to Europe to check her aggression. Now a strange twist of fate has placed Western Germany on the frontier of the free peoples of the West. We have had to spend vast sums and great energies in the attempt to help this new state become a peaceful democratic country.

The boundary line between freedom and suppression runs through Germany from the North Sea to the Czechoslovakian border and along it to Austria. Seventy miles from my office in Frankfurt, the Soviet Zone begins, and in that zone there are many fully-equipped and thoroughly trained Russian divisions. I have another office in Western Berlin, which lies like a tiny island of freedom 100 miles inside the Soviet Zone. That island is a frontier as well. It does not survive there because of any indulgent attitude on the part of the Soviets. West Berlin survives because of the spirit of its people and because the Western powers have made it clear that aggression there would constitute aggression against the entire free world.

Attempts to Communize Germany

Germany is one of the highest tension areas in the world. The Soviets are putting every possible effort, short of outright military aggression, into

a campaign to overwhelm the Germans and to make that country their greatest satellite. They know that if they could do this all Europe might be forced to succumb. Their menacing military forces in Eastern Germany, in the satellite countries, and in Russia provide a base from which they launch an alternating campaign of fear and blandishment. This campaign is designed to break the will of the German people—and other free peoples—to resist and to live an independent life. In the Soviet Zone of Germany, every familiar technique of the police state is used to subjugate the people—forced labor camps, secret police, rigged elections, political and economic pressure, and all other weapons of the totalitarian strategy of repression.

A mighty Soviet propaganda machine is also at work which submits the Germans of both the East and West zones to an intense, incessant barrage of psychological warfare which you must experience to appreciate. No expense, no effort is spared to win the war of ideas. Every day powerful transmitters in the East Zone and in Russia pour out this material, some of it crude, some of it subtle. The Communists employ every distortion and take advantage of every element of weakness. Every person, group, institution, and organization is subjected to this flood in newspapers, films, posters, pamphlets, books, and letters. It is augmented and stimulated by infiltration of agents and activists. It adds up to an enormous expenditure of energy and wealth on the part of the Communist world. In recent months, it has been largely directed against the United States.

This coming August in East Berlin a propaganda show, which may well be the greatest propaganda show of all times, will take place. Some 1,750,000 young people will be regimented to march and demonstrate in favor of Soviet political aims. This march of the so-called Free German Youth, in reality Slave German Youth, will be a vast masquerade of these aims in the dress of such attractive slogans as Peace, Freedom, and Unity.

What is the Communist goal in all this? The principal objective of all these efforts is to destroy faith in the principles and power of the free

¹Address made over Mutual network at Washington on June 26 and released to the press on the same date.

nations of the West. The Communists are trying to interfere with and destroy the unity of the free nations. They are trying to prevent German participation in the common defense of the West. They are trying to keep Europe weak.

These efforts have to be constantly combatted on our side by a vigorous and sustained flow of truthful information, by demonstrating the strength and value of a free way of life, by evidence of our determination to defend that life if attacked.

I think it requires no extensive argument to convince us all that the outcome of this struggle in the center of Europe is of the greatest importance to the United States.

Last June, when the Communists crossed the 38th parallel in Korea, the analogy between Germany and Korea came to many an anxious mind. Both geographically and politically, that analogy in large part still holds.

I stress this point because there has recently been so much discussion of whether the most important front in the struggle against communism is in Europe or Asia. The answer is that both are important and vital. In Berlin and in West Germany, we meet in different form the same forces which we are meeting in Asia. In Berlin there is no shooting, but we are closer to the mainspring of the action which induces the shooting in Korea.

Western Berlin and Western Germany are outposts. Their fate is coupled with that of free people everywhere. We do not propose to make them satellites or subject them to the doctrine of any single party or creed. We seek only to give them a free choice and a free life. We intend to respect their choice as long as it does not take the form of a new extreme leading to aggression.

Germany's Alignment with the West

This brings me to my second question: Where do the Germans stand in the struggle between East and West?

This question has to be examined in several different ways before one can get a full answer to it.

In one sense, there is no doubt whatever of the answer. Germany feels itself a part of the West. And despite the great propaganda barrage, communism has steadily lost ground in Western Germany. In the elections during the past year in the U. S. Zone, the Communist Party lost all of its representatives in the state legislatures.

Unlike the West Germans, the 18 million East Germans, living under Soviet-Communist domination, have been unable to express themselves. There is no doubt that they too seek a free life, undominated by Communist influence. One day, the two zones must be united as a free state within a united Europe.

The 47 million people of the Federal Republic have thus far withstood all Communist attempts to separate them from the West. The blandishments of the so-called peace plebiscites, staged by

the Communists, have found no real response in Western Germany. The strategy of fear not only has failed to reduce the West Germans and the West Berliners to submission; it has evoked vigorous counter-measures.

All of the evidence indicates that the people of the Federal Republic identify themselves with the life of the West. Differences of opinion arise, however, on the question of active German participation in Western defense. Opposition to participation comes not only from Communists whose major aim is to weaken the West. Many Germans honestly oppose a contribution to defense because of their fear of anything suggesting the recreation of a German army with its possible use as an aggressive instrument. Some oppose participation because they see in it a threat to a unified Germany; some, because they fear it might bring on a war in which their land might not be sufficiently protected by the Allied forces. Others simply hope for a neutral Germany which somehow will be able to avoid all the unpleasant consequences of taking a firm position.

The debate has been going on since last September when the Foreign Ministers in New York first raised the question of a German contribution to Western defense. Personally, I find the debate a healthy sign. Certainly, the German decision on a contribution to the defense of Europe will be a free one. If participation comes, as I think it will, it will come because the German people feel it is their responsibility to participate in the defense of their country as a member of the free community of nations.

At the present time there is no clear decision. But the idea of neutralism seems to be less appealing as it becomes apparent that such a policy would play so patently into the hands of the Communists. The growing strength of the Western powers and their increased forces in Germany will bring greater confidence that defense of Europe and Germany is a tenable proposition. It is becoming clearer that Germany will be accepted by the Allies as an equal partner in the Western community. Another factor is the growing awareness among the German people that it would be anomalous if the Germans themselves did not take a place at the side of non-Germans in the defense of Germany.

Educating Germany for Democracy

This brings me to my third and, in some ways, the most important question: How democratic is Germany today? Can the Germans be trusted with any arms at all?

There must be many people in this country who wonder whether this talk of a German military contribution, however safeguarded, is not dangerous and perhaps foolish. Does it mean, you may ask, that we have forgotten what Germany's militarism meant in the past? Are we not risking the same fearful consequences again? Six short

years ago, the German armies were defeated in the most destructive war in history. Have we forgotten how we vowed that never again would we allow Germany to become a military power? Is not our present policy a reversal of this resolve; is it not a short-sighted policy of expediency?

These are all serious questions, and honesty demands that they be thoroughly explored. The answers will be more easily understood, however, if we can first be quite clear about exactly what policy we are now following toward Germany.

In the first place, it is not a policy which advocates or condones a revival of German militarism. The United States and its Allies are as determined as ever that there will be no German General Staff in the old Prussian sense, no military caste with the political and social power it once exercised, and no German national army, which would be capable of becoming the source or the instrument of a future aggression. It is the fundamental principle of all proposals made to date that whatever German contribution to defense is made may only take the form of a force which is an integral part of a larger international organization. These conditions of a German contribution are of vital importance. If the German people decide to contribute to Western defense, it will be on these terms, and every precaution will be taken to see that they are enforced. I am glad to say that we have evidence that the Germans themselves want it this way.

In the second place, our policy on participation does not mean that the United States and its Allies are making or will make any concessions toward nazism or neo-nazism. There must be guarantees for the future that such groups would not be permitted to guide or control any German contribution.

As for expediency, the concept of German defense participation is no more expedient than any other action which is needed to cope realistically with the present world situation.

And now I come to the fundamental question—how democratic is Western Germany?

As you know, the United States, Great Britain, and France, who occupy West Germany and West Berlin, have given major attention to the problem of bringing about a democratic government and social order in Germany. Six years is not a long time to achieve such an end. A democracy is not produced by fiat; one cannot legislate it into being. It must come as a result of education, and in the last analysis it must be self-education.

It must be borne in mind that Germany's social structure was a predominantly authoritarian one and that nazism was not some freakish phenomenon that appeared over night. It was a direct product of an authoritarian society in a great social crisis. In such a society, a totalitarian solution finds ready followers.

It would be false to deny that a great deal of this authoritarian cultural pattern is still in exist-

ence in Germany. It is there—it still exists in the whole sphere of human relations.

In six years, even in this time of revolutionary transition, Germany could not be expected to have transformed itself into a democracy in the sense that we in America understand it—as a habitual social practice. But at the same time, one can truthfully say that the new Germany is moving to become a democracy. Starts have been made, and we have been devoting large efforts to further this development on every level of German society—in the schools and universities, in labor, church, and civic organizations, in radio and press, in the political and governmental structure.

The form of a German democracy will never be entirely like ours, but its constitution and its government are democratic and its chief political leaders are pro-democratic. The country has a free press. Freedom of speech and the rights of the individual are respected. All over Germany there are small groups of people who really understand the principles of representative government and the Bill of Rights. They are sincerely and effectually working for it.

Economically, Western Germany has made a large recovery which helps not only the Germans, but also other peoples of the free world. Its level of production is now one third greater than before the war. The old cartels which once turned a large part of Germany's economy over to Hitler have been or are being broken up into smaller competing units. If the German people recognize their own best interests, they will see to it in future that these concentrations do not reemerge. Although its economic and financial structure is still shaky, West Germany is now able to maintain a decent standard of living for the majority of its population. Compared with conditions in the Soviet Zone, the Federal Republic's economy is prosperous indeed.

The Government of Western Germany has displayed a salutary willingness to join various plans for international cooperation such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe. Most significant, both politically and economically, has been the signing of the Schuman Plan in which France, Germany, and the Benelux nations have agreed to share their coal and iron and steel resources for the common good. If France and Germany, traditional enemies in Europe's wars, endorse this type of cooperation and carry it out, the cornerstone of European unity will be securely laid. The Schuman Plan is a great, constructive step toward European peace and union. No issue must be allowed to get in its way.

Of course, Germany faces many problems, which if not solved could produce dangerous opportunities for radical groups of the Right and the Left. There is a shortage of capital for improving the industrial plant. High prices and taxes engender discontent among the working groups. There are

still a great number of refugees, among the nine million who have streamed into West Germany since the war, who must be fully assimilated into the economy.

In Germany, as in other countries, there are venal people. Some make money by selling strategic materials to the East Zone and other Communist-dominated areas. The long eastern border and the difficulty of adequate inspection controls have made it easier for them to carry on their harmful trade. I have requested the government of the Federal Republic to take action against these practices, and I am convinced that it is serious about checking this trade. The Federal Chancellor has instituted a centralized licensing system to control closely all trade with the East. We have sent American inspection teams to augment the work of German police along the border. These measures and others with German and Allied cooperation have greatly reduced and should continue to reduce the flow of strategic materials to Communist areas.

Political Concepts Gradually Changing

On the political front, we are watching closely the outcroppings of small fanatic parties, who seek to appeal to malcontent groups.

In the state elections in Lower Saxony, in the British Zone on May 6, the Socialist Reichs Party (SRP), largely under leadership of former Nazis, won 11 percent of the popular vote and 16 seats in the legislature. This has been widely publicized as a revival of nazism, and it is indisputably an outcropping of the old Nazi spirit.

This event occurred in a state which was once a stronghold of nazism, where unemployment is exceptionally high, and where one-fourth of the population consists of refugees. Yet in that state, 85 percent of the voters gave their support to parties which upheld the democratic idea. In my judgment, a group similar to the SRP could not marshal as much support in any of the other German states in the West Zone.

Nevertheless, the potential threat of the Socialist Reichs Party to German democracy must not be minimized.

The Federal and state governments are alert to the danger, and possess the power to suppress extremist political groups. Such action has already been taken against the SRP's strong-arm squads. Further action against the party itself may be taken when in the next few weeks the Constitutional Court, which alone can outlaw it, is established.

A situation such as this gives the Germans a chance to show the strength of the Federal Republic. The world will watch closely how the German authorities and people meet this test. I believe they will meet it successfully. They must, if the peoples of the world are not again to turn against Germany.

Let me now try to summarize my answer on the

question of democracy in Germany. I think there is a residue of authoritarian attitudes in German society, there is some aggressive nationalism, there is a feeling among certain groups of superiority over other peoples. There is a reluctance among some to face the full significance of the terrible crimes of the Hitler years.

And yet in West Germany and in West Berlin, particularly among the youth of the country, there is a growing understanding of and appreciation for concepts of freedom and democracy; there is a strong desire to become a part of a wider community and to cooperate with the Western World. In the press and radio, in schools, in adult education groups, in civic organizations, in some of the political parties, and in parliaments, courageous men and women are emerging. They are trying to show the way to a democratic life. It is our policy to help them.

Not long ago, I had an opportunity to speak before the students of the University of Frankfurt. I was interested to know what the reaction would be when I made the following statement: "The time has come in Germany to stop debating the question whether or not democracy is the right form of government for the Germans. It is the only form in which men can live in freedom and decency." There was long and deep-felt applause. The response of the students reflects a belief that is growing among the German people.

Ten years from now we shall have a more definite answer to the question of democracy in Germany. But, as I have said, I have confidence today that progress is being made. I am convinced that our programs to aid democratic development in Germany are vital. Above all, I am convinced that German integration with Western Europe and with the Atlantic Community is the best way to ensure that Germany will be democratic.

I want to emphasize this thought. Local solutions are no longer solutions anywhere in the world. There is no real solution of the German problem inside Germany alone. There is a solution inside the European-Atlantic-World Community. Inside this wider community, there is room for the imagination and energies of all young Europeans, including the Germans, to flourish. In it some of the perennial minor disputes, on which demagogues and nationalists like to fasten, would disappear.

Our Basic Policy

The basic aim of our policy in Germany has been and will remain the development of the German Federal Republic into a cooperative member of the Western Community of free nations. In six years, as I have said, a significant start has been made. I believe that these beginnings are sound enough to warrant confidence in Western Germany as a partner in the defense of the West.

In the attempt to carry out this policy, the Foreign Ministers met in Brussels last December

They decided that a logical counterpart to Germany's participation to Western defense would be the return to Germany of a large measure of sovereignty. We are at present engaged in studies directed toward the replacement of the present Occupation Statute by a series of contracts with the Federal Republic. These contracts will provide for the protection of the interests and functions of the Allies which are vital to their security and defense.

There are, of course, risks in our decisions on Germany, but it is wise and necessary that we take these risks. In the Western World, nations must be free. The paramount necessity today is the alignment of the free nations into a determined union in defense of a civilized social order which permits individual freedoms.

The magnitude of the stakes warrants the utmost in effort and sacrifice from the democratic nations of the world. In this task, the United States has a tremendous responsibility of leadership. The biggest contribution we can now make is to give clear evidence to the world that we are capable of carrying out this responsibility.

A few weeks ago, a prominent German said to me: "We Europeans like your great debates, but it's a little too much to have one every six weeks." His thought is prevalent in the minds of many Europeans. It is of the greatest urgency today that the people of the United States, who are making such large sacrifices for freedom, recognize the importance of a united and firm policy, and support it. The strength of such a policy will then flow out to the rest of the democratic world.

From my experience in Europe, I am convinced that nothing would do more to strengthen the democratic forces in Europe, particularly in the young republic of Germany, than such a manifestation from this country. I am convinced that it would invigorate the forces of freedom everywhere, even those behind the Iron Curtain. It would help assure that peace and freedom will prevail.

Point Four Agreement Signed With Mexico

[Released to the press June 27]

Through an exchange of notes, effected June 27, Mexico and the Government of the United States, through its Embassy in Mexico City, have agreed upon the terms of a Point Four general agreement which will in the future govern technical cooperation between the two Governments.

The agreement, as its name indicates, sets forth the general rules which will govern collaboration between the two countries in the field of technical assistance and which, without referring specifically to any predetermined project, will allow the expansion of that cooperation in such activities and under such conditions as the two Governments

may find to be to their mutual advantage. In short, it establishes principles which should be applied in each and every one of the concrete projects for technical assistance.

Since the agreement is of a general nature, when the two Governments decide to carry out any specific project of technical cooperation, they will draw up a supplemental agreement to the one that has just been signed.

The United States and Mexico are already engaged in six technical-cooperation projects under the Point Four Program. These include the fields of mining, fisheries, health and sanitation, geological investigations, and rubber development, as well as a number of student exchanges in a variety of fields.

One of the first of these projects got under way in 1942 when the Institute of Inter-American Affairs cooperated with the Mexican Government in setting up a joint health and sanitation "servicio." During the past 9 years, the "servicio," composed of United States and Mexican technicians, has developed a comprehensive public health and water supply program. Forty-five public water supplies and 22 sewer systems have been built, and 8 other water systems have received chlorination equipment. Five health centers have been established. Other activities include malaria and tuberculosis control, creation of maternal and child hygiene clinics, and the training of doctors in tropical medicine and public health. The "servicio" employs a staff of 7 Americans and 478 Mexicans. The Chief of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs Field Party is Dr. Alonzo Hardison, of Franklin, Tennessee. Dr. Hardison received degrees from the University of Tennessee and Johns Hopkins.

Mexico is one of 10 Latin-American countries participating in a rubber development program. The project began in 1940 when war threatened United States sources of natural rubber in the Far East. Seventeen agricultural technicians are providing guidance in the cooperating countries. Three are currently working in Mexico.

Nine Department of Interior specialists in the fields of geology, mining, and fishery are cooperating with Mexican experts. Mineral resource findings and the solution of some of the mining, milling, and metallurgical problems, under the expanding Point Four Program, will be of economic and strategic importance to both countries. The technicians are cooperating in investigation of metallic and non-metallic resources and coal deposits while a representative of the Fish and Wildlife Service assists in the development of marine and inland fishery resources.

Many Mexican technicians have received advanced training in the United States. Forty-four of them recently completed studies in various sections of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, and Federal Security Agency.

Address by President Plaza of Ecuador to the Congress of the United States

The following is the text of an address made on June 21 by Galo Plaza, President of Ecuador, to the Congress of the United States.¹

It is with deep appreciation that I have accepted the honor of speaking before the Congress of the United States of America in my capacity as President of a nation which, although small in size, can bring before you a record of moral achievement in having established, after years of political upheaval and despite heavy odds, a stable and truly democratic Government.

The privilege which you have graciously afforded me on this occasion is definite proof that your great country, which was built upon faith in people and their ability to govern themselves, is happy to give recognition to people elsewhere who cherish the same faith and the same hopes, and that your high and noble aims will always be to strengthen human freedom and the inherent dignity of man throughout the world.

If we look back into history, we find that the Declaration of Independence of your Republic, the basic document of your public life, was a major inspiration for our own heroes who fought for the political independence of Ecuador. Thanks in large measures to your splendid example, we are today a free and democratic nation.

More than a century has gone by since those heroic days and as the nations of the world again face critical times, we, the young republics in Latin America, once more find compelling reasons to look to you for leadership. Now that destiny has thrust the responsibility for the future of mankind upon your mighty and prosperous land, your aims and aspirations differ dramatically from those of all the other powerful nations which throughout history have dominated the world at one time or another. You are not interested in conquering land and subjugating peoples, you are not interested in imposing your rule anywhere; your purpose is far more noble and of far greater spiritual value. You want for the rest of the world what is already a reality in your own country. Your people enjoy an economic structure which calls for continuous improvement and reform toward better living standards, improved labor conditions, participation in the benefits accruing from increased wealth without loss of personal freedom and the right to free speech, to work, to strike. These are your intentions and your plans for all mankind and we are with you in this fight against servitude, poverty, and injustice.

This is why the free nations of the world must close ranks and fight for the principles that inspire your way of life. We have before us a powerful enemy of freedom, bent on bringing about confusion and disunion. They, the agents of a tyrannic imperialism, are creating a dangerously fanatic creed based on false promises and totalitarian solutions. In order to counteract this fanaticism we must give democracy the passionate strength and spiritual inspiration it had in the past.

I hold to a deep-rooted faith that communism has no chance to impose its doctrines upon the world, for that would mean the victory of two elements hostile to the best in human nature: brute force and dishonest propa-

¹ *Cong. Rec.* of June 21, 1951, p. 7060.

Released to the press by the White House June 25

The President of Ecuador and the President of the United States are associated in their approval of the following statements:

The President of the Republic of Ecuador and the President of the United States of America have met in Washington, D.C. and have reaffirmed their determination to continue their support of the efforts of the United Nations to reestablish peace in the world. They will remain steadfastly united in the present emergency. The two nations solemnly declare their attachment to the principles set forth in the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States and in other international agreements to maintain peace and security. They intend to defend themselves against aggression, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, improve the living standards of their peoples, promote their cultural and economic progress, and ensure respect for the fundamental freedoms of man and the principles of social justice that are the bases of their democratic systems.

President Plaza expressed the desire of his Government to cooperate closely with the United States and other free nations in the adoption of measures for increasing the production and processing of basic and strategic materials for the defense emergency. At the same time, he also emphasized the need to strengthen the economy of his country, and the two Presidents discussed ways in which the United States might be of assistance.

In recognition of the importance of Ecuadoran plans for fuller economic development, it has been agreed to make joint studies of the economic potentialities of Ecuador and the most effective means for furthering the fuller use of Ecuadoran resources to accelerate its economic and social progress.

President Plaza expressed his recognition of the value of the Point Four technical cooperation now in progress in the fields of agriculture, health, sanitation, education, transportation, and related fields and his gratification that the United States is prepared sympathetically to consider further requests for technical assistance from the Government of Ecuador.

In the cultural field, it has also been agreed to enter upon the negotiation at an early date of a cultural convention between Ecuador and the United States to improve and broaden the cultural relations between the two countries. Such a convention would encourage and further stimulate the present cultural exchange between Ecuador and the United States.

ganda. While aggressive force pretends to do away with dignity, false propaganda annuls intelligence. If dignity and intelligence are taken from man, it will mean his ultimate destruction.

These are the dangers we face today, which place

emendous responsibility upon this parliament, whose impact on the course of history is recognized throughout the world.

The nations of the Americas do not believe in peace imposed by tyranny. Our wars of independence in the nineteenth century were inspired in our will for liberty. Now, and always, we will be ready to defend freedom to the limit of our possibilities. We can accept the use of force only as a last resort in defense of peace, never for domination or for new aggressions.

I am speaking to you, gentlemen, in the name of a youth American Republic that has learned to cherish liberty and hence, to realize the dangers of losing it. Therefore we realize that we must all be ready and alert to defend it with conviction, through the printed word, in the classroom, in the workshop, and the public square; and, if need be, if all else fails, if truth and reason cannot last prevail, then on the field of battle.

We should strive to tell the world that the strength of democracy resides in freedom of discussion and conviction through reason, while the totalitarian system depends solely upon force and propaganda. This was the case with fascism and it failed, this was the case with nazism and that failed; for the same reasons, any other totalitarian system is doomed to inevitable failure. Any doctrine which denies individual liberty and the right to free discussion is reactionary, no matter what it calls itself. That propaganda tries to hide with purges and a government-controlled press is simply fear of the truth. It has been said that one of the weaknesses of democracy is excessive freedom of discussion. I believe that precisely here resides the greatness and the strength of democracy. You here, gentlemen in this Congress, have given the world proof of the vitality of your way of life and your civic institutions, by discussing freely and openly before the whole world problems of history-making scope. This is what we also do today in my country, in parliament, in the press and public assemblies, without restrictions of any kind, because our strength grows out of the fact that we do not fear discussion nor the truth. Our governments do not seek power through the imposition of a police state, but by stimulating a vigorous public opinion.

In Ecuador, I may say with pride, that anyone is free to express his opinion and to criticize the Government. We enjoy unrestricted liberty of the press.

This that would frighten a dictator, I consider our paramount accomplishment, because constructive criticism is an essential aid to good government. A real democracy is inconceivable without the right to freedom of expression. Whoever reasons that the democratic formula of government, to be successful, can be applied only in a powerful and highly developed nation, like your own, and that in certain countries or regions of the world dictatorships and colonial regimes are more in accordance with the psychology and temperament of the people, is unwittingly or deliberately misleading world opinion.

In our fight against aggression there is no sense in a position of neutrality or indecision. The defense of democracy is a defense of our own way of life, of our very life itself. This is why the resolute decision of the United Nations to fight aggression wherever it might appear, has the approval of the free world. This is why at the fourth meeting of consultation of Foreign Ministers, the American nations have shown their firmness against aggression in any form. We realize that we must stand together and strengthen ourselves, both physically and spiritually, if we are to keep the specter of a new war from casting its dread shadow over all our homes. This is the only way to teach the forces of confusion and chaos to respect the will of the democratic world. Only then will we live to see, in the near future, an honorable peace which is after all our ultimate and common goal.

This is our thinking in Latin America, this is how we look upon the crisis of today, how we evaluate democracy and understand our responsibilities; but, on the other hand, we need also to be understood through knowledge of our realities and problems.

Only the towering height of our mountains, the length

of our great rivers and the vastness of our forests are comparable in magnitude to the problems we face. But these mountains and this virgin soil are not merely reserves for the future progress of mankind, but a permanent challenge to the ability of the peoples of the Americas to advance their common interests through their own labors.

The people of Ecuador have made it possible for me to show proof that democratic institutions are successful in a country weighed down with all kinds of limitations. Our very existence is a valiant struggle against poverty, ignorance and ill health. On the positive side of the ledger we can show progressive legislation which seeks to correct, gradually, social and economic patterns established over centuries. We are beginning to take good advantage of technical aid and above all, we live in a climate of liberty and respect for human dignity.

The battle for freedom and the rejection of poverty and injustice should not have any geographical limitations. It should be carried out everywhere and in the case of Latin America it is wise to recall how near we are to you. We practically live in a wing of the same building; but if we overemphasize the good will and intentions and the patience of the peoples below the Rio Grande, we might be giving too much of a headway to the forces that, moving in the dark, with the weapons of falsehood and deception, intend to undermine our spiritual foundations. To meet this threat, we must give our masses the opportunity to work and to seek their betterment, and we must do it now.

Our vast majorities need urgent solutions of their problems, solutions suited to our own realities, American solutions for American problems. These cannot be met by solutions designed for Europe or Asia; but we should strive earnestly and promptly to remedy the dangerous disproportion that now exists between progressive economies and the economies of underdeveloped areas.

The time has come for you North Americans and us of Central and South America, for all of us throughout this new world discovered by Columbus, to strengthen our ties, face the responsibility to cooperate in the solution of our own mutual problems, the most important of which is the defense of our democratic institutions, by adopting a firm attitude against aggression. In my country as in all the others of Latin America, a sound policy of investment for constructive progress designed to secure mutual benefits would be the most effective way to fight the infiltration of subversive doctrines. When the peoples of Latin America realize that they can improve their living standards through their own efforts, thanks to proper guidance and assistance, their faith in our common democratic destiny will unquestionably be strengthened.

New industries and modern methods for production, based on our immense natural resources and developed with the aid of your technical know-how, will carry civilization to the most remote corners of our hemisphere so that the men of all the Americas may attain their rightful heritage.

We all should gain from such a process which does not call for embarrassing and unnecessary handouts. Your industrial production would find better markets in countries with a higher economic development than in those hardly able to meet their exchange obligations through the production of raw materials alone. Therefore the far-sighted concept of assistance to underdeveloped regions of the world set forth in President Truman's Point Four Program, blueprinted by the Gray report and the report to President Truman from the International Development Advisory Board headed by that great citizen of the Americas, Nelson Rockefeller, if put into effect, would mean for the United States a great historic decision in keeping with its stature and its noble Christian traditions. A program of this nature would constitute a vital factor in eliminating all possibility of communistic infiltration in the world in which we live. It would mean answering false promises with tangible accomplishments, lies with the truth, a philosophy of imposition with one of freedom: freedom of thought and action, freedom to achieve that

spiritual and material well-being which truly dignifies human living.

Because a bold policy of credit and technical assistance for economic development would defeat poverty, which is a breeding ground for communism, such a policy is urgently needed.

The vision of the statesmen and parliamentarians of today will profoundly alter the course of history. In your hands, gentlemen, is the shaping of events to come, and the fate of hundreds of millions of people whose future will be determined by the way your great Nation plays the role in which destiny has cast it. The men fighting today in Korea are doing so in the name of the free world; the hopes of all of us are with them. That free world wants an honorable peace, a peace that will permit us to live with honor, with tolerance for all ideas, religious beliefs, and political systems; not a peace without liberty in a world of fear. This is why we cannot trust in any solution that would not dispel the element of fear.

The weak points in our democratic front, which are constantly exploited by the enemies of freedom, have to do precisely with low standards of living in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

The countries of Latin America are far from prosperous. They demand a place under the sun which they justly deserve, and when their inhabitants can enjoy the benefits of constructive economic activity, they will certainly be more ready to defend what they have got. Freedom and political ideas mean little when you are walking around on bare feet with an empty stomach. If we can unite our efforts and solve our mutual problems for the benefit of all, there will never be a power strong enough to destroy Western civilization in our hemisphere.

We have always considered the United States of America as the arsenal of democracy, not only the arsenal of battle during the tragic hours of war, but also the arsenal of ideas and ideals which have inspired our political institutions, and, equally important, the arsenal of progress, of prosperity, of means for production, and of technical knowledge. If you can apply all this in global proportions you will be fulfilling the sublime destiny which historical imperatives have created for you in this day and age: the salvation of mankind from fear and insecurity, the final proscription of war and a firm hope of lasting peace for all the world.

RFC Studies Development of Hemp Production in Ecuador

[Released to the press June 25]

To meet the defense needs of the United States for abaca or Manila hemp, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Rfc) has been investigating the possibility of establishing an abaca plantation in Ecuador. Under authority of the Abaca Production Act of 1950 (Public Law 683) the Rfc is authorized to develop abaca production in the Western Hemisphere, so that a supply of this strategic material will be available for stockpiling purposes to meet emergency requirements.

A preliminary survey, which has been made by soil specialists of the United States Department of Agriculture under direction of Reconstruction Finance Corporation, indicates that conditions are suitable in Ecuador for the production of abaca on a plantation basis. The Rfc is currently conducting more detailed investigations of soils in Ecuador and, if the results are favorable, and transportation is available, the Rfc may estab-

lish, in agreement with the Government of Ecuador, an abaca plantation. This plantation would comprise 7,000 to 8,000 acres and require an investment of approximately 7 million dollars. It is contemplated that the plantation would provide employment for approximately 1,000 persons.

Most of the abaca (or Manila) fiber used in the United States is made into rope and cables for ships, for which use it is particularly adapted, having the necessary high tensile strength, durability, lightness, and resistance to salt water. Abaca rope absorbs water slowly and dries quickly, thus preventing, to a large extent, the rotting which ordinarily is so destructive to other types of rope in marine use.

The Government of Ecuador has indicated to the Government of the United States its willingness to cooperate with this Government in increasing the production of this strategic fiber.

Ecuador Granted Permit For Airline Route

[Released to the press June 25]

The Department of State announced today that during his recent visit to Washington, His Excellency Galo Plaza, President of Ecuador, was handed a copy of the foreign air carrier permit which the United States, through the Civil Aeronautics Board, issued June 22 to the Ecuadoran airline Aerovias Ecuatorianas, C. A. (AREA) for a route from the Republic of Ecuador via intermediate points to Miami, Fla. This permit, which was approved by the President of the United States, was granted to cover services over the route provided for in the United States-Ecuador Bilateral Air Transport Agreement.

The issuance of this permit in accordance with the terms of the existing agreement is further evidence of the desire of the United States to foster the development of civil aviation in Latin America in accordance with the Bermuda principles of air transportation.

This is the first Ecuadoran airline to be granted a permit for scheduled air services between the two countries and serves to emphasize the close cooperation which exists between them.

Export-Import Bank Announces Credits for Ecuador

[Released to the press by the Export-Import Bank June 22]

The Export-Import Bank announced June 22 that the Board of Directors had authorized a credit of \$500,000 in favor of the Republic of Ecuador

and that other credits for Ecuador are presently under active study in the Bank.

The credit announced June 22 will assist in financing the costs of rehabilitation and improvement of the waterworks system of the city of Ambato in the province of Tungurahua, which was damaged by the earthquake of August 1949. Ambato is the fifth largest city in Ecuador. It has many industries which are important to the Ecuadorian economy and is located in an agricultural section which supplies much of the needs of the thickly populated Ecuadorian sierra. Similar projects for several other municipalities in the area affected by that earthquake will be considered by the Bank as rapidly as the engineering studies, now under way, are completed.

The waterworks credit for the Ambato project and the others like it which the Bank may approve will be allocations of the commitment authorized by the Bank in December 1949 following the Ecuadorian earthquake.

The Bank is also making urgent study of an application for a loan of 1 million dollars to assist Ecuador in financing the improvement and expansion of its airport facilities at the capital city of Quito and the principal seaport, Guayaquil. Improvement and expansion of the Quito facilities are intended to make it possible for the big four-engine planes now used in international air traffic to land there and to provide improved terminal facilities. The application for the Guayaquil airport, an important stopping point in international air traffic, is for extending and hard-surfacing runways and expanding terminal facilities.

Among additional projects that have been presented for the consideration of the Bank are: building material and construction machinery for the earthquake zone, a hydroelectric plant at Rio Verde to supply power to the Ambato area, a system of grain storage and cleaning facilities which will be considered by the Bank as rapidly as the engineering studies, now underway, can be completed.

Homage Paid to Pilot Killed in Iran

[Released to the press June 27]

Dr. Henry G. Bennett, administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration, expressed deep regret over the death of pilot Roger Zents of Janesville, Wis., an employee of United States Overseas Airlines under contract to Point Four for locust-extermination work in Iran.

Zents crashed on June 25 while spraying a field from his small airplane, one of eight, equipped with spraying apparatus, which were flown to

Iran from the United States early in April at the urgent request of the Iranian Government.

"This brave and devoted pilot died in the service of his country and of humanity," said Dr. Bennett. "He was an effective soldier of peace."

Anniversaries of U.S. and Canadian Independence Observed

Statement by Secretary Acheson¹

This month both Canada and the United States mark the anniversaries of our independence.

We are not many generations removed from the founders of our countries. We are young nations.

The ideals which inspired the founding of our countries upon the continent of North America are also young and vigorous. They are still growing and exciting among men devotion, dedication, sacrifice.

The ideal of freedom, a fundamental tradition in our two countries, sometimes taken for granted among us, is desperately sought after by millions of our contemporaries.

The ideal of simple human dignity—embodied in the declaration of those unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is still today a revolutionary conception in a world overshadowed by a rebirth of tyranny.

The idea of self-government, proclaimed by our founders and maintained by succeeding generations, is tested anew by the challenge of each age.

The test which has fallen to us is to show that our countries under self-government can muster the material and spiritual strength to meet a challenge of unprecedented complexity and virulence. We are called upon to demonstrate that the institutions of self-government, which we have inherited, are capable of the decision and of the action now necessary to their survival.

Even more difficult, we are called upon to achieve that strength and that capacity for decision and action by means which do not themselves destroy our own values in the process.

Our people are required to summon up their greatest resources of wisdom, of understanding, of maturity, and of restraint to sustain in these trials the confidence of our founders in the institutions of freedom and self-government.

I am confident that we shall do this and that the free peoples of North America, allied with free men everywhere, will prove that the cause of freedom has not lost the power to awaken in men the utmost dedication and devotion.

I am confident that the cause of freedom shall survive triumphant.

¹Made over National Broadcasting Company and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on July 1 and released to the press on the same date.

President Receives Letter From Iranian Prime Minister

[Released to the press by the White House June 28]

Following is the text of a letter to the President from His Excellency, Mohammed Mosadeq, Prime Minister of Iran:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The special interest you have shown on various occasions in the welfare of our country in general, and in the recent oil question in particular, and the personal message you were kind enough to send me on 3 June 1951, prompt me to inform you that the Imperial Iranian Government has been duty-bound to put into force the law enacted by the two Houses of Parliament concerning the nationalization of the oil industry all over Iran and the *modus operandi* of that law in the quickest possible time.

Notwithstanding the urgency of the matter, the measures for the enforcement of the law were taken in a very gradual manner and with extreme care and caution, both in order to ensure the success of the preliminary steps, and also in order to bring about an understanding between the Government of Iran and the former oil company, and to give ample time to the latter for negotiations between their representatives and this Government.

The Imperial Iranian Government was ready in all sincerity to make the best possible use of this opportunity and it paid great attention to this matter especially in view of your kind message and the friendly mediations of the United States Ambassador in Tehran, and agreed with the request of the former oil company for the extension of the time limit originally fixed for these negotiations. Thus no measures were taken during 45 days after the enactment of the law.

The Imperial Iranian Government had repeatedly announced its readiness to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the company within the limits prescribed by the law fixing the *modus operandi* of its enforcement, and to discuss willingly various problems such as the question of the probable losses to the former oil company and the sale of oil to the former purchasers, etc. The Government, therefore, welcomed the arrival of the representatives of the former oil company, but it was found with great regret that the representatives of the former company wished to submit proposals which were contrary to the text of the laws concerning the nationalization of the oil industry and which made it unable for this Government to continue the discussions.

Since the Imperial Iranian Government has decided to prevent any stoppage, even for one day, in the exploitation of oil and its sale to the former purchasers, it has repeatedly announced its readiness to employ all foreign experts, technicians and

others in the service of the oil industry with the same salaries, allowances and pensions due to them, to provide them with all encouragement, to leave untouched the present organization and administration of the former oil company, and to enforce, so far as they may not be contrary to the provisions of the law, the regulations made by that company.

It is, however, noticed with regret that the former oil company authorities have resorted to certain actions which will necessarily cause a stoppage in the exportation of oil; for, firstly, they are encouraging the employees to leave their services, and are threatening the Government with their resignation en masse; secondly, they force the oil tankers to refuse to deliver receipts to the present Board of Directors of the National Oil Company.

Although the Iranian people have prepared themselves for every kind of privations in their resolve to achieve their aim, yet there is no doubt that the stoppage in the exploitation of oil machinery is not only damaging to us but it is also damaging to Great Britain and to all other countries which use the Iranian oil—a grave and serious matter which should be borne in mind by the authorities of the former oil company.

There is no doubt that the Government of Iran will take every effort with all the means at its disposal to prevent any stoppage, even temporarily, in the flow of oil, but it would be the cause for great regret if any stoppage occurred as the result of the resignation en masse of the British employees, or any delaying tactics in loading and shipping of the oil products because of the refusal on their part to give the receipts required. In such an eventuality the responsibility for the grave and undesirable consequences which might follow will naturally lie upon the shoulders of the former oil company authorities.

It must be mentioned at this stage that in spite of the public fervor in Iran there is no danger whatever to the security of life and property of the British nationals in Iran. Any spreading of false rumors on the part of the agents of the former oil company might, however, cause anxieties and disturbances; whilst if they acted in conformity with the expectations of the Iranian Government, there will be no cause whatever for any anxiety, for the Imperial Iranian Government has the situation well in hand.

Owing to the age-long and continuous cordial relations existing between the peoples of Iran and the United States, I am confident that no disturbances will ever occur in that happy relation, for the world regards the great and esteemed American nation as the strong supporter of the freedom and sovereignty of nations—a belief evidenced by the sacrifices of the great-hearted nation in the last two World Wars.

Such reflections have moved me to lay before you, Mr. President, the recent developments in Iran, and I am quite sure that the free nations of

the world and especially the Government of the friendly nation of America will not hesitate to support us in achieving our national ideal.

I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you, Mr. President, the expressions of my highest consideration and my most sincere wishes for the prosperity of the great American nation.

MOHAMMED MOSADEQ,
Prime Minister of Iran

Developments in Iran Cause Increased Concern

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press June 27]

The concern which I expressed last week over developments in Iran has been increased by what has taken place in that country during the past several days. I regret to say that the Iranian Government is proceeding with the nationalization of the oil industry in a manner which threatens immediately to bring the great Abadan refinery to a halt and to result in instability and economic distress within Iran with all the ill effects upon the Iranian people which that would entail.

The United States has repeatedly and publicly expressed its sympathy for the desires of the Iranian people to control their own resources. It has, however, strongly urged that changes in the relationship between the Iranian Government and the British interests involved be brought about on a basis consistent with the international responsibilities of both countries. It is the firm belief of the United States that a basis for agreement can be found. We were therefore disappointed that the recent British offer to Iran, which accepted the principle of nationalization and which had much to commend it, was summarily rejected by the Iranian Government without study to determine whether it could serve as a basis for further discussion.

The present atmosphere in Iran appears such as to render it most difficult for British technicians or technicians of any other country effectively to operate the vast oil producing and refining system. This atmosphere of threat and fear which results from hasty efforts to force cooperation in the implementation of the nationalization law cannot but seriously affect the morale of the employees and, consequently, their willingness to remain in Iran. Moreover the present stoppage of oil shipments indicates the dependence of the industry upon shipping and foreign marketing facilities. It is evident that unless arrangements are made very soon which would permit the tankers now tied up to move oil again,

storage facilities will become filled and the refinery will stop. I need not emphasize the effects that this would have.

In view of the great dangers involved in the present situation in Iran, and because of the strong desire of the United States to see the Iranian people realize their national aspirations without endangering their economy and society, I earnestly hope that Iran will reconsider its present actions and will seek some formula which will avoid the dangers of the present course and permit the continued operation of the oil industry.

If it is not possible at this time to agree upon a long-range basis for suitable collaboration, I sincerely hope that some interim arrangement can be made which will not prejudice the position of either side but which will, pending the development of something of a more permanent nature, permit British technicians to remain in Iran and the production and shipment of oil to be continued without interruption.

Hungarian "Trial" Continues Communist Attack on Human Rights

[Released to the press June 23]

In the trial of Archbishop Grosz and eight other Hungarian citizens now being staged in Hungary, the Communist regime of that country has resorted once more to its favorite but well-worn device of persecution by prosecution. There are the familiar charges against the accused of "conspiracy" and violation of "currency regulations," the usual attempt to implicate the American Legation in Budapest and the customary "confessions" which the Hungarian secret police have had ample opportunity to extract from the victims. There are also the same Communist lackeys running the show—Vilmos Olti the "judge" and Gyula Alapi the "prosecutor"—Whose names and faces, by reason of their habitual association with such farcical proceedings, have become symbolic of the perversion of justice in the Hungarian Communist courts.

The cases of Bishop Ordass, Cardinal Mindszenty, and Archbishop Grosz all combine to make clear the pattern of Communist repression. Those who live in freedom and under a just and ethical system of law as well as the Hungarian people themselves will recognize the current "trial" in Hungary for exactly what it is—a continuation of Communist efforts to suppress all human rights and liberties in Hungary, to crush all elements who will not become subservient to the regime, and to destroy the moral and religious influence of the Churches.

Foreign Relations Volume on Europe and Near East Released

[Released to the press July 7]

The Department of State released today *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, Volume II*, which contains the record of diplomatic relations between the United States and individual countries of Europe, the Near East, and Africa during that period.

This is the 130th volume in the annual series, which dates back to 1861. Forty special volumes concerned specifically with World War I, the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Russia: 1918-1919, and Japan: 1931-1941 have also been published. Volumes III and IV for 1934 dealing with the Far East and the American Republics respectively were previously released.¹ Two other volumes, Volume I, covering multilateral negotiations, and the British Commonwealth, and Volume V, The American Republics, will be issued as soon as they are ready.

Subjects of particular interest in the present volume are the consolidation of Nazi party control over German domestic and foreign affairs, the initial phase of the Ethiopian-Italian conflict, and trade discussions stimulated by the trade agreements legislation of June 12, 1934.

Documentation under the heading "Germany" exceeds that for any other country, partly because of background reports upon internal developments and their relationship to the advent of World War II. Nazification of German institutions of learning, of labor groups, and political life proceeded evidently with little effective opposition; not so, however, in the regime's competition with German Protestantism and the Roman Catholic Church to gain control of German youth.

Extension of Nazi activities to Czechoslovakia and Austria are also noted. In the latter country, where an abortive Nazi putsch removed Chancellor Dollfuss by murder, the American Minister was provoked to observe that "National Socialism is a disease which attacks many worthwhile people and has some strange results. It is a disease which has to be eradicated if Germany and Europe are to be saved."

Relations between the United States and Germany in this period were pronouncedly cool due to persecution of Jews, unsatisfactory trade relations, instances of Nazi propaganda in the United States, and of Nazi resentment of criticisms of the Hitler regime from this country.

The outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopian and Italian forces at Wal Wal in December resulted in an immediate appeal by the Ethiopian Government to the League of Nations. Subse-

quently, the Emperor expressed to the American Chargé the desire that a great power would assist the appeal for a solution by arbitration or judicial means. The United States maintained that it could not usefully or properly take such action since the incident was before the League of Nations of which it was not a member. For the time being, the American Government preferred the role of observer to that of mediator, nor did it want to have the Kellogg Pact invoked prior to action by the League of Nations on the question.

Efforts of the Department of State to protect and to improve American trade form a part of the negotiations with 19 of the 30 countries represented in this volume. Of interest to students of international law is correspondence on treaties and other international acts relating to air navigation, claims, double taxation, dual nationality, extradition (including documents on the Samuel Insull case), military service, and naturalization.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, Volume II, Europe, the Near East and Africa was compiled in the Division of Historical Policy Research under the direction of E. R. Perkins, Editor of *Foreign Relations*. Copies of this volume (xcv, 1002 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., for \$3.75 each.

Point Four Contracts Signed With Latin American Countries

On June 29, the Department of State announced that the Technical Cooperation Administration had signed contracts for surveys in Latin American countries on the need and advisability of setting up construction materials demonstration centers and for the mechanization and expansion of the babassu industry in Brazil.

The building materials demonstration center survey is to be made by the Armour Research Foundation of the Illinois Institute of Technology, at Chicago, and the babassu industry investigation by the Southwest Research Institute, at San Antonio, Texas.

Point Four Administrator Henry G. Bennett said:

Both surveys are important since they may open up possible new sources of income and aid in solving some of the economic problems faced by our sister American Republics.

The building materials demonstration center survey is designed to investigate the need and advisability of setting up centers in one or more of the Latin American countries to illustrate how best to utilize low-cost locally available materials in building highways, ports, railroad docks, dams, irrigation systems, factories, houses, and many other things.

The economic advancement of a country depends to a large extent on the availability of construction material. If the initial survey by the Armour Research Foundation

¹ See BULLETIN of Dec. 25, 1950, p. 1031 and BULLETIN of July 17, 1950, p. 95.

confirms what we have heard from other sources, we may decide, in cooperation with other countries, to contract for one or more training and demonstration centers.

The Governments of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and other Latin American countries have shown interest in the development of local building materials. The Organization of American States also has endorsed the survey as one answer to the housing problem in Latin America. Its work will complement that of the International Housing Research Center which the Pan American Union is creating.

The Armour Research Foundation will send our experienced technicians to make the survey. Its report indicates that the program is feasible and practical. Point Four may undertake a 3-year project employing about 20 technicians to establish a center to demonstrate the operation of a good working plant, a small wall-board mill, semi-chemical paper and roofing felt manufacturing plant, and possibly a small saw mill. In the earth and mineral products field, it would demonstrate simple machinery for making stabilized earth blocks, concrete blocks, brick and tile, asphalt emulsions, insulation materials, and aggregates. Improved kilns would be demonstrated for the production of gypsum plaster, standard high calcium and dolomite, and hydraulic lime. The techniques, though simple, would be an improvement over methods now in use in many areas. They would be kept within the financial reach of rural enterprise.

On the agreement with the Southwest Research Institute to develop a plan for the mechanization and expansion of the babassu industry, Dr. Bennett explained that this industry in Brazil has potentialities which could bring it into economic importance almost on a par with coffee. The oil extracted from the nuts is rich in practically all of the elements needed in the manufacture of plastics, detergents, emulsifiers, and many important related materials.

The babassu palm, the Point Four Administrator said, grows in many sections of Brazil and in great profusion. The problem has been one of transport as well as of efficient machinery for the cracking of the nuts and extraction of the oil. The survey will require 8 months to complete. It will investigate the kind of machinery to be used, the most logical location of plants, and the residual use of waste after the oil has been extracted.

Coconut oil, heretofore, has been the chief source of the oils needed in the manufacture of the products listed above. During the last war, there was a serious shortage of these oils and the survey contemplated in the contract announced June 29 was to endeavor to provide an adequate and constant source of this strategic material. The project has the endorsement of the Government of Brazil which already has done some investigation towards increasing production.

The agreements provide Point Four funds of

\$48,000 to the Armour Research Foundation and \$45,818 to the Southwest Research Institute for the surveys.

U.S., Sweden Sign Agreement For Red Cross Field Hospital

[Released to the press June 27]

Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Ambassador Erik Boheman of Sweden signed an agreement, on June 27, under which Sweden agrees to pay in dollars for the logistical support furnished by the United States to the Swedish Red Cross field hospital participating in the United Nations operations in Korea.

The Swedish Red Cross hospital unit arrived in Korea in September 1950 and is still providing medical care to the United Nations forces. At the conclusion of the signing ceremonies the Ambassador indicated that he would shortly turn over to the Department of Defense a check for \$649,940.43 to cover substantially all of the materials and services received by the Swedish hospital unit through December 31, 1950. Additional payments are to be made on a regular basis as vouchers are submitted by the United States and approved by the Swedish Government.

The basic agreement with Sweden will be supplemented by technical arrangements between the military departments of the two governments covering administrative and accounting matters.

The United States has undertaken to provide the United Nations forces with the materials, facilities, and services required in Korea which they are unable to furnish for themselves, either because they cannot procure the necessary supplies elsewhere or because it is not feasible to establish separate lines of supply. At the time arrangements are made for the participation of the forces of the United Nations in Korea, it has been the practice of the United States to reach an understanding in principle that the United States would be reimbursed for the logistical support furnished. Under this procedure the task of working out the detailed agreements as to reimbursement has been carried out without delaying the movement of personnel. Some of the governments receiving logistical support have been making interim payments to the United States even though they have not yet concluded the formal agreements.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT WITH SWEDEN

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden Concerning Participation of a Swedish Red Cross Field Hospital in the United Nations Operations in Korea

This Agreement between the Government of the United States of America (the executive agent of the United

Nations Forces in Korea) and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden shall govern relationships in matters specified herein for the Red Cross Field Hospital (hereinafter referred to as Field Hospital) furnished by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden for the operations under the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of the Member States of the United Nations in Korea (hereinafter referred to as "Commander") designated by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to resolutions of United Nations Security Council of June 25, 1950, June 27, 1950, and July 7, 1950.

Article 1. The Government of the United States of America agrees to furnish the Field Hospital with available materials, supplies, services, and facilities which the Field Hospital will require for these operations, and which the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden is unable to furnish. The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America will maintain accounts of materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished by the Government of the United States of America to the Field Hospital. Reimbursement for such materials, supplies, services, and facilities will be accomplished by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden upon presentation of statements of account by the Government of the United States of America. Such payment will be effected by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden in United States dollars.

Article 2. Pursuant to Article 1, appropriate technical and administrative arrangements will be concluded between authorized representatives of the Government of the United States of America and authorized representatives of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden.

Article 3. Classified items, specialized items, or items in short supply furnished to the Field Hospital by the Government of the United States of America will be returned to the Government of the United States of America upon request, upon the withdrawal of the Field Hospital from Korea, as a credit against the cost of materials, supplies and services previously furnished. If the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden determines at the time of redeployment of its Field Hospital that materials or supplies received from the Government of the United States of America hereunder are not desired for retention, such materials or supplies may be offered to the Government of the United States of America and if accepted, their residual value as determined by the Government of the United States of America will be used as a credit against reimbursement for materials, supplies and services previously furnished.

Article 4. Each of the parties to this agreement agrees not to assert any claim against the other party for injury or death of its personnel, or for loss, damage or destruction of its property or property of its personnel caused in Korea by personnel of the other party. Claims of any other Government or its nationals against the Government or nationals of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden or vice versa shall be a matter for disposition between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and such third government or its nationals.

Article 5. The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden will maintain accounts of materials, supplies, services, and facilities furnished by other governments to personnel or agencies of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden, either directly or through the Commander. Settlement of any claims arising as a result of the furnishing of such materials, supplies, services, and facilities to the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden by such third governments, whether directly or through the Commander, shall be a matter for consideration between such third governments and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden.

Article 6. The requirements of the Field Hospital for Korean currency will be supplied under arrangements approved by the Commander; provided, however, that settlement of any obligation of the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden for use of such currency will be a matter of consideration between the Government of the

Kingdom of Sweden and the competent authorities of Korea. If, with the approval of the Commander, the Field Hospital uses media of exchange other than Korean currency in Korea, obligations arising therefrom will be a matter for consideration and settlement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the other concerned governments.

Article 7. The Government of the Kingdom of Sweden agrees that all orders, directives and policies of the Commander issued to the Field Hospital or its personnel shall be accepted and carried out by them as given and that in the event of disagreement with such orders, directives or policies, formal protest may be presented subsequently.

Article 8. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to affect existing agreements or arrangements between the parties for the furnishing of materials, supplies, services or facilities.

Article 9. This Agreement shall come into force upon the date of signature thereof, and shall apply to all materials, supplies, services and facilities furnished or rendered on, before or after that date, to all claims referred to in Article 4 arising on, before, or after that date, and to all technical and administrative arrangements concluded pursuant to Article 2 before, on, or after that date.

In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement.

Done at Washington, in duplicate, this 27th day of June, 1951.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

DEAN ACHESON

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN:

ERIK BOHEMAN

Point Four Agreement Signed With Friends Service Committee in India

[Released to the press June 22]

The American Friends Service Committee will undertake Point Four projects in India under an agreement signed today with the Technical Cooperation Administration.

At the request of the Government of India the Committee will carry on rural improvement work in demonstration areas, with emphasis on agricultural production, health and sanitation, and education. An initial grant of \$150,000 from Point Four funds has been approved for the Committee's work.

The agreement signed today by Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator, and Lewis M. Hoskins, Executive Secretary of the Friends Service Committee, makes possible the continuation and expansion of work already in progress. Since 1947 the Committee has been developing cooperative improvement projects in the villages of Pifa and Ragabpur, near Calcutta. Its purpose has been to help the villagers to organize community-wide programs in the fields of agricultural production, health, primary and adult education, and child welfare.

The Committee's experience of working in

India dates back to 1942 when it was responsible for sending food, medicines, and \$100,000 worth of milk to children's canteens during a period of food shortage. Lately the emphasis of its work has shifted from relief to long-range projects on a self-help basis. The Committee's work under the new agreement will parallel other Point Four projects now under way in India, specifically agricultural and village improvement work being carried on by Horace Holmes in cooperation with Indian technicians in three demonstration areas.

Representing the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the American Friends Service Committee was established in April 1917, 24 days after the United States entered World War I. Since then its red and black star, first used by the British Friends on relief missions during the Franco-Prussian War, has become a familiar symbol in France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan, China, Poland, Austria, Israel, and Spain, as well as in sections of the United States, when emergencies arose.

Established originally as a relief agency, the Committee has broadened its interests to include long-range rebuilding and rehabilitation work as well. When the Committee was formed its position and purpose were expressed in the following statement:

"We are united in expressing our love for our country and our desire to serve her loyally. We offer ourselves to the Government of the United States in any constructive work in which we can conscientiously serve humanity."

Before the end of the first World War, more than 600 of the Committee's workers were in France distributing food and clothing, utensils, and farm animals, planting trees, caring for refugee children, setting up a maternity hospital, and repairing and rebuilding war-damaged houses. By the end of 1919 the Committee had helped over 46,000 families in 1,666 villages.

Committee workers reached Russia as early as 1917, and, between then and 1931, programs of famine relief and medical services were carried out. At the same time, missions in Poland and Serbia had undertaken similar work. In all three countries the medical services did their best to stop typhus which was threatening to sweep over Europe.

After the armistice, exploratory missions found millions of children in Austria and Germany suffering from malnutrition. Cows and milk for the children became a major project so that, at one time, the Committee was the largest distributor of milk in Vienna. The program in Germany was financed at first by the Herbert Hoover American Relief Administration and later by Americans of German descent. This program fed a million children a day through two periods, first in 1921

and 1922 and again in 1924 when inflation crippled Germany.

The scope of the Committee's activities had grown far beyond the dreams of the 14 Quakers who founded it. During its first 10 years it received and used approximately 12 million dollars in cash and more than that amount in drugs, clothing, seeds, foods, and other goods. In 1946 its budget, for the relief phase alone, reached 7 million dollars.

At the end of the second World War, the Committee was called in by UNRRA to help rebuild Italy. It worked also in France, Germany, and Eastern Europe. Emergency relief was again necessary but the parallel aim was to establish programs which would have a lasting effect on communities. India, Pakistan, Mexico, the Gaza strip in Arabia, Israel, Japan, China, and other countries were given technical help in health and sanitation and education. While Committee specialists were working with Arabs in 30 villages and in the Gaza strip, others were doing the same type of work in communities in Israel. When aid went to Spain during and after the civil war, it went to Republican and Falangist alike. There is no distinction of race or creed in the minds of the Committee. Wherever help is needed it is given.

An outstanding example of the Committee's work is in the Morgantown area of West Virginia. Under a grant of \$225,000 from the American Relief Administration the Committee established a community for coal miners and founded cooperative industries which made it possible for the people to become the owners of their homes and to participate in the activities of the factories. Today, they have become self-sufficient and no longer depend solely on the coal mines for their livelihood.

The Department of the Interior called on the ARSC to work with the Indians in the Southwest. Under the sponsorship of American institutions, the Committee also has carried out community activities in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Illinois.

The fact that most of its workers are volunteers makes it possible for the Committee to use a large percentage of its funds for actual rehabilitation. Those working in foreign fields receive maintenance only.

The Friends Service Committee is the eighth private nonsectarian agency of proven experience and competence to undertake technical cooperation work under a Point Four grant. Previous agreements have been made between the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Near East Foundation, the Unitarian Service Committee, the American University of Beirut, Athens College, the American Farm School, Greece, Booker Washington Institute in Liberia, and the University of Arkansas.

The United States in the United Nations

[June 22-July 5, 1951]

Korea

June 25, 1951, marked the first year of successful United Nations efforts to repel the Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea.

Two days prior, June 23, 1951, Jakov A. Malik, Soviet representative at the United Nations, in a radio broadcast on the United Nations program, "The Price of Peace," stated:

... The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day, the problem of the armed conflict in Korea, could also be settled. This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

Later that evening, the Department of State stated:

If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are now willing to end the aggression in Korea, we are, as we have always been, ready to play our part in bringing an end to hostilities and in assuring against their resumption. But the tenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to whether this is more propaganda. If it is more than propaganda, adequate means for discussing an end to the conflict are available.

Secretary-General Trygve Lie telephoned from Oslo, June 24, to United Nations Headquarters:

In recent weeks the qualified spokesmen of many of the Governments whose forces are participating in the United Nations action in Korea and I, as Secretary-General, have expressed hope for a military cease-fire in Korea, in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. . . .

The United Nations forces have been fighting in Korea to uphold peace and security under the United Nations Charter. From the outset the United Nations has made it clear again and again that the first step to the restoration of peace in Korea must be a cease-fire. Such a cease-fire should involve only the military arrangements necessary to stop the fighting and to ensure against its renewal.

... If such a cease-fire can be attained, the political issues involved in the restoration of peace and security in Korea can then be appropriately discussed in the competent organs of the United Nations.

President Truman, in his address of June 25 at the dedication ceremonies of the aviation development center at Tullahoma, Tenn., stated:

... We are ready to join in a peaceful settlement in Korea now as we have always been. But it must be a real settlement which fully ends the aggression and restores peace and security to the area and to the gallant Korean people.

In Korea and in the rest of the world we must be ready to take any steps which truly advance us toward world peace. But we must avoid like the plague rash actions which would take unnecessary risks of world war or weak actions which would reward aggression.

Ambassador Nasrollah Entezam (Iran), President of the Fifth General Assembly, and Chairman of the Good Offices Committee, commented June 26, that new paths toward peace had been opened:

... It is our duty to follow along these paths in the hope that we shall attain the consummation which we seek: to put an end to the war in Korea and establish there a just and lasting peace.

The representatives of the 16 members of the United Nations with forces in Korea made the following statement on June 27:

... The high purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, by which the Members of the United Nations are solemnly bound, oblige them to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. It was in accordance with these purposes that United Nations forces have been and are committed in Korea.

The United Nations charter also enjoins its members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. The representatives expressed their view that their governments have always been and still are ready to take part in action designed to bring about a genuine and enduring peace in Korea.

The United States Government, through its Ambassador to Russia, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, on June 27 requested from the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, clarification of certain aspects of the statement made by Mr. Malik (U.S.S.R.) on June 23.

On June 28 the Department of State stated:

... Mr. Gromyko indicated that it would be for the military representatives of the Unified Command and of the Korean Republic Command on the one hand and the military representatives of the North Korean Command and of the "Chinese volunteer units" on the other to negotiate the armistice envisaged in Mr. Malik's statement.

... Beyond the conclusion of an armistice the Soviet Government had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful settlement to which Mr. Malik referred. Mr. Gromyko indicated, however, that it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subsequent special arrangements would have to be made for a political and territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik's statement.

Secretary-General Trygve Lie, after his return to United Nations Headquarters on June 28, stated:

. . . I have long believed and stated that the best chance of bringing to an end the fighting in Korea lay in the negotiation of a purely military cease-fire and armistice by the respective military commands.

The three officers representing the United Nations Command at the preliminary meeting, Sunday, July 8, at Kaesong to make arrangements for the armistice discussions were Col. Andrew J. Finney, United States Air Force; Col. James C. Murray, United States Marine Corps; and Lt. Col. Ho Young Lie of the Army of the Republic of Korea.

The group of officers designated by General Ridgway to represent the United Nations in the Korean armistice discussions beginning Tuesday, July 10, at Kaesong will be headed by Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East; the other officers are Maj. Gen. L. C. Craigie, U.S. Air Force, Vice Commander of Far East Air Forces; Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, U.S. Eighth Army Deputy Chief of Staff; Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S. Navy; and Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, Commander of the First South Korean Army Corps, ROK.

I am of the opinion that the Unified Command is authorized under the resolutions of the Security Council to conduct such military negotiations on behalf of the United Nations, leaving political questions to be negotiated later or under the authority of the appropriate organs of the United Nations.

On June 29 United States Ambassador Ernest G. Gross forwarded to the Secretary-General in behalf of his Government in its capacity as the Unified Command of the United Nations Forces in Korea, the summarized observations made by Mr. Bromyko for circulation to the members of the United Nations, as well as the initial message which Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Communist Forces in Korea¹ on June 29.¹

President Truman in his Fourth of July address commemorating the 175th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence stated:

. . . Now, once more, we are engaged in launching a new ideal—one that has been talked about for centuries, but never successfully put into effect. . . . We are creating a new kind of international organization. We have joined in setting up the United Nations to prevent war to safeguard peace and freedom.

We believe in the United Nations. We believe it is based on the right ideas, as our own country is. We believe it will grow to be strong, and to accomplish its high purposes. But the United Nations faces stern, determined opposition. . . . Today, the idea of an international organization to keep the peace is being attacked and undermined and fought by reactionary forces everywhere—and particularly by the forces of Soviet communism.

The United Nations will not succeed without a struggle, just as the Declaration of Independence did not succeed without a struggle. But the American people are not afraid. We have taken our stand beside other free men, because

we have known for 175 years that free men must stand together. We have joined in the defense of freedom without hesitation and without fear, because we have known for 175 years that freedom must be defended.

On this day, sacred to those who established freedom in the United States, we should all pay tribute to the men who are fighting now to preserve our freedom. The troops under the command of General Ridgway, including not only our own but those of sixteen other free nations, constitute, I believe, the most magnificent army on the face of the globe today. We are all familiar with the splendor of their heroic deeds.

. . . Our aims in Korea are just as clear and just as simple, as the things for which we fought in the American Revolution. . . . We are not fighting there to conquer China, or to destroy the Soviet Empire. We are fighting for a simple aim—as important to us today as the goal of independence was in 1776—the aim of securing the right of nations to be free and to live in peace.

United Nations—General

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) is President of the Security Council for the month of July.

George L. Warren, adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State, is the United States delegate to the United Nations conference of plenipotentiaries which opened at Geneva on July 2. The conference will consider establishing a new convention relating to the status of refugees, together with a protocol on the status of stateless persons.

The following members were appointed, June 26, on the *Ad Hoc* Commission on Prisoners of War: Countess Bernadotte, Judge J. G. Guerrero, Vice President of the International Court of Justice; and Judge Aung Khine, Judge of the High Court, Rangoon, Burma.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labor Organization (ILO) announced, June 27, the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor with the following membership: Paal Berg, former Chief Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court; Sir Ramaswami Mudalier, former President and now Vice President of the Economic and Social Council; former Prime Minister of Mysore, head of the Indian delegation at the San Francisco conference of 1945; Sr. Felix Fulgencio Palavicini, distinguished statesman and diplomat of Mexico, and former Ambassador to England, France, and Italy.

Arrangements for the transfer of the functions of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (IPPC) to the United Nations is being discussed at its final meeting at Bern, Switzerland, July 2-7. United States Commissioner, Sanford Bates, Department of Institutions and Agencies, State of New Jersey, and Alternate United States Commissioner, Thorsten Sellin, Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, are attending the conference.

The United Nations paid on June 28 the initial installment of 1 million dollars to the United States in repayment of the headquarters building loan.

¹The various messages exchanged between Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway and the Communist Generals in Korea are printed in full in the front pages of this issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

Bulletin

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Vol. XXV, No. 629

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appreciated.

The Defense of Freedom

*Address by the President*¹

THIS is a very special occasion. Here in Washington tonight, in Philadelphia, and throughout our whole country, we are celebrating an anniversary of great importance. On this day, 175 years ago, the representatives of the American people declared the independence of the United States.

Our forefathers in Philadelphia not only established a new nation—they established a nation based on a new idea. They said that all men were created equal. They based the whole idea of government on this God-given equality of men. They said that the people had the right to govern themselves. They said the purpose of government was to protect the inalienable rights of man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

These were sensational proposals. In 1776, a nation based on such new and radical ideas did not appear to have much chance of success. In those days, power centered in Europe. Monarchy was the prevailing form of government. The divine right of kings was still widely accepted.

The new Nation was small, remote, poor, and, in 1776, apparently friendless. Europe did not for a moment believe this new kind of government would work, and, to tell the truth, fully a third of our own people did not believe it either. We can hardly imagine the courage and the faith it took to issue the Declaration of Independence in those circumstances.

Today, we can see that the members of the Continental Congress were right. Less than 2 centuries later, the Nation born that day, instead of being small, stretches across a whole continent.

Instead of being poor, the United States is wealthier than any other nation in the world. Instead of being friendless, we have strong and steadfast allies.

The Cost of Freedom

The transformation during these 175 years seems to be complete; but it is not. Some things have not changed at all since 1776.

For one thing, freedom is still expensive. It still costs money. It still costs blood. It still calls for courage and endurance, not only in soldiers but in every man and woman who is free and is determined to remain free. Freedom must be fought for today, just as our fathers had to fight for freedom when the Nation was born.

For another thing, the ideas on which our Government is founded—the ideas of equality, of God-given rights, of self-government—are still revolutionary. Since 1776, they have spread around the world. In France in 1789, in Latin America in the early 1800's, in many parts of Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, these ideas produced new governments and new nations. Now, in the twentieth century, these ideas have stirred the peoples in many countries of the Middle East and Asia to create free governments, dedicated to the welfare of the people. The ideas of the American Revolution are still on the march.

The United Nations and Freedom

There is another way in which our situation today is much like that of the Americans of 1776. Now, once more, we are engaged in launching a

¹ Made at Washington, D.C. on July 4 and released to the press on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4288.

new idea—one that has been talked about for centuries but never successfully put into effect. In those earlier days, we were launching a new kind of national government. This time we are creating a new kind of international organization. We have joined in setting up the United Nations to prevent war and to safeguard peace and freedom.

We believe in the United Nations. We believe it is based on the right ideas, as our own country is. We believe it can grow to be strong and accomplish its high purposes.

But the United Nations faces stern, determined opposition. This is an old story. The Declaration of Independence was also met by determined opposition. A spokesman for the British King called the Declaration "absurd," "visionary," and "subversive." The ideas of freedom and equality and self-government were fiercely opposed in every country by the vested interests and the reactionaries. Today, the idea of an international organization to keep the peace is being attacked and undermined and fought by reactionary forces everywhere—and particularly by the forces of Soviet communism.

The United Nations will not succeed without a struggle, just as the Declaration of Independence did not succeed without a struggle. But the American people are not afraid. We have taken our stand beside other free men because we have known for 175 years that free men must stand together. We have joined in the defense of freedom without hesitation and without fear because we have known for 175 years that freedom must be defended.

This determined stand has cost us much in the past year. I do not intend to dwell upon the money cost on the Fourth of July, the day on which we dedicated "our fortunes" as well as "our lives and our sacred honor" to the cause of freedom. I am much more deeply concerned that our stand has cost the lives of brave men. I report it with sorrow, but with boundless pride in what they have done—for the men who have fallen in the service of the United States during the past year have died for the same cause as those who fell at Bunker Hill and Gettysburg, in the Argonne forest and on the Normandy beaches. They have died in order that "government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth." They have died in order that other men might have peace.

Aim in Korea

On this day, sacred to those who established freedom in the United States, we should all pay tribute to the men who are fighting now to preserve our freedom. The troops under the command of General Ridgway, including not only our own but those of 16 other free nations, constitute, I believe, the most magnificent army on the face of the globe today. We are all familiar with the splendor of their heroic deeds.

I should like to say something to that army, something that I think is felt by free men in every country in the world: Men of the armed forces in Korea, you will go down in history as the first army to fight under the flag of a world organization in the defense of human freedom. You have fought well and without reproach. You have enslaved no free man, you have destroyed no free nation, you are guiltless of any country's blood. Victory may be in your hands, but you are winning a greater thing than military victory, for you are vindicating the idea of freedom under international law. This is an achievement that serves all mankind, for it has brought all men closer to their goal of peace.

It is an achievement that may well prove to be a turning point in world history.

Our aims in Korea are just as clear and just as simple as the things for which we fought in the American Revolution. We did not fight that war to drive the British out of the North American Continent. We did not fight it to destroy the military power of England, or to wipe out the British Empire. We fought it for the simple, limited aim of securing the right to be free, the right to govern ourselves. We fought it to secure respect for the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

It is much the same with Korea. We are not fighting there to conquer China or to destroy the Soviet Empire. We are fighting for a simple aim—as important to us today as the goal of independence was in 1776—the aim of securing the right of nations to be free and to live in peace.

The Charter of the United Nations says that its purpose is to "maintain international peace and security" and "to take effective collective measures . . . for the suppression of acts of aggression." We are fighting to uphold this purpose of the United Nations. That is what we have been doing in Korea. We have made it clear that those words mean what they say. We have taken

collective measures to suppress aggression, and we are suppressing it. We have shown the world that the United Nations Charter is not just a scrap of paper but something very real, and very powerful. To establish this is worth all the sacrifices and all the effort we have been making, because this is the way to peace.

Our constant aim in Korea has been peace, under the principles of the United Nations. Time and again, since the aggression started, we have proposed that the fighting be stopped and that peace be restored in accordance with those principles. Now, at last, the Communist leaders have offered to confer about an armistice. It may be that they have decided to give up their aggression in Korea. If that is true, the road to a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict is open.

But we cannot yet be sure that the Communist rulers have any such intention. It is still too early to say what they have in mind. I do not wish to speculate on the outcome of any meetings General Ridgway may have with the commanders on the other side. I hope these meetings will be successful. If they are not, it will be because the Communists do not really want peace. Meanwhile, let us keep our heads and be vigilant and ready for whatever may come.

We must remember that Korea is only part of a wider conflict. The attack on freedom is worldwide. And it is not simply an attack by fire and sword. It is an attack that uses all the weapons that a dictatorship can command: subversion, threats, violence, torture, imprisonment, lies, and deceit.

We cannot ignore the danger of military outbreaks in other parts of the world. The greatest threat to world peace, the tremendous armed power of the Soviet Union, will still remain, even if the Korean fighting stops. The threat of Soviet aggression still hangs heavy over many a country—including our own. We must continue, therefore, to build up our military forces at a rapid rate. And we must continue to help build up the defenses of other free nations.

Our Continued Effort Toward World Peace

Furthermore, we must continue the struggle to overcome the constant efforts of the Soviet rulers to dominate the world by lies and threats and subversion.

The Soviet rulers are trying to destroy the very

idea of freedom in every part of the world. They are trying to take from us the confidence and friendship of other nations. They hate us not because we are Americans but because we are free—because we are the greatest example of the power of freedom.

The Soviet rulers are engaged in a relentless effort, therefore, to persuade other nations that we do not, in fact, stand for freedom. They are trying to convince the people of Europe that we intend to exploit them. They are telling the people of Asia—who are for the most part ill informed about our purposes—that we mean to fasten new chains upon them. They are trying to make the rest of the world believe that we want to control them for our own profit—that the ideas of our Declaration of Independence are a sham and a fraud.

This shrewd, this unscrupulous, this evil propaganda attack we cannot overcome with military weapons. You cannot transfix a lie with a bayonet or blast deceit with machine-gun fire. The only weapons against such enemies are truth and fair dealing.

The way to meet this attack is to show that it is false—to live up to our ideals—to prove that we mean them.

The world looks to us. This country is living proof that personal liberty is consistent with strong and stable government. This country proves that men can be free. As a result, the freedom of the American citizen means a great deal more than his individual safety and happiness. It means that men everywhere can have the freedom they hope for.

Anyone who undertakes to abridge the right of any American to life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness commits three great wrongs. He wrongs the individual first, but in addition he wrongs his country and he betrays the hopes of mankind.

It is for this reason that persecution of minorities, which is wrong anywhere, is worse in America. It is for this reason that vilifying men because they express unpopular opinions is less to be tolerated here than in any other country. It is for this reason that holding men in bondage—personal, political, or economic—is a graver scandal here than elsewhere. It is for this reason that “to promote the general welfare” is more urgently required of the American Government than any other.

The United States and Freedom

We have made great strides in broadening freedom here at home. We have made real progress in eliminating oppression and injustice and in creating security and opportunities for all. I am proud of our record in doing these things.

Today, more than ever before, it is important that we continue to make progress in expanding our freedoms and improving the opportunities of our citizens. To do so is to strengthen the hopes and determination of free men everywhere.

Moreover, it is doubly important today that we set an example of sober and wise and consistent self-government. We face a long period of world tension and great international danger. We have the hard task of increasing production and controlling inflation in order to support the strong armed forces we must have for years to come.

One of our most difficult tasks, because it is new to our people, is that of organizing civil defense. Because we have been spared the rough schooling which the people of Europe have had, too many Americans are still skeptical and tardy.

All these tasks challenge the ability of free people to govern themselves with both reason and resolution. There are people who say our democratic form of government cannot do these things. They say we cannot stick to a hard, tough policy of self-denial and self-control long enough to win the struggle. They say we are no match for the steady, ruthless way the Soviet rulers seek their goals.

These people, and they are not all Communists by any means, say that we can't take it, over the long pull. They say we will either lose our heads and rush into a world war or that we will relax and give up our efforts to maintain peace. They say that the demagogues and the special interests will tear us apart from within. These people do not believe that free men and self-government can survive in the struggle against Communist dictatorship.

I think these prophets of doom are wrong. I think the whole history of our country proves they are wrong. I believe the last few months show

that we will not be stampeded into war or broken up by distrust and fear.

But we are going through a period that will test to the utmost our self-control, our patriotism, and our faith in our institutions. The very idea of self-government is being put to the test in the world today as it has never been tested before.

If we do not succeed in this country—if we do not succeed in building up our armed forces, in controlling inflation, and in strengthening our friends and allies—then the cause of self-government, the cause of human freedom, is lost. If we with all that we have in our favor do not succeed, no other free government can survive—anywhere in the world—and the whole great experiment that began in 1776 will be over and done with.

I believe we will succeed.

"Proclaim Liberty Throughout All the Land . . ."

The principles of the Declaration of Independence are the right principles. They are sound enough to guide us through this crisis as they have guided us through the crises of the past. Freedom can overcome tyranny in the twentieth century as surely as it overcame the tyrants of the eighteenth century.

There is a text inscribed on the Liberty Bell, the bell that rang out 175 years ago to announce the signing of the Declaration of Independence. When the Pennsylvania Provincial Assembly ordered that bell for the Statehouse in Philadelphia, they directed that it should bear certain words, "well-shaped in large letters." You remember what those words were: "Proclaim Liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof."

We should write these words again today. We should write them in everything we do in this country—"well-shaped in large letters"—by every deed and act, so that the whole world can read them. We have written them in the deeds of our soldiers in Korea—for the men of Asia and all the world to see. Let us write them in all that we do, at home and abroad, to the end that men everywhere may read them and take hope and courage for the victory of freedom.

President Urges U.S.S.R. To Inform People of U.S. Friendship

Released to the press by the White House July 7]

*The President today sent the following communication to His Excellency Nikolai Mikhailovich Khverniki, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, transmitting S. Con. Res. 11:*¹

I have the honor of transmitting to you a resolution adopted by the Congress of the United States with a request that its contents be made known by your government to the people of the Soviet Union.

This resolution expresses the friendship and good will of the American people for all the peoples of the earth and it also reemphasizes the profound desire of the American Government to do everything in its power to bring about a just and lasting peace.

As Chief Executive of the United States, I give this resolution my sincere approval. I add to it a message of my own to the Soviet people in the earnest hope that these expressions may help form a better understanding of the aims and purposes of the United States.

The unhappy results of the last few years demonstrate that formal diplomatic negotiations among nations will be largely barren while barriers exist to the friendly exchange of ideas and information among peoples. The best hope for a peaceful world lies in the yearning for peace and brotherhood which lies deep in the heart of every human being. But peoples who are denied the normal means of communication will not be able to attain that mutual understanding which must form the basis for trust and friendship. We shall never be able to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until communication is permitted to flow, free and open, across international boundaries.

The peoples of both our countries know from personal experience the horror and misery of war. They abhor the thought of future conflict which they know would be waged by means of the most hideous weapons in the history of mankind. As leaders of their respective governments, it is our sacred duty to pursue every honorable means which will bring to fruition their common longing for peace. Peace is safest in the hands of the people and we can best achieve the goal by doing all we can to place it there.

¹ The McMahon-Ribicoff resolution reaffirmed "the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union" and requested that the President call upon the Soviet Government "to acquaint the peoples of the Soviet Union with the contents of this resolution." See BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1951, p. 556.

I believe that if we can acquaint the Soviet people with the peace aims of the American people and government, there will be no war.

I feel sure that you will wish to have carried to the Soviet people the text of this resolution adopted by the American Congress.

VOA To Broadcast Resolution on American Friendship

[Released to the press July 7]

The Voice of America will broadcast to the Soviet Union the McMahon-Ribicoff "Friendship Resolution" and the President's transmittal message to the Soviet Government twice each hour, 24 hours a day, for the next 3 days. This was announced today by the Department of State, which explained that these broadcasts would make known to the Soviet people that President Truman had asked the Soviet Government to disseminate this resolution of American friendship.

In addition to Russian, the Voice has been broadcasting in the languages of the Baltic States taken over by the Soviet Union: Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia. The Voice has also been broadcasting in Ukrainian and has recently inaugurated new programs to the U.S.S.R. in Georgian, Tatar, Azeri (Azerbaijani), Turkestani, and Armenian. All these languages will carry the "Friendship Resolution" as well as the President's message to the Kremlin.

A friendship resolution was introduced in both Houses of Congress early this year. The final version, which was approved by the House with the Senate concurring on June 26, requested the President to transmit the resolution to the Soviet Government.

President Sends Birthday Greetings to Paris

[Released to the press July 8]

The President today sent the following message to Mayor Pierre de Gaulle of Paris, France, on the occasion of the 2000th birthday of Paris:

To the City of Light on its 2000th birthday, I express the profound appreciation of free men for the contribution Paris has made throughout its long life to knowledge, to art, and to the virile defense of the heritage of the Christian world.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Constant Vigilance to Combat Threat of Aggression

*Statement by W. Averell Harriman
Special Assistant to the President*¹

I appreciate the opportunity to testify again before this Committee. I have a brief statement underlining the broader aspects of the Mutual Security Program which, in my opinion, make it a vital and integral part of our security policies.

I first want to reiterate what I have said to you before—that I still believe it is possible that another world war can be prevented—providing we give the essential inspiration and leadership to the free world, and that we act with wisdom and vigor, and above all, consistency of purpose.

As the threat of Communist imperialism has unfolded, our country has supported unprecedented policies and programs which have been successful in thwarting in many areas the Kremlin's aggressive designs. Your Committee has played a notable role in developing and carrying through these policies and programs.

I believe that we are now in the acute phases of the struggle. The effort that our country will be required to make, including our own rearmament program and the program for mutual security, will be very great particularly for the next 3 or 4 years. If we carry out these programs effectively and are successful in preventing a general war, we can look forward to a tapering off of our domestic military expenditures and a sharp reduction in our foreign assistance. The greatest part of our own effort and that of our allies will be to build the necessary military forces in being and trained reserves, and to produce equipment needed for both. When this build-up has been completed, the annual cost will be very much reduced. Thus, our intensive efforts in the next few years will be in fact a capital investment in security.

The Kremlin respects nothing but strength. I firmly believe that when we and our allies are strong enough we will find an entirely different

political situation in the world. Confidence will replace fear among the free countries. The Kremlin will find that it must adjust its policies, and the processes of disintegration may begin behind the Iron Curtain.

Maintaining all Security Programs

To arrive at this situation, however, will require our carrying out all of the security programs that we are now planning—the development of our own military strength, aid to help our friends and allies rearm, and an economic program for an expanding economy in the free world.

There would be only disaster if we attempted to “go it alone.” Our associates can develop military forces exceeding our own in manpower, but these forces cannot be effectively equipped without our help. These nations have not the industrial capacity or the economic resources to produce in time all the weapons necessary for modern warfare. We must bear in mind that we produce industrially as much as the rest of the world put together, including the Soviet bloc. By a relatively small investment on our part to help arm other free countries, a vast addition to our own and to world security can be attained. To me, it is untenable that we should deny our own fighting men the benefit of well-equipped allies, should trouble come.

The Kremlin has at its command in Russia and its satellites only a small fraction of the industrial capacity of North America and Western Europe. It has been estimated that the gross national product of Russia and her European satellites totals less than 100 billion dollars. In spite of their pretensions for peace, the Kremlin rulers are forcing their enslaved populations to produce for military purposes at the expense of civilian needs in a manner utterly unthinkable in free countries. They are exploiting their European satellites by bring-

¹ Made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 3 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

ing down the standard of living of these unhappy peoples to that of Russia. They are increasing the military forces of these satellites and diverting output for Soviet use.

If they had succeeded, as I believe they thought they could, in taking over continental Western Europe through subversion during the economic chaos of the early postwar years, they would have more than doubled the industrial resources at their command. By applying the same system of exploitation to these countries, they could have developed military strength of staggering dimensions. We would, at best, have been forced into the total mobilization of a garrison state, and at worst, faced with an unmanageable situation.

These designs were thwarted by the Marshall Plan. And now, through the North Atlantic Treaty, we have vigorous allies who are working with us to develop and combine our mutual strength in a common effort to make the free world unassailable against external aggression as well as internal subversion.

Had it not been for the new rearmament effort, the Marshall Plan would have accomplished its purposes, in all but a few countries with special difficulties, within the 4 years as planned, and at a cost of several billion dollars less than originally estimated. Continued economic and technical assistance to Europe is now required on a much reduced basis to make possible the realization of its military potential, and at the same time, to sustain a sound economic base from which increased total production can be developed.

Expanding Production In Underdeveloped Areas

Military strength alone can not win this basically ideological struggle. The only solid foundation on which to build security is economic development—a free world expanding economy. Otherwise, we would be building on quicksand. An expanding economy is essential to bear the cost of adequate military forces for defense, and at the same time give hope to free men for a better life. The industrial countries can increase their production if adequate raw materials are available. We, in this country, know that shortages of raw materials now limit our total production. The same is true in Europe. We must work together to increase production of essential raw materials in the underdeveloped countries. This will have the double value of making it possible for the industrial countries to expand their economies, and at the same time improve conditions in the underdeveloped areas.

But it is not enough only to expand raw materials production in the underdeveloped areas. Their vast populations are engaged largely in agriculture. We must help them to increase their food production. I know you are familiar with

what has already been accomplished with our help in some of these countries. The underdeveloped countries need our technical assistance and capital under the broad concept of Point Four.

This country is the principal reservoir of capital in the world. It should be our policy to encourage as far as possible the flow of private capital to contribute to the needed developments. At some time, investments must also be made through the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank in those projects which are not appropriate for private financing, such as improved transportation, power, irrigation, drainage, and so forth. I hope that the Congress will approve the recommendation for the addition of one billion dollars to the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank.

The Mutual Security Program includes some grant funds for economic development and technical assistance. The increased earnings of the countries producing raw materials makes it possible for them to finance a considerable part of their development needs. However, there is real need for the grants that have been requested, to set in motion increased production and to help create conditions favorable to sound future international investment. It is planned that the administration of grants and of loans by the Export-Import Bank will be closely concerted to achieve the over-all objectives.

The reports by Gordon Gray and by the International Development Advisory Board under the chairmanship of Nelson Rockefeller have made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the problems of the underdeveloped countries and their interdependence with ourselves and the other industrial countries. These reports bring out clearly the dependence of our economy for its life and expansion on the development of other parts of the world.

We are almost wholly dependent on imports from overseas for such raw materials as manganese, tin, natural rubber, chrome, asbestos, cobalt, crucible graphite, industrial diamonds, hard fibers, and a number of other metals vital to military production. We also require very large imports of other basic metals, including copper, lead, zinc, tungsten and uranium, as well as other products such as vegetable fats and oils, and wool.

A part of this Mutual Security Program is directed towards expanding raw materials production abroad. The bulk of such expansion is privately financed, or promoted through Government loans and purchases for stockpiling or resale for military and other industrial production. Some of the development projects in this program, moreover, are for transportation and other purposes directly related to strategic materials development. In the underdeveloped areas generally, the program is designed to help create political and economic conditions making possible expanded raw materials production and assuring their continuing availability.

We cannot expect political stability under the conditions of misery that are so widespread. The false promises of communism have already made alarming inroads, and it is clearly essential that we help in showing that real improvement in economic conditions can only be obtained in a free society. This requires cooperative policies and actions on the part of all free countries.

A danger which overhangs us all is that of inflation. Like an infectious disease, it spreads from country to country. We must not only combat inflation at home but work with other countries to combat it on an international basis. Inflation has already caused great difficulties in the rearmament effort of Western Europe as well as in our own.

In Relaxation Lies Greatest Danger

Perhaps the greatest danger of all is the danger of relaxation. Already, with the hope of an armistice in Korea, there are those who are asking whether we cannot reduce our efforts. Relaxation can only lead to disaster. I believe that the United Nations action in Korea has been a crucial step in preventing another world war. The main purpose of our greatly enlarged rearmament program, however, was not to fight the Korean war—but to develop strength rapidly to prevent a world war, or to be prepared should it be forced upon us. If we were to relax now, the sacrifice of our men in Korea might have been made in vain.

I believe that the Kremlin considers the attack on Korea as a major blunder. They expected to attain an easy victory, demoralize the United Nations, and discredit American leadership. Not only has this plan failed, but the aggression in Korea has aroused our country and our allies to undertake greatly accelerated rearmament for defense. The Kremlin would like nothing better than to have us think that we can safely relax, while the Soviets continue to build their military strength.

The Kremlin is convinced that free society cannot organize itself for survival, and that free nations cannot remain united. The Kremlin always seeks to divide the free countries, and we must be ever on our guard. This is the moment when the United States must take the lead in going forward vigorously with all the security programs on which we have embarked. I earnestly believe that we are today facing a supreme test—whether we are prepared to make the present-day efforts to assure our security and the continuing growth and vigor of a free society.

U.N. MEMBERS DISCUSS KOREA

[Released to the press June 27]

Representatives of the 16 Members of the United Nations with forces in Korea met today for a

regular twice-a-week briefing on the military situation in Korea. The representatives also discussed briefly the statement of Jacob A. Malik of June 23 and various comments which have been made thereon. There was a consensus that the situation called for further clarification, and it was noted that steps are being taken to obtain such clarification.

The high purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, by which the Members of the United Nations are solemnly bound, oblige them to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. It was in accordance with these purposes that United Nations forces have been and are committed in Korea.

The United Nations Charter also enjoins its Members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. The representatives expressed their view that their governments have always been and still are ready to take part in action designed to bring about a genuine and enduring peace in Korea.

President Recommends Termination of State of War With Germany

[Released to the press by the White House July 9]

The President has today sent the following letter to Alben W. Barkley, Vice President, and a similar letter to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives:

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: The progress which has been made in the recovery of Europe and in the strengthening of democratic institutions there makes it appropriate at this time to end the status of Germany as an enemy country. Bit by bit in recent years we have carried out a policy, agreed upon with our allies, of building up a freely elected German government, and returning to the German people an increasing degree of control over their affairs. This policy has been most successful. As a legal matter, however, we are still in a state of war with Germany. It therefore becomes desirable, in pursuance of our policy, to bring this state of war to an end.

Six years ago, when the wartime allies achieved complete victory over Germany, the country was destitute and there was no effective German government. Allied control was the only way to manage the prostrate country. We went forward with a clearly stated policy which anticipated that after a period of Allied occupation and reconstruction we would be able, together with our allies, to conclude a treaty of peace with a newly-established

German government—a government truly representative of the German people, willing to assume its responsibilities as a member of the world community and anxious to work with its free neighbors in maintaining the peace and fostering the prosperity of Europe.

We have never deviated from this policy. Neither have our British and French allies. Unfortunately for all of us, however, and especially for the people of Germany, Soviet Russia has actively prevented the growth of a representative democratic government in a unified Germany, and has thus made impossible for the time being the arrangement of a final peace settlement. The Soviet effort has been, instead, to cut the eastern third of Germany away from the rest of the country and to develop it as a province of the new Soviet Empire.

As it became plain that we could not expect Soviet cooperation in rebuilding all of Germany as a self-respecting, democratic and peaceful nation, we were forced to change our approach. The ultimate fulfillment of our German policy had been delayed, but we were determined to do all we could to advance that policy in the part of Germany under our control. We were joined in our efforts by the British and French governments. Together with them, we gave the German people under our jurisdiction the chance to create their own government. Now, approximately two-thirds of the area of prewar Germany and three-fourths of the German people are free of Soviet control, within the present borders of the German Federal Republic. The Government of the Federal Republic rests on a democratic constitution worked out by representatives of the people themselves and approved by the Western Occupying Powers. Since its birth in September 1949, this German government has shown steadily increasing responsibility and readiness to take its place in the community of free nations and to do its share toward building peaceful and cooperative relationships with its neighbors of the West.

On their side, the occupying powers have shown faith in the German people and in the government of the Federal Republic by a continuing process of relaxing occupation controls on the one hand and increasing the scope of the Federal Republic government's responsibility on the other. This process has been accompanied by a changing attitude on both sides. The relationship of conqueror and conquered is being replaced by the relationship of equality which we expect to find among free men everywhere.

Last September, the governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States took another step in harmony with their developing policy when they joined in the following statement regarding continuation of a state of war with Germany:

In the spirit of the new relationship which they wish to establish with the Federal Republic, the three govern-

ments have decided, as soon as action can be taken in all three countries in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, to take the necessary steps in their domestic legislation to terminate the state of war with Germany.

This action will not affect the rights and status of the Three Powers in Germany, which rest upon other bases. It will, however, create a firmer foundation for the developing structure of peaceful and friendly relationships and will remove disabilities to which German nationals are subject. It is hoped that other nations will find it possible to take similar action in accordance with their own constitutional practices.

In this statement, our Government and the governments of the other Western Occupying Powers clearly recognized the desirability of bringing the existing technical state of war to a close, and pledged themselves to take action in collaboration with one another to that end. Since this declaration was issued, discussions have been held with the other friendly countries who are also in a technical state of war with Germany, and most of them have indicated their willingness to take similar action in the near future—thus lifting Germany from its present enemy status.

Ending the state of war with Germany will have many tangible benefits. Germans who wish to travel or do business here will receive the status accorded to nationals of other friendly governments. They will no longer be classed as enemies. While Germans have been permitted to have commercial relations with this country since the Presidential proclamation of December 31, 1946, declaring hostilities at an end, German citizens are still subject to certain disabilities, particularly with respect to suits in United States courts. General disabilities of this kind will be eliminated by the termination of the present state of war.

The termination of the state of war with Germany will not affect the status of the occupation. The rights of the occupying powers do not rest upon the existence of a state of war, as such, and will not be affected by its legal termination. The rights of the occupying powers result from the conquest of Germany, accompanied by the disintegration and disappearance of its former government, and the Allied assumption of supreme authority. We are not surrendering these rights by terminating the state of war. We do intend, however, in agreement with our allies, to grant the Federal Republic increasing authority over its own affairs, and eventually to see Germany restored as a fully sovereign nation.

Similarly, the termination of the state of war will not affect in any way the rights or privileges, such as the right to reparations, which the United States and its citizens have acquired with respect to Germany as a result of the war.

Furthermore, it is not intended that the termination of the state of war shall in any way change or alter the program, which Congress has authorized, of seizing, under the Trading With the Enemy Act, German property in this country on or before December 31, 1946, and using the pro-

ceeds to pay just and legitimate claims arising from the war in accordance with the War Claims Act of 1948. The vesting of German property under this program does not extend to property acquired since the resumption of trade with Germany on January 1, 1947, following the cessation of hostilities. It is limited to German property and rights located here before or during the period of hostilities.

Most of this German property has already been identified and vested. This government does not intend to embark on any new program in this field. However, some of the property already subject to vesting is believed to be cloaked or hidden and not yet discovered, and some is still under examination or subject to legal proceedings. Most of the property remaining unvested is involved in problems of conflicting jurisdiction between this and other governments, which are in the process of settlement by negotiation under authority of legislation which was enacted in September of last year.

Should the vesting power lapse immediately, this government would find it difficult to wind up this program in an orderly way, or to carry out its commitments for the equitable settlement of intergovernmental differences relating to enemy property.

Completion of the vesting of wartime enemy property, even after the conclusion of peace, is commonly accepted practice in connection with the settlement of claims between the nations which were at war. Our peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Italy all authorize the continued vesting and retention of such property.

In the absence of treaty provisions, however, there may be legal obstacles to the continued vesting of German property, after the termination of the state of war, unless there are changes in our existing statutes. According to the terms of the Trading With the Enemy Act, many of its powers expire at the "end of the war," a phrase which the Act defines to mean the date of proclaiming the exchange of ratifications of a treaty of peace, or an earlier date fixed by Presidential proclamation. There is some doubt that the vesting powers of the Trading With the Enemy Act can be exercised after the termination of the state of war, unless expressly provided for in new legislation.

This doubt should be eliminated, and it should be made clear that the Congress intends the vesting of German property for the purpose of paying war claims to continue.


In these circumstances, I believe that the best method for terminating the state of war with Germany would be by the enactment of appropriate legislation in advance of the issuance of a Presidential proclamation.

Such action will give the German people a new demonstration of our desire to help bring them back to membership among the nations of the free world. It will represent another and logical step

on the road which leads toward the eventual restoration of German independence.

I will appreciate it if you will lay this matter before the Congress for its consideration. For the convenience of the Congress, I am attaching a draft of a joint resolution that would be appropriate to achieve these objectives.

Very sincerely yours,



[Enclosure]

DRAFT RESOLUTION

To terminate the state of war between the United States and the Government of Germany.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress Assembled, That the state of war declared to exist between the United States and the Government of Germany by the Joint Resolution of Congress approved December 11, 1941, shall be terminated and such termination shall take effect on such date as the President shall by proclamation designate:

Provided, however, that notwithstanding this resolution and such proclamation by the President, any property or interest which prior to January 1, 1947, was subject to vesting or seizure under the provisions of the Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 411), as amended, or which has heretofore been vested or seized under that Act, including accruals to or proceeds of any such property or interest, shall continue to be subject to the provisions of that Act in the same manner and to the same extent as if this resolution had not been adopted and such proclamation had not been issued. Nothing herein and nothing in such proclamation shall alter the status, as it existed immediately prior hereto, under that Act, of Germany or of any person with respect to any such property or interest.

AP Correspondent's Trial Called Travesty of Justice

[Released to the press July 4]

The mock trial of the Associated Press representative at Prague, William N. Oatis, has now been brought to a conclusion. The sentencing is but an epilogue to this ludicrous travesty of justice in which the victim was required to speak his prefabricated "confession" as a part of a public spectacle exhibiting all the usual Communist trial techniques. This was prepared and rehearsed in advance under police auspices and by customary Communist police procedures when Oatis was held incommunicado for 70 days between his arrest and presentation in court.

The proceedings revealed the flimsiest kind of alleged "evidence," even more insubstantial than the Communists are accustomed to produce in trumped-up trials of this type. For example, the normal routine requests of the Associated Press for news reports, openly transmitted by wire, were

distorted into "espionage missions on orders from centers in New York and London."

Such an attempted hoax on the intelligence of world opinion will fool no one. While it had all the trappings of legal procedure, it was in fact a kangaroo court staged before the klieg lights of propaganda. Its purpose was purely intimidation and propaganda designed to strike at the United States press services and against the free press of the world.

The "confession" of "espionage" was in truth but the admission of an American reporter that, in the high traditions of his profession, he was attempting under the most unfavorable conditions to report a true picture of conditions and events in Czechoslovakia as he saw them.

The Czechoslovak regime has clearly demonstrated that it considers legitimate and normal news gathering and reporting as "espionage." As the prosecutor publicly stated, Oatis was held to be a particularly dangerous "espionage" agent because he insisted on obtaining accurate, correct, and verified information. To do this is "a crime," according to the concepts of the present Czechoslovak authorities, who find any press activity except the transmission of official propaganda to be "espionage." The Czechoslovak Government thus rejects completely the principle of freedom of information. It is presumed that the press of the free world will so view this turning back of the lock.

The proceedings of this especially arranged spectacle also included a number of groundless accusations against the American Ambassador and other members of the United States Embassy staff. These were invented as a part of the entire propaganda performance in attacking the United States.

This action comes as a climax in the treatment of American citizens in Czechoslovakia. It has accordingly been necessary to recognize that it is no longer safe for American citizens to go to that country and to prohibit private travel there until further notice.

If further evidence were needed, the arrest, the detention for months without access to friend, Embassy representative, or trusted legal counsel, the forced "confession" to fabricated charges, the hasty "conviction" of William N. Oatis shows that the present regime in Czechoslovakia fears truth, hates liberty, and knows no justice.

U. S. Asks Czechs To Free Planes

Released to the press June 26]

Following is the text of a note sent on June 24 by the United States Ambassador at Prague, Ellis O. Briggs, to the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viliam Broky:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's Note No. 651 of June 17¹ and Your Excellency's reply

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 12.

July 16, 1951

of June 21 concerning the unintentional landing near Prague on June 8 of two United States jet planes, the pilots of which are still being detained by the Czechoslovak Government.

Your Excellency's reply takes the position that notwithstanding the unequivocal statements made by me during my conversation with you on June 15 and confirmed by the Embassy's note of June 17, the Czechoslovak authorities must examine "whether this really was a training mission and whether the Czechoslovak aerial border has truly been violated unintentionally." Your communication indicates that the investigation is still in progress, apparently seeking thereby to justify the continued detention of the two pilots.

My Government directs me strongly to reiterate the request made orally on June 15 and repeated in the Embassy's note of June 17 that the pilots in question be released without further delay. Your Excellency is reminded that these two young men have already been in the hands of the Czechoslovak authorities for 16 days, although all the information the pilots could possibly possess concerning their having become lost on a training flight and their landing in Czechoslovakia must have been communicated by them to the authorities during the first few hours, if not during the first few minutes after their emergency landing in this country on June 8.

Your Excellency is further reminded that although during our conversation on June 15 you declared the pilots are not prisoners, they have been and are still being held incommunicado, and efforts on the part of the Embassy to visit them and ascertain their personal welfare have been unavailing.

With respect to the statement in Your Excellency's note that the United States planes intentionally and systematically cross the Czechoslovak border, my Government declares that such charges are false and furthermore an unintentional crossing of the border by lost planes, as occurred on June 8, does not constitute, and would not be so considered by nations generally, "flagrant violation of the most fundamental principles of international law prohibiting any flights of military planes over the territory of another state without its express consent."

Furthermore, with reference to 116 alleged violations of Czechoslovak territory referred to in the enclosure to Your Excellency's note of June 21, it is remarked that no identification numbers and no description of any kind concerning the planes are given, and therefore it is difficult for a proper investigation to be made by the appropriate authorities. I may mention that the Embassy already brought to the Ministry's attention the importance of specific data to support alleged violations.

In view of the fact that it was not the intent of the flight to enter Czechoslovakia, the presence of

guns and ammunition therein was unintentional vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia as was the presence of the aircraft themselves. Loaded guns are frequently carried on United States military aircraft on operational training flights within the United States Zone as is common of air forces of all nations when planes are over territory within their jurisdiction. The key point in the matter after all is that the planes were lost and did not cross the Czechoslovak frontier by intention.

I must again remind the Ministry, as the Embassy did in Note No. 558, February 7, that no reply was received to the Embassy's Note No. 422, August 28, 1950, requesting that investigation be made of a number of violations of the United States Zone of Germany by Czechoslovak aircraft. The aircraft guilty of these violations were described in detail. Also, the requested assurances that suitable instructions be issued to Czechoslovak aviators to prevent such violations have not been received. Furthermore, the Embassy has been informed that such violations are continuing.

The United States Government does not admit the right of Czechoslovakia to continue to detain the two pilots of the jet planes landing here unintentionally on June 8, the immediate release of whom is again requested.

U.S. Condemns Ruthless Measures In Hungary

[Released to the press July 7]

Following is the substantive portion of a note which the American Chargé d'Affaires in Budapest, Gerald A. Mokma, on instructions from the Department has communicated to the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply to the Hungarian Government's note of July 2, which alleged improper activities on the part of officers of the American Legation in Hungary:

The Government of the United States categorically rejects the allegations directed against the Legation of the United States and members of its staff by the Hungarian Government in its note of July 2 and regards the demands put forward by the Hungarian Government on the basis of these charges as arbitrary and unwarranted. The activities of the United States Legation in Hungary have been legitimate in every respect and in full conformity with international diplomatic practice. The United States Government concludes, therefore, that the conduct of United States Legation officials has been called into question only to serve the propaganda aims of the Hungarian Government.

In the view of the United States Government, the proceedings in the trial of Archbishop Grösz

establish nothing except the fact that the Hungarian authorities are continuing by ruthless and unconscionable measures to terrorize the Hungarian people into mute submission to the existing regime and its totalitarian program. In this instance, as on many past occasions, the Hungarian Government has contrived a tissue of falsehoods in a brazen though futile attempt to justify before the world its continuing campaign to crush all dissent and to suppress the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens. It is also evident that the Hungarian note of July 2 reflects the extreme annoyance of the Hungarian Government that the Hungarian people, despite unending Communist propaganda and repression, continue to maintain their feelings of deep friendship for the United States as well as their firm confidence that the United States Government will not cease to concern itself with their tragic plight.

Without accepting or crediting in any way the preposterous charges which the Hungarian Government has advanced, the United States Government has taken the decision to discontinue certain cultural and informational activities mentioned in the Hungarian Government's note, since it is clear that the Hungarian Government has rendered impossible the maintenance of open and normal contacts and the free exchange of ideas and information between the two peoples. The United States Government believes, however, that the attitude of the Hungarian Government in this regard will be viewed with deep resentment and regret by the Hungarian people, who have shown a great interest in cultural contacts with the people of the United States and who are fully aware that this policy of the Hungarian Government is aimed at further isolating them from the free world. By its behavior in this matter, the Hungarian Government has effectively demonstrated before the entire world that it dare not tolerate, even to a limited degree the exercise of freedom of opinion.

Italy Cooperates in Defense Effort

[Released to the press June 30]

Arrangements have been made with the Italian Government through Ambassador James C. Dunn at Rome, to facilitate the movement across Italy of supplies for United States forces in Europe. These supplies will move through the Port of Leghorn and across Italy by rail.

For the purpose of assisting in this movement of supplies a detachment of technical personnel from United States forces will be stationed in Leghorn. The conclusion of this arrangement is another demonstration of Italy's cooperation in the mutual defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty.

U.S.S.R. and Satellites Denied Import Tariff Concessions

Released to the press July 6]

Sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which was signed recently by President Truman, requires the President, as soon as practicable, to take action to deny the benefits of trade agreement concessions to imports from the U.S.S.R. and its satellites and to prevent the importation of certain furs from the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. The Department of State accordingly delivered to the Soviet Embassy on June 23, 1951, a note giving notice, according to provisions of the agreement, of the termination of the commercial agreement of August 4, 1937, with the U.S.S.R. as renewed by the exchange of notes signed on July 31, 1942. The agreement will terminate 6 months from the date of notice of intention to terminate. On June 27 similar action was taken to terminate the provisional commercial agreement of August 20, 1930, with Rumania, which provides for a 30-day notification of intention to terminate.

A request to notify the Bulgarian Government of termination of the provisional commercial agreement of August 18, 1932, with Bulgaria has been conveyed to the Government of Switzerland. This procedure is being followed in view of the suspension of relations between the United States and Bulgaria in February 1950. The agreement with Bulgaria provides for advance notice of three months for denunciation.

With Hungary and Poland, the most-favored-nation provisions in customs matters are parts of broader treaties of friendship, commerce, and consular rights. In the treaty between the United States and Hungary signed June 24, 1925, the most-favored-nation provisions appear in article II. In the treaty between the United States and Poland, signed on June 15, 1931, the most-favored-nation provisions are contained in article VI. The Hungarian treaty requires that notice of termination be given 1 year in advance; the Polish treaty prescribes a 6-month period of notice.

Notices to modify these treaties by terminating articles VII and VI respectively, or to terminate the treaties as a whole, were delivered to the Hungarian and Polish representatives in Washington on July 5, 1951. It is also anticipated that the President will promptly take action to set in motion the operation of section 5 (denial of tariff concessions) of the newly enacted Trade Agreements Extension Act in the case of satellite countries and areas with which the United States has no commercial agreement, as well as section 11 (further embargo) with respect to Communist China.

Texts of the notes to the U.S.S.R., Rumania, Hungary, and Poland follow (text of the note to Bulgaria will be released when notification of

delivery has been received from the Government of Switzerland):

Note to U.S.S.R. of June 23:

SIR:

I refer to the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, effected by exchange of notes at Washington on July 31, 1942, which agreement continued in force the agreement of August 4, 1937, regarding commercial relations.

In accordance with the procedure prescribed in the above-mentioned notes of July 31, 1942, the Government of the United States of America gives notice hereby of its desire that the agreement be terminated, and, notice having thus been given, the agreement of August 4, 1937, as renewed and continued in force, will terminate six months from this date.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

Mr. BORIS I. KARAVAEV,
*Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

Note to Rumania of June 27:

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the provisional commercial agreement between the United States of America and Rumania, signed at Bucharest on August 20, 1930.

In accordance with the procedure prescribed in the above-mentioned agreement, the Government of the United States of America gives notice hereby of its intention that the agreement be terminated, and, notice having thus been given, the agreement of August 20, 1930 will terminate thirty days after the date of this note.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

The Honorable
MIHAI MAGHERU,
Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic.

Note to Hungary of July 5:

SIR:

Pursuant to Article XXV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Hungary signed at Washington on June 24, 1925, I wish to propose modification of the Treaty by the termination of Article VII.

If this proposal is acceptable to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, the modification suggested will be considered effective on the date of the acceptance.

If, however, it should not be possible to reach

agreement with respect to the proposed modification of the Treaty, it is considered necessary that the Treaty terminate in its entirety. Therefore, in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XXV of the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America gives notice that, in the absence of agreement to the proposed modification, the Treaty will, pursuant to that Article, terminate one year from the date of this note.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

Mr. LAJOS NAGY,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Note to Poland of July 5:

SIR:

Pursuant to Article XXX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Poland signed at Washington on June 15, 1931, I wish to propose modification of the Treaty by the termination of Article VI.

If this proposal is acceptable to the Government of Poland, the modification suggested will be considered effective with respect to territory to which the treaty may be applicable on the date of the acceptance.

If, however, it should not be possible to reach agreement with respect to the proposed modification of the Treaty, it is considered necessary that the Treaty terminate in its entirety. Therefore, in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XXX of the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America gives notice that, in the absence of agreement to the proposed modification, the Treaty will, pursuant to that Article, terminate six months from the date of this note, with respect to territory to which the treaty may be applicable.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

Mr. TADEUSZ JAWORSKI,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Poland.

Export-Import Bank Bolsters ECA Aid to Philippines

[Released to the press June 16]

The American Embassy in Manila announced today that it delivered a note to the Philippine Government stating that the Export-Import Bank of Washington is, in further implementation of the Bell Mission recommendations,¹ prepared to enter into discussions with the Philippine Government

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 723.

looking toward the establishment of credits for productive projects in the Philippines. The Export-Import Bank loan operations will be most closely integrated and coordinated with the ECA aid program and will together comprise a single integrated and coordinated program of U. S. aid to the Philippine Government designed to help build economic strength in the Philippines and assist in meeting the needs and aspirations of the Philippine people.

The aid program begun by the United States Government on April 6, 1951, was of an interim character designed to promote the economic strengthening and betterment of the Philippines. That program, for which 15 million dollars has already been allocated, resulted from the substantial implementation by the Philippine Congress of the Quirino-Foster Agreement and from the recommendations of the U. S. Economic Survey Mission in September 1950. The President of the United States in his message to Congress on May 24, 1951, on foreign aid requested funds which would make it possible for the ECA to make additional grants to the Philippine Government in fiscal year 1952 for the purpose of substantially expanding the initial program already started in the Philippines.

It is expected that the Export-Import Bank will send representatives to the Philippines to investigate and develop specific loan proposals by the Philippine Government. The full text of the note delivered by the American Embassy to the Philippine Government is as follows:

The economic aid program launched by the United States Government on April 6, 1951, was of an interim character designed to promote the economic strengthening and betterment of the Philippines until the United States Congress could be asked for authority to establish an enlarged program of financial and technical aid. This program, for which 15 million dollars has already been allocated, proceeded from the substantial implementation by the Philippine Congress of the Quirino-Foster Agreement of November 1950, and from the earlier recommendations of the U. S. Economic Survey Mission in September 1950.

In further implementation of the Quirino-Foster Agreement (a) the President of the United States in his message to the Congress on May 24, 1951, on foreign aid, has requested funds which would make possible additional grants in fiscal year 1952, for the purpose of substantially expanding the initial program already started in the Philippines by the Economic Cooperation Administration; and (b) the Export-Import Bank of Washington is prepared to enter into discussions with representatives of the Philippine Government looking toward the establishment of credits for productive projects in the Philippines.

In extension of grant and loan assistance, the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Export-Import Bank will be closely associated to the end that both loans and grants shall be utilized as part of a single integrated and coordinated program of United States aid, and Philippine Government efforts designed to help build economic strength in the Philippines and assist in meeting the needs and aspirations of the Philippine people.

These actions reflect the confidence of the Government of the United States that continued progress will be made in carrying out the recommendations of the United States Economic Survey Mission.

Africa's Role in the Free World Today

by George C. McGhee
*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs*¹

I am honored to take part in this—the first Summer Institute on Contemporary Africa to be held on an American university campus. An outstanding and internationally known pioneer in the field of African studies, Professor Herskovits, has for many years attracted to Northwestern University African specialists from all over the world, to concentrate on that fabulous area lying south of the Sahara Desert. In turn, he has sent his graduate students to various parts of Europe and Africa to undertake field studies. The Department of State is pleased to have the opportunity to cooperate in some of these endeavors through the Smith-Mundt, Fulbright, and Point Four programs. It welcomes the opportunity of sending some of its own personnel to Evanston this summer to participate in this Institute, and to exchange views with others who have gathered here to advance knowledge and understanding of the vast African Continent.

For my brief talk this evening, I will offer an analysis of the role that Africa plays in the free world today and then discuss what the free world is doing for Africa—in particular what the United States is doing to assist in the development of that Continent in concert with the metropolitan powers.

Africa today remains oriented toward the free world both economically and politically, but we must not make light of the difficulties which face us—the peoples of the free world—if it is to remain so oriented. Communism as such appears to have made no substantial progress in the area, but continuation of this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted. Recent developments have focused attention on Africa's increasingly important role in global affairs. It provides a sizable proportion of the strategic materials now required by the Western powers, including such minerals as copper, chrome, cobalt, manganese, bauxite, as-

bestos, tin, industrial diamonds, and uranium. It also provides rubber, sisal, hardwoods, hides, fats, and oils.

Since three-fourths of the Continent's inhabitants are under European control, and the sovereign countries of Africa are allied both economically and politically with Europe and the United States, Africa is firmly associated with the free world. The Europeans regard their African territories as essential to their economic well-being, their military security, and their political position in the world community. Since the Second World War, Africa's importance to them has been greatly enhanced.

A Fertile Field for Communism

The Soviet rulers have also become increasingly aware of the importance of Africa to the free world and are accelerating their efforts to weaken European prestige and control with the hope of ultimately including the African territories in the Soviet bloc. In Africa there is fortunately time to apply preventive rather than curative methods against communism. But, as Elspeth Huxley recently pointed out: "We run a race with time, on the one hand, our good intentions, our needs, and our resolve to remake and enlighten, and, on the other hand, the natural and gathering impatience of the half-educated, fed on the vapor of our own philosophy—to be done with an alien ruler."

Conditions exist in many parts of Africa which could well play into the hands of Communist agitators—low standards of living, attitudes of white supremacy, and disintegration of tribal authority. In the war of propaganda and diplomacy which the Soviets are waging throughout the world, the central purpose is to destroy the unity of the free world, to pit against each other Americans, Europeans, Asians, and Africans. Soviet propagandists accuse Americans and Europeans of talking

¹ Address made at Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., on June 27 and released to the press on the same date.

of democracy and liberty and yet confining their application to a small minority. The Russians accuse the West of preaching justice and practicing inequality, leaving masses of people in poverty. Russia exploits grievances and poverty, incites resistance to authority, and encourages class and race hatred.

While the Russians have not attempted to establish states in Africa based on Communist ideology, they desire to disrupt the existing governments and create revolutionary conditions which would, if successful, react unfavorably on Europe. Communists in Africa infiltrate wherever possible into labor unions and nationalist movements. They attempt to subvert to Communist ends, movements sincerely designed to improve the position of the African.

In meeting the Soviet threat in Africa, the Department of State attempts to expose Communist lies and to reveal the true nature of "Soviet imperialism." We point out that no nation in modern times has annexed so much territory, or extended its ruthless imperialistic control over so many of her neighbors, as has Russia since the end of the Second World War; that since 1939 the Soviet Union has actually annexed 264,000 square miles of new territory with more than 24 million people. Russia rules with an iron hand over nine supposedly sovereign European states, not counting her dictatorial occupation of Eastern Germany and her interference in Chinese affairs.

We point out Russia's duplicity in posing as the champion of all colonial peoples while she herself rejects all moral and ethical standards in her treatment of peoples under her control; that between 3 and 4 million human beings are in Russian concentration camps; and that slave labor forms the very foundation of the Soviet economy.

Russia is herself an empire, and Russia's treatment of minorities living within that empire is well known. In 1946, for example, one-half million Moslems living in the Caucasus, Crimea, and Volga areas were exiled to Siberia. Six thousand mosques and 8,000 Moslem schools were converted to stables, dance halls, and antireligious museums. Wherever Russian communism has prevailed, there has resulted loss of freedom and lowering of standards of living. While Russia proclaims elsewhere in the world the right of self-determination, there is, neither in Russia nor in her colonial satellites, freedom of self-government, the right of peoples to live their own lives—to follow their own traditions.

Preparations for Self-Government

Exposing the falsities of Soviet propaganda, however, is not sufficient. To provide an answer to Russia's propaganda we must reaffirm our faith in the principles of the free world and its way of life. We must show to the Africans and others

that their individual and national aspirations can best be achieved in company with the free world community.

We could do much worse than take the advice of Chief Kidahu of Tanganyika, the first African member of the Executive Council in East Africa, who recently suggested: "The prime duty of European, Asian, and African leaders is to find and develop points of agreement." He added significantly: "We Africans will not be misled by extremists if the mass of the people come to feel that the Africans are being given fair representation."

If a true partnership can be worked out between Europeans, Africans, Asians, and Americans—based on mutual self-respect and understanding and the acceptance of mutual responsibilities—non-Africans will be less apt to confuse the African of today with his unprivileged grandfather, and Africans will not confuse the present-day European with his less liberal grandfather. Justified resentment against the practices of nineteenth century colonialism, tainted as it was with human exploitation and racial discrimination, will be replaced by a respect for the constant growth of international accountability for dependent peoples under the aegis of the United Nations.

Africans rightly insist, however, that words must be backed up with deeds. On the whole, the postwar performance of the metropolitan powers shows that steps are being taken in the right direction. Contrasted with the retrogressive Russian imperialism, in fact, the so-called capitalistic colonialism appears most progressive. Since 1945, countries containing over 550 millions of people have become independent. Six new nations of Asia—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia—have come into existence. In addition, there are Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel in the Middle East, while Libya, Somaliland, the new states of Indochina, and others are moving forward toward independence.

Immediate independence is, however, not the cure for all colonial problems. The United States Government has always maintained that premature independence for primitive, uneducated peoples can do them more harm than good and subject them to an exploitation by indigenous leaders, unrestrained by the civic standards that come with widespread education, that can be just as ruthless as that of aliens. Also, giving full independence to peoples unprepared to meet aggression or subversion can endanger not only the peoples themselves but the security of the free world.

It is, however, the traditional policy of the United States to support orderly movements toward self-government. We have followed with interest, therefore, the efforts of the various European governments over the years to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples in African territories and the spread of genuine African nationalism. African nationalism derives in part from the acute nationalism prevalent in other parts of the world

and, in part, is a reaction to foreign propaganda against colonialism. It is also derived, however, from an emerging belief that Africans as such must stand together.

Establishing a Constitution for the Gold Coast

Of especial interest have been the recent political developments in British West Africa. January 1, 1951, marked an historic day in the Gold Coast. It may well mark an historic day in Africa. It was on this day that a new constitution became effective in the Gold Coast, establishing popular elections and granting to the African himself broad competence over his own affairs for the first time in African colonial history. This last month I had the privilege of welcoming to Washington on behalf of my government two distinguished visitors from the Gold Coast, Mr. Nkrumah, the Leader of Government Business, and Mr. Botsio, the Minister of Education and Social Welfare, following Mr. Nkrumah's reception of an honorary doctorate at his alma mater, Lincoln University.

I took this occasion to point out to our honored guests that, while the far-reaching developments in British colonial policy had produced misgivings in certain quarters, we ourselves had no such misgivings—that we had observed the efficient manner with which the preliminary stages of this bold experiment had been worked out cooperatively between the British officials and the Africans, and the moderation and sense of responsibility shown by the African leaders since the constitution became operative. I pointed out that we were confident that this significant beginning in African administration would succeed; that it must succeed in order to prove that the African is capable of governing himself. I also cautioned that people were watching with some degree of anxiety, knowing that there are serious obstacles to overcome. Foremost among these will be the difficulty of unifying a diverse people, a people differing in language and customs and in degree of political consciousness and economic development. The boldness of the experiment could only be measured in the light of these difficulties.

Mr. Nkrumah in return spoke feelingly of his awareness of the difficulties and the responsibilities, as well as the opportunities, involved in setting up a new government which he hoped in the not too distant future would attain full dominion status within the British Commonwealth.

Elections will soon take place in Nigeria, and a new government will be elected under the new constitution which will, like the Gold Coast Constitution, represent a significant step in the direction of full self-government. These and other constitutional developments in British Africa offer convincing evidence of a sincerity of purpose in carrying out the long-avowed objectives of British colonial policy of advancing dependent peoples to self-government as rapidly as conditions per-

mit. They represent an incontestable denial of the oft-repeated charges of the Kremlin that the British and other European nations are intent on keeping dependent peoples in permanent subjection. Only by helping responsible African leaders create a state of society which the mass of the people will find infinitely preferable to the alternative offered by the Communists, can the full cooperation of the African be assured to the free world.

Among many of the peoples living in Africa, only slightly touched by modern civilization, the immediate problem is not political status but improvement of health, sanitation, living and working conditions, and education and training in the fundamentals upon which successful participation in government can be achieved.

Within the framework of the United Nations, the various Member nations having overseas territories have assumed specific obligations with respect to the dependent peoples of Africa. They have declared that they "recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount" and that "they accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories." Furthermore, in accepting the doctrine of international accountability they agreed to send regularly to the United Nations information on the economic, social, and educational conditions in their colonies. If one reviews these reports and the huge development and welfare schemes of the various metropolitan powers with territories in Africa, as I am sure you plan to, one cannot help but be impressed with the steps that have been taken since World War II to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples of their territories.

To summarize them only briefly: the United Kingdom has allotted some 500 million dollars under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 to promote the development of the resources of the colonies and the welfare of their inhabitants. By the end of March 1950, 10-year plans for 23 British territories had been approved, providing for expenditures on specific projects of 600 million dollars. Of this sum, about 180 million dollars includes contributions by the territories themselves. Most of the planning for the projects is done by development committees in the territories, subject to over-all approval by the Colonial Office in London.

Progress in Development Programs

Although most of the development programs are heavily weighted on the side of economic development, they also stress education, health, sanitation, water supply, community development, and resettlement of populations in healthier and more fertile areas. Illustrative of the latter is the very

successful Anchan Resettlement Scheme in Nigeria, which was accomplished over a period of three or four years after World War II. During this time a native population of some 60,000 living in an agriculturally impoverished area infested with tsetse flies was moved to a fertile region free from the scourge of sleeping sickness. This was no forced transfer of unwilling populations, as is so common in the Soviet Empire, but was carried out in a spirit of mutual cooperation. The Anchan Resettlement Scheme provided new housing, health facilities, a potable water supply, and necessary agricultural equipment for the resettled population.

In the field of public health it may be pointed out that about 3 million dollars was spent in the Gold Coast alone during fiscal year 1949-50 for the improvement of health facilities. A Training School for Nurses and several hospitals were constructed in the Gold Coast during that time.

In 1949-50 appropriations for education in the Gold Coast exceeded \$4,500,000. Plans were drafted for the expansion of primary, secondary, and higher education. Recent progress in technical education is represented by the reopening of the Government Technical School at Takoradi and the establishment of two trade-training centers in 1948-49. Construction of several new technical institutes was started in Kumasi in 1949.

The Belgian Congo 10-Year Plan which was announced last year proposed the expenditure of 500 million dollars for the following main projects: (1) construction of a railway line to connect the Lower Congo Katanga Railway with the Upper Congo-Great Lakes Railways; (2) electrification of the Matadi-Léopoldville Railway; (3) building of 12,000 kilometers of roads; (4) enlargement and reequipping of all ports, both maritime and river ones; (5) buoying of rivers and improvement of their channels; (6) construction of a new airfield at Léopoldville, and seven other airfields; (7) building of four hydroelectric power stations and increase in the power of seven stations already commissioned; (8) building of medical and pharmaceutical depots, building of eight new hospitals and enlarging and improving of 24 others, 14 laboratories, 10 tuberculosis sanatoria, 7 hospitals for the insane, and 6 hospitals for incurables. In addition, there is planned a vast expansion of the elementary and secondary schools, agricultural and professional schools, and eventually a university college in the Congo, establishment of local industries, and development of vast housing schemes.

Similarly, the French Government has begun an extensive development program in its African territories, and is planning to spend the equivalent of approximately 11½ billion dollars on various projects. Schools, hospitals, and roads will be provided to many primitive and backward areas. Irrigation and hydroelectric developments are steadily improving the supply of food and power

in North Africa. In French West Africa, the Niger Development Scheme has introduced the more extensive use of agricultural machinery.

In general, all administrations in Africa have been concerned with increasing agricultural productivity so as to eliminate hunger and famine and to improve the quality and the quantity of the native diet. Administrators in Africa face great obstacles to agricultural development because of irregular supply or total lack of water, soil erosion, and the primitive agricultural methods of the native populations.

By and large, the most concrete accomplishments have been made in the field of transportation and communications. Basic to all other development programs are more and better roads, ports, railroads, telephone and wireless communications.

Various forms of cooperation exist among the administering powers in Africa, primarily in the fields of health, labor, control of animal diseases, soil conservation, communications, and transportation. An international organization responsible for supervising these cooperative activities, called the Commission for Technical Cooperation South of the Sahara, was set up in 1949. Numerous conferences among the metropolitan countries have been held to discuss ways and means of improving health conditions, labor welfare, soil conservation, etc. Many special bureaus exist under the Commission of Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, which deal with such specific problems as sleeping sickness, education, et cetera.

ECA Aid to African Dependencies

Through ECA, extensive aid has been provided, in the form of both grants and loans, to the African dependencies of France, United Kingdom, Belgium, and, to a smaller extent, Portugal.

Since France has elected to utilize a substantial portion of her regularly allotted Eca program funds for recovery and development purposes in her overseas territories, as well as considerable franc allotments from ECA-generated counterpart funds, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the large French territories south of the Sahara have been the largest recipients of Eca aid. Altogether, the French have used approximately 285 million dollars in Eca country program funds for territorial imports, and, in addition, about 140 million dollars equivalent in local currency counterpart funds to the overseas territories.

The Eca has also provided considerable aid, through grants and loans, to the African Dependent Overseas Territories from a special reserve fund for overseas development. Up to the present time, the Eca aid approved from this source to British, French, and Belgian territories has come to more than 62 million dollars. Assistance from this fund, which has been more and more closely related to critical sectors in the current investment programs for the overseas ter-

territories, has been provided in support of a wide range of projects including road developments, improvements in river navigation and port facilities, agricultural projects, power installations where these are required in support of expanding production, irrigation schemes, and the like.

Aid provided through ECA has also been made available in the form of technical assistance. Through May 31, 1951, 49 technical-assistance projects in the dependent overseas territories had been approved by ECA at a total cost of about \$710,000. The scope of assistance thus provided has been quite wide, including surveys of mineral and other resources, engineering aid in planning transportation routes, and recommendations for health-control measures. In the handling of these projects, ECA has emphasized continuously the importance of transfer of "know-how" to local technicians in order that the benefits of the assistance provided may be permanent in character.

Additional Assistance Through Point Four

While ECA has given substantial assistance to the dependent overseas territories in Africa, little or no aid has been extended to the neighboring independent countries. The Point Four agreements which have been signed with Liberia, Libya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia will tend to fill this gap.

The Republic of Liberia was the first of the independent countries to sign a Point Four agreement with the United States. Liberia has, of course, received considerable technical and financial aid from the United States over a long period, which has contributed to the great progress made in Liberia in the last 10 years. The U. S. Navy, with the use of lend-lease funds made available during World War II, constructed a 20-million-dollar port at the capital city of Monrovia which is supporting Liberia's economic expansion. The cost of this port is, incidentally, being repaid the United States from port revenues. An airfield and several roads were also constructed during the war by the U.S. Army.

U.S. aid to Liberia has not been confined to wartime efforts, however. Since 1944 we have had an Economic Mission in Liberia. The Mission has conducted surveys of the mineral and agricultural resources of Liberia, leading to the development of many of these resources on a scale never previously known in that nation.

The U.S. Public Health Service has also had a mission in Liberia since 1944. The mission has established a school of nursing, has trained laboratory technicians, helped in a malaria-control program, and done valuable studies of tropical diseases. In addition to these missions, the United States is helping in the development of Liberia through the instrument of the Export-Import Bank and the Point Four Program.

The Liberian Point Four Program was designed to coincide with a proposed Liberian Government 5-year program for economic development. The number of technicians already assigned to Liberia is the largest of any country participating in the Point Four Program. Projects in operation include development and improvement of Liberian agriculture, public health, education, public works and government services. The program for fiscal 1951 had a budget of \$765,000 from Point Four funds. The Liberian Government agreed to allocate 20 percent of its annual revenue, which should exceed 7 million dollars, to the program.

The projects under Point Four for Ethiopia, Libya, and Eritrea are still in the planning stages but will include agricultural, educational, rural development, and transportation undertakings which will enable these countries to improve the standard of living of their peoples and will make it possible for them to play an increasingly significant role in the community of free nations.

Evidence of Cooperative Activity

From the foregoing, it may be seen that there is today a vast ferment of cooperative activity in the development of Africa. It will be effective only if all concerned have an appreciation of certain basic facts. Europeans and Americans having responsibilities in Africa must clearly recognize that there is no short and easy path to economic development which ignores the social complex and the psychological needs of African society. The African peoples must realize that if social and economic evolution is to become integrated effectively into African life, then they themselves must be prepared to assume a large share of the burden and responsibilities which it involves. Both African and non-African must realize that each has a separate but valuable contribution to make in the development of this vast Continent, and that maximum results will be obtained only by combining the African peoples' traditional and intuitive knowledge of their country with the European and American heritage of scientific and industrial advance.

The new era of progress and growing independence which has started in Africa with the help of the free nations of the world stands out in bold contrast to the dark spirit of reactionary colonialism which animates Russian expansionist philosophy. The peoples of Africa must realize that the greatest danger to the full realization of their economic, social, and spiritual development lies in the menace of Communist imperialism, which threatens the security of the entire free world and assures for the Africans as colonial peoples—not self-government but a dark future of political and cultural enslavement.

Further Expansion of VOA Programs

[Released to the press June 23]

The Voice of America will step up its campaign of truth to the Soviet Union with the inauguration Sunday, June 24, of daily broadcasts in Tatar, Turkestani, Azerbaijani, and Armenian. New programs also will be initiated on the same date in Malayan and Burmese.

Translated statements by Vice President Barkley will be broadcast in the opening Malayan and Burmese programs, and statements by Secretary Acheson, translated into each of the languages, will be used in all six of the inaugural programs. The Burmese broadcast also will include a statement by James Barrington, Burmese Ambassador to the United States, and the Armenian program will include a sermon by the Rev. M. Manigian, oldest Armenian minister in the United States.

The new daily 15-minute programs to the Soviet Union will be beamed from transmitters in the United States, with simultaneous relays by broadcasting facilities at Munich and Tangier, on the following schedule: Tatar, 9:30 a.m., e.d.t. (5:30 p.m. area time); Turkestani, 9:45 a.m., e.d.t. (6:45 p.m., area time); Azerbaijani, 10 a.m., e.d.t. (6 p.m., area time); Armenian, 10:45 a.m., e.d.t. (6:45 p.m., area time). The new programs will supplement broadcasts already being beamed to listeners in the Soviet Union in Russian, Ukrainian, and Georgian.

Additional coverage to Soviet-controlled areas has recently been initiated in Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian broadcasts.

The daily 15-minute Malayan and Burmese programs will be broadcast from stateside transmitters with simultaneous relay by Manila and Honolulu. The schedule will be: Malayan, 9:30 a.m., e.d.t. (9 p.m., area time); Burmese, 9:45 a.m., e.d.t. (8:15 p.m., area time).

All of the new programs will feature news and commentary.

Also on June 24, the Voice of America will add daily 15-minute programs to the present schedules in Italian and Turkish. This will increase the Italian language output to one hour and 25 minutes daily and the Turkish language output to one hour daily.

The additions will increase the total output of the Voice of America to more than 48 program hours daily in 45 language services and will complete the programing expansion for the current fiscal year, which began with a total of 29 program hours in 24 languages.

SOVIET MOSLEM BROADCASTS

Statement by Secretary Acheson

I am very happy to have this opportunity to say a few words to the Moslem peoples of the Soviet Union. For some while now, the Voice of America has been bringing its message of truth and liberty to the peoples of the free world including Islamic peoples of Asia and Africa. Today, we are proud to broadcast to the Tatar, the Azerbaijani, and the Turkestani peoples in the U.S.S.R. who for more than three decades have been denied access to the truth by the Communists.

We Americans admire the brave manner in which all the peoples of the Soviet Union including the Tatars, the Azerbaijanis, and the Turkestanis are striving to maintain their religions, their traditions, their own way of life, despite the efforts of the Communist regime to replace religion with godlessness, to replace the glorious histories of the peoples of the Soviet Union with the false folklore of Stalinism.

The people of the United States have a friendly regard for the Moslem peoples of the U.S.S.R. The proud history of the Tatars of the Volga, who have maintained their ancient culture and traditions despite all obstacles; the brave Azerbaijanis and other mountain people of the Caucasus whose centuries-old struggle for their human rights has provided some of history's most glorious pages; the peoples of Turkestan whose ancient cities of Bokhara, Samarkand, Merv, and Tashkent represent monuments of a lofty culture; these, like the other God fearing peoples of the Soviet Union, are regarded by us Americans as

taunch pillars against atheistic, materialistic tyranny.

The Voice of America will henceforth bring you in your own languages the truth which the Communists fear and try to keep from you. We shall tell you what is happening in the free world and particularly in those regions of the free world linked with you by religion, tradition, and culture. We shall keep you informed of the aggressive actions of those disturbing world peace. We shall tell you how free men are standing firm against the further spread of despotism.

As I said last month to the people of Georgia, the goal of the American people and their Government is a peaceful world where all men can live and work freely and happily, without want or fear and with the right to worship God in their own way. This is our vision of the future; we invite you to share it.

I extend to you Moslems of the Soviet Union, in the name of the American people, our sincere, friendly greetings.

SOVIET ARMENIAN PROGRAM

Statement by Secretary Acheson

I am happy to have this opportunity to say a few words to the people of Soviet Armenia. Here in the United States, a quarter of a million American citizens of Armenian origin are living proof of the magnificent character and spirit of this irile race. Among the leaders in American life today we find such names as Saroyan, Mamouljian, and Kazanjian; men who have contributed much to the cultural and scientific progress of modern America. Working under conditions of freedom and equality, these and other Americans of Armenian origin have shown that the same people who produced such luminaries in the fields of art and literature as Mesrop, Mashtots, and Mofses Chorenadzi can contribute in every field of endeavor.

Although not many Americans have had the good fortune of visiting Armenia, your land and people are well known to us. We admire the brave manner, in which you, like the other peoples of the Soviet Union, have succeeded in preserving your national personality, your ancient traditions, and your will to stand up for your human rights. You are known to us as a people who early adopted Christianity and maintained a Christian culture and civilization through the ages. You, like the other God fearing peoples of the Soviet Union, are regarded by us Americans as staunch pillars against atheistic, materialistic tyranny.

The Voice of America will, henceforth, bring you in the Armenian language the truth of what is happening in the outside world, the truth which the Communists are trying to keep from you. We

shall keep you informed of the aggressive actions of those disturbing world peace. We shall tell you how free men are standing firm against the further spread of despotism.

The ultimate goal of the American people and their Government is a peaceful world where all men can live and work in freedom, without want or fear, with the right to worship God in their own way.

This is America's vision of the future. We are confident the people of Soviet Armenia share it.

I extend to you Armenians in the name of the American people, our sincere and friendly greetings.

MALAYAN PROGRAM

Statement by Secretary Acheson

I am happy to greet the people of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya today on this new program of the Voice of America in the Malay language. Through these daily broadcasts we hope to strengthen the friendship that has existed between us for so many years. The people of the United States welcome this opportunity to share our ideas and ideals with you in Singapore and in the Federation of Malaya.

The part Malaya is taking in the free world struggle to preserve the peace and independence of all people is a bright ray of hope in these dark hours. Your courageous efforts in combating communism on the home front and the words and deeds of your leaders are living proof of your determination to build a world in which all peoples can enjoy peace and freedom.

As you listen to this new program and hear the voices of both American and Malayan friends, we hope it will serve to remind you of American friendship for Malaya and Singapore and of our common aims and hopes.

Statement by Vice President Barkley

This is the first broadcast of the Voice of America to the people of Singapore and Malaya. I send you greetings from the American people.

We in the United States are learning more and more each day about Southeast Asia. It is our hope that these Voice of America broadcasts, which you will hear each day, will tell you something about us. I hope that this new avenue for the transmission of information and knowledge will strengthen the ties of Malayan-American friendship, and that we may better work together for our mutual desire of peace in the world.

Statement by Assistant Secretary Rusk

I am happy to be able to speak to you today on this first Voice of America broadcast in Malay to Singapore and the Federation of Malaya.

The daily broadcasts which will follow will be dedicated, above all, to reporting the facts in the world situation. I hope that these broadcasts will prove to be not merely a message from the United States to you but will stimulate the exchange of knowledge and ideas between us.

We in America have learned that we live in a world in which each is dependent in a very real sense upon all. We believe that we cannot solve our problems unless men elsewhere solve theirs. We see the single great problem of men everywhere to be that of creating and preserving a world in which all nations can live in peace and move forward to a better life for all their citizens.

I know that these Voice of America broadcasts in the Malayan language will contribute to the understanding and friendship between our peoples which is essential to the great constructive tasks which confront us both.

PROGRAM TO BURMA

Statement by Vice President Barkley

It gives me great pleasure to greet the people of Burma today on this initial broadcast of a continuing series of Voice of America broadcasts in the Burmese language.

Through this new channel of education and information, we hope to strengthen the friendship that has existed between our two countries for so many years. The people of the United States are glad to have this opportunity to share our ideas and ideals with you in Burma. On these new programs, you will hear from both Burmese and American friends, and it is my hope that the friendship for Burma, which is so pronounced in the United States, will be strengthened by these broadcasts.

You in Burma can be proud of the part your nation is playing in the tremendous world struggle to preserve peace. Your courage is a lantern of hope in this dark period. We in the United States, who obtained our own independence less than two hundred years ago, can understand and appreciate the multitude of problems faced by a new independent government such as yours. The words and deeds of your leaders are an inspiration to us and to free people everywhere.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

It is my great privilege today to express the good wishes of the people of the United States to the people of Burma on the occasion of the first Voice of America broadcast in the Burmese language.

It is more important today than ever before, for the free nations of the world to have a full and free flow of information. It is essential that the

free world not be divided by barriers between the minds and hearts of free men. It is our hope that these Voice of America broadcasts will play a great part in the elimination of those barriers raised by distance and by the efforts of those who wish to see us divided.

The peoples of the nations of the free world have watched with interest and deep concern the struggles of the Union of Burma to consolidate its position within the family of free nations in the face of adverse domestic conditions. The example of the courage of the people of Burma in the face of these difficulties is an inspiring one. The faithfulness of the Union of Burma to the principle of collective security under the United Nations and to the cause of world peace gives hope and comfort to all the nations of the free world.

It is indeed an honor for me to reaffirm the friendship of the people of the United States toward the people of Burma and to send to you our best wishes for a prosperous future as a democratic member of the family of nations.

Statement by James Barrington Ambassador of Burma

It gives me great pleasure to be here on this inauguration of the Voice of America Burmese service.

It is now nearly 4 years since the Union of Burma entered into diplomatic relationship with the United States. They have happily been years of cordial understanding and cooperation between our two countries. I have been in the United States now for nearly 9 months. During this time, I have come to learn that the people of the United States have a genuine interest in Burma and that they and their Government are solicitous for the welfare and prosperity of our people. This interest and solicitude is fully reciprocated by the Government and people of the Union of Burma. The cultivation and strengthening of this mutual interest and solicitude is of the greatest importance not only for our two countries but also for the world in general.

With every year that passes, science draws the countries of the world physically closer to each other. To maintain the balance of the world, it is imperative that this performance in the physical sphere should be matched by corresponding advances in the political, cultural, and spiritual spheres. In other words, the peoples of the world themselves must be brought closer. Each of us must not only be able to present our own point of view and try to get it understood by the peoples of the world, but we must in turn try to become acquainted with, and endeavor to understand, the points of view of the other peoples who inhabit the globe.

The service which is being inaugurated today is a step in this general direction. As such, I warmly welcome it and wish it all success.

Regional Office of Private Enterprise Cooperation Opens

[Released to the press July 1]

A southern regional office to work with business, industry and other private enterprise in furthering the government's international information and educational exchange program will open at New Orleans July 2.

A branch of the State Department's Office of Private Enterprise Cooperation, the new unit will be located in the International Trade Mart. Vaughn M. Bryant, formerly director of public relations for International House at New Orleans, will be in charge.

New Orleans was selected for this new office because of its importance as a great port and international gateway. It has gained widespread recognition in recent years for its unique and effective international program to develop world trade and understanding.

Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, in pointing out the reasons for the selection of New Orleans for the southern regional office, said:

We consider New Orleans the gateway between the vast mid-Continent area of the United States and the rest of the world, particularly Latin America. Our office here will be able to serve this area, working with private enterprise in the Mississippi Valley and over the South from Florida to Texas.

The Office of Private Enterprise Cooperation was created nearly 3 years ago at the direction of Congress to enlist the aid and support of business, industry, education, and other private enterprise in the Campaign of Truth against Soviet-hate propaganda. A branch office was later opened in New York and expanding activities have now resulted in the New Orleans office and one opened in San Francisco last month.

Today, private enterprise is working in hundreds of different ways with the government in its far-flung Information and Educational Exchange Program. This is the Program with which we are meeting and refuting the Kremlin lies which Moscow is hammering out 24 hours a day in a ruthless war for men's minds.

By throwing its physical, material, and financial resources into this fight, private enterprise here in the United States has made a tremendous contribution to the success of this program already. Cooperation by private enterprise in all phases of our operation has become one of our most important weapons.

We have only begun to explore the possibilities of this cooperation, however. There are hundreds of new ways in which private enterprise can help, and we know that throughout the South there are projects which can be undertaken and carried out which will have a telling effect in our campaign to make friends with the world.

The purpose of private enterprise cooperation offices is to work with groups to develop these projects. No business, school, club, or other organization is too small or too large to help. This is essentially a truth campaign from people to people. We need all the friends everywhere we can get. Moscow would stop us from getting them. We need every citizen to work with us and we want his interest, his suggestions, and his help.

July 16, 1951

Responsibility for Samoa Transferred From Navy to Interior Department

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House June 29]

I have today signed Executive Orders transferring administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and for American Samoa from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, effective July 1, 1951.

The establishment of civilian administration in these Island areas is an historic event. It conforms with a long-established American tradition of conducting the affairs of civil populations under civilian authority. It is one further step in the extension of additional civil rights to the Island territories under our jurisdiction. A similar transfer of responsibility from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior was carried out on Guam on August 1, 1950, simultaneously with the enactment of organic legislation for that Territory.

For 50 years American Samoa has been served well and faithfully by the United States Navy, which, as the administering authority, had as its primary concern the well-being of the Samoan people. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States Navy has exercised similar functions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The concern of the Department of the Navy for the well-being of the peoples of these areas was an expression of the interest of the people and Government of the United States in the people and culture of these Pacific Islands. That interest will continue and will grow under civilian administration. The experience of the Department of the Interior in promoting the political, economic, and social advancement of our Territories will serve as assurance to the people of the United States and of the Islands concerned that sound policies looking toward their welfare will be carried forward without interruption in American Samoa and in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

It is a matter of particular satisfaction to me that this transfer of responsibility has been worked out in a planned, orderly manner, in which the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior have collaborated through administrative agreements. These agreements, embodied in memoranda which were approved by the President, will assure the people of the Islands concerned of the continuation of their essential services, and will assure the people of the United States of the greatest possible economy and most efficient administration.

Text of Executive Order 10264 ¹

TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN SAMOA FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WHEREAS the Island of Tutuila of the Samoan group and all other islands of the group east of longitude 171 degrees west of Greenwich, known as American Samoa, were placed under the control of the Department of the Navy by Executive Order No. 125-A of February 19, 1900; and

WHEREAS the joint resolution of February 20, 1929, 45 Stat. 1253, provides that until the Congress shall provide for the government of such islands all civil, judicial, and military powers shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States may direct; and

WHEREAS a committee composed of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and the Interior recommended on June 18, 1947, that administrative responsibility for American Samoa be transferred to a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date as determined by the President; and

WHEREAS plans for the orderly transfer of administrative responsibility for American Samoa from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior are embodied in a memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior, approved by me on September 23, 1949, and it is the view of the two departments, as expressed in that memorandum, that such transfer should take effect on or about July 1, 1951; and

WHEREAS the transfer of administration of American Samoa from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, effective July 1, 1951, appears to be in the public interest:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said joint resolution of February 20, 1929, and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The administration of American Samoa is hereby transferred from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, such transfer to become effective on July 1, 1951.

2. The Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior shall proceed with the plans for the transfer of administration of American Samoa as embodied in the above-mentioned memorandum of understanding between the two departments.

3. When the transfer of administration made by this order becomes effective, the Secretary of the Interior shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate, and in harmony with applicable law, for the administration of civil government in American Samoa.

4. The executive departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Departments of the Navy and Interior in the effectuation of the provisions of this order.

5. The said Executive order of February 19, 1900, is revoked, effective July 1, 1951.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 29, 1951.

Text of Executive Order 10265 ²

TRANSFER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WHEREAS the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter referred to as the trust territory) was placed

¹ 16 Fed. Reg. 6417.

² 16 Fed. Reg. 6419.

under the trusteeship system established by the Charter of the United Nations by means of a trusteeship agreement approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1947, and by the United States Government on July 18, 1947, after due constitutional process; and

WHEREAS the United States, under the terms of the trusteeship agreement, was designated as the administering authority of the trust territory, and has assumed obligations for the government thereof; and

WHEREAS Executive Order No. 9875 of July 18, 1947, delegated authority and responsibility for the civil administration of the trust territory to the Secretary of the Navy on an interim basis; and

WHEREAS a committee of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and the Interior recommended on June 18, 1947, that administrative responsibility for the trust territory be transferred to a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date; and

WHEREAS plans for the orderly transfer of administrative responsibility for the trust territory from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior are embodied in a memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior, approved by me on September 23, 1949, and it is the view of the two departments, as expressed in that memorandum, that such transfer should take effect on July 1, 1951; and

WHEREAS the transfer of administration of the trust territory from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, effective July 1, 1951, appears to be in the public interest:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The administration of the trust territory is hereby transferred from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, such transfer to become effective on July 1, 1951.

2. The Department of the Navy and the Department of the Interior shall proceed with the plans for the transfer of administration of the trust territory as embodied in the above-mentioned memorandum of understanding between the two departments.

3. When the transfer of administration made by this order becomes effective, the Secretary of the Interior shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate, and in harmony with applicable law, for the administration of civil government in the trust territory and shall, subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe and, when appropriate, in collaboration with other departments or agencies of the Government, carry out the obligations assumed by the United States as the administering authority of the trust territory under the terms of the trusteeship agreement approved by the United States on July 18, 1947, and under the Charter of the United Nations: *Provided, however*, that the authority to specify parts or all of the trust territory as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the President: *And provided further*, that the Secretary of the Interior shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities in the trust territory affecting the foreign policy of the United States and shall consult the Secretary of State on questions of policy concerning the trust territory which relate to the foreign policy of the United States, and that all relations between departments or agencies of the Government and appropriate organs of the United Nations with respect to the trust territory shall be conducted through the Secretary of State.

4. The executive departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Departments of the Navy and Interior in the effectuation of the provisions of this order.

The Engineer and Point Four

*Remarks by Dr. Henry G. Bennett
Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration*¹

Engineering is a modest profession. It does not shout its accomplishments from the housetops, so that most people are unaware of the contributions that engineers have made and are making to our safety, well-being, and happiness.

Science makes the advancement of civilization possible, but it is the engineers who apply scientific discoveries and inventions to everyday life for the benefit of ordinary people. Dr. Fleming and his colleagues gave us penicillin, but engineers worked out the methods of mass-producing the drug and bringing it within reach of millions of people. Pasteur found how to combat disease with antitoxins, but engineers put those life-saving materials at the disposal of everybody. Edison perfected the incandescent lamp, but it was the engineers who spread light by developing techniques for manufacturing millions of bulbs at the cost of a few cents each. McCormick had the inspiration to build a mechanical reaper that would do the work of hundreds of men, but engineers showed us how to produce these marvelous machines in quantity, so that no one in our country need suffer for lack of daily bread.

Almost everything we see or touch in our daily life is in some way the product of an engineer. Food engineers processed our breakfast food. The clothes we wear are spun, woven, colored, cut, and sewn by processes evolved by engineers. The house we live in was built according to engineering principles. The water we drink from the tap without a qualm—and this is one of the few countries of the world where it can be done—is safeguarded and delivered to us by the sanitary and the chemical engineer. The car we drive, the road we travel—they too are the products of the engineer's skill.

When we stop to think of how dependent we Americans are on engineering and how much the engineer has contributed to our modern society, we begin to realize that the gap between our condi-

tions of life and those in some other parts of the world is mainly a gap in engineering skills.

The Point Four Program is designed to bridge that gap by making some of our knowledge and skill available to other people in their struggle for a better life, so it is obvious that the various branches of engineering must play an important part in this effort.

Civil Engineering

One of the major handicaps of the underdeveloped countries is lack of transportation and communications. Take Africa as an example—a continent more than 5,400 miles from north to south and 4,500 miles from east to west, with no through routes, either railroads or highways, for transporting people or merchandise. In fact there are few miles of railroads or reliable highways on the whole continent. The same problem exists in many parts of Latin America and Asia. In some areas the wheel is still unknown. Yet the building of roads is possibly the greatest single means of opening up new regions to development and quickening the economic life of a people.

Under Point Four we are sending engineers of the Bureau of Public Roads to countries that ask for technical help in solving their transportation problems. Often, their surveying and planning paves the way for private American engineering firms to build roads under contract. We hope that the services of private companies will be increasingly in demand as our Point Four technicians point up the need of building roads and show how it can be done.

In Bolivia there is a great potential food-producing region, larger than Texas, lying east of the high Andes. American agricultural technicians are working with the Bolivians to solve the technical problems of growing food, raising cattle, and cutting timber under humid, tropical conditions.

¹Made before the National Society of Professional Engineers at Minneapolis, Minn., on June 16.

But probably the real key to the situation is transportation to get the food from the fertile lowlands to the food-deficient high plains of the Andes, where the majority of the Bolivian population is concentrated. A highway is now being built by American contractors to connect with a railroad leading to the capital. The Bolivian Government is paying for this, partly with its own funds and partly with a loan from the Export-Import Bank.

Aeronautical Engineering

Many of these countries, although still needing railroads and highways for bulk transportation, have leaped into the air age while still depending mainly on the oxcart. In some countries the airplane is the only means of cross-country travel. They need new, improved airports and all the services that go with air transportation. Aeronautical engineering itself, with its constant improvement of plane design and performance, will continue to contribute to the economic development of these countries.

Nautical Engineering

Some underdeveloped areas possess extensive water-highways—great river systems like the Amazon, which could accommodate far more shipping than is now using these waters.

This situation, it seems to me, is a challenge to nautical engineering. There must be ways, yet undiscovered, for designing craft for more economical and efficient operation in areas where waterways are the main arteries of travel and trade.

Harbor development and dock facilities are also among the urgent needs of many countries that want to expand their foreign trade. When I was in Ecuador recently, the Government there requested the assistance of American engineers in developing plans for opening up the port of Guayaquil to ocean shipping, so that large ships could take on and discharge cargo there, instead of having to stop some distance down the river and use "lighters," as at present. We promptly sent an experienced American engineer to look into the possibilities of that project.

Sanitary Engineering

I have mentioned the fact that in this country we take safe-drinking water for granted. Even in the capital cities of most other countries, the American visitor doesn't dare drink water from the tap for fear of water-borne diseases, which are common in those countries and are a main cause of death and sickness. Many young doctors in the United States have never seen a case of typhoid fever, which used to be prevalent in this country

too. Our sanitary engineers in our public-health services have given us safe drinking water and efficient sewage and waste disposal systems. What has been done in this country can be done, and urgently needs to be done, in other countries to safeguard the health of the people.

Our records are filled with examples of amazing results achieved by American sanitary engineers working abroad. The water supply and sewage systems they have planned and supervised in communities in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and other countries have brought a dramatic drop in typhoid and dysentery. The draining of swamps, coupled with the application of insecticides and other measures, has brought an equally dramatic reduction in the incidence of malaria, the scourge of the Tropics.

Geological and Mining Engineering

We all know that one of man's great sources of real wealth is the minerals brought out of the ground. Yet probably half the world has never had a thorough geological survey with modern methods. Most people consider Africa a poor continent, without stopping to think of the gold, diamonds, and other treasures taken from African mines.

Yet today precious metals and gems are not the most valuable materials we get from the earth. In the aggregate, the oil and coal extracted every year are worth far more than the gold and diamonds.

One of the greatest needs of many countries is to find and use sources of economical fuel. The baser metals, including iron ore, are essential to economic development. Nor are metals and fuels all we need. I was told recently in Bolivia, where fortunes in gold, silver, tin, and other minerals have been mined, that the Government would like to have a geological survey in the hope of finding, among other things, phosphate and lime that would help the country produce enough food.

Under Point Four, we have geologists in 12 countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia helping to make inventories of mineral wealth and ground water supplies. In some instances, our mining engineers are helping to work out more economical and efficient extraction methods. American geologists working with Brazilian geologists have scientifically confirmed the existence of rich manganese deposits, with the result that American steel companies are going into partnership with Brazilian capital to develop these deposits. I am convinced that unknown treasures remain to be discovered and mined in Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the world, and that our geological and mining engineers can help the people of those countries find and develop vast new sources of wealth.

Electrical Engineering

Many countries without coal or oil have another great source of energy—waterpower. Civilization really begins with the harnessing of heat energy for the work of man. Human slavery has been eliminated largely because man has found other and far more efficient sources of energy—mechanical power that has enabled our own people in this country to multiply their own physical strength many times over. Our coal, oil, and waterpower have made possible our amazing industrial development, and the same is true of Britain, Germany, and other industrialized nations. And rural electrification has done more to increase our agricultural production than many of us realize.

The same thing can be done in the less developed countries. We know that Africa, for example, has some of the greatest unused waterpower in the world—in the Nile, the Zambezi, and other rivers. The same is true of many countries in Latin America. In the development and utilization of hydroelectric power, America can furnish much of the engineering knowledge to provide other countries with the mechanical energy that is essential for their progress.

Agricultural Engineering

Here is one of the most varied and most promising fields of all. Most of the underdeveloped countries are in the Tropics, where the rain falls in torrents in some seasons and there is drought in other seasons. Under these conditions the nutrients are rapidly leached out of the soil. When we clear and cultivate the land under these conditions, we have to protect it with dams, catchments, terracing, cover crops, and other methods that are well-known. These measures are necessary to keep the top soil from washing away and the plant food from being lost.

The major limiting factor on food production and economic development in general in the semi-arid areas of North Africa and the Near East is lack of water. The people of that area need to store up the water in the rainy season and use it for irrigation in the dry season. The Romans largely solved that problem 2,000 years ago. All through North Africa and the Middle East, we find the remnants of the dams, reservoirs, and canals which in Roman times enabled that area to support much larger populations than can exist there today. We recently made a contract with the American engineering firm of Knappen, Tibbetts, and Abbott to go into Jordan and show the people how to restore and expand these old Roman works so that they will have enough water. The same thing can be done in other countries of that area. It is not a costly process, because most of the work can be done by the people themselves, with local materials.

We have many examples in the western part of our own country of what can be done to bring more land under cultivation by irrigation. I am looking forward to attending the opening in August of the Central Valley project in California, developed by the engineers of the Bureau of Reclamation. This project will make it possible to move water from the shadows of Mount Shasta 500 miles southward to the Central Valley where it is needed to make more land productive. This is a dramatic example of what can be done to increase the amount of land under cultivation.

I want to explain, however, that Point Four is not in the business of building or financing large-scale projects in other countries. We help with the planning and technical direction, but the cost of construction must be borne by the other country with its own money, with help from private investors, or with loans from international lending agencies. Many of these projects can be financed on a self-liquidating basis. At any rate, the cost need not fall on the American taxpayer.

For the last 8 or 9 years, American agricultural technicians, including engineers, have been cooperating with Peru in a joint service under the able leadership of Jack Neale of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. I want to tell you about just one of the things that have been done.

Along the coast of Peru, as you know, is a strip of desert, caused by unusual climatic conditions. There is no vegetation except where the few rivers run from the mountains into the sea, and sometimes even these dry up. One such river is the Piura, in northern Peru. In normal years the farmers in the Piura Valley grow the only crop of long-staple Pima cotton in Peru. It sells at a premium and ordinarily brings in about 8 million dollars a year. But for the last 3 years the river has practically dried up. The loss in the cotton crop is conservatively estimated at 15 million dollars.

Nearby is another river that does not dry up. Agricultural engineers of the joint service made studies that showed that the waters of the constantly flowing river could be diverted to the Piura. This would not only assure a cotton crop every year, but also add another 50,000 acres to the 75,000 now under cultivation. As a result of those studies, the Peruvian Government is now considering contracting with an American engineering firm to construct a short tunnel to save the cotton farmers.

Even more important than bringing new land under cultivation, however, is the multitude of little things which, repeated by large numbers of farmers, are increasing production on the land already in use. These are simple things. In some cases, it means designing a suitable steel plow to replace or supplement an inefficient wooden plow. It means introducing a little better cultivating or threshing implement. We need engineers with

the vision and the ability to work out and adapt these simple improvements that the people themselves can apply with their own resources.

Food Engineering

In most underdeveloped areas, harvesttime is feast time; the rest of the year is hungry time. The people have no way of conserving food in order to tide them over to the next harvest. In the United States, we probably lose 10 percent of our agricultural products through spoilage, insect infestation, and waste. In some countries, the loss must be 25 percent or more. In Africa I have seen millions of cattle, and not a packing plant.

In parts of Costa Rica the farmers can produce two crops of corn a year, but the rainfall is so heavy that the grain sprouts on the stalk, and much of what is harvested is ruined by mold and insects. Point Four technicians there showed the farmers how to build a simple corn drier, which resulted almost immediately in better prices for corn and an increase in production. An expert in milling was brought from Kansas for a few months, and as a result of his technical advice, an agency of the Costa Rican Government has built modern grain elevators, a quick-freeze plant, and cold storage facilities with its own funds. In Peru a fisheries expert from our Department of Interior is helping the fishermen increase their catch. Another American agricultural engineer has helped construct a cold storage plant in Lima that will assure the people a constant supply of fish at reasonable cost.

Chemical Engineering

Closely related to food engineering is chemical engineering, with the contributions it has made to the food industry. Chemical engineers can make many valuable contributions to the progress of other peoples. The insecticides, weed-killers, and the like already in use in our own country, if applied and adapted for use in other areas, can increase the production and utilization of food. I understand that there is a shortage of wood pulp and other material for cellulose products in the industrial nations. Yet in the tropical regions are wide stretches of forests waiting to supply the demand.

Actually, we have hardly begun to assess or use the wealth of the Tropics. When I think of the things developed in our own South, through the work of such men as George Washington Carver, who developed new products from peanuts, clay, and other common materials at hand, I am convinced that we haven't even scratched the surface of the potential wealth of the world.

One of the most intriguing possibilities of all is that chemists will devise an economical, efficient way to purify sea water by removing the salts, and make that limitless source of water available

for irrigating desert places like the Sahara and the west coast of South America. Two things are needed to make this dream a reality: first, practical processes for purifying the water in large volume, and, second, cheap power, possibly from atomic energy or solar energy. We must look to engineering for both answers.

Industrial Engineering

An increase in agricultural production naturally leads to industrial development. But it is a step-by-step process—little industries that eventually lead to big industries. As the people learn to produce more food and as surplus food production frees labor from the field, raw materials for small industries become available, along with the labor to process them.

This is a gap that needs to be closed in most of the rural countries. I referred to the millions of cattle I saw in Africa, without packing plants to process and preserve the meat, the hides, and by-products. The people there, and in comparable areas, don't need large, expensive factories. They need a little local packing plant, a little local shoe factory, a little local textile mill. They don't need vast amounts of capital from outside. They need to *know how* to use their own capital, their own raw materials, their own resources, to produce for their own vast internal markets. An American technician in Bolivia reports that Bolivians have asked him how they might profitably and safely invest a million dollars in local enterprises. There is a job—an almost limitless job—for American industrial engineering in the other regions of the earth.

Architectural Engineering

A house, or a hospital, or a factory, is not just four walls and a roof. It is a product of engineering that plans and constructs each building to serve a particular purpose. The underdeveloped countries need the techniques of American designers and structural engineers. They need the advice of our housing experts. And it isn't just a question of exporting our own designs and techniques. We have got to use imagination and ingenuity in the use of local materials to meet local economic, climatic, and social conditions that vary widely from country to country. In some countries the best material for housing is bamboo; in others rammed earth may be the best answer; in still others, tile from local clays.

This Point Four Program, in all its implications, is one of the greatest challenges to engineering I can think of. Believe me, technical skill by itself isn't enough. What we need is men with imagination and the pioneering approach, men who can translate American engineering into African, or Asian, or Latin American engineering, under conditions peculiar to those areas. We need

men who are willing and able to take knowledge into strange, unknown, untried situations and adapt it to different and sometimes quite primitive conditions.

I think the challenge of Point Four to American engineering is one of the most exciting things that has ever happened to a romantic, though largely unsung, profession.

Point Four Contract Signed With Road Federation

[Released to the press July 2]

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett today announced the signing of a contract with the International Road Federation for a Point Four cooperative good roads campaign designed eventually to cover Latin America, the Near East, and Southern Asia.

A grant of 85 thousand dollars provided by the Point Four Administration will be matched with an equal amount in equipment and services by the Federation to carry out the initial program, which includes two pilot schools for training operators and mechanics of farm and highway machinery and equipment; the inauguration of "Point Four Fellowships" for foreign highway engineers to study advanced technique in United States universities; and a survey to determine the kind and extent of technical assistance required for a long-range road development program.

The two pilot schools will be located in Latin America. They will be operated by the Federation to determine the best methods to be followed in other countries. The first group of advanced trainees will consist of 11 graduate highway engineers to be selected from various countries. They will study at Yale and Ohio State Universities for 1 year.

The International Road Federation is sponsored by more than 350 United States firms, including oil, automobile, rubber, and construction equipment interests. Its affiliated national good roads associations in more than 30 countries are sponsored locally by industry, business, and agricultural interests. The Federation and its associates will supply technicians, machinery, equipment materials, and space for certain educational projects outlined in the Point Four agreement.

Point Four Administrator Bennett said that he considers the program contemplated "an important phase of the technical cooperation plan we are developing throughout most of the world. It is especially interesting since it includes the cooperation of private industry in Point Four through the sponsors of the International Road Federation. One of the prime purposes of the act

setting up the Technical Cooperation Administration was to seek the participation of private agencies and persons to the highest extent practical.

"Every country today is faced with intricate road problems, and, in those where highway systems are rudimentary, there is immediate need for expansion and improvement to promote satisfactory standards of living.

"Roads and the fullest utilization of highway transportation are not only essential to the development of a country's agriculture, resources, and industry but also to health, education, and the everyday necessities of society."

In addition to establishing schools and providing fellowships, the program will include the production and wide distribution of highway promotional films and literature and the translation and proper use of technical manuals and texts, including standard specifications in highway construction and maintenance.

The International Road Federation maintains offices in Washington, London, and Paris. It is a consultant to the Transport Committee of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and to the transport commission of the International Chamber of Commerce.

Point Four Agreement Signed With Utah Colleges

[Released to the press July 6]

The present Point Four village development and rural improvement program in Iran will be strengthened and widened as a result of contracts signed this week between the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Brigham Young University, the Utah State Agricultural College, and the University of Utah. The three colleges will collaborate in the Iran rural improvement program by providing personnel to conduct elementary education, rural sociology, agronomy, animal husbandry, health and sanitation, and nursing projects. Point Four Administrator, Henry G. Bennett, said:

The contracts with the Utah schools will result in the amplification of the effective work now being conducted by Point Four directly and under a contract with the Near East Foundation.

It is believed that the existing large pool of technically trained Iranians, with the guidance of technicians and materials provided for in these new contracts, can achieve a profound change in Iranian village life.

About twenty technicians will be sent to Iran to become incorporated with the team of experts already in the field working with their Iranian colleagues. They will participate in the "grass roots" method of working which brings modern methods to the villagers in a form readily understood by them and easily adapted to their immediate problems.

Invitations to the University of Utah, Brigham Young University, and the Utah State Agricultural College to participate in the program were issued in recognition of the resource of experience and special competence that resides in the State of Utah. Climatic, topographical, and agricultural similarities in Iran and Utah have encouraged the interchange of specialists and students between Utah and the Near East for many years. The institutions in Utah train the greatest number of Iranian students in the United States in the field of agriculture, and several specialists from Utah institutions served with distinction in the past in advisory capacities to the Government of Iran.

The Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the Department of Agriculture will be responsible for technical guidance to the agricultural phases of the work and will assist in executing the program.

The Utah technicians, some of whom will leave within the next few weeks, are the type of specialists ideal for the job in prospect. They have been trained to meet conditions approximating those they will find in Iran, and many of them have had actual experience with Iranian people. Some of them have even had experience in the country itself. I am extremely gratified to have the cooperation in Point Four of these three outstanding educational institutions in a job which I feel sure will leave a lasting and beneficial impression on Iranian rural life and on its rural population.

Official Beginning of Colombo Plan

[Released to the press July 3]

The Colombo Plan for cooperative economic development in South and Southeast Asia officially went into effect on July 1, 1951. The Government of the United States commends the initiative and the friendly spirit of cooperation which has resulted in a program of cooperative development for a large part of Asia.

While the United States did not participate in the formulation of the report which has come to be known as the Colombo Plan, we are deeply interested in its potentials for genuine economic progress and, therefore, note with particular pleasure the official beginning of the Plan. Since the release of the report last fall, the United States has participated in a meeting of the Consultative Committee on Economic and Social Development in South and Southeast Asia which took place at Colombo, Ceylon, last February.

The United States has taken a deep interest in the needs of the peoples of this area. Recently, we have extended loan assistance of up to 190 million dollars for the emergency procurement of food grain for India.

We have followed closely and sympathetically the effort toward the achievement of economic and social development in the countries of this region. We are pleased to have made some contribution to this development in our programs of technical assistance and other economic aid. It is hoped that such programs as we may undertake through the proposed mutual security program in South and Southeast Asia will provide further opportunity

for cooperation with these countries in their efforts toward economic development.

The Government of the United States looks forward to further cooperation with the countries of South and Southeast Asia in their efforts to raise productivity and standards of living. The Government of the United States intends to effect the greatest possible coordination between the development programs it has undertaken or may undertake in that area and any operative programs under United Nations or Commonwealth auspices. We extend our wishes for success to the countries participating in the Plan and, with realization of the spirit which has brought the Plan to its official beginning, are confident of its ultimate success.

OAS Charter Moves Closer To Permanent Organic Status

[Released to the press by OAS June 19]

The charter of the Organization of American States moved a step nearer to entering into force today when the United States deposited its instrument of ratification of the charter at a brief ceremony in the Pan American Union. The United States thereby became the thirteenth of the 21 American member republics to give its final approval to the document since it was adopted at the Conference of Bogotá on May 1, 1948.

Deposit of the instrument of ratification was made by Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. representative on the Council of the OAS, and was accepted on behalf of the OAS by Dr. Alberto Lleras, Secretary General of that organization.

One more ratification, bringing to two-thirds the number of countries indicating their acceptance of the charter, will put the document into force and give permanent organic status to the OAS as a regional organization within the United Nations. Countries which previously had completed ratification of the charter were Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay. Ratification is still awaited in the final form from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The OAS charter—often known as the Bogotá charter—was one of two treaties and two conventions adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States 3 years ago at Bogotá. Its provisions include the principle that an aggression against one American state is an aggression against all, and it provides procedures for settling inter-American disputes before they are referred to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Broadcasting Looks Ahead in North America

By Marie Louise Smith

Senate hearings will shortly be held on the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA) and the protocol thereto. The draft treaty was transmitted by the President on February 5, 1951, for advice and consent to ratification. It is the third of a series of agreements among countries of the North American region designed to govern the international aspects of standard (AM) broadcasting throughout the region. Its purpose is to enable member countries to make the most effective technical use of the radio frequency bands available for this type broadcasting with a minimum of interference between stations of the several countries. And, most important, it provides a framework of international stability for each country's domestic broadcasting services.

Because of the inability of these countries to work out a mutually acceptable agreement, there has been no formal intergovernmental regulation of standard band broadcasting in North America since the expiration of the interim agreement in March 1949.¹ During this interval, a majority of the countries involved has continued on a voluntary basis to respect the terms of the interim agreement. The new treaty will bring under regulation all unorthodox usage of frequencies and will eliminate some of the interference caused by channel-jumping tactics on the part of a few countries in the absence of a formal binding agreement.

The new agreement was finalized at the third North American Regional Broadcasting Conference. The Conference was held in two sessions—the first in Montreal, September–December, 1949; the second in Washington September–November, 1950.² The proposed treaty was signed in Washington on November 15, 1950, by representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom (for the territories of Bahamas and Jamaica), Canada,

Cuba, and the Dominican Republic. Although the agreement was not signed by Mexico or Haiti, both of which are included in the North American region as defined in the agreement, provision is made in the treaty for adherence by either or both at some later date.

NARBA will enter into force when ratified or adhered to by the Governments of at least three of four designated countries, including Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States. The agreement will become effective the fifteenth day after the date on which the third of the necessary instruments of ratification or adherence is deposited. It shall be valid only between Governments which have deposited their instruments of ratification or adherence. NARBA will remain in force for a period of 5 years and if no new agreement enters into force by the expiration of that period, shall remain effective until superseded by a new agreement. Thus, in the absence of denunciation, the uncertainty and dislocation which has existed over the past few years because of the absence of an agreement will be circumvented for the future.

Features in Draft Agreement

Essential features of the draft NARBA include the classification of broadcasting channels and stations; the recognition of the right by each country to permit the operation of specific stations on specified channels; a delineation of the degree of flexibility permitted each country in modifying existing operations; specifications for the degree of protection from interference associated with each station or class of stations; methods of notifying proposed changes to all concerned; and methods for the procurement of facts concerning operations, the settlement of disputes, and modification of the agreement.

In common with earlier regional agreements, the draft NARBA acknowledges the sovereign right of each country with respect to the use of all standard

¹ For background on regional regulation of standard-band broadcasting, see article on North American Broadcasting Problems in BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1950, p. 258.

² *Ibid.*, for an account of the first session of the third NARBA conference.

broadcasting channels. It sets no ceiling on the total number of stations any country may have. However it provides for an agreed system of priorities and engineering standards designed to minimize interference and assure the orderly use of broadcasting channels in the North American region. These provisions are directed toward insuring that the broadcasting operations of any country will be free of interference from the broadcasting operations of any other country. To this end, it sets forth engineering standards to be observed with regard to the operation of broadcasting stations; lists certain priorities to be observed; establishes protection criteria to be maintained with agreed-upon yardsticks for determining interference patterns; and states the procedures to be followed in bringing new stations into being. Each proposed new station is submitted to other countries which are parties to the treaty for technical comment as to whether interference will result from operation of the projected station. If no objections are received, the station ultimately goes on the air. From that point on, the operation of that station must be taken into consideration when considering applications for subsequent stations.

Parties to the agreement are mutually bound to cooperate in the investigation and elimination of objectionable interference. Provisions are included for compulsory arbitration of disputes in the event such disputes are not otherwise settled and for holding administrative conferences permitting frequent consideration of engineering matters and necessary revisions of the broadcasting regulations during the period between plenipotentiary conferences.

A procedure is provided whereby any contracting government may denounce the agreement. Provision is made for the convening of a plenipotentiary conference to be held not later than 4 years after the agreement comes into force for the purpose of revising the agreement.

Channel Station Assignments

The most controversial features of the agreement, and those which delayed its finalization, pertain to clear channel station assignments. These channels had been designated under the original NARBA of 1937 wherein provision was made for priority of use in designated countries to a number of such channels under conditions protecting them throughout the area of the country having the priority. In all, 38 clear channels were assigned: 25 to the United States; 6 to Canada; 6 to Mexico; and 1 to Cuba. In addition to the provisions establishing these priorities for the use of clear channels, priorities also were established for stations on other clear channels, and for regional and local stations. Procedures were set up for subsequent notifications under which priorities for additional stations could be estab-

lished. Under these procedures, new stations were required to protect previously assigned stations from undue interference and, in turn, became entitled to protection from interference of stations covered by subsequent notifications.

Under the new agreement, the United States would retain priority in the use of 25 clear channels for class 1-A stations. These stations serve wide areas at considerable distances from the transmitter location and form the backbone of broadcasting services to our rural population. None of the United States 1-A stations would be required to change its operation. On 19 of these channels all other countries parties to the agreement would protect United States stations to our national borders. On six of these channels the United States stations would receive a degree of protection which, though somewhat less than full 1-A protection, is greater than that accorded any other type of station and would still permit them to render service over extensive areas hundreds of miles from the station. Greater flexibility will be possible in the domestic breakdown of class 1-A stations, at the same time retaining full protection.

It will not be necessary for any United States 1-B station to change its operations. These stations also are intended to serve wide areas through skywave service. Although stations of this class do not receive protection from foreign interference at the border of this country, they do receive a high degree of protection in areas in which their service is useful.

Class II stations operate on clear channels, but their operation is subordinate to the class I operation on the same channel. Under the new agreement, existing class II stations would receive a degree of protection from changes in existing class I assignments and from future class I assignments. To accommodate certain frequency changes in Cuba, which are part of a general reallocation in that country, three United States class II stations would be required to change frequency, with consequent changes being required in their antennas and equipment. On 11 channels, Cuba would be entitled to a relatively high degree of protection from future assignments in other countries.

The new NARBA incorporates a principle long favored by American operators. It provides that no broadcasting station need be protected from interference at any point outside the boundary of the country in which such broadcasting station is located.

Basic Needs of Other Countries

The agreement is a practical instrument for the accommodation of existing and anticipated needs in the tremendously expanding broadcasting industry. While it is not 100 percent ideal from the standpoint of any one country in the region, it represents the best possible workable arrangement, taking into account the existing circum-

stances and the diverse interests which have to be accommodated. In order to secure acceptance by other countries of established United States stations and agreement upon technical standards essential for the protection of the vast number of stations in this country, it was necessary for the United States to accept provisions essential to meet basic needs of other countries. In some instances, this meant less favorable provisions for the United States than were contained in the previous NARBA. The other countries participating in the new NARBA fare at least as well as they did under the previous agreement, and in many important respects their situation is substantially improved. This is particularly true in the case of Cuba and, to some extent, in the cases of Canada, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. These adjustments were necessitated by changed conditions in the field of standard broadcasting since the agreements of 1937 and 1946, especially the very rapid growth in broadcasting activity in all countries affected during that period.

Adoption of this agreement would provide a significant improvement for the United States over the increasingly chaotic situation which has existed over the last year and a half since the expiration of the interim agreement of 1946. In the absence of a new agreement, this situation can be expected to continue, probably becoming worse. Moreover, relatively few stations will be adversely affected by the terms of the new NARBA. In practical effect, the agreement would make it possible to maintain the same general level of broadcasting service now enjoyed by the people of the United States. Since it would be possible within the framework of the new agreement to effect needed improvement in existing service, the new agreement would facilitate rather than hinder efforts to accomplish such improvement.

The proposed treaty is endorsed by the executive agencies of the government as in the best interests of the people of the United States and of the broadcasting industry as a whole. Under its provisions, conditions of damaging interference to many of our stations will be completely eliminated or greatly reduced. And many United States stations, which otherwise would be subject to a constant threat of interference from foreign stations, will be assured of continued protection not otherwise available. Millions of American radio listeners, particularly farmers and residents of small towns, will get more and better radio reception than they now have. The government-industry team, which represented the United States in the series of negotiations leading to the finalization of this agreement, is convinced that failure to secure the necessary ratifications would perpetuate a situation of uncertainty and possibly lead to further confusion in the standard broadcasting band.

• *Mary Louise Smith is a foreign affairs officer in the Office of Transport and Communications Policy.*

Syria Withdraws From GATT

[Released to the press June 28]

The United States Government has been informed by the United Nations at New York that on June 7, 1951, the Government of Syria notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, effective August 6, 1951. Under the terms of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement, any contracting party may withdraw on 60 days' written notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Syria and Lebanon, which were joined in a customs union, became contracting parties to the General Agreement after the tariff negotiations at Geneva in 1947. The customs union was later dissolved, and Lebanon withdrew from the General Agreement, effective February 25, 1951. Since the concessions granted by the United States to the customs union at Geneva were of substantial interest to Syria, and in some cases to other contracting parties, there were no changes in United States customs duties as a result of Lebanon's withdrawal from the agreement.

The interdepartmental trade-agreements organization is now considering the question of withdrawal or retention of United States concessions initially negotiated with the Syro-Lebanese customs union, looking to the initiation of consultation with other interested contracting parties.

Any interested person who wishes to give information or present views with regard to this matter should do so, in writing, not later than August 1, 1951. Such communications, of which there should be 11 copies either typed, mimeographed, or printed, should be addressed to the Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C.

Dutiable products on which the United States initially negotiated concessions with the Syro-Lebanese customs union at Geneva are: unstemmed Latakia leaf tobacco (tariff paragraph 601); dried, desiccated, or evaporated apricots (paragraph 735); apricot pulp (paragraph 752); preserved chickpeas or garbanzos (paragraph 769); and unground thyme leaves (paragraph 781).

At Geneva, the United States obtained from the Syro-Lebanese customs union concessions, including duty reductions and bindings of existing customs treatment, on various automotive products, machinery and appliances, lubricating oils, certain chemical and pharmaceutical products, cosmetics, and other miscellaneous items. After withdrawing from the General Agreement, Syria will no longer be obligated to maintain these concessions.

Recent International Discussions on Wool

by Nan L. Grindle

During the postwar years the wool picture has developed in a fashion quite different from what traditional wool-market conditions had led the world to expect. Depressed prices resulting from a buyer's market, which had dominated the pre-war scene, were no longer problems, and the U.K.-Dominion Wool Disposals, Limited (the Joint Organization), established to liquidate wartime accumulated stocks without unduly depressing prices, had completed a task in 6 years which, it had been estimated, would take twice that time. For the last few years consumption of apparel wool has exceeded current production, but because the supplies held by the Joint Organization filled the gap, for some time no problem was created by the unusually high levels of consumer demand.

By the summer of 1950, however, it had become apparent that the wool situation might soon become critical. To the relatively large mill consumption for civilian use had now been added a military requirement greatly enlarged by the mobilization program. World stocks of apparel wool were at a low level, and only a small quantity of generally poor quality wool remained in the hands of the Joint Organization. As there was little prospect of an early increase in production the world was faced with a situation where supplies would be inadequate to fulfill all apparent requirements. This fact was reflected at the auctions which opened in the late summer in Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, where prices were substantially higher than they had been a few months before.

A review of the wool situation by interested agencies within the United States Government pointed up the seriousness of the situation and the need to take steps to deal with it. Since the United States is dependent on imports to meet a large part of its requirements of wool, it was obviously not possible to devise a unilateral solution

to the problem. In August 1950 this country notified the main wool producing and consuming countries that the defense program would involve heavy purchases of wool and that a preliminary evaluation of the supply position indicated the need for special measures to meet this military requirement. If special measures were not taken, it was feared that United States requirements would be met only at the cost of adverse effects on the market and unnecessary hardship to the economies of all consuming countries. Countries with which the United States discussed the question agreed that the facts presented by the United States pointed to the possibility of a serious situation and that international discussions should be held to clarify the supply and demand situation and to consider what action should be taken.

Fourth Meeting of International Wool Study Group

Machinery for such international talks already existed, since the International Wool Study Group had been established in 1946 for the express purpose of providing an opportunity for leading wool producing and consuming countries to discuss the world wool situation and common problems. The Group also had the responsibility of recommending to participating governments possible solutions to problems which were unlikely to be settled by ordinary developments of the world wool trade. The fourth annual meeting had already been scheduled for the fall of 1950, and developments of the past few months gave added significance to the event.

Held in London from October 2 to 10, the meeting was attended by representatives of the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paki-

tan, Peru, Poland, Switzerland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Also attending as observers were representatives of the following organizations: Commonwealth Economic Committee, International Wool Textile Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, U.K.-Dominion Wool Disposals, Limited, International Wool Secretariat, and Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

A review of the world wool situation by the Study Group led to the conclusion that although the over-all supply and demand for 1951 would probably be roughly in balance, a supply problem would exist within a certain range of grades. The 1951 over-all supply of apparel wool, consisting of the 1950-51 clip and sales by the Joint Organization and excluding any possible contribution from existing trade stocks, would be 1,954 million pounds, clean basis, an amount sufficient to maintain a consumption level only 90 percent of that prevailing in the first half of 1950. Available evidence, however, pointed to the possibility that consumer resistance to high prices and the fact that the backlog in demand had been filled might well reduce mill consumption below the rate existing in the first half of 1950. Consumers' wardrobes which had been depleted during the war had been largely replenished, and this stocking-up process might well be coming to an end. In addition, there was an increasing amount of substitution of other fibers and use of reprocessed wool. Despite this relatively favorable over-all picture, however, it was recognized that a supply problem would exist in the finer crossbred and medium merino wools, since it was in this range of grades that the principal military requirements of the United States would fall.

The Wool Study Group also considered proposals submitted by the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa for a reserve price scheme which was designed to stabilize wool prices and especially to prevent a sharp decline in prices at any future time. These proposals, which would operate in a manner similar to the reserve price feature of the Joint Organization system, would provide for the establishment of a minimum price at which wool would be bought in times of declining prices. When wool prices reached higher levels the wool which had been bought when prices were low would be placed on the market and would tend to curb upward price movements. The desirability from the standpoint of both producers and consumers of preventing unduly wide fluctuations in wool prices and the appropriateness of international action to achieve this aim were generally accepted. Nevertheless, the Study Group concluded that in the near future there was little prospect of a major decline in wool prices and that establishment of a reserve price system would be unlikely to have a material effect on market prices. If at any future time, buying-in operations at reserve prices could be expected to as-

sume substantial proportions it was agreed that there would be full international consultation in the light of any international agreement on commodity policy which might be in existence. At that time further consideration would be given to the question of adequate representation for consumer interests.

Because of the rapidly changing wool situation the Study Group agreed that its Management Committee, which had been established in 1949 to consider problems arising between the Study Group's annual meetings, should meet at intervals of not more than 3 months. It could thus maintain a continual review of the world wool situation, and it was instructed to circulate a report of each meeting to all governments which had participated in this fourth meeting of the Study Group.

U.S.-Commonwealth Wool Talks—London

The conclusion of the Wool Study Group that the gap between current consumption and available supplies would be bridged meant that at that time a complete change in the marketing process was probably not justified. Except under the most pressing circumstances it was natural that the Southern Commonwealth producers would be reluctant to part with the traditional auction system, which in normal times had proved to be an efficient method of marketing the great variety of grades and types of wool. Nevertheless, the Wool Study Group had confirmed the existence of a problem in those grades of wool in which United States military requirements largely fell, and special measures appeared to be necessary to meet this problem. Since government representatives familiar with wool problems were already in London for the Wool Study Group meeting, advantage was taken of this fact to discuss the impact which United States military demands would have on the market. The wool talks included representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the major producing countries of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. North Atlantic Treaty powers with a substantial interest in wool were kept informed of the progress of the discussions.

The wool-producing Southern Commonwealth countries had earlier indicated their willingness to cooperate in helping to fulfill the military wool requirements of the United States. Discussions held with the Commonwealth countries were concerned with the concrete problem of devising the best method of meeting that part of the United States military wool requirements which was represented by the 100 million pound, clean basis, emergency reserve authorized by the Supplemental Appropriations Bill of September 27, 1950. This emergency wool reserve differs from a stockpile program, since wool or garments acquired under the reserve system can be released for use at any time. Under a stockpile program,

however, wool cannot be released except in case of full scale mobilization. At the time of these international talks no decision had been made to stockpile wool. These discussions did not include consideration of methods of filling civilian and current military requirements since these were to be met through ordinary channels of commerce.

Because it had been indicated that the supply problem would be centered within a narrow range of grades and would not include all varieties of wool, the Australian representatives proposed that a system of preemption be discussed rather than one for allocation. It was considered that the introduction of an allocation system would present many practical and legal difficulties and should be resorted to only when absolutely necessary and after exhausting other methods. The report said that existing conditions did not seem to demonstrate that an allocation system was necessary, desirable or practicable. Under these circumstances the best alternative appeared to be the Australian proposal for a preemption system whereby the three Commonwealth producing countries would withhold an agreed amount of wool from the auctions and sell it to the United States for the emergency reserve.

On October 26 an announcement was made that a further meeting of the five countries would be held soon to examine a system of preemption of enough wool to meet the emergency needs of the United States but not such quantities as would harm the auction system. After calculating the quantities which the United States could expect to obtain from other sources it was estimated that the share of the United States emergency reserve which would be provided by the Southern Commonwealth countries would be less than the total requirement of 100 million pounds. If a practicable and acceptable system were devised the three countries agreed to introduce it with the least possible delay unless some alternative method of securing the United States military reserve was found to be more satisfactory.

U.S.-Commonwealth Wool Talks—Melbourne

Before the U.S.-Commonwealth Wool Talks reconvened in Melbourne, steps had been taken to implement the authorization given by the Supplemental Appropriations Act for acquisition of a 100 million pound emergency wool reserve. On October 20 the Department of the Army, which had been designated by the Department of Defense to procure this reserve, announced that it had requested the Commodity Credit Corporation to buy 30 million pounds of the reserve as raw wool through ordinary commercial channels and in an orderly fashion so as to avoid disruption of the market. The balance of the reserve was to be bought by the Army in the form of wool fabrics. Contracts would be placed with private manufacturers by June 30, 1951, with deliveries to extend into the next fiscal year. Manufac-

turers obtaining these contracts would purchase the wool as they needed it through ordinary trade channels. Since purchases of wool for the reserve were to be spread over a substantial period the total impact would not hit the market at any one time.

At the Melbourne talks from November 15 to 24, 1950, it was agreed that a preemption system could not be of any significant assistance to the United States in the near future. The decision by the Department of the Army and the Commodity Credit Corporation that the use of private trade channels would be adequate to fulfill the emergency reserve meant that no special arrangements would be necessary. In addition, a preemption system could not be put into operation without a time lag, because it would first be necessary to overcome certain legal and administrative difficulties. It was agreed, nevertheless, that at some future time the need might arise for introducing special measures to meet essential wool requirements. Therefore, careful study was made of preemption systems and of legal and administrative measures necessary to implement them.

International Materials Conference

Toward the end of 1950 it became apparent that the wool situation was steadily deteriorating and that market adjustments were not being made as had been anticipated at the meeting of the Wool Study Group. Demand continued to exceed the supply, a fact that was reflected in the sharp increase in prices. By the beginning of 1951 raw-wool prices had increased approximately 100 percent over the past year and were continuing to rise. Demand for wool showed every indication of remaining at high levels for at least several years.

Scarcities were becoming evident in an increasing number of essential materials in addition to wool and were of concern to many nations as well as to the United States. Accordingly, on January 12 the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced that invitations were being sent to major producing and consuming countries of the free world asking them to join in establishing a number of international commodity groups. Seven groups have been established, one of them concerning itself with problems relating to wool. The commodity groups, together with a Central Group, are known as the International Materials Conference.¹ The Wool Committee convened in Washington on April 2 and countries which have participated in its work are Australia, Belgium (for Benelux), France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. The Committee has the responsibility of considering and recommending to governments measures to increase produc-

¹ For an article on the International Materials Conference, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 23.

tion of wool and to ensure the most effective distribution and use of available supplies.

Conclusion

Since it first became apparent in the summer of 1950 that the supply of wool would probably not be adequate for all needs, the United States Government has kept the situation under constant review. Developments of the past months have demonstrated that forecasts of inadequate supply

have been accurate and that some international action is probably required to assure fulfillment of the most essential requirements. Producing and consuming countries of the free world have indicated their willingness to cooperate in considering solutions to problems related to wool, and with sufficient determination it should be possible to devise an adequate solution.

● *Nan L. Grindle is an international economist on the Agricultural Products Staff, Office of International Materials Policy.*

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

International Union of Pure and Applied Physics

The Department of State announced on July 2 that Copenhagen, Denmark, is to be the site of the Seventh General Assembly of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics, at which physicists from many countries of the world will have an opportunity from July 11 through 14, 1951, to confer on problems of common interest. The United States Government will be represented at the conference by the following delegation:

Delegates

John A. Wheeler, Ph. D., Professor of Physics, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., *Chairman*
Henry A. Barton, Ph. D., Director, American Institute of Physics, New York, N. Y.
David M. Dennison, Ph. D., Professor of Physics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Harald H. Nielson, Ph. D., Professor of Physics, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
Louis A. Turner, Ph. D., Chairman, Physics Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, Ill.

Alternate Delegates

Karl K. Darrow, Ph. D., Physicist, Bell Telephone Laboratories, New York, N. Y.
Elmer Hutchisson, Ph. D., Dean of Faculty, Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, Ohio
Thomas Lauritsen, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Physics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.
John C. Slater, Ph. D., Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

The General Assembly, which is the governing body of the Union, normally meets every 3 years to adopt basic measures for the administration of the Union, to formulate new programs for research in the fields of pure and applied physics, and to review the progress and results of work carried on by commissions established to carry out specific research programs. Of the 15 commissions which will submit reports to the Seventh Assembly, United States physicists have taken an active part in those dealing with (1) high altitude stations, (2) physico-chemical data and stand-

ards, (3) physics abstracting, (4) standards, constants, and units of radioactivity, (5) radiobiology, (6) spectroscopy, (7) symbols, units, and nomenclature, (8) thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, (9) cosmic rays, (10) very low temperatures, and (11) optics.

International Penitentiary Commission

The Department of State announced on July 2 that the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission will hold its final meeting at Bern, Switzerland, July 2-7, 1951. The meeting will be attended by the U. S. Commissioner, Sanford Bates, Department of Institutions and Agencies, State of New Jersey, Trenton, N. J.; and by the alternate U. S. Commissioner, Thorsten Sellin, professor of sociology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.

The prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders—the principal fields of activity of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission since its organization in 1872 as a permanent executive body for the series of international penal and penitentiary congresses—have been matters of concern to the United Nations, in particular the Social Commission of the U. N. Economic and Social Council, since 1946. Because of a desire to avoid duplication of work, and because 18 of the 26 members of the Commission are also members of the United Nations, representatives of the Commission and of the United Nations conducted negotiations in 1949 and 1950 for the integration of the Commission into the U. N. Secretariat. A resolution authorizing such integration was adopted by the U. N. General Assembly on December 1, 1950.

At its forthcoming meeting, the Commission will make arrangements for the transfer of its functions and activities to the United Nations.

The United States in the United Nations

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The Department of State

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An Estimate of the Present World Situation

By Secretary Acheson¹

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon. It is particularly pleasant since it gives me the opportunity to thank all of you who gave so generously of your time and efforts, both working here at home and through the special panel which went abroad, to help us on our overseas information service. You did a tremendous job for us and we are very deeply grateful.

This afternoon I am going to try something of an experiment. I am asked to speak with you on what is called "The Present World Situation." Now that is something of a problem, because I have also asked my associates who are dealing with the various geographical portions of our work to come and tell you in some detail about it, and I do not want to anticipate what they are going to say. Therefore I thought we might spend a little time on trying to discover what the present situation is; and, if we can get that in our minds, then perhaps some of the things that my associates say to you may have a little more meaning.

There are several preliminary observations I would like to make about the present situation. One of them is that it is not a situation clouded in obscurity. There is a blinding light thrown upon it—in fact, so much light that the question arises whether the light is not too strong and too multi-colored for reading purposes. I have had a few figures collected for me on some of the contributions to knowledge on this subject which are being put out by Government and by you, who are sitting here. My own Department, the State Department, puts out each year 1,200 press releases dealing with the present international situation. Every day we put out 320,000 words over all channels of the Voice of America. Every day we put out 40,000 words through the five *Wireless Bulletins* which we send to all parts of the world. Each year we put out 20 publications in the field of documenta-

tion of diplomacy, each one of these volumes containing from 100 to 1,500 pages. We put out 70 volumes a year in the field of current information, running from 100 to 500 pages. We put out 200 volumes a year, each running from 20 to 500 pages, on treaties and international actions.

The ECA, the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Reserve Board probably put out together some three times as much as we do on the international situation.

The Congress has made this one of its main subjects of interest, and you have with you this afternoon the two leading contributors to a Congressional work of 2 million words on Far Eastern policy. I think I led with 418,000 words and General Bradley came a poor second with 278,000!

Outside of the governmental field, there are 500 books a year printed on international affairs and the present international situation, and there are 3,000 magazine articles a year which are sufficiently important for bibliographical listings. Of course I cannot even begin to estimate the number of words put out in the news columns and the editorials.

So you see there is plenty of light being thrown on the present international situation. As I say, the light may be too strong, and it may be too varied for reading, but the situation certainly is not developing in gloom.

There are three things that I would like to talk with you about for a moment in the light of all these volumes of words I have talked about. I have had some 20 or 30 important monographs in the Library of Congress examined from three points of view. One was to find out when the writers of these monographs thought the present situation began. When is "present", in other words? The second thing was, what do these authors, these writers of these important monographs, believe to be the common characteristic, or what is the outstanding characteristic, of the present, as distinct from the past or the future? The third was, what are the essential steps recommended for dealing with the present?

¹A stenographic transcript of remarks made off the record and from notes to a group of magazine and book publishers on June 29 and released to the press on July 15.

The Problem of the Present

You will be interested to know some of the results of this inquiry. Let's take first of all when the present situation began. When is "present"? One writer says the present situation began in 1905 with Japanese victory over the Russians in the Russo-Japanese war. Another writer says it began with the conference at Yalta. Another says it began with General Marshall's mission to China in 1945-46. Another says it began with the invention of the airplane. Another says it began with the great upsurge of population which took place when modern medicine checked the death rate of the last century. Another one, who is not quite so modern, says it began with the Protestant Reformation. Another says it began with the collective action taken against aggression in Korea. Another, a medievalist, says it began with the Portuguese exploring the Senegal River 500 years ago. Another says the "present" began with the dropping of the atom bomb.

The main point in common that we can find in all these writings is that the present is upon us now. All we can say is what the little boy said to the little girl when he was looking over the fence and she was on the sidewalk. She asked, "Are you going to Mary Brown's party?" and he answered, "I am to it." All we know is that we are in the present, but when it began we cannot tell. We can say that there is no one moment when it began. We can say that there will probably be no one moment when it will end. But it is with us. Human experience is not like a book; it is not written in chapters.

The next thing that I had examined was, what is the fundamental quality of the present? How do you tell the present? How do you know something is present and is not characteristic of the past? Going through these monographs, we come upon these theories. One is that the fundamental quality of the present situation is that it is a contention between great powers over the control of territory and that in this contention between great powers ideological differences not only are secondary but really obscure the real meaning of the present time. Another writer says that the fundamental characteristic of the present is that it is a conflict between ideologies and that the old conflicts of states about territory have nothing to do with the present. Another says that it is fundamentally a struggle between the rule of law, imposed in the classic conception of the state, and a conspiracy, on the other hand, which is the revolt of men against the state. Another says that it is the struggle between the awakened peoples of Asia and the decadent peoples of the West. Another says that the fundamental quality of the present situation is that nations have tended to renounce the healthy interest in national self-interest and have run off after the will-o'-the-wisp of collective security. Another one says that the quality of the present is that nations have not re-

nounced their interests in national security and have failed to set up collective security in a world commonwealth.

All that we get out of these analyses of the quality of the present is that struggle is at the heart of the times in which we live, that the times in which we live are onerous, but that there is hope for mankind if we will keep our minds on the heart of the problem.

When we come to look for the heart of the problem, we find it somewhat confusing. It reminds me of some words in the introduction of Henry Nevins's book, *Changes and Chances*—you remember that is the first of three volumes in his autobiography. He was a wonderful man, whom many of you I am sure knew while he was alive. He was a great war correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. In his book he discussed one of the prayers in the *Book of Common Prayer*. The words I refer to are:

That so, among the sundry and manifold changes of the world, our hearts may surely there be fixed where true joys are to be found.

Nevins said that he always thought the writer of that prayer was slightly naive, because, if one only knew what the true joys were, it would be no difficulty to keep one's heart fully fixed upon them. If we only knew what the heart of the problem was at the present time, it would not be difficult to keep our minds on it.

The Necessary Line of Action

Now we come to the third thing that I asked to have looked up in these monographs—what is the line of action necessary to deal with the present situation? One writer says that we must recognize that what we are involved in is the struggle for the minds of men and that we must spend vastly more money on that and not waste our funds on economic or military expenditures. Another one says that the minds of men are trivial things at best, and that the minds of men follow their stomachs and, therefore, the thing to do is to concentrate on economic activities, and intellectual and ideological results will follow. Another writer says military power is the only thing that counts in our time—forget all this nonsense about propaganda and economics and concentrate on the military problem. Another one says that the real heart of the matter is a struggle for power as based upon position and therefore what we must do to settle the contention of our times is to come to agreement dividing the world into power areas. Another one says that the heart of the matter is to get away from the outmoded ideas of national sovereignty and go in for world government so that all differences between nations will be mere partisan friction, and war, if there ever is any war, will become merely small civil disturbances.

Summing up all of this, what you get out of the people who are writing most seriously about

our time is that there is no sovereign remedy; that there is no one course to pursue; that there are many courses, many attitudes, which we must take. I think this is a rather long-winded way of coming to a conclusion which all of you recognize is inherently sensible, that there is not any one characteristic of our time, there is not any one answer to it. It has many characteristics and there must be many answers to it.

I venture to put down here some of the attitudes which seem to me essential for us to have in mind as we struggle with the times in which we live.

The first attitude which seems to me essential is the recognition that, whenever the present began and whenever the present will end, it will be with us for a very long time. If we will get that firmly in mind, we will begin to get over the impatience which leads people to try to find magic solutions. If we will recognize that we have before us a long period of work, then we have the beginning of wisdom. Once we understand that we have a long period of work before us then we can see that the object of our efforts is not to remove these problems. They are not removable. The object of our work is to reduce these problems to manageable proportions.

A Sense of Continuing Responsibility

If we can reduce them to manageable proportions, and if we will then accept continuity of responsibility in managing those problems, we begin to see some daylight ahead. But we cannot for a moment believe, if we are really sensible in facing the present, that the problems can be escaped. We must believe over and over again, and understand over and over again—as though we heard them for the first time—Lincoln's great words in his message to Congress of December 1862: "We cannot escape history." We cannot escape the problem of the present. We can only escape it by death or defeat. If we are going to deal with those problems, we must be willing to deal with them for a long time. We must be willing to reduce them from almost impossible problems to manageable problems, and we must have a sense of continuing responsibility in dealing with them.

The second very important attitude for us to take in dealing with the problems of the present is to avoid overdramatizing any particular problem or overemphasizing it. That is always our danger not peculiar to the United States but common to everybody. The particular problem with which we are dealing seems to us to be the overwhelming problem of all time. Take Korea, for instance, which God knows is important enough. There is a phrase which has been applied to it which is typical of this attitude which I am urging you to avoid. The activities of the U. N. in Korea have been described as "the reluctant crusade." That phrase seems to connote that Korea is the place where the showdown be-

tween the East and West is going to occur. "The reluctant crusade"—reluctantly the East and West get into the showdown. Now if anything is important, if anything is true about the situation in Korea, it is the overwhelming importance of *not* forcing a showdown on our side in Korea and *not* permitting our opponents to force a showdown.

That has been the whole heart and essence of the policy which the Administration has been following and which General Marshall and General Bradley so brilliantly described in the hearings before the Joint Committee. Korea's significance is not the final crusade. It is not finally making valid the idea of collective security. It is important perhaps for the inverse reason that in Korea we prevented the invalidation of collective security.

Collective security is not something which is established once and for all by some dramatic gesture. Collective security is like a bank account. It is kept alive by the resources which are put into it. In Korea the Russians presented a check which was drawn on the bank account of collective security. The Russians thought the check would bounce. They thought it was a bad check. But to their great surprise, the teller paid it. The important thing was that the check was paid. The importance will be nothing if the next check is not paid and if the bank account is not kept strong and sufficient to cover all checks which are drawn upon it.

The third attitude which I think is important for us to have in mind is a proper sense of proportion about the problems and difficulties which come before us.

In getting the proper sense of proportion about our difficulties, the first thing that we must do is to understand that the present situation is a great deal more serious than the United States as a whole has yet come to realize. We must understand that the Soviet Union is a much tougher adversary than the United States has yet realized. We must not only understand that, but we must understand something else, and that is that the Soviet Union is not the only difficulty that we have. Behind and beyond the Soviet Union, and our problems with the Soviet Union, lie other difficulties, perhaps even greater. The important thing about our actions in the present is that we must so act in dealing with the immediate difficulty that we manage also the more long-range ones.

What do I mean by those general words? Twice in our lifetime we have dealt with problems before us as though the solution of the problems was the solution of all problems. We dealt with the Kaiser as though the defeat of the Kaiser was the defeat of all such menace to the world. And yet there immediately grew up after that Hitler and Tojo. Then we dealt with Hitler and Tojo, and then we found looming behind them Stalin and the menace of communism and the Soviet Union.

Now what lies behind the Soviet Union? I see two problems. I am not saying these are caused by the Soviet Union, but I am saying that here are problems which we must reduce to manageable proportion in our dealing with the present. One is the awakening of the vast populations of Asia, populations which are beginning to feel that they should have and should exercise in the world an influence which is proportionate to their numbers and worthy of their cultures. The force is a force which can be turned to good, or it can be a force which can rend to pieces a world which has imprudently managed its immediate problem and which finds itself weakened, perhaps shattered in facing these upsurging forces of Asia. Therefore, in thinking about the Soviet Union, we must think about this shadow on the rock behind it. We must manage our difficulties so prudently that we have strength and initiative and power left to help shape and guide these emerging forces so that they will not turn out to be forces which rend and destroy.

In addition to the emergence of these peoples of Asia with the ambitions and possible power—which has to be thought about in relation not only to the existing power but also to the power which might be left after some imprudently inaugurated struggle had torn the Western world apart—there are the great problems of the world's growing hunger, of its growing numbers, of its deficient knowledge of the very elemental methods of staying alive.

These are the problems, these are the shadows on the rock behind the Soviet Union, of which we must never lose sight. All of this has to do with getting the proper perspective on the difficulties before us.

Balance Between Commitment and Capabilities

Another attitude which we must always keep in mind is the need to match our strength with the interests which we must defend. We hear it said—and it is wisely said—that there must be a balancing of commitments and capabilities. Too often people say that when they mean that we should reduce our commitments to meet whatever our capabilities may be at any time. Nothing could be more erroneous than that. What we must do is to be conscious of our national interests. A commitment is a national vital interest of which we have become conscious and for which we have made provision, but we may have national interests, which are just as valid, of which we have not become conscious and for which we have not made provision—about which we should immediately become conscious and about which we should immediately make provision.

Another attitude which we must have in mind is that there is no unitary approach. I suggested this a moment ago when I talked about cures which have been put forward for our modern evils. To

think that there is a unitary approach is a fallacy. We must use all means at our hand, whatever they are, and not say that one is the answer, or one or two are the answers. If you take, for instance, the views of those who urge that propaganda is the sole necessary weapon to survive and win in the modern world, you easily find yourself in the ridiculous position where you may have all the people of a nation on your side, but those people are politically organized as an effective opposition to you. To a very large extent—not completely, but to a very large extent—that is the situation which exists in China. I believe that the vast masses of the people in China are sympathetic to the United States, and yet those masses of people in China are organized effectively against us so that they are a very strong opponent. So propaganda is not the sole answer. It is an important weapon, and we must use it—we must use it fully but it is not the sole answer.

Neither is dealing with governments alone the sole answer. The idea that we can make arrangements with this, that, or the other government, without regard to popular support founded on free consent would all too probably involve us in excessively brittle alliances. We have a very good illustration of that sort of brittleness in the arrangements which were made between Hitler and Mussolini; they seemed very fine but they were very brittle, and when the pressure was put upon them they broke down. As it turned out, not the nation but only their passing masters proved to be the parties to the alliance.

We must be aware of both the fallacy of recovery without defensive strength and the fallacy of military strength upon a shaky economic foundation. These two things are of vital importance. They go together and they are at the heart of our efforts at the present time in the North Atlantic Treaty countries. There you have a community, an important community, a virile one, one which has come through grave and deep economic troubles and has been fighting its way up for some time.

Economic well being is not enough by itself. The countries which we have aided along the upward road now see that the situation demands a tremendous effort to build up, along with us, military strength as well as economic strength. Defensive strength is as integral to recovery as a fence is to a cornfield. Yet in seeking to replenish military strength it is necessary to avoid putting too great a load on our allies or on ourselves, for that matter.

There must be a very carefully worked out balance between the firm economic foundation and the strong military defense so that the military defense does not bring down the economic structure in ruins and so that the economic structure is built up for the purpose of defending itself with its military components.

No Substitute for Central Strength

We must also recognize that there is no substitute for strength at the center. Alliances are important. It is of vital importance to us that our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the Rio treaty be strong and that the bonds between them and us be strong. But it is equally important, if not more important, that there be strength at the center of these groups—the strength of the United States, its economic strength, its military strength, which will, in itself, breed strength at the periphery of our associations. The same applies in the United Nations. In that union of nations there is no substitute for the strength of the United States at the heart of the great group of powers which share our determination to uphold the principles of the Charter.

In building that strength it is very important that we should not underestimate ourselves. We have to meet and face limitations and difficulties. But if every time a difficulty comes along somebody says, "Oh, to do that will wreck the economy of the United States," that is underestimating ourselves. I have no doubt that there is a point beyond which the United States cannot go, but I am equally sure that we are not anywhere near that point. Therefore the thing to do is not to be timid about ourselves but to realize that our great strength is there to be used, and to use it wisely and economically and sensibly to create the defenses which we need.

May I say right here in connection with this business of creating strength at the center, we must not for one second allow any development which may occur in Korea to lull us into a belief that now we have turned the corner, and now things are going to get better, and therefore we do not need to make the effort which we have been making. I think we need to make it even more than we made it before. If it is possible to bring about an end of the fighting in Korea, it will be because of the efforts which we have already made and the sacrifices of the men in Korea. The success of our policy will mean only one thing, and that is that we have held off this conspiracy against us and that we have some time now which, if used wisely, will give us the power and give us the union with powerful allies which can deter World War III. If we do not do that, if we allow ourselves to be lulled by Korea, I can assure you that, just as certainly as you are sitting here, we will be hit within the next 6 months to a year with a much tougher blow somewhere else. If we do not make the efforts now, we will be unprepared for that blow. We may completely deter it if we now all bend together every effort we can to going forward with the program.

Another point is that we must believe that time is on our side. I concede to you that in saying this there is an element of faith. There is an

element of faith because I believe that we are people who act. Time is not on our side if we merely sit in the shade and fan ourselves. Time is on our side if we go to work. We can do much in time. We can strengthen ourselves, we can strengthen our allies. We have a vast productive power which is now not harnessed, much greater than those opposed to us. We can harness it. There is much we can do and, if we will do it, time is on our side. If we don't do it, it is not.

Therefore, we come to the matter of will. We have a strong geographical position. We have people who are skilled in industry, who have courage, who make fine soldiers and producers. We have natural resources. We have the productive plant. All of those things are no good at all unless they are cemented together and thrown into action by will. I believe that the American people have that will and that they can put that will strongly behind everything of a material nature that they have so that they, along with their allies, will secure for the future the things they value.

Another attitude of the utmost importance is that we must keep constantly before us the goal toward which we are working. What we are working toward is a situation in which the normal course of settling disputes will be negotiation. We are enthusiastic people, and occasionally we get so enthusiastic about what we are doing that we believe that is the end instead of the means. We must never get ourselves into the state of mind where we say that we are building this strength in order to use it. We are building this strength in order that we may never have to use it, in order that we may get to the point where the normal way to settle things is to sit down, to argue about them, to negotiate about them, and to find a solution with which all parties concerned can live, even though it is not ideal for any of us.

That is not really a hopeless ambition. It seems a long way off—and it is a long way off when you are dealing with the Soviet Union under the present imbalance of power—but we have reached a situation in the Western Hemisphere where negotiation is the normal way of settling disputes. The normal way for the American republics to settle all their differences—and there are very grave and serious difficulties—is by negotiation and reasonable settlement. That has taken nearly 60 years to work out. It has taken all of that time to build up the trust of the American republics among themselves and between them and us. For years we were called the "Colossus of the North," and we took actions from time to time which made the other American republics apprehensive of us, but I think that no longer exists. I do not believe there ever took place in the world a more harmonious or constructive meeting than the recent meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the American republics, in which all sorts of questions, vitally affecting all our countries, were taken up and dis-

cussed. Sometimes points of view were very far apart. On one very tough economic question it took staying up all night for three nights to get people to realize that there was a good deal in common between them! But we solved that question and we will solve other differences in this Hemisphere in that way.

Pattern of Responsibility for Leadership

There is one last attitude which I should like to stress, and that is that we must always keep in mind that we must deal with these problems within a pattern of responsibility. I should like to talk a little bit about what I mean by a pattern of responsibility. I mean that we must act with the consciousness that our responsibility is to interests which are broader than our own immediate American interests. Great empires have risen in this world and have collapsed because they took too narrow a view. There is no divine command which spares the United States from the seeds of destruction which have operated in other great states. There is no instruction to that one of the Fates who holds the shears that she shall withhold them from the thread of life of the United States. We must operate in a pattern of responsibility which is greater than our own interests. We cannot yield to the temptation, because we are virile and enthusiastic, of thinking that, because we believe a thing, it just must be right. We must not confuse our own opinions with the will of God.

That is essential for leadership. It is not merely a moral dissertation which I am making. It is essential to leadership among the free nations if we are going to maintain the sort of coalition which we have. We cannot take the attitude that we will coerce nations, that we are so right that if they do not do exactly what we want them to do we will withhold economic aid, or we will withhold military aid, we will do this, we will do that. If we take that attitude, then we are creating a relationship indistinguishable from that which exists between the Soviet Union and countries associated with it. That must never be our attitude. We are the leader. We are accepted as the leader. But we will continue to be accepted as the leader only if the other countries believe that the pat-

tern of responsibility within which we operate is a responsibility to interests which are broader than our own—that we know today what Thomas Jefferson was talking about when he spoke of the need of paying a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.

How can we institutionalize that sense of responsibility? The means are at hand, have been used, and must continue to be used. The means lie in the United Nations. There is much talk these days that the United Nations has proved itself ineffective—it does not do this, it does not do that, we must scrap it in favor of some other kind of coercive machinery. I do not agree with any of those views.

I don't think anyone is more conscious than I am, unless it be General Bradley, of the difficulties of working within a coalition as large as the group in the United Nations who are associated together in Korea. There are a thousand problems in working with so many nations, considering their points of view, and modifying your own so that you may maintain a true friend. But I assure you that it is worth it a million times. Whatever loss there is in efficiency of operation is gained a million times by the strength which comes from the group's believing that the leader is paying attention to other people's points of view. We should be forever grateful to the United Nations for furnishing a forum where the United States of America, to maintain its leadership, must enter and must explain itself to the rest of the world, and do so in terms which are so persuasive that countries will be convinced, do so under circumstances where the United States and its representatives listen to the representative of the smallest country in the world who has a point of view which he wishes to express, do so under circumstances where we make every effort to harmonize the views, adjust views, and may not force views down other people's throats. If we do that, then I believe the United States will avoid that narrow view which has led to the destruction of great powers and great empires in the past. The United States will lead into a new course in which the free nations will continue to be free nations, freely associated, freely, willingly, and eagerly accepting leadership which they believe considers their interests as deeply as it does its own.

Consultations With Iran on Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER

[Released to the press by the White House July 9]

The following communication was sent yesterday by the President to the Prime Minister of Iran (the communication was telegraphed by the Secretary of State to Ambassador Grady at Tehran for delivery to the Prime Minister):

I am most grateful to Your Excellency for giving me in your recent letter a full and frank account of the developments in the unhappy dispute which has arisen between your Government and the British oil interests in Iran. This matter is so full of dangers to the welfare of your own country, of Great Britain, and of all the free world, that I have been giving the most earnest thought to the problems involved. I had hoped that the common interests of the two countries directly involved and the common ground which has been developed in your discussions would open the way to a solution of the troublesome and complicated problems which have arisen. You know of our sympathetic interest in this country in Iran's desire to control its natural resources. From this point of view we were happy to see that the British Government has on its part accepted the principle of nationalization.

Since British skill and operating knowledge can contribute so much to the Iranian oil industry I had hoped—and still hope—that ways could be found to recognize the principle of nationalization and British interests to the benefit of both. For these reasons I have watched with concern the breakdown of your discussions and the drift toward a collapse of oil operations with all the attendant losses to Iran and the world. Surely this is a disaster which statesmanship can find a way to avoid.

Recently I have come to believe that the complexity of the problems involved in a broad settlement and the shortness of the time available before the refinery must shut down—if the present situation continues—require a simple and practicable modus vivendi under which operations can continue and under which the interests of neither side will be prejudiced. Various suggestions to this end have failed. The time available is running out.

In this situation a new and important development has occurred. The International Court of Justice, which your Government, the British Government, and our own, all joined with other nations to establish as the guardian of impartial justice and equity, has made a suggestion for a modus vivendi.

Technical considerations aside, I lay great stress on the action of the Court. I know how sincerely your Government and the British Government believe in the positions which you both have taken in your discussions. However, I am sure you believe even more profoundly in the idea of a world controlled by law and justice which has been the hope of the world since the San Francisco conference. Apart from questions of jurisdiction, no one will doubt the impartiality of the World Court, its eminence, and the respect due to it by all nations who signed the United Nations treaty.

Therefore, I earnestly commend to you a most careful consideration of its suggestion. I suggest that its utterance be thought of not as a decision which is or is not binding depending on technical legal considerations, but as a suggestion of an impartial body, dedicated to justice and equity and to a peaceful world based upon these great conceptions. A study of its suggestion by your Government and by the British Government will, I am sure, develop methods of implementing it which will carry out its wise and impartial purpose—maintaining the operation of the oil industry and preserving the positions of both Governments. Surely no government loses any element of its sovereignty or the support of its people by treating with all possible consideration and respect the utterance of this great Court. Our own Government and people believe this profoundly. Should you take such a position I am sure that the stature of Iran would be greatly enhanced in the eyes of the world.

I have a very sincere desire, Mr. Prime Minister, to be as helpful to you as possible in this circumstance. I have discussed this matter at length with W. Averell Harriman who, as you know, is one of my closest advisers and one of our most eminent citizens. Should you be willing to receive him, I should be happy to have him go to Tehran as my

personal representative to talk over with you this immediate and pressing situation.

May I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration and to convey to you my confidence in the future well-being and prosperity of Iran.

REPLY FROM IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN

[Released to the press by the White House July 11]

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your friendly message of 8th July handed to me by His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States in Teheran just after the Government of Iran had taken its decision with regard to the findings of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. I deem it my duty to thank you once again, Mr. President, for the care you have always taken in the welfare of this country.

As I mentioned in my previous letter, the Government and people of Iran recognize the Government and the people of the United States as the staunch supporters of right and justice and appreciate therefore, with complete sincerity, the interest you are taking in the solution of the economic difficulties of Iran in general and in the oil question in particular.

I am extremely glad to note your reference, Mr. President, to the sympathy and interest of the American Nation in the realization of Iran's national aspirations and the acceptance of the principle of nationalization of the oil industry; for Iran has had and is having no aim other than the acceptance of this principle by virtue of the laws ratified by the two Houses of Parliament, and has always been ready, within the terms of these laws to take any measures for the removal of the present disputes. It is, therefore, a matter of great regret that, insofar as Iran can judge, no proposal or suggestion have been made, up to the present, by the former oil company denoting their acceptance of the principle of nationalization of the oil industry in accordance with the laws ratified by the Parliament—laws which the Government is duty bound to put into force. On the contrary, in their note of 29th June, the representatives of the former oil company made proposals which were against the provisions of these laws and which resulted in the termination of the discussions.

Provided, of course, that our indisputable national rights are respected in accordance with the laws concerning the nationalization of the oil industry, the Government and the people of Iran are ready to enter into immediate discussions with the aim to remove all the disputes so that there may be no stoppage in the production and exploitation of oil—a situation which the Government of Iran has always been anxious to avoid and

which, as you have mentioned, Mr. President, is causing losses to all concerned.

With reference to your desire, Mr. President, to help our country I must state without hesitation that the Iranian Nation and Government fully appreciate this high intent in all sincerity and candor, more so when they find that you have shown your readiness, Mr. President, to send to Teheran as your special representative Averell Harriman, one of the most distinguished American citizens, for consultations.

In the light of our knowledge of Mr. Harriman's personality and his vast experiences, and considering the fact that he will act as your representative, the Iranian Government welcomes this gesture and hopes to take full advantage of consultations with a man of such high standing. In the meanwhile it would also give him the opportunity to become directly acquainted with our views and to obtain first hand knowledge of our living conditions and requirements.

May I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you, Mr. President, the expressions of my best and most sincere regards.

OFFICIAL REMARKS MADE AT AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S DEPARTURE

THE PRESIDENT: I want to express to you my appreciation for your willingness to undertake this trip to Iran. It is a very important job that you have undertaken, and one which I think you can handle with satisfaction and success.

All of us want to wish you a pleasant trip, and I hope that you will express to the Iranian Government that our interest is the interest of world peace, and the welfare of Iran and the rest of the world.

We have no selfish interest in the matter whatever.

SECRETARY ACHESON: Mr. Harriman, you carry the good wishes of all of us with you, and I know this mission could not be in better hands than yours.

I wish you all the success and luck in the world.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I wish you a safe trip and look for success in carrying out your objective.

I have seen you in many parts of the world, and on some very difficult occasions, and I have complete confidence in your ability in this particular issue.

MR. HARRIMAN: Mr. President, Mr. Acheson, General Marshall: It seems to me that there is great mutuality of interest between and among the needs of the people of Iran, the British, and the many parts of the world—the people in Europe and the Far East who have been dependent upon the oil that has been coming from Iran.

Under these circumstances, if we can create a spirit of good will, a way can be found to work out the difficulties which are now causing so much trouble.

I go with great appreciation of your confidence, Mr. President, and hope that with that confidence results can be achieved.

THE PRESIDENT: Good luck!

**STATEMENT BY GEORGE C. McGHEE,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN,
SOUTH ASIAN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS¹**

The events which lead to my appearing on this program are very significant for all of us.

Just two days ago President Truman received a message from the Iranian Prime Minister welcoming the President's offer of July 8 to send Mr. Harriman to Iran as the President's personal representative, for consultations on the British-Iranian oil controversy. Mr. Harriman has already started on a 7000 mile airplane flight to Tehran, the capital of Iran. Shortly after his arrival there on Sunday he will meet with the Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq and with other high Iranian officials.

The question of Iranian oil is an extremely complex and controversial matter. The roots of this present crisis go back many years. Although the Soviets stand to benefit greatly from the Iranian oil dispute, the sources of the present difficulty are to be found primarily within Iran—not outside. They stem from the deep desire of the Iranian people to better their way of life, to eliminate poverty, illiteracy, and disease. A danger in Iran is that this understandable spirit of nationalism, and the legitimate desire of the Iranian nation to receive greater benefits from its oil resources, may lead to hasty or emotional acts detrimental to the long-range best interests of Iran.

A stalemate between the parties to the dispute has now lasted for almost 6 weeks. As a result, no oil has left Iran for 3 weeks. The great Iranian oil production and refining industry, which constitutes Iran's largest single source of revenue, is threatened with collapse—the consequences of which could be very serious indeed. The President, the Secretary of State, and the American press and radio have on numerous occasions in recent weeks emphasized the critical and urgent nature of the Iranian situation.

The United States for its part has a deep interest in the continued independence and territorial integrity of Iran. It has sought also to further the welfare and economic betterment of the Iranian people. When the Soviet Union left military forces in Iran in 1946, we gave strong support to the Iranian case in the U.N. Security Council. As a result of Iran's steadfastness and of her support by the United Nations, in which the United States played an important role, Soviet troops were withdrawn. The Soviet objective of obtaining control of Iran has, however, remained unaltered and Soviet pressures have continued unabated.

We can be sure that the Kremlin is losing no opportunity to fish in the troubled oil of Iran, for Iran would be a great and strategic prize quite

apart from oil. Control of Iran, an area approximately as large as the United States east of the Mississippi River, would put the Soviet Union astride the communication routes connecting the free nations of Asia and Europe.

Thus the issues at stake in Iran go far beyond the question of oil, important as oil is for Iran and for the other nations of the free world. There are issues involved which affect the very foundations of law and justice which the free nations of the world have, during the twentieth century, been trying so hard to establish as the basis for settling international disputes.

The United States has consistently urged moderation on the part of the Iranian government and of the British oil interests. We are convinced, as the President said in a press conference 2 weeks ago, that there is plenty of opportunity for a settlement of the oil controversy on a mutually satisfactory basis.

As personal representative of President Truman, Mr. Harriman is flying to Iran to learn as much as he can about the Iranian situation. He will attempt to carry out the President's expressed desire "to be as helpful as possible in this circumstance." He will consult with Iranian officials and report to the President.

We have no magic formula for solving this critical problem which has arisen between our two friends. We do hope that before it is too late—and time is very short—some arrangement, temporary if need be, can be found which will permit the Iranian nation to receive maximum benefit from the exploitation of its oil resources and the West to continue to make its contribution to the Iranian oil industry and to benefit from it.

U.S. Policy on Trieste Remains Unchanged

The following is an oral statement issued to the press on July 11 by Michael J. McDermott, Chief Press Officer:

The American Ambassador at Rome has been authorized to inform Prime Minister de Gasperi that the United States Government has noticed that there has recently been speculation in the Italian press about United States policy regarding Trieste. Accordingly, the United States desires to assure the Prime Minister that United States policy in this respect remains unchanged.

That policy continues to be guided by the spirit of the March 20, 1948, declaration and by the belief that a permanent and peaceful settlement of the Trieste question can best be realized by agreement between the parties directly concerned, Italy, and Yugoslavia.

¹ Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Network on July 13 and released to the press on the same date.

Draft Peace Treaty With Japan and Japanese Declarations

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DULLES

[Released to the press July 11]

We now have a draft Japanese peace treaty which we believe will be generally acceptable to the 50-odd nations at war with Japan. No one will be 100 percent satisfied but almost everyone should be about 95 percent satisfied.

There are some unique features. One is procedure. We have used diplomatic discussions instead of a general conference because some of the nations concerned are not on speaking terms with each other and could never be brought together in a conference. This has meant many separate discussions and personal visits. I myself have been to seven of the countries principally concerned in the Pacific, and my deputy, Mr. Allison, has been to two more. Our procedure, while perhaps slower than a general conference, has given every country an even better chance to present its views.

A second unique fact is that the proposed treaty does not put Japan under any permanent restrictions or disabilities which will make her different or less sovereign than any other free nation. The treaty will, in fact, restore Japan as a sovereign equal, and the treaty is truly one of reconciliation. Never in modern times have the victors in a great and bitter war applied this principle. They have, in the name of peace, imposed discriminations and humiliations, which have bred new war. The present treaty would avoid that great error.

Another unique feature is the proposed treatment of the so-called problem of Japanese rearmament. Usually victors impose treaty limitations upon the rearmament of their enemy. These restrictions are rarely enforced, and because they are discriminatory, they often provoke the very result sought to be avoided. We are planning a new and modern approach, inspired by the principles of the United Nations. That principle is to seek security on a collective basis. A byproduct of that is that national forces are so combined with each other that no national force, alone, is an aggressive menace. That is what is contemplated in relation to Japan. Under a collective security treaty there will be a combination of

United States and future Japanese forces, and perhaps others, so that it would be materially impossible for Japan to wage a war of revenge. That is the modern and enlightened way to deal with the problem.

The present draft is sponsored not just by the United States but also by the United Kingdom. That is appropriate. Of the 15 nations principally concerned, 7 are members of the British Commonwealth. The French Government is also in accord. So we have striking evidence of unity as between our 3 great democracies. Also we have reason to hope that the new independent nations of Asia will want to go along with the kind of a peace treaty which we have evolved and which largely takes their views into accord. India and Pakistan, for example, have both taken a lively interest in the evolution of this text.

In addition to international unity, there is a unique measure of domestic unity. As the President's representative and with his full backing I have had complete cooperation from the Department of State and the Department of Defense. We have kept in close touch with the appropriate congressional committees and, despite sharp difference of opinion as to many aspects of Far Eastern policy, Democrats and Republicans have united behind the principles of this treaty.

I believe that the peace conference scheduled for San Francisco in September will, more than any other yet held, reflect the ideals of the United Nations which was born at San Francisco.

TEXT OF DRAFT TREATY AND DECLARATIONS

[Released to the press July 12]

[A draft peace treaty with Japan and two declarations by Japan have been prepared by the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom on the basis of (1) a United States draft treaty, circulated the latter part of March to the Governments of the countries most closely concerned with the war against Japan; (2) an independently prepared United Kingdom draft circulated at about the same time to the British Commonwealth nations, and (3) comments and observations received from the governments concerned in relation to the two preceding drafts.]

The draft was circulated to the countries principally concerned with the war against Japan, except where special circumstances exist, during the week of July 2-6. It was circulated informally to other nations at war with Japan on July 9. The draft will be revised on or about July 20 in the light of any comments received from the nations principally concerned. It will then be formally circulated to all nations at war with Japan, except where special circumstances exist, with a request for any comments they may have and an invitation to a conference or final consideration and signature of the peace treaty which, it is planned, will be held at San Francisco, Calif., on or about September 3, 1951. Texts of the draft treaty and of the two declarations of Japan follow:]

Preamble

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions.

Chapter I: PEACE

Article 1.

The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is hereby terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Powers concerned, as provided for in Article 23.

Chapter II: TERRITORY

Article 2.

(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Spratly Island and the Paracel Islands.

Article 3.

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 4.

(a) The disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3, and their claims, including debts against the authorities presently administering the areas referred to above and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japanese owned submarine cables connecting Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

Chapter III: SECURITY

Article 5.

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

Article 6.

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall however prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of

the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

Chapter IV: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 7.

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties so notified shall continue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

Article 8.

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on September 1st, 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as she may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of July 20, 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne July 24, 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of January 20, 1930, and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated May 17, 1930, the Convention of January 20, 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements, and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Article 9.

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Article 10.

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article 11.

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, reduce sentences and parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on the recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

Article 12.

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the coming into force of the present Treaty:—

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests—such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property, participation in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities.

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under paragraph (b) of this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of that paragraph be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

Article 13.

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the time of coming into force of the present Treaty, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

Chapter V: CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

Article 14.

(a) It is recognized that, although Japan should in principle pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war, nevertheless Japan lacks the capacity, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make adequate reparation to the Allied Powers and at the same time meet its other obligations.

However,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the skills and industry of the Japanese people in manufacturing, salvaging and other services to be rendered to the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

(a) Japan and of Japanese nationals

(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and

(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals

which on the coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction, except:

(i) property of Japanese nationals who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected during that period to measures not generally applied by the Government of the territory where the property was situated to the property of other Japanese nationals resident in such territory;

(ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property rights arising after the resumption of trade and financial relations between the country concerned and Japan before the coming into force of the present Treaty, except in the case of any rights resulting from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(II) Property referred to in exceptions (i) to (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(III) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of Japanese property referred to above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the Japanese owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(IV) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trade-marks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Article 15.

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by the owner within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage, compensation will be made in accordance with Law No. ---- enacted by the Japanese Diet on ---- 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective September 1, 1949, No. 12 effective January 28, 1950, and No. 9 effective February 1, 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on the 6th December, 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from the

7th December, 1941, until the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of 6 months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

(Note: Paragraph (a) of this Article is dependent upon the acceptability of the legislation to be passed by Japan.

Article 16.

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or at its option the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14 (a) 2 (I) (ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese Financial Institutions.

[Note: The status of Japanese assets in Thailand is subject to further consideration.]

Article 17.

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between 7th December, 1941, and the coming into force of the present Treaty in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

Article 18.

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented

or re-presented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liabilities for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to facilitate negotiations in respect to private prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

Article 19.

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between 1st September, 1939, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before the 1st September, 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after the 2nd September, 1945.

Article 20.

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Article 21.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14 (a) 2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

Chapter VI: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 22.

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated 15th October, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

Chapter VII: FINAL CLAUSES

Article 23.

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, (here would appear the names of such of the following States as are signatories to the present Treaty) namely, Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, France, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. The present treaty shall come into force for each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Government of Japan and of the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

Article 24.

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each deposit and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23 of the present Treaty.

Article 25.

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan which have signed and ratified it. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Article 26.

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1st January, 1942, and which is at war with Japan, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Article 27.

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof and notify each such State of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23 of the present Treaty.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at _____ this _____ day of _____ 1951, in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

July 23, 1951

958202-51-3

Declaration

With respect to the Treaty of Peace signed this day, the Government of Japan makes the following Declaration:

1. Except as otherwise provided in the said Treaty of Peace, Japan recognizes the full force of all presently effective multilateral international instruments to which Japan was a party on 1st September, 1939, and declares that it will, on the coming into force of the said Treaty, resume all its rights and obligations under those instruments. Where, however, participation in any instrument involves membership in an international organization of which Japan ceased to be a member on or after 1st September, 1939, the provisions of the present paragraph shall be dependent on Japan's readmission to membership in the organization concerned.

2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government formally to accede to the following international instruments within six months of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace:

- (1) Protocol opened for signature at Lake Success on 11th December 1946 amending the agreements, conventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs of 23rd January, 1912, 11th February, 1925, 19th February, 1925, 13th July, 1931, 27th November, 1931, and 26th June, 1936;
- (2) Protocol opened for signature at Paris on 19th November, 1948 bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of 13th July, 1931 for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on 11th December, 1946;
- (3) International Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards signed at Geneva on 26th September, 1927.
- (4) International Convention relating to Economic Statistics with Protocol signed at Geneva on 14th December, 1928 and Protocol amending the International Convention of 1928 relating to Economic Statistics signed at Paris on 9th December, 1948.
- (5) International Convention relating to the simplification of Customs Formalities, with Protocol of signature, signed at Geneva on 3rd November, 1923.
- (6) Agreement for the prevention of false indications of origin of goods signed at London on 2nd June, 1934;
- (7) Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air, and additional protocol, signed at Warsaw on 12th October, 1929;
- (8) Convention on safety of life at sea opened for signature at London 19th June, 1948;
- (9) Geneva conventions of 12th August, 1949 for the protection of war victims.

3. It is equally the intention of the Japanese Government, within six months of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, to apply for Japan's admission to participation in (a) the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on the 7th December, 1944, and as soon as Japan is itself a party to that Convention, to accept the International Air Services Transit Agreement also opened for signature at Chicago on 7th December, 1944; and (b) the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization signed at Washington under date of October 11th, 1947.

Declaration

With respect to the Treaty of Peace signed this day, the Government of Japan makes the following Declaration:

Japan will recognize any Commission, Delegation or other Organization authorized by any of the Allied Powers

to identify, list, maintain or regulate its war graves, cemeteries and memorials in Japanese territory; will facilitate the work of such Organizations, and will, in respect of the above-mentioned war graves, cemeteries and memorials, enter into negotiations for the conclusion of such agreements as may prove necessary with the Allied Power concerned, or with any Commission, Delegation or other Organization authorized by it.

EXCHANGE OF MEMORANDA WITH U.S.S.R.

Soviet Memorandum of June 10

Following is an unofficial English translation of the Soviet memorandum concerning a Japanese Peace Treaty which was handed the American Ambassador at Moscow on June 10:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. received from the Government of the United States of America on May 19, 1951, a memorandum representing an answer to the "remarks of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the United States of America draft peace treaty with Japan" of May 7, 1951.

The Soviet Government takes notice of the statement of the Government of the United States that it, having examined the remarks of the Government of the Soviet Union on the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America of March 29, 1951, considers that the divergencies which exist between the views of the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the peace terms set forth in the American March draft are not so great as to prevent achievement of agreement on a peace treaty.

Inasmuch, however, as along with the statement mentioned, considerations respecting the "remarks of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the United States of America draft peace treaty with Japan" of May as set forth in the American memorandum of May 19 which give an interpretation that is incorrect and that in several instances distorts the meaning of these remarks, the Soviet Government for the purpose of introducing full clarity considers it necessary to state the following:

1. *Concerning basic positions in American draft peace treaty with Japan.*

(a) For the Soviet Union as well as for other countries interested in a guarantee of lasting peace in the Far East question that Japan not become an aggressive state again and that *revival of Japanese militarism be prevented* possesses most important significance.

As is known, little more than 10 years ago a militaristic Japan attacked the Soviet Union in the region of Vladivostok. In the course of 15 years Japanese imperialism, invading China, harassed the Chinese people causing them great hardships. Japanese imperialists did not stop at attacking the United States and later a whole series of states in Asia including India, which unleashed war in the entire Far East.

Is there in the American draft peace treaty with

Japan a guarantee against the rebirth of Japan as an aggressive state? Acquaintance with this draft shows that it does not possess any guarantee in this respect.

In connection with this it was stated in the "remarks of the Soviet Government on the U.S.A. draft peace treaty with Japan" that the "American draft not only does not contain guarantees against the restoration of Japanese militarism, but in general does not set forth any limitations with respect to the size of the armed forces of Japan," as was done, for example, in the peace treaty with Italy, although there is no basis for such a privileged position for Japan in comparison with Italy.

Having no possibility of refuting this assertion of the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States of America in its statements on this question in its memorandum of May 19 falls into patent contradiction. On the one hand, in this memorandum it states that allegedly no agreements "exist in reality" between the powers on the question of demilitarization of Japan "except decisions concerning the period of occupation." However, on the other hand, the Government of the United States of America refers here to the Potsdam declaration of the Four Powers concerning the situation of Japan, whereas the basic purpose of the occupation of Japan is set forth there as the task of obtaining "convincing proof that the capacity of Japan to wage war has been destroyed," which refers, as is obvious, not only to the period of occupation but also to the subsequent period.

Furthermore, there exists directives of the Far Eastern Commission, which as early as June 19, 1947, took an important decision, contained in its document *Basic Policy with Respect to Japan After its Capitulation*. In this basic document of the Far Eastern Commission adopted with the participation of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Holland, New Zealand, the Philippines, U.S.S.R., England, and the United States of America, the task was placed in the forefront:

Of accomplishing the physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by means of the execution of a series of measures requiring the establishment of a period of strict control, including complete disarmament, the carrying out of economic reform the purpose of which would be to deprive Japan of the possibility of waging war, the eradication of militaristic influences and carrying out of strict justice with respect to war criminals.

Naturally, this decision also concerns not only the period of occupation.

After the facts cited, it becomes clear how far from reality is the assertion of the Government of the United States of America that allegedly no agreements "exists in reality" between the powers with respect to the demilitarization of Japan "except decisions concerning the period of occupation."

After the facts cited, it cannot be denied that, inasmuch as no limitations on the armed forces of Japan are contained in the American draft, there are no guarantees there against the restoration of Japanese militarism and the possibility of repetition of Japanese aggression. It is clear that no state that experienced the aggressive attack of Japan and is interested in the guarantee of lasting peace in the Far East can agree with such a position.

Together with this, the Government of the United States of America, with the help of its occupation authorities, is in reality already carrying out a policy of restoring Japanese militarism. This is evident from the fact that the American occupation authorities are not only not taking measures for the liquidation of military bases in Japan but, on the contrary, are trying to expand them considerably, modernize, and utilize them for aggressive purposes. In Japan they have already begun the recreation of a land army and of naval and air fleets; are restoring and expanding the work of former Japanese military arsenals and military enterprises; are freeing Japanese war criminals; are restoring military organizations, and more and more promoting propaganda of war; and are elevating the role and influence of the supporters of the rebirth of militarism in the governmental apparatus. Moreover, the United States, as the Government of the United States of America basically admits itself in its memorandum of May 19, has already begun the utilization of the industrial and human resources of Japan for its military intervention in Korea which is being carried out illegally under the flag of the United Nations organization.

The draft peace treaty of the United States of America, as well as the policy carried out by the American occupation authorities in Japan, testify to the fact that the Government of the United States of America is not observing obligations it took upon itself in international agreements not to allow the rebirth of Japanese militarism. In essence, the American draft peace treaty with Japan, and likewise the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 pursue not the peaceful purposes of prevention of a repetition of Japanese aggression but the aggressive purposes of reestablishment of Japanese militarism.

No guarantees are contained in the American draft peace treaty with Japan for assuring the future security of countries which suffered from the aggression of militaristic Japan, although it is clear to anyone that this should be one of the main tasks of the peace treaty. Instead of this it is especially stipulated in the draft that Japan should be accorded the opportunity to make "a contribution toward assurance of its own security," which allegedly corresponds to the "right to individual and collective self defense" provided for member countries of the United Nations in the United Nations Charter.

This question is even more frankly discussed in the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19. In this memorandum it is stated that the Government of the United States of America intends "to enter into an agreement concerning security with Japan for the period after the conclusion of the treaty," i. e. the conclusion of a military agreement between the United States of America and Japan is envisaged.

From this it follows that the task of not permitting the rebirth of Japanese militarism and guaranteeing in the future the security of countries that suffered from Japanese aggression is being replaced by the Government of the United States of America by the conclusion of a military agreement with Japan which would push Japan even more toward the restoration of militarism. Inasmuch as it is perfectly obvious that such countries as the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union are excluded from participation in this military agreement of the United States of America with Japan, there can be no doubt that this military agreement of the United States of America with Japan is directed primarily against these very states and possesses an obvious aggressive character.

After this it becomes clear that all references to the Charter of the United Nations, to the "right to individual and collective self-defense" in this case obviously have no substance and are false throughout.

It is likewise not necessary to prove that the references of the American memorandum also to the statement of J. V. Stalin, made on March 10, 1939, on the matter of struggle with aggression and the collective security of peace-loving countries are not only completely inappropriate here but are also hypocritical.

Thus, the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 shows that the American draft peace treaty with Japan not only did not provide guarantees against the rebirth of Japanese militarism which has caused such hardships for peace-loving peoples but, on the contrary, pushes Japan on the path of aggression that has already led the Japanese Government to the verge of ruin, and consequently fundamentally runs counter to the interests of guaranteeing lasting peace in the Far East, as well as to the national interests of Japan itself.

(b) Concerning Termination of the Occupation of Japan and Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Japanese Territory.

In its comments of May 7, the Soviet Government proposed that precise mention be made in the treaty that "after conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan all occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japanese territory within not more than one year and that no foreign states should have troops or military bases in Japan."

As is known, in the peace treaty with Italy, as well as with other peace treaties with European

countries, it is specifically mentioned that the occupation should be terminated in the shortest possible time and in any event not more than 90 days from the date of the entry of the peace treaty into force. However, in the American draft peace treaty with Japan no time limit is mentioned for the withdrawal of occupation forces from Japan. The vague statement contained in the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 that the "occupation will cease with the entry of the treaty into force" without mention of any time limit for withdrawal of the occupation troops can only lead to confusion; all the more since it is evident from this memorandum that the United States of America in reality does not intend to withdraw its troops even after the conclusion of the peace treaty but intends to leave its armed forces in Japan, allegedly "not as occupation troops."

In refusing to set a time limit for the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Japanese territory, the Government of the United States of America breaks one of its important obligations under international agreements. Leaving foreign troops in Japan after conclusion of a peace treaty, under whatever pretext it is done, contradicts the Potsdam declaration of July 26, 1945, which provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Japan and signifies camouflaged prolongation of the occupation of Japan for an indefinite protracted period.

In intending to prolong the occupation even after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Government of the United States of America is thus aspiring to remain the real master in Japan for a long time. In such a situation, the Government of the United States of America can count on the preservation of those privileges which it has guaranteed for itself during the years of occupation, it can count on prolongation of the political and economic dependence of Japan on the United States of America and can count not only on the retention but even on the further expansion of its military bases on Japan. It is clear that all this can only harm the course of peaceful settlement with Japan and the strengthening of peace in the Far East.

Therefore it is necessary that in the peace treaty with Japan the time limit for withdrawal of occupation troops from Japanese territory be precisely fixed and that in this treaty it should be established that no foreign state should have troops or military bases in Japan.

(c) Concerning the Inadmissibility of Participation by Japan in a Coalition Against States Having an Interest in Signing a Peace Treaty with Her.

In connection with what has been set forth, it becomes clear why the Government of the United States of America does not agree in its memorandum with the proposal of the Soviet Union to oblige Japan not to enter into a coalition directed

against any state having an interest in signing a peace treaty with Japan. The reference of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that Japan should, in conformity with article 2 of the United Nations Charter refrain from aggression or from application of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state is obviously without substance. Experience has shown that the Government of the United States utilizes the political and economic dependence of other United Nations member states (first of all—participants in the North Atlantic Union and the Latin American Republics) in order to transform the United Nations into a weapon for unleashing aggressive war in the Far East. The reference to article 2 of the United Nations Charter in the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America, and also in article 6 in the American draft peace treaty was calculated on utilization of Japan as well for this purpose.

Besides, it is not difficult to understand that the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the nonparticipation of Japan in a coalition acquires important and immediate significance on the strength of possible military agreement of the United States of America with Japan.

(d) Concerning the Removal of Limitations From the Peaceful Economy of Japan and From the Trade of Japan with Other Countries.

The memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 bypasses the question of the peacetime economy of Japan being placed in servile dependence on the United States of America as the result of all kinds of limitations with respect to the Japanese peacetime economy and the establishment of privileges for American firms sponsored by American occupation authorities. Japan is deprived of the opportunity of engaging in normal trade with neighboring states, which still further harms prospects for the upsurge of Japanese national economy.

The Soviet Government considers that without the effective removal of these restrictions imposed from outside, it would be impossible to create conditions for the upsurge of a peaceful economy and for improving the life of the Japanese people.

(e) Concerning the Guarantee of Democratic Rights to the Japanese People.

Judging from the memorandum of the United States of America of March 19 everything essential has already been achieved with respect to the democratization of Japan. But this is wholly untrue. In fact, in Japan, police suppression of organs of the democratic press, repressions against trade unions and other democratic organizations and persecutions for political convictions are being fully revived, with the cooperation of the occupation authorities, and a return to the pre-war fascist order in Japan when the shameful law on the struggle against "dangerous thoughts" existed, is taking place.

All this confirms the necessity for adopting those proposals concerning the democratization of Japan which were put forward in the comments of the Soviet Government.

(f) *Concerning Fulfillment of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Yalta Agreement With Regard to the Territorial Questions.*

As far as the territorial questions are concerned, the Soviet Government proposes only one thing—guarantee of the honorable fulfilment of the international agreements mentioned above, under which stands the signature of the United States of America itself.

As is known, it is stated in the Cairo declaration that the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to the Chinese Republic. Inasmuch as the Chinese Republic has been transformed into the Chinese People's Republic and only the Chinese People's Republic expresses the will of the Chinese people, it is clearly obvious that Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands should be transferred to the Chinese People's Republic. In the contrary event the Cairo Agreement will not be fulfilled and the entire responsibility for this would fall on the Government of the United States of America.

As far as the Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Pares Vela, and Marcus Islands are concerned, the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 contains nothing which would require fresh confirmation on the part of the Soviet Government of what was set forth in the comments of the Soviet Government of May 7.

(g) *Concerning Slandorous Attacks Against the U.S.S.R.*

In the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America of May 19 it is stated: "In view of the known fact of the acquisition by the U.S.S.R. of zones of interest in Manchuria, the Government of the United States of America hastens to inquire the significance of the desire of the Soviet government to avoid references to the return of Manchuria". The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state in this respect that the U.S.S.R. does not possess any zones of interest in Manchuria, and as is known to all considers Manchuria as an inseparable part of the Chinese People's Republic. In view of this the above-mentioned statement of the American memorandum must be held as deplorable fabrications of idle people and malicious slander of the U. S. S. R.

It cannot be unknown to the Government of the United States of America that the Soviet Union after defeating the Japanese Kwantung army liberated Manchuria and returned it to the lawful authority of the Chinese people. As far as the rights to the naval base of Port Arthur and to the Chinese-Changchun railway, which were granted to the Soviet Union according to the Yalta

agreement and the Sino-Soviet agreement of August 14, 1945, are concerned, the Soviet Government voluntarily and without compensation renounced these rights in favor of the Chinese People's Republic. Appropriate agreements concluded in Moscow on February 14, 1950, were published at the time and of course are known to the Government of the United States of America.

According to this agreement the Soviet Union, as is known, is to liquidate not later than 1952 its naval base at Port Arthur and withdraw its troops thence.

According to the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be much better if the Government of the United States of America would refrain from slander of the U.S.S.R. on the subject of Manchuria and concern itself with the withdrawal of its armed forces from Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands and return these illegally seized territories to their lawful owner—the Chinese People's Republic.

In the memorandum of the Government of the United States of America of May 19 it was also stated that the Soviet Government allegedly "in violation of the surrender terms is delaying the return of approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers to their homes and peacetime life."

There can be no doubt that the Government of the United States of America itself does not attach any credence to this statement. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to recall that as early as April 22, 1950, the official report of the termination of repatriation of Japanese war prisoners from the Soviet Union was published, which, as were subsequent communications on this matter, were brought to the notice of the powers. In the report mentioned above it was pointed out that only 1,487 Japanese war prisoners, convicted and undergoing investigation for military crimes committed by them, 9 Japanese war prisoners subject to repatriation after the completion of medical treatment, and 971 Japanese war prisoners who had committed serious crimes against the Chinese people and would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Chinese People's Republic, remained unrepatriated.

Consequently, the assertion in the memorandum of the United States of America that the Soviet Government is delaying the return to their homeland of approximately 200,000 Japanese soldiers is a trifling slanderous attack and strikes only slanderers.

As far as the remarks in the memorandum of the United States of America that the Soviet Union participated only 6 days in the war with Japan and that the role of the military efforts of the Soviet Union in this war were allegedly insignificant are concerned, the Soviet Union considers it necessary to state the following: first, the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan exactly at the time fixed at the Yalta conference without any delay whatever. Secondly, the Soviet Army

fought a bloody engagement with Japanese troops not for 6 days but in the course of a month, since the Kwantung army continued resistance for a long time in spite of the imperial declaration of capitulation. Thirdly, the Soviet Army smashed 22 Japanese divisions in Manchuria—the main forces of the Japanese Kwantung army, and took about 600,000 Japanese soldiers and officers prisoner. Fourthly, Japan came to capitulation only after the first decisive blow of Soviet troops at the Kwantung army. Fifthly, even before the entry of the U. S. S. R. into the war with Japan, during 1941–45, the U. S. S. R. kept up to 40 divisions on the frontiers with Manchuria and tied up the whole Kwantung army, thus facilitating the operations of China and the United States of America in the war against the Japanese militarists.

All these facts are, of course, known to the Government of the United States of America, and if, despite these facts, the Government of the United States of America permits itself to minimize the leading role of the Soviet Union in the matter of the defeat of Japanese militarism, this can only be explained by the fact that the Government of the United States of America does not have any convincing arguments, in view of which it is obliged in this case to resort to slanderous fabrications against the U. S. S. R.

2. *Concerning Preparation of an Over-all Peace Treaty with Japan instead of a Separate Treaty.*

In addition to the comments on the draft treaty made above, the Soviet Government has in view the expressing of other remarks on the substance of this draft when the meeting of interested countries takes place.

(a) In its memorandum of May 19 the Government of the United States of America has refrained from answering the comments of the Soviet Government where the text of the Potsdam Agreement was cited, from which it is evident that the Council of Foreign Ministers is set up with a composition of the Five Powers—United States of America, U. S. S. R., China, Great Britain, and France—first of all for “preparatory work on a peace settlement” and that in the drafting of the corresponding peace treaties “the Council will consist of members representing those states which have signed surrender terms dictated to that enemy state which the given task concerns.”

In the meantime, the references to the Potsdam Agreement cited furnish the basis for drawing the following indisputable conclusions:

First, in setting up the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the Five Powers, “preparatory work on a peace settlement” was directly mentioned as its main task, moreover the peace settlement was not limited to Europe;

Secondly, the Council of Foreign Ministers should engage on its preparatory work on a peace settlement with a composition of members “representing those states which have signed capitula-

tion terms,” from which it follows that the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan is placed upon four countries—the United States of America, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China, which signed the Japanese surrender document.

Consequently, fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement with respect to preparation of a peace treaty with Japan requires the calling of the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of the United States of America, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China and objection to this on the part of the Government of the United States of America is without grounds.

The unfounded nature of the objections against calling a Council of Foreign Ministers for such reasons as that it could allegedly delay preparations of a peace treaty with Japan is likewise perfectly obvious. These objections have already been put forth for several years past and they have led only to dragging out the matter. Meanwhile preparation of the treaty could already have been finished during this time, and the treaty could have been signed, as took place duly with the peace treaties of five other states—Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland, which were prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The statement that the procedure of the Council would accord a “secondary role” to some allied states is also without substance. It is sufficient to point out that under the procedure being imposed by the Government of the United States of America all allied states are in reality excluded from preparation of the treaty since the Government of the United States of America has gone along the path of seizing this matter exclusively into its own hands.

(b) In its remarks of May 7 the Soviet Government emphasized the inadmissibility of excluding China from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. These Chinese people were obliged to wage a long and heavy war with militaristic Japan, which had invaded its territory, and bore uniquely great sacrifices in this struggle, and therefore the government of the Chinese People's Republic as the sole legal expression of will of the Chinese people cannot be excluded from preparation of a treaty which should serve to establish lasting peace in the Far East. The statement of the government of the Chinese People's Republic of May 22, 1951, confirms its legal right and unique interest in the preparation of the treaty, which other states cannot ignore.

In the meantime the American draft treaty and the memorandum of the United States of America of May 19 testify to the fact that the Government of the United States of America is going on with direct violation of the national rights of China with respect to its territory in refusing to fulfill the Cairo agreement regarding the return of Taiwan island and the Pescadores Islands to China, as well as with exclusion of China from preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.

In rejecting the established procedure for preparation of peace treaties, the Government of the United States of America is endeavoring to exclude the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union and also other interested countries from preparation of the treaty and, ignoring their legal rights and interests, intends to dictate terms of treaty to Japan in accordance with its own judgment, inasmuch as the Japanese Government, which is dependent upon American occupation authorities, is prepared to enter into such an arrangement with the United States of America.

All this speaks for the fact that the Government of the United States of America does not want Japan to have a peace treaty with all the states that were in a state of war with her. Instead of an over-all peace treaty the United States of America wants to impose upon Japan a separate peace treaty with the Government of the United States of America and its satellites.

It cannot be considered accidental that the Government of the United States of America does not want an over-all peace treaty with Japan, but spires to a separate treaty. Only with conclusion of a separate treaty can the United States of America secure the dependence of Japan for several years hence, and inasmuch as the conclusion of a military agreement between the United States of America and Japan is also envisaged by the draft treaty it becomes clear that the goal of the separate treaty is the transformation of Japan into a shameful weapon for carrying out the aggressive plans of the United States of America in the Far East.

If the Government of the United States of America does not desist from its intention to exclude the Soviet Union and Chinese People's Republic from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan and imposes a separate peace treaty on Japan, this will signify, first, that the United States has taken the path of gross violations of its international obligations, including the United Nations Declaration of Jan. 1, 1942, which imposes the obligation not to conclude a separate peace, and, secondly, that the present policy of the United States of America will lead not to restoration and strengthening of peace in the Far East but to the creation of a new aggressive grouping in the Pacific Ocean.

Responsibility for the consequences of such a policy will lie entirely on the Government of the United States of America.

(c) As far as the repeated statement of the Government of the United States of America that negotiations concerning the draft peace treaty with Japan took place between representatives of the U.S.S.R. and United States of America is concerned, the Soviet Government is obliged again to emphasize that there have not been and could not be any negotiations concerning the working out of a draft peace treaty, since the Government of the U.S.S.R. has stood and does stand

against any form of separate negotiations on this question. Of course, personal meetings have taken place between Jacob A. Malik and Dulles at the personal request of Dulles, as have also the transmittal by Dulles of his ideas concerning a peace treaty with Japan and the posing of questions by Malik for clarification of Dulles' views. However, it would be absolutely incorrect to consider such personal meetings as negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States of America concerning the working out of a peace treaty with Japan.

3. Fully confirming its proposals of May 7, the Soviet Government insists on the following basic principles with respect to a peace treaty with Japan.

First. The peace treaty with Japan should be over-all and not separate, for which purpose no country participating in the war with Japan should be excluded from the preparation and signing of the treaty.

Second. The peace treaty with Japan should be worked out on the basis of the Cairo declaration, the Potsdam declaration and the Yalta Agreement.

Third. A peace conference of representatives of all states which participated with their armed forces in the war with Japan should be called in July or August, 1951, for consideration of the available drafts for a peace treaty with Japan.

U.S. Memorandum of July 9

[Released to the press July 14]

Following is the text of a memorandum delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington on July 9, 1951, in response to the Soviet Memorandum of June 10 concerning a Japanese Peace treaty.

The Department of State, having transmitted to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington a revised (July 3, 1951) draft of a prospective Treaty of Peace with Japan, takes this occasion to allude to the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union of June 10, 1951, dealing with the earlier draft of March 29, 1951.

Section 1 of that memorandum dealt with the substantive terms of that draft. It failed to cite any language of the draft as objectionable. In essence, the Soviet memorandum objected not to anything contained in the draft treaty but because the treaty would not restrict Japan with respect to the right of individual or collective self-defense, a right recognized by the United Nations Charter as "inherent." The Government of the Soviet Union would have the peace treaty deny to Japan the right hereafter to enter into collective security arrangements with other countries of its choosing. This is a viewpoint which the Government of the United States cannot accept.

Section 2 of the Soviet memorandum dealt with procedure. It again "insists on observance of the Potsdam Agreement" which, according to the Government of the Soviet Union, means that "preparation of a peace treaty with Japan is placed upon four countries—the United States of America, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China" constituting the Council of Foreign Ministers.

This would commit the preparation of the treaty to the veto-bound processes of that Council and would exclude from the preparatory work France and many Pacific and Asiatic countries which bore a far heavier burden in the Japanese war than did the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government's memorandum does not attempt any reasoned reply to the analysis of the Potsdam Agreement contained in Section I of the United States aide memoire of May 19, which proves irrefutably that the Potsdam Agreement between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States neither mentions nor relates in any way to the Japanese peace, probably because the Potsdam Agreement was made on August 1, 1945, before Japan's surrender and when the Soviet Union was still a neutral in the Pacific war.

In the concluding Section 3 of its memorandum of June 10, 1951, the Soviet Government says that the "peace treaty with Japan should be multilateral and not separate" both as to preparation and as to signing.

The July 3, 1951, draft reflects the operation of those very principles. Many interested nations have participated in its preparation. The fact that they have done so through diplomatic channels makes their participation no less real than if they had participated in some other manner. The terms of the treaty would recognize and protect equally the legitimate interests of each and every state which took part in the Japanese war. At the same time the terms embody not merely the formality of peace, but the spirit of peace. The Government of the Soviet Union will further observe that, as it desires, the text is prepared as a multilateral instrument.

The Soviet Memorandum, after having first demanded that the preparation of a draft treaty should now be started over again by the Council of Foreign Ministers, suggests, in its final paragraph, that when there are available drafts, there should be a conference of all active belligerents in the Japanese war, for consideration of these drafts.

The Government of the United States anticipates that there will be a general conference early in September to conclude a peace on the basis of the draft of July 3, 1951. It will welcome participation in that conference, and adherence to the resultant Treaty, by the Government of the Soviet Union.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington.

U.S.S.R. Fails To Inform Soviet Peoples of Friendship Resolution

[Released to the press July 14]

The Voice of America today began calling to the attention of the Soviet Government its failure to transmit the McMahon-Ribicoff Friendship Resolution to the Soviet peoples.

For the next several days the Voice of America will stress in all Russian language programs the number of days that have elapsed since July 7, when President Truman forwarded the Friendship Resolution to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

The first of this series of basic scripts follows:

TRUMAN MESSAGE NOT PUBLISHED IN U.S.S.R.

Good Evening. This is _____. On July 7, President Truman sent a message to His Excellency Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was a simple request. That those who head the Soviet Union transmit to the people of the Soviet Union, a resolution passed by the elected representatives of the American people, the Congress, expressing to them the feeling of friendship. To date, there is no evidence that the President's request has been complied with.

The Resolution of Friendship has appeared in no Soviet newspaper; it has not been heard on any Soviet radio; nor has any Stalin prize winning actor stepped to the footlights to read it to his audience. Of course, there may be a delay—papers, letters, books, articles of all kinds have to go through a great many hands in the Soviet Union before seeing the light of day. Or, perhaps, it is being studied, as the diplomats say, but what there is to study about a simple expression of friendship from 150 million people it is difficult to understand. Or, perhaps, the Resolution itself isn't phrased correctly—after all, phraseology in the Soviet Union is a special science—but then it would be such a simple matter just to telephone Washington and ask for the definition or meaning of any word. For instance, if there's any difficulty with the American word "friendship" the word "comradeship" could be substituted. If it's difficult to telephone out of Moscow—I hear there are difficulties sometimes—Ambassador Kirk is right at hand, and he is an excellent grammarian.

But if it is none of these things—the nonappearance of the American people's resolution in any Soviet media, the ignoring of its President's simple request—is exceedingly strange, and we must look elsewhere for the reasons. Perhaps it's in the body, the actual words, in the Resolution itself.

Now let's see—it says "The deepest wish of America is to join with all other nations in preserving the dignity of man, and in observing those moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence . . ."

Now, what could be in there that wouldn't translate. I'm sure there are Russian phrases equivalent to "the dignity of man" and for "moral principles." If not in the new rapidly changing Soviet language, then back a little in the old Russian. And, there would be enough citizens who still understand the old phrases to be able to convey their meaning to the younger folk.

What else is in the Resolution? Oh yes—that "the American people offer to share all that is good in atomic energy, asking in return only safeguards against the evil in the atom." That would translate, I'm sure, for everybody in the new Russian; after all, the atom is much younger than the Soviet Union itself. No—they could

understand that part; it wouldn't be that section that could keep it out of the newspapers.

What about the part which says "the goal of the American people is now, and ever has been, a just and lasting peace." No—that's not it. That translates into any language, just as it is.

"That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war . . ." Well, that may be a little difficult, seeing as how Soviet typesetters have not put these words up in such a sequence for so long a time—but no, that can't be it; it would take a little practice, perhaps, but they could get it right.

Ah, here is a difficult passage—"the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples . . ."—Yes, that might be it; there's a difficult word to translate in there—I mean in the modern Russian—the word "barrier." I admit that it's hard for—not the Soviet people—but the pedants of bureaucracy to find a word for "barrier." There is a word, or two words, "stockade" is one, or "barbed wire" is another—these are in use, but they are actual things, actual barriers. The Soviet people will understand that perhaps the difficulty is with the word "artificial." Maybe that's it. I don't know.

But, as I said before, there's the telephone or Ambassador Kirk right at hand for difficult translation problems. Outside of this, I can't understand why the President's request has so long been ignored. Here in America, if we were to receive such a request from Generalissimo Stalin, for instance, every librarian, professor, Russian speaking editor would immediately be at work. The message would appear in every newspaper in a matter of hours. But then, if the Russian people were to send us the real message in their hearts, perhaps it would be more easily translatable into English . . . and now, this is ———, saying goodby, look for the message, and see you again.

Soviet Action on Lend-Lease Urged

[Released to the press July 6]

The following are the texts of two notes sent by Secretary Acheson on July 2, 1951, to the Soviet Chargé at Washington, Boris I. Karavaev, one concerning Soviet failure to reply to the United States demand of April 6 that all lend-lease vessels be immediately returned, the second noting that no reply has been received to the United States proposal for arbitration of the question of a financial settlement of the lend-lease account:

I

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the request of the Government of the United States in its note of February 7, 1951 and reiterated in its note of April 6, 1951 that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promptly return to the United States all vessels loaned to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.

July 23, 1951

In view of the clear and undeniable obligation of the Soviet Government under Article V of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement to return these vessels, immediate notification of the intentions of the Soviet Government with respect to this matter is requested.

II

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the proposal of the Government of the United States, as set forth in its note of April 27, 1951, that there be submitted to arbitration the question of what would be fair and reasonable terms of financial settlement by the Soviet Government for the lend-lease articles having civilian utility except ships, which were not lost, destroyed or consumed during the war and which are not returned to the United States.

In view of the extended period of time which has elapsed without response from the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States expresses the hope that the Soviet Government will promptly reply to the proposal of April 27, 1951.

Estate Tax Convention With Switzerland Signed

[Released to the press July 9]

On July 9, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Charles Bruggmann, Swiss Minister in Washington, signed a convention between the United States and Switzerland for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.

The estate-tax convention with Switzerland is basically similar to, and has the same objectives as, estate-tax conventions now in force between the United States and Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and such conventions concluded but not yet in force between the United States and Greece, Ireland, Norway, and the Union of South Africa. As applied to the taxes imposed in the United States, the convention with Switzerland deals solely with the Federal estate taxes and does not affect the estate or inheritance taxes imposed by the several states, territories, or possessions of the United States or the District of Columbia.

The convention will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It is provided in the convention that instruments of ratification shall be exchanged and that the convention shall become effective on the day that exchange takes place, but shall be applicable only to estates or inheritances in the case of persons who die on or after that date.

Agreement With India For Relief Supplies

[Released to the press July 9]

An agreement to facilitate the movement and distribution of packages and supplies donated for relief and rehabilitation in India was signed today at the Department of State by Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador, and Secretary Acheson.

The agreement applies to certain foods, medical supplies, hospital equipment, and agricultural implements shipped to India under an amendment to the India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951. This amendment authorizes the administrator for economic cooperation to pay the ocean freight charges on these types of supplies when donated through organizations qualified as voluntary non-profit relief agencies under applicable ECA regulations and registered for operations in India with the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.

According to the terms of the agreement signed today, the Government of India will allow duty-free entry and defray the inland transportation charges on the relief supplies mentioned above. These actions, by materially reducing the cost of handling shipments, will increase considerably the effectiveness of the distribution of the gifts donated by the American people through the relief agencies.

Norway Signs Torquay Protocol

[Released to the press July 9]

The United States Government has been informed by the headquarters of the United Nations that the Government of Norway, on July 3, 1951, signed the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The terms of the protocol require that the concessions negotiated between the United States and Norway at the recent tariff conference at Torquay, England, but which have heretofore been withheld, be put into effect on the thirtieth day—August 2, 1951—after Norway's signature of the instrument.

At Torquay, Norway granted substantial concessions on its imports of both agricultural and nonagricultural products of the United States. More than half of these concessions were reductions in duty; the remainder consisted of binding of existing duties or duty-free treatment.

Norwegian duties were reduced on fresh apples and pears; dried apricots, prunes, apples, peaches, pears, and other fruits; and various vegetable juices. Present moderate duties on lard were bound; duty-free status of soybeans was bound.

Duty-free treatment of ash lumber was bound, as was the moderate rate of duty on certain types of plywood.

Concessions were granted on various chemical products, on lubricating oil, and on petrolatum. There were duty reductions on tractors and a wide range of machinery and tools. Present duties on aircraft parts were bound. In addition to the concessions directly negotiated with the United States at Torquay, Norway made numerous concessions to other countries on products of interest to United States exporters.

Among the products to which United States concessions initially negotiated with Norway apply are: special types of canned sardines and herrings and certain other fish products; certain kinds of cheeses; reindeer meat; chrome or chromium metal and certain other metals and metal alloys; certain artificial abrasives; certain chemical pigments; fish hooks; and certain kinds of paper.

The specific United States concessions which will be put into effect as a result of Norway's signature of the Torquay Protocol will be announced as soon as possible.

WHO American Office Opens Nursing Workshop In Guatemala

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information June 28]

A nursing workshop on the principles of supervision and administration in communicable disease nursing opens on Sunday, July 1, in Guatemala City, under the auspices of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, regional office of the World Health Organization. The workshop is being financed with technical assistance funds by the Organization of American States.

Three bureau specialists in public health nursing and three specialists from Latin America—one from Brazil and two from Chile—are conducting the workshop, a 6-weeks' intensive study course intended for directors, instructors, and supervisors of schools of nursing and public health services. It will operate July 1 through August 12 and is designed to serve nurses from the six Central American Republics and Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Mexico. Two nurses in positions of leadership from each of the 10 countries have been invited to attend as students.

The Government of Guatemala is housing the workshop meetings in its new school of nursing, a completed unit on the grounds of a thousand-bed hospital now under construction in the capital city of the Republic. The Government is also contributing personnel, services, and facilities for the course.

.S., Australia, New Zealand Negotiate Security Treaty

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DULLES CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY

Released to the press July 12]

During the latter part of February 1951, I had several days of discussion at Canberra, Australia, with Mr. Spender, then the Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mr. Doidge, the Foreign Minister of New Zealand. We explored the possibility of an arrangement between our three countries, pursuant to the United Nations Charter, which would make clear that, in the event of an armed attack on any of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger.

After I had reported our conclusions to President Truman, he asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and me as his special representative, to pursue this matter further.

This has been done and has resulted in the negotiation of a proposed security treaty for consideration by the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America. This is the draft now being made public.

As said by President Truman in his statement of April 19, 1951, this arrangement between our three Governments is one of a series of arrangements, described in the preamble to the draft treaty, now being worked out by the United States to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific. These arrangements on which we are now working are, in turn, as the President said in his April 19 statement only "initial steps." It is expected that, in due course, these initial steps will be followed by others in order to achieve what the preamble and article VIII of the draft treaty describes as "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area."

It is expected that this treaty will be signed at about the same time as the signing of the Japanese peace treaty. There has not yet been any final decision as to the place or precise date of signing.

I am very happy to join with Ambassadors Spender and Berendsen in announcing the results of our discussions. It has been a great pleasure to work with both of them and with other officials of the Australian and New Zealand Governments. I am confident that what we have done will be an important step on the road to peace.

STATEMENT BY PERCY C. SPENDER AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S.

[Released to the press July 12]

The end of the negotiations which have resulted in the initialling for identification, on behalf of the three countries concerned, of this draft security agreement marks the beginning not only of a new and important relationship between our three countries in the Pacific but a historic occasion of profound significance to the free world.

For too long this part of the world has not received the attention which its growing importance merited. This draft agreement which will be formally signed at an agreed and not distant date is but one but nonetheless an exceedingly important step in building up the security of the Pacific area. Based upon mutuality of interest and obligation what in substance it does is to recognize that any armed attack on one of the parties is an armed attack on all and obligates the others to come to the assistance of the party attacked.

Based upon the close and intimate understanding which already exists between the three countries, an understanding which was fortified and developed by the great comradeship which arose between the men of the three countries in the perilous days of the last conflict, Australia, dedicated to the cause of peace, is happy to join in this great association of free peoples and confidently faces the future in the firm knowledge that we stand together.

I would like to record how much the Australian Government appreciates the great labours which have been put in the negotiations by Mr. Dulles and the officials associated with him. The splendid consultations which have taken place between us is a happy augury for the progress of this proposed agreement. At all times he and his associates have been frank, reasonable, and prepared to see a different point of view.

My own satisfaction in being so intimately associated with these negotiations is I hope understandable. But merely as an Australian I know I speak for my countrymen when I say that the successful conclusion of these negotiations will be warmly hailed by Australia.

**STATEMENT BY CARL BERENDSEN
NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR TO U.S.**

[Released to the press July 12]

It is my privilege to initial this draft treaty on behalf of New Zealand, and I wish to pay my tribute to the invaluable assistance rendered in this matter by John Foster Dulles and his associates.

These proposals appear to me to meet the essential requirements of all useful international engagements in that they conform with an existing situation, with the facts and the necessities of the time and the area. On completion, this pact will formally record what so clearly and happily exists today—the close relation between the interests of the parties in the Pacific, the warmth of the regard of their peoples one for the other, their common desire for peace, and their common intention to resist aggression. And this pact when completed will be more than a piece of paper—it will be an engagement between three parties who, in the defence of liberty, have in the past fought side by side on many a hard-won field; who know and respect each other's character and capacity; who trust each other in all circumstances; and who have proved their determination and their ability at all times to honour their pledged word.

I believe that this treaty, when concluded, will be entirely in conformity with the aims, the ideals and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; that it will prove a useful measure to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific; and that it will be of real and lasting benefit to all its signatories and indeed to the world.

TEXT OF DRAFT TRIPARTITE SECURITY TREATY

*[For consideration by the Governments of
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
of America]*

[Released to the press July 12]

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense

of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at _____ this _____ day of _____ 1951.

TCA Adopts Plan For Use Of American Science Books

Released to the press July 9]

Adoption of a plan for the selective use of American scientific and technical books in the Point Four Program was announced today by Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Technical Cooperation Administrator. The plan was worked out in cooperation with the American Book Publishers Council, Inc., American Textbook Publishers Institute, and American Association of University Presses, representing the principal book publishers in the United States. It calls for the distribution of American scientific and technical books on a limited scale by American technicians engaged in Point Four projects in other countries. The books will be presented to ministries, institutions, and individual technicians of the other countries with whom the American technicians are working. In all cases, the books will be presented only when it is determined that such works printed in English can be used to advantage and will contribute to the furtherance of the Point Four Program. Dr. Bennett said:

We recognize that American scientific and technical books can be a valuable means of sharing our knowledge with other peoples. In fact, the distribution of such books is one of the most effective ways of disseminating scientific and technical knowledge which other people will find useful in increasing their productivity, developing their economic resources, and improving their standards of living.

At the same time, we want to make sure that every book purchased with Point Four funds will serve a practical purpose. Therefore we are adopting this plan for limited distribution of such books by American technicians who will select specific titles for presentation to the scientists and technicians with whom they are working directly in other countries.

Dr. Bennett pointed out that in many countries in which the Point Four Program operates, many individuals and institutions that can use scientific and technical books in English have very limited dollar funds for such purposes.

The selective distribution of such books under the Point Four Program will be coordinated both in the United States and in other countries with the general book distribution program being carried on as part of the foreign information and educational exchange program operated by the Department of State.

Point Four Administrator Visits Ethiopia

[Released to the press July 10]

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett left Washington July 9 for a 2-week visit to Ethiopia to consult with Ethiopian authorities on the program of technical cooperation under a Point Four General Agreement signed June 14, 1951. Dr. Bennett is accompanied by Benjamin H. Hardy, director of the Public Affairs Staff of the TCA.

Dr. Bennett served as agricultural adviser to Emperor Haile Selassie in the spring of 1950. Many of the projects which now come under the Point Four Program in Ethiopia are the results of recommendations he made following his studies of the Ethiopian economy.

The Point Four Administrator said that the technical cooperative plan includes the establishment of an agricultural college staffed by American technicians and teaching the most modern rural practices in their adaptation to local conditions. Other projects are for aid to primary and secondary schools, including the establishment of an Ethiopian-American educational service separate from the Ministry of Education in undertaking teacher training work with materials prepared in the United States under the direction of American educators.

Dr. Bennett said that the last time he was in Ethiopia he saw evidences of great potential development. He stated:

Huge sources of untapped hydroelectric power are there. These will be studied by United States and Ethiopian experts with the view toward harnessing them to the development of other resources.

I saw countless herds of cattle, a potential source of meat for Europe and income to the Ethiopians. Yet the lack of packing plants, and refrigerated transportation deny the benefit of this great industry both to Europe and Ethiopia.

The TCA administrator also declared that conferences will be held with Ethiopian Government officials and members of the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa for the purpose of discussing other projects on which Ethiopia has requested assistance under the Point Four Program.

U.S. Signs Defense Agreements With Saudi Arabia

[Released to the press July 13]

The United States Government signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and Dhahran Air Field agreements with the Saudi Arabian Government at Jidda on June 18, 1951.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement was concluded following the designation of Saudi Arabia as eligible for cash reimbursable military assistance under Public Law 329, as amended. This act provides such assistance may be extended any nation whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part is important to the security of the United States. Saudi Arabia is the first Arab country so designated. The United States is prepared to provide military training in the use of the equipment to be purchased by the Saudi Arabian Government in order that Saudi Arabia may maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part. The Saudi Arabian Government agrees not to undertake any act of aggression against another state.

The Dhahran Air Field Agreement is for a period of 5 years with provision of renewal for a similar period. The complete title to and sovereignty over the Dhahran Air Field by the Saudi Arabian Government is safeguarded, but the United States Government is permitted to use the field for the maintenance, repair, and other technical services of United States Government aircraft. The training of Saudi Arabian students in airfield maintenance and operation will be continued under the new agreement.

Department Confirms Suspension of Two Foreign Service Officers

[Released to the press July 12]

The Department of State confirmed today the suspension from duty of John Patton Davies, Jr., and Oliver Edmund Clubb, career officers of the Foreign Service. The Department made it known that Davies and Clubb had been suspended on June 27 as the result of recommendations by the Department's Loyalty Security Board that hearings be held by the Board on both cases. In emphasizing that the Department's suspension action is mandatory under Public Law 733, the statute which governs the Department's security procedures, it was explained that the Department is required to suspend any employee when it has been determined that security charges should be preferred and formal hearings conducted. Suspension, it was pointed out, does not indicate

that a person is guilty of misconduct or is a security risk; but suspension is a mandatory legal requirement (PL 733) in any case in which a hearing is held. The Department made it clear that the purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the complete facts and thus hearings are for the protection of both the Government and the individual.

The Department stated that the date of hearing of Davies' case before the State Department Loyalty Security Board has been set as July 23 and the date on Clubb's case as July 31. The chairman of this Board is Conrad E. Snow, wartime Army General and former secretary of the New Hampshire Bar Association.

It was stated that the Department would make no further comment upon the two cases until the cases are completely adjudicated.

Department of State Conducts Seminar on Foreign Affairs

[Released to the press July 11]

Ten outstanding young men and women, representing that many different colleges and universities throughout the Nation, are now attending the Graduate Student Summer Seminar on Foreign Affairs conducted by the Department of State.

The seminar is designed to give the academic circles of the country a more comprehensive picture of the State Department's role in the conduct of foreign affairs. It will provide an opportunity for students at the graduate level to undertake or continue certain types of studies or projects in which the Department is concerned and to experience at first hand some of the day to day operations of the Department.

Classes began July 10 in the Foreign Service Institute where members of the 2-month course gathered to hear top flight specialists from all areas of the Department. The seminar was officially launched with a welcome from Walter K. Scott, deputy assistant secretary for administration.

The 8-week program will be concluded September 1.

One-hundred twelve colleges and universities participated in the Nation-wide program by nominating candidates on the basis of individual interests in international relations as well as scholastic and leadership merit. A similar type program has been offered for the past 2 years. This, however, is the first time it has been possible to offer financial assistance to the participants. The funds are provided jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Department of State.

Members of the seminar course are classified as temporary employees of the Department.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MEETINGS

Documents Relating to the Armistice Negotiations in Korea

U.N. Communiqué Issued July 11

The second meeting of the armistice negotiations convened in the vicinity of Kaesong, Korea, at 10 a. m., today, 11 July 1951, Wednesday [8 p. m., Tuesday, eastern daylight time].

The principal delegates of both negotiating parties were the same as for the first meeting. Vice Admiral Joy, United States Navy, was the senior United Nations Command delegate, and General Nam Il, North Korean Army, was the senior Communist delegate.

It was evident to all United Nations Command delegates that the Communists exhibited less stiffness and were less formal than on the previous day. This atmosphere permitted a better understanding between the negotiating parties.

One of the delays in conducting and expediting these negotiations is the difficulty inherent in the language barrier. Considerable time was spent in the part of both negotiating delegations in assuring themselves that they had correctly interpreted and understood the statements of the other parties.

Today, the agenda items were more thoroughly explored and discussed by both parties and there now exists a better understanding of the intended scope by all concerned.

There still exist some differences of opinion regarding the priority of items for the agenda.

Certain administrative agreements were reached including the relaxation of certain restrictions on movement and arrangement for mutual communication facilities.

Today's negotiations adjourned shortly after 4 p. m. There is a general feeling among United Nations delegates to the armistice negotiations that progress is being made.

The delegation for the next meeting will include approximately 20 news media representatives. They will be permitted within the area of the negotiations but will not be allowed to enter the conference room.

July 23, 1951

U.N. Memorandum of July 12

At the first meeting with the Communist delegation, Admiral Joy proposed the admission of newsmen to the vicinity of the conference. His proposal was that 20 selected newsmen be permitted to move to and from the conference area as a part of the United Nations Command delegation. He emphasized that they would not be admitted to the conference room but only to the area of the conference.

General Nam Il at first accepted this proposal but later reversed his decision, saying that he communicated the question to his Supreme Commander. Until he receives the answer he would like to postpone the matter. Admiral Joy stated that his liaison officer would go to Kaesong at 7:30 a. m. July 11 to get their reply.

At that time, Col. J. C. Murray, U.S.M.C., landed in a helicopter on the landing strip at Kaesong to receive the Communist reply.

He was met at the airstrip on arrival by Lt. Col. Chai Chengwan, Chinese Communist forces, and his interpreter, Pi Shi-lung. Colonel Chai stated he was instructed to advise:

Since the conference at the present stage is still strictly a military one, and even the agenda has not been agreed upon, our Supreme Commander considers that it is not the time yet for the press to come in. However, we are still considering this matter.

Admiral Joy, on the second day of the conference, again raised the question of the press, stating that the United Nations Command delegation desired the presence of professional newsmen at the site of the conference.

The United Nations Command delegation [Admiral Joy said], on instruction of the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, must therefore insist that newsmen be admitted to the area of this conference without further delay.

General Nam Il replied that the meeting was being held under war conditions and that the agenda had not been agreed upon and the Com-

munist delegation did not consider the presence of newsmen desirable at this time.

At a later time, Admiral Joy again raised the question and General Nam Il replied:

I don't mean to say I refuse the newspapermen to come to the conference site area, but for the time being the matter must be reserved.

Toward the end of the session, Admiral Joy stated he had received a dispatch from the Commander in Chief United Nations Command, which he read:

I desire that you inform the Communist delegates as follows—The presence of a selected number of newsmen at a conference of such major importance to the entire world is considered an inherent right by members of the United Nations. Therefore, a selected group of professional newsmen, photographers and newsreel cameramen, numbering approximately twenty, will accompany and be an integral part of the United Nations Command delegation to any and all future sessions beginning 12 July.

Thereupon, Admiral Joy informed the Communist delegation that if, by tomorrow morning, newsmen are still unacceptable at the site of the conference, it is requested that we be informed by 7:30 a. m. tomorrow on what date it will be possible to resume the conference with newsmen present at the conference site.

Communications by liaison officers meeting at a half-way point between the Imjin River and Kaesong were agreed upon. At 7:30 a. m., 12 July, Col. J. C. Murray, in company with an interpreter, landed at the enemy outpost at Panmunjon to receive the answer of the enemy delegation. The spokesman of the enemy delegation was a captain of the North Korean Army who stated:

I have been instructed by our senior delegate to inform you formally with regard to the question of correspondents that we are in favor of having newsmen from both sides come to Kaesong at the opportune time.

When agreement is reached on our negotiations we shall welcome newsmen to come here to do their press coverage. We wish that we can state a definite date and we hope that such a date will arrive very soon, but this depends on the efforts made by both sides during the conference and cannot be determined by our side alone.

Colonel Murray replied:

On the assumption that you would not allow the conference to be delayed over the issue of admitting 20 newsmen to the conference area we placed our convoy on the road to arrive on time to prepare for the conference at 9 a. m. This convoy includes 20 newsmen. If you refuse the convoy permission to proceed, the officer in charge has been directed to return to our lines.

The convoy reached the enemy outpost at 8:37 a. m. An armed guard stopped the convoy and noted the presence of the accompanying newsmen. The Communist officer in charge refused to permit the convoy to proceed with correspondents as an integral part.

Captain McAllister, the convoy commander, stated that he would wait until 9:30 a. m., at which time, if his complete convoy, including the 20 newsmen, had not been passed, he would return

to the lines of the United Nations Command. At 9:30 a. m., the enemy outpost having received no additional instructions, the convoy returned to the positions of the United Nations forces.

Message to Vice Admiral Joy from the Chief Communist Delegate, July 13

Vice Admiral Joy, United States Navy.

"I have received your letter. The following is my answer:

1. We did not stop your group of delegates from coming to the meeting at 0746 12 July. Since we have not agreed concerning correspondents who had come along in the vehicles, naturally we could not allow them to come into the area of our meeting. It is without reason that your group of delegates refused to come to the meeting because of this.

2. Our opinion on the problem of news reporters and representatives of the press is that neither side's news reporters or news representatives can come into the area of the meeting until both sides have agreed.

3. We proposed that the meeting will be continued at 0900 today.

GENERAL NAM IL,

*Senior Delegate, Korean People's Army.
Chinese People's Volunteer Delegation.*

0600 13 July, 1951

U.N. Commander's Message to the Communist Delegates, July 13

General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief United Nations Forces, transmitted the following message over the Armed Forces Radio:

To Gen. KIM IL SUNG and Gen. PENG TEH-HUAI

In my initial message to you on 30 June I proposed that representatives meet aboard a Danish hospital ship. I suggested this site since it would have afforded equal freedom of access to both parties, including any elements such as newsmen associated with the party. It would have provided a completely neutral atmosphere free of the menacing presence of armed troops of either side. It would have provided equal communication facilities of all kinds.

Your reply to my message made no reference to my proposed meeting place. Instead you proposed Kaesong. In the interest of expediting the end of bloodshed and to demonstrate the good faith under which the United Nations Command was proceeding, I accepted Kaesong as the site for our discussion.

In so doing, I expected the conditions referred to above, vital to the success of any such discussion would be afforded at Kaesong. In order to provide further assurances that such conditions would

fact exist at the conference site, my liaison officers in their initial meeting with yours on 8 July proposed that a ten-mile-wide corridor centered on the Kumchon-Kaesong Munsan road and limited by Kumchon on the north and Munsan on the south be established as a neutral zone free of any hostile action by either party.

They further recommended that United Nations forces within this corridor remain south of an east-west line to the south edge of Kaesong while your forces within this corridor remained north of an east-west line to the north edge of Kaesong, leaving the town of Kaesong restricted entry only by those individuals in the delegation party.

Agreement on this proposal would have assured freedom of movement to both delegations to and from the meetings and within the town of Kaesong. However, your liaison officers declined to agree to this proposal, stating that it was not needed to ensure satisfactory conditions at the conference site for both delegations. To show good faith and avoid delay I accepted your assurances instead of my proposal to establish a neutral zone. Since the opening of the conference it has been evident that the equality of treatment so essential to the conduct of armistice negotiations is lacking. Since the first meeting at Kaesong your delegation has placed restrictions on movement of our delegation. It has subjected our personnel to the close proximity of your armed guard. It has delayed and blocked passage of our couriers. It has withheld its cooperation in establishment of 2-way communications with our base even though it agreed to do so immediately. It has refused admittance to the conference area certain personnel in our convoy which I desire and for whose conduct I stated I assumed full responsibility. Extension of the present recess and the delay in resuming the conference of our delegation is solely due to those unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions against which my representatives have repeatedly protested.

As pointed out to your representatives by Vice Admiral Joy, my personal representative in the first meeting of 10 July, the hope for success of these discussions rested upon the good faith of both sides. With good faith mutual confidence might be established, an atmosphere of truth created and the attainment of an honorable and enduring settlement brought measurably nearer.

The record of the United Nations Command delegation to date is open for world inspection. It establishes beyond any shadow of doubt their honorable intentions and good faith at every stage of the proceedings. With full and solemn realization of the vital importance of our conference to all the peoples of the world, the United Nations Command delegation is prepared to continue our discussions in the same spirit of good faith at any time that we receive assurance that your delegation will proceed in like spirit.

The assurances which I require are simple and few. They include as primary prerequisites the establishment of an agreed conference area of suitable extent completely free of armed personnel of either side. Each delegation must have complete reciprocity of treatment to include complete and equal freedom of movement to, from and within the agreed conference area and complete and equal freedom at all times in the selection of the personnel in its delegation party to include representatives of the press.

I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center approximately at the center of Kaesong and with a five-mile radius be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Panmunjon. I propose that we both agree to refrain from any hostile acts within this zone during the entire period of our conference. I propose that we agree that the area of the conference site and the roads leading there to use by personnel of both delegation parties be completely free of armed personnel.

I further propose we both agree that the total personnel of each delegation within the neutral area at any time be limited to a maximum of 150. I propose that we agree that the composition of each delegation party within the foregoing limits be subject solely to the determination of its commander. It is understood that personnel to be admitted to the actual conference chamber should be limited to those agreed upon by your representatives and mine.

If you agree to these proposals the present recess can be terminated and the conference resumed without delay and with some expectation of progress. Radio telephone is available to you for communication to me of your reply. If you prefer to send your reply by liaison officer I guarantee his safety within my lines during daylight providing you inform me of the time and route by which he will travel and the manner by which he may be identified.

Should you continue to insist that restrictions are necessary for our personal safety or for any other reason I propose that the conference site be moved to a locality which will afford the few simple assurances I have specified herein.

**Communist Delegates' Reply to the U.N.
Commander, July 14**

The following message was broadcast in English over the Peiping radio:

General RIDGWAY:

Your letter dated July 13 has been received. In order to eliminate misunderstanding and arguments over some side questions and to enable the work of peace negotiations to proceed smoothly, we agree to your proposal of fixing the Kaesong area as a neutral zone during the period of the meeting, and that both parties do not carry

out hostile acts of any kind within this area, and all armed personnel be excluded from the area of the meeting place and from the routes through which your delegation and our travel to the area of the meeting place. As to the size of the area of the meeting place and other related concrete questions, we propose that these be left to the delegations of both sides to settle at a single session.

With regard to the question of news reporters, which gave rise to the holding up of the meeting, this has nothing to do with the question of the fixing of a neutral zone. Your delegation never raised the question of fixing of a neutral zone after your liaison officers raised it once on July 8, but the task of the liaison officers was to discuss questions of detail. They had no power to discuss a question of this nature—a question of fixing a neutral zone.

The question of news reporters which gave rise to the present suspension of the meeting is a trifling one. It is not worth while suspending the meeting for this, much less is it worth breaking up the meeting for this. Your delegation had raised this question at the meeting. Our delegation at the time considered that the arrival of news reporters of various countries in Kaesong to be inappropriate, as the meeting had not yet achieved any result and even the agenda had not yet been passed. Thus on this question no agreement was reached.

We insist on the principle that all matters must be agreed upon by both sides before they can be executed. We hold that this principle is fair and irrefutable. Since agreement was not reached on the question of news reporters, your side should not one-sidedly and forcibly put it into operation.

For the sake of preventing the meeting from being suspended for a long time or broken up by this trifle, we now agree to your proposal: to include the 20 news reporters of your side as a part of the personnel of your delegation.

We have already ordered our delegation to provide facilities to your side on this question too.

KIM IL SUNG, Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army; PENG TEH-HUAI, Commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers.

JULY 14, 1951.

U.N. Communiqué Issued July 15

The third meeting of the Korean armistice negotiators convened at 2:09 p. m. today, Sunday, 15 July 1951 at the same conference site that has been used for the two previous meetings.

When the helicopters carrying the members of the United Nations Command delegation landed near the conference site, no North Korean or Chinese on guard were apparent.

Admiral Joy, who had traveled to Kaesong by jeep, took the initiative and opened the meeting.

He extended his regrets for being nine minutes late, but stated that the delay was occasioned by actions of sentries in holding up 2 one-quarter ton trucks (jeeps) of his convoy. The admiral's jeep and one other had gone ahead of the convoy in order to arrive at the conference at the scheduled time. Sentries delayed the admiral until the convoy closed. He further stated that he expected no repetition of such an event on the part of the Communist forces.

The senior members of the United Nations Command delegation then elaborated on certain details previously advanced in General Ridgway's message of 13 July and proposed that:

1. The road leading to the conference site of Kaesong shall be open to unrestricted use by vehicles of the United Nations Command delegation. No notice will be required for such movement.

2. The neutral area, five miles in radius, with traffic circle in Kaesong as its center, would contain no armed personnel except the minimum needed for military police purposes. Such personnel could be armed with small arms.

3. Any personnel required for security at the conference site would be unarmed. The conference site would be defined as an area having a radius of one-half mile centered on the conference house.

At 2:22 p. m., General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate, requested a 15-minute recess to discuss with his delegation Admiral Joy's proposals.

At the end of the recess General Nam Il agreed in principle and accepted the United Nations Command proposals. It was suggested and agreed upon, that it would be appropriate for the liaison officers of the two delegations to work out the minute details of establishing the neutral area of the conference.

Significant of the desires of both delegations to get on with the main work of the conference was the complete absence of any controversy over the arrangement for neutrality of the site. The delegation then proceeded for the remainder of the meeting to discuss agenda items.

Supplementary Announcement

During a meeting of the liaison officers, which immediately followed the negotiation session held between the United Nations Command delegation and the North Korean-Chinese delegation this afternoon at Kaesong, all of the proposals made by Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy relating to the neutrality of the zone for the discussion were reviewed.

No particular problems in implementing the provisions are anticipated and, for the most part, the proposals have already been placed into effect.

Colonel Chang, senior Communist liaison officer, appeared to be very anxious to resolve any future difficulties on a liaison officer level in order that the delegates might not be diverted.

Twenty-second Report Of U.N. Command Operations In Korea

FOR THE PERIOD MAY 16-31, 1951¹

N. doc. S/2217
Transmitted June 28, 1951

I herewith submit report No. 22 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 May, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 875-905, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

This twenty-second report records a battle cycle characteristic of the current Korean tactical operations, and records also the enemy's most costly reversal since the intervention in Korea of the Chinese Communist Armies in November of last year. The enemy launched the anticipated second phase of his spring offensive on 16 May, committing 21 Chinese Communist force divisions on the 5-mile front from Tokchong to Nodong. By 21 May, the attack had generally passed its climax as United Nations forces exacted heavy casualties at a relatively small cost to themselves. On 19 May a counterattack was launched by forces on the left of the United Nations line followed 2 days later by the counterattack of the remaining United Nations Forces on the right, thus initiating a powerful counteroffensive which, by the end of the month, had thrust the exhausted enemy forces northward 15 to 30 miles. The close of the period found enemy resistance stiffening, and the oppos-

ing forces arrayed in positions approximating those of 1 January, in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. The enemy suffered extremely heavy casualties, for the first time giving up large numbers of Chinese prisoners and losing substantial quantities of weapons and supplies.

The hostile effort was made in two major sectors. Six Chinese Communist force divisions attacked on a 25-mile front in the Yongyang-Kapyong sector in the western part of the front. Having penetrated to a line passing about 3 miles south of Masogu and Munye by 20 May, the enemy drive was contained and then converted into a retreat by counterattacking United Nations forces. Chinese Communist force units fought fairly strong delaying actions near Yongyang on May 24 and 25, and in the Chiam area, about 25 miles north of Munye, from 25-28 May.

The most desperate fighting of the Korean campaign developed in the east central part of the front, in the vicinity of Hange. Six Chinese Communist force divisions launched a powerful attack against strongly held United Nations lines on a 20-mile front to the north of that town, on 16 May. Though United Nations units were thrust southward about 12 miles by 22 May, combat elements equivalent to at least three enemy divisions were destroyed. The remainder of the attacking force was hurled back 18 miles to the 38th parallel. By 28 May, trapped enemy units were attempting to escape past the west end of the Hwachon Reservoir. In this action, the United States 2d Infantry Division and attached units including the French and Netherlands infantry battalions displayed extraordinary heroism, performing brilliantly against an enemy numerically vastly superior. Staunch resolution of these forces in face of great odds provided a major contribution to the success of United Nations forces.

In an eastward extension of the above action, three enemy divisions made a strong effort on a 12-mile front from Inje to Nodong, near the coast. In this sector, the enemy scored numerous penetrations in the United Nations lines, forcing a series of withdrawals which carried defending forces about 30 miles southward. The situation

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the acting U.S. representative to the Security Council on June 28. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the nineteenth report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the twentieth report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; and the twenty-first report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30.

stabilized by 22 May, a few miles to the north of Changdong and Hajinbu. In this action, fighting was particularly intense in the vicinity of Komsan, Changdong, and Kusung. However, the enemy's calamitous losses on other parts of the front completely neutralized this temporary success, and he resisted only moderately as the United Nations counteroffensive forced him back toward the 38th parallel.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally northeast from Munsan, along the Imjin River to Chongong, thence eastward through Hwachon to Inje, southeast to Sori, and northeast to Yongchon.

In spite of his severe losses, the enemy retains a strong potential for aggressive action, though he probably will require a minimum of several weeks to reorganize for another major effort. In addition to the 21 Chinese Communist forces and 9 north Korean divisions now in contact with United Nations Forces, there are 33 Chinese Communist forces and 14 north Korean divisions, or a total of 77 infantry divisions available to the enemy for further operations. Of the 15 Chinese Communist force divisions which undertook the main burden of the offensive, at least 8 suffered so heavily that they will require an extended period for reorganization. Though these losses constitute a serious depletion of enemy strength, they are not such as to preclude future offensive operations.

Guerrilla activities continued at a minimum during the period, and were mainly confined to foraging, and to small scale defensive actions, as United Nations Security units sought out dissident bands.

United Nations naval forces continued the constant patrol and reconnaissance operations which throughout the Korean war have so effectively denied to the enemy the use of Korean waters and assured the unrestricted movement of United Nations shipping to and from Korea.

Carrier based and Marine shore based aircraft directed the principal weight of their effort to close support of United Nations ground forces, as the enemy's renewed offensive reached its high water mark and began to recede. These operations resulted in heavy losses to the enemy.

United Nations surface units and carrier based aircraft continued a coordinated program of interdiction of enemy railroads and highways in northeastern Korea, with the naval gunfire phase of this program concentrated largely in the Wonsan-Songjin-Chongjin areas. Similar interdiction operations were conducted on the west coast, particularly in the Chinnampo area and along the Seoul-Pyongyang axis.

During the period of this report, surface units were active in providing gunfire support to United Nations ground units on the east coast of Korea.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea, mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment. Drifting mines continued to be sighted and destroyed in substantial numbers.

The heaviest night air attacks of the war were unleashed during the fortnight by United States Far East Air Force medium and light bombers ranging the entire battlefield. Employing radar techniques, the bombers have delivered hundreds of tons of explosives upon the advancing enemy masses with an accuracy comparable to that attained in visual bombing. Temporarily diverted from the role of interdiction, the bombers have imposed severe losses upon the enemy forces as they renewed their Spring offensive. Additional night sorties by light bombers and fighters concentrated upon transport attempting to sustain the enemy's drive.

Incessant daylight attacks by United States Air Force, United States Marine, and South African planes exacted huge tolls by strafing, napalming, and bombing. Ground observers advancing with counter-attacking United Nations forces report thousands upon thousands of enemy killed by air action. In one single smashing attack, 16 pilots of the 27th Fighter Wing inflicted over 700 casualties and destroyed 50 vehicles near Inje.

Airfields, supply dumps, bridges, and tunnels were repeatedly struck by all types of combat aircraft, though enemy personnel in the immediate battle zone constituted the primary target while their attack was being repulsed and the United Nations counterattack being developed successfully.

Rain and low clouds reduced the number of sorties on many days but contributed to the effectiveness of some attacks by permitting surprise attacks upon an enemy relying upon cloud cover to conceal his movements and to ground United Nations aircraft.

Reconstruction of airfields in hostile territory receives much attention, but other than at Sinuiju no effort to utilize these fields has been revealed. Pyongyang is the site of a unique attempt to develop an airfield in the center of the city by using a widened avenue as an air strip and adjacent streets as taxiways to dispersal areas and revetments.

Air conflicts were relatively few. However, in aerial combat, United Nations Air Forces are increasing their extremely favorable proportion of heavy enemy losses to negligible friendly losses.

Air lift and air drop operations by the United States 315th Air Division continued their material contribution to the success of United Nations ground successes.

Exemplifying the importance of the interdiction program to the United Nations is the tremendous effort of the north Koreans and Chinese to maintain river crossings over the Chong-Chor River one and one half miles north of Sinuiju. At the time the north Korean Army invaded South Korea, the river was spanned at this point by a rail bridge and a highway bridge, each about 3,500 feet long. Preliminary work had been completed upon another rail bridge.

Other than during the freeze-over period in midwinter when the crossings have little significance as a choke point, this bridge complex has been neutralized repeatedly as United Nations air power has countered reconstruction and by-passing activities. In addition to attempted repair of the existing spans, the enemy has undertaken to maintain two temporary bridge bypasses and two ferry crossings despite repeated disruptive attacks by United Nations air.

There remains a void of reliable information concerning United Nations soldiers who have fallen into the hands of the enemy. In spite of their statements to the United Nations, the enemy has deliberately ignored the provisions of the Geneva convention, which require that a civilized nation provide for the safety of, and render reliable reports on, prisoners of war who fall into their hands. Reports which have already been submitted describe the atrocities to which captured United Nations soldiers have been subjected. The atrocities are attested by both photographs and documents in the files of the United Nations Command. The aggressors have furnished no information on United Nations prisoners to the International Committee of the Red Cross, or to any official intermediary recognized by the United Nations, except for two short incomplete lists. Instead, the enemy has consistently pursued a maliciously misleading program wherein highly colored propaganda has been substituted for the official, confirmed data required by the Geneva convention. The International Red Cross has tried but has not been permitted to establish liaison with United Nations prisoners held by the communists, or to carry out other services usually provided by the Red Cross organization.

The United Nations Command has endeavored to inform the enemy soldier in Korea of the frightful, but fruitless, sacrifice of human life caused by their Communist masters. By leaflets and loud-speaker broadcasts there is pointed out to him the opportunity to escape the Communist-created holocaust by electing surrender as an honorable alternative. United Nations radio broadcasts continue to keep the Korean people accurately informed on the course of the war.

Heavy Communist losses during the winter and spring have been followed by malicious Communist propaganda alleging that United Nations forces have resorted to bacteriological and chemical warfare. These charges are wholly groundless and manifestly absurd. But it has been definitely established that not only the enemy's armies, but also the civilian population under their domination, have suffered terrible losses to disease because of the lack of basic preventive and curative measures. By depriving the civilians of their normal food stocks, the Chinese and North Korean masters have aggravated the effects of communicable disease; by providing virtually no medical care, they alone bear the guilt of wanton and human neglect.

July 23, 1951

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2171, May 28; S/2177, May 31; S/2187, June 6; S/2189, June 8; S/2190, June 11; S/2192, June 11; S/2195, June 13; S/2196, June 13; S/2198, June 15; S/2199, June 15; S/2200, June 19; S/2205, June 20; S/2206, June 20; S/2208, June 21; S/2209, June 22; S/2210, June 25; S/2214, June 27; S/2215, June 27; S/2222, June 29; S/2223, July 2; S/2224, July 2.

Merwin L. Bohan Named to U.S.-Brazil Joint Commission

The Department of State announced on June 12 that the position of U. S. Member on the United States-Brazil Joint Commission for Economic Development under the Point Four Program left vacant by the sudden and unfortunate death of Francis Adams Truslow will be filled by Merwin L. Bohan until a new appointment is made by President Harry S. Truman.

The Joint Commission was established, as part of the Point Four Program, by an agreement made on December 19, 1950, between the Governments of Brazil and the United States. Mr. Truslow was named the American member and Mr. Ary Frederico Torres, prominent São Paulo businessman, the Brazilian member. Staffs of advisers to the two members are being provided by the respective Governments. It is anticipated that the Joint Commission will commence its work immediately upon the arrival in Brazil of Mr. Bohan who plans to leave for Rio de Janeiro by air shortly.

The purpose of the Joint Commission is to study the development needs of Brazil and make recommendations for development and improvement in specific fields, particularly transportation, electric power, food and agriculture, and minerals.

Mr. Bohan, U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, has had many years of experience in Latin American economic development projects. He was chief of the U.S. Economic Mission to Bolivia in 1941-42 which laid out a broad economic development program which is still being followed in that country. He was appointed to the Council with the personal rank of Ambassador in March of this year.

Mr. Truslow, who resigned as President of the New York Curb Exchange and was appointed U.S. Member of the Joint Commission by the President in May of this year, died July 8 at sea while en route to Rio de Janeiro.

The United States in the United Nations

[July 13-19, 1951]

General Assembly

General Assembly Resolution 500 (V)—“Additional Measures To Be Employed To Meet The Aggression In Korea”—A report issued by the United Nations Secretariat, July 12, 1951, contains 55 communications received from governments (43 Member States and 12 non-Member States) concerning the implementation of the United Nations embargo resolution adopted May 18, 1951, against the Communist aggressors in Korea—the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities.

The following 34 Members advised that they were complying fully with the resolution requirements: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. The Governments of Ecuador and Mexico advised that special consideration was being given to the matter. Burma and India, whose governments abstained from voting on the resolution, advised that the strategic items on the prohibited list were in short supply in their own countries and had to be imported from abroad, and that therefore their use was strictly controlled and re-export prohibited.

The United Nations members comprising the Soviet bloc stated that the resolution was “illegal” and therefore they would not give consideration to its recommendations. Three other satellite, non-member countries—Albania, Hungary, and Rumania—replied similarly.

Communications from the following nine non-Members stated that their governments were either giving the matter favorable consideration or were unanimously supporting the resolution: Austria, Cambodia, Finland, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Jordan, Laos, Spain, and Vietnam.

The Secretariat will issue subsequent reports upon receipt of additional communications.

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)—The Department of State and the Department of Defense announced on July 18, 1951, that

an agreement has been concluded between the United States Government, acting in its capacity as Unified Command pursuant to resolutions of the United Nations, and Mr. J. Donald Kingsley, Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, governing the relationships in Korea of the United Nations Command and the UNKRA during the present phase.

While active hostilities continue, the U.N. Command will have sole responsibility for all relief and short-term economic aid essential to the military operations. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation operations when the military situation permits this responsibility to be relinquished by the United Nations Command. In the meantime UNKRA will expand its present staff in Korea to prepare for its full-scale operations, will render technical advice and assistance to the Korean Government, will plan for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction, and will carry out any program of economic aid in addition to the program of the United Nations Command which may be found feasible. The plans and activities of the UNKRA staff will be closely coordinated with the work in the relief field of the United Nations Command.

This agreement is designed to introduce the UNKRA into the relief operation as it progresses in order to make the eventual transfer of responsibility as smooth as possible, while preserving the integrity of General Ridgway's military command during hostilities.

Collective Measures Committee (CMC)—The committee held its fifth meeting on July 17. The chairman, Ambassador Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil), pointed to the current armistice negotiation in Kaesong and said that if a satisfactory agreement on Korea could be reached it would mark the first time an attempt to enforce peace by collective measures would have been achieved. At the same time, he warned that any relaxation of efforts now in the direction of collective measures would invite further aggression. He described the number of replies that had been received in connection with implementation of paragraph of the “Uniting for Peace” resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950.

The Secretary-General on June 25 distributed to the members of the General Assembly copies of ten replies and four acknowledgments that had been received as of that date in answer to the

letter he sent to all members, April 16, 1951, at the request of the Cmc. This letter called attention to paragraphs 8 and 9 of section C of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which states:

8. RECOMMENDS to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. INVITES the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

The communications were received from Canada, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Norway, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and the United States; the acknowledgments were from China, Luxembourg, Mexico, and the Union of South Africa.

Subsequent communications have since been received by the Secretary-General from Brazil, Greece, Philippines, New Zealand, and Yugoslavia. Mr. Joseph Nisot (Belgium) and Mr. K. C. O. Shann (Australia) advised the Collective Measures Committee that replies from their Governments would be forthcoming shortly.

Canada, France, United Kingdom, and the United States replied that their respective armed forces serving under the United Nations Unified Command in Korea and their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty were considered as fulfilling at this time the purposes of the General Assembly recommendations in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. These countries further stated that their Governments would keep this matter under constant review in the light of changing circumstances and in furtherance of the policy of the United Nations to build up an effective collective security system. Canada stated that its unit in Korea has been established under legislation providing for a permanent Canadian force available for service under appropriate United Nations recommendations. Norway advised that in addition to the unit placed at the disposal of the NATO has "decided to designate a unit of battalion strength as an additional Norwegian contribution to the forces at the disposal of the United Nations for collective action at the call of the General Assembly or the Security Council." New Zealand stated, "If in any future case the United Nations should again call upon Member States to make armed forces available, the New Zealand Government would make every effort to comply with such request as they have done in the Korean case."

The Philippines advised, "The status of the contingent of Philippine armed forces now serving in Korea is subject to further consideration by the appropriate organs of the Philippine Government in accordance with the developing system of collective security under the United Nations."

Brazil noted that "it will do its utmost to maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could be made available in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, . . ."

Greece stated, "The Greek Government is now in principle resolved that, even after the termination of the war in Korea, it will maintain in readiness a military force in any case not inferior to that at present serving in Korea . . . with a view to an immediate availability for service on the recommendation of the Security Council or the General Assembly."

Yugoslavia advised that because it must guard its frontiers against pressure by the Soviet Union and its satellites, it cannot earmark forces for service to the United Nations. Guatemala, Honduras, India, and Pakistan advised that they were unable to make available any armed forces to the United Nations.

Mr. Harding F. Bancroft, the United States Deputy Representative on the Collective Measures Committee proposed the establishment of a Subcommittee on Military Measures, whose task it would be to discuss methods, procedures, and arrangements which could be used by Member States for utilization of their armed forces as envisaged in section C of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. This, Mr. Bancroft stated, would ensure streamlining the procedures whereby United Nations Members could bring their strength to bear against an aggressor. The Subcommittee would deal with the collation of offers as well as with methods for coordinating military measures and general guidance for the Panel of Military Experts. The Committee also approved the composition of the Subcommittee as proposed by Mr. K. C. O. Shann (Australia), namely, Brazil, France, Philippines, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. Ambassador Muniz (Brazil) to act as Chairman.

The Committee approved (13-0-1, Egypt), with a few changes, the report of the working group on the general functions of the Panel of Military Experts, and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions was directed to consider the financing aspects as broadly as possible.

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Unity of Western Europe—Essential for World Security

*By General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe¹*

One hundred seventy-five years ago, the founding fathers of the American Republic declared their independence of the British Crown. Little could they have known—in the heat and bitterness of the hour—that the severance, accomplished in passion, would through the years flower into an alliance of such fitness and worth that it was never recorded on legal parchment, but in the hearts of our two peoples. The bond that joins us—stronger than blood lines, than common tongue and common law—is the fundamental conviction that man was created to be free, that he can be trusted with freedom, that governments have as a primary function the protection of his freedom.

In the scale of values of the English-speaking people, freedom is the first and most precious right. Without it, no other right can be exercised, and human existence loses all significance. This unity of ours in fundamentals is an international fact. Yet on more than one occasion, it has been obscured in Britain and in my own country by concern with trifles and small disputes, fanned into the flames of senseless antagonisms.

Serious differences in conviction must be beaten out on the anvil of logic and justice. But scarcely need they be dragged into the public forum, in the petty hope of capturing a fleeting local acclaim, at the expense of an absent partner! There are men in this room with whom, in World War II, I had arguments, hotly sustained and of long duration. Had all these been headlined in the press of our two countries, they could have created public bitterness, confusing our peoples in the midst of our joint effort. Decisions were reached without such calamitous results, because those at odds did not find it necessary to seek justification for their personal views in a public hue and cry. Incidentally, a more personal reason for this expression of satisfaction is a later conclusion that my own posi-

tion in the arguments was not always right. In any case, may we never forget that our common devotion to deep human values and our mutual trust are the bedrock of our joint strength.

In that spirit our countries are joined with the peoples of Western Europe and the North Atlantic to defend the freedoms of Western civilization. Opposed to us—cold and forbidding—is an ideological front that marshals every weapon in the arsenal of dictatorship. Subversion, propaganda, deceit, and the threat of naked force are daily hurled against us and our friends in a globe-encircling, relentless campaign.

We earnestly hope that the call for a truce in Korea marks a change in attitude. If such a welcome development does occur, the brave men of the United Nations forces did much to bring it about. We entered the conflict one year ago, resolved that aggression against free and friendly South Korea would not be tolerated. Certain of the nations furnishing forces had heavy demands elsewhere, including postwar reconstruction at home. Nevertheless, every contingent added evidence of the solidarity and firmness of the free nations in giving an object lesson to aggression. Our success in this difficult and distant operation reflects the fortitude of the Allied troops and the leadership that guided them.

Realism and Might Against Communism

The stand in Korea should serve notice in this area, as well as in the Far East, that we will resist aggression with all the force at our command. Our effort to provide security against the possibility of another and even greater emergency—an emergency which will never be of our making—must go forward with the same resolution and courage that has characterized our Korean forces. The member nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need not fear the future or any Communistic threat if we are alert, realistic,

¹ Notes for address made before the English Speaking Union at London on July 3 and released to the press by SHAPE on the same date.

and resolute. Our community possesses a potential might that far surpasses the sinister forces of slave camps and chained millions. But to achieve the serenity and the confidence that our potential can provide, we must press forward with the mobilization of our spiritual and intellectual strength; we must develop promptly the material force that will assure the safety of our friends upon the continent and the security of the free world.

This is the challenge of our times that, until satisfactorily met, establishes priorities in all our thoughts, our work, our sacrifices. The hand of the aggressor is stayed by strength—and strength alone!

Although the security of each of us is bound up in the safety of all of us, the immediate threat is most keenly felt by our partners in Europe. Half the continent is already within the monolithic mass of totalitarianism. The drawn and haunted faces in the docks of the purge courts are grim evidence of what Communistic domination means. It is clearly necessary that we quickly develop maximum strength within free Europe itself. Our own interests demand it.

It is a truism that where, among partners, strength is demanded in its fullness, unity is the first requisite. Without unity, the effort becomes less powerful in application, less decisive in result. This fact has special application in Europe. It would be difficult indeed to overstate the benefits, in these years of stress and tension, that would accrue to NATO if the free nations of Europe were truly a unit.

But in that vital region, history, custom, language, and prejudice have combined to hamper integration. Progress has been and is hobbled by a web of customs barriers interlaced with bilateral agreements, multilateral cartels, local shortages, and economic monstrosities. How tragic! Free men, facing the spectre of political bondage, are crippled by artificial bonds that they themselves have forged, and they alone can loosen! Here is a task to challenge the efforts of the wisest statesmen, the best economists, the most brilliant diplomats.

European leaders, seeking a sound and wise solution, are spurred by the vision of a man at this table—a man of inspiring courage in dark hours, of wise counsel in grave decisions. Winston Churchill's plea for a united Europe can yet bear such greatness of fruit that it may well be remembered as the most notable achievement of a career marked by achievement.

The difficulties of integrating Western Europe of course appear staggering to those who live by ritual. But great majorities in Europe earnestly want liberty, peace, and the opportunity to pass on to their children the fair lands and the culture of Western Europe. They deserve, at the very least, a fair chance to work together for the com-

mon purpose, freed of the costly encumbrances they are now compelled to carry.

Europe cannot attain the towering material stature possible to its peoples' skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork territorial fences. They foster localized instead of common interest. They pyramid every cost with middlemen, tariffs, taxes, and overheads. Barred, absolutely, are the efficient division of labor and resources and the easy flow of trade. In the political field, these barriers promote distrust and suspicion. They serve vested interests at the expense of peoples and prevent truly concerted action for Europe's own and obvious good.

This is not to say that, as a Commander, I have found anything but ready cooperation among the Governments of Western Europe. Time and again, I have saluted from my heart the spirit of their armed services—of officers and men alike—from the mountains of Italy to the fjords of Norway, from Normandy to the Curtain. Within political circles, I have found statesmen eager to assure the success of their current defense programs. I have no doubts as to the capacity of NATO to surmount even the formidable obstacles imposed upon us by the political facts of present day Europe. Yet with the handicaps of enforced division, it is clear that even the minimum essential security effort will seriously strain the resources of Europe. We ignore this danger at our peril since the effects of economic failure would be disastrous upon spiritual and material strength alike. True security never rests upon the shoulders of men denied a decent present and the hope of a better future.

Security in Achievement of Unity

But with unity achieved, Europe could build adequate security and, at the same time, continue the march of human betterment that has characterized Western civilization. Once united, the farms and factories of France and Belgium, the foundries of Germany, the rich farmlands of Holland and Denmark, the skilled labor of Italy, will produce miracles for the common good. In such unity is a secure future for these peoples. It would mean early independence of aid from America and other Atlantic countries. The coffers, mines, and factories of that continent are not inexhaustible. Dependence upon them must be minimized by the maximum in cooperative effort. The establishment of a workable European federation would go far to create confidence among people everywhere that Europe was doing its full and vital share in giving this cooperation.

Any soldier contemplating this problem would be moved to express an opinion that it cannot be attacked successfully by slow infiltration, but only by direct and decisive assault, with all available means.

The project faces the deadly danger of procrastination, timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages. Granted that the bars of tradition and habit are numerous and stout, the greatest bars to this, as to any human enterprise, lie in the minds of men themselves. The negative is always the easy side, since it holds that nothing should be done. The negative is happy in lethargy, contemplating, almost with complacent satisfaction, the difficulties of any other course. But difficulties are often of such slight substance that they fade into nothing at the first sign of success. If obstacles are of greater consequence, they can always be overcome when they *must* be overcome. And which of these obstacles could be so important as peace, security, and prosperity for Europe's populations? Could we not help? We, the peoples of the British Commonwealth and of the United States, have profited by unity at home. If, with our moral and material assistance, the free European nations could attain a similar integration, our friends would be strengthened, our own economies improved, and the laborious NATO machinery of mutual defense vastly simplified.

A solid, healthy, confident Europe would be the greatest possible boon to the functioning and objectives of the Atlantic Pact.

But granting that we cannot reach maximum security without a united Europe, let us by no means neglect what is within our immediate grasp or deprecate the achievements already attained.

From Figures to Reality

Look back, I ask you, over a space of 2 years only. Consider the dangerous level to which morale and defensive strength had descended: the despairing counsel of neutralism, appeasement, and defeatism that then existed. Against such a backdrop, the accomplishments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are magnificently manifest. We are joined together in purpose and growing determination; we know the danger, we have defined our goals. Each day we make headway. The basic economies of European nations are on the upswing: the chaos and floundering of the postwar years are definitely behind. The international forces of Atlantic defense are no longer merely figures on paper; the international organization is no longer a headquarters without troops. The forces—ground, naval, and air—are assembling. They are training together and the spirit of mutual respect and cooperation that marks their joint maneuvers is heartening and encouraging. Still far too few in numbers and short of equipment, their ranks are filling; machines and weapons reach them in a steady stream. The military and political leaders of the participating nations no longer slowly feel their

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way forward in an endeavor without guiding precedent. Caution that is inescapable in a new and unique enterprise has been replaced by confidence born out of obstacles overcome. The Allied Powers in Europe are constituting a team for defense, one capable of assuring a lasting and secure peace.

The winning of freedom is not to be compared to the winning of a game—with the victory recorded forever in history. Freedom has its life in the heart, the actions, the spirit of men, and so it must be daily earned and refreshed—else like a flower cut from its life-giving roots, it will wither and die.

All of us have pledged our word, one to the other, that this shall not be. We have cut the pattern for our effort—we are devoting to it available resources for its realization. We fight not only our own battle—we are defending for all mankind those things that allow personal dignity to the least of us—those things that permit each to believe himself important in the eyes of God. We are preserving opportunity for men to lift up their hearts and minds to the highest places—there must be no stragglers in such a conflict.

The road ahead may be long—it is certain to be marked by critical and difficult passages. But if we march together, endure together, share together, we shall succeed—we shall *gloriously* succeed together!

U.K. Offers Aid to Flood Victims

[Released to the press July 19]

The following note was delivered to the Department of State today by the British Embassy:

His Majesty's Ambassador for the United Kingdom presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that he has been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inquire whether there is any aid which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the British people can give to those who have been afflicted by the disastrous fires and floods which have recently occurred in the States of Kansas and Missouri. Sir Oliver Franks would be grateful if Mr. Acheson would let him know what suggestions the United States Administration wish him to transmit to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
19th July, 1951.

The Department is deeply gratified by this token of friendship by the Government and people of the United Kingdom for those afflicted by fires and floods in Kansas and Missouri. The Department is exploring suggestions which may be made to this generous offer of aid.

Touring the Border¹

By W. J. Caldwell

The sleepy Bavarian hamlet of Moedlareuth typifies the results of the Communist doctrine of divide . . . and utter confusion.

There, as in many other communities lying astride the Iron Curtain which wraps snake-like around miles of Bavaria's twisting northern and eastern frontiers, the demarcation line between East and West lies flush in the center of town.

Citizens of Moedlareuth tell you that having the home town split in two with a forbidden wall to keep lifelong neighbors and friends apart is no joke. One man living on the Bavarian side of town hadn't visited his brother, a resident of the Soviet half of the town, for more than 18 months despite the fact they live only a stone's throw apart. Countless others experience similar family splits. But many, with a sly wink, admit that Russian vigilance has not prevented an occasional "sneak" journey across the border.

"A community of two nations," grunted one leathery-faced native as he leaned on his cane on the Bavarian side of town.

"Yah," sighed a peasant woman as she snatched up an unwary child of three toddling in the direction of the unpainted fence which marked the zonal dividing line, "two nations side by side—but so distant."

Moedlareuth was a typical German farming community situated partly in the county of Hof, in the extreme northeast corner of Bavaria, until that fateful day when the Russians put up the fence in the middle of the village. The half which the Soviets claimed lies in adjacent Thuringia. That original barrier, which follows the course of a small stream which forms the state border, was later made more impenetrable by the Soviets. They dug a trench parallel to the fence and then

added another wooden fence as a triple deterrent to East-West relations. Reinforcement of the Iron Curtain at that point followed swiftly on the heels of two Curtain-defying incidents.

A young Bavarian, on the day of his wedding, wanted to celebrate the nuptial occasion by publicly flaunting the Soviets. He brazenly drove his car across Moedlareuth's main street, smashing the fence to a splintered loop, and then driving triumphantly back through another section of the wavering Curtain to western safety.

The second Iron Curtain-busting incident which prompted the three-layer border barrier involved a trucking company whose owner decided it was healthier to go west. Mobilizing his fleet of trucks and tractors, he convoyed the rumbling exodus across town, through the hapless wooden barrier, to a safe haven on the Bavarian side.

Moedlareuth as a whole comprises approximately 210 natives and some 50 houses, many dating back centuries. The Bavarian side of town was left without a school, a store, a post office and a community well by the Soviet's decision to partition the community. Fortunately, one enterprising woman on the Bavarian side of town had, with true womanly intuition, opened a tiny shop in her home which served bottled beer. Her foresight saved the Bavarian side from a complete drought.

William G. Keen of Chattanooga, Tenn., U.S. resident officer of county Hof, said the Soviet-inspired division had created quite a problem for the hamlet's Bavarian citizens.

"In normal times," 38-year-old Keen drawled, "the kids on the Bavarian side of town merely crossed the road into Thuringia and in a matter of minutes were in school. The school is now barred to them so they have to walk two miles to the nearest Bavarian school at Toepen. There was also the mail problem. At first the Bavarian residents were able to walk to the Soviet border and have their mail handed to them over the fence. But the Russians stopped that, so now mail has to be routed to them from Toepen, the closest Bavarian village having a post office."

¹ This article, reprinted from the June issue of the *Hrcog Information Bulletin*, is an account of a tour of Bavaria's northern and eastern borders, overlooking the Soviet Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, made in May by 20 press, radio, magazine, and newsreel correspondents. The tour, arranged by the Public Relations Division, Hrcog, enabled them to observe first-hand how people live and work within the shadows of the Iron Curtain.

The likable resident officer said the community's water well posed one of the greatest problems. The more daring Bavarians have sneaked across the border at night for their pail of water. But it's risky. One hapless woman, wife of a Bavarian border policeman, was apprehended by a Soviet one so-called "People's Police" as she was kneeling by the forbidden well. Her captors drove her 10 miles to Soviet headquarters, where she was thoroughly grilled. She later was released but had to walk back. The Bavarian side of town now is building its own well to avoid the risk of more serious consequences befalling its citizens.

It was mid-afternoon when we drove into Moedlareuth and the streets on both sides of the frontier were deserted except for two "People's Police" guarding the Soviet side of the barrier. Our arrival attracted natives from both sides of town. On the Soviet side, a score of men, women and children gathered near the barrier. They waved and exchanged pleasantries, seeming not to mind the two rifle-toting "People's Police." Shortly after we reached the town, the two "People's Police" hurried to a field telephone and minutes later more than a dozen "People's Police" reinforcements arrived from various directions. They clustered in a group 200 feet from where we stood.

A chicken pecked its way across the churned up border and just as nonchalantly returned over the no-man's strip. Citizens on the Soviet side watched with envy.

We had been at the border about an hour when a warning whisper was hissed among the Eastern onlookers that "the Russians are coming." Frantic mothers on the eastern side of the border grabbed their offspring and together with their menfolk fled into their houses. Within seconds the Soviet part of Moedlareuth was deserted except for the gaping "People's Police." On the Bavarian side of town, the citizens remained unperturbed. They smiled, joked and seemed to say, "Gosh, ain't freedom wonderful."

A cloud of dust rose from the nearby hill where the Russian soldiers reportedly were on guard. The dust cloud moved rapidly closer and then from it emerged a battered German-army "jeep" of World War II vintage. The lumbering vehicle, manned by two uniformed "People's Police," rumbled over the dirt road toward us and then about 25 feet away it followed the road which runs parallel to the zonal boundary. The vehicle skidded to a stop by the group of "People's Police," but nothing more happened. The border guards continued to stare at us until we finally departed.²

Moedlareuth is just one of many towns straddling the zonal border which have been halved by

the Soviets' zonal policy. At towns lying partly in Bavaria and partly in Czechoslovakia, Communist officials have created a barren no-man's buffer corridor by demolishing houses on their side of the frontier. The unfortunate occupants were obliged to find shelter elsewhere.

Resident Officer Keen pointed to border police statistics to show how ineffective the Communist zonal policy is. The illegal border traffic is one-sided all along the Iron Curtain frontier, with many times more Easterners seeking to enter the western zones of Germany.

"The Easterners," the resident officer pointed out, "risk death, slave labor or other primitive forms of punishment to escape to the West. Many of them bring stories which would make your hair curl. Still others, with families in the East whom they don't dare desert through fear of Soviet reprisals, slip across the border merely to visit relatives and friends, to get a square meal or to purchase other necessities of life unavailable or beyond reach of their pocketbooks in the Soviet Zone."

Mr. Keen was quick to admit that the people living in the Hof area, as in other border counties, have their problems—mainly housing, unemployment, a steady influx of refugees, the flight of industry westward, the acquirement of needed raw materials for the border area's manifold industries, and new markets for the finished goods.

"Being human," he said, "many of the citizens complain—some probably too much. But on the whole the people seem thankful they are free and have been given the opportunity, mainly through American financial aid, to better their living conditions. The Marshall Plan was a big factor in restoring self-confidence. It helped show them democracy is not just talk, but cooperative action."

While many Bavarians complain of the drain on their economy from the refugees, some are well aware of the contributions these refugees have made in bringing new industries to their area. The Neuerer porcelain factory in Hof is a good example. This world-famous concern, one of many border factories visited by the correspondents, formerly was located in Czechoslovakia. It moved west and in addition to providing employment for hundreds of Hof workers, it is now earning much-needed dollars for the West German economy by exporting the bulk of its products to the United States.

The correspondents visited three Bavarian border areas—Hof, Coburg and Passau—and in each there was one postwar problem most frequently voiced. Creation of the Iron Curtain along the border had caused a major trade dislocation, since in normal times the bulk of commercial relations these areas had were with the East. Coal and other raw materials had been obtained cheaply from nearby Czechoslovakia and other countries now behind the Iron Curtain. And the finished products formerly were marketed in the East.

² Ten minutes after the correspondents departed, a detail of approximately 50 armed Russian soldiers arrived at the border town but there was no incident.

Today, except for authorized crossing-points, roads and railroad lines connecting Bavaria with her eastern markets have been blocked off at the border. Consequently, manufacturers have had to turn west—getting coal from the more distant Ruhr and seeking markets in far-off western European countries and the United States.

Hans Peter Thomsen of Madison, Wis., resident officer in the counties of Coburg and Neustadt since last August, said this problem is especially acute in Coburg, which jets peninsula-like into the Soviet Zone. The county is rimmed by the Iron Curtain on the west, north and east, forcing traffic to follow a 90-degree route between Coburg and western Europe.

It greatly increases the operating costs of Coburg's manufacturers, making it difficult for the area's businesses, which comprise small industrial enterprises producing mainly toys, ceramics, chinaware, furniture, electric cables and Christmas tree ornaments, and 5,000 small farms, to compete on the world's free markets. This is one reason why unemployment in the Coburg area is higher than the over-all Bavarian average. Generally speaking, the people living on Bavaria's borders facing Communist-dominated lands are trying to make the best of their lot. Roads linking them with the west are being repaired and new ones built, and housing slowly but resolutely is being provided in most areas to accommodate workers seeking employment in old and new industries.

In some border communities, which in prewar days attracted tourists from far and wide, the local officials have been more reluctant about marring their beautiful landscape with smoke and soot-erupting factories. Passau, which faces Austria and where William J. Garlock of Bloomfield, N. J., serves as resident officer, has launched a large power project as an economy aid. However, many of Passau's leading citizens still frown on industries which they fear would deter future tourist trade when life there once more becomes normal.

All along the border, the problem of training youth for democratic living was heard. The Communist-dominated youth movement (FbJ) in the Soviet Zone of Germany, freely financed by the Communist Party, is making a determined effort to convert Bavarian youth to their cause. The highly-regimented FbJers have made surprisingly few inroads on Bavarian youth, however, despite the impetus a movement of their kind normally receives when substandard economic conditions and widespread unemployment exist.

The anti-Communist youth movement in the border areas generally has received less financial support from local government officials, but their unregimented organization has grown—a growth which many observers attribute in part to the proximity of Communism itself. The Bavarian youth, like their elders, don't have to be told about the evils of a Communist state. Stories recounted

by refugees of life under Red rule has been convincing proof for most of the youth that while conditions in their own Bavarian communities may be bad, their life still is a paradise to that in the East.

Hicog, through its resident officers, and U.S. Military authorities are working hand in glove with Bavarian officials to maximize work and play opportunities for Bavarian youth. In Coburg, for instance, a youth home was established in the summer of 1950 through the joint efforts and cooperation of local Bavarian authorities, Hicog and the U.S. Army.

The Hof area, as part of its energetic youth program, has completed plans for an international youth forum and camp on the border—one of many such activities planned this summer to promote greater understanding with other nations and to provide, for the benefit of the East zone, an example of unregimented youth activity.

The U.S. resident officer—the American Government's so-called "grass-roots ambassador"—deserves much of the credit for introducing the western brand of democracy to a people who, geographically, are exposed to Eastern influences.

Only a person who has never taken the trouble to observe the resident officer in action can doubt the vital role he is playing in postwar Germany. His job is a round-the-clock one, with endless conferences, meetings and discussions with local officials and citizenry representing all facets of community life.

Sandwiched into his never-ending schedule of activities are the many problems the resident officer is expected to solve—a controversy stemming from a hunting incident involving a member of the Allied governments stationed in Germany, liaison between American and German officials on a project affecting the interests of both nations, engineering Hicog's exchanges program at the county level, answering questions or providing information in defense of Western democratic concepts and principles. These are just a few of the jobs which daily demand of the resident officer Solomon-like judgment, wisdom, and discretion.

Traditional rivalry between city and county government officials in Coburg—a rivalry which existed long before 1920 when Coburg, the ancestral home of the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, ceased its historic role as a duchy and was incorporated into the Bavarian state—had retarded community cooperation. This condition was further heightened by the fact that the Coburg area politically leans toward two extremes—right and left.

Resident Officer Thomsen sensed this rivalry shortly after he took up his post there. He investigated, analyzed the situation, consulted the more open-minded community leaders, and then took some positive steps. Mr. Thomsen intensified Hicog's educational program by organizing youth forums and discussion groups. In the field of

adult education he induced the adult people's school (*Volkshochschule*) to institute a series of lectures, conducted by elected city and county officials of the area, on local civic affairs, explaining that "this development is significant if you will bear in mind the traditional philosophy of the government official—namely, to govern." Mr. Thomsen said of the lectures: "Slowly but surely, the concept of the public official as a public servant, responsible to the citizens of his community, is taking root."

Mr. Thomsen succeeded in getting the citizens interested in problems pertaining to their particular fields, but bringing them together to tackle problems on a community-wide basis was another thing. Public officials were reluctant to look at the over-all welfare of the community. Coburg city officials, the majority members of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and Coburg county officials, predominantly Social Democrats (SPD), were at odds for reasons primarily of political dogma.

The resident officer finally solved that problem by hitting upon the community planning council idea.

"Citizens not only have a right to determine by whom they should be governed," Mr. Thomsen argued, "but how their schools and parks should look, how their hospitals and streets should be built. In other words, they have the right to help plan their community."

The attitude of officialdom toward community planning in its earlier stages was succinctly expressed by Coburg's mayor, Dr. Walter Langer, who told Mr. Thomsen: "It is easy for you Americans to plan because you have the dollars." Retorted Mr. Thomsen: "No, Dr. Langer, we have dollars because we have planned."

The resident officer was determined to show political diehards that community-wide planning was not a matter of dollars but common sense. His first success was among the area's educators and scholars, who, at his suggestion, formed a city planning group late in 1950. The group attracted interested citizens from both the city and county, including some government officials who, while they still suspiciously eyed community planning, were sufficiently politically-minded to heed the views of their constituents.

The planning committee grew, and both county and city government heads began taking an active role. However, at the beginning community planning was limited to city or county—never the two jointly.

City and county officials, sitting with local citizens on the planning committee, at first glared at each other. Then they began wrangling. Mr. Thomsen was encouraged when he noticed they were beginning to agree occasionally on minor problems affecting either city or county. The big turning point came early this year when the two rival political camps decided to meet to discuss

problems common to both city and county. That history-making meeting was held late last January when city and county officials, along with government representatives from Munich and Bonn, sat down at one table with an eye on their common community problems.

Mr. Thomsen had reason to be proud of an accomplishment for which he was mainly responsible.

Duplicating the truce declared by city and county officials of Coburg, Bavarian citizens along the border are meeting and solving many of their problems. And in seeking to better their own way of life, they are not turning their back on their less fortunate fellow countrymen who live across the zonal border in the Soviet Zone.

At virtually every village and hamlet we visited we were asked by Bavarians: "Do you realize that the Germans living in the East also are waiting to be liberated by you Americans?"

More than once we were told that "whenever the Americans withdraw their troops from a border point, it causes even greater concern among the eastern Germans than among the Bavarians. The eastern Germans feel safer knowing the American soldiers are nearby."

And many Bavarians relayed this message they said they had received from relatives and friends in the Soviet Zone: "Please remind the Americans that most of us are Communists by force—not of our own free will."

• *W. J. Caldwell is Chief of the Public Relations Branch, Office of Land Commissioner, Bavaria.*

U.S. Concessions to Sweden Under GATT Made Effective

[Released to the press July 5]

The President, in a letter of July 3, 1951, to the Secretary of the Treasury, authorized the application, as of July 7, of certain United States tariff concessions negotiated at the 1950-51 tariff conference at Torquay, England, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This action was taken as a result of the signature, by Sweden, on June 7, 1951, of the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement.¹

Under the Torquay Protocol a country negotiating there may withhold the concessions initially negotiated with another country until the thirtieth day after that country has signed the protocol and made provision for putting into effect its own concessions.

The United States is continuing to withhold practically all the concessions initially negotiated

¹ BULLETIN of June 25, 1951, p. 1020.

with Austria, Brazil, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Norway, Peru, and Turkey, until those countries have signed the Torquay Protocol. In addition to Sweden, six other countries with which the United States negotiated at Torquay—the Benelux Customs Union (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), Canada, France, and the Dominican Republic—had previously signed the protocol and United States concessions to those countries were put into effect on June 7.

The President's letter to the Secretary of the Treasury was published in the *Federal Register*.² Copies of schedule XX of the General Agreement, as negotiated at Torquay, are available for inspection at the field and regional offices of the Department of Commerce.

A detailed discussion of the concessions exchanged between the United States and Sweden is contained in the *Preliminary Analysis of the Torquay Protocol of Accession, Schedules, and Related Documents* (State Department pub. 4209) also available by purchase from the Superintendent of Documents (Price \$1.00).

U.S. Begins Conversations on Spain's Role in European Defense

[Released to the press July 18]

At his press conference today, Secretary Acheson made the following statement regarding the July 16 conversation between Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, and Generalissimo Francisco Franco:

Admiral Sherman's interview with General Franco on Monday has caused widespread speculation in the press, both here and abroad. The facts are as follows:

Military authorities are in general agreement that Spain is of strategic importance to the general defense of Western Europe. As a natural corollary to this generally accepted conclusion, tentative and exploratory conversations have been undertaken with the Spanish Government with the sole purpose of ascertaining what Spain might be willing and able to do which would contribute to the strengthening of the common defense against possible aggression.

We have been talking with the British and French Governments for many months about the possible role of Spain in relation to the general defense of Western Europe. We have not been able to find a common position on this subject with these Governments for reasons of which we

² 16 Fed. Reg. 6607. The schedule is also included in *Treasury Decisions No. 52739*, published by the Treasury Department on June 7 and available by purchase from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. (Price 15 cents).

are aware and understand. However, for the strategic reasons outlined above, the United States has initiated these exploratory conversations.

Any understanding which may ultimately be reached will supplement our basic policy of building the defensive strength of the West. It has been and is our firm intention to see to it that if Western Europe is attacked it will be defended—and not liberated. The presence of American armed forces in Western Europe bears witness to this intent as does the appointment, at the request of our NATO Allies, of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander.

We are sending vast amounts of military and other aid to these Allies for whom a clear priority has been established. There will be no change in this procedure. In other words, the North Atlantic Treaty is fundamental to our policy in Europe and the closest possible cooperation with our NATO Allies will remain the keystone of this policy.

Spain Receives Credits For Purchase of Coal, Wheat

[Released to the press by the Export-Import Bank July 10]

Two new credits to Spain totaling 5.8 million dollars have been granted by the Export-Import Bank, with the approval of the Economic Cooperation Administrator, on the basis of an authorization in title I, chapter XI of the General Appropriations Act of 1951.

The first of the two, in the amount of 3.5 million dollars, is to finance the purchase and shipment of coal from the United States to be used in the Spanish steel industry and coking plants. The second credit, amounting to 2.25 million dollars, is to finance the purchase and shipment of an additional quantity of wheat.

Spain possesses deposits of various types of coal. In recent years, Spanish domestic production of coal has averaged approximately 12 million metric tons a year. But Spain has always been in varying degrees dependent on foreign sources for certain specialized types of coal not produced at all or produced in inadequate amounts in Spain itself. Spain's imported coal requirements vary from 500,000 to 1,000,000 tons a year, depending on the level of economic activity, the availability of other sources of power, and the supply of raw materials to industries using imported coal.

Spain has never before imported coal from the United States but has depended entirely on European sources of supply. However, as a result of shortages and reduction in the exports of European coal producers, Spain finds itself faced with the need to import certain types of high-grade coal from the United States. The imports are

particularly necessary for the steel and coke industries.

The coal credit of 3.5 million dollars has been established in favor of Central Siderurgica, S. A., which is a private organization established in 1907 representing Spanish steel mills and coke companies. Spanish mills provide the bulk of Spain's requirements in steel, their production in 1950 having reached 807,000 metric tons.

In March 1951 a credit of 5 million dollars was authorized for the purchase of wheat in order to provide for temporary shortages. The additional credit of 2.25 million dollars is designed to assist Spain in covering her most urgent wheat requirements until the coming harvest, when a bumper crop is expected.

Each of the two credits bears interest at 3 percent per annum payable semiannually; the principal to be repaid in 20 years following a period of grace of 5 years; and each credit is to be unconditionally guaranteed by the Spanish Government.

New Soviet Publication Called Part of "Peace Offensive"

At Secretary Acheson's press conference on July 18, a correspondent asked what his reaction was to the new Soviet publication called *News* which had come out and spoken of Anglo-American friendship. Mr. Acheson replied that he thought he had to be completely realistic about things like that that happened in the Soviet Union. He remarked that he would say, in the first place, one had to remember that there was always the Soviet censor. He said that therefore, when something like this was published, one knew it was published for a purpose. He continued that, in the second place, this magazine was published in the English language, that it was not published in Russian. He commented that the readers of English in the Soviet Union were undoubtedly fairly limited. He explained that it looked, therefore, as though this were published for foreign consumption and was to be let through by the censor for that purpose.

The Secretary continued that the next thing he noticed, when one looked at the content of the matter in this journal, was that it was quite contrary to material which was being published in Russia in the Soviet press and to material going out over the Soviet radio.

Mr. Acheson commented that this was obviously part of the drive—this "peace-offensive" drive—this Russian lullaby which we were having sung to us now for the purpose of getting us to relax our efforts to go forward with the whole program to build strength in the West. He added that he could not imagine a more stupid or a more dangerous thing that this country could do than to be lulled by that sort of thing.

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Bavarian Radio To Broadcast On New Frequency

[Released to the press by HICOG July 9]

The Bavarian Radio has been assigned a new broadcasting frequency designed to improve radio reception in southern Bavaria, it was announced today by Shepard Stone, director of the Office of Public Affairs, Hicog.

Beginning July 12, the Bavarian Radio will use the new frequency of 800 kilocycles, Mr. Stone said, employing the transmitter at Ismaning with special directional antenna. Mr. Stone said:

The construction of the directional antenna was intended to give the Bavarian Radio better reception and avoid interference with the Leningrad radio, which broadcasts on the same frequency.

The complicated antenna system was erected by the Bavarian Radio with the assistance of American broadcasting engineers provided by the Department of State. This action was taken in accordance with the policy of the United States Government as a result of the European Broadcasting Convention at Copenhagen in 1948, which failed to make adequate provisions for radio broadcasting in the U.S. area of control in Germany. Although it is unable to carry out the provisions of the Copenhagen plan, the United States Government will continue to maintain all essential broadcasting and will attempt to hold interference to a minimum.

U.S. Sends Condolences On Death of King of Jordan

[Released to the press July 20]

Following is the text of a message sent by President Truman to His Royal Highness Prince Talal of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the occasion of the assassination of King Abdullah July 20:

I have been deeply moved to learn of the sudden and tragic death of your father, King Abdullah. His name will live as one of the great personages in the history of the Arab peoples. I extend to you my deepest and most heartfelt sympathy in this hour of your great loss.

The President sent the following message to His Royal Highness The Emir Naif, Regent of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan:

I send to Your Royal Highness my condolences and deep sympathy on the tragic death of His Majesty your father, King Abdullah Ibn Hussain. It is deeply to be regretted that Your Royal Highness should be called upon to assume the Regency of the Jordan Kingdom under such unhappy circumstances. I know, however, that the memory of your father's wise statesmanship will long remain a guide and inspiration to Your Royal Highness and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan.

The following message was sent by Secretary Acheson to His Excellency Samir Pasha al-Rifai, Prime Minister of Jordan:

I have learned with the deepest regret and sorrow of the news of the tragic death of His Majesty King Abdullah. I wish to express to you and to the Jordanian people the condolences and deepest sympathy of the American people and Government on this sorrowful occasion.

U.S. Rejects Polish Protest in Repatriation Question

TEXT OF POLISH NOTE OF JUNE 13

Following is an unofficial English translation of a note delivered to the American Embassy at Warsaw concerning the Polish repatriation mission in the United States zone of Germany:

The American authorities in Western Germany refused the Polish repatriation mission in Frankfurt on Main, Munich, and Stuttgart further accreditation and the right to stay in the American occupation zones and demanded that they leave the zone by June 15.

This demand was made with complete disregard of the fact that Polish officials are duly accredited to those authorities.

The Polish Government on May 30, 1951, approached the Embassy of the United States in Warsaw requesting the withdrawal of the above-mentioned demand, but the intervention has produced no results. The Government of the United States has furthermore confirmed the decision of the American authorities in Germany.

As is known, the Polish Repatriation Mission performs, on behalf of the Polish Government, functions connected with the repatriation of Polish citizens deported to Germany during the Hitlerite occupation. The rights of Polish authorities to carry out repatriation activities are based on international acts binding also the Government of the United States and in particular on the resolutions of the United Nations organization of February 12, 1946, and of November 17, 1947, as well as on the resolution of the Council of Foreign Ministers of April 23, 1947.

The order denying the Polish repatriation officials the right to stay in the zone means that the American authorities are attempting through illegal methods to render impossible the performance of the repatriation tasks by the Polish authorities by demanding the liquidation of the Polish Repatriation Mission.

The hostile attitude of the American authorities toward the action of repatriating Polish citizens has been known to the Polish Government for a long time. The Polish Government has more than once been forced to intervene officially concerning the violation by those authorities of their own obligations undertaken with regard to

facilitating repatriation. The American authorities have in every possible way been systematically obstructing the repatriation activities of the Polish representatives. They have been supporting and aiding organizations whose clear aim was to counteract such activities. The camps for the Polish displaced persons (so-called DP's) were under pressure which frequently assumed the form of brutal terrorization on the part of those organizations. The camps were the scene of continual agitation against return to Poland and of demoralizing propaganda aiming to recruit candidates for subversive and espionage work against Poland.

While the dissemination of true information about Poland and its reconstruction, information particularly needed by the Polish citizens severed from their fatherland, has been made more and more difficult, the Polish camps have at the same time been inundated with calumnious, provocative, and anti-Polish propaganda. The publications of the Polish mission, furnishing honest information about the country, wrestled with difficulties even if it was a matter of license and paper allocation, while publications openly agitating against repatriation and showing hatred against Poland were obtaining without difficulty the means and right of publication.

This policy of the American authorities and the baiting systematically practiced with the support of the American authorities created an atmosphere of pressure against Polish citizens. Those who wished to return to Poland were more than once forced outright to withdraw their applications for repatriation.

At the same time, the American authorities made it difficult for the Polish representatives to enter not only the displaced persons camps but even those camps where repatriates waiting departure for Poland were assembled.

In spite of repeated interventions by the Polish authorities, the American authorities have done nothing to eliminate this state of affairs. Orders recently issued against the members of the Polish Repatriation Mission are evidence of the fact that the American occupation authorities have decided to pass from the system of obstacles and difficulties to the total liquidation of Polish repatriation or-

gans in the zone in order to cut off the Polish displaced persons from the possibility of returning to Poland. The aim of this move is understandable in the light of the policy of remilitarization of Western Germany, conducted by the American authorities. In the process of remilitarization the displaced persons have been assigned a specific role. The American authorities are using the displaced persons, disoriented and confused by false propaganda, severed from their country and families and left without the possibility of building for themselves a stable existence, as reserve manpower for the so-called guard companies and for the recruitment of "foreigners in Germany" into military formations in accordance with the program announced on March 26, 1951, by the Defense Department of the United States.

Polish citizens who suffered irreparable wrongs from Hitlerism are now on orders of the American authorities to serve anti-Polish plans, plans for the remilitarization of Germany which primarily threaten Poland.

Also the provisions of the law approved on April 13, 1951, which under threat of penal sanctions provides for compulsory military service by foreigner-immigrants in the American Army, sheds proper light on the true aims of the anti-repatriation policy of the American authorities.

The demand that Polish repatriation officers leave the United States zone and that the activities of the Polish Repatriation Mission be terminated is a continuation of the campaign conducted by the American occupational authorities against the Polish representative missions in their zone. This action cannot be considered otherwise than anti-Polish aimed against the interests of the Polish state and Polish citizens.

In view of the arbitrary and illegal orders of the American occupational authorities, the Polish Government does not of course see any possibility for members of the Polish Repatriation Mission to remain in the American zone and therefore they are being recalled as of June 15, 1951.

The Polish Government at the same time lodges its firm protest against these orders responsible for the liquidation of the Polish Repatriation Mission and demands that they be revoked. The Polish Government holds the United States Government entirely responsible for rendering impossible the continuation of repatriation activities.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF JULY 19

[Released to the press July 19]

The American Embassy in Warsaw delivered today to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the following note in reply to a Polish Government protest concerning the termination of accreditation of the Polish Repatriation Mission in the United States Zone of Germany:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions from the Government of the United States has the honor to reply

as follows to the Ministry's note of June 13, 1951, concerning the termination of accreditation of the Polish repatriation mission in the United States zone of Germany.

As the Polish Government is aware, repatriation mission personnel are accredited to the United States High Commissioner for Germany who has the responsibility of determining the size of the mission on the basis of the number of displaced persons with which the mission is properly concerned. From July 1, 1947, to December 31 1950, the Polish voluntary repatriates from the United States zone totaled 12,504. Of this number, only 410 volunteered for repatriation in 1950. Moreover, during the first 5 months of 1951 there were only 27 voluntary repatriations of Polish citizens from the United States zone.

There is no Polish displaced persons camp in the United States zone and only one International Refugee Organization repatriation camp at Griesheim near Frankfurt. Thus, since the period of mass repatriation had clearly come to an end, the continued presence in the United States zone of eight Polish repatriation officials could no longer be considered necessary.

A procedure exists, in the absence of a Polish repatriation mission, for returning those few persons who might from time to time volunteer for repatriation to Poland. Arrangements in each case can readily be made by the Polish Military Mission at Berlin with the United States High Commissioner's office. This was pointed out to the chief of the Polish Repatriation Mission in the United States zone in a letter of May 16, 1951, from the United States High Commissioner's office requesting the withdrawal of the mission. The United States Ambassador at Warsaw also stressed in a conversation with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office on June 12, 1951, that facilities for Polish repatriation have not been terminated as arrangements for this purpose can readily be effected by the Polish Military Mission at Berlin, in agreement with the office of the United States High Commissioner.

Under these circumstances the United States Government categorically rejects the charge made by the Polish Government in its note of June 13, 1951, that American authorities in terminating the accreditation of the Polish mission in the United States zone of Germany are rendering impossible the repatriation of Polish displaced persons who wish to return to Poland.

Moreover, since the Polish Government continues to have the possibility of making arrangements for voluntary repatriates, there has been no violation of Polish rights under the United Nations General Assembly resolutions of February 12, 1946, and November 17, 1947, or under resolutions contained in the report of April 23, 1947, to the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The actual facts concerning the unwarranted charge of the Polish Government that American

officials have hindered the repatriation of Poles are as follows:

1) United States officials have provided extensive logistical support to the Polish Repatriation Mission, including authorization for free train travel throughout the United States zone of Germany, facilities for vehicle registration and purchase of gasoline from United States Army supplies, United States post-exchange privileges and commissary privileges for the Chief of Mission.

2) No protest has ever been received from the Polish Mission that its activities in the repatriation of dependent persons resident in the United States zone of Germany were obstructed by United States zonal authorities.

3) The record shows that Polish representatives were free to visit International Refugee Organization camps as frequently as they wished, and that these visits often averaged three a week.

4) The Polish Repatriation Mission did not publish a periodical in Germany, but rather imported quantities of magazines and newspapers from Poland. The question of paper allocation and licensing therefore did not arise.

The Polish Government has included in its

note various misstatements concerning United States statutes governing military service. The reference to the "law approved on April 13, 1951," was apparently intended to relate to Public Law 51, enacted June 19, 1951. Public Law 51 is essentially a continuation of the Selective Service Act of 1940 under which many thousands of legally admitted aliens fought for the freedom and survival of the allied nations, including Poland.

The Polish Government's statement concerning "displaced persons . . . as reserve manpower" is presumably directed at plans announced by the United States Secretary of the Army for the implementation of the Act of June 30, 1950, providing for voluntary enlistment of a limited number of aliens in the Regular Army of the United States. It would seem singularly inappropriate that exception to this law should be taken by the Government of Poland, many of whose present leaders have frequently and recently called attention to the brilliant feats of arms by Generals Kosciuszko, Pulawski, E. Bem, and Walter, and whose own national anthem is still the song of Dabroski's soldiers in Italy.

United States Policy Toward the Middle East

by George C. McGhee

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs*¹

The Middle East is described in the Institute's program as being that area stretching from the western border of India to the western border of Libya. This area is the cradle of Western civilization, the birthplace of the three great monotheistic religions and the area which preserved the light of culture and learning during the Dark Ages of Europe. It is one-third again as large as the United States and has a population of over 150 million people, the same as our own. Its territories are the crossroads of the world. Its great strategic importance is evident from a quick glance at the globe. Here three continents meet. Every major international airline connecting Asia, Europe, and the United States passes through the Middle East. The Suez Canal is of immense importance to world shipping. The Middle East contains one-half of the proven oil reserves of the

world and supplies a large proportion of the oil requirements of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Over and above its own importance, the Middle East provides access to South Asia with its tremendous resources of manpower and raw materials, and to the continent of Africa where the resources which we have imported for a number of years—copper, manganese, chrome, industrial diamonds, rubber—have now been augmented by uranium from the Congo. The strategic importance of North Africa, which provides an access to the European Continent from the south, was clearly demonstrated during World War II.

The Middle East is the heartland of Islam—the religion of 300 million people who inhabit the warm belt from the Atlantic shores of Africa to Indonesia and the Philippines in the South West Pacific. Paradoxically, though the recorded history of the Middle East is older than any other part of the world, it contains more new nations. The spirit of nationalism which swept through Europe and the Western Hemisphere in recent centuries is affecting all of Asia profoundly today.

¹ Address made before the University of Virginia Institute of Public Affairs at Charlottesville, Va., on July 10 and released to the press on the same date.

Strong Aspirations Influence Middle East

The peoples of the Middle East are greatly influenced by three strong aspirations. First, they are passionately dedicated to retaining and strengthening the independence which they have won. Most are suspicious of outside influences, including that of the West. At times, some are more alarmed at what they mistakenly consider as Western imperialism than they are over communism.

Second, the people of the area are determined to exercise their full share of responsibility in the collective effort to stabilize the world situation. Their ideas as to how this should be accomplished often differ from our own, as for instance, the views of the so-called Arab-Asian bloc on Korea and Communist China's intervention there.

Third, the people in the Middle East seek to raise their standard of living and to eliminate the poverty, starvation, and disease which have hung over most of the area for centuries. The desire is growing to overcome inefficient production methods, illiteracy, and corruption.

These objectives are strikingly like those to which Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, George Mason, George Washington, Madison, Monroe, and other distinguished Virginians devoted their lives. In striving to attain these objectives, we in the United States have been blessed with comparatively long periods of peace and a country rich in natural resources. The peoples in the Middle East have not been so fortunate.

Other Problems To Be Settled

Apart from their basic economic and social problems and their difficulties as new weak states, there are certain other specific major problems currently existent in the Middle East: (1) continuing Soviet-inspired pressure on the area; (2) economic dislocation in Greece caused by World War II and the subsequent Communist-inspired guerrilla warfare; (3) the British-Iranian oil controversy; (4) trends toward neutralism; (5) Anglo-Egyptian relations including the future of the Sudan; (6) the military weakness of certain states; (7) unsettled issues remaining from the Palestine question including the problem of the Arab refugees; (8) the role of the Middle Eastern area in the international community of nations.

The northern countries of the Middle East—Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan—are all adjacent to the Soviet Union or areas which the Soviets dominate. Soviet pressure against these states and against the general area of the Middle East has been unrelenting. Its roots lie deep in traditional Russian foreign policy. We know from the documents on Nazi-Soviet relations that Molotov stipulated to Hitler on November 25, 1940, that the "area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" be recognized "as the center of the aspirations of the

Soviet Union." We have no reason to believe that there has ever been any alteration of this aspiration. Indeed, the actions of the U.S.S.R. since the end of World War II clearly indicate that more than ever this is still her objective. These actions include the Communist espousal of the guerrilla warfare in Greece from 1946 through 1948, continuous Soviet pressure on Turkey, the creation of a puppet government under Soviet protection in Azerbaijan in Iran in 1946; and sustained Soviet efforts to fan anti-western sentiment throughout the area. In posing as the anti-imperialist champion in the United Nations, the principal contribution of the imperialist Soviet Union has been to sow seeds of mistrust and hostility toward the nations which wish to aid the new Middle East states in strengthening themselves.

U.S. Organizations Established for Assistance

The Truman Doctrine of March 1947 was the American answer to Soviet-inspired pressures on Greece and Turkey. Since that time, the United States has expended some 2 billion dollars in building up these two countries. We have provided military and economic aid which has strengthened the capabilities of these two valiant peoples to resist aggression and has eased their economic burdens. The established Greek Government successfully liquidated the guerrilla activities. Greece is now one of the nations valiantly contributing military assistance in Korea.

The economic situation in Greece at the end of World War II was one of near collapse. When I first went to Greece in 1947 on an inspection trip as coordinator of the program for assistance to Greece and Turkey, the country's highways, canals, railroads, and ports were in deplorable condition after a long period of war and enemy occupation. The initiative of the people of Greece, coupled with timely assistance from the United States, have put the country's economic facilities back in operation.

Turkey has also clearly demonstrated her determination to stand firm. We regard her as one of our staunchest allies. We share her pride in her magnificent record in Korea. Both Greece and Turkey have indicated a desire to enter into reciprocal security arrangement in which the United States is included. As membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization appears to be the most logical method of concluding such security arrangements, we have raised the question of Greek-Turkish admission with the other NATO powers who are currently considering it.

When the Soviet Union left military forces in Iran in 1946, contrary to her previous commitment to the United Kingdom, the United States, and Iran, the United States gave strong support to the Iranian case in the United Nations Security Council. It is our belief that Iran's steadfastness

and her support by the United Nations, in which the United States played an important role, caused the U.S.S.R. to back down and to withdraw her troops.

The United States has also demonstrated its deep interest in helping Iran by supplying grant military assistance. Through our current Mutual Defense Assistance Program, we are supplying equipment as quickly as the Iranians can effectively absorb it, and American officers are assisting in training the Iranian Army in its use. This army not only contributes to internal stability but also helps to discourage external aggression.

Oil Controversy Creates Serious Situation

You know, of course, of the present controversy between the Iranian Government and the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concerning the operation of the Iranian oil industry. This controversy has created a serious situation. Its origin stems from the desire of the Iranian Government and people to nationalize their oil resources, and the difficulty in developing an arrangement under which the British oil interests can continue to co-operate in the production, processing, and marketing of Iran's oil. Although the British have recognized the principle of nationalization, the two parties to the controversy have not yet been able to find an agreement as to how the nationalization can effectively be implemented.

A solution to this problem is, of course, of very great importance not only to Iran and Great Britain but to the entire free world. The Iranian economy depends largely upon the exploitation of its oil resources, and any interruption in the flow of oil will have an immediate impact upon the people of that country. The British economy and the economies of many countries throughout the world rely heavily upon Iranian oil shipments. While Iranian oil and refining capacity can be substituted for in other world markets, their loss would compel radical and costly adjustments in oil production and refining throughout the world.

Last week, the dispute between Iran and Great Britain was considered by the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The Court recommended that both parties adopt a *modus vivendi* which would permit the continued operation of the oil industry pending the development of a permanent solution. On July 9, President Truman, in a letter to the Prime Minister of Iran,¹ urged that the Iranian Government, notwithstanding legal technicalities as to whether the Court did or did not have jurisdiction, a question which has been raised by the Iranian Government, give most careful consideration to its utterance, which was a suggestion of an impartial body dedicated to justice and equity and to a peaceful world based upon these great conceptions. He said that a study of the Court's suggestion by the Iranian and British

¹ BULLETIN of July 23, p. 129.

Governments could develop methods of implementing it which will carry out its wise and impartial purpose; that is, of maintaining the operation of the oil industry and preserving the positions of both governments. We earnestly hope that Iran will give full weight to the Court's finding. If this is done, Iran's stature, as the President said, would be greatly enhanced in the eyes of the world.

U.S. Policy Supports Independence Movements

The anti-western and neutralist tendencies in certain parts of the Middle East are a cause of considerable concern. There have been indications that some very sincere nationalists share these sentiments. We have sought during the past several years, both in the United Nations and outside, to pursue a moderate and sympathetic role with regard to nationalism. It is our traditional policy to support orderly movements toward self-government. We have been pleased with the establishment of many new nations in Asia—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia; the Associated States of Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam; and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel in the Middle East.

The United States is also closely bound to the Western European nations through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and through other strong ties. Certain of these nations, the United Kingdom and France in particular, have long been interested in the development of the Middle East. In so far as possible, we have sought to strengthen the ties between the Western nations and the new nations of the East. We are not unmindful of the fact that there exist serious difficulties between certain of the Middle Eastern countries and the Western nations—difficulties such as the resentment of the Arab States arising out of our policies and those of other Western states in Palestine, and the impasse between the Egyptians and British regarding the future of British forces in Egypt under their treaty of alliance. We seek, however, to minimize these differences and to capitalize on common interests; to convince the Middle Eastern states that their aspirations can best be achieved in company with the West; that there is no neutral ground where aggression is concerned and that their best hope for survival lies in firm support of the principle of collective security.

There exists a weakness in the military, economic, and social structures of a number of states in the Middle East. Throughout the Middle East, as indeed in the remainder of the vast undeveloped areas of the world, people are impelled by a basic reality—the fact of poverty among potential plenty. People are living on an income of less than 100 dollars a year per person as compared with our average of 1400 dollars. These people are demanding more and more that they share in the world's progress. They know that their lands

can be made more productive, and that their rivers can be brought under control for irrigation and power.

The economic background of the Arab states and Israel was brilliantly described in the report of the U.N. Survey Mission to the Middle East, headed by Gordon Clapp, who is to address you tonight. This report clearly demonstrates that peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East until the standard of living is raised. It recognizes, however, that will be a long and difficult process requiring development of unused agricultural lands and potential water resources. Some of the countries of the Middle East have been able to earn foreign exchange through sales of their own raw materials such as cotton from Egypt, oil from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. However, most of the countries in the area have little means with which to generate an excess of imports over exports. Many of these countries already have mapped programs, some of a far reaching nature, for economic development, and it is our earnest hope that these countries will press forward their programs with energy, imagination, and hard work.

The United States Government has been acutely aware of the economic, social, and military weakness in the Middle East area. Because of the limitations on our over-all capacity to assist other nations to strengthen themselves, we have not been able to do all that we should have liked to have done in this area. The necessity for expending our efforts in Europe and in the Far East during the past several years limited our effort in the Middle East with the exception of Greece and Turkey. With respect to the rest of the area, we have sought to help through the granting of loans, as for instance to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. We have always stood ready to consider requests for loans from other nations. In addition, some of the nations have sought and continue to seek loans from private and international agencies.

In January 1949, President Truman announced in his inaugural address what has since become known as the Point Four Program, to make available technical assistance for the undeveloped countries. This program has been accepted by almost all of the countries of the Middle East and is now well under way. However, because of the urgent necessity to strengthen the free world as rapidly as possible, the President sent a message to the Congress on May 24, 1951, which recommended that the Congress take further steps to help build up the countries in the Middle East as a part of the Mutual Security Program. I shall describe this program to you in some detail in a few moments.

After the conclusion of World War II, the world community was confronted with the tragic plight of the Jewish peoples who had suffered such inhuman treatment at the hands of Hitlerite Germany. This problem was directly related to the final settlement of the British Mandate in Pales-

tine. The American Government supported the recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947, which called for a partition of that area. This resulted in 1948 in the establishment of the State of Israel. We recognized this state, supported its admission into the United Nations, and extended loans for its development. As is well known, the partition of Palestine left bitter feelings among the Arab States and peoples. I regret to say that these feelings have not yet been dissipated.

The United States, on the basis of a policy of strict impartiality as between Israel and the Arab States, has sought, through the United Nations and through all other possible means, to obtain a solution to the issues which remain from the Palestine question. I am sorry, however, to state that little progress has been made. The principal issue remaining from the Palestine question is the future of almost 900,000 Arab refugees. The plight of these refugees is tragic. They are a ready target for anti-western propaganda and constitute a source of instability in the area. Their bitterness over the loss of their homes and lands is understandably deep. The United States has participated financially and in other ways in trying to solve the problem of the refugees. We have supported strongly the efforts of the Palestine Refugee Agency which a distinguished American, John B. Blandford, has just been named to head.

Mutual Security and the Middle East

I should like now to turn to the President's message to the Congress on May 24, on the Mutual Security Program, particularly as it relates to the Middle East.² In his message, the President set forth our objectives in the Middle East and our plans for attaining them. I note from the preliminary issue of your program that several questions are asked under the heading of the Middle East. They are: Is more help indicated? If so, what kind of help and how can and should it be distributed? I believe that these questions have been answered in the President's message. Without going into too much detail, I shall briefly attempt to give you these answers.

After pointing out that the countries of the Middle East are of great importance to the security of the entire free world; that there is no simple formula for increasing stability and security in the Middle East; and that the countries should be helped to withstand the pressures and advance towards stability and improved living conditions, the President stated as follows:

... To these ends, I am recommending 415 million dollars in military aid for Greece, Turkey, and Iran; a portion of this aid will be available for other Middle Eastern nations if necessary. I am also recommending 125 million dollars in economic aid for Middle Eastern countries, exclusive of Greece and Turkey, for whom economic aid is provided as part of the program for Europe. This

² BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 883.

amount also includes programs of technical assistance to Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia, three independent states of Africa whose economic problems are similar to those of the Middle Eastern countries.

Continuing military aid for Greece and Turkey will make possible the further strengthening of these countries' large and well-trained armed forces, which have already displayed their valiant resolution in the fight for freedom in Korea. In Iran, continuing military aid is required to help build internal security and defense, together with economic aid to help sustain the Iranian economy and give impetus to the much needed longer term process of economic development for the benefit of the Iranian people

In the Arab States and Israel, the fundamental requirement is a regional approach to the basic problems of economic development

The program I am now proposing is a balanced program for strengthening the security of the Middle East. It will make a solid contribution to our hopes for peace.

The continuation of economic and military aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran will enable those countries to strengthen further their military forces. The President has proposed that up to 10 percent of the 415 million dollars requested may be utilized in the Arab States and Israel, if he determines such action is essential to the security of the United States. This will permit the United States, for the first time, to assist those states directly in building up their defensive capabilities. The Government believes that it is in the United States interest to preserve and strengthen the ties of these states with the United States and the West; to maximize the will of the Arab States and Israel to cooperate in resistance to any expansionist tendencies of the U.S.S.R.; and to create strength and stability in depth for the benefit of the area as a whole by encouraging the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities, to strengthen their internal security, and reduce area rivalries.

Aside from Greece and Turkey, which participate in the economic aid program for Europe, the economic part of the Mutual Security Program for the Middle East will, subject to approval by Congress, provide grant aid of \$24,050,000 for Iran; \$23,500,000 for Israel; \$23,500,000 for the Arab States; \$3,950,000 for the independent states of Northern Africa, and 50 million dollars for the relief and reintegration of the Arab refugees. In large part, the programs will be directed toward the following fields: Agriculture extension service designed to increase food production by the use of better tools, seeds, fertilizers, and methods of cultivation; improvement of public health and sanitation; improvement of vocational educational practices, and improvement of the road network of the area. Greece and Turkey would, under the Mutual Security Program, continue to receive economic assistance on much the same scale as they have in the past. Pakistan and Afghanistan would, for the first time, be eligible to receive economic grant assistance. The assistance to Iran is not related to the immediate situation in Iran arising out of the oil issue.

The military assistance requested for the Arab

States and Israel follows logically from the policy agreed to by the Governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom in May 1950, at the conference of the Foreign Ministers in London. At that time, the three Governments issued a declaration known as the Tripartite Declaration, recognizing that the Arab States and Israel need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for internal security and to play a part in their defense and that of the area as a whole. The three nations also indicated that they would take immediate action in the event of aggression by one state in the area against another. This was a strong declaration, and I am glad to report that the reaction of the countries in the area to the declaration has on the whole been salutary.

In announcing the world-wide Mutual Security Program, the President emphasized three major characteristics of the Soviet threat today: First, it is world-wide; second, it is total, and third, it is of indefinite duration. The program which I have outlined above for the Middle East and South Asian countries is designed to help them strengthen their economies and give their peoples incentive to combat the Soviet threat as described by the President. The assistance program submitted to the Congress is a much more positive and comprehensive program for the Middle East than we have hitherto had. Our original efforts in Greece and Turkey, which we started in 1947, are now expanded, in the President's request, to approximately 1 billion dollars for the Middle Eastern area. We believe the program is based on a balanced, impartial area approach and it will be so administered.

There has been a very natural tendency on the part of the United States, with its traditional attachments to European nations, to focus its attention more on Europe than on other areas of the world. Of course, it is in our common interest to strengthen our relationships with European nations. The President's Mutual Security Program is designed to further strengthen these ties. At the same time, the responsibilities thrust upon us as a result of the shifting trends of history compel us to take into account more and more the importance of the general area of the Middle East as well as Asia as a whole.

There are certain common denominators between the Middle Eastern states and those of the West. We are all basically opposed to Communist expansionism. We all seek to better the way of life of our peoples. Though we may differ in the method of achieving our objectives, we are nevertheless all dedicated fundamentally toward achieving the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It is incumbent upon all of us to approach common problems with a sympathy and understanding which will lead to a solution of those problems and the strengthening of the entire free world during this hour of peril to the institutions which are basic to our way of life.

U.S. Files Preliminary Objection Regarding Treaty Rights in Morocco

INTERNATIONAL COURT RULING REQUESTED

Released to the press June 29]

In October 1950 the Government of the French Republic instituted proceedings against the United States in the International Court of Justice concerning the rights of American nationals in Morocco.¹ The Court subsequently set time limits for the filing by the two Governments of written pleadings.² On March 1, 1951, the French Government filed its Memorial with the Court. The United States Counter-Memorial was due on July 1, 1951.

The case before the International Court involves the interests of both France and Morocco as well as of the United States. The Treaty of Fez of 1912 established a protectorate by France over Morocco, pursuant to which Morocco is represented in foreign affairs by France. The French Memorial, and the French application instituting proceedings, had not specified whether the French Government brought this case on behalf of France, on behalf of Morocco, or on behalf of both countries. The United States Government is concerned that both France and Morocco, as well as the United States, should be parties to the case before the International Court and should be bound by the Court's judgment. Since the French written pleadings had not made clear whether the moving party or parties were France, Morocco, or both, the United States Government sought in discussions with the French Government, beginning April 23, 1951, to have this point clarified prior to the filing of this Government's Counter-Memorial. However, representatives of the French Government informed representatives of the United States Government on June 9, 1951, that the French Government was not prepared to make any formal statement concerning the identity of the parties in whose name and on whose behalf the present case has been brought. The representatives of the French Government stated that the application and the Memorial did not require clarification. Accordingly, last week the United States Government filed with the Court, pursuant to its rules, a preliminary objection asking the Court to rule on the identity of the party or par-

ties which had instituted the proceedings and which would therefore be bound by the judgment of the Court in the case.

The United States wishes to secure an authoritative determination by the Court on the rights of American nationals in Morocco pursuant to treaties governing the obligations between France, Morocco, and the United States. This Government is naturally anxious that the case proceed without unnecessary delays, and indeed regretted the necessity of filing a preliminary objection. It is hoped, nevertheless, that the issue raised in the preliminary objection may be disposed of promptly and that it will then be possible to proceed without delay to subsequent phases of the *Moroccan* case.

TEXT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

The proceedings in this case were instituted by an application filed on behalf of the Government of the French Republic on October 28, 1950. On November 22, 1950, the Court issued an order fixing the time limits for presentation by the parties of the written proceedings. Pursuant to this order, the French Government filed its Memorial on March 1, 1951. The United States Counter-Memorial was required to be filed by July 1, 1951.

Before filing a Counter-Memorial and before entering the case on the merits, the Government of the United States has found it necessary to file a preliminary objection in accordance with the provisions of article 62 of the Rules of Court.

The Government of the United States noted, when the application instituting proceedings was filed by the French Government in October 1950, that the application did not clearly specify the parties to the proceeding other than the United States of America. My Government hoped that this lack of specification might be only a formal defect, which would be corrected through a fuller and more definite statement in the Memorial. When copies of the Memorial had been received by the Government of the United States in March 1951, it was observed that the Memorial, like the application, was still not clear and definite in specifying the parties to the case other than the United States of America.

In the view of the United States, the application and the Memorial submitted by the French Gov-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 11, 1950, p. 950.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 79.

ernment admit of three alternative possibilities in regard to the identity of the parties in whose name the present proceedings have been instituted (1) the case may be brought by the Government of the French Republic in the name of and on behalf of the French Republic in its own right and capacity; (2) the case may be brought by the Government of the French Republic in the name of the French Republic as Protector of the State of Morocco under the Treaty of Fez, dated March 30, 1912, on behalf of the State of Morocco; or (3) the case may be brought by the Government of the French Republic both in the name of and on behalf of the French Republic in its own right and capacity and as Protector of the State of Morocco under the Treaty of Fez, dated March 30, 1912, on behalf of the State of Morocco.

Having noted the ambiguity in the application and in the Memorial filed by the Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United States sought in discussions with representatives of the French Government to clarify the identity of the party or parties in whose name and on whose behalf the case concerning the rights of American nationals in Morocco had been brought. These discussions continued over a number of weeks, and it was the hope of my Government that a clarification of the point would be obtained so as to make unnecessary the filing of any preliminary objection in this case. The Government of the United States had suggested to the French Government that clarification might be effected either through an amendment of the application or Memorial, or by a written communication addressed to the Government of the United States which could be incorporated in the written proceedings of the case. However, representatives of the French Government informed representatives of the United States Government on June 9, 1951, that the French Government was not prepared to make any formal statement concerning the identity of the parties in whose name and on whose behalf the present case has been brought. The representatives of the French Government stated that the application and the Memorial did not require clarification.

The Government of the United States refers to article 40, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This paragraph provides:

1. Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated.

Similarly, article 32 of the Rules of Court provides, in part:

2. When a case is brought before the Court by means of an application, the application must, as laid down in article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, indicate the party making it, the party against whom the claim is brought and the subject of the dispute. . . .

In the view of the Government of the United States, the application in the present case, as supplemented by the Memorial, does not accord with the above requirements.

The United States is concerned to secure an exact identification of the parties to the present case in order to know in advance what states (and in what capacity so far as France is concerned) would be bound by the judgment of the Court in the present case. This case concerns the rights of American nationals in Morocco under bilateral treaties between the United States and Morocco, and under certain multilateral treaties—the Convention of Madrid of July 3, 1880, and the Act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906—to which France as well as the United States and Morocco are parties. The United States of America would be bound by the judgment of the Court. My Government is concerned that the State of Morocco and also the French Republic, both in its own right and capacity and as Protector of Morocco, should be bound by the judgment of the Court in determining the rights of American nationals in Morocco. My Government refers in this connection to article 59 of the Statute of the Court, which provides:

The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.

The Government of the United States observes that the Government of the French Republic in the past has drawn a distinction between the capacity of France in its own right and France as Protector of Morocco. For example, in a note to the Secretary of State dated January 19, 1917 (Annex A),³ the French Ambassador, replying to the note in which the Government of the United States had recognized "the establishment of the French Protectorate over the French Zone of the Shereefian Empire," said:

In reality the Protectorate established by France in Morocco, with the assent of its ruler, covers the whole of that country, as evidenced by the terms of the Treaty of March, 1912, a copy of which I had the honor of transmitting to you on January 3, 1913. The Spanish rights are mentioned in it (Article 1) as being to be defined by an agreement between the Governments, not of Morocco, but of France and of Spain. Every Power, Spain included, has recognized that our Protectorate was co-extensive with the total area of Morocco.

This note thus makes the point that France may choose to engage in international acts with respect to Morocco in its own right and capacity, without regard to its capacity as Protector of Morocco.

In a comparable situation, in the convention concluded by France and Great Britain on July 29, 1937 (Annex B),⁴ it was stated in the first para-

³ Not here printed; see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, p. 1095.

⁴ Not here printed. See Command Paper No. 5538, *Convention between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the president of the French republic for the abolition of capitulations in Morocco and Zanzibar [with Protocol of signature, minute, and exchanges of notes]*, London, July 29, 1937.

graph of the preamble that the President of the French Republic was "acting in his own name and on behalf of his Majesty the Sultan of Morocco." In the latter case, therefore, the French Government made it clear that its international act in concluding the convention was intended to and did bind Morocco.

The Government of the United States also draws attention to the case concerning phosphates in Morocco (Italy/France, before the Permanent Court of International Justice). In its application, the Government of Italy requested that the Court "notify the present Application, in conformity with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute, to the Government of the French Republic, as such, and as Protector of Morocco . . ." *Case Concerning Phosphates in Morocco* (Italy/France), Series C, No. 84, p. 15 (1936).

Should the determination of the Court, in disposing of this preliminary objection, be otherwise than that both the State of Morocco and the French Republic, in its own right and capacity and as Protector of Morocco, are parties to the present case and would be bound by the judgment of the Court on the merits, the Government of the United States would wish to consider the inclusion of a counterclaim or counterclaims in its Counter-Memorial, pursuant to article 63 of the Rules of Court. Should it be determined, pursuant to that article, that under such circumstances a counterclaim of this character could not be joined to the original proceedings, the Government of the United States would have to consider what other steps it must take to safeguard its rights and interests.

The Government of the United States desires to make the following submissions to the Court:

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:

(1) To communicate to the Government of the French Republic the present preliminary objection;

(2) To note that the proceedings on the merits have been suspended;

(3) To decide whether the party or parties in whose name and on whose behalf the present proceedings have been instituted consist of

(a) The French Republic in its own right and capacity,

(b) The French Republic as Protector of Morocco on behalf of the State of Morocco, or

(c) The French Republic in its own right and capacity and as Protector of Morocco on behalf of the State of Morocco;

(4) To determine, in the event that the answer to (3) above is other than as stated in (c), whether under article 63 of the Rules of Court the Government of the United States would be entitled to present a counterclaim or counterclaims designed to ensure that the judgment of the Court on the merits would be binding on the State of Morocco

and on the French Republic both in its own right and capacity and as Protector of Morocco;

(5) To note that, pending a decision by the Court on this preliminary objection and without prejudice to the position which the United States may believe it necessary to take in light of the decision, the Government of the United States reserves all rights it now possesses, including the right to file further preliminary objections.

ADRIAN S. FISHER

Agent of the Government of the United States of America

June 15, 1951

Atomic Energy Commission Enlarges Radioisotope Export Program

[Released to the press by AEC July 15]

To assist in extending the scope of international cooperation in science, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission today enlarged its radioisotope export program to include all radioactive materials now sold in this country on an unrestricted basis, and for the first time made U.S.-produced radioisotopes available to foreign users for industrial research and applications.

The action today increases the number of U.S.-produced isotopes available to buyers in foreign countries from 26 to 99. Among the more useful of the newly-available isotopes are Cesium-137, Yttrium-91, Selenium-75, and Tantalum-182, which all have valuable applications in industrial research; Chromium-51, Nickel-59 and -63, and Tungsten-185, which are useful in metallurgical research, and Rubidium-86, which is a valuable substitute for the shorter-lived Sodium-24 and Potassium-42 in agricultural research.

Today's action also for the first time permits American manufacturers to export radioactive thickness gages, which are finding increasing application in a number of different industrial processes.

The U.S. radioisotope export program has been in effect since September 3, 1947. Since then 34 countries have completed arrangements to receive these radioactive substances and shipments of the 26 varieties of isotopes available have been made to 30 of these for use in scientific and medical research and medical therapy.

The nations which have received shipments up to the present are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and Uruguay. In addition,

Guatemala, Ireland, Israel, and Portugal have made arrangements to receive isotopes but have not yet placed orders.

To date, more than 1,000 shipments of U.S. isotopes have been made to foreign nations. The largest users have been Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

The isotopes most in demand in foreign countries have been Phosphorus-32, Iodine-131, and Carbon-14. Phosphorus-32 is useful in agriculture and medicine, notably to determine the most efficient ways of using fertilizer, to locate brain tumors, and as a palliative treatment for certain types of leukemia. Iodine-131 is useful in medicine, notably in the diagnosis and treatment of thyroid disorders and the treatment of thyroid cancer. Carbon-14 is useful in a number of different fields, including particularly the study of plant and animal physiology.

In announcing today's action, the Commission said:

Our principal reason for enlarging the radioisotope export program at this time is the very high degree of success with which the program has been operated in the past and the benefits which have been derived from the wide-spread use of isotopes throughout the world. Isotopes produced in the United States have been enthusiastically received by the scientists of foreign lands and the work accomplished with them is contributing importantly to the welfare of all peoples.

There is nothing secret or evil about radioisotopes in the forms in which they are sold in this country and abroad. While their utilization cannot significantly advance the atomic energy programs of nations, they can contribute, and are contributing, significantly to advancements in basic science, medicine, agriculture, and industry. As of today, isotopes constitute the single most important contribution of atomic energy to peacetime welfare.

Enlargement of our isotope export program is, we feel, in keeping with the foreign policy of the United States, which calls for aid to foreign nations in peaceful development, and, even in the absence of international control of atomic energy, constitutes a field in which international cooperation can be increased.

The new isotope program also permits the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which produces most U.S. radioisotopes, to provide special irradiation services to scientists of other nations. Under this program, foreign scientists may send special materials to Oak Ridge to be made radioactive by exposure to the intense neutron radiation in the nuclear reactor there.

The number of foreign scientists who are familiar with isotope research techniques has been increased considerably in recent years, partly through attendance by scientists of other nations at the Isotope School of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies at Oak Ridge, Tenn.

The radioisotopes that can now be exported under the newly-enlarged program are as follows (asterisks mark those that were previously available):

Antimony 122, 124, 125*	Osmium 185, 191, 193
Argon 37	Palladium 103, 109
Arsenic 76*, 77*	Phosphorus 32*
Barium 131, 137, 140	Platinum 197
Bismuth 210	Polonium 210
Bromine 82*	Potassium 42*
Cadmium 109, 115 (2.3d), 115 (43d)	Praseodymium 142, 143, 144
Calcium 45*	Promethium 147, 149
Carbon 14*	Rhenium 186, 188
Cerium 141, 143, 144	Rhodium 105, 106
Cesium 131, 134, 137	Rubidium 86
Chlorine 36*	Ruthenium 97, 103, 106
Chromium 51	Samarium 153
Cobalt 60*	Scandium 46*
Copper 64*	Selenium 75
Europium 152, 154	Silver 110*, 111*
Gallium 72	Sodium 24*
Germanium 71, 77	Strontium 89*, 90*
Gold 197, 198*, 199	Sulfur 35*
Hafnium 181	Tantalum 182
Indium 114	Technetium 97, 99
Iodine 131*	Tellurium 127, 129, 131
Iridium 192, 194	Thallium 204
Iron 55*, 59*	Tin 113*, 121, 123*
Lanthanum 140	Wolfram 185, 187
Mercury 197, 203*	Xenon 131
Molybdenum 99	Yttrium 90, 91
Neodymium 147	Zinc 65*, 69
Nickel 59, 63	Zirconium 95, 97
Niobium 95	

These include all isotopes distributed in the U.S. on an unrestricted basis. One isotope distributed in the U.S. on a limited basis—hydrogen-3 (tritium)—is not available for export.

In order to buy U.S.-produced isotopes, foreign users must agree (1) to furnish the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, upon request, or at intervals of not more than one year, results of progress obtained with the use of radioisotopes procured from its facilities; and (2) to facilitate exchange of information and visits, relative to work with radioisotopes, between qualified scientists, without regard to nationality, in accordance with normal scientific practice. Foreign purchases of U.S.-produced isotopes must be made through a representative in the United States who has been designated by the foreign government to handle all matters connected with isotope shipments to that country.

If and when the demand for any particular U.S.-produced isotope exceeds the supply, no foreign orders will be filled until all domestic applications have been taken care of.

The procedures which foreign buyers must use in ordering isotopes from the United States, as well as information on the procedures U.S. buyers must use in ordering isotopes from Canada and the United Kingdom, are described in the 1951 Isotopes Catalog, available from the AEC Isotopes Division, Export-Import Branch, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

The United Nations and the United States—July 1951

By Ambassador Ernest A. Gross
Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N.¹

There could hardly be a more fitting moment than this in which to take an inventory of the United Nations—and what it means to the American people.

The scope of events now taking place cannot be fully assessed by our own generation. But there are some essential facts which can be judged now as clearly as they will be by future historians.

Korea is not at all the first attempt in history to meet the threat of imperialism and of a degenerate ideology. Frequently, men have confronted an aggressive imperialism seeking world domination. Barbarism has often marched up to the gates of freedom. However, Korea is the first attempt the world community has ever made to organize against such a challenge through collective action of the whole.

Our times are therefore unique in the history of man's struggle for security. But the question is, What are the essential ingredients of effective collective action? We correctly think of security now primarily in terms of the struggle with Communist imperialism. But we should not concentrate our attention too exclusively on their familiar procedures: aggression, displays of force, and subversion. I stress another source of the great danger.

The strategic political frontiers are vital and must be guarded. However, the victim and the target of the Iron Curtain system is the individual. The strategic frontiers of the free world are the minds of free men. I would demonstrate the truth of this by asking you to consider the nature of the world we live in today and the means used by the Communists to achieve their goal of world conquest.

We are cradled in the American way of life. How easy it is for us not to know—and how often we forget—the facts of other ways of life. More than two-thirds of the entire population of the world subsist on a diet inadequate under any

standard. More than one-half are illiterate—without the elementary knowledge we demand of our 7- and 8-year old children. A small minority lives under truly democratic governments.

The Soviet leaders and their satellites survey important sections of the outside world in which the minds of men are full of tension and fear. In addition to suffering from hunger and poverty, large numbers of people look darkly through the hang-over of a recent colonialism. There are the people of the new states—proud and insecure—whose primary concern is to achieve domestic stability and a fitting place in the community of nations. The menace of some seemingly remote aggression is for them a very distant drum. Their concern is more often the threat from across the frontier or even from within. These states and their peoples look toward the United Nations to preserve them from dangers they perceive close to their own doorsteps.

Countless millions who aspire to what the Charter describes as “better standards of life in larger freedom” have yet to take the first steps on the road that leads away from the false promise of communism. We must remember that these people frequently do not embrace Communist slavery of their own free will.

I do not believe it necessary to recount in detail the major problems with which the United Nations dealt prior to Korea, and the successes it achieved. But it should be remembered that the greatest of these successes were those involving disputes between members of the free world. And some of the disputes which are now before the United Nations threaten to explode into conflicts of a sort which have often before in history led to major wars.

It is quite appropriate to speak of the “free world.” But I think it is important to agree upon a definition of that term, otherwise we run a serious risk of resting upon a comfortable illusion that there is some kind of magic formula or ritual which binds together all anti-Communist governments and peoples.

¹ Address made before the University of Virginia Institute of Public Affairs, Charlottesville, Va., on July 13 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

U.S. and U.N. Share Common Goals

There is no such formula or ritual. But there is a bond, and it is of decisive importance to our own security to understand what that bond is.

To my mind, the key to understanding is the similarity between the preamble to the Constitution of the United States and the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. I refer to substance rather than language—to the objectives for which men live and die.

The people of the United States established a constitution "in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

The peoples of the United Nations established a charter to unite the strength to create conditions under which justice can be maintained, to insure international peace and security, to provide for common defense against aggression, to promote social progress and better standards of life, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights. These are the common elements: justice, peace, common defense, promotion of welfare and liberty. The parallel is of course not accidental.

The "free world" comprises those peoples which support and wish loyally to carry out the principles of the United Nations Charter. I do not think there is any other common denominator.

Certainly individual men and women everywhere aspire to these purposes. The tragedy of the slave world is the forcible suppression of human aspirations. But what characterizes the free world and constitutes its only valid definition is common adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. Men everywhere who are free to think for themselves know that these also are our fundamental principles.

This truth has for us such a momentous significance that I believe we would fail to realize it only at the gravest risk to our security. For what must concern us, along with our own national integrity and well-being, is to prevent the fragmentation of the world and the subjection of men to the new barbarism. This would inevitably happen if the one common bond of the free world were to be destroyed.

The Soviet leaders who signed the Covenant of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945 soon learned that they had subscribed to a set of principles and joined an organization which could not be deformed into an instrument of Soviet control. The record of their relationship to the Organization since 1945 is a record of obstruction, nonparticipation, walk-out, and finally, in the case of Korea, overt aggression against the Charter.

It is a curious fact which we of the United States delegation to the United Nations have frequently observed that the Soviet leaders have usually attacked actions of which they did not approve by asserting that such actions were "contrary to the

Charter" or "illegal under the Charter." This we have felt to be an unconscious tribute to the moral strength of United Nations principles which, as in the case of the Scriptures, leads an unwilling devil to quote them. Beyond this, it has a great political significance. It reveals the awareness of the Kremlin that in large and important areas of the world encompassed in their plan of conquest, principles of the Charter have a solid and enduring appeal to the minds of men.

U.S. Integrity Important to World Security

There is another important aspect of this matter which relates most directly to the role of the United Nations in our own foreign policy. I think the American people are aware that the greatest single force in the world today is the force of American public opinion. But we do not always realize the extent to which many foreign governments formulate their own policies and make decisions vital to their own national security on the basis of their peoples' faith and confidence in our integrity. It is a constant source of pride to your delegates to the United Nations to observe this in our constant dealings with representatives of other members of the free world.

No one is more aware of the importance of this fact than are the leaders of international communism. They act on the basis that the greatest obstacle upon their own road to world conquest is the confidence of large populations all over the world in our continued support of the United Nations Charter. It is for this reason that they single us out for special attack and accuse us through all their propaganda devices of committing wrongs against the Charter of which in fact they themselves are guilty.

I do not think many people are fooled by this technique. There are undoubtedly some who fail to realize how essential it is for us to retain the confidence which has been so spontaneously and generally reposed in us as the primary guardians of the Charter.

The importance of retaining this confidence must be viewed in the light of the nature of the world in which Communists seek to accomplish their objectives. It must be appraised on the basis of the aspirations which all men share as human beings: aspirations which Communist leadership constantly attempts to betray and to subvert.

All men wish for economic improvement. In terms of the United Nations Charter, this must be defined as cooperative action for the purpose of improving standards of life of people everywhere. The only answer to the false promises of the Kremlin is the cold record of practical accomplishment. This necessarily involves for us the most mature participation in international programs of economic development and technical assistance which take fully into account priorities of effort, sound allocation of our large but limited resources and

nergies, and the most effective possible administrative procedures.

Programs of mutual economic assistance for the free world are as much a part of our arsenal of defense as are our military defense programs themselves. The question is not one of choice between them, but of the wisest execution of both.

Men also everywhere aspire to freedom. Our leadership must also necessarily be in the direction of promoting increased observance and application of fundamental human rights and individual liberties. The closed Communist system has not been able to conceal even from the least informed the true nature and significance of the Iron Curtain.

Iron Curtain Is Means of Enslavement

The minds of men are enslaved and corrupted through the device of the Iron Curtain even more than by the lash or the concentration camp. The Kremlin rulers cannot expect to gain the world's confidence so long as they isolate men's minds by vast radio jamming operations, by rigid press censorship, and by prohibiting the circulation of people and of the media of public information. Can the Cominform leaders doubt that their present course is a swamp, breeding suspicion, fear, and mounting tension?

The Iron Curtain is the complete negation of one of the most fundamental principles of the United Nations: the principle of communication of ideas and of information.

We hear talk from behind the Iron Curtain of "co-existence." The concept of "co-existence" is as cold and as blind a thing. It creates in my mind a vision of convicts in cell blocks. People do not normally boast of their willingness to allow members of their community to "co-exist" with them. We take this for granted in our own society, and we have stern laws enforcing such a primitive and elementary right. What *we* are proud of is the friendly, mutual, and constructive way of life which builds a *better* existence, not a mere "co-existence."

The Charter of the United Nations looks toward cooperation, rather than mere co-existence; toward harmonizing actions of nations for better existences for all—not in keeping communities whirling in fixed orbits separated by vacuums of space.

In addition to the aspirations for economic improvement and wider observance of human rights and individual freedoms, men everywhere aspire for security in their countries and in their homes. There is no alternative to collective action for the achievement of security. The opposite of collective security is complete insecurity.

The effort of the people of the free world to march toward these goals, to fulfill these aspirations, is the unrelenting target of the Communist conspiracy. This, to my mind, is the decisive significance of Korea.

Korea Jolted Communist Plan of Conquest

The Communist imperialists undertook this enormous risk and engaged upon a course of disastrous folly because the free world was making progress and the United Nations represented the organizational expression of that progress. The Communist master plan of aggression could not hope to succeed without breaking the will to resist and weakening the means of resistance which are found under the flag of collective action.

Whether or not an armistice issues from the negotiations now in progress, the world has succeeded under our leadership in frustrating an overt Communist attempt to demolish the United Nations collective security system. The spontaneous reaction of the free world to the Korean aggression must have shocked those who believed they could terrorize the United Nations into helplessness.

Everyone, no matter how immured behind iron curtains and stone walls, must now be aware that aggression has not been tolerated and that the free world has shown its determination to repel it. There should be no more tragic Communist miscalculations as the one which occurred on June 25, 1950.

The United States Government is confident that the people of the United Nations will not forsake the people of Korea whose land has been devastated by the ruthless and unprovoked aggression of June 25. Nor should there be any illusion that the United Nations will surrender its often stated policy for a unified, independent, and democratic Korea established by the people of Korea.

The Communist master plan for world conquest undoubtedly has been seriously jolted and set back by the United Nations action in Korea. There is of course no evidence to justify the belief that the plan has been abandoned or seriously modified. The strength of the United Nations is growing but we must not permit that strength to be dissipated and along with it the moral unity of the free world.

What do these facts mean to the United States? They seem to me to yield at least one inescapable conclusion. Turn in whatever direction we will, the principles of the United Nations will remain the concrete expression of the aspirations of men and of their hope for security. The only question is whether these aspirations and hopes will come to fruition—however gradually—under our leadership or whether they will be subverted and stunted to the false leadership of international communism.

The minds of free men will either be mobilized under the leadership of those who support the principles of the United Nations, or be regimented under the leadership of those who negate those principles.

We can be certain of this at least. There will be leadership, and the choice of who the leader shall be is ours to make.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Invites 50 Nations To Sign Peace Treaty With Japan

[Released to the press July 20]

The United States, as the host Government, extended to 50 nations at war with Japan an invitation to attend a conference at San Francisco on September 4, 1951, for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace with Japan.

The invitation has been extended to the following nations at war with Japan:

Argentina	Iraq
Australia	Lebanon
Belgium	Liberia
Bolivia	Luxembourg
Brazil	Mexico
Burma	New Zealand
Canada	Nicaragua
Ceylon	Norway
Chile	Pakistan
Colombia	Panama
Costa Rica	Paraguay
Cuba	Peru
Czechoslovakia	Poland
Dominican Republic	Saudi Arabia
Ecuador	Syria
Egypt	The Netherlands
El Salvador	The Philippines
Ethiopia	Turkey
France	Union of South Africa
Greece	Union of Soviet
Guatemala	Socialist Republics
Haiti	United Kingdom
Honduras	Uruguay
India	Venezuela
Indonesia	Yugoslavia
Iran	

The Protocol referred to in the invitation deals with technical matters relating to the extension of time for the enforcement of prewar private contracts and negotiable instruments, insurance contracts, etc., and is available for signature by such countries as prefer to deal with these matters by international convention rather than by their own private law. Many countries, including the United States, prefer to rely upon their own negotiable instruments laws and judicial precedents. The Protocol is thus optional and will probably only be availed of to a limited extent. The Proto-

col does not have to be signed at San Francisco but remains open indefinitely for signature.

Copies of the revised text of the Draft Treaty, dated July 20, and two Declarations by Japan are annexed to the invitation.¹

The text of the invitation follows:

The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have the honor to enclose herewith two copies of a draft of peace treaty with Japan, of two Declarations by Japan, and of a Protocol. The draft Peace Treaty and the two Declarations have been prepared on the basis of earlier drafts and observations thereon by countries which were actively concerned in the Japanese war. The draft Protocol which is open for signature at any time has been proposed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and is circulated for the information and comment of those countries whose domestic law permits them to sign it. It is believed that the enclosed draft Treaty and Declarations combine and reconcile, as far as is practicable, the point of view of all the Allied Powers which were at war with Japan and will establish, with Japan, a just and durable peace.

The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be happy to receive comments on the enclosed draft, which should be addressed to the Government of the United States of America as promptly as is convenient. After receipt of these comments they propose to circulate a final text of the Peace Treaty on August 13, 1951.

The Government of the United States of America has the honor to invite your Government to a Conference for conclusion and signature of a Treaty of Peace with Japan on the terms of that text. The Conference will convene at San Francisco, U. S. A., on September 4, 1951.

Concurrent and identical invitations are being sent to the other Allied Powers at war with Japan, except where special circumstances exist.

The Government of Japan has advised the Government of the United States of America that it will be represented at San Francisco by duly accredited delegates empowered to sign the Treaty and Declarations on behalf of the Government of Japan.

It will be appreciated if your Government will, in due course, notify the Government of the United States of America at Washington, D. C., whether it accepts this invitation.

Any inquiries relating to the organization of the Confer-

¹ BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 132.

and the provision of facilities for duly accredited delegates, their advisers and staff, may be addressed to the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

President Names U.S. Delegates To Conclude Peace, Security Treaties

Released to the press by the White House July 20]

The President named the United States delegations to conclude the contemplated Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Security Treaty of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and the United States-Japan Security Treaty.

The Secretary of State and John Foster Dulles, together with Senator Tom Connally and Senator Alexander Wiley, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will be members of all three delegations, with plenipotentiary powers. Additional delegates with power to act as alternates to those above named will be:

For the Japanese Peace Treaty:

Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and Representatives James P. Richards, Chairman, and John M. Vorys, Minority Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

For the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty:

Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, the Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and Representatives Mike Mansfield and Walter H. Judd, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Foreign Affairs Far Eastern Subcommittee.

For the United States-Japan Security Treaty:

Senators Richard B. Russell and Styles Bridges, the Chairman and Ranking Minority member, of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senators John J. Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith, the Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and Representatives Carl Vinson and Dewey Short, the Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Deputies' Meeting Strengthened Western Powers

*Statement by Ambassador at Large
Philip C. Jessup¹*

I am glad to have this opportunity to discuss the broader aspects of the recent meetings of the four-power deputies at the Palais Rose in Paris.

¹ Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Network on July 20 and released to the press on the same date.

These meetings in Paris were merely one of the stages in the continuing difficult relationship between the United States and other members of the free world on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. Some results of the meetings are already clear; others may become apparent later.

Since my return I have been asked many times just why we went to Paris. In the broad sense, it is accurate to say that we went to Paris to see if the Russians were ready to enter into honest negotiation on at least some of the issues which split the world today.

These issues stem from the aggressive policies which the Soviet Union has pursued since the end of World War II.

These Soviet policies, backed by excessively large armed forces, have posed a clear danger to the security of the free nations—a danger which became even more acute with the flagrant Communist aggression in Korea. Faced with this deliberate and unprovoked violation of peace, the free nations intensified their efforts to build effective defenses, both individually and within the collective framework set up by the North Atlantic Treaty.

At Paris the deputies of the United States, Great Britain, and France were assigned a relatively simple task by their governments. We were to meet with the Soviet delegate and agree upon a straightforward list of problems at issue among the four powers with relation to the situation in Europe. This list of problems was then to be used as the agenda for a later meeting of the four Foreign Ministers.

We were instructed to ask that these problems be stated fairly and impartially. Beyond this, the Western deputies sought to impose no conditions upon their Soviet colleague. Our task was to indicate the complete willingness of our governments to enter into honest negotiation toward establishment of a genuine and just world peace.

I am sorry to say that, after 4 months and 73 meetings, we were unable to report any indication of a similar willingness upon the part of the Soviet Union.

On the contrary, the Soviet deputy apparently had no idea except to use the Palais Rose as a sounding board for Cominform propaganda. He sought constantly to indict the free nations for their efforts to defend themselves. He seemed to insist that the free nations should agree to bargain away their right to self-defense. For example, he contended that the North Atlantic Treaty was an aggressive pact, which threatened the security of the Soviet Union.

We pointed out that no nation need fear the North Atlantic Treaty unless it had aggressive designs against one of the member states. This simple statement of obvious fact, based upon the treaty itself, had no effect upon the Soviet delegate. He continued to throw up his propaganda

smokescreen and to hamstring the work of the conference.

After the most exhaustive efforts we were forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was using the Paris meetings solely in an effort to hamper the defense effort of the free nations. The Soviet delegate sought to throw doubt on our honest motives; he sought to divide us and to confuse us.

He failed. The Western Powers emerged from the Paris meetings more closely united than ever, and with stronger support from their free allies. Public opinion, especially in Western Europe, strongly condemned the Kremlin for its stubborn opposition, and gave fresh strength to the collective defense efforts of the Atlantic Community.

Armistice Negotiations in Korea

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press July 19]

The Communist delegation at Kaesong has raised the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in connection with an armistice. The United Nations Command delegation has stated that it cannot go into this question, which is political in character and can only be settled by the United Nations and the governments concerned.

This is no theoretical argument as to whether the question is political or military. The United Nations forces are in Korea because of decisions made by governments to send them to Korea in response to a request by the United Nations. They are there to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area.

If there is an effective armistice, a United Nations force must remain in Korea until a genuine peace has been firmly established and the Korean people have assurance that they can work out their future free from the fear of aggression. The size of the United Nations force remaining in Korea will depend upon circumstances and, particularly, upon the faithfulness with which an armistice is carried out.

Korea's neighbors know that the presence of United Nations forces in Korea constitutes no danger or threat to themselves. The repeated expressions of policy by the United Nations and, indeed, the very nature of that organization, furnish them entirely adequate guarantees on this point.

Once before, foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea as a part of a U.N. plan to reach a final settlement of the Korean problem. The

The Paris meetings have now passed into history—another chapter in our continuing effort to establish a just peace through honorable means and without the horror of war.

I have no doubt that there will be other such meetings. The mounting strength of the free world must eventually make it clear to the Soviet Union that aggression will not pay.

We closed no doors at Paris. Before the meetings ended, we invited the Soviet Union, together with Britain and France, to attend a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Washington. That invitation is still open. If it were not for the opposition of the Soviet Union, the four Ministers would be meeting here next Monday [July 23].

Communists defied this effort and committed aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Korean people can be assured that a repetition of this act will not be tolerated.

U.N. COMMUNIQUÉS

[JULY 16]

Convening for the fourth time, the armistice negotiations continued at 10 a. m. today [8 p.m. July 15, Eastern daylight time].

All procedural matters having been previously agreed upon, only agenda items were open for discussion.

The senior United Nations Command delegate opened the meeting, presenting further arguments in favor of the items on the agenda proposed by the United Nations Command.

After Admiral Joy spent the best part of the morning presenting the views of the United Nations Command delegation, General Nam Il requested a 2-hour recess to enable him to discuss these views with his delegation. Upon reconvening, General Nam Il presented the reaction of his delegation to the views of the United Nations Command.

The conference adjourned at 1:55 p. m. after having agreed to reconvene at 11 a. m. tomorrow, Tuesday, 17 July.

The United Nations Command delegation reports that some progress was made toward the formation of a mutual agreed-upon agenda.

The Communists have fulfilled their agreement with respect to the neutrality of the conference site in that no armed personnel were observed.

The United Nations Command delegation posed for United Nations photographers during the 2-hour recess and the Chinese-North Korean delegation posed after the conference was over.

[JULY 17]

Convening at 11 a. m. Seoul time today [9 p.m. July 16, Eastern daylight time], the fifth session of the Korean armistice negotiations was opened by the North Korean and Chinese senior delegate.

Most of the time of the morning session was taken up by discussion of the items of the agenda proposed by the United Nations Command with both senior delegates participating. In addition, clarification of definitions and translations took considerable time.

The afternoon session of the conference was more formal with the North Korean senior delegate elucidating and explaining details of his proposed agenda. Both the English and Chinese translations appear to have been prepared in advance.

The United Nations Command delegation felt that some progress may be recorded in the conference discussions.

The fifth session adjourned at 2:35 p.m. until 10 a.m. Seoul time, 18 July 1951.

[JULY 18]

The sixth session of armistice negotiations which convened at 9:58 this morning, Seoul time [7:58 p.m. July 17, Eastern daylight time], resulted in some additional progress being made toward the formation of a mutually acceptable agenda on which to base the detailed discussion. Nevertheless, at least one major issue remained unsolved when the conference recessed for the day. Agreement on the key point is essential to the successful completion of the first phase of the negotiations.

In order to hasten the conferences to their ultimate goal, the United Nations senior delegate accepted two points presented by the Communists on the phraseology of agenda items, after placing on the record the United Nations understanding of their basic intent.

Today's meeting moved rather ponderously, as had the previous meetings, due to language difficulties. Since three languages, Chinese, North Korean, and English, are used in the conferences, it was necessary for each statement from either side to be translated two times.

Twice during today's talks recesses were requested. The first, a 2-hour recess, was asked by the North Korean-Chinese delegation at 10:51 a.m. in order to study in detail a revised agenda which was presented by Admiral Joy at the conclusion of his opening statement of the morning.

At 12:55 p.m. the North Korean-Chinese delegation requested through their liaison officer an additional 30-minute recess.

The afternoon session opened at 1:34 p.m. with a statement by the senior Communist delegate which was followed by a detailed exploration by both sides of the points of issue. At 2:37 p.m. the United Nations delegate requested a 15-minute recess.

Shortly after reconvening at 2:54 p.m. the two delegations found an area of mutual agreement on phraseology of the second major point accepted during the day.

The conference adjourned at 3:34 p.m. (Seoul time) and will be resumed at 11 a.m. (Seoul time) tomorrow, 19 July 1951.

[JULY 19]

General Nam Il, North Korean-Chinese delegate, opened the seventh session of the armistice negotiations at 11 a.m. today [9 p.m. July 18, Eastern daylight time] by requesting the opinion of the United Nations senior delegate on the proposed North Korean-Chinese agenda.

Admiral Joy reiterated the United Nations stand that only matters of a military nature would be discussed. General Nam Il then replied with a statement obviously prepared in anticipation of the United Nations reply. The North Korean-Chinese senior delegate occupied the floor for approximately 18 minutes and made it clear that their position was unchanged on the question under debate. About two-thirds of this time was spent in the translation of this statement into English and Chinese.

At the conclusion of General Nam Il's statement, Admiral Joy suggested a 30-minute recess, to which the Communist delegation agreed.

After the recess the conference continued with discussions of the same subject. At 1:22 p.m. no progress had been made. It was agreed to adjourn until 10 a.m. (Seoul time), 20 July, 1951 (Friday).

Charges of Atrocities in Korea Called Propaganda To Discredit U. N. Action

U.N. doc. S/2232
Dated July 6, 1951

Letter dated 5 July, 1951, from the Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General

EXCELLENCY:

While President of the Security Council, the Representative of the Soviet Union circulated to the members of the Council a paper entitled "Report of the Women's International Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities Committed by the United States and Syngman Rhee Troops in Korea."¹ The charges contained in the paper are false. They were fabricated for the purpose of propaganda designed to discredit the United Nations effort in Korea. The purpose of circulating this paper under the guise of a Security Council document is transparent. It is inconsistent with the legitimate functions of the Security Council.

Because this paper has been circulated to the Security Council members, I would ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, to address this communication to members of the Security Council.

The United Nations Forces in Korea have been and are under instructions to observe at all times the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on:

1. the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
2. the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick, and ship-wrecked members of armed forces at sea;

¹ U.N. doc. S/2203, dated June 19, 1951.

3. the treatment of prisoners of war;
4. the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

In addition, they have been instructed to observe the applicable portions of the Hague Convention IV of 1907 as well as other pertinent principles of international law. These Conventions and principles have been observed by the United Nations forces.

There exists a legitimate, impartial organization of recognized international standing, one of whose functions is to investigate *bona fide* charges of the conduct of military operations not conforming to international law. The International Committee of the Red Cross is that organization. Its representatives are in a position to observe the conduct of United Nations Forces and have been given access to all information they may desire in order that they may submit a factual and impartial report.

The representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, however, as well as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, have constantly been

denied access to that part of Korea under Communist control.

The Unified Command urges that the conduct of all troops in Korea be subjected to investigation by a neutral and impartial group of recognized international standing, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. The so-called Women's International Democratic Federation is not such a neutral or impartial group, and its report is nothing other than a falsification designed for propaganda use. The Soviet delegate might pursue a more constructive course if, instead of forwarding propaganda documents to the Security Council, he would direct his influence toward the Communist Command in Korea to permit the customary humane practice of impartial observation and report. Let the International Committee of the Red Cross carry on in all of Korea as it has been doing in the Republic of Korea, its regular humanitarian function, and the United Nations will have an uncolored statement of the facts.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WARREN R. AUSTIN

U.S. Observes Administration of French Cameroons

*Statement by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre
U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council*¹

My delegation considers the record of developments in the Cameroons under French administration during the 2 years under review an encouraging one.

In the political field the advancement has been somewhat less marked than in the economic field. However, a number of significant political reforms either have been introduced or are under consideration. Among these my delegation regards as the most interesting and promising the experiment of introducing in the N'Tem Region the system of village bureaus directed by a committee composed of the heads of families and presided over by an elected chief.

My delegation lays particular stress on the growth of responsible representative local political institutions, and is particularly interested in the development of these small local units.

Another development of importance is the extension of the system of mixed communes to five urban centers in addition to Douala and Yaounde, and it is particularly encouraging to note that the municipal commissions of these new municipalities have African majorities. The members of these commissions are, however, appointed. My

delegation hopes that it will prove possible, particularly with regard to the older of the municipalities (i. e., Douala and Yaounde), to obtain the agreement of the Representative Assembly for the introduction of some kind of electoral system for selecting the members of the Municipal Commissions.

For some time the Council has recommended that the administering authority progressively extend the powers of the territory's Representative Assembly, particularly in the field of legislation. The Council may wish to express the hope that the draft legislation now under consideration, to extend the Representative Assembly's powers, will be adopted and implemented in the near future, and will provide for substantial legislative powers.

My delegation is glad to note the substantial increase in the number of registered electors and is particularly interested in the administration's proposal "to give the suffrage to all persons liable to payment of a lump sum by way of income tax and all persons exempted from this tax". The Council may wish to express the hope that the administering authority will pursue its plans for progressively expanding the electorate with universal suffrage as its objective.

Passing to the economic field, my delegation is pleased at the acceleration of the rate of economic

¹ Excerpts from a statement made in the Trusteeship Council on July 11 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

advancement during the 2 years under review. One index of the extent of economic advancement is the substantial increase in the import and export trade of the territory, an increase in both exports and imports, measured both by volume and by value.

My delegation is impressed with the substantial progress which has been made under the ten-year plan for economic and social development, particularly with respect to the development of new industrial establishments. The policy of the administering authority to associate the indigenous inhabitants in the industrial development of the territory seems to us a particularly happy one. I refer specifically to the plan whereby plants for the processing of palm oil are to be managed by a company in which 50 percent of the shares will be reserved for African subscribers. My delegation hopes that this policy of drawing the indigenous inhabitants into a participation in the industrial development of the territory will be increasingly pursued in the future.

The creation on November 22, 1949, of a new Soil Bureau is of particular interest. It is the hope of my delegation that it will be possible for the people of the territory, under the guidance of officials of this Bureau, to take effective steps to preserve the full soil resources of the territory.

May I mention one additional activity in the economic field? I refer to the active efforts of the administering authority to improve communications within the territory. Future economic development within the territory so clearly depends upon the establishment of an effective all-weather system of communications that my delegation feels that the Council may well wish to commend the administering authority for the attention which it is devoting to road construction in the territory, and to express the hope that it may even find it possible to expand and accelerate its program.

The reports of the administering authority indicate that there has been steady progress in the educational field during 1949 and 1950. The number of pupils in public primary schools has increased from 21,332 in 1949 to 26,682 in 1950. Moreover, the educational budget of the territory which totaled 6 percent of the total budget in 1946 rose to 10 percent in 1950 and 12 percent in the 1951 estimates. These advances, although indicative of the importance which the administering authority attaches to education, must be considered in the context of the magnitude of the problem. Considered in this context, they become less impressive. The administering authority itself in the section of the 1950 report dealing with education indicates its recognition of the vastness of the problem. I refer to page 247 of the 1950 report where it is stated:

... it is evident that ... a great number not only of adults but even of young children are not able to receive knowledge of the first rudiments.

It is also clearly evident that the lack of teachers constitutes perhaps the greatest bottleneck to educational advancement in the territory. My delegation welcomes the opening of the Nkongsamba normal school and hopes that the administering authority will accelerate its efforts in this all-important field of teacher training. It also hopes that bold and imaginative steps will be taken to meet this critical and larger problem of providing adequate educational facilities at all levels. Upon the solution of this problem depends to a large degree advancement in the political, economic, and social fields. Indeed, upon its successful solution depends the entire future welfare of the people of the territory.

In the social field our interest was stimulated by the establishment in 1949 of a Service of Social Affairs and the institution of a program of welfare work with trained social workers.

Another promising new service was established in December 1950 in the field of housing, the *Service de l'Habitat*. The problem of providing adequate housing in the growing towns of the territory is being rendered increasingly acute by the rapid economic expansion which the territory is undergoing.

My delegation has shared the concern of the Council in the past with regard to the relatively low wage rates in the territory, and is glad to note the evidence in the two reports under review of an increasing standard of living for workers. We understand that minimum wage rates were substantially increased in 1950. Nevertheless, in general, wages in the territory still seem to my delegation to be low. The Council may wish to urge that the administering authority continue and extend its study of the standards of living in the territory, review minimum wage rates at relatively frequent intervals, and, in general, make every effort to see that wage rates continue to increase sufficiently rapidly to compensate for prevailing inflationary tendencies.

My delegation was glad to note the evidence of the increasing effectiveness of the medical services in the territory. Since in the long run the medical needs of the territory can only be met by training large numbers of Africans, we found it encouraging that the number of African doctors with degrees from Dakar rose in 1950 from 58 to 61, and that one African received a degree of Doctor of Medicine in France in 1950. Yet these figures are still very small—too small to meet the needs of the territory. We feel that the Council may wish to urge the administering authority to intensify its efforts to train African medical personnel.

I should like to extend my congratulations to the administering authority and to the Special Representative, Mr. Watier, for the excellence of the 1949 and 1950 reports on Cameroons under French trusteeship. These reports have been manifestly prepared with great care.

International Materials Conference

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SULPHUR AND TUNGSTEN-MOLYBDENUM

Distribution of Tungsten and Molybdenum

[Released to the press by IMC July 8]

The International Materials Conference announced today that the member countries participating in the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee have accepted the Committee's conclusion that an interim plan of distribution of tungsten and molybdenum for the third calendar quarter of 1951 should be put into operation at once. These allocations will be in the nature of a stop-gap and should not be regarded as establishing a permanent pattern for future allocations. The plan includes an agreement on maximum and minimum prices for tungsten to apply during this period. While the distribution features of the plan were accepted unanimously, one member expressed a reservation with respect to the question of prices.

Eleven member countries are represented on the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee. They are: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

This plan has been forwarded to all affected governments for implementation.

The Committee's recommendations, which the participating governments have now accepted, deal primarily with the distribution of ores and concentrates of these two metals, which in both cases are in extremely short supply. The distribution of primary products (i. e., ferro-tungsten, tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, and ferro-molybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide) has been made the subject of a further recommendation by the Committee to the governments. The paragraphs below should be read as applying only to ores and concentrates of tungsten and molybdenum.

The plan of distribution recommended by the Committee and accepted by the governments is set forth in appendix I attached hereto. The amounts shown for each country include both the quantities obtained from their own production (if any) and from imports.

These tables are to be understood as follows:

1. The figures of quantities are the maximum share of total production in the free world which the consuming country named in the table may retain:

- a. out of its own domestic production, and/or
- b. out of imports

in the third calendar quarter of 1951 (i. e., from July 1 to September 30, 1951, both dates inclusive.)

2. For this purpose any quantity exported (i. e., shipped from ports or across national borders) by an exporting country in the period July 1 to September 30, 1951, both dates inclusive, shall be regarded as an import for that period into the consuming country to which the shipment is immediately consigned, unless clear reconsignment instructions accompany the particular shipment. In the latter event, the country to which the shipment is reconsigned shall be regarded as the importing country.

There will be a monthly review of the operation of the plan of distribution by the Committee. In the course of this review, any maladjustments or omissions will be brought to light. Maladjustments in previous allocations will be rectified in the ensuing 6-months period following the end of the quarter under review (i. e. any maladjustments up to September 30, 1951, should be adjusted in the period October 1, 1951 to March 31, 1952). If the actual out-turn of production either of tungsten or molybdenum for the third calendar quarter of 1951 proves to be either more or less than the estimates, upon which the plan of distribution has been based, the excess or deficiency would be distributed among the consuming countries at the same percentage rates as are set forth in appendix I.

Appendix II attached hereto shows the export and import quotas of tungsten and molybdenum ores and concentrates for the third calendar quarter of 1951 resulting from the plan of distribution now adopted.

Consuming countries' governments will be prepared, if necessary, to buy any part of their quotas which their private importers do not purchase,

and producing countries' governments will endeavor to insure to the best of their ability, that estimates of production are realized, thus enabling the agreed quotas to be fulfilled and the pattern of distribution to be followed.

The Committee also emphasizes the importance of full control of exports and imports of these two metals during the present emergency. To assist in insuring that allocations are implemented, full particulars of export licenses granted and actual exports by destination (including re-exports and exports of primary products) will be furnished by all governments to the IMC Secretariat; these particulars will be furnished monthly, within one month after the close of each month. Importing governments will similarly give particulars of imports; returns of imports will be furnished quarterly within one month after the close of each quarter.

Countries also are being asked to furnish monthly figures of production and consumption within one month of the period to which they relate.

In carrying out the arrangements above described, existing contracts will be respected so far as possible. If, however, such contracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molybdenum to any one importing country in excess of the amounts recommended, it is suggested that the importing country should sell shipments to other importing countries which have not yet filled their import quotas so far as possible without upsetting the original contractual arrangements.

The plan of distribution has already been notified to interested governments not represented on the Committee, and they also are being requested to cooperate in the plan. Upon the request of any interested government, the latter may be heard by the Committee to give further explanation of its interest.

All member governments, with the exception of Brazil, agreed to accept certain recommendations with regard to the price of tungsten for the third calendar quarter of 1951. The Government of Brazil reserved its position on the question of prices. The agreement reached was that, as a special measure, applicable to the third quarter, any spot transactions should take place under the following conditions:

Producers will not demand a price higher than 65 dollars per short-ton unit of WO_3 standard grade f. o. b. shipping port (or border, in case of overland shipments), and importers will purchase at prices not less than 55 dollars per short-ton unit of WO_3 standard grade f. o. b. shipping port (or border, in case of overland shipments).

These proposals apply exclusively to spot purchases and will effect no change in any long-term arrangements that may exist or may be negotiated between sellers and purchasers.

The question of longer term contracts is of great importance and is being considered urgently.

With regard to molybdenum, it is agreed that prices will, for the third calendar quarter, be in line with those now prevailing in the United States.

Appendices I and II follow:

APPENDIX I

Plan of Distribution of Ores and Concentrates for the Third Calendar Quarter of 1951

A. Tungsten

	<i>Metric Tons of Metal Content</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Allocated</i>
United States.....	1,255	44.8
United Kingdom.....	695	24.9
France.....	280	10.0
Germany.....	290	10.3
Sweden.....	210	7.5
Other Countries ¹	70	2.5
	2,800	100.0

¹ Divided as follows: Australia 15, Canada 26, Spain 13, Yugoslavia 16.

B. Molybdenum

	<i>Metric Tons of Metal Content</i>	<i>Percentage of Total Allocated</i>
United States.....	3,420	77.8
United Kingdom.....	515	11.7
France.....	195	4.4
Germany.....	125	2.8
Sweden.....	100	2.3
Other Countries ²	45	1.0
	4,400	100.0

² This is a reserve.

APPENDIX II

Schedule of Export and Import Quotas of Tungsten and Molybdenum for Third Calendar Quarter of 1951

(All figures in metric tons of metal content)

A. Tungsten

<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>	
Asia.....	180	Canada.....	25
Australia.....	165	France.....	175
Belgian Congo.....	35	Germany.....	290
Bolivia.....	600	Sweden.....	160
Brazil.....	125	United Kingdom.....	690
New Zealand.....	5	United States.....	630
Other W. Hemisphere.....	75	Yugoslavia.....	10
Other African.....	50	Other Countries.....	25
Portugal.....	500		
South Africa.....	20		
Southern Rhodesia.....	10		
Spain.....	240		
TOTAL.....	2,005	TOTAL.....	2,005

B. Molybdenum

<i>Exports</i>		<i>Imports</i>	
Chile.....	275	France.....	195
Norway.....	25	Germany.....	125
United States.....	680	Sweden.....	100
		United Kingdom.....	515
		Other Countries.....	45
TOTAL.....	980	TOTAL.....	980

Allocation of Crude Sulphur

[Released to the press by IMC July 11]

In view of the serious shortage of sulphur disclosed by its investigations, the Sulphur Committee of the International Materials Conference has unanimously recommended to governments an allocation of available world supplies of sulphur for the third quarter of 1951. Governments represented on the Committee have accepted these recommendations. The 11 member countries are: Australia, Belgium (representing BENELUX), Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

This is an allocation of crude sulphur only. The Committee has not sought to allocate the relatively small quantities of sulphur which enter into international trade as crushed, ground, refined, and sublimed sulphur, or in the form of flowers.

The attached schedule shows the quantity allocated to each country (column 2); the import quota of each importing country (column 3); the export quota (column 4) of the three exporting countries (Italy, Norway, and the United States) whose production has been taken into account by the Committee for the purpose of this allocation. Where the allocation exceeds the import quota, the difference is explained by domestic production or reduction of stocks.

In arriving at these recommendations, the Committee has examined statistics representing total world consumption of sulphur (excluding certain countries for which data are not obtainable). Most of this information has been supplied in response to a questionnaire circulated to member and nonmember governments last April. The Committee also has had the benefit of oral statements from certain nonmember governments who, in response to the Committee's general invitation to nonmember governments to do so, wished to supplement their written replies in this way. The governments heard were: Austria, Ceylon, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

In reaching its conclusions, the Committee has considered a number of factors, including forward requirements, trends of past consumption, the availability of sulphur-bearing materials other than native sulphur, the level of stocks, the conversion programs now under way in certain countries, and the special needs of defense. The results have been reached by common consent of the members of the Committee after careful examination of each individual case.

The figures in the schedule represent firm allocations for the third quarter of 1951. The Committee intends to recommend, by September 10, 1951, firm allocations for the fourth quarter.

The Committee has officially notified all interested governments of these arrangements.

The Sulphur Committee has set up a Management Subcommittee to deal with any procedural problems which may arise in connection with the allocation scheme.

Following is the Schedule of Allocation:

*Allocation Schedule of Crude Sulphur for the Third Quarter of 1951
(in 1,000 long tons)*

Country (1)	Allocation (2)	Import quota (3)	Export quota (4)
Argentina	8.2	0.0	-----
Australia	31.6	21.6	-----
Austria	6.5	6.5	-----
Belgium and Luxembourg	17.8	17.7	-----
Brazil	13.5	13.5	-----
Canada ¹	-----	-----	-----
Cuba	2.9	2.9	-----
Finland	4.5	4.5	-----
France	31.2	27.7	-----
French North Africa	4.5	4.5	-----
Germany	15.1	5.1	-----
India	11.4	11.4	-----
Israel	1.0	1.0	-----
Italy	² 36.0	-----	17.7
Netherlands	0.6	0.5	-----
New Zealand	16.6	16.6	-----
Norway	6.3	-----	18.7
South Africa	16.2	16.2	-----
Sweden	15.1	11.6	-----
Switzerland	6.8	6.8	-----
United Kingdom	106.3	105.0	-----
United States	11,050.0	-----	250.0
Oil Refineries in Bahrain, Lebanon, Netherlands An- tilles, Trinidad, Indone- sia, Iran.	8.5	8.5	-----
Other Countries	4.8	4.8	-----
TOTAL	1,415.4	286.4	286.4

¹ The Canadian allocation is included in the United States figure in column 2.

² Does not include 10,000 tons of crude sulphur to be exported as refined.

U.S. Member Named To U.N. Criminal Court

The Department of State announced on July 11 that George Maurice Morris had been designated as the representative of the United States on the U.N. Committee on International Criminal Court.

The Committee was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations by a resolution of December 12, 1950, for the purpose of preparing one or more preliminary draft conventions and proposals relating to the establishment and the statute of an international criminal court. The first meeting of the Committee will be held on August 1, 1951, at Geneva. The countries represented on the Committee are Australia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, India,

Iran, Israel, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Syria, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.

Mr. Morris was born in Chicago on May 3, 1889. He received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Dartmouth College in 1911 and a Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from the University of Chicago in 1915. Admitted to the Illinois bar in 1915, he began the practice of law at Chicago and moved to Washington in 1919. He has been a member

of the law firm of Morris, Kix Miller, and Baar since 1934.

Mr. Morris is a former president of the American Bar Association. He has also served as president of the General Alumni Association of Dartmouth College and of the Alumni Association of the University of Chicago. He is the author of a number of books and articles on legal subjects.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Conference On Public Education

The Department of State announced on July 12 that the United States representatives to the fourteenth International Conference on Public Education at Geneva, Switzerland, July 12-21, 1951, under the joint sponsorship of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Bureau of Education. The United States delegation is as follows:

Earl J. McGrath, Ph. D., L. H. D., (*chairman*) Commissioner of Education, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency.

Finis E. Engleman, Ph. D., State Commissioner of Education, Hartford, Conn.

Galen Jones, Ph. D., LL. D., Director, Instruction, Organization and Services Branch, Division of State and Local School Systems, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency.

Raymond F. McCoy, Ed. D., Director, Graduate School, and Head, Department of Education, Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio.

H. Arnold Perry, Ed. D., Professor of Elementary Education, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C.

The major topic to be considered at the conference, in which more than 80 countries have been invited to participate, will be the problem of making free compulsory education more nearly universal and longer in duration. In preparation for the conference, the International Bureau of Education has undertaken a world-wide general survey of the subject, based on a questionnaire addressed to governments; UNESCO has made studies on compulsory education in six typical countries; and the International Labor Organization has contributed a study of child labor and compulsory education.

It is expected that, by virtue of its emphasis on the topic of compulsory education, the conference will be of particular significance in furthering UNESCO's campaign to make the right of education, as set forth in article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more generally enforceable.

The two other topics on the agenda for the conference are "School Meals and Clothing Facilities" and "Annual Reports of Ministries of Education for the Year 1950-51."

Ninth World Poultry Congress

On July 19 the Department of State announced that the Ninth World's Poultry Congress will meet at Paris from August 2 through August 9, 1951, under the auspices of the French Government.

Objectives of the Congress will be to stimulate interest in world poultry affairs, to pool information concerning recent developments of the many aspects of the poultry industry, to intensify the fight against disease in poultry, and to encourage the development of scientific research work and education in connection with the production and marketing of poultry products.

The United States, in which the poultry industry is one of the most important branches of agriculture and ranked fourth in the production of gross farm income in 1949, will be represented at the Congress by the following official delegation:

Berley Winton, (*Chairman*)

Director, U.S. Poultry Research Laboratory,
East Lansing, Mich.

Government Advisers

Herbert R. Bird, Ph.D.,

Animal Husbandry Division of the Bureau of Animal
Industry,
Department of Agriculture

C. Rowena Schmidt Carpenter,

Poultry Branch,
Production and Marketing Administration,
Department of Agriculture

Edward Karpoff,

Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
Department of Agriculture

Industry Advisers

- H. H. Alp,
American Farm Bureau Federation,
Chicago 1, Ill.
- Cliff D. Carpenter, M. S.,
President, Institute of American Poultry Industries,
Chicago, Ill.
- Clyde C. Edmonds,
Secretary and General Manager,
Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
- Arthur D. Goldhaft,
Director, Vineland Poultry Laboratories,
Vineland, N. J.
- Leslie S. Hubbard,
President, National Poultry Producers Federation,
Lancaster, Pa.
- Homer I. Huntington,
Manager, Poultry and Egg National Board,
Chicago 6, Ill.
- R. George Jaap, Ph.D.,
Ohio State University,
Department of Poultry Husbandry,
Columbus 10, Ohio
- Jesse D. Jewell,
President, J. D. Jewell, Inc.,
Gainesville, Ga.
- Roy Lynnes,
Publisher, Poultry Supply Dealer,
Chicago, Ill.
- E. S. McConnell,
Browning Turkey Farm,
Winchester, Ky.
- Kathryn Bele Niles,
Poultry and Egg National Board,
Member of the American Home Economics Assn.,
Chicago 6, Ill.
- Leavitt C. Parsons,
Publisher, "Poultry Industry,"
Boston 16, Mass.
- Thomas W. Staley,
General Manager, Staley Milling Company,
Kansas City, Mo.
- J. D. Sykes,
Vice President, Ralston Purina Company,
St. Louis 2, Mo.
- Alfred Van Wagenen,
Managing Director, Northeastern Poultry Producers
Council,
Trenton 8, N. J.

Discussion will be facilitated by a division of the Congress into five sections which will deal respectively with poultry genetics and incubation; nutrition, physiology, and rearing; investigation of poultry diseases and their control; economic problems, including marketing; and education and organization. An exhibition, which is to be held in conjunction with the Congress, will serve to demonstrate recent improvements in the breeding of poultry and will enable the participants in the Congress to examine a wide variety of materials, food products, and veterinary patents connected with the poultry industry.

The poultry congresses are triennial meetings of the World's Poultry Science Association, organized in 1912 and composed of leaders of the world's poultry industry. The First Congress was held in the Netherlands in 1921, and the Eighth Congress was held at Copenhagen, Denmark, August 20-27, 1948.

History Teaching Seminar

The Department of State announced on July 11 that the United States Government will be represented at a seminar in the teaching of history in elementary and secondary schools, to be held at Sèvres, France, July 18-August 21, 1951, under the sponsorship of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

The United States delegation is as follows:

- John U. Michaelis, Ph. D., (*Chairman*)
Director, Supervised Teaching,
University of California,
Berkeley, Calif.
- Elizabeth Bein,
Teacher, American and World History,
East High School,
Denver, Colo.
- Ruth M. Robinson,
Supervisor, Elementary School Social Studies,
Cleveland, Ohio.

Dr. Howard R. Anderson, Associate Chief, Secondary Schools, Division of State and Local School Systems, United States Office of Education, will be one of the seminar group leaders.

Participants in the Seminar on the Teaching of History as a Means of Developing International Understanding will seek to attain their objective through comparative study of history teaching in the elementary and secondary schools of the various countries represented, through discussion of educational and technical problems common to all history teachers, through examination of questions relating to the training of history teachers for primary and secondary schools, and through the drafting of plans for post-seminar activities to be carried out in their respective countries.

In making arrangements for the work of this seminar, UNESCO has stressed the importance of taking into account actual curricula, rather than emphasizing the ideal curriculum of history teaching, and of studying the different systems of history teaching in effect in order to find means for using the better systems more extensively.

This seminar, in which there will be some 80 participants, will be one of the links in a series begun by the Seminar on the Teaching of Geography as a Means of Developing International Understanding held in 1950 at MacDonald College in Canada. It will also further the work of the Seminar on the Improvement of Textbooks, particularly history books, held at Brussels in 1950, where two working groups initiated studies of problems relating to syllabuses of history teaching and to the publication and exchange of history books.

"The United States in the United Nations,"
a weekly feature, does not appear in this issue but
will be resumed in the issue of August 6.

Congress Asked for Further Measures on Illegal Entry of Migrant Workers

VIOLATIONS OF CONTRACT TERMS WITH MEXICO CAUSE CONCERN

Message of the President to the Congress

Released to the press by the White House July 13]

I have approved S. 984, an Act relating to the recruitment and employment of agricultural workers from Mexico.

If promptly followed up by other needed measures, this Act can be a first step toward a comprehensive program to bring badly needed improvements in the living and working conditions of migratory farm workers, both foreign and domestic. At the same time, this Act can help to assure an adequate supply of labor to meet the needs of American agriculture. On the other hand, if enactment of this legislation becomes an excuse for delay on these other measures, it will hamper our efforts to meet more basic problems—including the pressing problem of illegal immigration.

For that reason, I could not have given my approval to this Act had I not been assured by congressional leaders that supplementary legislation and appropriations would receive prompt consideration at this session.

For many years, the Mexican Government, by agreement with the United States, has allowed its citizens to come into this country on contracts with agricultural employers to assist in harvesting vital crops—principally cotton, sugar beets, citrus fruits, and vegetables—and mostly in the southwestern part of the United States.

During and since the last war, the recurrent shortages of farm labor in the United States have made the addition of contract workers from Mexico a vital factor in bringing in the crops. Last year, for example, 70,000 Mexican workers were legally admitted to this country for contract work during the harvesting season.

However, both this Government and the Mexican Government have become increasingly concerned about violations of the contract terms under which Mexican citizens are employed in this country. We must make sure that contract wages will in fact be paid, that transportation within this country and adequate reception centers for Mexi-

can workers will in fact be provided. It is necessary, therefore, that this Government be able to stand behind all contracts and guarantee performance in the future, if any more Mexican citizens are to be legally recruited for work in the United States. Until this can be done, Mexico has taken steps to terminate the agreement under which her citizens were brought to this country in the past and will make a new agreement only if these guarantees are given.

It is the purpose of S. 984 to give this Government the authority needed to make a mutually satisfactory new agreement with Mexico, which would include these guarantees. Under the terms of this Act, the United States Government, subject to a fixed reimbursement by the employer, will be able to recruit and transport Mexican workers to reception centers in this country, to house and care for these workers until they are employed, to help them make arrangements with American employers, and to guarantee performance by employers of the terms of their employment contracts.

With this authority, it should be possible to reach a new agreement with Mexico. This Act will thus take care of one immediate problem, the harvesting of crops this year. It will also undoubtedly improve the situation of Mexican workers brought into this country for contract work. A government-to-government guarantee of wages and work standards for these workers will be a real step forward.

But this is very limited progress, which hardly touches our basic farm labor problems. The really crucial point, which this Act scarcely faces, is the steady stream of illegal immigrants from Mexico, the so-called "wetbacks," who cross the Rio Grande or the western stretches of our long border, in search of employment. These people are coming into our country in phenomenal numbers—and at an increasing rate. Last year 500,-

000 illegal immigrants were apprehended and returned to Mexico. In 1949 less than 300,000 were returned.

There are many thousands of these people who have escaped detection and remain in this country today. Thousands more will find their way here before the year is out. Since these unfortunate people are here illegally, they are subject to deportation if caught by our immigration authorities. They have to hide and yet must work to live. They are thus in no position to bargain with those who might choose to exploit them.

And many of them are exploited, I regret to say, and are left in abject poverty. They live always under the threat of exposure and deportation. They are unable, therefore, to protest or to protect themselves.

The presence of these illegal workers has a seriously depressing effect on wages and working conditions in farm areas throughout the southwest. The standards of living and job opportunities of American farm workers are under constant downward pressure. Thousands of our own citizens, particularly those of Latin descent, are displaced from employment or forced to work under sub-standard conditions because of the competition of these illegal immigrants.

Everyone suffers from the presence of these illegal immigrants in the community. They themselves are hurt, first of all. Our own workers—as well as the legal contract workers from Mexico—are hurt by the lowering of working and living standards. And the farmers are hurt, too. Instead of a well trained, reliable supply of workers, they are increasingly dependent on a rapidly shifting, ill-trained domestic labor force, supplemented legally or illegally from foreign sources. They face a crisis in their labor supply at every season. They are forced, year after year, to makeshift last minute measures to save their crops.

The President's Commission on Migratory Labor, in its recent report on the situation throughout the Nation, put the issue this way:

Shall we continue indefinitely to have low work standards and conditions of employment in agriculture thus depending on the underprivileged and the unfortunate at home and abroad to supply and replenish our seasonal and migratory work force? Or shall we do in agriculture what we already have done in other sectors of our economy—create honest-to-goodness jobs which will offer a decent living so that domestic workers, without being forced by dire necessity, will be willing to stay in agriculture and become a dependable labor supply? Just as farm employers want able and willing workers when needed, so do workers want reliable jobs which yield a fair living. Neither is being satisfied.

S. 984 does not face up to that basic issue.

The Act does, it is true, provide that Mexican workers may not legally be brought in unless the Secretary of Labor certifies a real shortage of domestic workers. The Act also provides that employment of Mexican contract labor must not adversely affect wages or working conditions of domestic workers. But these safeguards have lit-

tle meaning so long as illegal immigration continues—so long as illegal workers are in fact used by American employers to take the place of other workers.

If we are to begin to meet the basic problem, we must do two things right away. First, we must put a stop to the employment of illegal immigrants. Second, we must improve the use of our domestic labor force. These steps will require more sanctions than our laws now provide and more administrative machinery and services than are now available. Therefore, I recommend that the Congress take the following action:

First, legislation should be enacted providing punishment for the offense of harboring or concealing aliens who have entered this country illegally. While we have a law on the books purporting to make this an offense, that law is not enforceable, because no penalty was adequately provided. This should be remedied at once. In addition, to help discourage the smuggling of aliens, the existing provisions of law punishing transportation of illegal immigrants must be strengthened. While such legislation will be very useful in bringing illegal immigration from Mexico under control, it will also be a valuable addition to our general immigration laws.

Second, legislation should be enacted to clearly establish the authority of personnel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to inspect places of employment, without a warrant, where they have reason to believe that illegal immigrants are working or quartered. Immigration inspectors are able to cope with known illegal immigrants by obtaining warrants for their arrest. But where there are places of employment, consisting of many acres of land on which many workers are employed and quartered, inspection is necessary to find out whether illegal immigrants are among those workers. The inspections would involve no more, and probably a good deal less, than inspections of mines or factories by public authorities to assure compliance with accident prevention laws. Of course, a farmer's dwelling should be safe from search without a warrant. But there is no reason why other premises which serve as places of employment should not be open for inspection to aid in the enforcement of our immigration laws.

Third, a supplemental appropriation should be made available immediately to the Immigration and Naturalization Service to expand its personnel in the southwest so that all types of enforcement work can be stepped up—including apprehension, investigation, and deportation of illegal entrants. I shall shortly send a budget estimate for this purpose to the Congress.

It is absolutely impossible, without the expenditure of very large amounts of manpower and money, to seal off our long land borders to all illegal immigration. But these three actions by the Congress will give us the tools we need to find

and deport illegal immigrants once here and to discourage those of our own citizens who are aiding and abetting their movement into the country.

In this connection, I am glad to report that the Government of Mexico is contemplating more stringent measures on its own account to help curtail illegal crossings of our border.

As a *fourth* measure for immediate congressional action, I shall shortly forward to the Congress a supplemental budget estimate for the Farm Placement Service of the Labor Department.

It is not enough to take strong action against the stream of illegal immigrants. If we are to make real progress toward solving our basic farm labor problem, we must improve the utilization of our own citizens in the farm labor force, and reduce to a minimum our dependence on foreign sources. As a first step, we need at once to strengthen the machinery of the Department of Labor for surveying labor market needs and recruiting workers to fill these needs. This will be essential if we are to do an effective job under S. 984, in deciding how many contract workers to bring across the border and where they ought to be employed. It will be essential if we are to make this importation of foreign workers truly supplemental to our own resources of farm labor and give the fullest opportunity to those of our citizens who seek employment on the farm.

The additional funds for the Farm Placement Service will be used to expand labor-market studies which will be undertaken in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture. These funds will also permit an expansion of the field staff in rural areas, where large-scale employment of farm labor is required. The aim in these areas will be to find out exactly what workers are needed and find the right workers to do the job.

Finally, these funds will be used to expand the Government's operations in the manner required under S. 984, including transportation and reception of Mexican workers, inspection of contract operations and handling of complaints.

Unless all of these activities of the Farm Placement Service can be built up quickly and effectively, orderly operations under S. 984 will be impossible and we will lose the chance to make full use of our domestic supply of farm workers or to determine on a realistic basis our need for workers from abroad.

These four measures, supplementing the provisions of S. 984, will give us a real program with which to tackle the basic problems of farm labor in the southwest. They will help us also to make a start in other areas where agriculture is dependent on large-scale use of migratory workers.

There is one provision of S. 984 which could interfere quite seriously with our efforts to maintain labor standards in this country. This is the provision which so defines agricultural employment as to allow the Secretary of Labor to bring

in Mexican workers for employment in food processing trades as well as on the farm. It is essential that we keep the importation of Mexican workers from reducing the job opportunities or working conditions of our own citizens employed in these trades. To that end, I believe the Congress should repeal this provision. In the meantime, it will be necessary for the Secretary of Labor to use his discretion with great care and to authorize the employment of Mexican workers in these trades only in case of some genuine, unmistakable emergency.

The measures which I am now recommending to the Congress will not take care of all our problems by any means. The President's Commission on Migratory Labor, a group of distinguished citizens, recently completed an extensive investigation of migratory labor problems throughout the country. The Commission's report was submitted two months ago and is being intensively studied within the Executive Branch. It is a very useful and constructive document and it emphasizes, among other things, that the migratory workers in this country will need specially adapted programs to improve housing conditions and health, education, and social security. They will need these things if they are to develop into the kind of labor force so badly needed in agriculture today—a labor force which really meets the long-run requirements of large-scale "industrialized" farm production.

From time to time, therefore, as the report of this Commission is studied and appraised, I intend to send further recommendations to the Congress, looking toward more improvements in the working conditions and living standards of our migrant workers. Meanwhile, it is my earnest hope that the Congress will lose no time in acting on the recommendations outlined in this message.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Negotiations for New Agreement on Importing Mexican Workers to U.S.

Conversations looking toward the negotiation of a new agreement for the importation into the United States of Mexican agricultural workers began in Mexico City on Monday, July 16, 1951. The United States Government will be represented by the following:

United States Senate—Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana.
Department of Labor—Assistant Secretary Robert T. Creasey; Jeter S. Ray, Associate Solicitor; Albert D. Misler, Principal Attorney; Don Larin, Chief, Farm Placement Service.

Immigration and Naturalization Service—Argle W. Mackey, Commissioner; Lamont Eaton, Chief Inspector.

Department of State—R. R. Rubottom, Jr., Officer in Charge, Mexican Affairs; and John L. Ohmans of the Mexican Affairs Office.

U.S. Embassy at Mexico—Carl W. Strom, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General; and V. H. Blocker, American Consul.

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A Stout Shield Of Defense Against Soviet Expansionism

By Secretary Acheson¹

I am honored to be here today to take part in Detroit's 250th birthday party.

This is an occasion of importance—to our country and to the world, as is evidenced by the presence here of the distinguished ambassadors of Great Britain, of France, and of our next-door neighbor, Canada. Their presence reminds us of the many contributions their countries have made to the fabulous growth of this community.

We are also honored tonight by the presence of Dr. Ralph Bunche, citizen not only of Detroit, but of the world.

Two hundred and fifty years ago, this twenty-fourth of July, Cadillac brought ashore his 100 men to build a fort where Detroit now stands. In the language of our reports from the front this night he called establishing an outpost in platoon strength. But this would wholly miss its significance, and his own idea of what he was doing.

In the narrow strait commanding the passage between the two great lakes of Erie and Huron, Cadillac saw a secure position, a commanding position, an economic position for trade and commerce. And he saw all of this with the eyes and mind of a pioneer—shrewd, aware of dangers, aware of opportunities, but dominated always by the driving power of an idea—the idea of discovery, of building, of creating, of enlarging, of leaving behind him something new and challenging and alive—something which would change the whole life of man on this globe.

To the pioneer, security came first. He knew the dangers beyond every bend in the river, behind every tree. He had seen hundreds of charred or smoking ruins and the horrors around them. He kept his equipment operational and his powder dry. He understood propaganda, although he didn't know the word. Whatever the word was, it didn't fool him. Most of his people made bullets, sharpened their cutting weapons, built forts and mounted guard while the others cleared the fields,

cultivated them, and traded. If the military program failed everyone got killed.

Cadillac was building for a future greater than he could have known. How little could he have foreseen the majestic and powerful community which Detroit has become, a symbol to all the world of the New World's industrial might.

We, too, are pioneers. We, too, are making beginnings that arch into the future beyond the limits of our vision—the beginnings of a world secure, free, and infinitely productive. Like the founder of Detroit, we draw upon our faith in the future to meet the dangers of the present.

Here in the heart of this nation's great productive power is a fitting place from which to look ahead to the job that faces us in the world. For the factories of Detroit, built by American labor, commerce, and industry, symbolize the power of American production which may tip the balance of history in our times.

For us, as for all pioneers, security comes first.

We are in great danger, greater perhaps than many Americans now appreciate. This danger is not less than it was a month ago, although some of us seem to think so.

You may recall Aesop's old fable about an argument between the North Wind and the Sun. They were trying to see which one could take off the coat of a man who happened to be passing by.

The Wind tried first. It blew and blew, and the icy blasts made the poor man shiver with cold. But the more the Wind blew, the more the man clutched his coat about him, and finally the Wind gave up.

Then came the Sun. Out from behind a cloud it came, and shone gently and warmly.

And the man, of his own accord, removed his coat.

This fable illustrates our present danger. The icy blast of Korea made many people realize the need for building our strength. But, as soon as the slightest break in the clouds appeared, some of our fellow citizens were ready to relax into the nearest rocking chair.

¹ Address made at Detroit, Mich., on July 24 and released to the press on the same date.

In Korea, General Ridgway and his command are alert against a trap.

But are we alert against falling into a bigger trap here at home? Will the warm sunshine of a false propaganda "peace" campaign lead us to think that our problems are solved and that we can safely let down our defense effort? That would be a dangerous and costly mistake.

Whether or not an armistice results from the talks in Korea, the fundamental job ahead of us will not change.

The attack on Korea brought home to many of us the readiness of the Communists to risk war. And it gave an impetus to our arms-building program. But it was not Korea alone that was the reason for our defense effort.

Whether or not there is peace in Korea, whether our adversaries are cooing like doves or growling like bears, our job remains the same. The threat we face remains the same.

The world has never known a more ruthless or more powerful challenge to the independence of nations and the freedom of men.

The tactics of the Kremlin are flexible, and may change from season to season. But so long as its power is of threatening proportions, and so long as it does not show a willingness to work for a stable and peaceful world, the danger to us remains. We must move ahead steadily and firmly to build our strength, regardless of what tune the Soviet Union happens to be playing at the moment. In that strength lies our only security. We must not be distracted from it by the switching-on of a Russian lullaby.

Neither war nor weakness is the way to meet the Soviet challenge. We will counter force with force, if necessary, but war does not solve problems—it multiplies them. Weakness, on the other hand, would lead to defeat, with or without war. Between these two extremes lies a middle course, which seeks to block Soviet expansionism without war, by building an effective system of collective security, and by making it strong. This is the course we are following.

The job before us—the great rearmament effort of the free nations—has an urgent priority, if we are to reduce the risk of war and pass safely through the dangers of these next few years.

Strength Deters Aggression

The danger of war and of disintegration will continue until the free nations have fully repaired their military weakness. It must be understood that weakness not only invites attack; what is even more menacing, it paralyzes the will to resist and makes for political disintegration.

The massive effort which is just now gaining momentum in our country and among our allies to build up our armaments is not an endless job, nor one without limits. It has specific goals, both as to amounts and as to time.

What we are building is an adequate deterrent

force against military attack. We already have the means to guarantee that a general military attack against us would be costly to the aggressors. We must now achieve a force of sufficient size to make it plain that such an attack could not succeed.

How big does this force need to be? Our best military experts, working together with those of our allies, have developed strategic plans which estimate the numbers of men, planes, tanks, guns, and so forth, which we and our allies need to insure that a Soviet attack upon us could not succeed.

We do not have to match the Soviet armies man for man, or gun for gun, since our mission is to deter, not to attack, but we have a long way to go before we reach a safe deterrent level.

Communist armed forces at present total some 9 million men. The Soviet Union has more than 4 million men under arms. Chinese Communist forces exceed 3½ million men. The European satellite regimes have nearly a million men.

The Soviet Union has more than 200 divisions, fully mobilized. In addition, the Soviet Union has a trained reserve of massive proportions. The Soviet air force is the world's largest in peacetime, with more than 20,000 first-line aircraft, a large proportion of which are jets of excellent quality.

What these figures mean for us is that we have a long way to go before we can breathe more easily.

Let's look at what we are doing to reduce as quickly as we can this risk of war.

First of all, we are building strength at the center. We are mobilizing the great strength of the United States so that we will have readily available forces, and a production base that will enable us to expand rapidly if necessary.

Within the past year, we have advanced the timetable of this effort, but it is still short of what we must do. If we are to meet our minimum goals, we will have to do more than we are now doing. And it may be necessary to raise our sights to higher goals.

This is a job which needs to be done cooperatively with our allies. We cannot do it alone, or without an effective organization of the total allied effort. Side-by-side with our defense program at home, therefore, we are helping to build a force in being in Europe.

Under General Eisenhower, the integrated force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been moving rapidly from a paper organization to the beginning of a real defense system. The command structure is functioning; actual divisions are under his command; new divisions are being formed and trained; the nucleus of his tactical air force is conducting maneuvers. A program for expanding the network of allied tactical air bases in Europe has been launched.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has come to grips with the problem of developing the military production potential of Western Europe. We are working together to lick the financial

problems, the raw material problems, and the many other problems which must be overcome in the process of building strength together.

We are greatly encouraged by the progress our European partners are making in strengthening their unity of operation. Many of us do not realize what progress has been made toward European unity in just the past 2 or 3 years.

The North Atlantic Treaty idea of pooling military strength is a revolutionary peacetime accomplishment. At Paris, several of the European nations are now in conference seeking to carry this principle further forward by establishing a single European defense force. We are deeply concerned with the success of this conference, and we are doing all that friendly cooperation can do to help it succeed.

This effort is of a piece with the bold vision and promise of the Schuman Plan which will pool the coal and steel industries of Western Europe.

The vast free market of the United States, which allows raw materials and human skills to be used efficiently, has shown us the value of breaking down local trade barriers. We do not have one automobile industry in Texas and another in North Dakota and another in Florida. We build steel mills and parts factories and assembly plants wherever they can efficiently serve the entire country, without regard to state lines. The Schuman Plan is a step in this direction in Europe.

By such steps as this and the proposed European defense force, we believe that our European partners can continue to move toward greater unity and greater strength.

Although our joint progress toward an effective defense force in Europe has been considerable, it is not enough, when measured against the goals that are necessary to insure our common safety. No one can be satisfied with the progress so far made. A greater effort is required, from us and from our allies. This effort must be measured according to our economic capacities since economic health is an important foundation for defensive strength.

Along with our effort at home and in Europe, we are also seeking to build other situations of strength in Asia, the Middle East, and other parts of the world, as a bulwark against further advances of Communist imperialism.

The treaty of peace with Japan² will be taking concrete form in a little more than a month, and it will be followed by security treaties with Japan, and with Australia and New Zealand.³ These are in addition to our long-standing commitments to the Philippines, whose security is as much our concern as the defense of our own land.

What we are now doing, in this total effort at home and in various parts of the world, is building up the capital equipment of a defense system. We started with very little, and several years of very

hard effort are before us—even harder than we have yet put forth.

But the greater our effort now, the more rapidly will we pass through the present period of maximum danger.

Defenses Must Be Fully Maintained

When we have achieved our goals, when we have acquired the capital equipment of an adequate defense, we must not again be foolish enough to destroy it, to relax our guard. Once the capital cost has been met, military expenditures and military aid programs will be substantially less. Once a level of defense has been achieved which should deter any power from plunging the world into war, the task will shift from creating defenses to maintaining them. But they must be maintained, and fully maintained.

Until we reach that point, it would be as dangerous to relax our effort as it is to fall asleep in a blizzard. This is something we must all of us understand thoroughly, so that no one will be able to lull us or divide us, or in any way keep us from building the strength and unity which spell safety for us.

When we have a stout shield of defense, our problems will change, and become more manageable. So long as the Soviet regime remains what it is—committed to the aim of world communism directed from Moscow, dedicated to a fundamental hostility against states that are not subservient to its will—we cannot ever afford to become less vigilant of our freedom.

The danger of war may be reduced, but the struggle will continue. The Soviet threat is much more than a military one, and we can expect that the effort to subvert free peoples, to lure them into captivity with empty promises of a better life, will go right on.

Therefore, we must continue to offer real leadership toward the kind of life that people want. Behind the protection of our military shield, we can increase our cooperative efforts toward higher living standards and toward economic development.

We would also be able to give much more help in other problems beside those created by the Soviet Union—in such problems as arise from the awakening of the vast populations of Asia and the Middle East, and their desire for national self-expression and for the improvement of their conditions of living.

Our practical help to the people of the Middle East, of Asia, and of Latin America can be both to their interest and to ours. For it is crucial to the future peace of the world that these turbulent and dynamic forces emerge in forms that will be constructive and truly progressive.

We are the natural allies of these peoples. We have with them a common interest in peace, in progress, and in freedom. We can enter with them into a partnership of peace.

² BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 132.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

As we carry forward these activities, and as we maintain our military shield, the temptation for the other side to use force will be reduced. Instead, they will be more willing to begin the peaceful adjustment of some of the issues. It will be to their, and to our, self-interest to do so.

We are of course prepared to undertake such adjustments at any time. We would welcome any genuine opportunity to reduce the level of tension in the world—but we must always be alert against the baited hooks of phony propaganda.

Efforts Toward One Goal

The ultimate purpose of all these efforts—whether military, economic or political—is to bring a realization in the Soviet Union that no one power is going to dominate this world, and that it would be foolhardy for any power to try to do so.

When this realization sinks home in Moscow, we can begin to hope for those changes in the Soviet regime which will make for a more peaceful world.

What sort of changes do we need to look for?

It is not that we want to compel other countries to adopt our form of government or our economic system. What we are concerned about is whether their system is one which inevitably attempts to dominate other people.

If the Soviet Union is to become a friendly member of the world community—within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations—there must be real evidence that the Soviet rulers have renounced their hope of world domination, their dedication to the forcible overthrow of other governments, and the isolation of their people from the outside world.

No one can now predict how or when such change may come about. We must be prepared for the possibility that it may take many years.

We know that many strains and tensions exist within the Soviet world. We know that such things as the perpetual mobilization of the people, the suppression of national freedom in the satellite countries, the inevitable frictions of police-state rule, all must have, over a period of time, a significant effect. Ultimately, these factors, when added to the realization by the Kremlin that intimidation, falsehood, and the sowing of confusion can be neither successful nor profitable, may bring about a change in the Soviet system, which, in turn, will reduce the fear of war in the world.

The Soviet rulers are aware that we shall have to overcome difficulties of our own in the meantime. The maintenance of even a limited mobilization level also puts strains on us. The Communists are counting on these strains to make us tire of our burdens, to break our nerve, to bring about our collapse, to break down our economic system, and to weaken our political institutions. They stand ready to profit by any weakness which we might show.

But we confidently believe that time is on the side of freedom so long as we make good use of it. We can meet the test of time better than they can. We have faith that free societies can out-last, out-produce, and out-build a police state, and can better stand the tensions of partial mobilization. We of the free world have geography, resources, manpower, and moral values on our side. So long as we also have a firm and resolute will, we shall come out on top.

This is the picture of what we face. The prospect may be hard and long. It may mean many more sacrifices for us, more shortages, higher taxes. But there is no easier way through the dangers of the present. If we shirk it, the alternatives are war or surrender.

You all remember the poster which said "Uncle Sam needs you!" And the finger of Uncle Sam pointed at each of us, and followed us. This, too, is a job for all of us. There is no man or woman in America so important, or so unimportant, that he can shrug his shoulders and say "Let somebody else do it." Whether you work with a wrench, a gun, a hoe, or a pencil, you are an important part of this job.

Today as in the time of Cadillac, the real strength of our free society in an emergency is that the individual free men and women pitch in and deliver the goods.

Make no mistake about it—this is an emergency, an emergency as great as any our country has ever faced.

We shall need a new birth of patriotism, above our personal interests and our party loyalties—a patriotism which is strong enough and mature enough to inspire us for the long haul.

We shall need the kind of faith that gave courage and strength to the pioneers of America.

We need a faith that can look ahead and see a job that may take years, which surely will take patience, moderation, restraint, steady nerves, and lots of effort—a faith that will say: "We can do it."

U. S. Note to Czechoslovakia on Killing of German Policeman

Following is the text of a note sent by the American Embassy at Prague to the Czechoslovak Foreign Office on July 17 concerning the killing of a German policeman at the frontier of the United States zone of Germany on July 3:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Foreign Office of Czechoslovakia and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note No. 653 of June 19, 1951¹ concerning two violations of the U. S. zone of Germany by members of the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The Czechoslovak Government's attention is now called to another and even more serious violation of the United States zone of Germany, a violation resulting in death of a German Customs policeman.

At about 1:50 a.m. on July 3, 1951, an unidentified person tried to cross from Czechoslovakia into Germany in the vicinity of Gruensteg Bridge between Hohenberg and Sommerhau. When stopped by a German Customs patrol on the road inside German territory which parallels the frontier, the illegal border crosser fired a shot at the German patrol but missed and then fled back to Czechoslovakia. Immediately a fusillade of shots was fired at the German Customs patrol from the Czechoslovak side apparently to provide cover for the illegal border crosser. These shots were fired by two or three different persons. George Nirschl, German Customs policeman who formed part of the patrol, was killed on German territory by one of these shots. The bullet was subsequently recovered and identified as having been fired from a Czechoslovak machine pistol.

The American Government requests that an immediate investigation be made by the appropriate Czechoslovak authorities to determine the person or persons guilty of this violation of the U. S. zone of Germany. It also requests that a prompt report be made to this Embassy, pending receipt of which the American Government reserves all rights in the remedies including the right to claim compensation on behalf of the German Customs policeman who was killed.

The Foreign Ministry is reminded that it has made no reply to the Embassy's request for information as to the results of an investigation by the Czechoslovak authorities of two previous border violations by Czechoslovak personnel described in the Embassy's note of June 19, 1951, and that no reply has been received to its request for assurances that steps have been taken by the pertinent Czechoslovak authorities to prevent such violations in the future. The Embassy further reminds the Ministry that it expects the Czechoslovak Government to show the same diligence in dealing with reports

of violations by Czechoslovak personnel of the U. S. zone of Germany as the American authorities have consistently shown with respect to representations made by the Czechoslovak Government.

U.S. Answers Bavarian Protest Over Enlargement of Army Training Area

[Released to the press July 20]

In reply to a letter from Dr. Erich Frenzel of Munich, protesting the proposed enlargement of a U.S. Army training area in Bavaria, the following letter has been written at the request of the U.S. High Commissioner by Staff Secretary Eric G. Gration. Dr. Frenzel signed his protest letter as a representative of the Land Bavaria Committee for Carrying out the Popular Referendum Against Remilitarization.

MY DEAR DR. FRENZEL: Mr. McCloy has requested me to reply to your letter of June 3rd. Your membership in a large number of the groups specially created as "front" organizations for the KPD (West Germany Communist Party), ranging from the Helmut von Gerlach Gesellschaft through the *Landesausschuss Bayern zur Durchfuehrung der Volksbefragung Gegen Remilitarisierung* (Land Bavaria Committee For Carrying Out The Popular Referendum Against Remilitarization) plus the fact that your secretary, if not yourself, is a known member of the KPD, do not lead me to believe that your letter of June 3rd was written for any purpose other than Communist propaganda aims, and also lead me to believe that you would only utilize any reply from me or Mr. McCloy for the same purpose.

Therefore, since your letter is not written with the aim of possibly reaching an understanding concerning or better comprehension of the problem which you have raised, I see no point in attempting to tell you facts about it which the KPD would never allow you to believe.

I would like to point out, however, that the size and extent of training areas in Western Germany is hardly comparable to the tremendous areas under requisition by Soviet forces in the smaller Soviet zone of occupation, where Soviet forces apart from *Volkspolizei* (Peoples Police) military cadres, occupy at least ten large training areas ranging in size from 100 square kilometers to 600 square kilometers. In addition numerous smaller training areas, located near the permanent *Kasernen* (barracks) are in constant use throughout the entire year.

From early spring through late fall when Soviet troops are engaged in large-scale exercises in the field training areas practically no farming is permitted whatsoever. In many instances whole farming communities have been evacuated to satisfy the training space requirements of the Soviet army. Furthermore, German farmers in large sections of the country outside the training areas must often harvest their crops early in the fall before they are fully matured or else run the risk of having them destroyed by Soviet units during the final large-scale exercises during which Soviet forces maneuver over most of the zone. These farmers are, on the one hand, afraid to register protests, while on the other hand the Eisler-controlled press is under instructions to make no mention of damage done to farmlands by Soviet troops.

At such time as your "committee", or other Communist-sponsored groups like it, is ready also to raise questions concerning the massive military power assembled in the Soviet zone, about the establishment of German military cadres under the direction of the GDR's (German Demo-

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 12.

cratic Republic of Soviet Zone of Germany) *Hauptverwaltung Fuer Ausbildung* (main administration for training), or about the covert production of military arms and equipment in the Soviet zone I will be very happy to discuss with you or other Communist sympathizers the charges raised by your letter of June 3rd. At that point there should be no difficulty in convincing you of the very modest character of the training needs of the United States forces as they are put forward in West Germany.

Mass Deportations From Hungary

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House July 27]

Many Americans have expressed concern about the mass deportations from Hungary which are being carried out by the Communist Government of that country. Their condemnation of these brutal acts against the people of Hungary is in the best American tradition of concern for liberty and justice. I am deeply moved by the tragic plight of the Hungarian people, who bear a heavy burden of oppression, and I share the abhorrence which has been expressed with regard to these measures which the Hungarian Government has instituted in wanton disregard of every principle of right and decency.

The Government of the United States is giving the closest attention to the deportations in Hungary with a view to taking such steps as may appropriately expose this situation to public view and judgment and render the Hungarian Government accountable before the world for its infamous conduct. The forced removal of thousands of persons from their homes by the Hungarian Government under the conditions which have been reported must be regarded as a flagrant violation of the human rights provisions of the treaty of peace. The United States Government has already formally charged the Government of Hungary with wilfully and systematically contravening these provisions, which obligate that Government to secure to all persons under its jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, and has exposed these violations before the United Nations. In accordance with the terms of a resolution passed by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950, this Government will submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and through him to all member Governments of the United Nations, detailed evidence which the Department of State has in its possession regarding many such violations. In view of the significant bearing which the present deportations have on the general question of the Hungarian Government's suppression of human rights and freedoms, the United States Government will also submit to the Secretary-General all evidence which may be available from reliable sources regarding the conditions under which such expulsions are being conducted.

Jet Planes Leave For NATO Countries

*Comment by James C. H. Bonbright
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*

I consider it a very rare privilege to participate in this ceremony this afternoon since it is an important and concrete demonstration of the mutual effort being made by the North Atlantic treaty nations.

In a very short time, the U.S.S. *Corregidor* will be under way, bearing its cargo of jet airplanes to five of our NATO allies. The movement of this powerful air equipment is an impressive sign of the will and the determination of the American people to assist the free peoples of the world in building defensive military strength which has become necessary due to Communist aggression.

The strength of the free nations is dedicated to peace, and it serves as a warning to potential disturbers of the peace that aggression will be resisted by the unified might of these free nations. The *Corregidor* and its cargo are symbolic of this strength, and it is noteworthy that this is the first of many trips which this carrier will make across the ocean bearing military assistance to our Allies.

While this occasion gives additional evidence of American cooperation with the other NATO countries, I wish at the same time to refer to the expanded defense programs of all the NATO nations who are participating in a mutual security effort.

United in the cause of freedom and in support of the United Nations, we are all contributing together to our common goal. In that unity of purpose lies all our hopes for peace and the defense of our liberties.

CONGRESS

Legislation

Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1951, and for Other Purposes. Approved January 6, 1951. H. R. 9920, Public Law 91-161, 81st Cong. 2d sess. 16 pp.

Authorizing a Federal Civil Defense Program, and for Other Purposes. Approved January 12, 1951. H. R. 9798, Public Law 920, 81st Cong. 2d sess. 14 pp.

(Continued on page 236)

¹ Made on July 23, and released to the press on the same date, prior to the departure of the U.S.S. *Corregidor* from Newark, N. J., with a cargo of jet planes for delivery to five NATO countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and Norway.

Peace and Security Rest on Economic Improvement of Free Nations

Statement by Secretary Acheson¹

I am very happy to appear before your Committee in support of the Mutual Security Program. I know that many of you have recently been abroad to study at first hand some of the problems involved in such a huge undertaking. All of you are familiar with the main problems with which we are confronted and with the objectives of our policy.

But I would like to review with you some of the major reasons why we believe that this program is an essential and vital part of our country's defense and foreign policies.

The Mutual Security Program is based on our demonstrable need for strength and support in the rest of the free world. The need for such support is as great today as it has ever been. The present armistice negotiations in Korea, irrespective of their final outcome, have not affected, and will not affect, that fundamental fact. It is essential that we do not take the easy course and delude ourselves into thinking otherwise.

When the fighting was going against us in Korea it was easier to persuade ourselves and our friends abroad of the necessity for a speedy strengthening of our common defenses. Day-to-day changes in the news from Korea do not change the basic situation. The danger is no less real than it was a month ago. The strategy of the Kremlin is still the same.

If the armistice talks should collapse, we should be ready for a major Communist assault on the United Nations Forces. The enemy has been building up his forces throughout this period. General Ridgway is alert to the threat and is ready for it. The discussions at Kaesong thus far have not yet produced agreement as to any points of substance which are essential to a satisfactory armistice.

I need not remind this Committee that we have

had periods of relative quiet before. There was an easing of tension for a while after the Soviet failure to dominate Iran in 1946. There was a lull in Soviet pressure after the Soviet success in Czechoslovakia. There was an easing of tension after the defeat of the Communists in Greece and after the lifting of the Berlin blockade. There may be a period of comparative quiet if there is an armistice in Korea. If so, we must not let ourselves be pulled off balance by a shift in tactics.

It is our purpose to create enough strength in the free world to deter the Soviet imperialists from all aggressive adventures and to bring about an era of genuine relaxation of tension. But we must face the fact that the required amount of strength does not yet exist. Until it does exist—and until there is a fundamental change in Soviet policy—we must recognize temporary easings of tension for what they are—as tactical moves intended to weaken and to divide us.

I am convinced that the American people, with the events of recent years clearly in mind, will not now relax their efforts to make our country secure.

We must instead renew our determination and increase our current efforts to create an over-all situation of strength that will bring a measure of general peace and security.

It would be misleading to imply that this program can be completed without sacrifice. It is going to cost large sums of money and it is going to take time. I am convinced, however, that it represents the most economical, practical and efficient method of providing this country with the necessary security. I believe, moreover, that irrespective of comparative costs, there is no other way of providing an equivalent measure of security.

The practical steps which we are taking and those which we now propose to take to build strength in other countries, are essential to our own safety and well-being.

We are requesting a total of 8.5 billion dollars, of which 6.3 billion dollars are for military aid

¹ Statement made in support of the proposed Mutual Security Program before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 26 and released to the press on the same date.

and 2.2 billion dollars are for economic aid. This assistance to other free nations will yield a much larger and a much faster return in terms of our national security than we could obtain by spending the same sums of money directly on our own armed forces. Without this program our whole defense strategy would have to be drastically revised. That would be both a costly and a dangerous procedure.

Relationship of Elements of Strength

We are not now proposing an essentially new program. What is new is the pulling together of the economic, technical and military assistance elements of our foreign aid into one program. It is important to keep in mind the relationship of these different elements of strength.

Military assistance, from a dollar standpoint, is the largest single part of the Mutual Security Program. It is not necessarily and in every instance the most important part. We have seen how political and economic deterioration and loss of morale rot the fibers of military strength. And we have seen how political and economic recovery can contribute to an increase in military power.

Thus, while we must be deeply concerned with the development of military strength, I am concerned that we do not take too narrow a view of the problem. Economic and technical assistance must be sufficient to support the military programs and to deal with some of the fundamental problems of weakness where weapons alone are no defense.

Security is more than a military matter. It requires action against all those forces which undermine the free world. And it is not only the aid itself which is important—it is the way in which the aid programs are conceived. If these assistance programs are carried forward affirmatively and dynamically, they will in themselves become a source of strength and support.

Nor should we take too narrow a view as far as the different recipient countries are concerned. The needs of each have to be considered separately, but the relation of the parts to the whole must not be lost sight of. The parts interlock—between countries and areas, and within them.

This program has been developed over a period of many months by teamwork between all the departments and agencies concerned. They had available to them a vast amount of information assembled here and abroad, as well as the plans and data of many international agencies in which the United States is represented—such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Inter-American Defense Board, and various United Nations agencies.

This program is the result of the evaluation of this material and its coordination with our own plans and programs. It is the judgment of our highest authorities in military, economic and for-

eign affairs that the program is needed in our own interests, that it will efficiently contribute to our own security, and that we have the means to carry it out.

The presentation of the program to your Committee will, like the preparatory work, be a teamwork job. Following me, you will hear General Marshall, Mr. Foster, and four of our leading men in Europe, Messrs. Spofford, Katz, and Batt, and General Kibler. Then the political, military, economic and administrative aspects of the program in Europe, the Near East, the Far East and the Western Hemisphere will be presented by officials of the Departments of State and Defense and ECA, with assistance from other agencies on particular subjects of concern to them. And finally you will hear from Mr. Cabot, the chairman of the interdepartmental committee responsible for coordination of the program, and General Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This teamwork will be carried over into the administration of the program, and will obtain a continuity of thought and of action which will result in a single-minded application of funds to promote the security of our nation and of the free world as a whole.

We are proposing that the Mutual Security Program be administered under existing legislation, brought together and amended to the extent necessary to further the objectives of this integrated approach. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the Economic Cooperation Act, the Act for International Development and other assistance acts provide adequate foundation for a mutual security program. They were all designed to further the national interests and national security of our country, and they can be linked together to increase their effectiveness.

The organizational arrangements under which the program will be operated also link to the arrangements under which these Acts have been administered in the past. Using the interdepartmental International Security Affairs Committee, we intend to make use of the valuable experience gained in operations under existing legislation, and permit the new program to be carried out with minimum disruption of current operations, with maximum speed and efficiency.

The amendments proposed to the existing Acts are not many in number, but they are important. All are designed to make the application of our resources more effective in furthering mutual security.

The men who will testify in support of this program will not assert that it is a perfect program. In a task as large and complex as this there will always be room for improvement and development—which is the reason why we seek some flexibility in the use of the funds requested.

What we are prepared to show is that requirements exceed currently available resources; that they have been trimmed to fit our immediate ca-

abilities; and that funds have been requested only where there is a need, a clear opportunity, and the means to build strength. This strength is important to our own security; it could not be obtained without our aid; and it could not be matched by any use of the same funds here at home.

The basis on which we have developed this program, as of our foreign policy as a whole, is that time is on our side if we make proper use of it. If we falter or relax the advantage will be with the other side.

The free nations are potentially so much stronger than the Soviet Union and its satellites that it would be folly if the free world's strength were not organized and developed. The free world includes more than two-thirds of the total population and nearly three-quarters of the land area. The total productivity of the free world is many times that of the Soviet Empire. And the free world has resources of mind and spirit incalculably greater than those under the dictatorial control of the Kremlin.

The countries and the regions of the free world are interdependent, and if there can be created unity of purpose, resolution to meet the present danger, and the great strength that can come from mutual security efforts—and this is what we are now doing—then the threat that faces us can be reduced to manageable proportions. American policies are aimed at helping to bring about these conditions.

Situation in the Western Hemisphere

Let us look first at the situation in the Western Hemisphere.

Fortunately, we are blessed with good neighbors to the north and south. Our aim is to develop and strengthen the ties with our neighbors so that this hemisphere will have the security to enable all of us to pursue our national ideals and purposes free from foreign threats.

Canada is a member with us of the North Atlantic Treaty and is associated with us in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. We and our neighbors to the south are members of the Organization of American States. Military cooperation between the states of the Western Hemisphere is close and, I am confident, will continue to be close through the trials of the next few years.

There are certain tasks—such as the protection of key installations and key sources of raw materials—which we believe our partners to the south are ready and willing to take over. Careful plans are being developed by the Inter-American Defense Board. The Mutual Security Program would for the first time permit grant military assistance which will be required by certain countries of this hemisphere in order to discharge specific military tasks of this character.

There is also a very definite need in many of the Latin American republics for help in improving agriculture and food production, health, education and other essential services. The funds which are requested for technical assistance will be used for this purpose.

These military and technical assistance programs, amounting in all to 62 million dollars, will help to keep the New World a symbol of hope for men everywhere, an evidence of man's ability to build a peaceful and secure and progressive way of life.

Condition of Europe

Now let us look at Europe. You are familiar with the development of American policy in Europe since the war, of its evolution through the Greek-Turkish programs, the European Recovery Program and the North Atlantic Treaty. And now American troops are participating in an integrated force for the defense of Western Europe, with General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander.

A united Europe that is strong economically, spiritually and militarily, can, when added to our own strength, be a very strong deterrent to all forms of aggression, not only in Europe but elsewhere in the world.

The program of aid to Europe totals nearly 7.0 billion dollars, of which 5.3 billion dollars are for military aid and 1.7 billion dollars are for economic aid. The first is composed almost entirely of military end-items to be used to equip forces now being raised and trained to use them. Economic aid in large part is directly related to defense.

You are already familiar with the significant progress which our European partners have made during the past year in raising their defense expenditures, increasing military production, and training and equipping their armed forces. These tasks have been very difficult because their economies are not yet strong enough to carry the full burden of the necessary defense program. They have, however, undertaken these tasks with growing determination, and much progress has been made. They are planning an even greater effort on all fronts. The Mutual Security Program will help make this effort possible and will help achieve our common goals.

Along the southeastern reaches of Europe and into the Near East the aims of our foreign policy are to make even stronger the existing strong points, and to help other countries to strengthen themselves against the dangers which they face.

We are proposing military aid of 415 million dollars and economic aid of 125 million dollars for these purposes. This is in addition to economic aid for Greece and Turkey, which is included in the economic aid totals for Europe. The Near East is an area of special tensions today.

Time is of great importance in furnishing aid to our friends in this area.

The military program alone, however, is clearly not enough. The peoples of the Near East must feel that their lot is with the free world, and that the free world has their basic needs—moral and material—at heart. The economic program is of longer term in its nature, but we must build economic strength in the area if it is not to be lost to subversion or aggression.

Asia and the Pacific Area

In Asia and the Pacific area, we have proposed a program of 930 million dollars. Military aid will amount to 555 million dollars and economic aid to 375 million dollars.

In the great crescent which reaches from Japan to Afghanistan, there live almost 700 million people—about three out of ten people who inhabit the earth.

The area includes South Asia—India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal; Southeast Asia—Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and the Associated States of Indochina; and the Philippines, Formosa, and Korea.

But it is not only its large population which gives this area significance in a survey of the defenses of the free world. In this crescent are large resources of strategic materials essential to the productivity of the free world—tin, rubber, jute, petroleum and many other materials. The location of this crescent is also of significant importance—astride the vital Pacific Ocean lines of communication, and bordering the Communist-dominated central land-mass of Asia.

Of key importance too is the industrial potential of Japan, which lies within this region but is not included in this aid program, since its needs are met in other ways.

Communist pressures in the Pacific area have been very great and internal pressures are continuous. The immediacy of the military aid for this area is apparent. The arms we are sending to Indochina and the Philippines are urgently needed. With the concentration of the Communist effort in the last year in Korea, some people may have forgotten that the Communist pressure still are being kept up elsewhere in this region.

Military and Economic Assistance Essential

We are proposing substantial military aid to Formosa, in order to strengthen its ability, in conjunction with the Seventh Fleet, to resist any aggression, pursuant to the President's policy statement of June 27, 1950. We will supplement this aid, which is deemed essential for the military

defense of the island, with economic assistance required to backstop the military effort and to assist Formosa to become self-sustaining.

Military aid to these countries is only part of the problem of strengthening the Far Eastern area. The other part of the problem relates to the way people live. Poverty, disease, illiteracy and resentments against former colonial exploitations are our enemies, too. They represent turbulent forces which the communists exploit at every opportunity. To achieve our objective of helping the people of this area maintain independent governments friendly to us, we must understand these forces at work in Asia, and assure that the forces of nationalism and of the drive for economic improvement are associated with the rest of the free world instead of with communism.

That is why an essential part of the Mutual Security Program for this area is designed to help the people of Asia to create social and economic conditions that will encourage the growth and survival of non-Communist political institutions dedicated to the honest fulfillment of their basic needs and aspirations. American materials and technical help can be of inestimable value.

The program before you also calls for 112.5 million dollars in support of the United Nations Korean Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The approach to relief and rehabilitation in Korea will be on an international basis in cooperation with other members of the United Nations.

In considering the overall security of the Pacific, we also have in mind the great importance of restoring sovereignty to Japan. You are familiar with the very real progress we are making in the preparation of a treaty of peace for Japan as the essential first step in this direction.

I know that we all want to see an end in sight to the great efforts we are now making through the aid programs that are designed to promote and sustain our foreign policy. The immediate task is to build the capital structure both here and abroad. After that is done there will be the lesser problem of maintenance. All in all, it will require a number of years of hard work and sacrifice.

Very large appropriations will be required for at least the next several years. But as the build-up of the North Atlantic Treaty forces is completed, the amount of aid for the European area can be substantially reduced because we believe that the maintenance of the necessary European forces should be largely financed by Europeans.

The ingenuity and best efforts of all free nations are necessary to success. We are proposing a large capital investment to make these efforts possible and fruitful. That is the cheapest and quickest way—perhaps the only way—that we can achieve peace and security for the people of the United States.

Bolstering the Near East and Africa as a Barrier to Aggression

Statement by George C. McGhee

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs*¹

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to discuss the Near Eastern and African area, which includes Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel and the Arab nations, Libya, Ethiopia, and Liberia. We propose a program for granting economic assistance to these countries, indicated on the accompanying chart,² and granting military assistance to certain of them.

Those of us appearing before you will be working as a team in presenting this program, and I should like to explain how the team will work. With your permission, I shall attempt to present the Executive's views on the region as a whole and the over-all rationale of the proposed military and economic programs. Special reference will be made to the economic programs for the Near Eastern countries which have not hitherto received ECA assistance.

Admiral Duncan will discuss the military and strategic significance of the region, and he and his colleagues from the Department of Defense will be responsible for the justification in detail of the military program.

Mr. Foster and his colleagues in ECA have dealt with the economic program of assistance to Greece and Turkey and the relationships of these economic programs to the military programs in these countries. ECA has, of course, a long and successful record of operation in both countries.

Mr. Bennett, the Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State, will deal with those elements of the economic program that specifically pertain to the operations of his administration, and will relate the programs of United Nations technical assistance to the United States bilateral programs.

¹ Made in support of the Mutual Security Program before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on July 20 and released to the press on the same date.

² Not here printed.

I should also like to file at this time statements from our political, military, and economic representatives abroad.

The sums involved in the program are considerable, amounting to 415 million dollars for military assistance and 125 million dollars for economic assistance. The Department would not support a request of this magnitude were it not convinced that the stakes are large and a major effort imperative in terms of our own national security.

First, a word about the area as a whole. The chart shows the area, with the exception of Liberia, to represent contiguous territories at the world's crossroads. It is bounded on the north by Soviet Russia or satellite states, and we are all too familiar with the pressure that has been exerted from the north on the border states. Aside from its importance as a route for land, sea, and air transport, the region contains one-half the proven oil reserves of the world, and its present production of oil accounts for a very large proportion of the current requirements of the Eastern hemisphere. If no substitute were found for these oil supplies—and it would be very difficult to find a substitute—the industries in Europe would grind to a halt and the economy of many countries in the Far East which are of concern to us would be seriously affected.

Russia has traditionally sought to expand toward the south. It is obviously not in our interest to permit such a Soviet challenge to win by default. This is a reason why we present an expanded program of aid for the Near East to the Congress.

With your consent, Mr. Chairman, I should like now to take up the case country by country, endeavoring to describe the general background of the present situation and the program which is submitted for the consideration of the Congress.

Military Aid

Greece

Aid to Greece, which has been extended since 1947, first through the Greek-Turkish Aid Program and later through the ECA and MDAP, has paid very satisfactory dividends. Greece has preserved her independence, and is now contributing to the principle of collective security and to the strength of the defense of the free world. Greece provides an example of effective action by the agencies of the United States Government pursuing a common policy, clearly defined. The economic program for Greece has been considered in testimony covering title I of the proposed legislation. I should like to take this opportunity to endorse the accomplishments of the ECA Mission in Greece and express the conviction that progress in Greece fully justifies the continued support of the Congress.

On the military side, it had been hoped that with the successful accomplishment of the Greek Army in ridding the country of guerrilla forces, the size of the military establishment could be reduced, with a resultant decrease in the need for U.S. aid and benefits to the economy of the country as a whole. Because of Korea and the general trend of the "cold war," however, such a course is no longer possible. Accordingly, we must seek substantial military aid for the Greeks to replace supplies and equipment which are becoming obsolescent and to enable the Greeks to maintain the strength of their military establishments. The Greek soldiers are tough, courageous, well-trained; they have proven their fighting qualities both in the defense of their homeland and in Korea.

Turkey

Turning to Turkey, we can also point to a creditable record of accomplishment. We have learned to regard the Turks as staunch allies, determined to resist aggression from the north. The Turkish economic program, like that of Greece, is considered with the European economic program. ECA can look back on solid accomplishment in the work which it has done to assist the Turks in the development of their resources. ECA aid, supplemented by loans from the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank, has enabled Turkey to expand her capital plant in many directions. Turkish economic assistance is closely related to requirements for the Turkish armed forces; over a third of the Turkish national budget is devoted to defense.

The population of Turkey is about 20,000,000. Turkey's large armed forces are backed by a substantial reserve. The combat effectiveness of the Turks has been steadily improving as a result of intensive efforts of the Turks, aided by the United States. During the past 4 years we have assisted the Turks in obtaining modern equipment, and in providing extensive training facilities, designed

to enable the Turks to make best use of the equipment. This policy is paying off. Turkey has made an important contribution in Korea, where the Turkish brigade has lived up to the high tradition of Turkish military history.

We still have far to go, however, before the full Turkish military potential will be realized. If this is to be achieved, we must continue to assist in expanding local production of arms, we must continue our training programs, and we must continue to furnish equipment to the extent that our resources permit and the Turks can effectively absorb it. Hence we propose to carry on the program launched in 1947.

Military and Economic Assistance for Iran

We are proposing both military and economic assistance to Iran. The economic program proposed will amount to \$24,050,000. The military figure I should like to discuss in executive session. The two elements of assistance are interrelated, and, we are convinced, vital in meeting the critical situation there.

The situation in Iran has, of course, given all of us the greatest concern in recent months. While over a period of time Iranian oil and Iranian oil refining capacity could be replaced in the world markets, loss of this industry and its products to Europe and to the Near and the Far East would compel radical, costly, and difficult adjustments in oil production and oil marketing throughout the world.

That is one reason for our special interest in Iran. A further reason is the impelling fact that Iran represents a tempting bait to Russia in its effort to forge a chain of satellites around the Soviet periphery. Iran's loss to the free world would jeopardize the security of the entire Middle East, which is itself the gateway to South Asia and Africa.

We have seen in Iran the eruptions of pent-up nationalism. Although the Communists did not precipitate the oil dispute, the expertly organized and highly vocal Communist organization, the Tudeh Party, is attempting to aggravate and capitalize upon it. In this atmosphere there has been a political reaction in Iran against the British oil interests which has made more difficult an agreed settlement of the oil problem. Iran is heavily dependent financially upon the exploitation of its oil resources. Failure to work out an agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has already seriously affected Iran's economy and retarded implementation of Iran's 7-year development program.

The present situation is, however, a reflection of the fundamental weakness of the social and political structure of Iran. The bulk of the Iranian people are poor, undernourished, and illiterate. Only through an improvement in basic living conditions can the Iranian people be given

the means and the incentive to build a strong nation. Only a strong Iran can in the long run survive as an independent state and maintain its national integrity. In climate and in natural resources, Iran has been compared to California. If Iran's living standards even moderately approached California's Iran would be a powerful ally in the free world. We propose to help Iran make progress toward a better way of life.

Military assistance to Iran has double importance. It strengthens the government internally by contributing to stability and order, and contributes at the same time to the integrated defense of the Middle East. A moderate-sized Iranian army, with modern training and equipment, would serve to deter any aggressor, and to prevent Iran from falling by default to Soviet subversion. Through our current Mutual Defense Assistance Program, we are supplying equipment and training as quickly as the Iranian military establishment can effectively absorb it. As the Iranians learn our weapons and techniques, they would be able to utilize larger quantities of modern equipment to advantage.

What we also propose, and believe to be as essential as military aid in the situation, is a concurrent threefold attack on the Iranian economic difficulties. I would like to make it clear that what we propose is in no way related to the present oil dispute—but was planned before the oil controversy arose and was directed toward overcoming Iran's more fundamental problems. We need to strengthen Iran and its ties with the West by giving the Iranian people tangible evidence of our support through a modest program of grants. This program must be flexible and designed to bolster up those elements in the country who are working to improve the social and economic conditions of the mass of Iranian people. It must be directed at the town and village level.

The village development and rural improvement program would be carried out in selected localities by teams of American technicians, working side by side with Iranian technicians who are already available, in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, education, and health. Work of this nature has been carried on with great success by the Near East Foundation, in Iran and other countries of the Near East. The proposed program would expand these activities and would direct them specifically to making better use of existing land and water resources. It would be attuned to Iranian customs. It is proposed that a considerable sum be set aside in this specific project for the purchase of modern equipment for demonstration purposes. The program would also include vocational training and would provide teams from the United States Public Health Service to direct programs of public health and sanitation.

Most commentators on Iran have noted the appallingly unhygienic system of water supply in the towns and villages where water for domestic

use is drawn from open streams running down the village streets. The effect on the health of the people of such an inadequate and unsanitary supply is obvious. The illustrative program of assistance for Iran provides for assistance in the installation of simple but sanitary water supply systems in selected towns. This program should make an immediate impact on the population thus aided. Once they have been proven practical these projects will undoubtedly be emulated by the Iranians themselves in other places.

Another way in which it is proposed to assist the Iranians would be in the improvement of their system of highways, through the facilities of the U.S. Public Roads Administration. The record of the Public Roads Administration in assisting Turkey in building and maintaining that road network has been an eminently satisfactory one. This experience can be extended to good advantage in Iran. Iranian production and distribution of needed supplies within the country suffers from inadequate local transport facilities.

These basic programs would be supplemented by technical services of American engineers in preparing specific plans for major development of water resources, both for irrigation purposes and for domestic use in certain of the larger towns. The program also provides for import and sale of limited amounts of needed goods, as was done under the ECA program heretofore conducted in Europe and the Far East. The funds accruing from sale of such importations would, by arrangement with the Iranian Government, become immediately available for financing certain local costs of the projects which I have just described. It is hoped that the proposed program would be administered by the ECA, with a modest sized ECA mission.

The Arab States and Israel

For the Arab States and Israel, there is proposed a regional economic program, regionally administered, in addition to a program of military assistance for the Near East. This program breaks into three principal segments: first, aid rendered bilaterally to the Arab States; second, aid rendered bilaterally to Israel; and third, aid coordinated by the United Nations for the Arab refugees from Palestine. This latter program has three facets: it represents aid to the refugees themselves, whose plight is a serious source of instability in the Near East; aid to the Arab States into whose economies the refugees may be integrated; and aid to Israel, whose future in the Near East will be difficult until there is a reasonable settlement of the refugee problem.

Throughout the preparation of this program we have kept in mind three primary considerations: first, the legitimate aspirations of all the peoples of the area, Christian, Jew, and Moslem, on an impartial basis; second, their feeling, fre-

quently expressed, that the West has shown little or no interest in their welfare; and third, the importance of the continued independence of their countries to the security and peace of the free world.

The Arab States

The Arab States, if they are to play their proper role in the defense of the Middle East and are not to be lost by default to Soviet subversion, must be strengthened politically, economically, and militarily.

The economic background in the Arab States was fully described in the brilliant report of the U.N. Survey Mission to the Middle East, which was headed by Gordon Clapp of the Tennessee Valley Authority. His mission was charged with determining the economic possibilities of the northern Arab States, with special emphasis on the prospects of absorbing the Arab refugees from Palestine into the economy of the area. The report of this survey mission points out that the refugees themselves are a manifestation of the basic problems of the Middle East; that peace and stability cannot be achieved in the region until the masses of its peoples are able to enjoy higher standards of living than they do at present; and that, while the path to higher standards is a long one, such higher standards could be achieved through the development of the natural resources of the area.

These resources consist, in the main, of remote and unused agricultural land and potential water resources. To benefit fully from the opportunities offered by their environment, the Arab peoples require assistance, primarily in the fields of public health, agricultural extension, and engineering. With such assistance, they can march forward to a better way of life. Without such assistance, they will become victims of subversion, or, at the best, passive spectators in the present world conflict.

In considering assistance to the Arab world, distinction must be made between those countries whose financial resources appear adequate to finance development through their own funds and those countries whose resources are presently inadequate. While to all countries technical assistance may be offered as a useful tool to promote their development, a strong case can be made for granting financial aid to those countries presently lacking in capital resources. Our illustrative programs for the Arab States are therefore weighted heavily toward Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In preparation of the program, consideration has been given to the resources available to the various countries from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank, as well as from private financial institutions. Advantage has also been taken of the experience of the U.N. refugee program, and the

investigations of the Banks' and of our own Departmental officers.

Existing tensions in the area cannot be relieved unless these countries can be assisted in their programs of economic development. The problem of the Palestine refugees cannot be solved unless there are more opportunities for settlement and useful employment in the region. It is clearly impossible for local governments to find work for refugees from another country now within their borders unless their own citizens are employed to equal advantage. The proposed programs of bilateral assistance, therefore, are essential for the furtherance of United States objectives in the Near East, and should be considered as part of an integrated program of assistance for the area.

In working out proposed programs of assistance, the problem has been approached project-by-project. Illustrative projects are summarized on statistical tables available to you. We have placed the greatest emphasis on the increased production of food, and secondly, on improvement of public health.

It is proposed that the projects would be administered in concert with the local governments concerned in such a manner as to ensure accountability by Americans for every dollar of appropriated funds, but always with the purpose of relying on local officials to carry out approved projects which have received the necessary local support. This must be a program of self-help. It must be directed at the "grass roots" to help better the living conditions for the masses.

This program is not a cash "hand-out" to governments. It is felt, however, that more assistance should be given in the poorer countries of the region, than technical assistance alone. It is hoped to build on the experience of the past, but to point to the future through demonstration projects for rural improvement and resettlement. To succeed funds are needed to provide supplies and equipment and to undertake minor construction projects, looking toward the development of unused agricultural resources. This is especially true of Syria and Jordan. Only through such development of local resources can the outstanding issues threatening the stability of the Near East, including the issue of the Arab refugees from Palestine be resolved.

Palestine Refugee Program

One year ago, the Congress appropriated funds for a United Nations program for Palestine refugees, which was designed to create a more favorable political and economic climate for a future solution. On this basis, the United States participated in the 1951 program to the extent of a \$27,450,000 contribution.

The Department now considers that, with the passage of another year and the partial abatement of some of the political tensions in the area, it can present to Congress proposals which show definite

promise of a conclusion to this problem, a principal deterrent to peace and stability in this strategic area.

Quite apart from humanitarian considerations, abandonment of the Palestine refugees to their fate would result in the most serious consequences to the security of the whole Middle East. One need only consider the impact of 880,000 people on refugee rolls in relation to the populations of the neighboring countries—Israel, 1,400,000; Jordan, less than 1,000,000; Lebanon, one and a quarter million; Syria, 3,500,000. Discontinuance of aid to the refugees would mark the end to hope of peace in the area, and of any opportunity for constructive influence by the United States or the United Nations in the Near East.

More positively, assistance to the refugees is an affirmative act which cannot fail to benefit Israel on the one hand, which has acknowledged its debt of compensation but lacks the means to pay it; and the Arab States on the other, whose economies and social and political well-being would be strengthened by the addition of the refugee population if the refugees were absorbed and reintegrated into local economies.

Direct relief must be continued for a further period. A sum not to exceed 20 million dollars has been authorized by the General Assembly in December 1950 for direct relief purposes for the fiscal year 1952. This is a maximum which cannot be exceeded by the Agency without special authority from the General Assembly. Rising prices may make an upward revision of this total necessary. The intent of the General Assembly was to keep relief costs at the lowest practicable level in order to make the maximum amount available for the reintegration program. Presumably the Agency will not seek more funds for relief unless substantial price rises make it impossible to stay within the stipulated limits.

In the light of changing attitudes in the Arab countries, the Palestine Refugee Agency (PRA) has proposed, and the General Assembly has approved, a program of reintegrating refugees into the economies of Near Eastern countries. The object of the reintegration program is to move as rapidly as possible toward the permanent reestablishment of refugees on a self-sustaining basis so they can be removed once and for all from dependence on the United Nations for direct relief or temporary employment.

The energies and resources of PRA will henceforth be directed to working out with interested governments specific projects which will remove refugees from the breadlines and provide continuing employment. For the most part this will involve projects for settlement on new lands to be brought under cultivation. At least 60 percent of the refugees are farm people. In urban centers, where expanded or revitalized business or industrial activity is stimulated, housing projects already initiated will be extended. But no projects

will be financed from the reintegration fund except when requested by an interested government, and then only under conditions that guarantee the reestablishment of a specified number of refugees, and their permanent separation from the relief rolls.

Reintegration, however will be a slow process. In the words of the Agency's report to the General Assembly, it is "a major undertaking to reintegrate the majority of over three quarters of a million refugees, which may ultimately entail the expenditure of several hundred million dollars over a period of years. It should, at the same time, be noted that all expenditure under this fund will hasten the day when international assistance can be terminated."

Estimates prepared by the Palestine Refugee Agency indicate that the minimum cost for such resettlement would average at least \$1,000 per family for the 150,000 families concerned. Under the circumstances, action by the United States to authorize a contribution of 50 million dollars available for direct contribution to the Agency itself or to projects coordinated with the Agency's work is necessary if this program is to make a start towards settlement of the refugee problem. In this undertaking, it is hoped that other members of the United Nations will shoulder their share of the burden. Records of the program to date indicate that the United States share of the cost has been about 55 percent. This percentage may rise in 1952 and subsequent years, but every effort will be made to attract other contributions. I believe that our interest in the program justifies bold action and that other interested countries will follow our lead. Even if they did not do so, United States interests should not suffer as a result of inaction by others.

Our interests called for a clear definition of intent to see the reintegration program through to a conclusion, provided local governments remain cooperative in seeking this accomplishment.

Israel

Israel has requested assistance from the United States to balance its international accounts. The nation is not currently self-supporting, and it has depended on three principal sources of funds from abroad to meet its international obligations: donations from private donors in the United States, release of its sterling balances, and the proceeds of its line of credit with the Export-Import Bank which amounts to 135 million dollars. In a note submitted to the Department on March 22, 1951, Israel requested a grant for fiscal year 1952 in the amount of 150 million dollars.³ This amount is part of a 3-year plan for the future development of the economy of Israel, which will involve the settlement of as many as 500,000 additional immigrants. In its explanation of the magnitude of the requested

³ Not printed.

grant, the Government of Israel refers to its heavy burdens for financing its military forces and the obligation assumed by Israel to compensate the Arab refugees.

In view of the fact that the Mutual Security Program would make possible a measure of military assistance to Israel, and the immediate requirements of the U. N. program for the Arab refugees, the Department has analyzed the requirements of Israel on a basis different from that presented in the note from the Israeli Government. We have attempted an analysis of the Israeli balance of payments in order to determine a reasonable measure of grant aid for Israel, designed to enable the new nation to consolidate its economic position in 1952. The best financial information available to us indicates that there will be a gap of approximately 23 million dollars which would be met by the projected aid program.

This program, which would fill the gap, is designed on a project basis to supplement those projects financed by the Export-Import Bank. These new projects could have formed the basis for further bank credit if such credit were available to Israel, which it is not. The projects involve the supply of needed equipment to settle farmers on the land, and to extend the system of irrigation to increase agricultural output. The illustrative projects shown also include assistance to industry through expansion of electric power and improved port facilities. All components of the program are designed to increase productive facilities, especially food production. All are aimed towards Israel's urgent need to increase her exports and decrease her imports if she is to become a viable state.

The Administration of the Economic Program

A regional administration of the programs for the Arab States and Israel is proposed, with headquarters located in the area. It is hoped by the establishment of such an office to attract top administrative and technical talent to operate the program; scattering of independent country missions throughout the area could not attract such talent. Furthermore, the economic problem in the Arab States is a regional problem, incapable of solution if viewed from the standpoint of a single country. Through this regional office appropriate coordination would be assured with the U. N. activities in the area, in particular the Palestine refugee program. This pattern by no means conflicts with the general administrative proposals presented for the program as a whole, military and economic.

The Military Program

Total military grant aid proposed for Greece, Turkey, and Iran is estimated in the amount of 415 million dollars for fiscal year 1952. It is proposed also that up to 10 percent of this amount

be available for military assistance to other Near Eastern countries, i. e. to Israel and the Arab States. Such assistance could only be furnished following the finding by the President that such a course is essential in the security interests of the United States. Assistance can be granted only following the receipt of satisfactory evidence that the aid will increase the ability of the recipient country to defend itself, and that such self-defense will contribute to the preservation of peace and increase the security of the United States.

In all candor I should like to say that it is now the Department of State's view that the President may well find it necessary to utilize this authority, if it is granted in the very near future. Events in the Middle East are moving rapidly. The United States cannot afford to allow the forces of neutralism and anti-Western sentiment to gain any further ground, nor to allow these forces to be captured and exploited by international communism.

The Middle East is an important pivotal area whose strategic importance was clearly demonstrated during the past two World Wars. The Soviet Union's intention of dominating the Middle Eastern area is abundantly clear. This historic goal of Russian foreign policy was expressly stated in documents published relating to the negotiations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1940.⁴ It is evident today in the efforts of the Soviet Union to play on the nationalist aspirations of peoples and to stir up animosity and hatred toward the free nations of the West.

We believe that it is in the United States interest to (a) preserve and strengthen the orientation of these nations toward the United States; (b) maximize the will of the governments and people in the Arab States and Israel to cooperate in resistance to the U.S.S.R. both now and in the event of war; (c) create political stability in depth for the benefit of Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and contribute to the stability of the area as a whole; (d) induce the countries to increase their indigenous defensive capabilities; (e) strengthen internal security; and (f) reduce area rivalries and tensions.

There has been an increasing belief, particularly in the Arab States, that the United States and other countries have no interest in helping those countries to prepare to defend themselves. This feeling is producing increasing political disaffection. There are over 40 million people in the Arab States and Israel. These people belong to the free world. Apart from economic and technical assistance, military assistance on a scale appropriate to their present capacity to make effective use of it would go far to prove that the United States does not lack interest in their continued independence and defense.

⁴ *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, Department of State, 1948, pp. 258-259.

At the present time the armed forces of the Near Eastern states, which total on paper over 200,000 men, are not in a position to do more than maintain internal security and offer token resistance to invasion by a modern army. Some of them, however, could, if properly equipped, participate usefully in defense of their territories and in protecting lines of communication and vital installations and facilities. Generally speaking, the equipment of these forces is old, inadequate, and heterogeneous, and the introduction of modern training methods and a reasonable amount of up-to-date equipment is in most instances a condition precedent to their performance of any effective role in the defense of the Near Eastern region.

In order to achieve our objectives, there should be initiated, where justified, a limited arms supply program with early delivery of token quantities. Supervisory and technical personnel should also be furnished on request. General Scott is prepared to discuss this whole military question further.

The Independent Countries of Northern Africa

We are convinced that the modest aid programs proposed for the independent African countries of Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia are fully justified. Each in its own way is an important unit in the Mutual Security Program.

Liberia

The investment of private funds from the United States has made Liberia an important source of rubber. Export-Import Bank loans have enabled Liberia to export high-grade iron ore to the United States, the first shipload of which arrived in Baltimore on June 22. The Export-Import Bank loans are assisting in the development of Liberia's palm kernels and cocoa crops. The Port of Monrovia, developed with U.S. assistance, makes these materials readily available for ocean transport.

The geographical location of Liberia fully justifies its continued development as a source of raw materials. Much remains to be done, however, before Liberia realizes its potential. The proposed aid program, emphasizing food production and public health, will enable Liberia to make best use of other resources, including its line of credit from the Export-Import Bank.

Libya

In Libya a people previously under colonial status are establishing a nation. The development of Libya as a stable state is important to the United States, who strongly supported the U.N. resolution providing for Libya's independence on or before January 1, 1952. Libya is of course contiguous with other Near Eastern territories which have been discussed earlier in this presentation. Its coast line and its airfields are of great

strategic importance to us. Its people require the assistance of the Mutual Security Program in order to build up their economy, which is largely agricultural and pastoral.

Ethiopia and Eritrea

Ethiopia and Eritrea lie adjacent to the Red Sea, strategically located on the transport lifeline to the East and on the perimeter of the Near East.

Ethiopia has been traditionally friendly to us and Ethiopian troops have recently arrived in Korea to participate in the U.N. military operation there. In view of the progressive attitude of the Government and its promising natural resources, Ethiopia again is a case where we can expect early returns from a modest program of assistance which will supplement aid which Ethiopia is now receiving through the International Bank.

The total aid proposed for these three African countries amounts to 4 million dollars. Dr. Bennett will deal with these programs more specifically.

ICAO Simplifies Aircraft Navigation With New Chart Catalog

[Released to the press by ICAO]

The navigation of aircraft between points in any of the International Civil Aviation Organization's 57 member nations has been made easier by the publication of an ICAO aeronautical chart catalog which tells aircraft pilots and airline companies where they may find all the necessary maps. The catalog, the first of its kind in the world, contains complete listings of all aeronautical maps and charts available from ICAO's contracting states, noting from where they may be purchased and how much they cost. The catalog details the areas from which charts are available. It gives a full description of what is shown on the various types of aeronautical charts, such as route charts, radio facility charts, celestial navigation charts, and visual flight charts at various scales providing either world-wide, continental, regional or small area coverage. Most of the charts listed conform to the cartographic standards developed by ICAO for the use of international civil aviation.

The catalog is trilingual, in the three official languages of the Organization: English, French, and Spanish. It lists more than 7,000 individual charts, and ICAO provides a quarterly amendment service, so that both commercial and private pilots may have a complete and up-to-date listing of all available aeronautical charts necessary for safe flight.

Aside from its value to the flight and operating personnel in civil aviation ICAO officials expect that this catalog will be of interest to aviation economists, educational institutions, and other commercial and governmental agencies.

Democracy Must Keep Constant Guard For Freedom

By Philip C. Jessup
*Ambassador-At-Large*¹

The problem which confronts us in the United States today is a difficult one. It is the problem of a democratic, unregimented, peace-loving people conducting their affairs in time of peace with the same kind of intense effort and devotion which they have always been ready to apply in time of war.

I say "in time of peace" because in terms of our general position in the world there is an absence of any condition of over-all warfare despite the major military effort in Korea and the existence of what we have come to call the "cold war."

Already the United States has demonstrated its capacity and its willingness to pour forth its resources and to make sacrifices in this time of relative peace in order that the far greater burdens and sacrifices which general war necessitates can be avoided. As Secretary Acheson said and as Mr. Cabot, Director of the Office of International Security Affairs of the State Department, said here the day before yesterday it is essential to our very survival that we should press forward with our Mutual Security Program and that we should be prepared to maintain our effort for a considerable period of time.

Our Mutual Security Program places upon us a great burden, it is true. But this current burden should be regarded both in terms of our own security and in terms of the cost which the free world has borne in its fight against anti-democratic forces in two world wars. Adding the financial costs of these two world wars we find that for the United States the cost was about \$2,750 for each individual in our population in 1940. On a similar basis, it was \$3,720 for the United Kingdom, \$1,650 for France, and \$1,400 for Belgium.

In terms of human suffering and the irreparable cost in human life, our military casualties for the

two wars were 11.4 persons for each thousand in our population in 1940. For the United Kingdom it was 70.4, for France 164.5, and for Belgium 25.4.

We now assume great burdens both because we are strong enough to bear them and because it is necessary for our own security, which is inevitably bound up with the security of the free world. We cannot escape the fact that we are living in a period of tension. Because we are a peace-loving people and recognize that the common aim should be the general improvement in standards of living among all peoples, we naturally consider that international tension which deflects much of our energy from this goal is highly undesirable and that it should be terminated as soon as possible.

We must recognize on the other hand that from the point of view of the Communist conspirators in the Kremlin, a state of tension represents a desirable condition. From the point of view of their internal economy they think they can continue to operate on the basis of slave labor and suppression of the views of individuals who are kept in ignorance. From the point of view of their imperialist aims for expansion, they find in a state of tension a helpful condition for the promotion of subversion, civil strife, and even international conflict on a limited scale.

Rejection of Preventive War

We, as a people and through our Government, reject the idea that we can proceed toward the elimination of this state of tension by initiating preventive war with a view to wiping out the Soviet Union. Because of our very nature, and because war would multiply and not eliminate our problems, we must choose the more difficult path which leads us slowly but nevertheless surely toward the objective of frustrating the aggressive plans of the Kremlin.

We must not be lulled into a sense of security and of relaxation by little gestures which may

¹ Address made before the Colgate University Conference on American Foreign Policy, Hamilton, New York, on July 26 and released to the press on the same date.

actually have as their objective disarming us so that we will be ripe for a sudden and violent aggression. We must have real assurances that Soviet policies have fundamentally changed before we can put down our guard. It is clearly difficult to maintain this attitude and at the same time take advantage of any opportunity for promoting peaceful settlements, but this difficult task is also one which we must accomplish.

An essential central part of our effort consists in continuing to build the strength of the free world. Because we are dealing with a material world and with a heavily armed, aggressive enemy, our strength must have a material base. It must, however, include more than material strength. We need to have also the strength of mind and spirit which has been characteristic of the American character throughout history.

In thinking about these things we must not be afraid to repeat and repeat again fundamental truths. We began our life as a nation by stating fundamental truths and the elements of our political creed. We must learn in our political life constantly to reiterate the things we believe in, just as in our religious life we remind ourselves of our basic faith by constant repetition of familiar creeds and prayers.

One of these truths is what President Truman has called "the endlessly revolutionary idea of human freedom and political equality."

Moreover, in this epoch of world history, we must recognize that certain of the political truths on which our own national society is based are also applicable to the international society in which we live. I ask you to think about these two aspects of our society.

Within the United States we are members of many communities. From the point of view of political organization we are all members of a village, town, or city community. We are also members of the larger communities which are the States of the Union, and, finally, we are all members of the national community of the United States. These political groups, of which we as individuals are a part, are also themselves parts of the larger groupings, as we progress from the villages, towns, or cities to the counties or townships which in turn are parts of the State community. The States themselves are parts of the United States.

Although in its basic and original and true meaning the word "democracy" is based on the individual man and woman and their control of their own affairs, by a process of historical evolution "democracy" has come to mean for us also a parallel self-control and participation in government on the part of the political groups in which we are organized. It does no violence to the term "democracy" therefore to say that the States of the Union, in their relations among themselves and as parts of the United States, operate and co-operate on democratic principles.

International Concept of Democracy

As the world community has developed and is developing, this concept of democracy has become an international concept. This is true both in terms of the emphasis on individual rights throughout the world and in terms of the relations between the many nations of which the world community is composed.

On the individual side we must not forget that the Charter of the United Nations begins with a declaration by "the peoples of the United Nations." The peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed in the preamble to the Charter their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women" and also "of nations large and small." In this paragraph we see this combination of the idea that fundamental rights of individuals are equally applicable to groups of individuals who compose the nations of the world. There is, therefore, an international democracy of which the United States is a member just as there is a national democracy of which you and I are members.

On V-J Day we hoped and had reason to believe that the world was united and that international democracy would thrive and prosper. The unity which then existed has been destroyed by the leaders of the Soviet Union. This split was not of our choosing and the continuance of it is not our choice.

We ratified the Charter of the United Nations with the sincere determination to carry out its purposes and abide by its principles. It is clear now that the democratic concepts embodied in the Charter are either so foreign to the thinking of the men in the Kremlin that they never understood them or else that they signed the Charter with the cynical intention to ignore those provisions. This attitude on the part of one member of the United Nations, carrying in its train the subservient acquiescence of a small group of satellites, cannot deflect us from our steady course.

A fundamental concept in the international democracy is the same idea of equality which exists in our national democracy. In the Charter of the United Nations this is referred to as "sovereign equality". We know that in our national democracy this idea of equality does not mean that there do not exist differences between individuals in terms of personal capacity, physical well-being, or material prosperity. Similarly, the idea of sovereign equality does not deny the actual differences which exist among the states of the world. The idea of equality does mean both in our national and in our international democracy that the ideas of totalitarian dictatorship and slavery, whether practiced within a state or in its international relations, are entirely at variance with this basic idea to which we attach so much importance.

In its international relationships, the Soviet Union has no concept of acting as first among equals but only as a single central authoritarian despot. In our relations with the other countries of the world we operate on the principle of leadership which depends upon our ability to convince other countries that we are going in the right direction and that their interests call for their proceeding in company with us along the same road. By virtue of our power and the responsibility which comes with power, we do not deny that we seek to lead. We do repudiate the idea that we should drive.

With Leadership—Time, Patience, and Humility

The task of leadership is not easy because there will always be difficulties in acting on the basis of unity among allies. One has to learn not to resent this difficulty. No nation can ever see a range of problems from precisely the same standpoint as another nation. It always takes time and patience and it often requires humility to find the common denominator of purpose so that nations can stand together rather than apart. We seek allies and work with them not out of a desire for power or as a result of charitable impulses but as a result of our realization of common interests and common needs. We do not have the will to be their master nor they the willingness to be our satellites.

It is a part of the concept of democracy that it shall be organized and not anarchic. There are those who believe so strongly in this principle that they feel we have made no progress in international democratic organization since we have not yet attained complete world government. Actually, the progress toward the organization of the international democratic community has been very great. There is no need for discouragement because developments in the international community of states take very much longer than a political organization of individuals in a national community. The United Nations with its numerous specialized agencies represents an advance over the progress made in the League of Nations between the two wars. The democratic process did not end with the signing of the Charter but has continued as the United Nations as an organization has grown in experience.

It was true in regard to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations that the original constitutional document contained provisions which gave a special position to the great powers. Under the League of Nations Covenant there was a Council and an Assembly. The Council was originally composed of 9 states of whom the 5 great powers formed a majority. It was originally thought that they would be able to keep the control in all matters of political importance. After 6 years the Charter was amended to increase the size of the Council to 14, which destroyed the voting majority in the

Council of the great powers. Moreover, the Assembly, in which all members of the League were represented, gradually became the organ through which important political judgments of the League were expressed.

A similar process has been going on in the United Nations. The Charter recognized, through its special provision for voting in the Security Council, the veto right of the great powers. The United States has taken a leading part in an attempt to get the great powers to use restraint in the exercise of this veto power. We have never cast a veto in the Security Council, while the Soviet Union has used its veto 44 times. Partly because of this abuse of the veto and partly, I think, as the inevitable result of the democratic process, the General Assembly in which all members are represented has come to have more and more authority in the political field.

The "Uniting for Peace Resolution" adopted by the General Assembly with American leadership last year recognizes and consolidates this trend. The Security Council still has important functions to perform but the United Nations have in effect decided that their efforts are not to be crippled if one member of the Security Council abuses its right and prevents the Council from acting.

There are numerous other international organizations which on the political side have been formed regionally as the Charter contemplated. The oldest of these is the Organization of American States, which has steadily developed over more than half a century in the Americas.

One of the newest is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, set up under the treaty signed on April 4, 1949. This is an organization of 12 states in the North Atlantic community. Because of the policy of the Soviet Union, which endangers the security of all of them, the organization is concentrating its efforts on the problem of their common defense. That effort is personified for us by a great American, General Eisenhower.

But the treaty of the organization represents something even deeper and more permanent than this. During the course of the Four Power Deputies' meeting in Paris this spring, we pointed out to the Soviet Deputy that "the treaty is a manifestation of a common culture and of common interests in the economic, social, cultural, and political fields."

Mr. Gromyko was unable or unwilling to understand the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He seemed to think it was something which three of the parties to that treaty might be able or willing to bargain away to the Soviet Union. This is not the case. The treaty was concluded for a period of 20 years, and it is certainly within the realm of possibility that even when that period expires, parties to the treaty will find in it or in an amendment of it a continuing expression of their common interest.

No one can say with assurance today what the democratic organizational developments in the At-

Atlantic community may be during the next two decades, but the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as a part of their defense effort, are necessarily working together on many economic, financial, and political problems, as well as on the problems which are strictly military. The result of their cooperation in all of these fields might well serve to strengthen the bonds which already exist between them.

Parallel Developments in Europe

Within this North Atlantic framework there have been parallel developments on the Continent of Europe. A broad basis for the consideration of the common European problems is now afforded by the Council of Europe, in which 15 states are represented. The Organization of European Economic Cooperation, in which 18 states are represented and with which the United States and Canada are formally associated on subjects of mutual interest, has already over a period of 3 years done much to assist in solving some of the economic problems of this group of European states.

In the center of the traditional problems among the countries of Western Europe, there is the question of Franco-German relations. The bold initiative of the French in launching the Schuman Plan may well prove in historical retrospect to be a step of very great significance. Mr. McCloy has recently called it "the cornerstone of European unity."

When Prime Minister Plevin of France visited President Truman last January, they announced that they "were in fundamental agreement that the cause of peace in Europe and the world would be furthered by a progressively closer integration in every respect of a democratic Germany into a vigorous Western European community."² For some months now, a conference has been meeting in Paris to discuss the idea of creating a European Army in which Germany, as well as France, Belgium, and Italy could cooperate in their common defense all under the tent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Secretary Acheson pointed out in a letter to Foreign Minister Schuman of France last January that the United States supports closer European association and that it strongly favors European integration. With particular reference to the conference on the European Army, he said:

If your Government, in close consultation with the German and other European Governments who wish to participate, can evolve the main outlines of a plan for bringing the free nations of Europe more closely together in the spirit so well represented by the Schuman Plan, we can reasonably hope for long term solutions of many of our problems, be they political, military, or economic.

For such European unity General Eisenhower made a dramatic plea in London on July 3.³ All of these developments are illustrations of demo-

cratic association in an organized international society. They are characteristic of the spirit which animates the free world.

In other respects, too, we have seen international democratic progress. Countries which had for years been in subordinate relationships have been given their independence. Faithful to our pledges we gave independence to the Philippines. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon became independent but remained associated with Great Britain and other members of the Commonwealth. Burma is free. Indonesia has become a separate state linked with the Netherlands in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Indochina as a French colony has been superseded by the three Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, joined with France in the French Union. With the aid of the United Nations the Republic of Korea was set up as an independent state. When it was brutally attacked by the aggressive Communist forces on June 25, 1950, the United Nations rallied to its defense in the greatest, if not the first, demonstration of the actual effective operation of collective security.

What do we see on the other side of the ledger where the accounts of the Soviet Union are totaled up? The national boundaries of the Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have been obliterated and the populations largely dragged away into slavery. Rumania and Bulgaria are puppets, completely responsive to the will of Moscow. Poland, with its vigorous history of national pride and longing for independence, has also been subordinated. A Marshal of the Red Army was appointed Defense Minister of Poland. With the Red Army on its borders, Czechoslovakia was taken over and forced into submission. Hungary has equally been swallowed up. Democratic freedom has been suppressed in East Germany, which is under Russian occupation.

In the Far East the Soviets have continued and accelerated the imperialist expansion of the Czars. Ever since 1933, the Soviet Union has progressively tightened its control of Sinkiang. In Mongolia, ever since the occupation of its capital city by the Red Army in 1921, the Soviet Union has clearly established that it is no less determined than the Czars to maintain an imperialist control in this region.

Although pledged to treat Mongolia "as an integral part of the Republic of China," the Soviet Government ignored the authority of the National Government of China, even to the extent of exercising consular functions abroad on behalf of Outer Mongolia. The fate of Tanna Tuva may indicate what is in store for Outer Mongolia and for other sections of China. In 1921 Tanna Tuva declared itself independent. But in October 1944 its independence disappeared and it was annexed to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government did not even bother to announce that the annexation had taken place until 2 years later. North Korea

² BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1951, p. 244.

³ BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 163.

was also drawn in behind the Iron Curtain and made a base for aggression.

The Conspiracy that Walks Like a State

The Soviets make a desperate effort to cover up these obvious facts by calling all of these countries "The Peoples' Democracies." But no one knows as well as the people in these satellites that the only people who rule them are the men in the Kremlin and their agents whom they have put in charge. The whole history of Russia, both before and after the Soviet Revolution, with the exception of the sale of Alaska to the United States, has been one of always grasping and never relaxing except under force of arms.

The expansion of Western Europe, which began in the fifteenth century, has evolved from mastery to equal cooperation. The expansion of Russia has moved in the direction of always stricter and more brutal domination. Whatever else the Russians may have invented, they have not developed any framework of political relationship with other peoples, except that of domination.

The technique of bolshevism was something new. It represented the first example in history of a conspiracy which absorbed a state. It did not simply take over the power of a state. It supplanted the state. The Communist conspiracy took to itself the attributes of government without losing its conspiratorial characteristics.

The Soviet Union claims and uses the prerogatives of a sovereign state. It employs these prerogatives to further the conspiracy which centers in Moscow and reaches out across the entire world. The same system employs the weapons of conspiracy to forward its interests as a state. We used to refer to Russia as the bear that walks like a man. Let us revise that and call it the conspiracy that walks like a state.

When the last war ended the door was open to the Soviet Union to cooperate with the rest of the world, but it chose instead to conspire against the rest of the world. The door has never been closed to the Soviet Union, but on the other side of the door they have rung down the Iron Curtain behind which their conspiracies are still hatched.

Our defense plans in their reality are known to all peoples of the world who are permitted to have access to the truth because they have been adopted by the genuine democratic process of legislative and public debate.

Now as the conspirators in the Kremlin examine the state of the world and the record of the years since the end of World War II they must take into account a series of failures.

In the first place, so far as their own system behind the Iron Curtain is concerned, they cannot view the scene with tranquillity.

A system which depends for survival on recurrent purges is not a system which stands on the solid base of popular approval. The rigors of

a police state make escape dangerous and difficult but has not been able to check the flow of defectors. In areas outside the Soviet Union where they have still been unable to make their controls absolute, the flow is greater. In Korea, for example, the movement of people from North Korea to South Korea both before and after the fighting started last June was steady and could be counted in the hundreds of thousands. So also we find a steady stream of refugees escaping from behind the Iron Curtain which seeks to shut Eastern Germany off from the rest of the world.

The men in the Kremlin must wonder how large the flow would be if all restrictions were taken off. Faithful to our traditions, we have done our best to assume the burden of assisting those who escape from Soviet tyranny to find a place in the free world.

In China, it is true that the Communist forces supported by the Soviet Union have succeeded in gaining substantial control of the Chinese mainland, but those Chinese Communist armies have suffered terrific losses in Korea. Discontent is widespread and opposition continues throughout the area of China now held by the Communist armies. Mass executions are again the sign that they have not obtained the support of important parts of the population and they therefore resort to the technique of attempting to exterminate their opponents.

In our international relations the Soviet Union has seen the rapid consolidation of the free world. The whole program of democratic international organization which I have referred to constitutes a defeat for the Soviets. In the United Nations they find themselves without support not because any one else controls a majority of the votes but because the Soviet proposals are absolutely unacceptable to free nations. The response of the United Nations to the aggression in Korea was not only a severe blow to the plans of the Soviet Union for that area but registered and strengthened the unity and determination of the free world.

Faced with this situation the Soviet Union must be trying to recover lost ground. It is too much to expect that they have yet learned that a state based upon the murder of every local dissident cannot indefinitely survive. As stated in the McMahon-Ribicoff resolution adopted by the Congress,⁴ the American people are the friends of the Russian people. We sympathize with them in the suffering which they, and which the people in the other states behind the Iron Curtain, still endure. It is again full proof of the weakness of the Soviet system that the Soviets have not dared to comply with the request of the President of the United States that this resolution of friendship be published throughout Russia.

It is always a mistake to underestimate one's opponents. We must recognize the skill which the Communists possess in the field of propaganda.

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1951, p. 556.

There is perhaps less danger of Soviet acquisition of more territory than of their capturing in the minds of people, even outside the Communist orbit, such concepts as the promotion of peace.

We can expect the Soviets to press forward with all their capacity their campaign to split the free world, to prevent the development of international democratic organization and consultation.

This was one of their objectives during the Deputies' Meeting in the Palais Rose in Paris. They evidently thought that they could divide and weaken us by the combined use of carrots and wedges. Their carrots were intimations that the Soviet Union was a great peace-loving state; that differences could be settled; that tension could be relaxed; and that the great burden of the defense effort was unnecessary. But if one bit into the carrots, it turned out that they were filled only with a poisonous fluff which was bitter in the mouth.

Their wedges were efforts to appeal to the particular interest of one state or another in the hope that the Western powers would quarrel among themselves and fall apart. So far as results were concerned, they might just as well have tried to split a block of granite with a toothpick.

Caution Against Trickery and Promises

I would repeat again that we shall constantly be faced by the difficult task of keeping up our guard against trickery and illusory promises while at the same time not shutting the door to any genuine prospect of the settlement of issues, large or small. It is pertinent to note as did Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna in referring to his efforts to restrain the attempts of Czar Alexander to extend his sway in Europe: "Acquiescence will not keep him back nor will opposition accelerate his march."

We did not shut the door at Paris to negotiations with the Soviet Union. We invited the Soviet Union to send its Foreign Minister to Washington for a full and open discussion of the principal issues in Europe. If there had been any reality in the Soviet claims that it was ready to promote peace, the four Foreign Ministers would now be engaged in such a meeting in Washington.

We have invited the Soviet Union, along with other interested countries, to come to San Francisco on September 4 to sign a peace treaty with Japan. We do not know whether they will accept.

In the organs of the United Nations we are always seeking Soviet agreement upon solutions of the great problems confronting the world, notably in connection with the establishment of an effective system of international inspection which would permit the regulation of atomic weapons and of general limitation of armaments. The General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed the outlines of such a plan, but the Soviet Union has as often refused to accept them.

August 6, 1951

Because we genuinely want a peaceful world, we shall continue our efforts for peace. Because we know the nature of the Soviet system and the way it operates, we shall continue to build and to maintain our strength. If they are tempted to change their policies and to cooperate with the rest of the world in building peace, the door is open. But we are determined that we will not offer them the temptation which weakness always gives to a well-armed powerful aggressive state to launch new aggressions.

Despite the individual differences of view and the political disagreements which are a part of our democratic system and a part of its strength, America is united and will remain united in its determination that it will neither be weak nor imitate the practices of aggression. We will never surrender our own birthright nor will we through the process of appeasement surrender the birthright of others. Upon such a platform the United States can stand in the world as first among equals and exercise the leadership which comes from its position of power and its sense of responsibility.

The American Revolution has never ended. Its democracy is still a living and vital force. Social justice, tolerance, liberty, and equality are still our goals.

Respect for the rights of the individual in the state is the mark of our democracy at home. Respect for the rights of the individual nation is the mark of our democratic foreign policy.

U.S. Approves Establishment Of Japanese Overseas Agency

[Released to the press July 19]

The United States Government and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, have approved the establishment of a Japanese Government overseas agency at Washington. To date the Japanese Government has established such agencies at New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, and Honolulu for the purpose of promoting trade between the United States and Japan and handling affairs pertaining to the nationality and civil status of Japanese residing in the United States. Similar agencies have also been established in a number of foreign countries, including Brazil, Uruguay, France, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, India, Pakistan, and Thailand. The agencies operate under the supervision of the Japanese Foreign Office but have no diplomatic status.

The chief of the new agency in Washington will be Ryuji Takeuchi at present Trade Commissioner of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, who is expected to arrive in Washington late in August 1951. He will be assisted by Takeshi Watanabe of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, who will act as financial adviser, and Yoshimitsu Ando and Harumi Takeuchi of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Exposing Soviets' Conflicting Propaganda Lines

*By Edward W. Barrett,
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹*

I want to emphasize that there is no reason for us to be in awe of Soviet propagandists. It is true that they are putting on the most massive campaign the world has ever known. We estimate they are spending at least the equivalent of one to two billion dollars a year on foreign propaganda. It is true that they don't permit themselves to be impeded by the facts. But they have blundered and do blunder. They blundered in their propaganda handling of Yugoslavia. They blundered in the way they handled the Marshall Plan. And their multi-million-dollar campaign to make the world believe we were the aggressors in Korea backfired badly. In the face of the clear facts, it merely convinced much of the world that Soviet propagandists were colossal liars.

Today they are even playing two conflicting propaganda lines to audiences abroad. Line one is that the Soviet Union, the great champion of peace, took the initiative in seeking a truce in Korea. Line two, in sharp contrast, is that the Americans were licked and came to the Communists on bended knee to seek peace. Neither line is proving particularly successful in most of the world—partly because the two tend to cancel each other out.

Perhaps the Kremlin's most vulnerable point today is its dread of having its subjects exposed to the truth—the dread that led to the Iron Curtain and to the progressive tightening of that curtain. Let me illustrate the incredible lengths to which they go. A group of American scientists who have studied the problem estimate that the Soviet is now using between 5,000 and 10,000 men in a vast network to try to jam the Voice of America and the BBC out of Russia alone. That is more men than we use in our entire world-wide radio operations. These scientists also estimate that for every dollar and every man we put into the Voice of America operations aimed at Russia,

the Kremlin must put about five dollars and five men into jamming in order to have any significant success in keeping the Voice from getting through. That is one reason why we advocate and shall continue to advocate large-scale expansion of Voice of America facilities abroad.

It should be noted that the Kremlin hasn't yet dared to report to its own population the recent Congressional Resolution of Friendship for the Russian people—even though the President formally requested its transmission to the people of Russia.

Hour after hour we are saying in various languages of Russia: "It has been 14 days since the President of the United States requested your government to transmit to you a message of friendship from the American Congress. Why has your government not done so? Is it afraid for you to know of that friendship?"

Those broadcasts are getting through. Our reports indicate some 20 percent are getting through to Moscow, despite the jamming, and 60 percent or more are getting through to many areas outside of Moscow.

No, there is no occasion for us to be awestruck. But it is urgent that we miss no opportunity to combat the Big Lie with the Big Truth—the truth that freedom is on the march. And this can be done only by active, militant information programs by our own government, other free governments, and private organizations. The press and radio of the free world have a big responsibility in this.

Tribute to U.S. Staff

As one who came into this work only 18 months ago and will not continue in it indefinitely, I want to pay tribute to the intelligent, loyal, and able crew of men and women who have dedicated their careers to this vital field of activity. I can cite you individual after individual who, despite constant and usually ill-informed sniping at the pro-

¹ Excerpts from an address made at the Colgate University Conference on American Foreign Policy, Hamilton, N.Y., July 25 and released to the press on the same date.

gram, have turned down outside jobs paying \$15,000 to \$25,000 and more a year in order to perform, at \$10,000 or less, this work which they consider so vital to the national interest.

They deserve full support from the American people and the American Congress. If there's anything really wrong with any of their work, they would welcome a full study by appropriate Congressional groups and welcome constructive proposals. But they feel and feel deeply that the work they are doing is far too vital to the future of the free world to be used as a political whipping boy.

It is high time that we all recognize what these men recognize: That the truth is the most potent single weapon we have against Communist imperialism and that we are trifling with the world's future if we miss any opportunity to use it fully and effectively.

Application of GATT Concessions Negotiated With Norway

[Released to the press July 23]

The President on July 23, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, authorized the application, as of August 2, 1951, of certain additional United States tariff concessions negotiated at the 1950-1951 tariff conference at Torquay, England, under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This action was taken in consequence of the signature by Norway, on July 3, of the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement.

The provisions of the protocol require that a country signing it shall put into effect, on the thirtieth day after signing, the concessions which it negotiated at Torquay, but may withhold concessions initially negotiated with another country until the thirtieth day after that other country had also signed the Protocol.

The United States is continuing to withhold, under this provision, practically all its concessions initially negotiated with Austria, Brazil, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Peru, and Turkey, until those countries have signed the Torquay Protocol. In addition to Norway, seven other countries with which the United States negotiated at Torquay—the Benelux Customs Union (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), Canada, the Dominican Republic, France, and Sweden—have signed the Torquay Protocol and United States concessions to those countries have been put into effect.

At Torquay the United States obtained from Norway concessions on various agricultural and industrial products including: certain fresh and dried fruits; vegetable juices; lard, ash and fir products; certain chemicals; lubricating oils and petrolatum; cotton sail cloth; tractors; electric

hand tools; various machinery items; aircraft parts; and miscellaneous articles. Concessions granted by Norway to other countries will also apply to a large number of articles imported into that country from the United States.

In return, the United States negotiated with Norway concessions on various products imported from that country. The principal products on which such United States concessions will apply include: canned sardines packed, not in oil, in immediate containers weighing, with contents, less than 8 ounces; other sardines and other herring, not in oil (not including herring smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing, with contents, more than one pound each); sardines, canned in oil, neither skinned nor boned but smoked before canning, valued at more than 18, but not more than 23, cents per pound, including the weight of the immediate container; fish cakes, fish balls, and fish pudding, canned, not in oil; reindeer meat; certain specialty types of cheese; chemical pigments; manganese silicon and ferromanganese; chrome or chromium metal; calcium silicide, zirconium silicon, and certain other alloys; certain paper products; and artificial abrasives.

The President's letter to the Secretary of the Treasury will be published in the *Federal Register*.¹ Copies of Schedule XX of the General Agreement, enumerating the concessions granted by the United States at Torquay, are available for inspection at the field and regional offices of the Department of Commerce. Schedule XX is also included in *Treasury Decisions*, No. 52739, published by the Department of the Treasury on June 7. A detailed discussion of the concessions exchanged between the United States and Norway at Torquay is contained in the *Preliminary Analysis of the Torquay Protocol of Accession, Schedules, and Related Documents* (State Department Publication, No. 4209), which is available by purchase from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Price \$1.

Point Four Agreement For British Dependent Overseas Territories

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain on July 17 signed a Point Four general agreement for the British dependent overseas territories. The agreement is similar to those signed with other countries in providing terms for possible technical cooperation under the Point Four Program with the territories.

This "umbrella" agreement does not mention any specific projects or areas for technical cooperation.

¹ 16 Fed. Reg. 7379.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During July 1951

Aeronautical Exposition, 19th International	Paris	June 15-July 1
Crystallography, International Union of: Second General Assembly	Stockholm	June 27-July 5
Education, 14th International Conference on Public	Geneva	July 12-21
German Debts, Tripartite Commission on	London	June 25-July 25
Labor Organization, International (ILO): Meeting of Committee of Experts on the Status and Conditions of Employment of Domestic Workers	Geneva	July 2-6
Governing Body, 116th Session	Geneva	July 2-4
Lifeboat Conference, 6th International	Ostend	July 22-25
Penal and Penitentiary Commission, Meeting of International	Bern	July 2-7
Physics, International Union of Pure and Applied: 7th General Assembly	Copenhagen	July 11-14
Survey Officers, Conference of British Commonwealth	London	July 9-20
Telecommunication Union, International (ITU): International Radio Consultative Committee: 6th Plenary Assembly	Geneva	June 5-July 6
United Nations: International Law Commission: 3d Session	Geneva	May 15-July 31
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons	Geneva	July 2-20
Economic and Social Council: Agenda Committee and Economic Committee	Geneva	July 23-27
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): General Conference: 6th Session	Paris	June 18-July 11
Executive Board: 26th Session	Paris	July 11 (one day)
Seminar on Teaching of Visual Arts in General Education	Bristol	July 7-27

In Session as of July 31, 1951

Arts and Modern Architecture, 9th International Exhibition of Decorative and Industrial	Milan	May 5-
Building Exhibition, "Constructa": the 25th	Hannover	July 3-
Festival of Britain	England	May 3-
Materials Conference, International	Washington	February 26-
Swiss-Allied Accord, Four Power Conference on	Bern	March 5-
United Nations: General Assembly: 5th Regular Session	New York	September 19, 1950-
Trusteeship Council: 9th Session	New York	June 5-
Economic and Social Council: 13th Session	Geneva	July 30-
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): Seminar on Teaching of History	Sèvres	July 11-
Whaling, International Commission for the Regulation of: 3d Meeting	Capetown	July 23-

Scheduled August 1-October 31, 1951

American States, Organization of (OAS): Inter-American Cultural Council: 1st Meeting	Mexico City	September 10-
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: Special Meeting	Panama City	August 20-
Aviation Organization, International Civil (ICAO): Legal Committee: 8th Session	Madrid	September 11-
Search and Rescue Division: 3d Session	Montreal	September 4-
Aerodromes, Air Routes and Ground Aids Division	Washington	October 9-12

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, July 26, 1951.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled August 1–October 31, 1951—Continued

Map Division	Montreal	October 30–
South American Regional Air Navigation Meeting: 2d Session.	South America	October 30–
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International— and International Monetary Fund: 6th Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors.	Washington	September 10–
Chemistry, International Union of Pure and Applied: 16th General Conference	New York	September 8–
Chemistry, 12th International Congress on Pure and Applied	New York and Washington	September 8–9 and 14–15
Chemists and Chemical Engineers, International Conclave of	New York and Washington	September 3–
Cinematographic Art, 12th International Festival of	Venice	August 8–
Deaf and Dumb, International Conference on the	Rome	September 19
Documentation, International Federation for: 18th Conference.	Rome	September 15–
Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	August 19–
Entomology, 9th International Congress of	Amsterdam	August 17–
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO):		
Second Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology	Igels, Austria	August 6–
Regional Meeting on Land Utilization in Tropical Areas of Asia and the Far East.	Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon	September 17–
Meeting on Fisheries Statistics	Rome	October 29–
Plant Quarantine Conference	Rome	September 25–
Geodesy and Geophysics, International Union of: 9th General Assembly.	Brussels	August 21–
Interparliamentary Union, 40th General Assembly	Istanbul	August 20–
Izmir International Fair	Izmir	August 20–
Japanese Peace Conference.	San Francisco	September 4–
Labor Organization, International (ILO): 2d Conference on Migration.	Naples	October 2–
Poultry Congress, 9th World's	Paris	August 2–
Refugee Organization, International (IRO):		
8th Session of the General Council	Geneva	October 15–
10th Session of the Executive Committee	Geneva	October 10–
Food Congress, 9th International	Lisbon	September 22–
Sanitary Organization, Pan American (PASO):		
5th Session of the Directing Council and the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization.	Washington	September 24–
14th Meeting of the Executive Committee	Washington	September 20–
15th Meeting of the Executive Committee	Washington	October 3–
Scientific Unions, International Council of (ICSU): Meeting of Executive Board.	Washington	October 14–
Tariffs and Trade, 6th Session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on.	Geneva	September 17–
Telecommunication Union, International (ITU):		
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference International Telephone Consultative Committee:	Geneva	August 16–
16th Plenary Assembly	Rome	October
United Nations:		
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction.	Geneva	August 1–
World Health Organization (WHO):		
First Meeting of the Regional Committee for Africa.	Geneva	September 22–

United States Delegations to International Conferences

International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: Ninth General Assembly

The Department of State announced on July 23 that the Ninth General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics will be held at Brussels August 21–September 1, 1951. The United States will be represented by the following delegates:

August 6, 1951

Walter H. Bucher, Ph.D., Chairman of the delegation; professor of structural geology, Columbia University; president of the American Geophysical Union.
K. Hilding Beij, assistant chief, hydraulic laboratory, National Bureau of Standards; general secretary, American Geophysical Union; secretary, committee on finances, International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.
Perry Byerly, Ph.D., chairman, department of geological sciences and professor of seismology, University of California.

Horace R. Byers, Sc.D., professor of meteorology, University of Chicago.

L. P. Disney, chief, section of predictions, tide division, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce.

J. Wallace Joyce, Ph.D., consultant to the Science Adviser, Department of State; secretary, International Association of Terrestrial Magnetism and Electricity.

Walter D. Lambert, president, International Association of Geodesy; geodesist (retired), U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey.

Waldo E. Smith, hydraulic engineer and geophysicist, Washington; executive secretary, American Geophysical Union.

F. J. Veihmeyer, Ph.D., director, division of irrigation, and professor of irrigation, University of California.

The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, one of the ten scientific organizations comprising the International Council of Scientific Unions, is composed of seven associations which are concerned with the following specific phases of geodesy and geophysics: geodesy, seismology, meteorology, magnetism, oceanography, vulcanology, and hydrology.

The Assembly will meet only at the opening and closing of the 12-day meeting to consider various administrative matters of the Union. During the intervening period the seven associations will meet separately to hear and discuss papers on the specialized problems of each association.

Among the subjects to be considered by the associations are explosion waves, the effects of explosion reverberations on regional coastal structures, continental structures, the physics of clouds, solar radiation, ozone in the atmosphere, upper atmosphere physics and the ionosphere, microclimatology, magnetic-electrical ramifications of rocket planes, international standards for geomagnetic operations, a catalogue of the earth's volcanoes, recent volcanic disturbances, the use of fossils found in deep-sea deposits as keys to past climatic conditions, ocean-atmosphere interaction, sea turbulence, ocean currents, fluctuations of ground-water levels, geographical distribution of land erosion, and methods of probing ocean depths.

In terms of everyday affairs, these studies may lead to developments in such practical matters as rainmaking, oil drilling, predictions of flying conditions, alleviation of great water shortages, prevention of land erosion, the causes of volcanic eruptions, and studies leading to the development of earthquake-resisting structures—to name a few.

A special joint committee on the physics of the earth's interior will meet 5 days before the Assembly to discuss the earth's radioactivity, heating and cooling, and thermal conductivity.

The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics was formed in Brussels in 1919 to further scientific research and investigation by international cooperation in the fields of geodesy and geophysics. The Union also collaborates with other scientific unions in maintaining the International Latitude Service, Naples; the International Isostatic Institute, Helsinki; the International Seismological Summary, Cambridge; and

Bureau International de l'Heure, Paris. The United States became a member of the Union in 1919.

Whaling Commission: 3d Annual Meeting

On July 19 the Department of State announced that the International Whaling Commission will convene at Capetown, South Africa, for its third annual meeting on July 23, 1951, with preliminary meetings commencing on July 19. The United States delegation is as follows:

United States Commissioner

Dr. A. Remington Kellogg, Director, United States National Museum

Deputy United States Commissioner

Dr. Hilary J. Deason, Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Advisers

John F. Stone, American Consulate General, Capetown
Fred B. Taylor, Office of the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Department of State

The International Whaling Commission was established pursuant to the international convention for the regulation of whaling, which was signed at Washington on December 2, 1946, and entered into force on November 10, 1948. The United States is one of 17 contracting governments comprising the membership of this Commission. The Commission is charged with responsibility within the framework of the convention for safeguarding the whale stocks of the world. Within strictly defined limits, the Commission may amend the schedule, an integral part of the convention, by adopting regulations designating protected species, fixing closed seasons and waters, limiting total catches and the sizes of whales taken, defining standards for measurement of whales, and establishing requirements for statistical and other records.

The third annual meeting will be concerned with such matters as possible amendments of the schedule of the convention, action taken by the member governments to promulgate certain laws and regulations concerning whaling in conformity with the provisions of the convention, the method of reporting infractions of the regulations and the penalties for infractions, the status of ratification and adherence of several countries to the convention, possible amendments to the rules of procedure, and administrative and budgetary matters.

The second annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission was held at Oslo, Norway, July 17-21, 1950.

ECOSOC: Thirteenth Session

The Department of State announced on July 26 that Isador Lubin, the United States representative on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, will attend the thirteenth session

of the Council, which is to open at Geneva on July 30, 1951. Mr. Lubin and the deputy United States representatives on the Economic and Social Council, Walter Kotschnig, director, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, and Leroy D. Stinebower, director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State, will be assisted by the following other members of the United States delegation:

Advisers

Kathleen Bell, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State.
Donald Blaisdell, United States representative for Specialized Agency Affairs, Geneva, Switzerland.
Herbert Block, Division of Research for U. S. S. R. and Eastern Europe, Department of State.
John M. Cates, Jr., Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State.
Herbert J. Cummings, director, Near Eastern and African Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.
Corwin D. Edwards, director, Bureau of Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
Gladys Harrison, assistant general counsel, Department of State.
Frances Kernohan, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State.
Mrs. Delia Kuhn, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State.
Forrest Murden, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York.
William Stibravy, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State.
Mrs. Virginia C. Westfall, Division of International Administration, Department of State.
Mrs. Ayrness Joy Wickens, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor.
William H. Wynne, financial adviser, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury.

Secretariat

Press and Information Officers:

Chester D. Harvey, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State, New York.
Gilbert W. Stewart, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York.

Administrative Secretary:

Florence Marie Rodgers, United States Mission to the United Nations, New York.

The Economic and Social Council is responsible for making or initiating studies and reports concerning international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters; for the promotion of respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and for making recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to the members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

The Council is composed of one representative each from 18 member states, six countries being elected each year by the General Assembly to serve for a period of 3 years. The member states at the present time are Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.

Among the 57 items on the provisional agenda for the thirteenth session of the Economic and Social Council are consideration of the world economic situation, economic development of underdeveloped countries, problem of food shortages and famine in many regions, and full employment. Other important matters with which the Council will deal are narcotic drugs, invitations to non-member states to become parties to the convention for the suppression of the traffic in persons and of the exploitation of the prostitution of others, the plight of survivors of concentration camps, and refugees and stateless persons. Consideration will be given to the expanded technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and long-term measures to promote the economic development and social progress of Korea. Other agenda items include coordination among the United Nations and the specialized agencies, relations of intergovernmental organizations with the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and applications and reapplications of nongovernmental organizations for consultative status.

The last session of the Economic and Social Council was held at Santiago, Chile, February 20-March 21, 1951.

Armistice Negotiations in Korea

U. N. Communiqué of July 25

The ninth meeting of the United Nations Command-Communist armistice negotiations today made considerable progress toward the formulation of an agenda.

The general question of placing in the agenda the item of the withdrawal of military forces from Korea was discussed further and the new proposal made by the Communist delegation was sufficiently interesting to cause the United Nations Command delegation at 3:13 p.m. to suggest an overnight recess in order to examine the matter in detail.

After General Nam Il's new proposal the remainder of the afternoon session was devoted to the exploration and clarification by both sides with questions and replies following rapidly across the conference table.

The morning session was devoted to a statement by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, who expressed the United Nations Command's views on the Communist agenda proposed at the last meeting. This was in response to the opening query by the senior Communist delegate in order that there be no misunderstanding on one of his more significant remarks. Admiral Joy authorized a United Nations Command liaison officer to provide the Communist delegation with an extract in English of the statement in question. The next conference is scheduled to be held at 2 p.m. Seoul time, July 26 [midnight July 25, Eastern daylight time].

U. N. Commander's Announcement

General Matthew B. Ridgway issued the following announcement on July 26:

This afternoon the delegations representing the belligerent forces in Korea in the conference at Kaesong agreed

upon an agenda for the regulation of the military armistice conference.

This agenda is as follows:

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea.
3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice.
4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.
5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

Having agreed upon an agenda, the way now is clear for the delegations to enter the area of really substantive discussion of the terms of a military armistice. Major problems remain to be solved in these discussions. It is much too early to predict either the success or the rate of progress to be obtained. Preliminary discussion began immediately after the agreement on the agenda in order that the potential for halting bloodshed in Korea may be realized as soon as possible.

It must be fully realized that mutual acceptance of an agenda is merely the initial step for the final goal of a military armistice and resultant cease-fire, which must be achieved under conditions giving every reasonable assurance against the resumption of hostilities.

There are numerous basic points within the framework of the agenda on which agreement must be reached and on which there is presently wide diversion of views.

U. N. Communiqué of July 27

A substantive statement expressing the United Nations Command views on one of the items of the previously agreed upon agenda was the principle business transacted during the eleventh meeting today of the military armistice conference at Kaesong.

Admiral Joy's sparsely phrased and logical presentation was supplemented by military maps, which were later turned over to the Communist delegation.

Immediately following the United Nations statement, the Communist delegation, without expressing an opinion on the remarks, requested a recess until 10 a.m. Seoul time, July 28 [8 p. m., July 27, Eastern daylight time].

Discussion by both sides on administrative and procedural matters designed to expedite final achievement of a military armistice and cease-fire opened today's conference, with agreement in principle reached.

Officer staff assistants to work out details were named by both sides.

U. N. Communiqué of July 28

Although the substantive discussions during today's armistice conference at Kaesong were in their entirety related directly or indirectly to item number two of the agenda, little progress was made toward reaching an agreement in principle.

During both the morning and afternoon sessions, the viewpoints of the two delegations were stated in an atmosphere of cool military formality. The positions, restated today by the senior Communist delegate, had been first placed on the record by him during the conversation that preceded agreement on the agenda.

It was yesterday that the United Nations delegation expressed its views on agenda item number two, providing maps to the Communist delegation to supplement the statement.

At the end of today's session, recessed at 3:42 p.m. at the suggestion of the senior Communist delegate, the posi-

tion of both delegations on the agenda item under discussion had not changed.

The thirteenth session will be held tomorrow morning at 11 a.m. [9 p.m., July 28, Eastern daylight time].

U. N. Communiqué of July 29

Discussions were continued today, the thirteenth session of the military armistice conference, on item number two of the agenda dealing with establishing a demilitarized zone between the opposing forces, with both delegations holding firm to their respective and previously stated viewpoints.

In responding to the Communists' opening statement of the morning, Admiral Joy urged that the conference talks be limited to the immediate military problem faced by the negotiators. The Communists' opening statement had attempted to explore matters not germane to the current armistice negotiations.

The afternoon session was devoted largely to a series of brief statements by Admiral Joy in development and further clarification of the United Nations position.

Little tangible progress resulted from today's session, which adjourned for the day at 4:05 p.m. Seoul time [2:05 a.m., Eastern daylight time].

The fourteenth session will meet tomorrow morning at 11 a.m. [9 p.m., July 29, Eastern daylight time] as suggested by the Communist delegation.

U.S. Concludes Agreement With UNKRA

[Released to the press July 18]

The Department of State and the Department of Defense announced today that an agreement has been concluded between the United States Government, acting in its capacity as Unified Command pursuant to resolutions of the United Nations, and J. Donald Kingsley, Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), governing the relationships in Korea of the United Nations Command and UNKRA during the present phase.

While active hostilities continue, the U.N. Command will have sole responsibility for all relief and short-term economic aid essential to the military operations. The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will assume full responsibility for relief and rehabilitation operations when the military situation permits this responsibility to be relinquished by the United Nations Command. In the meantime, UNKRA will expand its present staff in Korea to prepare for its full-scale operations, will render technical advice and assistance to the Korean Government, will plan for long-range rehabilitation and reconstruction, and will carry out any program of economic aid in addition to the program of the United Nations Command which may be found feasible. The plans and activities of the UNKRA staff will be closely coordinated with the work in the relief field of the United Nations Command.

Department Reiterates Position on Conduct of Its Loyalty and Security Programs

Letter From Deputy Under Secretary Humelsine to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy

[Released to the press July 25]

The Department of State released today the text of a letter from Deputy Under Secretary of State Carlisle H. Humelsine, dated July 25, 1951, to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.

Mr. Humelsine's letter was written in answer to Senator McCarthy's demand that the Department disclose information on the status of 29 alleged loyalty cases. As in previous lists furnished the Department by Senator McCarthy, some of the individuals cited are not employees of the Department; others have been cleared by the Department's Loyalty Security Board; and others are in process through the loyalty program.

It is the Department's position that Senator McCarthy's indiscriminate lumping together of names is tantamount to holding hostage the rights and reputations of those employees who have been or may be cleared of the allegations against them.

The text of Mr. Humelsine's letter follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARTHY: As the officer in charge of the operation of the loyalty and security program of the Department of State, I am answering your letter to the Secretary of July 23.

You begin your letter by stating that it is your understanding that the twenty-nine individuals whom you list are "cases . . . pending before the State Department's Loyalty Board". Your understanding is incorrect. The twenty-nine individuals—all of whom you have cited, of course, in your former lists—fall into varying categories. Like your previous lists, this one also includes the names of persons who are not employees of the Department of State, employees who have been cleared by the Department's Loyalty Security Board, as well as individuals in process through the loyalty program. Your indiscriminate lumping together of names and the threat to make them public is tantamount to holding hostage the reputation and rights of those employees who have been or may be cleared of the allegations against them. The President's Directive of March 13, 1948 (*Federal Register*, March 16, 1948) precludes me from furnishing any reports, records, or files relative to the loyalty of employees. Disclosure of such information

would be prejudicial both to these people as individuals and to the Government's ability to conduct a sound, just and honorable loyalty security program.

Let me once again remind you that the Department of State is operating under the loyalty program laid down by the President in Executive Order No. 9835, as amended by Executive Order No. 10241. This executive order, which anyone interested in our national security safeguards should feel duty-bound to study, prescribes a loyalty system which even the most critical have endorsed. This system offers as much protection to the Government as any ethical and American system which could be devised. That it is subject to attack for purely political reasons without regard for the facts is unfortunate.

The Department of State, operating under the authorities of the so-called McCarran Security Rider and Public Law 733, carries out a total security program. When I say total, I mean total; if an individual is found to be a security risk, he is separated from the Department.

Now, the following points with regard to the Department's loyalty and security program have been said many times, but I will repeat them again for your benefit as simply and as briefly as possible.

1. Both the loyalty and security programs of the Department are under my immediate supervision, and they are being carried out honestly and effectively. We are and will continue to operate a program to assure (1) maximum protection to the Government and (2) due regard for the rights of the individual.

2. Under this program, all Departmental and Foreign Service officers receive complete security investigations. These investigations are exhaustive and are made by trained investigators, operating under the direct supervision of a former FBI agent, Mr. Donald Nicholson.

3. The Department does not permit any employee to have access to secret material when it has determined that such access might constitute a danger to the security of the United States. To

do otherwise would be contrary to the established security principles of the Department.

4. Questions as to the loyalty of any employee of this Department or the Foreign Service result in an up-to-date and full-scale investigation of the individual employee by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The evaluation of this investigation is made by a competent Loyalty Security Board which operates under the chairmanship of General Conrad E. Snow, an experienced and able lawyer of distinguished reputation and unquestioned integrity.

5. This Board is made up of men of such high qualifications and unquestioned loyalty that I doubt that even the most suspicious person could be able to challenge their credentials.

6. The work of the Board is reviewed administratively by my immediate office and by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. Mr. Seth Richardson, a former Assistant Attorney-General under ex-President Herbert Hoover, was formerly Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board. He was succeeded by the present Chairman, ex-Republican Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Hiram Bingham.

7. In the more than 4 years of operation under this procedure, the Loyalty Review Board has never reversed the Department's adjudication of a case.

8. In conducting this program, the Department has uncovered some employees who did not meet its high security standards, and these employees have been separated.

As should be perfectly clear from the foregoing, the conduct of the Department's loyalty and security programs is predicated on thoroughly tried and proven American principles. We will continue to operate this program in the same straight-forward manner in the future, confident that we are taking every reasonable step to assure a completely loyal and trustworthy group of employees. But we will not abandon adherence to those concepts so carefully and deliberately laid down in the President's Loyalty Program, and we will not compromise our legal and ethical responsibilities under pressure of political stratagem or threat.

Division of Overseas Information Centers Established

Effective July 13 the Division of Libraries and Institutes, Office of Educational Exchange, is abolished. There is established, in the Office of Educational Exchange, the Division of Overseas Information Centers (ICD). All of the functions, personnel, funds, property, and records of the former Division of Libraries and Institutes are transferred to the new Division of Overseas Information Centers.

The Division of Overseas Information Centers is to be headed by Lawrence S. Morris, Chief.

The major components of the division are Program Planning and Evaluation Staff; Administrative and Management Staff; Overseas Operations Branch; Program Service Branch; Special Programs Branch.

Appointment of Officers

William C. Herrington as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, with responsibility for policy on international fisheries and wildlife matters, effective June 29.

Philip N. Glick as Assistant Legal Adviser in charge of technical cooperation programs, effective June 18.

Hulten Appointed Chief European Representative For IE Program

The Department of State announced on July 16 the appointment of Charles M. Hulten as chief European representative for the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program.

Mr. Hulten will be charged with on-the-scene representation of the Department in coordinating the greatly increased operations in Europe authorized by the Congress in late 1950 under the President's "Campaign of Truth" program. Making his headquarters in Paris, he will concentrate particularly on initiating important new operations in Europe.

To succeed Mr. Hulten in Washington, the Department has appointed Thurman L. Barnard as Acting General Manager of the program.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

U.S. Scientists To Serve As Attachés In Overseas Posts

[Released to the press July 17]

The Department of State announces the appointment of five American scientists to serve as scientific attachés in overseas posts. Dr. Hans T. Clarke, professor of biochemistry at Columbia University and an international authority on the chemistry of biological compounds, heads this list.

Others are Dr. William L. Doyle, professor of anatomy at the University of Chicago; Dr. L. H. Farinholt, associate professor of chemistry at Columbia University; Dr. Robert L. Loftness, a physical chemist from industry; and Dr. Louis Lek, formerly of the Scripps Institution at La Jolla.

These appointments represent additional progress in carrying out the recommendations in the Department of State report, *Science and Foreign Relations*, prepared under the direction of Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner. That report, adopted by the Department of State last year, recommended that science and technology be brought to bear on for-

ign policy and international relations. It accordingly proposed establishment of an office of science adviser in the Department and of science attaché posts in important U.S. missions abroad. In line with the report, Dr. Joseph B. Koepfli was granted leave of absence from the California Institute of Technology to accept the appointment as February of science adviser. Appointments to other foreign missions are expected to follow.

Dr. Clarke and Dr. Farinholt will assume responsibilities as science attachés in our Embassy in London; Dr. Doyle and Dr. Loftness, in our Embassy in Stockholm; and Dr. Lek, in our Legation in Bern. They will report to the Department on scientific and technical developments abroad, advise the mission staffs on science aspects of policy and problems, and will represent the U.S. Government abroad in scientific matters.

Dr. Clarke has established a high reputation in science in this country and abroad. Member of the National Academy of Sciences and other scientific organizations, he enjoys the confidence of American scientists. Having studied and taught at universities in Great Britain, he has a keen knowledge of international relations in science and other fields and holds the respect of European scientists and scholars. He was responsible for coordinating the program of chemical studies on penicillin in this country and Great Britain during World War II. Dr. Clarke has been chairman of the department of biochemistry at Columbia University since 1928.

As Dr. Clarke's associate, Dr. Farinholt will draw upon his industrial and university laboratory experience in chemistry and upon his administrative experience in the wartime program of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and received his degree there before the war. He is at present a member of the faculty at Columbia University and specializes in organic synthesis.

Dr. Doyle is highly regarded for his contributions to enzyme histochemistry. He is author of many scientific papers in this field and a member of numerous biological societies. Dr. Doyle was Director of the OSRD's Wartime Toxicity Laboratory at the University of Chicago. He is particularly well fitted for the assignment in Stockholm, having engaged in research at the Carlsberg Laboratory in Copenhagen and at Cambridge before the war as a Rockefeller Fellow.

Trained in physical chemistry at the University of Washington and in chemical engineering abroad, Dr. Loftness will assist Dr. Doyle. His teaching and research experience, together with his familiarity with foreign science, will fit him for this assignment. Dr. Loftness was formerly associated with an industrial firm on the west coast.

Dr. Lek was trained abroad in physical chemistry, oceanography, and meteorology. A former research associate of the Scripps Institute, he was

a civilian scientist with the U.S. Army Air Force during the last war.

Diplomatic Missions

The Department of State announced on June 18 that it had been informed that the Belgian Diplomatic Mission in Washington would hereafter be known as the Embassy of Belgium.

The Department of State announced on June 25 that it had been informed that the Korean Diplomatic Mission in Washington would hereafter be known as the Embassy of Korea.

Confirmation

On July 6, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Francis P. Matthews to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ireland.

PUBLICATIONS

Educational Exchange Stresses Spiritual Values

[Released to the press July 12]

The United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange has given a strong endorsement to the Department of State's plans for increased emphasis on the moral and spiritual aspects of American life in its information and educational exchange program.

The Advisory Commission, which was set up by Congress and is appointed by the President, submitted its quarterly report to the Secretary of State on July 11. The report called for a "counteroffensive" against Communist attacks on the moral and religious aspects of life in America so that other nations may understand the principles which motivate our foreign policy.

The report noted the addition of a religious adviser to the program staff and the appointment of a religious advisory panel and stated that these would give impetus to the plan.

A pertinent section of the report follows:

The U.S.S.R. is waging psychological warfare against the United States. It is a part of the Kremlin's strategy to create distrust and suspicion of American integrity in international affairs by attacking the principles upon which our society is based.

This attack has fallen on fertile ground because of a misconception about the fundamental nature of the American people. Americans are believed by others to be godless, materialistic people. This belief stems from at least two factors:

First, our nation has been endowed with greater material resources than any other on earth; and we have

shown high skill in developing those resources. These facts of material superiority have overshadowed the basic moral and spiritual characteristics of the people who have developed this country.

Second, the complete separation of church and state in the United States is misunderstood by peoples to whom this idea is strange; and the inherent reticence of Americans to discuss their spiritual convictions feeds the idea that Americans have no abiding religious faith.

The time has come to initiate a counteroffensive against communist attacks on the moral and religious aspects of American life. We must emphasize to other peoples the underlying purposes which have guided this nation's destiny for more than a hundred years.

Few aspects of American life are as difficult to explain as the spiritual foundations of our culture, but few present as many opportunities for explaining the basic concepts of our social order, such as equal rights, freedom of conviction, and the mutual responsibility between the individual and society. In many respects the life and institutions of this country cannot be explained to foreign audiences apart from the moral and religious principles which have conditioned them. The American family, our educational system, our public health programs, and our political and social institutions have been directly influenced by our moral and religious heritage.

American foreign policy itself in many instances reflects this moral and religious heritage. Without understanding the principles which motivate our foreign policy, foreign peoples cannot understand or appreciate many actions of this government, such as disaster relief and Point Four. America's reputation is at stake, since without understanding of the spiritual factors ingrained in the American character, other nations undervalue or view with suspicion United States international social and economic problems.

Communism has the advantage of ready-made organic unity. To combat this, we must develop a community of purpose between ourselves and all peoples of the world who cherish moral and spiritual values so as to protect them. A common religion is not necessary, but it is imperative that the whole world recognize that man's right of worship is in jeopardy. While democracy is neither a religion nor a substitute therefor, it affords protection of the individual's right of worship and an opportunity for spiritual development.

The Department of State will take the lead in bringing the facts in this case to other peoples. Greater emphasis will be placed on the beliefs and purposes of the American people in the Department's programs of international information and educational exchange. Impetus has been given to this plan by the appointment of Dr. Albert Joseph McCartney as the Department of State's Information and Educational Exchange Program liaison officer for religious advice, as well as the subsequent establishment of a religious advisory panel. The members of this panel are: Monsignor Thomas J. McCarthy, National Catholic Welfare Conference; Isaac Franck, Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington; Rev. Edward Hughes Pruden, president of the American Baptist Convention. Dr. McCartney and the members of the advisory panel will provide direct counsel to Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

The Commission commends the Department on its initiative and forward-looking action in this matter. We await with interest the development of specific plans for executing this broad policy.

Dr. Harvie Branscomb, chancellor of Vanderbilt University, is chairman of the Commission. Other members are: vice chairman, Mark Starr, educational director, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union; Harold Willis Dodds, president, Princeton University; Edwin B. Fred, president, University of Wisconsin; Martin R. P. McGuire, professor, Catholic University.

Sixth Series of United States Treaty Developments Released

The Department of State issued on July 30 the sixth in its series of releases of *United States Treaty Developments*. This is a documented loose-leaf reference service providing periodically up-to-date information on the status of international agreements entered into by the United States.

The current release contains annotations on more than 200 international agreements not previously included in the publication and brings to over 1,100 the total number of agreements annotated. Part 2 of the sixth release, containing revised information on agreements previously included, will be published later in the year.

Among the subjects covered in the current release are mutual defense assistance agreements with 10 countries, the Occupation Statute and other agreements for merger of the Western zones of Germany, lend-lease and surplus property settlement agreements with Belgium, the economic cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, and agreements providing for the World Meteorological Organization and the North Atlantic and Pacific Ocean weather stations. Information is supplied as to date and place of signature, effective date, duration, ratifications, adherences, reservations, amendments, extensions, terminations in whole or part, related legislation, Executive orders, administrative and diplomatic interpretations, and court decisions.

A list of all agreements relating to avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion, concluded by the United States with other countries, together with information respecting their status, is also included in the current release.

United States Treaty Developments, now in its fifth year of publication, is compiled by the Treaty Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser. The sixth release and all prior releases may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

Legislation—Continued from page 208

- Amending and extending Title II of the First War Powers Act, 1941. Approved January 12, 1951. S. 4266, Public Law 921, 81st Cong. 2d sess. 1 p.
- Extending for Two Years the Existing Privilege of Free Importation of Gifts from Members of the Armed Forces of the United States on Duty Abroad. Approved February 21, 1951. H. R. 2141, Public Law 1, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.
- Extending the Period for the Admission of Alien Spouses and Minor Children of Citizen Members of the United States Armed Forces. Approved March 19, 1951. H. R. 1090, Public Law 6, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.
- Providing for the Renegotiation of Contracts, and for Other Purposes. Approved March 23, 1951. H. R. 1724, Public Law 9, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 18 pp.
- Clarifying the Immigration Status of Certain Aliens. Approved March 28, 1951. H. R. 2339, Public Law 14, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

authorizing Vessels of Canadian Registry to Transport Iron Ore Between United States Ports on the Great Lakes during 1951. Approved March 29, 1951. S. 683, Public Law 15, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Joint Resolution To Extend the Time for the Filing of Certain Claims under the War Claims Act of 1948. Approved April 5, 1951. S. J. Res. 40, Public Law 16, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Joint Resolution To Give the Department of Commerce the Authority to Extend Certain Charters of Vessels to Citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. H. J. Res. 223, Public Law 25, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Joint Resolution To Provide for Continuation of Authority for Regulation of Exports. Approved May 16, 1951. H. J. Res. 197, Public Law 33, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Suspending Certain Import Taxes on Copper. Approved May 22, 1951. H. R. 3336, Public Law 38, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Joint Resolution To Permit Articles Imported from Foreign Countries for the Purpose of Exhibition at the Japanese Trade Fair, Seattle, Washington, to be admitted Without Payment of Tariff, and for Other Purposes. H. J. Res. 253, Public Law 46, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Providing for the Common Defense and Security of the United States and To Permit the More Effective Utilization of Manpower Resources of the United States by Authorizing Universal Military Training and Service, and for Other Purposes. S. 1, Public Law 51, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 14 pp.

Expanding the Authority of the Coast Guard to Establish, Maintain, and Operate Aids to Navigation to Include the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. S. 1025, Public Law 52, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Expanding The Authority of the Coast Guard To Establish, Maintain, And Operate Aids to Navigation To Include the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. H. Rept. 571, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 1025] 4 pp.

Extending for Two Years the Period During Which Free Postage for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Korea and Other Specified Areas shall be in Effect. H. R. 4393, Public Law 54, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for the Department of State. Communication from the President of the United States . . . in the amount of \$28,926,000 . . . H. Doc. 171, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 3 pp.

Consular Convention with Protocol of Signature with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a Consular Convention and an Accompanying Protocol of Signature between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at Washington on June 6, 1951. S. Exec. O, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 21 pp.

Extension of Free Postage for Members of Armed Forces in Korea and Combat Zones. Report of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on H. R. 4393, a Bill to Extend for 2 years the Period during which Free Postage for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Korea and Other Specified Areas shall be in effect. H. Rept. 580, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany Public Law 609] 2 pp.

Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Colombia. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Colombia, together with Protocol relating thereto, signed at Washington on April 26, 1951. S. Exec. M, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 17 pp.

Convention with Switzerland Regarding the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, signed at Washington on May 24, 1951, for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income. S. Exec. N, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 16 pp.

International Labor Conventions. Message from the President of the United States transmitting copies of Conventions nos. 91, 92, and 93, which were adopted by the International Labor Conference at its thirty-second sess., held at Geneva, from June 8 to July 2, 1949. S. Exec. J, K, L, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 40 pp.

Permitting Canadian Vessels To Transport Merchandise and Passengers Between Alaskan Ports and Continental United States for a Temporary Period. S. Rept 419, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 1559] 4 pp.

Amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, As Amended. S. Rept. 412, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To Accompany H. R. 3576] 8 pp.

Proposed Rescissions of Amounts Placed in Reserve. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting . . . pursuant to section 1214 of the General Appropriation Act, 1951, in the amount of \$572,829,925. H. Doc. 182, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 8 pp.

Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1951, and for Other Purposes. Approved June 2, 1951. H. R. 3587, Public Law 45, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 12 pp.

Extending the Authority of the President to Enter Into Trade Agreements Under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and for Other Purposes. Approved June 16, 1951. H. R. 1612, Public Law 141, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 4 pp.

Providing Transportation on Canadian Vessels between Skagway, Alaska, and Other Points in Alaska, between Haines, Alaska, and Other Points in Alaska, and between Hyder, Alaska, and Other Points in Alaska or the Continental United States, either directly or via a Foreign Port, or for Any Part of the Transportation. Approved June 27, 1951, H. R. 157, Public Law 55, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended. Approved June 28, 1951. H. R. 3576, Public Law 60, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 2 pp.

Amending chapter 213 of title 18 of the United States Code. Approved June 30, 1951, H. R. 2396, Public Law 65, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 1 p.

Joint Resolution Making Temporary Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1952, and for Other Purposes. Approved July 1, 1951. H. J. Res. 277, Public Law 70, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 4 pp.

Granting of Permanent Residence To Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 612, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 2 pp.

Reaffirming Friendship of the American People for All Peoples of the World, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union. H. Rept. 632, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 11] 4 pp.

St. Lawrence Seaway. Hearings before the Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, first sess., on H. J. Res. 2, H. J. Res. 3, H. J. Res. 4, H. J. Res. 15, H. J. Res. 102, H. J. Res. 122, H. J. Res. 159, and H. J. Res. 2536, Approving the Agreement between the United States and Canada Relating to the Development of the Resources of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin for National Security and Continental Defense of the United States and Canada; Providing for Making the St. Lawrence Seaway Self Liquidating; and for Other Purposes. April 2-6, 9-14, 16-20, 23-25, and 30, 1951, II, 948 pp. (Committee on Public Works 631-1579)

Legislation To Terminate The State of War Between The United States and Germany. Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for the Enactment of Appropriate Legislation to Terminate the State of War between the United States and the Government of Germany. H. Doc. 188, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 4 pp.

The United States in the United Nations

[July 27–August 2, 1951]

General Assembly

Collective Measures Committee (CMC)—The following additional replies were received by the Secretary-General concerning elements within national armed forces for service as United Nations unit or units:

Australia advised "that its action in providing forces to the United Nations Command in Korea demonstrates its support of collective action through the United Nations against aggression . . ." "... The Australian Government . . . will be ready to consider in the light of its responsibilities the extent to which it may be able to provide forces as it had done in the case of Korea as a contribution to any future United Nations action to meet breaches of the peace and acts of aggression."

The Belgium Government noted its contribution to U.N. forces in Korea; two divisions in Germany under the NATO; and advised it will continue to study the question of "the contribution which it will be in a position to make in the future toward establishing an apparatus for international mobilization against a future aggressor."

The Government of the Republic of China stated, "To the extent that the military requirements for its own defense will permit, the Chinese Government will consider China's participation in the collective military efforts of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, pursuant to provisions of the United Nations charter, and in arrangements which may be specially made for that purpose . . . will keep this matter under constant review in the light of prevailing circumstances."

Colombia noted its contribution of a frigate and a battalion to United Nations forces in Korea and stated its intention to train other contingents to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations in the future provided that the United Nations or the United Nations Command facilitate the training and make available the armaments required.

Iraq stated it was unable to make available any armed forces at present but that it is "determined never to relax its efforts to find ways and means within its limited capacity for helping the United Nations measures to preserve world peace and resist aggression."

The Netherlands Government advised that:

Taking into account the commitment in Korea and in view of the fact that the obligations of the NATO claim completely the national efforts of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Government do not at present contemplate the recruitment and organization of further units of their armed forces specifically for service with the United Nations. The Netherlands Government, however, intend to continue their cooperation with other member states in collective action for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Committee of Twelve (AEC-CCA)—The Committee continued discussion at its fifth meeting, July 31, of the United States proposal for the establishment of a single commission to coordinate the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia approved the concept of merger and expressed general agreement with the proposed plan relating to the organizational set-up of the commission.

Mr. Nash, the U.S. representative, expressed gratification at the general agreement on the "purpose and tenor" of the United States working paper, which, he said, was intended only as an outline of his Government's views on this matter. He stated that the United States delegation would now prepare a draft resolution to be submitted to the General Assembly, which would incorporate as many concrete suggestions by the Committee members as possible. The next meeting is scheduled for Aug 10.

Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War—The three-member Commission began its first 2-week session, July 30, at United Nations Headquarters.

The Commission will study the 45 replies received as of July 18, 1951 by the United Nations Secretariat in answer to the Secretary-General's note of February 23, 1951 to all Governments requesting information on prisoners of war held by them. The majority of these replies are either from countries that did not take prisoners of war or from those who have completed the task of repatriation.

The United States advised that all prisoners of war held by it had been returned to their home lands by June 30, 1947, and that information had been furnished on prisoners who died while in custody.

The Government of Austria stated "that there are Austrian prisoners of war detained in the Soviet Union, whose repatriation has been promised in bilateral negotiations." Italy drew "attention to the fact that no information from the Soviet Union regarding the fate of a large number of Italian prisoners of war has been received. The Federal Republic of Germany requests the Commission to inspect at the earliest opportunity the data it has compiled on prisoners of war and missing persons. Japan stated "as of the end of 1950 the Japanese Government has in possession

list of names of 323,973 Japanese yet to be returned from the Soviet territory and areas occupied by the Soviet forces at the end of the war." It invited the Commission to visit that country to conduct a survey of the problem and review the facts and data available in Japan.

Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc)

The thirteenth session of Ecosoc opened at Geneva on July 30, 1951. The Council has before it a 57-point agenda. Two of the major items that will receive immediate consideration are (1) The World Economic Situation, and (2) Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.

In plenary discussion this week on the item, World Economic Situation, Isador Lubin, U.S. representative on the Council, reported on measures taken by the United States Government to deal with inflation, production, and scarce materials.¹

The U.S.S.R. made its customary motion to unseat the representative of the Chinese Nationalist Government. However, a Philippine proposal to adjourn debate of this issue was adopted by a vote of 11-5-2.

Security Council

The Palestine Question—The Council held two meetings, July 26 and August 1, at the request of the Government of Israel, to discuss the matter of the restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal.

It heard a statement of charges by Ambassador Abba Eban (Israel) to the effect that this action by Egypt was in contravention of international law, of the Suez Canal Convention (1888), of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement, and of the Security Council resolutions of August 11, 1949 and November 17, 1950.

Ambassador Mahmoud Fawzi Bey (Egypt) in statements at the two meetings noted that Egypt exercised the right of visiting ships "occasionally, lawfully, and with utmost discretion." He discussed in considerable detail his Government's view on the laws of nations relating to the blockade restrictions. He pointed out that the armistice put an end only to the hostilities and "not the state of war" and insisted that the existence of a state of war in Palestine "could not validly be denied." In view of the continuance of the "violations and

contraventions by Israel," Egypt had no lesser right, duty and no other choice than to exercise the transcending right of self-preservation and self-defense. He cited various counter charges of violations of the armistice by Israel.

Mr. Eban (Israel), in reply, stated that the remarks of the Egyptian representative had not contained much that was relevant to the agenda item. He reemphasized that the Egyptian search of vessels bound for Israel was a breach of the Egyptian-Israeli general armistice agreement. The question the Council would have to decide is—if belligerent rights could still be invoked, then the armistice system would have to be reassessed.

The only statement thus far by a Council member was made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom). He recalled his statement of last November and the three main reasons why his Government attached importance to securing an early and satisfactory settlement. First, his Government viewed with great concern any restrictions imposed during peacetime on the freedom of passage of vessels going through the Canal. Second, the ban on the passage of oil tankers through the Canal to the refinery at Haifa had caused great inconvenience and considerable financial loss. The virtual inactivity of the great Haifa refinery affected almost all the countries of Western Europe. Third, and most important, the United Kingdom held that the political importance of these restrictions lay in the fact that if maintained they jeopardized the continuation of the armistice system. For practical purposes, he suggested that Egyptian conduct in this respect should be guided by the armistice agreement concluded in February 1949. Further, if Egypt were involved in actual hostilities, it would no doubt be justified in taking measures for its own defense. But hostilities were not, and had not been in progress for 2½ years. It could not even be maintained that Egypt was under any imminent threat of attack from Israel. Noting Egyptian pledges of cooperation, he said he believed he was expressing the views of many Council members in voicing the hope that the Egyptian Government would feel able now to lift these restrictions. In conclusion, he stated that the United Kingdom held that "maintenance by the Egyptian Government of restrictions on traffic proceeding through the Suez Canal is quite unjustified, that it is becoming increasingly abusive and that, unless the Egyptian Government can itself find ways and means of remedying the situation, the Council should exercise its undoubted authority."

¹ The text of Mr. Lubin's statement will appear in a subsequent issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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appreciated.

The American Frontier 1951

*By President Truman*¹

I am happy to come to this great city of Detroit and to join with you in celebrating its 250th birthday. I do not suppose that Cadillac and his little band of French pioneers would believe their eyes if they could see what has happened on the spot where they built their fort back in 1701.

To them the word Detroit meant a narrow place in the river. In George Washington's time it meant a place of danger, a source of Indian raids and scalping parties. Today the word Detroit is a synonym throughout the world for the industrial greatness of America. Today the word Detroit symbolizes for free men everywhere the productive power which is a foundation stone of world peace. . . .

The United Nations and World Peace

This past year has been a period of challenge. It has tested all we have done since the end of World War II to bring about peace in the world. Aggression in Korea was aimed at the whole idea of the United Nations. It was the purpose of the aggressors to pick off one free nation after another. They intended to create fear in the hearts of the free peoples and to force them to submit to Communist domination and control.

We could have given up in the face of that attack. We could have abandoned the United Nations and torn up the Charter. We could have retreated into a hopeless and fearful isolationism, just as we did after the First World War. But this time we didn't do that.

This time we went forward. With our allies we met the challenge. And today the United Nations is a going concern—stronger than ever. Today the Charter means more than it ever did. It has been tested by fire and sword. Today it offers real protection to the free nations of the world.

¹ Excerpts from an address made at Detroit, Mich., on July 28 and released to the press by the White House on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4288.

The free nations have made their determination clear. We will not give in to aggression. Our plans for world peace still stand. We will never quit in the fight for world peace.

The Communists have asked for talks looking toward a settlement of the Korean conflict. Those talks are in progress. We do not yet know whether the Communists really desire peace in Korea or whether they are simply trying to gain by negotiations what they have not been able to gain by conquest. We intend to find that out. The talks can be successful if the Communists are in fact ready to give up aggression in Korea.

Military Preparations of Soviet Union and Its Satellites

But whatever happens in Korea, we must not make the mistake of jumping to the conclusion that the Soviet rulers have given up their ideas of world conquest. They may talk about peace, but it is action that counts.

What they have been doing is quite clear. They are putting themselves in a position where they can commit new acts of aggression at any time. Why right now, for example, the armed forces of the Soviet satellites are rapidly being brought to a peak of military readiness. In the last several months the satellite countries in Eastern Europe have been forced by the Kremlin to reorganize their armies. The size of these armies has been increased, and modern Russian equipment is being furnished to them in large quantities.

We know that Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary now have armed forces far greater than those allowed under the peace treaties they signed in 1947. That is one of our difficulties in dealing with Soviets of any kind; they have no respect for signed treaties or their given word.

We know also that Rumania recently ordered the inhabitants moved out of a stretch of land 30 miles wide along the Yugoslav border. Bulgaria and Hungary have done the same thing. Military preparations have been going on in those zones

along the border. Actions like these certainly are no indication of peaceful intentions.

In the Far East the situation is much the same. The North Koreans and the Chinese Communists—so-called volunteers—are getting a steady flow of new equipment from the Soviet Union for ground and air use.

The Russians themselves have more than four million men under arms in Europe and the Far East. There are heavy concentrations of Soviet air, land, and sea forces in the Russian provinces along the Manchurian border, across from Japan, and across from Alaska.

As your President I am telling you that the dangers in other parts of the world are just as great as they are in Korea. Every day reports come to my desk about Soviet military preparations around the world. If every one of you could see these reports and receive this same information, you would give up any thought that the danger is over. You would be just as anxious as I am to see that this country builds up its armed forces, equips them with the most modern weapons, and helps to arm our Allies.

Don't let anyone confuse you about this. We cannot let down our guard, no matter what happens in Korea.

Building Strength and Unity Among the Free Nations

The free world must have armed strength—the free world must have it now—not in reserve, not later, but now. We must have men, ships, planes, tanks, and bombs—on hand—ready for any emergency. And if we have them, we won't have to use them.

We hope and believe that we will not have to use the armed strength we are building up. Our aim is to put an end to war. But we know that unless we have armed strength we cannot put out the fires of aggression that threaten the peace of the world at this time.

The aim of this Administration is world peace. My term in office is dedicated to bringing us closer to this goal. Our great chance lies in building up such strength and unity among the free nations that the Kremlin will have to drop its plans of aggression and subversion. When we reach that point there can be peace between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. They can have peace any time they want it.

I know of only two alternatives to this policy, and the American people have rejected both of them. One is to start a world war now, with all its horrible and unforeseeable consequences. Some people would like to do that. The other is to withdraw and isolate ourselves. That means sur-

rendering the rest of the world to Soviet communism. Neither of these alternatives could possibly lead to peace.

Peace is the purpose of our defense program. Peace is what this great production job is all about. We have the resources, the morale, the economic strength to do this job. And we are going to do it!

We have this great strength because the people and the Government have been working together for the welfare of all Americans. We have this strength because we have been working for equality of opportunity and economic security for all our citizens. We have helped our farmers and our workers to reach higher and higher living standards; we have developed our natural resources for everybody's benefit. And because the welfare of the people has been our first concern, our business and industry have grown and expanded tremendously.

That is our record. That is why we stand before the world as the strongest of the free nations. That is why we have the opportunity to lead mankind to peace. . . .

America—Stronghold of Freedom

This is America—and in America working men and women have a voice in their destinies, in their conditions of work, and in the course their country shall follow.

There are many of you who trace your origins to Poland or Hungary or other countries now behind the Iron Curtain. You know how the people of those countries are suffering today. You know what has happened to their churches, their schools, their trade-unions, and to their homes and their farms.

You can be sure that you are remembered in those countries now under the yoke of slavery. You can be sure that the people there look to you—and to all of us—as examples of what freedom means and as a source of hope for better lives for themselves.

Here in this city, and throughout America, we have a great task to perform. It is up to us, acting together as free men, to build up our defenses against aggression, to inspire and help other free men to defend themselves against tyranny, to give hope and courage to those who are now oppressed, to open the way to a better day for the world—a day of peace and security and freedom.

On this anniversary of the beginning of one of the greatest American cities, let us all pledge ourselves anew to carry out this task, with determination and with faith in God, who alone can give us the will and courage to see it through.

The New International Economic Challenge

By Willard L. Thorp

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

The economic problems faced by the United States have changed drastically in the last 13 months, and the same can be said for virtually every country in the world. The attack on Korea gave new urgency to the efforts of the free world to build military strength. Greatly increased military requirements were imposed on the productive capacity of the world, already occupied in meeting expanding civilian demands. Today, our international economic problems stem from conditions of shortage. Stated much too simply, our immediate economic problem is one of bringing requirements and production into equilibrium without permitting inflation to destroy the delicate balance which exists among the many elements in our economy.

Many commodities were also in short supply at the end of World War II. In many countries, productive capacity had been disrupted, disorganized, or destroyed, and the products available in the rest of the world had to be carefully husbanded and distributed. At first, the great need in the war-devastated areas was for food and other necessities of life. Then the requirements of relief gradually gave way to those of recovery. In the last 3 years, these economies have made rapid strides, and production has increased rapidly, particularly with Marshall Plan assistance. As a matter of fact, the problem had become more and more one of developing trade channels so that these same countries could reduce their dependence upon foreign aid by bringing their imports and exports into balance. Even that problem, usually labeled "the dollar shortage," was rapidly yielding to the effort of many countries to reach a point where they could pay their own way.

The drastic change in the international economic scene is the result of the strengthened determination to rearm. That the free countries did

not feel secure in the face of the Russian threat had already been evidenced in the conditions which led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—the fact that the Russians had not disarmed after the war, and the fact that they had continued to give high priority to a vast armament buildup, including military establishments for their satellites as well. However, the danger became crystal clear to all to see, when they demonstrated their willingness to encourage and support irresponsible aggression. The attack on Korea forced the free world to undertake its own rearmament on a new scale of magnitude and urgency.

In no economic area was the impact of this new development felt as severely as in that of raw materials. It is undoubtedly true that in recent years our capacity to fabricate has expanded more rapidly than our supply of raw materials, and probably the rapid increase in industrial production in this country and in Western Europe in 1950 by itself alone would have put substantial pressure on the raw material markets. As an added element, the United States Government was active in many markets in building up its stockpile of strategic materials. However, when to these was added the recognition of the fact that enormous quantities of raw materials would be required to implement the armament program, a fact which had an exaggerated effect on the situation by encouraging speculation, the raw material markets reacted immediately and prices skyrocketed. For some commodities, even where prices did not rise substantially as in the case of sulphur, the deficit situation was reflected in the inability of prospective purchasers to locate any available supply.

World-Wide Effect of Raw Material Shortage

This situation held a serious threat to all industrial economies where actual shortage could lead directly to serious disruption of production. In many instances, a number of different raw ma-

¹ Address made at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on July 19 and released to the press on the same date.

terials must be combined into a final product and the lack of any one of them could stop the flow of the finished product. Furthermore, the problem is not only one of supply but also of price. The tremendous advance in raw material prices could not help but disturb economies where price structures and wage levels often were in rather uncertain balance. For some countries, largely producers of raw materials, the high prices might well prove to be a bonanza, creating difficult problems of financial discipline often associated with the sudden attaining of unexpected wealth. In other countries, large consumers of imported raw materials whose prices had gone up much more than those of the manufactured goods which they sell abroad, the difficulty of meeting their foreign payments again became serious.

To put the problem in economic terms, it was simply that the demand for raw materials caused by the active civilian economies and the rearmament programs exceeded the supply of those materials, and the net result was a rapid increase in price. In some instances, prices have declined in recent months as the original speculative outburst has worn off, and as other adjustments in demand or supply have been made, but, in general, raw material prices are still far above other elements in general price levels. The problem of raw materials, both supply and price, has become a major preoccupation of top officials in every government because it not only affects the health of their civilian economies, but can prove to be a limiting factor on even the most energetic efforts to build up their military structures.

In the United States the raw material problem has been approached in a number of ways. The first has been to endeavor to cut back the demand. To some extent this has been done by efforts to reduce the dollars in the hands of purchasers. For example, Regulation W of the Federal Reserve Board reduces the availability of installment credit; increases in taxes reduce purchasing power in the hands of corporations and individuals; and the efforts to reduce the volume of credit have been directed at restricting business expansion and new housing starts.

The problem has been attacked not only by the efforts to reduce purchasing power, but also more directly by limitations in the use of materials in short supply. The Defense Production Authority has required the elimination or reduction in the rate of production for civilian consumption of many less essential products in order to reduce the requirements on scarce raw materials. Some nonessential uses have been forbidden, and in other cases limits have been placed on the total permissible production of finished products. In the case of certain basic materials, such as steel, copper, and aluminum, the Government is now allocating the supply among producers, thus cutting back on many uses. Finally, in some instances, such as rubber, tin, and tungsten, which come largely from abroad, the Government is

doing all the buying and therefore is able to control use within the American economy by its control over distribution.

Not only are steps being taken to cut back requirements, but steps are also being taken to increase the supply. In the case of rubber, the war built synthetic rubber plants are being brought back into full operation; in the case of cotton, the Department of Agriculture successfully set a greatly increased acreage goal; expansion projects for sulphur already under consideration give promise of an increase of 12 percent over the 1950 domestic output; special inducements have been offered to producers who might otherwise be unwilling to expand their production under present price ceilings, through accelerated tax amortization, direct loans, loan guaranties, long-term procurement contracts, and standby purchase commitments.

Efforts are being made to increase foreign raw material production through ECA projects, Export-Import Bank loans and long-term supply contracts. For example, credit has been extended to projects to produce manganese in Brazil, tungsten in Argentina and Peru, and sulphur in Argentina and Mexico. In addition, exploration has been assisted in instances such as manganese, lead, and zinc in Greece; tungsten in Portugal; copper, lead, and zinc in the Belgian Congo; chrome in Turkey and New Caledonia; industrial diamonds in British Guiana and French Morocco; and columbite in Norway and British Guiana. This encouragement of exploration parallels efforts in this country, where the Government has offered to pay from 50 to 90 percent of the cost for prospecting for 28 different minerals; 700 applications have been received, and a number of promising projects have already been approved. By thus reducing the effective demand and increasing the supply as much as possible, the pressures on the markets have been greatly reduced, the necessary raw materials have been made available for the rearmament program, and the maintenance of price ceilings has been possible.

However, the problem of raw materials is not one faced alone by the United States. There are some strategic materials in which we are self-sufficient such as molybdenum, petroleum, sulphur, and phosphate rock. On the other hand, there are other products which we obtain almost entirely from abroad, such as quartz crystals, industrial diamonds, tin, nickel, long-fiber asbestos, and strategic mica. There are still many other products where more than a third of our supply is imported, such as copper, lead, zinc, and tungsten. Other countries, of course, have different geological resources, but all face the same problem of dependence for much of their requirements upon sources outside their own control. Normally, we all compete in the world markets for these materials. In the face of limited supplies and high prices, many other countries have

taken steps closely paralleling our own. The British have restricted the use of scarce commodities to various percentages of 1949 or 1950 use. In many other countries government purchasing has given the government a means of restricting the less essential uses.

The International Materials Conference

However, the world requirements still exceed the world supply, and in such a situation of shortage no amount of domestic stabilization on our part could prevent the skyrocketing of world prices if other countries went into the market vigorously. It therefore became apparent last fall that international action was necessary, and the United States, the United Kingdom, and France set out to organize some international machinery. This led to the setting up of what is known as the International Materials Conference.² The Conference has a Central Group with ten members, namely Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, India, Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States, and representatives of the Organization of the American States (OAS), and of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). This group provides geographical representation as well as that of producer and consumer countries. The Central Group is responsible for initiating action in connection with any commodity where its members feel that international consideration would be helpful.

The form which action has taken has been to set up specific commodity committees whose members are representatives of the leading producing and consuming countries in the free world of the particular commodity to be considered, usually about a dozen countries in all. Each commodity committee therefore includes the main producers and the main consumers who, after all, are those most concerned with the behavior of the commodity. Neither the Central Group nor the commodity committees have any charter or bylaws, but they are merely a group of responsible government representatives gathered together to consider with each other what can be done to deal with whatever seem to be the immediate problems for their particular commodity. There are now seven committees dealing with the following groups of commodities: copper, lead and zinc; cotton and cotton linters; manganese, nickel and cobalt; molybdenum and tungsten; pulp and paper; sulphur; and wool.

These committees have no powers except to make recommendations to governments. Therefore, the solutions which are devised must be so reasonable and equitable as to command acceptance. Up to the present time, technicians have been sent to Washington by almost thirty countries to participate on one or another committee, and they have been at work for several months.

² BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 23.

Each committee has made a survey of world requirements and supply. It has listened to suggestions and received information from representatives of nonmember countries who wished to appear. Already, agreed recommendations have been developed for the conservation of tungsten, molybdenum, manganese, cobalt, nickel, and copper. The meetings together have also stimulated technological improvement; i. e., as a result of the discussions, French experts have visited this country to learn about boron steel. In turn, French experts have made useful suggestions to reduce the sulphuric acid requirement in fertilizer production.

Already we can see specific international action in four particular cases. Tungsten and molybdenum are metals of particular importance in making heat-resistant steel. There is no doubt but that present world production is far short of present world demand. What the international committee has done, beyond developing recommendations for conservation, is to estimate the available supply and then recommend to governments the fair distribution of this supply among the various consumer countries for the third quarter of this year. The governments concerned have accepted the recommendations of the committee. Furthermore, with one exception they have agreed that the prices shall not exceed those which have been the ceiling prices in the United States.

The third case, that of sulphur, is one in which the United States is the chief producer and the demands by various countries for American sulphur have far exceeded our ability to supply. What the commodity committee has done is to develop a fair basis for distributing sulphur among the various countries, thus relieving the United States of what would have been an exceedingly difficult problem, and a type of problem hardly calculated to create friends. In the fourth case, that of paper and pulp, the committee has already agreed upon emergency allocations of newsprint to take care of special shortage situations in some eleven countries.

During World War II the problem of the equitable allocation of raw materials was handled by a board with only two members—the United States and the United Kingdom—and the decisions which were reached were effectively enforced through the control of the world's shipping. Today there is no such sanction and one must rely on international cooperation. It is to me a most encouraging sign that the International Materials Conference is working so busily and so well on an entirely voluntary and cooperative basis. International machinery cannot solve problems unless individual countries are prepared to do their part also. However, international consideration can be of incalculable value in developing common national actions in the areas of supply and requirements, and of eliminating the dangers of an

international scramble for these materials with the inevitable results of high prices and wasteful utilization.

Allocation of Manufactured Goods

I do not wish to make it appear that all commodity problems relate to raw materials, for there are serious shortages in manufactured products as well. This shows up particularly in the international field where the interest of many countries in the American market is focused particularly on short supply items such as fertilizer, agricultural machinery, electrical generating equipment, freight cars, and tin plate. In every one of these cases American supply is affected by the diversion of steel and other materials to armament production as well as the high level of demand of the American civilian economy. In every one of these cases foreign countries, many of which are earning large supplies of dollars through sales of raw materials, are eager to buy in the American market, and again the problem of a proper and appropriate allocation enters into the picture. Our interest in these matters is not merely one of maintaining trade channels, but of seeing that essential requirements of other countries are met, and that their programs of economic development are carried forward so far as possible. We have machinery available through the export license system for establishing a pattern among foreign claimants by limitation, but it cannot bring about the acceptance of foreign orders by American business men. There still remains the exceedingly difficult problem of the proper division between domestic and foreign requirements, and the possible necessity for meeting such foreign requirements as are essential through D. O. orders which establish priorities, allocations, or actual set-asides.

In general, the policy of the United States is that we are willing to share where sharing is needed. We place armament and essential civilian requirements first, both at home and abroad. In terms of our immediate national interest, we need a program of international cooperation, for we import many more essential materials than we export. In fact, there are 70 commodities in the list of our strategic requirements which come wholly or partly from foreign sources. More important, however, is our basic desire to build strength in the free world. And that requires the most effective and efficient use of the deficit commodities throughout the world.

I have discussed the adjustments which are being made in the supply and demand aspect of these commodities because that is the basic answer to the problem of efficient utilization and also to our hopes of achieving price stabilization. However, there is another set of problems which arise directly in the price field. I have already discussed the combination of circumstances which drove raw material prices up so rapidly—active civilian de-

mand, armament demand, stockpile purchases, and speculative buying. We made a valiant effort to stop further price advances when price ceilings for transactions in the United States were established at the levels of the beginning of this year. But this, of course, did not control prices in other countries, and for many commodities, the world price level advanced still further. This meant that sellers were likely to sell to purchasers in other countries wherever possible rather than to American buyers. The United States copper ceiling was 24½ cents, but the world market price was nearer 30 cents and sales have been reported at levels as high as 50 cents. The dilemma thus created is a real one. Either American buyers are unable to purchase in foreign markets, or the price ceilings on imports must be raised with the effect of weakening the entire efforts to stabilize. Therefore, we have a real interest in the price levels of other countries. In one instance, we have forced a major reduction in price, that of tin, by simply staying out of the market. Obviously, that is not a long-run solution.

As a matter of fact, this problem of domestic versus world prices has been met in a number of ways. Many imported products, particularly consumers' goods, are allowed to come in with only the American additions to the foreign export price being under ceiling control. For some raw materials which must be obtained abroad, where their use is limited and specialized, and where they constitute a very small part of the cost of finished goods, the ceilings have actually been removed. For other products, Government purchasing has been established and the material then resold to the American consumer. Of course, this technique of government purchase and resale might be used to equalize prices with the Government absorbing the difference, and this is one of the authorities presently being requested in the extended Defense Production Act.

While I am talking about our present-day commodity problems I must interject still one further complicating factor, and that is that the military program in which we are interested is not merely the program of the United States but the program of many other countries. To the extent to which we assist these countries to build their military strength by sending them equipment and other military material, the process merely adds their requirement to our own American defense production program. However, we also have a major interest in encouraging military production itself in other countries. This may mean additional requirements for them in the way of raw materials as well as new machine tools and other equipment. It may even call for finished consumer goods in cases where it has been necessary to divert productive capacity from civilian to military use. These elements also have to be included in all calculations.

I have not tried to give you the full detail of the many commodity problems which appear in a

period of shortage, but merely to suggest the variety and the complexity of considerations which have suddenly become important in the last 13 months. These are difficult problems but at least I think we are entitled to feel that we have made substantial progress toward increasing the supply, and in assuring the most effective use both nationally and internationally of that supply which is available.

Even the most successful plan for the distribution of goods is of little effectiveness unless purchasing power is available to carry out the distribution. Therefore, in facing the new economic problems of the day, we must work not only in terms of the prospective requirements and supplies of commodities, but in terms of changes in the flow of dollars needed to achieve the desired flow of commodities. In the United States, this particular problem is most serious in connection with the greatly increased schedules for military goods. The problem therefore is that of how to assure an adequate supply of dollars in the hands of the purchaser, which is of course the United States Government, and gets us at once into questions of fiscal policy, taxes, Government borrowing, and the like. The problem does not stop at that point, of course. On a broader scale, the location of purchasing power among various groups within our economy has substantial influence on the effectiveness of our efforts at stabilization. These same problems are also present in every country which is accelerating the strengthening of its military structure.

The Dollar Deficit

So far as international relations are concerned, the dollar problem also has new aspects under present conditions. I shall not endeavor to discuss our international assistance programs in terms of their full political, economic, and social implications, but only as they relate to the problems which I have already raised concerning requirements and supply. The greatest dollar deficit is in the availability of dollar purchasing power in the North Atlantic Treaty countries and in certain other countries such as Greece and Turkey, to purchase those military items which they must get from the United States in order to achieve the rapid expansion of their military strength which is contemplated. In a sense, this is in no way a new type of American assistance. During the war we supplied enormous quantities of military material to our allies under lend-lease arrangements. After the war we continued to provide them with military equipment through the disposition at bargain prices of the surpluses which inevitably accumulated. In connection with the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we undertook to share in the burden of building military strength, and last year assistance was appropriated for this purpose to NATO and certain

other countries in excess of 5 billion dollars, a small part of which was to aid military production. The proposal which is now before Congress would authorize assistance in the form of military end items, military training, and military assistance during the '51-'52 fiscal year of \$6,250,000,000, of which \$5,240,000,000 is for Europe.

However, in spite of the tremendous strides which have been made in European recovery, not every country has reached the point where, even exclusive of military requirements, it can completely pay its own way. To be sure, several Western European countries received no assistance in the form of grants last year, and grant assistance to the United Kingdom was discontinued at its request as of January 1, 1951. Some countries, however, still need economic assistance, notably Greece, Italy, Austria and Western Germany, while others require assistance primarily to carry out programs of domestic production in support of their augmented military programs. After all, the Marshall Plan as originally contemplated anticipated a period of four years of operation, and it has only been in operation for three. The goals which were set at the outset seem well on the way to achievement within the four-year period. The economic assistance for Europe proposed for the next fiscal year is 1.650 billions. As a matter of fact, because of the reduction in economic assistance the proposed military and economic assistance together for Europe is approximately equal to that which was authorized last year in spite of the great increase in their military programs.

However, the threat of communism is not exclusively a military threat. Marching armies are not the only means of aggression, and we all recognize that the process of building strength in the free world involves defeating those allies of communism which lead to internal instability—hunger, disease, poverty and hopelessness. There are enemies against which all believers in progress must continually fight.

For many years the United States has given assistance to other countries for their economic development, but last year for the first time such programs were established in legislation by Congress under a broad policy directive in the Act for International Development. We believe that economic development of the underdeveloped areas should be encouraged on political, economic and social grounds. At this moment, some of the underdeveloped countries do not need dollar assistance for economic development because of their substantial earnings in connection with the sale of raw materials, but there are others where this fortunate condition does not exist. There are still other instances in which cooperative programs of technical assistance, in which the United States would participate, are of value not only in demonstrating our interest and cooperation but as pilot and demonstration operations. It is to

meet problems of this type that the Mutual Assistance Security Bill includes provisions for economic assistance outside of Europe in excess of 500 millions. I should mention that included within this total are certain specific programs which call for special action on our part. There is an amount of \$112.5 millions which is to be available for the rehabilitation of Korea whenever the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency is able and ready to undertake its exceedingly difficult assignment. In addition, there is a substantial sum to be dedicated to projects intended to contribute to the resettlement of the Arab refugees. To these sums included in the Mutual Security Assistance Bill should be added assistance which will be provided in the form of loans, the chief sources of which are the Export-Import Bank of Washington and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Just as commodity requirements will not be met unless purchasing power is in the hands of those entitled to purchase, dollars do not constitute programs unless they can be converted into commodities. During 1950, as a result of all their economic transactions with the United States, foreign countries increased their gold and dollar holdings by over 3.6 billions, and this situation is continuing. Of course, this sum is not evenly distributed among countries, and in many instances is serving to strengthen their currency and other reserves. However, this continued out-flow of gold from the United States is at least an indication that commodity availability is a limiting factor on potential foreign purchases, although both imports and exports are moving at relatively high levels. At least, it reinforces the basic point that our international economic foreign policy must express itself both in the equitable allocation of commodities and in the effective utilization of dollar assistance.

What does all this add up to? Essentially, the new situation in terms both of commodities and of dollars is based upon three simple propositions:

1. The best hope of preventing another world war lies in making ourselves and our friends strong.
2. To do this requires the intelligent development and utilization of the resources of the entire free world through international cooperation.
3. The strength which will come from the collective efforts of free countries will far exceed the possible achievement of the national components separately.

As I have indicated, the actual carrying out of such objectives is no easy matter. We shall have to bear heavy burdens as consumers and as taxpayers. Other countries will share in carrying the economic burden, but as the richest and strongest country in the world, it will fall most heavily on us. However, present programs do not indicate that our share of this burden is too heavy for us to carry. During the war years, we de-

voted as much as 45 percent of our economic effort to war production. Present plans do not carry it beyond 20 percent. And with the ability of our economy to expand, it should be only two or three years before we and our allies can once again begin to see the resumption of the advance in our standard of living.

Our most serious problems lie in the degree of effectiveness with which we organize ourselves to meet the present temporary difficulties. We must find the right balance between such economic factors as prices and wages, requirements and supplies, consumption and savings, and foreign and domestic requirements. During the shortage period, we cannot permit economic forces to operate with their normal freedom. If we can manage our affairs with reasonable intelligence, the cost will be low and certainly the goal deserves our utmost efforts. We are trying to prevent World War III by building the might of America and with it the might and security of the free world.

Challenge to Soviet Sincerity in Peace Overture

*Statement by Edward W. Barrett
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹*

To some people Moscow's so-called new propaganda line may seem to be a "peace offensive". To those of us who have studied it carefully, it is as phony as a "three dollar bill." At the most, I regret to say, it is what has been called a "Russian lullaby"—designed to lull us and the other free nations into letting down our guard. Actually, while Soviet propaganda to the non-Communist world seems on the surface to be more friendly than a few weeks ago, there has been no fundamental change of objective, and certainly no change in the vicious character of the vast flood of anti-free world propaganda inside the U.S.S.R. That goes for the printing of Mr. Morrison's message, for the reception of the Quaker Delegation, and for the Kremlin's new publication called *News*.

In the first place, this new gimmick of the Politburo's doesn't really call for friendship and cooperation at all. On close examination, it calls on the peoples of the West to betray the efforts of their governments to build up their defenses against the threat of Soviet aggression. In the issue of the *News*, for example, every single article of the first issue is chiefly concerned with this theme. Just take the little gem innocently titled "People I Met in Iceland". It was written by Khachaturyan, the composer. After praising the Icelandic people, it gets down to the real point. This is to warn the Icelanders and other free

¹ Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Network on August 3 and released to the press on the same date.

people against those who are building military bases for defense of the free world.

The Politburo's new gimmick is phony also because it is clearly aimed at sowing disunity among the countries of the free world. Time and again, this new campaign charges stridently that the Americans are intriguing against the United Kingdom or other nations. Look, for example, at the *News* article entitled "Commonwealth and Common Sense". In this the author charges the United States with trying "to detach Australia and New Zealand from the Commonwealth." It warns against domination by U.S. big business. It charges Britain with being a tail to the American kite.

In the third place, the Kremlin's so-called co-operation campaign is phony because it is only one movement in a vast symphony of hate against the West, particularly against the United States. For years the masters of the Kremlin have been seeking to arouse in the Soviet population a frenzy of feeling against America. Recently, they have charged Americans with every conceivable crime in history against the Soviet people. They have shouted the propaganda slogan "The Russian people will never forget, and never forgive".

Now, most important of all, the Soviet campaign is phony because it is not accompanied by deeds. Yes, the Kremlin has found, apparently, that its former blustering propaganda has simply resulted in renewed determination among the peoples of the free world. So now they have changed the tone a little, though they have not changed the substance at all. Their purpose now is to make the Western free countries feel that there is really nothing to fear—that we can relax—so that we will be easy set-ups at some future date. It is a challenge to us, to all Americans, and to all free men, to remain calm, unconfused, resolute, and determined.

And speaking of a challenge, I would like to issue a challenge to the Soviet authorities right now. They say they are for Soviet-American friendship.

All right, if the Kremlin leaders are sincere about this friendship business, we challenge them again to print the President's letter and the Congress' resolution of friendship, so that all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. can see it for themselves.

If Mr. Stalin is really interested in friendship, he might begin by shutting down those hundreds of transmitters which are now doing nothing but trying to jam the Voice of America, trying to keep the Soviet peoples from hearing what the American people are saying to them.

If the Kremlin bosses really want to be friends, we will be glad to help them. We will offer tonight to furnish regular commentaries and addresses by outstanding Americans speaking to the peoples of Russia. We will send them out on the Voice of America beamed to the Soviet Union, so that Mr. Stalin's technicians can easily pick them up and

rebroadcast them to the millions behind the Iron Curtain. We will be glad to arrange a special broadcast every night for this purpose. If the Kremlin is interested, it should just send in its request. We will handle it without delay!

Mass Deportations in Hungary

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press August 1]

In recent weeks the Hungarian Communist regime, in emulation of the Nazis, has resorted to the inhuman practice of mass deportations as a further instrument of oppression. Thousands of innocent and helpless Hungarians have been expelled from their homes in urban areas throughout Hungary, their only crime being that the regime considers them "undesirable," "unreliable," or out of sympathy with the Communist program. Under circumstances of the grossest brutality, they have been removed on sudden notice to the provinces, where they have been billeted under harsh conditions, some of them in detention camps. These evictions have affected persons of every age and from every walk of life and have resulted in innumerable individual tragedies which are perhaps beyond the full comprehension of those of us who live in freedom and security under a just and humane rule of law. The fate of the victims of this wholesale persecution is cause for the deepest apprehension on the part of all persons of good will, for there are already indications that many of these people face slow but inevitable death by exhaustion, disease, forced labor, or further deportation to an unknown destination. It is known that these deportees are closely restricted at their new locations and that many of them are living under extremely crowded and unhealthy conditions. Members of families have been separated in many instances. Women, children, and the aged are being forced to perform hard and menial labor. In most instances they have been allowed to retain only a few personal belongings. Some have committed or attempted suicide prior to their deportation and others, who have undergone the ordeal, have also sought this escape.

The uncivilized conduct of the Hungarian Government has aroused profound indignation throughout the world. I wish to reaffirm solemnly the statement of the President on July 27, 1951, that the United States Government regards the deportations being carried out by the Hungarian Government as a further flagrant violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace which obligate that regime to secure to all persons under its jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms. It is my understanding

that the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of France feel equally strongly about this matter.

If the Hungarian Government has any regard for the dictates of justice and humanity, it must end immediately the deportation of Hungarian citizens and permit these persons to return to their homes without further molestation or to depart freely from Hungary and accept such safe haven as may be offered them by the governments of other lands.

It is imperative that the free governments of the world should continue to scrutinize most closely the further attitude and behavior of the Hungarian Government in this matter. As the President announced in his statement of July 27, the Government of the United States intends to take all possible steps to expose this situation to public

view and judgment and to render the Hungarian Government accountable before the world. This Government will accordingly in due course present all available evidence on this subject to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in conformity with the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 3, 1950, which invited all member nations to submit such evidence concerning violations of human rights by the Hungarian Government, as well as by the Governments of Bulgaria and Rumania. The United States Government is also taking careful note of the identity of individual Hungarian officials, including the highest authorities, who have participated in any way in carrying out these mass deportations, in order that their responsibility may be made fully known and their acts publicly stigmatized.

Germany—the Main Objective of Soviet Policy

By John J. McCloy

U.S. High Commissioner for Germany¹

... Basically, the world situation facing us today is about the same as it was at our last meeting, nine months ago. Little has happened to make the world look much brighter than it was in October last. The ultimate purposes of the Soviet Union have clearly not changed. All around the world in the satellite countries, in Indo China, Malaya, Tibet, Iran, Iraq, Yugoslavia, there remained powerful signs of unrelenting pressure and constant scheming to achieve totalitarian aims. Nothing on the horizon would give any reasonable basis for looking forward to an early respite of strain, or the ending of the need for rapid build-up of our strength to counter the still heavy preponderance of the Soviet forces. To be sure, the Soviets have sharply stepped up their emphasis upon peace in their propaganda. But by peace, they apparently mean a condition by which their own aims could not be successfully opposed. They are plainly concerned over the stimulus that Korean aggression has given to the defense measures of the West. The United States has become the main butt of their hypocritical attacks; but their objective is to create and exploit disagreements, conflicts of policy, confusion of opinion wherever they can be found in the free world.

To this end the Soviets, and those working with the Soviets, have made proposals designed to give the appearance of a desire to seek peaceful settlements of burning issues; but when reasonable and

concrete steps are to be taken, they appear to draw away, as was evidenced at the recent meeting at Paris. I can't comment on the negotiations in Korea, which I see by the morning's paper have been resumed; but there does appear to be an aroma of distrust about them which, together with the undoubted build-up of forces in Northern Korea, do carry an ominous note. In short, there is no evidence that though the Soviet or the Communist tactics may shift, there is any abandonment of their fundamental policy of seeking to find areas where new pressures may be applied and new strains may be induced. Germany remains today, as it has for the last few years, the main objective, or at least the main intermediate objective, of their policy.

In the face of the Soviet menace, the country at home seems to be convinced that the inescapable task is to build up our nation's defense and to strengthen the ability of all free nations, who show a will to defend themselves, against Communist aggression. There is, of course, criticism of policy and programs, but none of it seems to me to cast any doubt on the determination of the people or of the Government to get on with the work in hand. There is much informed talk about the new equipment, new aircraft, tanks, and some amazing developments in the field of atomic energy; a deep sense of shock over the way things have gone in Asia, and much uneasiness over the situation in Iran. But the hearings on the MacArthur recall seem to have had a very interesting and somewhat sobering effect on the people as a whole. Originally prompted by the criticism, by

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Third U.S. Resident Officers' Conference at Frankfurt, Germany, on July 16 and released to the press by HICOG on the same date.

many people, of General MacArthur's recall, or at least the manner of it, the investigation has turned, as you know, into a rather complete analysis of our Far Eastern policy. The testimony that has evolved was frank, most detailed, and the questions were often very penetrating. But, in the end, I gathered the impression that the responsible leaders who testified held their own, if they did not increase their stature, in their appearance before the committee.

German Participation Necessary to European Defense

This emphasis upon Asia apparently led some Europeans to fear that Europe might be overlooked or neglected, but this, I think, is clearly a mistaken view. The threat to Europe, and the importance of helping Europe meet the threat, are fully recognized by all with whom I talked. The most immediate concern was with European security, and the measures needed to strengthen it. This is recognized as a problem not only of the present emergency but of the long term, and requires not only military strength but economic strength and social stability. Viewing it in this light, there is a widespread conviction in the United States that Europe cannot long play a decisive role as a mere series of independent states. They see every state in Europe, including Germany, heavily dependent upon outside help in order to maintain its economy. They see on every side emphatic assertions by each country of its inability to defend itself without outside aid. Yet they see that together these countries represent enormous strength in material resources, manpower, and cultural development. It may be oversimplification, but the conclusion for the thinking people in the United States is that Europe must find some way, some pattern, or formula by which its strength can be constituted in effective unification. The American people recognize that the difficulties along this route are very great, but they see no alternative. I think they are influenced not only by the limitations of the individual states but by the fact that this is the trend of the times. With the vast areas of the East drawn together, they see the necessity of marshalling the great resources and energies of Europe, to enable Europe to maintain adequate defense without undermining its living standards and its great social fabric. In Europe, as elsewhere in the world today, it is useless to seek protection in a national shell when bombers will shortly be built to encompass the world with about the ease that they have only recently been crossing the Atlantic.

All Problems Exist on a World Basis

While I was home, I had the privilege to attend the Harvard commencement exercises, and of a number of speeches, there was one by Thornton

Wilder. I wish I could do justice to it. It was a speech, very eloquent, somewhat explosive, and very poignantly expressed; so I can't really do it justice by trying to repeat it here. His theme was the necessity of facing all problems on a world basis. He emphasized the fact that there were no longer any areas in which one could find refuge. He even, to the great shock and consternation of the class of 1900, indicated that there was no longer any New England; no longer, as he puts it, any psychic nest to which one could withdraw; and it seemed to me that he hit the nail on the head in expressing the concept which this year's graduating class ought to take with them as they went into the world.

Now this attitude, I think, explains why, in the United States, the Schuman Plan has been so widely hailed at home. Economically it is viewed as the first radical attack on the splitting up of Europe by boundaries, tariffs, cartels, and other barriers and restrictions against the most efficient use and development of industry and the economic resources and talents in Europe. Its concept of a common market for coal and steel is considered as a forerunner of similar steps for other commodities and services. Even more, perhaps, the support for the plan comes from its political implications. The fact that the six nations have undertaken to surrender some part of their sovereignty to European institutions charged with fostering the common interest is looked on by many as the first step toward European federation. Finally, the plan is considered as a fundamental step in creating peaceful Franco-German relations by the joint recognition of their joint interests in the large European community. For all these reasons, the United States and its people are keenly watching the actions toward ratification as a sort of test of whether the European countries are yet prepared to work together in creating a progressive European community which will advance the interests of all and overcome the cleavages of the conflicts of the past.

For similar reasons, there is great interest in the United States in the proposal for a European defense structure, now under discussion in Paris. This too, if it can be created on a sound and effective basis, would be a tremendous further stride on the road to European unity and Franco-German rapprochement.

Now this general framework of views is a setting for the attitude toward Germany. Those to whom I've talked at home fully recognized that Germany was the major target of Soviet aggressive policy. For that reason, the members of the Appropriations Committee, with whom we discussed our expenditures of both dollar, and this time, counterpart funds, were greatly interested in the programs to improve community life in Germany, especially for the youth, and seemed to support our programs in this field to the full. (I hope I'm not anticipating anything when I say that, because

the committee reports have not come in yet; but that was the general impression that I gained. I don't mean to anticipate the committee's decision.) The fact that so much of our budget was now directed to what one might call the spiritual and the social rebuilding of Germany rather than to the commercial and economic rehabilitation of the country was, I should say, generally applauded; but running through all the questions, all the questioning and all the comments, were the thoughts of the Senators as to what we were really accomplishing in Germany. How realistic is the new German State? Can we expect that it will take a respectable and helpful part in the maintenance of Western civilization and the preservation of its liberties? What is the real attitude of the Germans toward military participation and defense of the West? Is it true, as we so frequently hear, that German nationalism is on the rise? What real significance was there in the recent expression of Neo-Nazism in Lower Saxony? Will there emerge from the new state a liberal, democratic, tolerant nation, or do we have to endure once more from Germany some new political aberration that will mark her fundamental unreliability, as a world partner? If these questions could be answered favorably, there would be utmost good will available for Germany. I found that the leading figures engaged in formulating our foreign policy were quite prepared to relinquish to Germany wide authority and powers, very wide indeed, if convinced that the trends in Germany were solidly developing in the right direction. The feeling was general that if we could not be satisfied as to these trends we ought to maintain our controls even though it would mark to some extent the failure of our efforts. But every hope was cast in favor of relinquishment.

I think our leaders are convinced that there is no realistic defense of Western Europe, including West Germany, without some form of German participation. They recognize that if Germany does participate, her political status should be substantially changed, and she should be given an honorable and self-respecting role in any defense system. There is a very clear-cut determination to permit such participation only within a larger organization and only if based on a true democratic support. The fear of Germany going off on a military venture of her own, in the light of past experiences, has not completely died out, even though it may appear unrealistic at the moment. I would not say that anyone has drawn a deadline in the matter, but there is a general sense of urgency to restore the balance of strength in the world, and that whatever is necessary to do to bring that about we should be doing now and not later. Time is growing short to make these decisions, but again the recognition is complete that it is a decision which the Germans must make for themselves. It cannot be induced or dictated from the outside.

Soviet Demand for German Merchant Marine Vessels Rejected

[Released to the press August 2]

U.S. Note of July 31, 1951

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to previous communications with respect to the report and recommendations of December 4, 1947, of the Tripartite Merchant Marine Commission (TMMC) in regard to the distribution of the German merchant fleet.

The Soviet Government is informed that the Government of the United States has decided not to approve the above-mentioned report. The Tripartite Commission constituted a committee of experts who were authorized solely to make "recommendations" to their governments. The respective governments were under no obligation to approve these recommendations. The contention of the Soviet Embassy that the Soviet Government is "legally entitled" or "has a legal right" to the vessels recommended for allocation to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in this report is therefore erroneous.

Soviet Note of March 20, 1951

Upon instructions from the Soviet Government the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the honor to communicate the following to the Department of State of the United States of America.

In the Embassy's note No. 89 of May 26, 1950, the attention of the Department of State was called to the fact that up to that time the Soviet Government had not received any information concerning the approval by the Government of the United States of America of the second report and the recommendations of the Tripartite Commission for the Allotment of Vessels of the German Merchant Marine of December 4, 1947, although more than two and a half years had elapsed since the day on which the aforesaid report of the Commission had been submitted. As a result of the delay in the approval of this report by the Government of the United States of America, the Soviet Union has not received, up to this date, the 13 vessels of the German merchant marine which are due it and to which it has a legal right in accordance with the recommendations of the Tripartite Commission mentioned above.

Considering that a 3-year period appears more than sufficient for the examination and approval of the aforesaid report, the Soviet Government would like to know whether the aforesaid report and the recommendations of the Tripartite Commission have been approved by the Government of the United States of America.

German Federal Republic's Monthly Economic Review ¹

Early reports for the month of May indicate some slowing in the rate of improvement of the Western German economy evidenced during the earlier months of this year. The index of industrial production shows output slightly below the postwar record of April, with the greatest decline in the manufacture of consumer products. Holidays and the continuing shortage of raw materials were responsible for the slow expansion of production in some industries while in others, particularly the consumer goods industries, slackening demand and the resultant accumulation of excess stocks were the responsible factors. Crude steel and pig iron production during May advanced three percent and a little more than six percent respectively, but the daily average output of hard coal dropped two percent.

The reduction in world market prices noted during the preceding two months had only begun to reach the West German internal economy as basic materials prices dropped two percent, industrial producer prices halted their preceding month's rises and consumer prices moved up, but only 1.4 percent. Earlier import licensing restrictions designed to end Germany's foreign payments deficit, cut May's imports to \$248,000,000 and—for the third consecutive month—brought a favorable balance of trade as exports rose to \$273,000,000.

With rising production and employment, developments during April and May in the Western German economy showed a steady over-all improvement. The foreign trade surplus reported for April was repeated in May. Preliminary figures show that May exports exceeded imports by \$25,000,000 ² as compared with April's \$18,000,000. With a European Payments Union (EPU) payments surplus in May, the cumulative deficit has been brought below the credit quota originally set for the Federal Republic.

The index of industrial production rose another four points, but although a postwar record of 139 percent of the 1936 level has been reached, there are signs of weakening in the indexes for May or June, particularly in consumer goods output.

¹ Reprinted from the July issue of the *HICOG Information Bulletin*; prepared by the Analytical Reports Branch of the Program Review Division of the Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG.

² Deutschmarks 105,041,000 at the official rate of 23.8 cents to DM 1.

Employment reached a new peacetime high by the end of May, and the number of registered unemployed showed another decline to less than in mid-August 1950.

Basic material prices fell in April and May, and the May index of industrial producer prices remained at the April level. The consumer price index, however, continued to rise, 1.5 percent in April and 1.4 percent in May.

Foreign Trade

In April 1951, for the first time in the postwar period, Western Germany's monthly exports exceeded imports to show a \$18,000,000 trade surplus. Total exports of \$274,600,000 in April were at a record level for the second consecutive month. Total imports of only \$256,600,000, the lowest figure since October 1950, clearly showed the effects of the temporary suspension of licensing of imports from the EPU area in late February and in March.

The true significance of the April foreign trade figures becomes apparent when three facts are noted:

(1) Prior to April 1951, the postwar month of least total foreign trade deficit was May 1950, when imports were \$161,100,000, exports were \$140,300,000, and the deficit was \$20,800,000. While trade in May 1950 amounted only to \$301,400,000, the April 1951 total was \$531,200,000, or 76.2 percent higher than a year ago.

(2) The highest postwar figure for monthly imports was \$314,800,000 in December 1950, when exports were \$241,100,000. Had imports in April been at this postwar high, they would still have been covered 87.3 percent by April exports.

(3) ECA- and GARIOA-financed imports in April 1951 amounted to \$50,400,000. Thus, the commercial balance of trade in April shows exports exceeding imports by \$68,400,000, as compared to the excess of \$18,000,000 when total trade is considered.

On an area basis the export rise was chiefly accounted for by increased shipments to the United States (\$18,700,000), South America (\$24,200,000), Yugoslavia and Finland (\$6,700,000), and the OEEC sterling area (\$23,800,000). The decline in imports was almost entirely from the OEEC group, both sterling (\$27,200,000) and non-

sterling (\$91,800,000). Imports from the United States of America (\$54,400,000), South America (\$21,600,000), and Yugoslavia and Finland (\$4,800,000) were all higher than in March 1951. Both exports to (\$6,200,000) and imports from (\$5,200,000) the Soviet Bloc were slightly lower than in the previous month.

A commodity breakdown of exports disclosed that the increase was wholly in finished goods. These were \$199,300,000, or almost three-fourths of total exports. All major commodity groups suffered equally in the import decrease.

In the month of May the surplus with **FRG** amounted to \$81,152,000 (\$45,071,000 in April), reducing the cumulative deficit to \$319,585,000. The Federal Republic is thereby enabled to repay the special **FRG** credit, and, in addition, has brought its cumulative deficit within the quota originally accorded it. Germany will be refunded the net dollar payment of \$30,666,000 made after it had exceeded the quota and will also receive a dollar payment of \$332,000, which is 80 percent of the amount by which the net cumulative deficit fell below the original quota of \$320,000,000. Therefore, Germany will receive a total dollar payment of \$30,998,000. Repayment has occurred much earlier than had been anticipated.

Industry

The volume of industrial production in April expanded substantially to new postwar record proportions despite persistent reports of raw material shortages. During the month the index of industrial production (excluding building, stimulants and food processing) rose by four points to 139 percent of the 1936 level—well beyond the 135 postwar record of November 1950. Production in the iron and steel and steel construction industries, among those showing decreases during the last few months, increased in April by 10 and 13 percent, respectively.

The index of both investment goods and general production goods continued to increase. Production of raw materials, showing a nine-point increase in April, has had a remarkable expansion since January of almost 18 percent. Consumer goods output continued its slow increase from the January low point (115), but rose only 1½ percent over the March index.

Production increases in the various industry groups were almost general during April, and especially strong in the finished goods group, steel construction rising 13 percent. Of the 29 industry groups for which data are available, 23 showed increases in output and five showed decreases. The largest increases were in stones and earths, iron and steel (excluding castings). Important decreases were in leather production, rubber and shoes.

The index of orders received in selected industry groups in Western Germany during March went

down for the first time in three months by 11.3 percent to 186 of the 1949 monthly average—a greater decline than in September 1950, when orders fell off after the first Korean boom. Orders received in March dropped in both the production goods and investment goods industries, but there was a sharper decline in the consumer goods industries. The discrepancy between orders received and current sales is still especially high in machinery (orders 157 percent of sales), drawing plants and cold rolling mills (149 percent of sales as compared to 302 percent in August 1950), and iron and steel foundries (146 percent of sales).

Coal

Hard coal production in May amounted to 9,372,000 tons, somewhat lower than April's 10,023,000 tons. Daily average production (excluding Sundays and holidays) was 388,038 tons, compared with 396,000 in April. Total commitments for United States coal are now estimated to be approximately 2,500,000 tons with deliveries running through the first quarter of 1952. Actual United States loadings of coal consigned to Western Germany for April were reported to be 210,000 tons. About 80 percent is scheduled for the iron and steel industries, the remainder for the textile, paper and cement industries.

The third quarter coal export allocation of 6,200,000 tons, as set by the International Authority for the Ruhr, has aroused considerable antagonism within the Federal Republic. Probably appeals will be made to the Allied High Commission to reduce this quota substantially, since there is a recognized shortage of coal for increasing steel production and other basic commodities as well as the need for stock building by industries and public utilities.

The Federal Government has proposed an increase in coal export prices of DM 14.70 per ton, which, if adopted, would increase the differential of export prices over inland prices to DM 17 per ton. The Federal Government will attempt to justify this price increase as making a contribution to a proposed investment program for the coal mining industries, which contribution would total some DM 316,000,000, and with other funds totaling DM 2,800,000,000 by the middle of 1953, would develop a daily production of 450,000 tons of hard coal. The proposed increase may not be acceptable, since it appears to be contrary to the purpose of the Schuman plan.

Iron and Steel

Crude steel production (ingots and castings) during May totaled 1,154,000 metric tons (MT), with a daily average production of 48,083, to bring both figures well above the April production, and set a new postwar daily production rate. April output totaled 1,121,300 MT, and a daily average of 44,852 MT. It is estimated that 125,000

MT of the total were produced with United States coal imports. For the first time in months, orders received were in balance with outgoing shipments, so that April saw no increase in the backlog of domestic or export orders.

Pig iron production rose from 866,500 MT in April to 919,980 MT in May, which increase is mainly the result of higher imports of coke from the United States. However, there is almost negligible improvement of the inland situation of iron and steel, since the steel barter deals against American coke require extensive exports of steel to the States. Actual relief can be expected only with higher deliveries of German coke to the mills.

Scrap collections have not improved materially, and were estimated in April at 525,000 MT, of which 40,000 MT were exported. The German scrap drive has developed very slowly and tangible results are not expected before July. The iron industry will contribute DM 5,000,000 for promotion of scrap mobilization. This money will be spent for salvaging ships, bridges and other scrap projects, and for wide publication on scrap collection.

Severe sheet metal shortages are reported by the iron, metal and steel industry. Some firms were forced to dismiss workers, and 70 firms introduced the "short week." Only 60 percent of the needed metal wares were delivered, which is already affecting some buyers, e. g., the export business of the chemical industry is endangered by insufficient metal packing material.

The production of aluminum increased to 6,000 tons, and the production of copper and zinc remained about the same. Lead production showed a slight decrease, however, due to the insufficient supply of ores and scrap, and it is expected that two smelters will close down soon.

Copper scrap as well as ores are in short supply. The copper smelters can maintain the present level of production only by accepting more processing contracts for foreign accounts. Processing contracts a year ago averaged 2,500 tons monthly, but now run 3,000 to 3,500 tons monthly. The coal allocation, although slightly increased, is insufficient and some United States coal has been imported. Average stocks are 14 to 16 days' supply—half normal stocks.

Chemicals

Although the May coal allocation was reduced to 248,000 tons from 282,000 tons in April, over-all production has been maintained at about the previous level. The smaller coal allocation is partially alleviated by imports, barter deals and use of more low grade fuels. There was adequate hydroelectric power in Bavaria for the chemical plants, but the shortage of coal cut the production of calcium-carbide and calcium-cyanamide. Due to curtailed imports of phosphate rock from North Africa, two major superphosphate firms

were forced to close down. The French agreed to ship 40,000 tons of phosphate before the end of June, however, and it was hoped trade negotiations in Paris would soon bring increased imports.

Current potash production, only two percent below the 1938 output, totaled 986,000 tons for the German fiscal year just ended, a 20 percent increase. A further 20 percent boost in output is planned for the coming year.

The cement industry continued to complain during May of coal shortages, which caused many plants to continue at 40 to 50 percent operation. Plants with a large export business, however, are getting United States coal from their dollar earnings to permit full operation.

The cotton textile industry began to curtail operations in May. Many weavers operated five days per week instead of the customary six days, due to serious decline in domestic sales without any increase in exports. The trend, it was feared, might worsen during June and July. This comes at a time when raw cotton is becoming scarce, and perhaps many plants will be forced to curtail operations, anyway, before the new United States cotton crop is available this fall. Raw cotton stocks are now about 2½ months, with 4-5 months' yarn stocks on hand at the spinners and weavers. In view of this situation, an increased interest is being taken in exports of cotton textiles.

The tanning, shoe and leather goods industries continued curtailment in May due to declining domestic sales and despite price reductions. Many firms reported difficulties from a shortage of operating capital which is aggravated by the drop in sales. Loans from banks or the government have been requested to tide over this period.

Rail Traffic Developments

The month of May with its many holidays brought a drop in freight car demands on the federal railroads. Consequently the critical freight car situation improved considerably and the Federal Railroad System was able to return 2,000 freight cars hired from France and 1,000 rented from Belgium. In spite of this momentary improvement, the outlook for the harvest remains unfavorable. The stock of serviceable freight cars now is 247,000, but a minimum of 270,000 will be required in the fall and no orders for new construction have yet been placed.

The 100,000 common wagon park between the German railroads and the French railroads (SNCF) became operative on May 1. The common car office opened in Paris on that date is headed jointly by one German and one French rail official. The additional marking on the cars belonging to the common pool will consist of the word "EUROP," which will strongly underline the intention of the French and German railroads that this pool is intended as a forerunner of a single European car park.

Finance

Combined federal and state fiscal operations yielded a surplus of DM 454,800,000 for the last quarter (January–March) of the 1950–51 German fiscal year. The over-all deficit of DM 1,015,300,000 resulted from the deficits incurred in the first three quarters: April–June 1950, DM 993,300,000; July–September 1950, DM 93,400,000; October–December 1950, DM 383,400,000; and January–March 1951, DM 454,300,000.

Since currency reform (June 20, 1948), the expenditure pattern has shown the greatest spending during the April–June quarter, with a decrease during the October–December and January–March quarters to a low in the July–September quarter. Thus, the seemingly favorable development of a surplus in January–March 1951 stemmed primarily from seasonal factors affecting both revenues and expenditures. Expenditures other than occupation and related costs were DM 352,000,000 lower than in the preceding quarter.

Revenues reached record heights for January–March 1951. Most of the increase over the previous quarter resulted chiefly from the many annual tax accounts collected in January, and also from the increasing general revenue trend, especially in the turnover and income taxes. Much of the profits of the July–November period of business expansion was reflected in January–March income tax collections.

Another factor affecting this surplus was the fact that the increase in occupation costs and related expenditures was less than expected. These expenditures increased by only DM 122,600,000 over the previous quarter to reach DM 1,181,800,000, which is approximately DM 400,000,000 below estimated cash requirements of the various administrative services. As the 1951–52 budget calls for greatly increased occupation costs, substantial deficits can be expected in the near future if these costs are accurately estimated at their high level and unless federal and state revenues are increased or sources extended.

Labor

The downward movement of unemployment, which had slackened appreciably during the first part of May (down 9,700), regained momentum during the latter half when unemployment dropped by 49,500 for a monthly decrease of 59,200. Since mid-January 1951, unemployment has declined by 524,000, thus compensating for 77 percent of the winter increase.

As of the end of May 1951, registered unemployment in the Federal Republic had been reduced to 1,386,900, or somewhat less than in mid-August 1950. In terms of the estimated wage- and salary-earning labor force, the unemployment rate has dropped to 8.7 percent as against 9.1 percent in April 1951 and 10.9 percent in May 1950.

The improvement in the unemployment situation continues to be most evident in the agricultural states which were most severely affected last winter by seasonal influences. The three major farm states, which have 61 percent of total unemployment, accounted for 72 percent of the unemployment drop during the latter half of May 1951.

On the whole, the employment situation continued to be favorable with higher employment in building and construction, manufacturing industries taken as a group, agriculture, and in trade and commerce. Estimated employment of wage and salary earners, climbing slightly above the 14,500,000 mark, achieved another new peacetime high for the federal area.

Seasonal causes, especially expanding activity in building and agriculture, remain the chief factors in the employment rise. The increase in building employment, however, was significantly less in May than in April 1951 due perhaps to the interim which usually prevails between the completion of construction begun the year before and new building. The effect of difficulties in financing, especially of housing, cannot yet be clearly determined. However, employment in the building industry now stands at the level of about midsummer 1950.

Manufacturing employment also attained a new postwar record in May with the increase coming almost exclusively, as in April, from the capital goods industries, almost all of which increased their staffs. Automobile plants, which had had to curtail working time due to raw material shortages, resumed more normal schedules.

Prices

During April the sharp rate of increase in recent months of the three major price indexes slowed noticeably. The basic materials price index actually showed a drop of one point from 251 to 250 percent of 1938, which is the first decline since April 1950. The index of industrial producer prices continued earlier increases, but at a much slower rate (+1.8 percent), to reach 222 percent.

The only decline in the index was in the group "iron, steel and non-ferrous metals, including castings" due to a decrease in the "non-ferrous metals." The most important rise was in "chemicals, plastics, rubber and asbestos," while the upward trend in "sawmills, woodworking, paper and printing" continued—caused by rising pulp and paper prices. The consumer price index went up by 1.5 percent to reach 163 percent of 1938. All the items with exception of rent increased slightly.

Berlin

In April, with one more working day than March, the value of industrial deliveries totalled DM 210,300,000 (excluding building industry), a slight increase over the previous month, and a new post-blockade record. The largest percentage

gains, as compared with March, were recorded in fine mechanics and optics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and structural engineering.

Industrial employment, which in March had also reached its highest level since the end of the blockade, increased somewhat during April, reaching almost 160,000. Total employment during May increased by 4,200, due chiefly to new hirings under the Work Relief Program. The number of gainfully occupied totaled 887,900 at the end of May. The registered labor force increased by less than 1,000; during the second half of the month, it showed a slight decline for the first time this year. Unemployment was 286,700, a decrease of 3,300 below April.

For the first four months of 1951, Berlin's deficit in current commodity trade with Western Germany and foreign countries amounted to an estimated DM 519,200,000. Since exports to foreign countries (DM 64,300,000) were approximately balanced with imports from such areas (DM 60,300,000), the deficit arose in trade with Western Germany. For the comparable period of 1950, the deficit was about DM 406,000,000, but since the 1950 total trade volume was substantially smaller, the relative position of the city has improved.

I.G. Farben Invites Shareholders To Declare Stocks

[Released to the press August 3]

The Department of State announced on August 3 that the United States High Commissioner for Germany has invited I.G. Farben shareholders to declare their shares. This step is part of the reorganization and dispersal program of I.G. Farbenindustrie A. G. and prepares for the allocation to shareholders of stock in the successor companies.

The procedure by which shareholders may make their declaration is as follows:

(a) Declaration forms may be obtained from the principal banks in Western Germany, or by writing to the Tripartite I.G. Farben Control Group, Shareholders Registration Department, Mainzer Landstrasse 28, Frankfurt/Main, Germany. In the latter instance, a self-addressed return envelope should be enclosed.

(b) These forms are to be completed and returned in duplicate to the above mentioned Registration Department.

(c) The time limit for registration is four months beginning July 3, 1951, for shareholders with domicile, head office or administrative office in Western Germany (including Western Berlin), or six months from the same date for shareholders whose domicile or office is outside Western Germany or Western Berlin.

Shareholders are advised that those who do not register their securities in accordance with the above procedure run the risk of receiving compensation other than an allocation of the stocks of the new companies formed from out of the

Farben complex. On the other hand, shareholders will not be subject to legal proceedings with respect to any violation of article 3 of Allied High Commission Law No. 35 and related legislation (forbidding all transactions connected with the shares of I.G. Farben) which might come to light from the filing of the registration form provided that such violations occurred before July 3, 1951.

President Points out Financial Crisis In Palestine Refugee Program

[Released to the press by the White House July 27]

The President sent identical letters on July 27 to Kenneth McKellar, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate, and Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The text of the letter follows:

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to call to your attention a critical situation which now exists with respect to the financing of the Palestine Refugee Program of the United Nations. This program of relief to Arab refugees displaced from Palestine was carried on during the fiscal year 1951 through contributions from participating countries, including a contribution from the United States of \$25,450,000. The Mutual Security Program now before the Congress includes a request of \$50,000,000 for the United States contribution to this program in the fiscal year 1952.

In the July Joint Resolution making temporary appropriations, no provision was made for the Palestine Refugee Program. The program was carried forward during July, however, through the use of existing stocks and funds from other sources. Available resources are now nearly exhausted.

One of the principal causes of tension in the Near East is the miserable state of the hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees from Palestine. A major step forward was recently made when the Arab League went on record in favor of a massive program of resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the Arab States. Grave damage to this program is likely to result if the present aid program collapses because of a temporary shortage of funds.

I therefore urgently request that the pending continuing resolution provide \$2,000,000 for the month of August and \$3,000,000 for the month of September. Such a contribution is essential to prevent the starvation of many refugees and to avoid a deterioration in the present critical situation in the Near East.

Respectfully yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Export-Import Bank To Assist in Philippine Rehabilitation

[Released by Export-Import Bank July 31]

The imminent departure of a four-man delegation to the Philippines was announced on July 31 by the Export-Import Bank.

Lynn U. Stambaugh, a member of the Board of Directors of the Bank, will head the group. He will be accompanied by Edward S. Lynch, Economic Adviser, Victor F. Hasenoeherl, Financial Specialist, and Winter K. Graves, Engineer, all members of the regular staff of the Bank.

The Export-Import Bank representatives are going to Manila on the invitation of the Philippine Government to assist that Government in identifying productive projects, which will contribute to economic development in the islands and to the stability and productivity of the economy of the Philippines, and may thus be eligible for consideration for financing by the Bank.

The Export-Import Bank representatives, who will arrive in Manila on August 3d, will work with representatives of the Economic Cooperation Administration, now in the Philippines. This ECA-Export-Import Bank group will assist the Philippine Government in its plans for the rehabilitation and development of the Philippine economy as a follow-up on the recommendations made by the Bell Mission sent to the Philippines last year for the purpose of studying the problem of financial and economic rehabilitation.

Payment on Mexican Lend-Lease Obligation Complied With Instruction

[Released to the press August 3]

During the past few days, various reports have appeared in the press concerning an alleged transfer of 1 million dollars from Mexico to a New York City bank by Ambassador William O'Dwyer. Some of these reports have created the unfortunate impression that the transaction was extraordinary and even irregular. These reports have absolutely no basis in fact.

The following is a brief description of what actually transpired:

On March 3, 1951, the Government of Mexico delivered to the Embassy in Mexico City a dollar draft in the amount of 1 million dollars drawn on the Chase National Bank, city of New York, as an installment payment on its lend-lease obligation to the United States. The draft was made out to William O'Dwyer, Ambassador of the United States of America, in his official capacity. This draft was returned to the Mexican Government in exchange for a check in the amount of the peso equivalent of 1 million dollars, this Government

having previously exercised its option in accordance with the lend-lease settlement agreement to accept payment in local currency for the purpose of meeting operating expenses in Mexico. This check was deposited to the credit of the Government of the United States in the Mexico City Branch of the National City Bank of New York.

The transaction was carried out by the Embassy in Mexico City with the full knowledge and in accordance with instructions of the Department of State. In no way did it deviate from accepted practices in such cases.

U.S. Nominees For Panel of Conciliators Under Brussels Intercustodial Agreement

[Released to the press July 29]

The United States has nominated three candidates for the Panel of Conciliators to be set up under the Agreement Relating to the Resolution of Conflicting Claims to German Enemy Assets, otherwise known as the Brussels intercustodial agreement. The United States nominees are Arthur B. Koontz, well-known attorney of Charleston, W. Va.; Malcolm S. Mason, formerly General Counsel of the Office of Alien Property; and Owen J. Roberts, formerly Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Article 35 of the Brussels intercustodial agreement, which has been signed by the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and which went into effect January 24, 1951 (Department of State press release No. 93 of February 6, 1951), provides that each signatory party may nominate not more than three candidates for election to the Panel of Conciliators. Article 35 further provides that the parties to the agreement shall elect from the candidates seven conciliators, who shall constitute the panel. However, not more than two nationals of the same country may be elected to the panel.

Article 37 of the Brussels intercustodial agreement provides that in the event a dispute between the parties to the agreement is not resolved within a reasonable time, a party may request the appointment of a conciliator from the panel for the settlement of the dispute. The solution formulated by the conciliator shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned.

The types of claims covered by the Brussels intercustodial agreement are those where the Alien Property Custodian of two countries both claim the same German external asset or where an Alien Property Custodian claims that certain property is a German external asset and a national of a friendly country claims the property is owned by

m beneficially through an intermediate corporation. With regard to this latter type of case, the Department of State refers to Department of State press release No. 93 of February 6, 1951, which requests American claimants who have interests in property falling under the agreement or in other property in Allied or neutral countries which has been seized or blocked as enemy property to submit information to the Department of State on the basis of which the Department may take action to protect their interests.

Use of Individuals and Companies by VOA

Letter from Assistant Secretary Barrett
to Representative John J. Rooney¹

July 25, 1951.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ROONEY: In fairness to the individuals and the companies concerned, I think the record should be set straight on the use of outside radio commentators, writers, and private corporations in the United States International Information and Educational Exchange Program.

As you well know, it has continually been suggested by many individuals, including Members of both parties in Congress, that this program should utilize as fully as possible the best professional talent obtainable. It has also been emphasized that we should utilize fully services and facilities of private American agencies. In fact, Public Law 602, the basic legislation for this program, calls upon the Secretary of State "to utilize, to the maximum extent practicable, the services and facilities of private agencies, including existing American press, publishing, radio, motion picture, and other agencies, through contractual arrangements or otherwise. It is the intent of Congress that the Secretary shall encourage participation in carrying out the purposes of this act by the maximum number of different private agencies in each field consistent with the present or potential market for their services in each country."

Naturally, the Department of State has tried to comply with these very sensible and constructive suggestions and instructions. As one part of this program, we have utilized the part-time services of well-known American radio commentators in reaching our world-wide English-language audience and in reaching audiences in other languages. Such commentators have been extremely generous in doing this work at nominal rates far below the pay scale they normally receive. I hardly need to tell you that it is a gross injustice for anyone to imply that a distinguished American

radio commentator could be swayed to change his views in any respect because he received a nominal fee of \$50 to undertake a special broadcast for the Voice of America. On the contrary, these men deserve very sincere thanks from the Nation for doing this work at fees substantially below those they can command elsewhere.

U.S., Greece Sign Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation

[Released to the press August 3]

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Greece was signed on August 3 at Athens. Ambassador John E. Peurifoy signed for this Government, and Premier Venizelos signed for Greece. The treaty must be ratified by both Governments before it will become effective.

This treaty marks a significant forward step in the close treaty relations which have existed between the United States and Greece for over a century. It is the second treaty of this general type to be concluded by the two Governments, the first being the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1837, which was in force until 1921. The new treaty reestablishes, for the first time since 1921, a comprehensive formal basis for the conduct of general economic relations between the two countries. Since the termination of the earlier treaty, economic intercourse between the two countries has been governed mainly by provisional commercial arrangements and by a short establishment convention signed in 1936. These agreements, however, were essentially interim measures intended to be replaced by a comprehensive treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Years of war and international crisis intervened, however, and it was not until last summer that the actual negotiations, successfully completed today, could be undertaken.

The new treaty establishes a set of advanced principles to govern basic economic relations between the United States and Greece and to serve as a practical means of directing the future development of those relations along mutually beneficial lines. The treaty contains 28 articles and deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject matter. In general, it covers the same ground as other treaties of this kind concluded by the United States in recent years and covers it in much the same way. In brief, the provisions of the treaty fall into seven broad categories: (1) entry of persons, travel, and residence; (2) basic personal freedoms (3) guarantees for property rights; (4) the control and conduct of business enterprises; (5) exchange restrictions; (6) the exchange of goods; and (7) navigation.

¹ Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.*, July 25, 1951, p. 9038.

U.S. Participation in the United Nations

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

[Released to the press by the White House July 26]

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith, pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act, a report on our participation in the work of the United Nations during 1950.

It is a record of decision and action in the face of danger and, at the same time, a record of increasing efforts to promote human progress in the attainment of the basic objectives of the United Nations Charter. It is for the most part a record of solidarity among United Nations members against aggression.

The struggle of the United Nations against Communist aggression in 1950 has a deep significance that reaches beyond the momentary successes and reverses recorded. This significance lies in the simple fact that the United Nations acted promptly and resolutely, and with success, against deliberate, treacherous, and well-prepared aggression. The aggressors and their supporters undoubtedly believed that the Organization and its members would not come to the defense of Korea with timely and effective help. It is probable that one of the purposes of the attack was to break down—through such a failure—any possibility of effective United Nations action against aggression in the future.

As the world knows, the United Nations met the assault squarely and without hesitation. In so doing, it made clear that an aggressor will not be allowed to isolate and destroy his victims one by one. The United Nations elected to act now rather than to drift passively once more down the fatal

¹Included in Department of State Publication 4178, *United States Participation in the United Nations*, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price \$1.00 (paper); also contained in H. doc. 196, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

trail of failure to oppose aggression which leads finally to total war. Thousands of men have therefore sacrificed their lives in Korea to the end that millions may not lose their lives in a world war.

There is much to indicate that the resolute resistance of United Nations troops has given pause to those aggressive forces which cold-bloodedly brought tragedy to Korea.

In these great events the United States has taken a worthy and responsible part. American troops fighting in Korea are a major bulwark of the international community against the barbarous forces that would debase and destroy it. American fighting men have rarely in all our history struck more important blows for human freedom and welfare. I am proud—and I know the American people are proud—of the fight which our men, together with their comrades in arms, have waged in Korea.

The army and people of the Republic of Korea have heroically and patiently endured the brunt of the Communist aggression. The story of their unwavering resistance to that aggression is an epic in the annals of the struggle of free men to maintain their liberty and independence.

I should like to pay special tribute to the gallant fighting men of the other countries who defended the cause of the United Nations in battle during 1950—men from Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom.

Fighting units for Ethiopia arrived in Korea in early May 1951, and units from Colombia arrived in early June 1951. Hospital units and ships from Denmark, India, Norway, and Sweden also are operating in the Korean area.

United Nations action in Korea has been truly collective action. Concrete aid in the form of combat troops, ships and planes, field hospitals and medical equipment, other equipment, supplies, and food has been made available by 39 members of the United Nations; political support, by no less than 53 members. These countries vary greatly in their abilities to contribute to a collective military operation such as that in Korea. Contributions equal in number and identical in kind are obviously impossible. Nevertheless it must be recognized that every free country, large and small, is vitally—and I should say equally—interested in world security.

Much has been said in the Congress and in public forums on all phases of our action in Korea. Discussion and honest criticism are in the best traditions of our people and are in fact essential to the working of our system of government. As on other subjects, I welcome them in connection with our record in the United Nations. Throughout the world, Communist propaganda has of course sought to represent this country's action as "imperialism" dictated by material interests. I do not believe that, wherever the channels of opinion are free, our basic purposes will be misunderstood. Our action in the Korean crisis was not dictated by any American material interest there. We neither sought nor do we seek any special position or privilege in Korea. Our action in the crisis was motivated by our deep conviction of the importance of preventing a breakdown of the international security system and of the principles of the Charter. I was convinced then, and I am convinced now, that to have ignored the appeal of Korea for aid, to have stood aside from the assault upon the Charter, would have meant the end of the United Nations as a shield against aggression. It might have meant the end of any possibility that collective security could be made to work.

Under the Charter, the United Nations must afford protection against aggression, whether committed by big countries or by small countries. Just as the United Nations branded as aggression the original assault by the North Korean Communist regime, so it has branded as aggression the later intervention by the Chinese Communist regime and its attack upon United Nations forces. There are not two laws, one for small and one for large countries. Indeed it is hard to see how the United Nations could ever operate under such a double standard. This does not of course mean that the United Nations has acted blindly, without carefully considering the effects of its measures. In fact the record shows a most careful concern by the great majority of members, including this country, to avoid extension of the conflict and to preserve unity while maintaining our objective of resisting aggression.

While our primary and immediate task has been defense against aggression and the creation of collective measures for accomplishing this more

effectively, we have not lost sight of the objective of creating an international security system based upon the reduction and control of armaments. In my statement to the General Assembly on October 24, 1950, I made clear our continued determination to work toward this goal in every practicable way.

The aggression against the United Nations has brought home to all peoples the imperative need for developing more effective means to deal with aggression within the framework of the United Nations. The Korean case has demonstrated that the United Nations can act effectively against aggression through recommendations of the Security Council, or the General Assembly, if the Security Council is paralyzed by the veto. But in Korea the participating nations had to improvise their measures from the ground up.

It was to meet this need that the Secretary of State launched at the beginning of the General Assembly in September 1950 the proposals which were developed into the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Mr. Acheson said:

"The world waits to see whether we can build on the start we have made. The United Nations must move forward energetically to develop a more adequate system of collective security. If it does not move forward, it will move back.

"... The General Assembly can and should organize itself to discharge its responsibility promptly and decisively if the Security Council is prevented from acting."

This resolution can mark the beginning of a great step forward in the development of the United Nations as an instrument for collective action to maintain peace and put down aggression. We place great hope in the program projected by this resolution, particularly the provisions relative to the maintenance by members of the United Nations of armed forces for possible service as United Nations units, and the Collective Measures Committee set up to study and report on possible methods of maintaining and strengthening international peace and security. We shall give our full support to the aims and objectives of the program and to the work of this Committee in developing them.

Despite the emphasis which the United Nations has been compelled to give during the last year to action to meet aggression, it has intensified rather than slackened its various activities to promote human progress in attainment of other basic objectives of the Charter.

One of the fundamental human aspirations is the desire to control one's own destiny or, phrased in another way, to exercise the rights of self-government or independence. The organs of the United Nations which are charged with the responsibility of fulfilling the purposes of the Charter with respect to the development of non-self-governing people made notable progress during the past year. The United States has contributed fully to these efforts.

The United Nations has intensified its efforts to combat the perennial enemies of mankind—hunger, disease, and ignorance. Through many channels and in numerous programs, the United Nations and the specialized agencies have furthered the basic goal of “the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.” Of particular significance this past year was the inauguration of an expanded program of technical assistance for the economic development of underdeveloped countries. Some 56 countries of the free world have participated by making contributions, and 48 countries have initiated programs designed to use the facilities of the United Nations and specialized agencies in the development of their own human and material resources and in raising their standards of living. The United States has actively supported these activities and will continue to do so.

The weakness and the strength of the United Nations manifested in 1950 were those of a human endeavor which is still in its infancy. Despite centuries of effort, nations have only recently been able to cooperate effectively on a world-wide scale to achieve security and their other common purposes. In our limited experience we have met with many difficulties and reverses and will meet more in the future. But we have also achieved tangible success, and this success gives ground for hope that we are moving ahead on the right track. It is essential for all of us to understand that a stable peace can be achieved only through long, hard work and sacrifice. I am sure that the people of this country and of practically all countries realize that the goal of peace is worth this work and this sacrifice.

Under the stress of events in 1950 the members of the United Nations did not, of course, always see completely eye to eye. Nevertheless as loyal members the great majority strove to accommodate their views and action to the fullest possible extent in the interest of the major purposes of the United Nations. No nation has a monopoly of wisdom. Even among peoples sincerely devoted to United Nations principles—the overwhelming majority—there are bound to be differences concerning the best methods of putting these principles into effect. When we attempt honestly and frankly to work out these differences in the common interest, no one nation can expect to have its way completely. But decisions that are the result of discussions by many countries have a moral and political force in the international community which unilateral decisions seldom have.

Two years ago I said that the first point of our four-point foreign-policy program would be “to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies” and “to continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness.”

The record of our participation in 1950, set forth

in the following pages, shows that we have not faltered in our support. I know the American people are determined to persevere in this course.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 26, 1951.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Agent General of UNKRA To Study Conditions in Korea

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information July 18]

J. Donald Kingsley, agent general of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, will arrive in Pusan next week. He will be accompanied by two of his senior advisers, Joel Fisher and Donald Pryor. Sir Arthur Rucker, deputy agent general, is going to Tokyo on Saturday, 21 July, to meet Mr. Kingsley. It is expected that the party will arrive in Pusan on Tuesday, 24 July.

The purpose of Mr. Kingsley's visit is to enable him to study conditions in Korea at first hand and to discuss fully with the Republic of Korea the plans for future work of UNKRA.

Immediately on his arrival he will meet the President and Prime Minister and all ministers concerned with the reconstruction schemes. He will also consult with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and coordinate plans of UNKRA with the military authorities and, in particular, with the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAC), who are responsible for the administration on behalf of the United Nations of relief and short-term economic aid.

Mr. Kingsley's provisional plans include visits to hospitals and other institutions in the Pusan area as well as visits to Taegu and Seoul. It is also hoped to arrange, while Mr. Kingsley is in Pusan, for the formal opening of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency's new offices in the center of the city.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2228, July 3; S/2229, July 5; S/2230, July 6; S/2237, July 10; S/2240, July 11; S/2243, July 12; S/2244, July 13; S/2248, July 16; S/2249, July 17; S/2251, July 18; S/2257, July 23.

Department of State Bulletin

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

TWENTY-THIRD REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1-15, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2246 Transmitted July 16, 1951

I herewith submit report no. 23 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 June, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 901-915 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Depleted by losses suffered in the preceding period which amounted to more than 100,000 casualties and 12,000 prisoners, the enemy continued a slow withdrawal under continued United Nations pressure. Resistance was heavy as the United Nations advance carried into the immediate approaches of the critical Kumhwa-Chorwon-Pyongyang triangle, but by 12 June the enemy was forced to relinquish the southern reaches of this area. Relatively heavy fighting took place along the entire ninety mile front from the vicinity of Yonchon, through the Hwachon reservoir area, northeast to Kansong. In various sectors the enemy managed a considerable measure of organization of his defenses, to include semi-permanent fortifications and earthworks, and employed increasing amounts of mortar, artillery, and anti-tank fire. Small numbers of enemy tanks were sighted, but they played only a defensive role, and remained behind their own lines.

On the extreme west flank, enemy activity was confined to small-scale patrol contacts with United

Nations forces operating over the Imjin River. In the west-central zone, enemy forces resisted stubbornly as United Nations troops drove across the Hantan River toward Chorwon and Kumhwa. The fighting here passed its climax from 7 to 9 June, and by 11 June United Nations forces controlled both of these vital communications centers.

Fighting was intense in the area immediately north of Hwachon from 1 to 8 June. In a series of stubborn delaying actions, the enemy units withdrew by short-bounds, clinging tenaciously to each exploitable terrain feature. However, United Nations forces had advanced more than ten miles to the north of Hwachon by 13 June.

Some of the heaviest fighting of the period took place to the north and northwest of Inje, where the United Nations advance was limited to about seven miles. To the east of Inje, however, following highly commendable defensive operations by the Republic of Korea Capital Division with the 20th Republic of Korea Regiment attached, the enemy was forced to relinquish his shallow salient. On the extreme east flank he was driven back about six miles.

Although the enemy has gradually augmented his strength in supporting arms—particularly artillery and anti-tank units—his position has deteriorated considerably the past few weeks. His earlier force of approximately eighty infantry divisions has now declined to less than seventy, of which sixteen were very seriously depleted in his recent abortive offensive. The southern limits of his Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyongyang complex are now in United Nations hands, depriving the enemy of much of the excellent communication net in this area. Behind the United Nations lines, his once-formidable guerrilla force has been reduced to about 7,000; and although it still has some capacity for harassment, it is now concerned primarily with its own security.

There is no indication that the enemy will relax his hold on any major portion of North Korea. In fact, all signs indicate that he has no intentions of abandoning his aggression and that he intends eventually to mount further efforts to expel the United Nations Forces from Korea. The enemy has probably not yet been able to build up sufficient fresh forces for a new offensive. In the past, this process has required a minimum of three weeks, and in the present instance, should require considerably more, due to the magnitude of recent losses.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on July 16. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43; and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports, which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively, will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the nineteenth report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the twentieth in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the twenty-first in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; and the twenty-second in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155.

Front lines at the close of the period ran generally along the Imjin River to Yonchon, thence northeast to Chorwon, eastward through Kumwha and Yulmok to the vicinity of Sohwa, and thence northeast to a point eight miles north of Kansong.

Constant patrol and reconnaissance operations by United Nations Naval forces continue to deny to the enemy the use of Korean waters and to prevent enemy interference with the movements of United Nations shipping to and from Korea.

Close air support of United Nations ground elements received strong emphasis from both United Nations carrier-based and Marine shore-based aircraft on all sections of the front in Korea. As a result of these operations, the enemy suffered severe losses in men and matériel.

Co-ordinated United Nations surface ship and carrier-based aircraft interdiction operations were continued against enemy main lines of communication in northeastern Korea with very effective results. The surface ship phase of these operations was concentrated mainly in the Wonsan, Songjin and Chongjin areas. On the west coast, United Nations carrier-based aircraft interdiction operations were concentrated mainly in the Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Kaesong areas.

During the period of this report, the enemy repeatedly tried to interfere with United Nations bombardment activities in the Wonsan area by employing shorebased artillery against the bombardment ships. As fast as enemy batteries disclosed their positions by firing, they were silenced by United Nations Naval gunfire. The sixteen-inch guns of *USS New Jersey* were particularly effective in counter-battery.

Active and effective naval gunfire support of United Nations ground forces was furnished by the *New Jersey* along the east coast of Korea and by United Nations cruisers and destroyers.

Royal Marines from a British cruiser conducted an effective raid behind enemy lines on the west coast of Korea in the Chinnampo area. Covered by naval gunfire from United Nations surface vessels, the Royal Marines reconnoitered several villages in the area, destroyed enemy military installations and returned to their ship without casualties.

The usual numbers of drifting mines were sighted during the period of this report. Floating mines continue to be a serious menace to shipping everywhere in the Japan Sea and in Korea coastal waters. Check minesweeping operations continue on both coasts of Korea, mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment.

Troops, equipment and communications in the Chorwon-Pyongyang-Kumwha triangle formed the focal point of much of the United Nations air effort as ground forces approached and penetrated this critical area. USAF and Marine units, with planes of the South African Air Force, repeatedly attacked targets in and near the triangle, decreasing considerably the enemy's capability to resist.

The advancing ground forces received material assistance from aircraft operating in close support as napalm, machine-guns and bombs drove the enemy from organized defenses. The close integration of the air and ground efforts is responsible for the conservation of countless United Nations soldiers whose lives would be taken in rooting out an intrenched enemy. Despite many days of poor flying weather the front line soldiers have received fine support from all air units engaged in the United Nations operations.

Continued improving radar techniques for control of aircraft have resulted in increased air operations by night subjecting the enemy to destruction of equipment and harassment as he attempts to cloak his movements in darkness. Medium and light bombers are engaging in this type of attack. Fighters and light bombers are attacking by night, also, utilizing flares for illumination.

Airfields and communications targets north of the battle zone received attacks during the period. The hostile air effort remained localized in north-west Korea where Soviet-built jet airplanes engaged United Nations bombers and fighters on several occasions. Little damage was suffered by United Nations aircraft, as the toll of damaged and lost MIG-15 mounted.

There have been two changes in the air commands of the United Nations Forces. Lt. Gen. Otto Weyland has replaced Lt. Gen. George Stratemeier as the Senior Air Commander in the United Nations Command, and Major General Everest has replaced Lt. Gen. E. E. Partridge as Commander of the US 5th Air Force operating in Korea. To the two who have relinquished their commands, Generals Stratemeier and Partridge a high tribute must be paid for the contribution they have made to the United Nations cause.

Transfer of prisoners of war interned in enclosures of United Nations Prisoners of War camp number one in the Pusan area continued and by the end of May, over 117,000 prisoners of war were occupying enclosures of Kojedo island. To date information concerning over 155,000 enemy prisoners of war has been forwarded in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, 12 August 1949.

In conjunction with the United Nations drive northward, every available medium of information was used to focus the attention of soldiers on the significance of this latest failure of their Communist leaders. United Nations leaflets and news sheets, air-dropped along major supply and transport routes, and over key military centers from the international border south to the line of contact, tersely reported the grim facts of the Communist squandering of the lives of thousands of their soldiers. At the front, these leaflets were augmented by frequent loudspeaker broadcasts both from the ground and from aircraft, urging Chinese and North Korean soldiers to cross over

the United Nations side. Daily radio broadcasts brought the latest news to the Korean people on both sides of the battle line, and relayed to them important statements by various delegates to the General Assembly, setting forth United Nations objectives and principles, and discussing United Nations efforts for world peace.

SEVENTY-FOURTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 16-30, 1951¹

N. doc. S/2265
Transmitted July 28, 1951.

I herewith submit report number 24 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16 to 30 June, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiqués numbers 16-930 provide detailed account of these operations.

On the last day of this period, the United Nations Command repeatedly broadcast to the Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Forces in Korea a proposal that accredited representatives of each command meet on the Danish Hospital Ship *Outlandia* off the coast of Wonsan for the purpose of negotiating a cease-fire agreement. No reply had been made to the proposal by mid-night of 30 June. The full text of the radio message follows:

As Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, I have been instructed to communicate to you the following: I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed forces in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice. Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired, I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish Hospital Ship in Wonsan Harbor.

In mid June counterattacking United Nations ground forces were meeting increased resistance as noted in the previous report. As United Nations forces reached and occupied their main objectives, hostile forces from organized positions opposed advances with determination. United Nations patrols ranged forward of the main battle position to maintain firm contact, but relatively little aggressive action has been undertaken by either side.

On the western part of the front from Changdon to Kumhwa, United Nations combat patrols found the enemy alert, well organized, and determined. Along this fifty mile arc, the enemy appears to have achieved a considerable measure of defensive organization consisting of well-developed earthworks and a well-integrated series of anti-tank defenses covering the main approaches, including elaborate tank-traps, roadblocks, and minefields.

On the thirty-five mile portion of the central

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on July 28.

front extending from Kumhwa to the vicinity of Pia, hostile troops clung tenaciously to positions in the immediate vicinity of the United Nations lines throughout the period. Contacts were particularly frequent on a twelve mile sector from Kumhwa to Hudong. There the enemy displayed great sensitivity, stoutly resisted United Nations probing, and himself engaged in numerous small-unit probing efforts and moderate strength counterattacks. Due north of this from along the Kum-song-Changdo axis, sightings reveal that a rather extensive hostile buildup is in progress. Significant is a growing network of dumps and other supply installations established well forward, many within five miles of the United Nations front line.

A similar situation prevailed in the adjoining fifteen-mile sector immediately south of Changjaedae and Pia. Although contacts were less numerous little distance separated friendly and hostile lines. The enemy frequently probed United Nations positions and stoutly resisted all local small-scale United Nations attacks. Immediately to the north, along the Sangsogen-Mundung axis, several supply installations have been sighted.

Front lines at the close of the period were nearly identical with those of 16 June, except on the extreme flanks where the United Nations Forces advanced about four miles. Front lines ran generally northeast of Changdan to Chorwon and Kumhwa, eastward to Songhwangdang, and northeast to Phoang.

There was a slight increase in guerrilla activity and a considerable increase in guerrilla contacts in the Tanyang area of South Central Korea during June. These forces have been operating in larger units during the past few weeks, but their action appears to be uncoordinated, both among themselves and with respect to enemy operations on the front. Expanded operations to mark the anniversary of the war failed to materialize on 25 June although repeatedly called for in the North Korean propaganda broadcasts.

In general, the current pattern of enemy activity is identical with that which has preceded previous major offensives. Vigorous screening action, re-deployment of assault units, and logistic build-up in forward areas suggest that a renewed offensive may be in prospect. The enemy has had time to effect at least partial recovery from his defeat in May and is still capable of replacing depleted units with fresh forces. Prisoners of war repeatedly mention plans for the "Sixth Phase Offensive" bearing out the above indications.

United Nations Naval Forces continued to conduct the constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations which have denied to the enemy the use of Korean waters since the beginning of hostilities and which have assured the unrestricted movement of United Nations shipping to and from Korea. Increased surveillance of enemy boat and junk traffic resulted in the destruction or seizure of

numerous enemy small craft on both coasts of Korea.

United Nations carrier based and Marine shore based aircraft conducted both close air-support and interdiction operations with emphasis on the former, exacting a heavy toll of enemy personnel and equipment.

Surface units continued a daily campaign of interdiction by Naval gunfire against enemy road and rail crossings, tunnels, bridges, and troop and supply concentrations in the Wonsan, Songjin, and Chongjin areas with good results.

During the period of this report, opportunities were presented for Naval gunfire support of United Nations Ground Forces on the east coast of Korea. A heavy cruiser and destroyers were assigned to this mission and achieved gratifying results.

Check-minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea, particularly in the Wonsan area and in those areas where Naval gunfire support ships were in operation. Considerable numbers of drifting mines were sighted and destroyed during this period.

Increased enemy air activity during the period influenced the United States Far East Air Forces to place emphasis on counter-air operations. Medium bomber daylight effort was placed upon North Korean airfields to deny their use to the enemy. Daily attacks by the medium bombers supplemented by low level attacks by fighter bombers have rendered temporarily unserviceable all but three of the twenty-two enemy-held airfields south of the 40 Parallel. The B-29's, in addition, continued to obtain excellent results by night attacks on enemy-held positions in the battle area under the control of ground radar.

United States 5th Air Force light bomber and fighter units, including South African Air Force and land based United States Marine Forces, have taken over the entire interdiction campaign during the period, and F-80's have accomplished unusually effective attacks on rail and highway bridges. These units continued to render close support to United Nations Ground Forces, inflicting heavy enemy troop casualties and destroying quantities of his supplies.

Light bombers have been employed almost entirely on night operations against the enemy's convoys and trains and on patrols over enemy airfields.

On 20 June F-86 and F-51 fighters destroyed two, possibly three, and damaged two hostile ground-attack aircraft of a force which may have been attempting to launch the first combined air attack since the early days of the Communist invasion. F-86's and MIG 15's continued their combat almost daily in northwest Korea, the former taking a heavy toll of enemy jets. For the first time, the enemy enjoyed some success, destroying three, and damaging one F-86.

Some of the most spectacular and daring operations of the Korean conflict have been accomplished by detachment "F" of the United States Air Force Third Rescue Squadron which, in addition to medical evacuations of personnel of all branches of the United Nations Command, has effected, at great risk, over 500 rescues of personnel from behind enemy lines, often under heavy enemy fire.

Transport aircraft continued their extensive logistical support of combat units, the evacuation of medical patients, and transportation of personnel. A daily average of approximately 250 tons of ammunition was airlifted to forward airfields for United Nations Ground Units.

More than five million special leaflets were air dropped over enemy territory, to soldiers and to civilians, on the First Anniversary of the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea. These leaflets noted the terrible suffering and destruction brought upon the Korean people by Communist aggression during a year of tragedy and the reckless abandon with which the Communists have sacrificed their own soldiers in successive vain attempts to destroy the Forces of Freedom. These leaflets also placed particular emphasis on the deeds of the free members of the United Nations as offering better guidance for China's and Korea's welfare than the empty words of the Communist aggressors. Other United Nations leaflets, radio and loud speaker broadcasts continued to bring to the attention of enemy soldiers and the Korean people the true facts about the conflict. They are being reminded of the repeated efforts of the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire and to restore peace in Korea and of the repeated frustration of these efforts by Communist intransigence and continued aggression. United Nations media are pointing out the sharp contrast between Communist exploitation and United Nations friendship and between Communist imperialism and United Nations aid to Korea.

Armistice Negotiations in Korea

U.N. Communiqué of July 30

The fourteenth and lengthiest single session of the Kaesong military armistice conferences today recessed after three hours and eight minutes, with both sides holding firm to their views on item number two of the agenda, which deals with establishment of a demilitarized zone.

The United Nations senior delegate, Admiral Joy, in a series of prepared statements, made a detailed analysis, both of the Communist contentions as well as United Nations' position on the subject under discussion. He then once again invited comment by the Communists on the basic concept of the United Nations on the demilitarized zone "so that the final solution to this item may reflect our mutual views."

Shortly before noon, General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate, replying to an earlier clarifying statement by

Admiral Joy, stated it was also his definite understanding that hostilities would continue during the current armistice negotiations. The fifteenth session will meet tomorrow morning at 10 hours [9 p. m., July 30, eastern daylight time].

I. Communiqué of July 31

There was no perceptible change in the expressed viewpoints of the two delegations for item two on the agenda of the military armistice conference during the fifteenth session at Kaesong today.

The first half of today's session, which lasted one hour and 35 minutes, was devoted to a further effort by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy to clarify the United Nations position and the mutual benefit to be derived from acceptance of this view.

The latter portion of the session consisted of reiteration by the senior Communist delegate of his previously stated position.

No progress can be reported as a result of today's session.

The sixteenth session will be held tomorrow morning at 10 hours [9 p. m. July 31, eastern daylight time].

II. Communiqué of August 1

The sixteenth session of the military armistice conference failed to make progress toward an agreement on item number two of the agenda, the only substantive point thus far discussed. The basic views of both the U. N. Command and the communist delegation remained unchanged.

Admiral Joy, in an hour and 13 minute statement, made a detailed analysis and refutation of the Communist contentions. He again restated the U. N. Command's position with respect to the establishment of a realistic demilitarized zone, equitable to both belligerents.

The 17th session will be held tomorrow at 1100 hours [9 p. m. August 1, eastern daylight time].

III. Communiqué of August 2

Fundamental differences between the U. N. Command and Communist delegations on item number two of the agenda remained unresolved today at the close of the seventeenth session of the military armistice talks.

Admiral Joy, in a further effort to keep the negotiations focused on pertinent military matters, twice attempted to secure an expression of opinion from the senior Communist delegate on the basic responsibilities of military commanders to their respective forces during a military armistice. Neither time did General Nam Il respond directly.

At the Communist delegate's suggestion, the talks recessed at 1220 hours to be resumed tomorrow at 1100 hours [9 p. m. August 2, eastern daylight time].

IV. Communiqué of August 3

No progress was made during the eighteenth session of the military armistice conference on a mutually acceptable solution of item two on the agenda.

In a brief opening statement of the morning Admiral Joy emphasized that the U. N. Command would not relinquish its military defensive positions "to satisfy political desires to subdivide Korea."

The senior Communist delegate then spoke for nearly two hours attempting to justify his previously expressed view that the military demarcation line should be fixed along a parallel of latitude rather than following significant terrain features which are militarily important to the security of the U. N. forces.

In the closing statement of the day, Admiral Joy proposed several searching questions in an effort to establish

the general attitude of the Communist delegation towards a truly military armistice and the resultant ceasefire.

The conference will convene tomorrow at 1100 hours [9 p. m. August 3, eastern daylight time].

U.N. Communiqué August 4¹

[Excerpt]

. . . The nineteenth military armistice conference reconvened at 1400 [12 midnight August 3, eastern daylight time]. . . . In an extremely brief afternoon session Admiral Joy formally noted for the record "a violation of the Kaesong neutral zone."

The Chinese military formation carried automatic weapons, mortar, and grenades in addition to small arms consisting of rifles and pistols.

An investigation was promised by the Communists.

The twentieth session will be held tomorrow morning at 1100 hours [9 p. m. August 4, eastern daylight time].

Message from the U.N. Commander to the Communist Delegates, August 5

The following message was broadcast by General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces, over the Armed Forces Radio Service at 6 a. m., August 5 (4 p. m. August 4, eastern daylight time):

Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai:

It has been officially verified by witnesses, confirmed with still and movie photography, that on or about 1345 hours 4 August, armed military forces not belonging to the United Nations Command were observed in Kaesong and within approximately 100 yards of the conference house.

These forces, approximating an infantry company, were proceeding in an easterly direction on foot and were armed with rifles, pistols, grenades, automatic weapons and mortars.

Your attention is invited to the following—on the 13th of July I broadcast a message addressed to you which contained the following passage:

The assurances which I required are simple and few. They include as primary prerequisites the establishment of an agreed conference area of suitable extent completely free of armed personnel of either side.²

In the same message I stated:

I therefore now propose that a circular area with its center approximately at the center of Kaesong and with a five-mile radius be agreed upon as a neutral zone. The eastern limit of the neutral zone shall be the present point of contact of our forces at Panmunjon. I propose that we both agree to refrain from any hostile acts within this zone during the entire period of our conference and that roads leading there to be used by personnel of both delegations' parties be completely free of armed personnel.

On the 14th of July you broadcast a reply to me to this message which stated among other things:

We have received the proposition dated 13 July and have agreed to make Kaesong the neutral zone as you have proposed.³

I now invite your attention to this flagrant violation of the assurances which I required and which you promised. The United Nations Command delegation is prepared to continue conversations as soon as a satisfactory explanation of this violation and assurance of a non-recurrence are received.

Meanwhile, the United Nations Command delegation will remain within the United Nations line. I await your reply.

¹ The full text of this communiqué was not available as the BULLETIN went to press.

² BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 152.

³ BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 153.

Communist Delegates' Reply to the U.N. Commander, August 6

The following message was broadcast over the Pyongyang radio at 6:30 a. m. August 6 (4:30 p. m. August 6, eastern daylight time):

We have received your communication.

At 3 p. m. Aug. 4, a formation of our guards who are responsible for patrolling the Kaesong area entered by mistake the conference area carrying inappropriate arms in violation of our agreement.

At 9:30 a. m. Aug. 5, our senior delegate ordered his liaison officer, Chang Ping-shang, to inform [*sic*] the cir-

cumstances surrounding the present violation of our agreement and to inform you.

At the same time our senior delegate gave warning our guards patrolling the Kaesong area not to enter the conference zone and strictly ordered them to obey his instructions so that such an incident may not arise again.

In order to prevent an interruption of the conference through such accidents, we have ordered our guards the Kaesong area to observe strictly our agreement July 13 and to take measures so there will be no repetition of such an incident.

We request you to order your delegation to come Kaesong to continue the negotiations following receipt of our answer.

Amendment to Resolution on the Ewe Problem Introduced

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FRANCIS B. SAYRE, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE IN THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL¹

My delegation is glad to be associated with the delegations of the Dominican Republic and Thailand in introducing the amendment to the Anglo-French draft resolution on the Ewe problem which is now before the Council.² Before entering into an explanation of the more important provisions of this amendment, may I make a few general observations with respect to this difficult and long-standing problem?

First, I should like to say that my Government is deeply concerned in the problem of the Ewes and of the peoples of the two Togolands. It believes that this problem is among the most important problems with which the Council has been confronted. I am certain that the Council shares the opinion of my delegation that there is one cardinal principle which must guide the Council in its efforts to assist in arriving at a fair and wise solution of the problem. This principle is that any solution must accord with the wishes and desires of the peoples directly concerned, that is, the peoples of the two Togolands. Herein lies the core of the present difficulty. My delegation, after the most careful study and consideration, has failed to find any convincing evidence that at this time there exists any single definitive and clear-cut solution which would reconcile the conflicting points of view which exist among the peoples of the two territories or even gain the concurrence of a majority of them. If this be true, it seems clear that at the present time any attempt by the Council to reach a long term, definitive settlement

of the question would not only be premature but also dangerous and not in the best interests of the inhabitants themselves.

My delegation believes, therefore, that the Council should concentrate upon finding the most constructive measure which can be taken at this time in order to move forward toward an ultimate solution. After a careful review and study of all factors of the situation, my delegation has reached the conclusion that action along the lines of the joint amendment submitted by the Dominican Republic, Thailand, and the United States would constitute the most constructive practical step forward which can be taken at the present time.

Before deciding to associate itself with the delegations of the Dominican Republic and Thailand in introducing the amendment, my delegation gave the most careful consideration to the draft resolution introduced by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom. It reluctantly reached the conclusion, however, that the adoption of the resolution in its present form would not be the wisest action which the Council could take at the present juncture. One of the objections of my delegation to the Anglo-French draft resolution is the limited scope of responsibilities of the proposed Joint Council. The establishment of a Joint Council is, in the opinion of my delegation, an imaginative and constructive step forward towards a final solution of this problem. It seems to my Government, however, that the effectiveness of such a Council would be substantially lessened if it is not empowered to function in the political field. Almost every economic problem has its political aspects. Conversely, almost every political problem has its economic aspects. How could it be possible to determine, therefore, whether a problem was primarily economic, and thus fell within the purview of the Joint Council, or primarily political and thus outside its scope of authority? My delegation is convinced that in order for the

¹ Made in the Trusteeship Council on July 24 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

² See BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951, p. 128, and BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1951, p. 509.

Joint Council to be an effective means of working towards a solution of the problem its scope of responsibilities must be broadened to include all matters of common concern to the inhabitants of the two trust territories, as is provided for in the Dominican Republic-Thailand-United States amendment.

We strongly hope that it will be possible for the two administering authorities to proceed immediately with their plans to establish the proposed joint council. We also hope that the Council when constituted will be able to speak in behalf of the whole population of the two Togolands. We therefore urge all groups to cooperate with the administering authorities in their establishment of the Joint Council. We also urge the administering authorities to proceed with the implementation of their plans for its establishment in such a way as to provide all groups in the two territories with a fair and reasonable opportunity to be represented on it. It is only by making the Joint Council fully representative of the Togoland people that it can provide an effective means of working towards a final solution of this problem.

My delegation hopes, therefore, that the Council will approve the draft amendment which we have submitted in conjunction with the Delegations of the Dominican Republic and Thailand.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL ADOPTS RESOLUTION ON EWE QUESTION

Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information July 24]

The Trusteeship Council, meeting under the chairmanship of Awni Khalidy (Iraq), this afternoon adopted—by 10 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions (Iraq, U.S.S.R.)—a joint Anglo-French resolution on the Ewe problem, as amended by the Dominican Republic, Thailand, the United States, and Argentina.

The operative part of this resolution, among other matters:

Approves the Administering Authorities' proposal to establish a Joint Council to advise them on matters of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories—including, in particular, the Ewe problem;

Recommends that the Administering Authorities proceed with their plans immediately to establish this Joint Council;

Recommends that the scope of responsibilities of this Council be sufficiently broad to enable it to exercise its functions with respect to all questions of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories, and including questions of political, economic, social, educational, and cultural development;

Recommends that the method of determining the composition and selection of the Council's members be such as to ensure, if possible, the participation of the major groups of the two Territories; and

Urges all elements of the population of the Territories to cooperate in the establishment and operation of the Joint Council.

TEXT OF EWE RESOLUTION³

T/936
July 25, 1951

The Trusteeship Council,
Recalling its resolution 306 (VIII) of 9 March 1951 on the Ewe question;

Having considered in this connection various petitions submitted by different groups, parties and individuals to the Trusteeship Council, which are listed in the annex to this resolution;

Notes with interest the Anglo-French memorandum regarding the Ewe and Allied Petitions (T/931 and T/931/Add.1) submitted to the Trusteeship Council by the two Administering Authorities in response to Resolution 306 (VIII) of 9 March 1951;

Concurs with the view of the two Administering Authorities expressed in their Joint Memorandum that there would seem to be no reason for continuing the existence of the Consultative Commission;

Approves the proposal of the Administering Authorities to establish a Joint Council composed of representatives from Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under United Kingdom Administration to advise the two Administering Authorities on matters of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories [including in particular the Ewe problem];

Recommends that the two Administering Authorities proceed with their plans immediately to establish such a Joint Council in order that it may have functioned for a sufficient period of time for the United Nations Visiting Mission to the West African Trust Territories in 1952 to form an evaluation of its accomplishments;

Recommends that the two Administering Authorities ensure that the scope of responsibilities of the proposed Joint Council be sufficiently broad to enable it to exercise its functions with respect to all questions of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories, including questions of political, economic, social, educational, and cultural development;

Recommends that the method of determining the composition and selecting the members of the Joint Council be such as to ensure, if possible, the participation of the major groups in the two Territories;

Urges all elements of the population of the two Trust Territories to cooperate in the establishment and operation of the Joint Council in order that the Joint Council's decisions may fully reflect the views of all concerned;

Requests the two Administering Authorities to report as soon as possible on the action taken pursuant to this resolution.

[*Re-affirms* its recommendation of 14 July 1950 in which the Council recommended to the Administering Authorities concerned to take all necessary and appropriate measures in order to ensure that, until a definite settlement was reached, the common traits and traditions of the Ewe people in the two Trust Territories be preserved.]

³The text of the resolution as passed is identical with the amendment introduced by the Dominican Republic, Thailand, and the United States with the addition of the passages enclosed in brackets.

The United States in the United Nations

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue, but will be resumed in the issue of August 20.

Implementing the Atlantic Pact

By Thomas D. Cabot

Director for International Security Affairs¹

... The major objective of the North Atlantic Treaty may be stated very simply. We want to prevent war, and if war comes, we want to win it. I always like to emphasize the dual nature of this objective. Although we will fight to preserve our freedom, our primary purpose is to preserve peace. We must, of course, act in such a way as to take full advantage of every reasonable and honorable opportunity for peace. At the same time, we must make certain that we will not be caught napping if the Soviet dictatorship, despite our efforts to maintain peace, chooses to launch a new world war.

There is no foreign policy that can provide an ironclad guarantee of either peace or victory. All we can do is to consider the alternative courses of action, choosing those which seem to offer the best prospects of success and avoiding those in which the risk is excessively great. We can be sure that there are certain things which will assist neither in maintaining peace nor in protecting our security. The first is appeasement. There is no need for me to recite the tragic fate of nations which have tried to keep the wolf from the door by opening up the family larder whenever he howled. Appeasement inevitably leads to war, and to war on the most disadvantageous terms. In this connection, I think it is useful to point out that, in the kind of world we face today, the most dangerous and the most shortsighted form that appeasement could take would be a policy of isolation. Anyone who suggests that the United States should think of itself alone and permit other friendly nations to be gobbled up by aggressors is, in fact, proposing that the United States make appeasement the very cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Second, we know we cannot preserve peace by going to the opposite extreme and adopting a

"chip on the shoulder" attitude. If we should become belligerent or hypersensitive and determine to fight at the drop of a hat, it would be very difficult to maintain peace. Our task is to steer a firm patient middle course, heeding neither those who cry "peace at any price" on the one hand, nor those who, on the other hand, seem incapable of distinguishing between honest compromise and slavish appeasement. Meanwhile, we must be alert to every opportunity to take positive steps which will advance our aims.

Fortunately, there is one fundamental approach which offers us simultaneously the greatest hope for preventing war and the best chance of victory if war comes. This approach, expressed simply, is to build and maintain the total strength of the free world. If sufficient strength can be created, and can be created fast enough, there is reason to believe that the Soviet Union may be discouraged from launching a military attack. This does not mean, of course, that the men in the Kremlin could be expected to banish completely, on the spur of the moment, their dreams of world domination. But if we can achieve an indefinite delay in Soviet aggression, there is a good possibility that it will never occur. The strains and stresses affecting tyrannies, although deceptively hidden, are enormous, and these strains are more acute because tyrannies cannot permit the public criticism and discussion which makes possible the rational correction of excesses. They are boilers without safety valves. Purges may strengthen the plates, but do not reduce the pressure inside. In the long run, therefore, time is always on the side of free men if free men are also careful to remain strong.

The building and maintenance of strength among the nations of the North Atlantic community—the very heart of the free world—is the broad objective of our efforts to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. Because of the present military weakness of these nations, and because of the proven willingness of international communism to use military force in carrying out its

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Colgate University Conference on American Foreign Policy, Hamilton, N. Y., on July 24 and released to the press on the same date.

signs, our primary immediate purpose is to develop our mutual defensive power.

The United States and its allies must build adequate armies, navies, and air forces. We must make sure that these forces are properly trained. We must provide them with the expensive weapons which are required to resist military attack in the modern world. We must establish strong defense bases. We must develop the productive facilities which will provide a continuing flow of supplies and equipment to our defense forces. In doing all these things, however, we must be constantly aware that Communist imperialism has several strings to its bow, and is always ready to take advantage of any political or economic weakness which may develop in free societies. It is just as necessary to avoid Communist political conquest as it is to deter Soviet military adventures, and we cannot sacrifice economic and social stability in our effort to create military strength. Let me now review the major problems which we face in endeavoring to implement the North Atlantic Treaty.

Moreover, despite much misleading information to the contrary, taxes are already high throughout Europe. In the United Kingdom, taxation takes nearly 34 percent of the total gross national product, in France 27 percent, in Norway 32 percent, in the Netherlands 28 percent, as contrasted with approximately 24 percent in the United States.

All told, Western Europe cannot devote either the same amount or the same percentage of its income to defense purposes that we do without endangering a ruinous inflation, driving living standards below the subsistence level, and destroying the European defense program altogether.

Psychological Obstacles to Cooperation

The psychological attitudes of the European people represent a third major problem area. The sudden collapse in the last war, the lengthy period of occupation and the painful process of slow recovery all combined to cause widespread defeatism in Europe. Also, Europe has its own breed of isolationists, who mistakenly regard the present world struggle as essentially a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and who naively believe that it would be possible for Western Europe to remain neutral in the event of a global war. Finally, there are a few Europeans who are suspicious of United States motives and who fear that North Atlantic cooperation threatens the sovereign independence of their nations.

All these attitudes are distinctly minority attitudes, and are rapidly diminishing in force as Europe becomes stronger and its capacity to protect itself increases. However, they are still sufficiently strong in certain quarters to represent a definite obstacle to a fully effective defense program. The Communists do everything possible to exploit these attitudes and it would be a serious mistake

for us to ignore them or lightly adopt policies which might stimulate their growth.

A fourth major problem is the development of machinery and procedures by which the 12 sovereign countries of NATO can work together effectively. It is always difficult for a number of independent nations to carry on a joint enterprise and achieve quick results.

On the whole, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has worked surprisingly well. This may be attributed to the fact that the fundamental community of interest and the overwhelming sense of urgency among the NATO nations have repeatedly overridden differences on secondary issues. Even so, neither the North Atlantic Council nor any of its subsidiary bodies possess the power to make binding decisions, and agreements can be reached only through the slow process of negotiating unanimity among the members.

It is perhaps a recognition of this difficulty which has recently prompted a renewed interest in the problem of European unity both here and abroad. On this point, I wish to say only that the United States Government has constantly supported all practicable approaches to the achievement of closer European integration and will continue to do so. At the same time, it would be a mistake to believe that this problem can be easily solved or that European unity, even if achieved, would be a panacea for all ills.

All of the foregoing problems are formidable. However, we have already proved that they do not represent unsurmountable obstacles. Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, a great deal has been accomplished. Let us look at some of the things that have been done.

Complex Nature of Modern War

Our first problem has to do with the complex requirements for defense in modern warfare. All the nations of the North Atlantic community, including our own country, started at a rather low point in beginning the current military build-up. To some extent this may be attributed to the fact that the North Atlantic nations rapidly demobilized their military forces in the early post-war years while the Soviet Union did not. However, it is well not to exaggerate the significance of this factor in explaining the present situation. We must remember that organized armed forces in several allied nations had totally ceased to exist during the war and had to be rebuilt from scratch. Even more important is the fact that the requirements of modern war have changed considerably.

Many people do not realize that the nations of Western Europe at this moment have on active duty the same number of armed forces that they had in 1938 and 1939. Why, then, do we need to do more? There are two reasons.

Before the last war, nations tended to judge their armed strength in terms of the troops which could be mobilized within a reasonable period of time. Reserve strength is less decisive today, since the techniques of blitz warfare have made it necessary to possess an adequate number of active troops. Also, the armed forces of the free European nations lack the equipment which is essential to effective fighting power, and equipment for reserve forces in many cases is totally nonexistent. Thus, the North Atlantic nations require more troops than they had in 1939, and these troops must be better equipped.

Our second major problem results from the economic and financial limitations upon the efforts of our European allies. Potentially, the nations of free Europe possess a great deal of economic strength, so much, in fact, that their conquest or absorption by the Soviet Union would throw the world economic and industrial balance against the United States. However, by American standards, the economic capabilities of our NATO allies have always been low, and World War II created additional economic difficulties from which these nations have not yet fully recovered. They have indeed achieved a sufficient level of recovery to permit them to undertake already a substantial defense effort, and the magnitude of this defense effort is being gradually expanded. However, it would be foolhardy to ignore the upper limitations beyond which they can go only at the risk of economic collapse.

The economic limitations of Western Europe can best be understood by reference to a few figures. During the current fiscal year, the total gross national product of all the European NATO nations, with their 170 million people, will be less than one-third the gross national product of the United States with its 150 million people.

The full significance of this disparity of income can be appreciated only if considered in terms of the living standards of individual citizens. Thus, the total output of Western Europe would provide only \$597 per capita in the average European country as contrasted with \$2,143 in the United States. The per capita income in certain particular countries is even lower. The average Italian, for example, has an income of only \$25 per month, while food prices in Italy are approximately 80 percent of what they are in the United States.

Progress Made Under NATO

We have steadily improved the machinery for cooperative planning and collective action. Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we have developed instruments through which the member countries cannot only reach agreement on broad policies, but can also work together effectively in solving specific financial, economic, and production problems.

In the military field there have been unique achievements in collective action, the most important of which has been the establishment of an integrated force for the defense of Western Europe under the command of General Eisenhower.

The armed forces available for active duty in Europe have increased both in size and effectiveness. These forces are better equipped than they were 2 years ago and are also better trained. Within the last year, nearly every member of NATO has increased its period of compulsory military service.

The defense budgets of our European allies today are about 80 percent higher than they were in 1949, and will continue to increase in the future.

Military production in Western Europe has doubled since the outbreak of Korean hostilities and is expected to rise rapidly during the coming year.

Last but not least, there has been a steady improvement in the morale and determination of the European peoples. The will to resist has grown in almost direct proportion to the increasing capacity to resist, and the continued evidence of America's determination to stand by its allies has dealt a powerful blow to neutralist sentiment.

Much, of course, remains to be done if we are to achieve the objective of peace and security. The problems which I have outlined indicate clearly that our European allies cannot do this job alone and that substantial assistance from the United States will be necessary to permit them to make an optimum contribution to our common defense program.

This assistance is provided for in the Mutual Security Program which the President recently submitted to the Congress.² The President's proposal covers both military assistance in the form of vital defense weapons and direct economic assistance to enable the Europeans to expand their military production and to maintain economic stability while undergoing the strain of their increased defense effort.

Of all the problems which we face in implementing the North Atlantic Treaty, perhaps the most important is to maintain continued understanding and support of the Mutual Security Program on the part of the American people. In every real sense, the crucial area in the present world conflict is right here at home; the fate of Western civilization may depend in the long run upon the minds and hearts of the men and women of the United States. Moreover, the maintenance of this vital understanding and support is a task which cannot be left to governmental officials; it can be performed effectively only by people like yourselves.

I believe the great majority of our people are ready to understand and support the basic principles of the Mutual Security Program. But much careful and painstaking explanation still needs to be

² BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 883.

e in order to clear up misconceptions and false
pressions.

ome of our citizens continue to regard Europe
something very far away and see no direct con-
tion between Europe's security and their own
ety. A few of these people lightly assume that
merica can lick the world" and do not realize
overwhelming odds we would face if the entire
stern Hemisphere should fall under the domina-
n of the Soviet imperialists. Nor do they stop
think that even victory under such circum-
nces would involve a fearful price in suffering,
truction, and death.

ut this group is a distinct minority. A more
icult problem is posed by the people who rec-
ize the importance of Europe to our own secur-
y, but who nevertheless feel vaguely that the
uropeans are uncooperative, that the United
tes is doing too much for Europe, that the
ited States Government fails to drive sharp
ugh bargains with its allies, etc. It is this
up which is inclined to support the imposition
a variety of harsh conditions on foreign aid
l to insist that unless the Europeans meet these
ditions, we should cut off our assistance and
ort. In brief, they demand that the United
tes "get tough" with Europe.

Now, this point of view is essentially correct in
e respect. In terms of the total strength needed
deter Soviet aggression, the nations of Western
urope are not yet doing enough. They them-
ves know this and are increasing their efforts
ordingly. Meanwhile, there are certain things
hich we Americans need to keep in mind about
e American role in NATO and our relations with
r allies.

In the first place, we have to remember that
ese countries are independent nations with demo-
atic institutions and national sensitivities very
ch like our own. The United States doesn't
ve satellites and doesn't want satellites. We
nt free, independent, and courageous partners.
e must deal with our European allies as equals
d treat them with the respect which we our-
ves demand.

In the second place, we need to remember that
e implementation of NATO is a joint enterprise
d that we are fully as interested in its success as
e Europeans are.

Just as there are people in this country who ask
y we should send soldiers and guns to help
urope, there are people in Europe who ask why
ey should die to defend the United States.

Both groups are badly off the beam. The whole
rogram is based on the solid principle that the
ly way any of us can protect ourselves is to
protect one another.

S. Stake in European Security

There have been occasions in which our govern-
ent has given assistance to foreign peoples pri-

marily for humanitarian reasons. I personally
hope that the American people never lose the
humanitarian instinct which prompted such gifts.
However, let us not deceive ourselves by the belief
that the Mutual Assistance Program represents a
gift from the United States to the Europeans. It
is an investment in our own security—an invest-
ment by which we can achieve a greater addition to
our own strength than by spending the money in
any other conceivable manner. The Europeans
know this as well as we do, and it would be pre-
sumptuous and foolish for us to take the attitude
that our contribution to North Atlantic defense
is a one-way proposition.

Next let's remember that our own best interests
are not served by demands that Europe exceed
the limits of its real capabilities. There is not
much point in "getting tough" with a turnip
simply because it refuses to become a blood donor.
When a nation has truly approached its economic
limits, withholding American aid could only have
the effect of reducing its effort still further and
thereby weakening the total defense capacity of
the free world.

Moreover, if European nations should under-
take an effort substantially beyond their true
capabilities, the economic health which is the very
foundation of effective strength would collapse.
As a result of such collapse, the Communists might
be able to achieve through political means a
cheaper and quicker victory than they could ever
achieve through armed force.

I don't want to imply that we should fail to
use our influence with the Europeans to encourage
them to a maximum defense effort, nor am I say-
ing that there should be no conditions attached
to foreign aid. We have already made it clear
to our allies and to the American Congress that
the distribution of aid must be related to the
magnitude and the requirements of each nation's
defense effort. My point is simply that we must
use an intelligent, businesslike approach in deal-
ing with the European governments, recognizing
the effective limits to which successful negotiations
may be carried.

The United States has always been a nation
of horse traders, and there is still a place for
horse trading in international relations. I am con-
cerned only that we do not become enmeshed in
a prolonged argument about who gets the bridle
and the saddle while someone runs away with
the horse.

A final consideration which we Americans must
ever keep in mind is the need for patience and
endurance. It is not easy to live for a long period
of time in a state of unbroken international ten-
sion. In such circumstances, we are constantly
tempted by the illusion that we can afford to relax
our efforts, on the one hand, and are frequently
impelled, on the other, to take ill-considered
precipitate action.

A war of nerves, unpleasant as it is, is infinitely

better than a war of blood. As our understanding of the world situation becomes clearer, I am confident that the endless series of bold advances and cautious retreats which constitute the trademark of Communist world strategy will neither lull us to sleep nor stimulate us to irrational frenzy.

Meanwhile, there must be no let-up in America's own effort. We have not yet achieved the level of mobilization required, and already there are signs that the brighter prospects in the Far East are being misinterpreted by some as an indication that we can cut back the National Defense Program. I don't need to tell a group like this how absurd such a notion is. A victory which we use as a sleeping pill would be no victory at all.

I do not know how long the present world crisis will last. It would be pleasant to be able to say that, at some predictable date in the near future, we will be able to throw off our defense burdens. But I cannot honestly say this.

The test of our patience and endurance may be a long test. While the European aid program can taper off when the present military build-up is completed, I believe the free peoples of the world will be required, for many years to come, to remain alert to the dangers of aggression and steadfast in our efforts to maintain an impregnable political, economic, and military defense.

But I repeat my conviction that time is on our side, provided we are willing to cooperate with time. The Mutual Security program represents the most effective method by which we can make sure that time remains our firm ally. In combination with the increase in our national defensive power, this program is the best way that we can preserve peace, security, and freedom—perhaps the only way.

It is not a cheap program, and it is not an easy program to carry out, but it is far cheaper and easier than any conceivable alternative.

And we must remember that our lives and our freedom are at stake, and that these things have never been cheap. As Thomas Paine once said:

Heaven knows how to put a price on her treasures, and it would have been strange indeed if she had undervalued so precious a commodity as freedom.

Two Meetings of NAC Announced

[Released to the press August 3]

Two meetings of the North Atlantic Council will be held this autumn, it was announced August 3 by Paul van Zeeland, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Council.

Prior to the ordinary annual session, which is to convene in Rome at the end of October, a meeting of the Council will be held in Ottawa on September 15 to consider such problems as may be ready for discussion or action by the Council at that time.

NATO Progresses Toward Real Atlantic Security

*Statement by Ambassador Charles M. Spofford, Deputy U.S. Representative, North Atlantic Council*¹

Two years ago the United States Senate proved ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. By its terms, 12 sovereign nations agreed to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

I should like to tell you something about NATO and some of the things it has already achieved in this short time.

There have been many alliances in the past which nations have agreed in principle to aid each other if attacked. There have been some in which advanced planning has taken place. But NATO is the first security pact where collective forces have been forged into a combined army, navy, and air force in peacetime. It is NATO's job to make sure that these combined defense forces are adequate, and that they are supported by planned production to equip and to maintain them.

However, NATO is not a supranational state. It has no delegated power. It must act through the agreement of its members.

The key to progress toward Atlantic security therefore, lies largely in the scope and rate of acceleration of defense programs of the member states themselves. NATO is the central nervous system which energizes and coordinates the body; the sinews and muscle must come from individual national efforts.

What can be said of progress to date? Let me give you two illustrations.

First, every NATO country contributing to General Eisenhower's army has increased its period of military service during the past year. These increases marked extremely important steps towards forging an effective defense.

Second, the aggregate defense budgets of the NATO countries are over two and one half times what they were before the Korean war. Every NATO country has called upon its citizens to make sacrifices for the common cause. And we must remember that these sacrifices were called for from our European allies at a time when they were just beginning to recover from the ravages of World War II. These steps have been and are being taken in an atmosphere of growing mutual confidence that a successful defense can be achieved.

Much of this increased confidence stems from the leadership of General Eisenhower. It has been only four months since General Eisenhower took command of SHAPE. In that period key command appointments have been made, permanent headquarters erected, and troops assigned to General Eisenhower's command.

¹ Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television News on July 27 and released to the press on the same date.

another vital factor has been the actual delivery of American military equipment to the constantly increasing numbers of NATO troops in the field. American equipment, supplied under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, is a symbol that "arsenal of democracy" is once more at work. Evidence of this was the military parade in Paris on July 14. New weapons and new divisions were displayed before an enthusiastic audience. The revival of the French spirit is fully as important as that of the French Army and it is good to see it both appearing again.

We are now actively in the period of building up our forces. In effect we are paying up the back premiums on an insurance policy for defense. These premiums are in the form of investment in production capacities, in tanks, planes, and guns, in the man-hours of the young men going into training camps. Once this policy is paid up, we will be in a position to receive the dividends of security from attack. Then, and only then, will we be in a position to devote national income to purposes other than those forced upon us by the Soviet menace to the free world.

The tasks which still lie ahead of NATO are a challenge to the intellectual and spiritual resources of the free world. Our material resources are fully superior to those in the Soviet orbit. The challenge lies in the use we make of our assets. Sharing of technical skills, the increase in productivity, the mobilization of military strength for all tasks which call for determination, and cooperation of the highest order.

With the will to work hard and to work together there is reason, I believe, to have faith in our progress toward real Atlantic security.

Germany and India To Be Represented on Sulphur Committee of IMC

[Released to the press by IMC July 22]

The International Materials Conference announced today that Germany and India have accepted its invitation to be represented on the Sulphur Committee.

This brings to 13 the number of countries now represented on this Committee. They are Australia, Belgium (representing BENELUX), Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Federal Republic of Germany will nominate its representative very soon. Dr. Kurt Hoerl, meanwhile will be acting representative.

The Indian representative on the Committee will be H. A. Sujana, director of the India Supply

Mission at Washington, and his alternate M. B. Shankar, deputy director of the India Supply Mission.

Japan Becomes Member of IMC Committees

[Released to the press by IMC July 11]

The International Materials Conference announced today that Japan has accepted its invitation to be represented on the Pulp-Paper Committee.

The Japanese Government has designated Takio Oda of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tokyo, as its representative. Mr. Oda is presently in Washington as Chief of the Japanese Section of the SCAP-Japanese Allocations and Procurement Mission.

This brings to 14 the number of countries represented on the Pulp-Paper Committee. They are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Japan is also a member of the Cotton-Cotton Linters Committee. Announcement of her membership into this Committee and into the International Materials Conference was made on June 17.

U.S. Proposes ECOSOC Consider Restrictive Business Practices

[Released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N., July 13]

The United States Government has proposed that the question of restrictive business practices be taken up by the Economic and Social Council at its forthcoming meeting at Geneva. This proposal is in line with a national antitrust policy of many years standing. It is also in line with international objectives, aimed at reducing barriers to international trade, which have been set forth many times since the end of World War II and which have been widely discussed in the business community. In short, this is a new step in pursuance of long-established policy.

The United States is convinced that the facts will show that monopolistic practices on an international scale can and do keep prices unduly high; accentuate inflationary pressures; hold real wages down; retard the modernization and productivity of industry; and increase the cost of economic development in under developed countries.

Since the war, the United States, in collabora-

tion with many other countries, has engaged in numerous efforts to stimulate the commerce and industry of every country through the lowering of trade barriers. This was the object and effect of the trade agreements concluded under the General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (GATT) at Geneva, Ancey, and Torquay. This was the object and effect of the creation of the European Payments Union. The ends sought not only of the United States but of many other countries, therefore, would be defeated if private cartel arrangements were allowed to interpose restrictions which stunt industrial and commercial growth.

Many of the private arrangements which restrict trade extend beyond the jurisdiction of any one country. International collaboration therefore is necessary in order that effective action may be taken against them. While much already is being done within the United Nations on the subject of governmental barriers to the international movement of goods, there is at present no consideration of the problem created by private cartels. The United States considers it highly important that this subject also be examined by the United Nations.

There are many indications that other industrialized countries have, since the war, come to the view that the undesirable effects of private business restrictions must be eliminated. For example, the western European governments have included in the Schuman Plan strong provisions against cartel and monopoly restraints in the coal and steel industries. Certain countries of Western Europe have adopted, or are considering, legislation against the abuses of cartels.

In initiating this discussion in the Economic and Social Council, the United States hopes that the international community will discover the form of international action which will best promote competition, as against restrictionism, in the production and distribution of goods. The United States looks forward to the creation of international machinery which can be instrumental in achieving this end.

U.N. Representative Arrives in Karachi

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information July 17]

Dr. Frank P. Graham, United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, together with his principal secretary, Petrus J. Schmidt, and his military adviser, Gen. Jacob L. Devers, and three assistants, arrived in Karachi today from Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Earlier, the party had traveled by road from Srinagar, Kashmir, to Rawalpindi, visiting United Nations military observer teams on both sides of the cease-fire line while enroute.

On 13 July, the Graham party stopped at the Baramula Division, where they were met by the Indian Army divisional commanding general. Then, at Uri, they visited a United Nations observer group headquarters. Crossing the cease-fire line in the vicinity of Uri in United Nations jeeps, they were met on the other side by Maj. Gen. S. M. Afzal of the Pakistan Army. At Domel, the party was greeted by a guard of honor. Then they visited the United Nations observer group headquarters in Domel.

Arriving at Rawalpindi late on 13 July, the party conferred the next day with the Pakistani Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani. On 15 July, the party toured the Rawalpindi area, and on 16 July they visited Western Kashmir, going to Muzaffarabad through Murree and returning through Abbottabad. At Muzaffarabad, they met with Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, supreme head of the Azad Kashmir movement, and other Azad Kashmir officials.

Returning to Rawalpindi, the group went today to Karachi.

THE DEPARTMENT

Loyalty Security Board Clears John Paton Davies, Jr.

[Released to the press July 30]

The Department of State announced on July 30 that Foreign Service Officer John Paton Davies, Jr., had been cleared by its Loyalty Security Board and returned to active duty. Deputy Under Secretary Carlisle H. Humelsine stated that he had reviewed the findings of the Board and expressed his conviction that the Board's decision was fully and unequivocally supported by the evidence. Mr. Humelsine also stated that he is in full accord with the Board's recommendation that Davies be restored to duty.

Mr. Davies' suspension has been rescinded and he has been reinstated without prejudice and with the full confidence of the Department.

The Department of State's Loyalty Security Board is under the chairmanship of Gen. Cornelius E. Snow, able and experienced New England lawyer. The Board's actions are taken independently of the normal supervisory channels in the Department since it is the Department's contention that a fair and impartial adjudication of a loyalty security case can be assured only if the Board is so constituted. Adjudications of the Board on loyalty matters are subject to post-audit by the

Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.

Mr. Davies, who is about to complete his twentieth year of governmental service as a Foreign Service officer, is one of the Department's outstanding foreign affairs officers.

Mr. Davies has resumed his duties on the Policy Planning Staff awaiting his next assignment abroad in conformity with requirements limiting domestic tours of duty of Foreign Service officers. Mr. Davies' domestic tour of duty will expire next month. He will then be assigned to the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, John J. Cloy, the assignment Davies was scheduled for in spring by the Assignments Board of the Foreign Service.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Offices

An American consulate was established at Kuwait, Kuwait, on June 27, 1951.

Appointment of Officers

Capt. William Jackson Galbraith, United States Navy, Naval Attaché and Naval Attaché for Air to the American Embassy at Oslo, Norway.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

United States Treaty Developments: Sixth Release. Pub. 2851. 255 pp.

A documented looseleaf reference service providing periodically up-to-date information on the status of international agreements entered into by the United States.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2198. Pub. 4146. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nepal—signed at New Delhi Jan. 23, 1951; entered into force Jan. 23, 1951.

United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950. International Organization and Conference Series III, 67. Pub. 4178. xviii, 429 pp. \$1.

Annual report on the activities of the United Nations and on the participation of the United States therein.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2217. Pub. 4180. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Australia—effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington Feb. 1 and 20, 1951; entered into force Feb. 20, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2221. Pub. 4186. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—signed at La Paz Mar. 14, 1951; entered into force Mar. 14, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2233. Pub. 4206. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—signed at Amman Feb. 27, 1951; entered into force Feb. 27, 1951.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States, April 1, 1951. General Foreign Policy Series 46. Pub. 4162. 51 pp. 20¢.

A complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States, together with their jurisdictions and recognized personnel.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases

Beginning with this issue the BULLETIN is printing a check list of Department of State press releases as a convenient reference. Releases not printed in full in the BULLETIN may be secured from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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*Omitted.

†Held for future issue.

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bulletin

Vol. XXV, No. 634

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TRIAL OF WILLIAM N. OATIS

On July 4, 1951, William N. Oatis, American citizen and chief of the Associated Press bureau at Prague, Czechoslovakia, was convicted at the end of a mock trial on charges of "espionage," together with three Czechoslovak employees of the A. P. His sentence was 10 years' imprisonment, subject to reduction to 5 years for good behavior; the other defendants were sentenced to terms ranging from 16 to 20 years.¹

During the period between Mr. Oatis' arrest on April 23, and the opening of the "trial" on July 2, the Czechoslovak authorities refused to permit any member of the American Embassy staff to visit Mr. Oatis nor did they allow him American legal counsel.

The "trial" was held in the State courtroom attached to Pankrac prison, on the outskirts of Praha. It was described as public, but spectators were not admitted without special credentials which had to be presented at five separate control points in the courtroom.

Places in the rear of the courtroom were reserved for the American Embassy observers, Vice Consul Richard G. Johnson and Mary Horak. Their seats were about 100 feet from Mr. Oatis' bench, which was directly before the dais where the five judges sat. The Embassy observers were given headsets for receiving the simultaneous English translation of the proceedings, and both took notes.

Mr. Oatis spoke in English; a court interpreter translated the questions put to him into English, and translated his replies into Czech. There were indications that the proceedings had been rehearsed in advance.

Mr. Oatis was forced to accept the Communist definition of "espionage," a word he used repeatedly during his testimony. According to the statutes under which he was convicted, espionage can be interpreted as the acquisition or dissemination of any information not officially made public by the Czechoslovak Government. Thus, all the normal newsgathering routines of a reporter could be described as "espionage activities." As evidence of such activities, the prosecution introduced Mr. Oatis' notes on interviews, requests from the A. P.'s London and New York offices for information, conversations with diplomats, discussions with his Czechoslovak staff.

Printed below are:

- (1) A condensed version of the indictment as it was read at the opening of the trial by State Prosecutor Josef Urvalek;
- (2) the Czechoslovak espionage laws to which the prosecutor and Presiding Judge Jaroslav Novak referred during the trial;
- (3) excerpts from the proceedings, based on notes made by the American Embassy observers. Questions put both by the prosecutor and by the presiding magistrate are designated "P".

THE INDICTMENT

The United States is waging war against the Soviet camp of peace. Officials of its missions and agencies in the Peoples Democracies are espionage agents. One of the espionage agencies in Czechoslovakia was the so-called news agency of the Associated Press. This agency abused the right of free collection of information. Masquerading as a news agency, the Associated Press for years carried on extensive espionage activities and obtained reports of military, economic, and political nature. This agency was managed by experienced and specially trained agents

Goldberg, Kasischke, and Polowetzky who because of their hostile activities were not reaccruited.²

In June 1950 the trained spy Oatis assumed charge of the office. Under his management the office was further developed. The core of the agency were paid employees, i.e. people hostile to our Republic and to other Peoples Democracies. These enemy agents in American service did not hesitate to murder Czechoslovak citizens when they were hampered in their vicious tasks. The cynical

(Continued on page 285)

¹ For the Department's views on this sham trial, see BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 92.

² A. I. Goldberg, Richard Kasischke, and Nathan Polowetzky are former chiefs of the Associated Press bureau at Prague.

Oatis Trial Labeled As Communist "Smear Campaign" Against U.S.

Representative Karl Stefan (R. of Neb.) speaking on a Voice of America news program to Europe on August 7, labeled the Oatis trial "a carefully planned smear campaign against the United States." Of Czechoslovak origin, Representative Stefan is a former newspaperman. For Czechoslovak listeners, his speech was translated and prefaced by introductory remarks in Czech by two Nebraska constituents. The text of Representative Stefan's speech follows:

SVOBODA GOES TO JAIL

A study of the transcript of the trial of Associated Press correspondent William N. Oatis by the Communist government of Czechoslovakia proves beyond doubt that the whole trial was a phony and a hoax. No one who looks through the testimony, obviously rigged and rehearsed in advance, could possibly believe that Bill Oatis was guilty of anything but doing his job as a newspaperman.

Editors and newspaper reporters throughout the world should take careful note of this Communist attempt to smear a profession which has long been the guardian of freedom in the world. Newsmen in the free world are quick to recognize the substitution of propaganda for fact, and it is their duty to expose this substitution.

The record of the Oatis trial shows clearly that the Communist judge, prosecutor and "defense" lawyer assigned to Oatis did not really try him, defend him, or judge him. They merely used him as a sounding board for Communist propaganda prepared long ago and designed to scare any feelings of freedom from the people of Czechoslovakia.

It may be that the trial was also designed to frighten the people of Czechoslovakia away from any tendencies toward independence. We may be assured, however, that the people of Czechoslovakia, who had experienced real democracy under Presidents Masaryk and Benes, were not fooled by this travesty of justice.

As an American of Czechoslovak descent and as a former newspaper reporter and editor, I have been particularly interested in the Oatis case. From the Czechoslovak point of view, an interesting figure in the trial in addition to Oatis himself was his Czech employee, Thomas Svoboda, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Now Svoboda is a common name in Czechoslovakia. But in the Czech language and in all other Slavic languages including Russian, the word Svoboda means freedom.

So the Communist newspapers of Prague, if they were really concerned with the welfare of Czechoslovakia instead of a Communist propaganda campaign against the United States, would have published streamer headlines on July 4, SVOBODA GOES TO JAIL, or literally FREEDOM GOES TO JAIL.

The indictment on which Bill Oatis, as well as Svoboda, or freedom, and two other Czech employees of the Associated Press were tried, was not concerned with facts but devoted to propaganda. The indictment was published in the Czech newspapers a few days before the trial and set the tone of the so-called charges in these words:

"The United States is waging war against the Soviet camp of peace. Officials of its missions and agencies in the Peoples Democracies are espionage agents."

Starting from this propaganda assumption, the indictment and testimony of the 3-day trial translated every normal activity of a newspaperman into a Czechoslovak version of the children's game of "I Spy." The natural curiosity of a youthful journalist who was eager to learn how the freedom-loving Czech people lived under communism, became the secretive activities of a spy, although Oatis made no effort to hide his activities.

Throughout the trial the testimony is filled with the words "espionage" and "secret." Every routine contact with the non-Communist world was considered to be of exaggerated significance. At one point in the trial the prosecutor insisted that any gathering of more than two persons could be considered a "secret" meeting.

It was also brought out in the trial that for an American correspondent to ask a question of a Czech employee in regard to a news query from abroad constituted "a network of informants," engaged in espionage.

A routine message from the Associated Press office in London or New York, sent over an open telegraph wire without any attempt at secrecy, was characterized in the trial as an espionage "directive." Any conversation between Oatis and his Czech employees was characterized as an "order" and the replies Oatis telegraphed openly to his office became secret "reports."

Throughout the testimony it becomes increasingly clear that the definition of espionage by the Czech Communist government is the acquisition or dissemination of any information not officially made public by the Czech Communist government. Once you accept the Communist definition of the term, as Oatis apparently was forced to do, any activity showing curiosity, individuality, or resourcefulness can be interpreted as espionage.

The "evidence" against Oatis consisted almost entirely of his notebooks in which he had jotted down his observations and comments as newsmen have been accustomed to do since the invention of paper and pencil. Oatis obtained most of his information by the old-fashioned method employed by newsmen since the beginnings of journalism—talking to people and writing down what they said.

During the trial Oatis was accused of obtaining "secret" information by querying airline offices on the arrival and departure of passengers, by inquiring about personnel changes in the government, and in one instance by questioning the bartender of a Prague hotel.

These are methods which newsmen have employed for centuries, in Czechoslovakia as well as other parts of the world. The most interesting news items in newspapers throughout the world frequently are based on interviews—the talks of curious newsmen with the people around them. But Communist governments don't want their

people to be questioned or interviewed. They might say what they really think.

Oatis also was accused of attempting to "verify" news which had been officially announced by the Czech government, and this too was considered a crime. Throughout the free world newspapermen are looked upon as the "Fourth Estate"—an independent profession that serves to criticize as well as interpret free governments to free peoples.

But under communism, it is considered traitorous to question the activities of Communists, and espionage to verify the statements of Communists, even though their own people frequently know that they are lying.

In summary, a reading of the testimony shows that the Oatis trial was not a trial at all, certainly not under the traditional laws of Czechoslovakia. Instead, it was a carefully planned Communist "smear campaign" against the United States and a "fear campaign" against the people of Czechoslovakia.

When Oatis was arrested last April he was accused of activities beyond his duties as a news correspondent. But the trial concentrated completely on his work as a newsman and sought to smear an American news agency, known

(Continued from page 283)

and premeditated murder of a Czechoslovak officer was carried out by the agent Josef Pavelka.³ The murder weapon was given to the terrorists by another agent, Miroslav Komarek, who cooperated with Polowetzky and delivered to him important material such as reports on discoveries of metals and information regarding various military installations.

Polowetzky delivered to Oatis in London before Oatis' departure for Czechoslovakia directives for espionage activities, and praised the terrorist Komarek. Therefore, after the murder Oatis, with the help of the accused Wojdinek, attempted to aid the murderers by sending a report to London informing Komarek, then residing abroad, of the critical situation of the terrorist group. The Associated Press espionage group worked as closely with some official United States diplomatic representatives. Oatis established contacts with the United States military attaché from whom he received directives and in turn delivered to him espionage material, particularly military information.

Oatis together with his Czech employees, Svoboda, Wojdinek, and Munz, who were employed in American services because of their hostile attitude to the democratic republic, systematically assembled information of a military, economic, and political nature under the direction of the Associated Press New York office. Their criminal activities were their primary work. Svoboda admitted that obtaining espionage reports for Oatis and through him for espionage service was his daily function. Oatis attempted to hide his real activities by masquerading as a progressive newspaperman. Recently his main task was gathering information on Sling, Svermova, and Company.⁴ The American espionage service expressed unusual interest and attempted to ascertain the degree to which the network had been uncovered and the measures to be adopted.

The proof of the espionage activities of these "newspapermen" are Oatis' own notes.

Oatis was trained in espionage work in the years 1944-1945 at an Intelligence School in the United States. In June 1950 he was nominated head of the Associated Press Agency in Prague.

He charged individual members of the Associated Press office with espionage tasks following instructions which he received from New York and London.

He tried, despite failure, to have complete and verified

throughout the world for its objectivity, in the eyes of the Czechoslovak people.

The trial also cut off to a further degree the flow of information between the United States and the Communist nations controlled by Soviet Russia. It proved once again that Communist governments fear freedom as their greatest enemy.

Within Czechoslovakia the trial demonstrated the dangers of associating with foreigners, and sought particularly to weaken the traditional friendship between the United States and Czechoslovakia. The trial may also have been intended to demonstrate to Soviet Russia that the Communist regime was in complete control in Czechoslovakia and could put down all anti-Communist feelings.

Svoboda, or freedom, has been sentenced to 20 years in prison for interpreting Czechoslovakia to an American newsman. But there are many Svobodas in Czechoslovakia, more than the Communists can ever put in jail. No matter how cruel and terror-stricken the Communist masters may become in their attempts to subjugate a proud land there will always be a Svoboda in Czechoslovakia.

espionage information. This is clearly espionage activity, bearing all the hallmarks of trained espionage. Oatis was very active in espionage directed towards the Sling, Svermova, and Clementis case. He endeavored to gain detailed information as to the manner of the arrest of prominent officials, he also tried to obtain photographs of the place where certain persons in high positions were interned. . . . On the instructions of the United States military attaché Oatis verified places in Czechoslovakia where important military installations were being prepared for the army. On orders from New York and London Oatis tried to ascertain where secret meetings of certain high officials in public life were being held.

Notes written in his own hand clearly prove Oatis was active in espionage efforts directed against the Peoples Republic and especially against the Soviet Union and other peoples democracies. Oatis procured espionage information concerning the transfer of heavy industry from one part of Czechoslovakia to another. He obtained information concerning the airlines, personnel changes in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, requirements of raw materials necessary for the planned construction of the Republic.

CZECHOSLOVAK ESPIONAGE LAWS

Part II of the Penal Code of July 12, 1950

Criminal Acts Against the Safety of the Republic

Espionage

Article 75. Interpretation of Certain Terms

(6) By state secret is meant everything that should be kept secret from unauthorized persons in an important interest of the Republic, particularly in political, military or economic interest.

(7) By economic secret is meant everything that is typical or important for economic enterprise or that should be kept secret in the common interest from unauthorized persons.

(8) By service secret is meant an important fact that is connected with the activity of national committees, courts, or other authorities, public agencies or enterprises or people's cooperatives and that should be kept secret from unauthorized persons.

Article 86

(1) He who attempts to obtain state secrets with the intention of betraying them to a foreign power, or who intentionally betrays a state secret to a foreign power, will be punished with imprisonment from 10 to 25 years or life imprisonment.

(2) Identical punishment will be inflicted on such person as

³ A Czechoslovak described at the trial as a terrorist.

⁴ Otto Sling and Marie Svermova, leading Czechoslovak Communists; government authorities arrested the former late in 1950, the latter in February 1951.

- (a) Associates with someone else in order to commit the act referred to in Section (1);
 - (b) Contacts a foreign power or foreign agents for such purpose;
 - (c) Contacts an organization, whose purpose is to obtain state secrets, with the intention of supporting its efforts.
- (3) Capital punishment will be inflicted on the perpetrator
- (a) If he commits the act referred to in Section (1) or (2) at a time when the country is under increased menace;
 - (b) If he commits such an act although the duty to keep a state secret has been expressly imposed upon him or is involved in his position;
 - (c) If he commits such an act as member of an organization whose purpose is to obtain state secrets;
 - (d) If the act concerns a particularly important state secret;
 - (e) If he commits such an act in a particularly dangerous manner, on a large scale, or for profits or if he keeps on committing the act for a longer period; or
 - (f) If there is any other particularly aggravating circumstance.
- (4) Apart from the punishment referred to above in Sections 1 to 3, the Court may express the loss of citizenship; if this punishment is not imposed the Court will announce the confiscation of property.

*Law 231 of October 6, 1948
Paragraph 5 Section (a)*

By state secret is meant a fact, measure or object which the Government keeps secret in an important interest of the Republic, particularly in political, military or economic interest, or which in such an interest should remain concealed from a foreign power or from foreign agencies.

EXCERPTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS

- P. Did you understand the indictment?
- O. Yes, I did.
- P. Do you feel guilty?
- O. Yes, I do.
- P. This means that you committed espionage in the Czechoslovak Republic?
- O. Yes, I did.
- P. I remind you to speak clearly.
- O. I will do so.
- P. Further I remind you that if you will admit everything, it will help you.
- O. Thank you.
- P. Before there will be further questioning of the accused, may I put before the court as Exhibit A his identity card from an American Military Intelligence School and request the accused to express himself about this.
- O. Yes, I know this document.
- P. What kind of an identity card is it?
- O. This is a card issued by the Military Language School in U.S.A. It's my own card issued to me in 1944. . . .
- P. How did you get into the school whose identity card we now have?
- O. I was sent there because I studied Japanese and this school taught soldiers and officers intelligence.
- P. How long did you attend?
- O. For only one or two months.
- P. Who was running this school?
- O. The commandant was Col. Rasmussen of the Intelligence Service.
- P. When did you leave the school?
- O. In December 1945.
- P. What did you do after that?
- O. I was dismissed from the Army and became correspondent for the Associated Press.
- P. Before you entered this school, did you know any military officers?

O. I was in contact with many military officials. I was in the Army since 1942.

P. Can you give us more details, but please be brief!

O. I should explain how I got into this school. This lieutenant interviewed me, but I was not accepted right away. Instead I was sent to the University of Minnesota ASTP⁶ Japanese Language School where I took a 6-week training course. In October 1944 I was sent to the school at Fort Snelling, Minn., where this identity card was issued to me. This school was for Americans of Japanese descent. I was thoroughly instructed in the Japanese language. I could translate captured documents and intercepted radio broadcasts. They also taught some of the fundamentals of intelligence . . . including the strength and morale. . . . The other school [was] at the University of Minnesota [Michigan] at Ann Arbor. This school was for soldiers and officers of the so-called white race. These soldiers and officers studied the Japanese language. Some of the officers who directed this school were from the Military Intelligence Service. The commanding officer of my company, which included about 300 men, was Joseph K. Yamahiwa. The teachers were Americans of Japanese descent. . . .

P. Both schools were espionage schools?

O. Yes.

P. You mentioned before that after completing this school you left the Army and began employment at the Associated Press?

O. That's right.

P. Besides you, were there also other members of this school who worked in civilian life?

O. Yes, many from my class.

P. Did you make the acquaintance in this school of someone whom you met on the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic?

O. Not exactly. At the time I was in school, Col. Atwood,⁷ Military Attaché at the American Embassy, was also in the school, although I did not know him before. I found out about it after he came to Prague in January of 1951 when I met him.

P. Did you talk to him about the fact that you both attended this school?

O. Yes.

P. How did you meet Col. Atwood in 1951?

O. I met him at the American Embassy.¹

P. Were your meetings frequent?

O. Yes, they were.

P. What was the nature of the meetings?

O. They were espionage meetings.

P. How often were they?

O. About once every two weeks, I'd say.

P. Tell us details of your espionage with Atwood.

O. I used to meet him and give him the espionage

⁶The Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) established in 1943. Foreign area and language study was part of the program at 55 of the 227 universities and colleges where the ASTP was conducted. The curriculum was not connected in any way with training for intelligence work. "The common objectives of the schools of the various services were that the officers and men be able to speak and understand a foreign language, know the area in which the language is used, and in general have a understanding of the conditions within a given country which might conceivably favor or endanger relations between the services and the people whom they were to govern or in whose midst they were to live, temporarily at least, whether it be enemy-occupied territory or territory under allied control." (*Language and Area Studies in the Armed Services*, Robert J. Matthew, for the Commission on Implications of Armed Services Education Programs, American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1947, p. 4.)

⁷Lt. Col. George L. Atwood.

The prosecution throughout laid emphasis on the close contact which the A. P. and other news services in Prague maintained with the American Embassy, an obvious source of news for foreign correspondents.

material and at these meetings he gave me espionage requests which he obtained. He told me that in a certain part of Prague, military accommodations were being prepared for military personnel. He said he understood there were several other projects and that these were connected with the new militia.

P. Did he mention specific places? Did Atwood give you any instructions and tasks?

O. Yes, he took me to a map on the wall and showed me some places where he understood similar projects were in preparation.

P. Did you make note of the places in question?

O. I did.

P. Are these the notes? (Exhibit B). . . . Did you fulfill the task given to you by Atwood?

O. Not until I went to one of these places in an office car and ascertained that the information which I obtained from Atwood was correct. I was not able to make a report on this.

P. Another question. Did you obtain instructions of espionage activity? I have one document which clearly shows that.

O. Yes, I obtained instructions from London and New York.

P. It reads: "New York—Clementis . . ."

O. This constituted in effect the instructions from New York on the four officers of the security who had been arrested in connection with Clementis.⁹

P. How did you verify this report?

O. From Mucha.⁹

P. How did you get acquainted with him?

O. I met him at the home of Peter Swan, Secretary to Broadmead, British Ambassador. I gathered that he was an enemy of the People's Democracies and I concluded that I could use him for my espionage work. Later this year I ran into him at the coffee shop of Hotel Palace and he told me on that occasion the number of security officers who had been arrested. He had no details so he invited me out to his house. He gave me his telephone number.

P. Do you have it in your notebook?

O. It is in there. (Judge warns Oatis at this point to look at him, i.e. the Judge, and not at the court.)

P. Do you remember this number?

O. No, I don't.

P. Did you make a note of a certain name?

O. I wrote the name Blake.¹⁰

P. Is this the note?

O. Yes, that's the note.

P. (Exhibit C—telephone number of Mucha alias Blake.)

P. You mentioned before that Mucha gave you the telephone number for the purpose of arranging a meeting. Was this meeting arranged?

O. So far as I remember, the meeting took place.

P. Where was the meeting? What did you talk about?

O. At his home. He gave me names of 10 or 12 officials. I made a note so that I could send a report to London. . . .

P. Can you tell us how you were brought into espionage activity?

O. Well, I was sent here from London in June 1950.

P. Who was your predecessor?

O. Nathan Polowetzky.

P. Did you speak to him before you came to Prague?

O. Yes.

⁹ Vladimir Clementis, former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, disappeared from Prague in January 1951. There were reports that he had escaped to Germany, Austria, or Yugoslavia. Later the Czechoslovak authorities announced that he had been arrested. The case aroused world-wide interest.

¹⁰ Jiri Mucha, novelist and poet, who was acquainted with British diplomats in Prague, appeared as a witness at the trial.

¹¹ Notation by Embassy observers: "No mention fact Mucha had taken apartment formerly belonging Br. Mil. Att., Col. Blake."

P. Where?

O. London.

P. What did you speak about?

O. We talked of his work here.

P. What details did he tell you?

O. He said part was official reporting and part unofficial.

P. By unofficial news you mean espionage news?

O. That's what he meant. . . .

P. But you were sure of the fact that he was referring to espionage?

O. Yes, I understood that.

P. Was it clear that A. P. was working together with people connected with espionage?

O. Yes, it was. . . .

P. Tell us further about this activity of yours. From whom did you receive directives and what did you do with reports obtained . . . ?

O. In July and August, 1950, from London and New York. Some reports I sent to London and New York and some, because it was dangerous, I gave to officials of the American Embassy for their own use and for transmittal to U. S. A.

P. What kind of information did you receive?

O. I gathered news of economic and military character. News of relations of Czechoslovakia towards the Soviet Union and other people's democracies, news of security measures pertaining to political leaders, news about the situation of supplies and food, and news on the structure and location of various factories.

P. One more question in this connection. Were these reports official or non-official?

O. This news was of the unofficial character, the kind that Czechoslovakia does not publish and is kept secret.

P. How did you gain this news?

O. From personal observations or from informants.

P. Mainly these were your employees?

O. Yes, they were. . . .

P. (Exhibit) Here are original documents marked with L-23. . . . They are concerning instructions regarding details about the anti-state activities of the Clementis group, at that time considered secret by our Government. Your instruction also concerns not only Clementis but also others who were concerned with Clementis. What steps did you take?

O. First I was to find out if Clementis disappeared. I went to the American Embassy and got in touch with the clerk, Colclough¹¹ who gave me the address and number of Clementis' apartment. Then I went back to the office and got Svoboda and Wojdinek¹² to go with me.

P. Why did you take these two with you?

O. Because they could speak Czech.

P. What did you three do?

O. We were investigating that Clementis was not in his apartment. We learned that he was not there and that security measures had been taken.

P. What did you do with the information?

O. I sent the news to London.

P. Did you file this item? (Exhibit)

O. Yes, this is part of that item.

P. Did you send more reports regarding Clementis? It is then possible to say that there were quite a number of them.

O. I sent several such stories. Yes, that's true.

P. Did you try to find out where Clementis was interned?

O. Yes.

P. Your employers either in New York or London were interested in Clementis?

O. They were highly interested.

P. You finally obtained a photograph?

O. Yes, I did.

P. Respective information regarding photograph, did you send to London or New York?

¹¹ Tomas Svoboda and Pavel Wojdinek, with Peter Munz, were Czechoslovak employees of the A. P. being tried with Oatis.

¹² Otho Colclough, administrative officer of the American Embassy.

O. Before I could do so I was arrested. . . .

P. When did your espionage activities start? When you came to Czechoslovakia?

O. The first case was an instance of negotiations in a Czechoslovak town at which other officials of satellite countries were to be. About a month after I arrived.

P. Were your espionage activities unusual as compared with activities of a correspondent?

O. No, it wasn't. Other correspondents did the same. The fact is that members of the western press and the diplomatic corps in Prague did the same. For that reason it was difficult for me not to fall into espionage.

P. Was this the reason for your activities?

O. One of the reasons. Orders were received from London and New York.

P. In other words you were paid for this?

O. Yes, I was paid for this.

P. You say that you were paid for espionage?

O. Among other things. Not just official reporting. . . .

P. Thank you, I don't have any further questions. Do you have anything to add?

O. No, I made a full statement as it was drawn out of me by your questions and I want to add that I am sorry for what I did.

P. Mr. Oatis, do you yourself hold any hatred to Czechoslovakia or do you hate the Czech people?

O. No, I don't.

P. What compelled you to do these activities?

O. I did this on instructions from New York and London and under the influence of Western diplomats.

P. Please make it clear before the court, your origin and background.

O. I am from a working class family. My father and both my grandfathers were from the working class. One of my grandfathers worked in another man's glass factory, the other worked in another man's butcher shop. My father worked in another man's pharmacy. I am a worker myself. I earn my living by the work of my hands and brain. I am not a capitalist and don't own any factories. I am a worker.

P. You are not a worker. You are a spy. You admitted this.

O. I am still a worker. I intend going on being a worker.

Here the opening session, held the morning of July 2, ended. That afternoon the prosecutor and presiding magistrate questioned the three other defendants. During the morning of July 3, after 11 witnesses had testified the defense attorney announced that Mr. Oatis would add to his testimony of the day before. Mr. Oatis then made a supplementary statement from which the following excerpts are printed:

O. The witnesses have given a picture of one class of people with whom I had connection in Prague, I mean the Czech citizens from the reactionary point of view. Now I would like to say something more about a second class of people I dealt with in this way. I mean in this case Western correspondents and Western diplomats here in Prague. I said yesterday that other Western correspondents were dealing in espionage news. I will give you some examples. . . . My own espionage activity resulted from trying to check on stories that these other correspondents had produced in Prague. This in fact is the case of the story of the military negotiations I spoke of a while ago. The story of the disappearance of Clementis and routine story of the arrest of the official in Agriculture. Usually it happened that when a correspondent produced a story that I didn't have, I got an order from London or New York to get it too. . . . I had a supply of espionage news coming from Czechs and diplomats and on the other hand I had a certain demand for such news coming from New York in the form of orders. This was because my agency works for newspapers in America [which] expect to get news and slanderous reports. It vied with other Western news agencies, so I was under constant pressure from the New York and London service

for news of this kind. I got it coming from Czechs and diplomats and I sent it out to the Agency. Sometimes news that I got from one source I gave to another. So I was a man in the middle. I am sorry I allowed myself to be used in this way. Thank you.

At the afternoon session on July 3, Mr. Oatis made the following final statement in response to a question by the prosecutor:

O. I am sorry that I went into espionage in this country. I didn't do it because I am an enemy of the working class, I am from the working class myself. I did it only because I listened to the wrong kind of orders from abroad and came under the influence of the wrong kind of people here in Czechoslovakia. I hurt myself, I hurt my friends, I harmed the Republic and helped its enemies. I harmed the cause of peace and helped the cause of war. I repeat that I am sorry for all this. Your security organs caught me and now you know all about me. I have talked freely here of what I have done in the hope that I can be of some help that way. This has been a matter of some moment to me because it is likely to hurt me when I leave this country, but I thought it the best thing to do. Your security organs have treated me with great consideration even though I didn't deserve it. Your courts treated me courteously. I thank you for all that. I know that I did the wrong thing. I want to renounce espionage work forever. [Courtroom laughter] In view of my admission I hope the court will be as lenient as it can. I am ready for your judgment. Thank you.

VERDICT AND SENTENCE

At 8.20 a. m., July 4, 1951 the presiding magistrate announced the verdict of guilty and sentenced Mr. Oatis to 10 years' imprisonment, Mr. Svoboda to 20 years', Mr. Wojdinek to 18 years' and Mr. Munz to 16 years'. The magistrate then made a final statement:

P. . . . With help of people from the fields of economy, politics, security and military, it [the Associated Press bureau in Prague] had secured information which the Government in the interests of the security and defense of the state kept secret and which it did not pass either through the press or the radio. They searched for such news for the purpose of handing them on to the centers in London and New York so that they might be used against the Czechoslovak Democratic Republic. . . . They worked against the Republic and particularly against the Soviet Union. . . .

As far as the sentence is concerned: In considering the sentence of the individuals accused the court is aware of the fact that there are here two groups of spies, one formed by the foreign citizen William Oatis who was correspondent here for a relatively short time. Owing to the vigilance of the security organs not much damage was done. He knew nothing of our conditions here. He fulfilled the tasks of his employers, taking over the espionage of his predecessors. . . . Another alleviating circumstance was his full and sincere admission not only in that he fully described his espionage activities, but that he exposed the espionage activities of the A. P. employees, and finally his informants and that he exposed the whole espionage network which is here led by certain representatives of the Western capitalist countries. By this he helped our security organs to expose the whole network. . . .

[Addressing Mr. Oatis] There are two possibilities. The sentence passed on you can either be accepted or you have the right to appeal. . . . You will inform the court of your decision. Furthermore, in accordance with Czech laws in case of good behavior, your participation in the work of our working people, you can, after serving half of the sentence, appeal that you may be released. . . .

[After a 10-minute adjournment:] Mr. Oatis, what is your decision?

O. I accept the sentence of the court and ask that I be sent somewhere where I can do some useful work.

ECOSOC Resolution Asks Protection Of Correspondents' Rights

A resolution condemning governmental restrictions on information was passed on August 15 by the Social Committee of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, meeting at Geneva. Walter Kotschnig, United States representative on the committee, introduced the resolution and made the following remarks on the trial of William N. Oatis in Czechoslovakia:

. . . The interesting thing is that even on the basis of the so-called confession of Mr. Oatis it is perfectly evident how baseless the charges were that were leveled against him. What were these charges in detail and the so-called proofs of Oatis' guilt?

(A) We were told that Mr. Oatis had on him a document certifying him as a spy. Heavens, what kind of a spy is that? Do any of you really believe that a spy would carry such a document into a totalitarian country where he was liable to arrest and search at any minute?

(B) Much was made of the fact that Mr. Oatis allegedly attended two military schools of spies. We know all about that allegation. Mr. Oatis in 1945 . . . did indeed attend special courses at the University of Minnesota and at Ann Arbor. But what were these courses? They were intense courses in Japanese language and Japanese institutions which he took in preparation for work with the military occupation authorities in Japan. Since I am not aware that Japanese is spoken in Czechoslovakia, it is completely beyond me to see how that kind of training would qualify anyone for espionage activities in Czechoslovakia.

(C) Mr. Oatis was accused of receiving instructions from abroad, particularly from London and Paris. What were these instructions? They were instructions from his employers, a legitimate news agency. They were transmitted to him in clear language over the official Czechoslovak wires. This is a practice well known to every correspondent. If this should be accepted as a proof of espionage activities then every correspondent at this moment in this room is a spy.

(D) Mr. Oatis, we are told, saw people at the American Embassy in Prague. But, gentlemen, with whom else should he meet? Everybody knows of the miserable life imposed upon nationals of Western countries in the Communist countries of the East. They are restricted in every way and they hardly dare to meet any national of the

country in which they live for fear of jeopardizing the life and liberty of such people.

(E) To add weight to this particular accusation, the representative of Czechoslovakia told us this morning that Mr. Oatis received instructions from the U. S. military attaché in Prague. And what, according to the Czechoslovak delegate himself, did Mr. Oatis do with these instructions? He copied them conscientiously in his notebook. Again all I can say is, "What a spy!"

(F) Oatis, according to the Czechoslovak delegate, committed a particularly odious crime by reporting the discovery of new uranium deposits in Czechoslovakia, the kind of deposits which the Communist countries are undoubtedly planning to exploit for purely peaceful purposes. Gentlemen, our papers in the United States are full of notices about such finds in our own country. News of that kind is considered legitimate news to be given to the public. . . .

Text of Resolution

The Economic and Social Council

RECOGNIZING freedom of information as one of the fundamental freedoms referred to in the Charter and the high importance accorded in the universal declaration of human rights to the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontier;

DESIRING TO IMPLEMENT the right of all peoples to be fully informed;

CONSCIOUS of the need of continually stressing the vital importance of maintaining and safeguarding this essential freedom in order that all peoples may, by freely exchanging information and ideas, come to understand one another, develop friendly relations among themselves and achieve true international cooperation in solving problems of vital concern to all nations;

VIEWS with extreme concern all governmental action aimed at the systematic exclusion of bona fide correspondents, the imposition of arbitrary personal restraints and the infliction of punishments upon such correspondents solely because of their attempts faithfully to perform their duties in gathering and transmitting news;

URGES strongly that personal restraints be removed and sentences imposing arbitrary punishments be revoked;

APPEALS to governments to do all within their power to safeguard the right of correspondents freely and faithfully to gather and transmit news.

Suspension of Trade-Agreement Concessions From Communist Dominated Countries

U.S. TO WITHDRAW TARIFF CONCESSIONS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Released to the press July 31]

The United States has requested that the item "Termination of Obligations between the United States and Czechoslovakia" be placed on the agenda of the sixth session of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, scheduled to convene at Geneva on September 17. The following statement concerning the United States' position in this matter has been circulated to the Contracting Parties:

The United States has determined to withdraw from Czechoslovakia the benefits of trade agreement tariff concessions.

Since the United States and Czechoslovakia are Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United States proposes that at the sixth session all of the obligations existing between it and Czechoslovakia by virtue of the provisions of the Agreement should be formally terminated. This statement is a brief explanation of the factors involved in the United States decision.

When, in 1947, the Contracting Parties framed the obligations to one another which are contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, it was assumed that the political relations of the countries concerned would be such that it would be in their mutual interests to promote the movement of goods, money, and people between them. It is now apparent that this assumption is no longer valid as between the United States and Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia have been progressively impaired by manifestations of Czechoslovak ill will toward the United States. The property of American nationals in Czechoslovakia has been confiscated, without compensation or any serious attempt on the part of Czechoslovakia to settle this matter. American firms have been persecuted and harassed to such a degree that it is virtually impossible for them to do business with Czechoslovakia. Procurement of ordi-

nary trade information essential to the conduct of commercial enterprises has been declared a crime. The United States has been forced, on extremely short notice, to reduce drastically the personnel of its Embassy in Prague. American citizens have been imprisoned without justification. American charitable and welfare organizations have been forced to discontinue their work.

The impairment of economic relations has been aggravated by the progressive integration of Czechoslovakia's economy into the Soviet bloc. Czechoslovakia has openly declared its intention of administering its economy solely in the interests of the bloc. It has granted a special and guaranteed position in its economy to Soviet bloc corporations. It has left no room for doubt that its commitments to the United States are being subordinated or disregarded in the carrying out of its undertakings as a part of the Soviet economic bloc.

The United States attaches considerable importance to the maintenance of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as an instrument through which nations which are in agreement on its broad objectives can work together in the economic sphere. The United States is of the view, therefore, that in the interests of maintaining the integrity of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in its application to trade among nations with normal relations, the existing situation between the United States and Czechoslovakia should be frankly and unequivocally recognized by the Contracting Parties, and the obligations between the two countries embodied in the Agreement, already rendered a nullity by political events, should be formally dissolved.

ACTION UNDER TRADE AGREEMENTS EXTENSION ACT OF 1951

[Released to the press August 1]

On August 1, 1951, the President signed a proclamation giving effect to sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which provide that, as soon as practicable, he shall

withdraw the benefits of the trade-agreement concessions "to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement," and shall prevent the importation of certain furs which are the product of the Soviet Union and Communist China. He also signed, on August 1, 1951, a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury under this basic proclamation (1) providing that reductions in rates of duty made in trade agreements should be suspended after the close of business August 31, 1951, in the case of a list of nations and areas (including Communist China and the Soviet Zone of Germany) as to which such withdrawal would not on that date conflict with any international obligations, and (2) preventing the importation of specified kinds of furs from Communist China after the close of business August 31, 1951.

As announced by the Department of State on July 6, 1951, steps have been taken to terminate most-favored-nation commitments to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Soviet Russia.¹ Furthermore, the Department announced on July 1, 1951, the withdrawal of trade-agreement concessions from Czechoslovakia. When it is found practicable, as a result of the above steps, to suspend the trade-agreement benefits from these countries and to prevent the importation of furs from Soviet Russia, the dates on which such actions are to take effect will be similarly notified by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury under the proclamation.

TEXT OF PROCLAMATION:

WHEREAS sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (Public Law 50, 82d Congress) provide as follows:

Sec. 5. As soon as practicable, the President shall take such action as is necessary to suspend, withdraw or prevent the application of any reduction in any rate of duty, or binding of any existing customs or excise treatment, or other concession contained in any trade agreement entered into under authority of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended and extended, to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement.

Sec. 11. The President shall, as soon as practicable, take such measures as may be necessary to prevent the importation of ermine, fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and skins, dressed or undressed, which are the product of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of Communist China.

WHEREAS an important element in determining when it may be practicable to apply these provisions to particular articles is the ability to do so consistently with the international obligations of the United States;

WHEREAS, in giving effect to the procedures available to free the United States from international obligations

existing with respect to some of the nations and areas covered by the above provisions, it will not be practicable to apply such provisions to all such nations and areas at the same time;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the said sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, do proclaim:

PART I


That the application of reduced rates of duty (including rates of import tax) established pursuant to trade agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into under the authority of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as originally enacted or as amended and extended (ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943; ch. 22, 50 Stat. 24; ch. 96, 54 Stat. 107; ch. 118, 57 Stat. 125; ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410; ch. 678, 62 Stat. 1053; ch. 585, 63 Stat. 697; Public Law 50, 82d Congress), shall be suspended with respect to imports from such nations and areas referred to in section 5 as may be specified in any notification pursuant to this part of this proclamation given by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury, and published in the *Federal Register*, which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on such date as may be specified for each such nation or area in the notification, or are so entered or withdrawn thereafter until such date as may be so specified in a later notification and so published for the termination of such suspension. For the purposes of this part the term "imports from such nations and areas" shall mean articles imported directly or indirectly into the United States from nations or areas specified in an effective notification, but shall not in any case include articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any other nation or area.

PART II

That the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of ermine, fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and skins, dressed or undressed, shall be prohibited as to products of such nations and areas as may be specified in any notification pursuant to this part of this proclamation given by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury, and published in the *Federal Register*, on such date as may be specified for each such nation or area in the notification, and thereafter until such date as may be so specified in a later notification and so published for the termination of such prohibition.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 1st day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.



By the President
DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

[Released to the press August 1]

Pursuant to Part I of my proclamation of August 1, 1951, carrying out sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, I

¹ BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 95.

² 16 Fed. Reg. 7635.

hereby notify you that the suspension provided for therein shall be applicable with respect to imports from the following nations and areas which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after the close of business August 31, 1951:

Albania

Any part of China which may be under Communist domination or control.

Estonia

The Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin.

Associated States of Indochina:

Any part of Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam, which may be under Communist domination or control.

Any part of Korea which may be under Communist domination or control.

The Kurile Islands

Latvia

Lithuania

Outer Mongolia

Rumania

Southern Sakhalin

Tanna Tuva

Pursuant to Part II of that proclamation of August 1, 1951, I hereby notify you that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of ermine, fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and skins, dressed or undressed, shall be prohibited after the close of business August 31, 1951, as to products of any part of China which may be under Communist domination or control.

My letter addressed to you on May 30, 1942, with reference to duties proclaimed in connection with trade agreements entered into under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act, shall be superseded after the close of business August 31, 1951.

West Berlin Festival, 1951

by William Keefe¹

When German Conductor Wilhelm Furtwaengler brings down his baton on the evening of September 5 to introduce the opening chords of Ludwig van Beethoven's immortal Ninth Symphony, he will simultaneously launch the Berlin Festival, 1951. Twenty-five days later, on September 30, an uninterrupted series of festival plays, concerts, operatic performances, and other special attractions will come to a fitting end with the presentation of another Beethoven masterpiece, the "Missa Solemnis."

In the interval between September 5 and 30, visitors and native West Berliners will be treated to a memorable array of cultural and entertainment offerings. The visitors are expected to stream into the city from all parts of the free world as well as from the eastern sector of Berlin and the Soviet-occupied zone. They will be joined by outstanding artists from half a dozen European countries as well as the United States.

Appropriately, the Schiller Theater, named after one of Germany's greatest poets, will be the scene of opening-night festivities. Now undergoing reconstruction in preparation for the September 5 inaugural, the theater will be dedicated in ceremonies preceding the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra's rendition of the Ninth Symphony.

During the remainder of the festival, first ever held in the former German capital, Berlin and

western German stars will compete or collaborate with visiting artists from France, England, Austria, and the United States. In many instances such as the opera appearances of Astrid Varnay, leading soprano of the New York Metropolitan Opera's Wagnerian wing, German and foreign performers will share the same stage.

Orchestral accompaniment for Miss Varnay's performances in the roles of Isolde in Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*, and of Brunhilde in *Die Walküre* will be provided by the Berlin Civic Opera Orchestra, and supporting casts will be made up of star members of the Berlin Opera Company.

Later in September, Suzanne Juyol of France will replace Miss Varnay in repeat performances of *Tristan* and *Die Walküre*.

Comprising an integrated whole, the festival program has been weighted with complementary admixtures of tried, proven attractions and premiere performances. It has also been spiced with ingredients representing the best in orchestral concerts, light concerts, opera and stage ballet and choral works, and with such special items as pantomime programs and chamber music evenings.

The Berlin Civic Opera, now undergoing a thorough grooming for its regular fall schedule of operatic performances, will present five new productions especially prepared for festival audiences. The list of special productions includes

¹ The following article will appear in the August issue of the *Information Bulletin*, HICOG.

Malipiero's opera, *Phantasien um Callot*; Bartok's *Bluebeard*; Stravinsky's *Oedipus Rex*; Gian-Carlo Menotti's *The Consul*; and a restudied version of Strauss' *Salome*. The last will feature the Viennese star, Ljuba Welitsch.

Opera lovers will also have an opportunity during the festival to attend guest performances of the famous *Beggar's Opera* by the Hamburg State Opera Company.

Following the September curtain-raiser, the restored Schiller Theater will feature—very appropriately—Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* as well as Zuckmayer's new play, *Gesang im Feuerofen* and Hugo von Hoffmannsthal's orchestration of Sophocles' tragedy, *Oedipus*. Concerts are to be presented by the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction of Sergiu Celibidache and guest conductors, and the RIAS (U.S.-sponsored radio in the American sector of Berlin) symphony orchestra is planning a Mozart evening with Erna Berger as soloist. The RIAS Symphony will also give a special Bartok program starring Tibor Varga as soloist.

Among stand-out chamber music programs and recitals listed on the festival schedule are appearances by the brilliant Juilliard Quartet of New York, by the Amadeus Quartet from London, the Koeckert Quartet from Munich, the Berlin String Quartet and the renowned Dennis Brain Wind Ensemble. Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau will sing Schumann's song cycle, *Die Schoene Muellerin*; Helmut Roloff will present an evening of modern piano music; and Gerhard Taschner will give a violin recital.

Pantomime will be the order of the day at Berlin's tiny Tribuene Theater during the colorful festival. *Bip*, *Der Jahrmarkt*, and *Der Mantel*, after the novel of Gogol, are slated for presentation by Marcel Marceau and his company from Paris, while the United States will be represented by pantomimist Angna Enters. The Tribuene will also stage a special production of Boris Blacher's *Romeo and Juliet*.

Neither Shakespeare nor the Broadway musical has been overlooked by festival program-makers. The Old Vic Company of London will step before the footlights of the Hebbel Theater to present Shakespeare's *Othello*, while Broadway will come to Berlin with full-cast performances of the hit show *Oklahoma* and a new production of Robinson Jeffers' *Medea*, starring Judith Anderson. Guthrie McClintock has accepted an invitation to direct the Berlin staging of *Medea*, an adaptation of the classical Greek tragedy by Euripides. *Medea* will be presented five times during the festival, while *Oklahoma* will be presented 13 times between September 11 and 22.

The United States and British troupes will receive competition for the attention of festival audiences from the Comedie Française, which is planning a performance of Molière's *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*.

On the lighter side of the festival are open-air

performances in the 25,000-seat Waldbuehne, where special mixed programs are to be given by artists from the opera and ballet. A Johann Strauss evening is also on schedule. Choral works will be presented by the Aachener Chor singing Carl Orff's *Carmina Cartuilli* and the famed Hall Johnson Choir of New York, specializing in Negro spirituals.

Berlin and world premieres of a number of concert works are planned for the festival, among them the *Kantata Profana* of Bartok, a violin concerto by Boris Blacher, Honegger's symphony no. 4, a piano concerto by Pepping and the violin concerto of Schoenberg. Blacher's *Lysistrata* ballet will also be premiered at West Berlin's Civic Opera House.

As a matter of course many of the troupes and individual artists billed for performances during the Berlin festival have received international acclaim from critics and audiences. These noted stars and groups form the festival's headline circle. To utilize the 25-day cultural holiday in another direction, the city-sponsored festival committee is also recruiting unemployed local actors for a company to be trained by a "name" director. Appearances by the amalgam group are to be announced shortly.

From a statistical viewpoint, the range of festival events is decidedly impressive.

About 200 separate, complete programs will be presented between September 5 and 30 on nine different Berlin stages, including those of the Berlin Civic Opera, Titania Palast, Korso Theater, the Schiller Theater, the Tribuene, the Hebbel, Renaissance and Schlosspark Theaters, and the Theater am Kurfuerstendamm. Total seating capacity of the nine is approximately 9,000. An additional 25,000 persons can be seated in the Waldbuehne.

Festival performances will be given in three languages—English, German, and French. Among guest conductors will be Wilhelm Furtwaengler, Sergiu Celibidache, and Ferenc Frissay of Berlin; Josef Keilberth, Hamburg; Paul Sacher and Carl Schuricht from Switzerland. Scheduled to visit Berlin with orchestral and choral groups are Hans Schmidt-Isserstedt, conductor of the Northwest German Radio Symphony Orchestra of Hamburg, Ernest Bour of the Orchestre National of Paris, and Felix Raabe of the Aachener Chor. The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra and the local Hochschul Chor will be directed in festival performances by Hans Chemin-Petit and Werner Egk.

Visiting and local artists will present orchestral, operatic, dramatic, and other compositions by playwrights and composers representing more than half a dozen nations.

As added insurance that Berlin during September will impress visitors as the "Show-Window of the West," a variety of side attractions has been scheduled for the festival weeks. These include

sporting events and a series of special art exhibits. Among them a display of sculpture and drawings by Henry Moore, sculpture by Bourdelle, and a retrospective show of Max Brachmann's works.

During 10 days of the festival, an automobile show, featuring famous "makes" of half a dozen countries, will also be held.

Blueprinted by West Berlin authorities for nearly a year, the Berlin Festival is receiving moral and financial support from the Allied High Commission. Berliners confidently expect that it

will supply a conclusive answer to the question: "What is Berlin today, culturally speaking?"

Equally important, the festival is expected to furnish irrefutable proof that the island city, though geographically isolated from the Western-democratic world, stands—in an artistic as well as in a political sense—in the forefront of the current struggle against Communist control and oppression.

• William Keefe is Deputy Chief, Public Relations Branch, HICOG.

Soviet Leader Transmits Resolution of Friendship

[Released to the press on August 6]

The President on August 6 instructed the immediate publication of the text of a message to him from His Excellency Nikolai Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The message was transmitted by President Shvernik earlier the same day through the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, which sent it to Secretary of State Acheson under cover of a note to him.

TEXT OF TRANSMITTING NOTE

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I should be grateful if you would transmit to Mr. Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, the enclosed letter of reply from N. M. Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated August 6 of this year and resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Accept, [etc.]

*Chargé d' Affaires ad interim of the
USSR in the USA
BORIS I. KARAVAEV*

His Excellency
DEAN G. ACHESON
*Secretary of State
United States of America*

Text of President Shvernik's Letter

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of July 7, 1951, and of the enclosed resolution of the Congress of the United States of America and to transmit to you a resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This resolution expresses the feelings of sincere friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union toward the peoples of the whole world—it speaks of the fact that the Soviet people is unified in its attempts to establish a stable peace and to eliminate the threat of a new war.

The Soviet people has no basis for doubting that the American people also do not want war.

However, the Soviet people know well that there exist in some states forces which are striving to unleash a new world war, in which the circles in question see the source of their own enrichment. The peoples of the Soviet Union believe that there will be no war if the peoples take into their own hands preservation of peace and defend it to the end, unmasking the attempts of those forces which have interests in war and which are trying to draw the people into another war.

I share your opinion that a desire for peace and brotherhood exists in the hearts of a majority of people. Therefore, governments which not with words but with deeds are striving to support peace must encourage by every means the peaceful strivings of their people.

The Soviet Government assists in every way the unification of the efforts of the Soviet people fighting for peace with the efforts of the peoples of other countries. It hospitably receives communications of peace from any country and by every means contributes to the intercourse of the Soviet people with the peoples of other countries, placing no barriers in the path.

There is no doubt that friendship between peoples which is mentioned in your communication pre-supposes the development of political, economic and cultural relations and connections between peoples on a basis of equal rights. There is also no doubt that a most important step on this road must be the elimination of any discrimination with regard to the Soviet Union on the part of the American authorities.

The duty of all peace-loving peoples consists in steadfastly carrying on a policy of war prevention and preservation of peace, of not permitting arms races, of attaining limitation of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons with the establishment of inspection over the implementation of such a prohibition, and of cooperating in the conclusion of a Five Power Pact for the strengthening of peace.

The conclusion of such a pact would have an exceptionally important significance in the improvement of Soviet-American relations and the strengthening of peace among peoples. Such a pact would raise the confidence of all peoples in the preservation of peace and, moreover, would permit the possibility of limiting armaments, lightening the burden of military expenditures, which lie with all their heaviness on the peoples' shoulders.

In implementing the indicated measures the American people will always find full cooperation on the part of

the Soviet people, who unalterably defend the cause of peace.

I hope that the text of the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be brought to the attention of the American people.

I take this occasion to request you to transmit to the American people my greetings and good wishes from the people of the Soviet Union.

Moscow, August 6, 1951

NIKOLAI SHVERNIK
*President of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics*

His Excellency
HARRY S. TRUMAN
President of the United States of America

RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Being informed of the joint resolution adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the USA, which was transmitted together with a letter from Mr. Truman, President of the USA, on July 7 of this year, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, combining the work of both Houses—the Council of the Union and the Council of the Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, considers it necessary to make the following statement:

1. Expressing the will of the peoples of the Soviet Union for peace, the Soviet Government always conducts a policy directed toward strengthening peace and establishing friendly relations between states. The principle of this policy was laid down in the Peace Decree adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets on November 11, 1917, as soon as the Soviet State was formed. Since that time the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has remained unchanged, being directed toward the strengthening of peace and friendly relations among peoples.

After the Second World War, when, as the result of the joint efforts of the allies, the forces of the aggressors were smashed, the aggressive states were disarmed, an international organization was established for the maintenance of peace and the prevention of the outbreak of any new aggression, conditions were created for the establishment of a lasting peace. As is known, in the matter of strengthening international security the Soviet Government assumed the initiative, coming forth with a proposal for general reduction in armaments, including as its primary mission the prohibition of the production and utilization of atomic energy for war purposes.

Subsequently, in defending the cause of peace and expressing the inflexible determination of peoples to prevent the threat of a new war, the Soviet Government has twice introduced a proposal that the United States, Great Britain, China, France, and the Soviet Union unite their efforts for the purpose of supporting international peace and security and conclude a peace pact among themselves. The initiative of the Soviet Government met with fervent support and approval on the part of the peace-loving peoples of the entire world. The Soviet people cannot understand what peace-loving motives the Government of the USA can have in hitherto rejecting the proposal of the Soviet Government for the conclusion of a peace pact between the five powers.

After the outbreak of the military conflict in Korea and the open armed intervention of the USA in Korea, the Soviet Union made repeated proposals for a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. Recently the Soviet Union again advanced a proposal to put an end to the bloodshed in Korea which has even led to negotiations for an armistice and a cessation of military activities in Korea.

August 20, 1951

The peace policy of the Soviet Union is based on the full and unconditional support of the peoples of the Soviet Union, in which there are no classes and groups which are interested in unleashing a war. The Soviet Union has no aggressive plans and does not threaten any country or any peoples. The armed forces of the Soviet Union are not waging war anywhere and are not taking part in any military actions. The peoples of the Soviet Union are completely absorbed in executing the tasks of peaceful construction. The Soviet State is developing the construction of magnificent hydroelectric stations and irrigation systems and is creating conditions for the steady future improvement of the standard of living of the population of the country.

2. In the resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the USA it is stated that the American people deeply regret the presence of "artificial barriers" that separate them from the peoples of the Soviet Union.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR must state that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union does not place any obstacles in the way of friendship of the Soviet people with the American people or with other peoples, and does not create any obstacles to the establishment of business, trade and friendly relations between them.

However, this cannot be said of the foreign policy that is being conducted by the organs of authority of the USA. This is proven not only by such facts as the systematic refusal on the part of the American authorities to issue visas for entry into the USA to agents of Soviet culture and their expulsion in spite of permits for entering the USA previously received through legal channels, but also a number of other measures of the Government of the USA of a discriminatory character with respect to the Soviet Union. For example, this is confirmed by the following facts:

(a) In December 1949 the American Immigration Authorities on the Virgin Islands, without any justification, issued an order by which the crews of two Soviet fishing vessels, the *Trepang* and the *Perlamutr*, which had called at St. Thomas for minor repairs and taking on water, were forbidden to come ashore.

(b) In July 1950 in the port of Baltimore the Soviet SS *Krasnodar* was subjected to an indiscriminate search by the American authorities, and in violation of generally accepted international custom police agents remained on board the steamship after the search until the very moment when it put to sea.

(c) On March 18, 1948 the American authorities arbitrarily seized the Soviet vessel *Rossiya* which had arrived in New York and which is state property of the Soviet Union, on the grounds of searching for two particular passengers of this vessel.

(d) In March 1949 the Immigration Authorities in New York proposed to the Soviet representatives who were present at the Congress of Cultural and Scientific Workers of the USA in Defense of Peace, to leave the United States within a week under the threat of application of administrative measures against them in case they did not comply with this order.

(e) In October 1950 at the Brumm airport in New York two Soviet diplomatic couriers were detained in spite of the fact that they had American diplomatic visas on their passports.

(f) In March 1951 the Department of Commerce issued an order to annul the licensing for exporting scientific and technical literature to the Soviet Union.

(g) Recently in front of the building of the Mission of the USSR at the United Nations in New York there have been gathering, with the connivance of the police, gangs of hooligans who interfere with the normal work of the Mission and threaten the personal security of its members. On the second of August the First Secretary of the Mission, A. S. Polyanski, who possesses diplomatic immunity, was, on his exit from the Mission, subjected before the eyes of the police to an attack by hooligans who hit him on the head with sticks.

(h) On the 23rd of June of this year, only a few days before the President of the United States of America sent the Resolution of the Congress of the USA to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, N. M. Shvernik, the Government of the United States of America denounced the Trade Agreement concluded between the USSR and the USA in 1937.

(i) On June 2 of this year a law was passed by the Congress which demanded that countries receiving so-called economic and financial aid from the USA practically eliminate trade with the Soviet Union and with the countries of the Peoples' Democracy under threat of termination of this aid.

(j) The prohibited lists published on June 7 of this year in connection with this law include almost all goods entering into international trade.

(k) On August 2, even after the approach of the Congress of the USA to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the House of Representatives of the Congress passed a new law which, under the pretext of prohibiting shipments of strategic materials, provides for measures directed toward the termination of trade with the Soviet Union and with countries friendly to the Soviet Union.

The discriminatory measures in the trade field indicated above have led to the result that the exchange of goods between the USSR and the USA over the past five years beginning with 1946 has dropped more than six times and has reached an almost non-existent level.

Thus all these facts bear witness that on the part of the organs of power of the United States of America there is carried on a policy of discrimination toward the USSR and artificial barriers are being set up which interfere with the free intercourse of the Soviet and American peoples and which are pushing our countries apart from each other.

There arises a legitimate question how to reconcile the statements contained in the resolution of the Congress of the USA regarding the necessity for the elimination of barriers in relations between the peoples of the two countries with the above mentioned acts of the American authorities.

The Soviet people have no doubt that the American people, like all other peoples, do not want war. However, as history shows, questions of peace and war are not always decided by the people. The statements of many responsible representatives of the Government of the United States of America, and also of members of the Congress of the USA, contain direct appeals for the unleashing of aggressive war against the peoples of the USSR, for the use of weapons of mass destruction against the peaceful population. Such statements, which contradict not only the interests of peace but also the elementary requirements of human morality, must call forth condemnation on the part of the Congress of the United States.

3. The Government of the United States of America came forth as the initiator of the establishment of the North Atlantic military union directed, it is clear, against the USSR. It has established a wide network of military bases on foreign territory near the frontiers of the USSR and, in infringement of obligations taken upon itself, is putting into effect the remilitarization of Western Germany and is reestablishing Japanese militarism. At the same time there is being implemented in the United States of America a gigantic armament program.

The Government of the USA has unalterably refused all proposals of the Soviet Government aimed at strengthening peace and international security. Thus, up to this time there has not been achieved an agreement for the conclusion of a Peace Pact between the Five Powers, for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the establishment of inspection over the implementation of this prohibition, and also for the limitation of armaments and armed forces. In the Resolution of the Congress the thought is set forth that now the path is open for the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time there is no doubt that only after the prohibition of

atomic weapons can atomic energy actually be used for peaceful purposes, for the welfare of peoples.

The Soviet people are daily convinced that the policy and actions of the Government of the United States of America diverge from its verbal declarations regarding the preservation of peace, and equally from the peace-loving desires of the American people, and that there are being established conditions for the further worsening of relations with the Soviet Union, although no danger has threatened and does not threaten the United States from the Soviet Union.

4. It goes without saying that one can only welcome the approach of the Congress of the U.S. to the Soviet people and its appeal for the strengthening of friendly relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, an approach by words with an appeal for cooperation in the improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA and in the strengthening of international peace can give positive results only in the event that there is no divergency between it and the deeds of the Government of the USA, the policy and actions of the Government of the United States of America.

However, inasmuch as the Congress of the USA states that it is seeking a path toward the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, it can have no doubts that such attempts by the Congress will find a response in the peace-loving efforts of the Soviet people and the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet considers that one of the serious steps on this road could be the elimination of the discrimination toward the Soviet Union in all fields of international relationships which hinder normal relations between our countries.

A still more important step in the matter of improving relations between our countries and strengthening peace between peoples could be the conclusion of a Peace Pact between the Five Powers, to which could also adhere other states which are striving to strengthen peace.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no doubt that all peoples striving for the preservation of peace would greet with great satisfaction the conclusion of such a pact.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet expresses the hope that the Congress of the United States of America will bring the present Resolution to the attention of the American people.

AUGUST 6, 1951.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House August 9]

The Government of the Soviet Union has replied to the resolution of the United States Congress declaring the friendship of our people for the Soviet peoples and our deep desire to achieve world peace. The Soviet Government withheld this resolution from the people of the Soviet Union for more than a month—although, of course, some of them heard it over the Voice of America. Now, the Soviet Government has finally released the resolution through Soviet newspapers and over the Soviet radio.

I am glad they did this, as millions of Soviet citizens can now hear and read for themselves the resolution of friendship enacted by the representatives of the American people.

Mr. Shvernik's reply, naturally, was released in our country as soon as it was received, since in a free country there is no reason or desire to withhold such information from the people. I noted

with special interest the statement in Mr. Shvernik's letter that the Soviet Government places no barriers in the path of the intercourse of the Soviet people with the people of other countries. This has not been true in the past—witness the rigid prohibitions laid down by the Soviet Government against people from the Soviet Union traveling abroad and people from other countries traveling in the Soviet Union, the rigid restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government on the reading of books and magazines and newspapers from outside of the Soviet Union by Soviet people, the large-scale and costly effort by the Soviet Government to “jam” the radio broadcasts of the Voice of America and other free radios, the prevention by the Soviet Government of Russian wives of citizens of other countries from leaving the Soviet Union, and many other barriers preventing travel and communication between the Soviet Union and other countries. I will be particularly interested to see whether the Soviet Government means what it says, and now intends to change these policies.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

[Released to the press August 8]

I am glad to note that the Soviet Government has finally seen fit to release the text of the Congressional Resolution expressing the friendship of the American people for the peoples of the Soviet Union which was transmitted by President Truman to Mr. Shvernik over a month ago. This is a step forward. The peoples of the U.S.S.R. have now seen, in striking contrast to what they are continuously told by their own Government, an assurance that the American people and the Government of the United States are earnestly seeking a real peace. The members of Congress deserve our thanks for wisely adopting the resolution which made it possible to get this truth to the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

In expressing satisfaction over the Soviet Government's disclosure of the Congressional Resolution of peace and friendship, let me add the hope that this may be the first of many actions to permit the peoples of the Soviet Union to catch up with the facts of the world situation, particularly with respect to the attitudes and policies of other peoples and their Governments.

The Iron Curtain remains a basic obstacle to the attainment of that peace which will ease the tension in people's minds everywhere. It is vital that it not merely be penetrated occasionally by a ray of truth but that it some day cease to exist—and the sooner the better for the realization of the general hope for a peaceful and secure world.

There is one phrase used by Mr. Shvernik in his letter with which I think we can all agree. That is his reference to the necessity that govern-

ments must encourage by every means the support of peace not just with words but with deeds. These deeds are exactly what we have been awaiting from the Soviet Union. Mr. Shvernik states that the duty of all peace-loving peoples consists in steadfastly carrying on a policy for the prevention of war and for the preservation of peace, of not permitting an armament race, of attaining the limitation of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons with the establishment of inspection over the implementation of such a prohibition.

Since the end of the war the United Nations, which was ignored in Mr. Shvernik's letter, has been working to attain precisely these objectives. But its work has been obstructed continually by the Soviet Government. If the Soviet Union now wants to reach concrete realistic agreements, all of these objectives can be realized within the United Nations.

However, the Soviet communication brings up again the subject of the vague “Five-Power Pact.” Why only five powers to make peace? We already have a peace pact, not only among five powers but among sixty nations, in the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet communication uses the word “peace” much too loosely. We hold “peace” to be more than a word on a printed page.

“Peace” for us is the opportunity to live our own lives in full liberty and to work together in true friendship with all peoples of this earth towards creation of a better life. “Peace” is freedom and justice and progress for all mankind.

I wish again to invite the Soviet Government to join us wholeheartedly on the United Nations road to peace. The Soviet Government could show its will for peace, not merely in words but by deeds, by joining without reservation in carrying out the programs set forth in three United Nations resolutions which point the way to peace. These are the three key resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1949 and 1950 which set forth the kind of conduct and action necessary to world peace. They are entitled “Essentials of Peace,”¹ “Peace Through Deeds,”² and “Uniting for Peace.”³ Each was approved by the great majority of the nations of the world, but opposed by the Soviet Union and its satellites. I suggest that everyone should reread and study these resolutions, and by “everyone” I mean also the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Will their Government give them the same opportunity that peoples of the free world have had to read and study these important resolutions? That remains to be seen.

The door is wide open to the Soviet Union to participate with the free world in making these resolutions effective.

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1949, p. 807.

² BULLETIN of Nov. 13, 1950, p. 767.

³ BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1950, p. 655.

Export-Import Bank Grants Credit to Spanish National Railway

The grant of a credit not to exceed 7.5 million dollars to the Spanish National Railway System under the authorization contained in Title I, Chapter XI, of the General Appropriation Act of 1951, was announced on July 20 by the Export-Import Bank.

The Spanish National Railways or RENFE (*Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles*), established in 1941 as an autonomous public enterprise, accounts for approximately 80 percent of the mileage of all railroads in Spain, having about 8,000 miles of track, more than 3,000 locomotives, and more than 74,000 freight cars.

The reconstruction of the railway system, a facility of prime importance to the Spanish domestic economy and foreign trade, was begun in 1949 through a plan calling for local expenditures of about 6 billion pesetas, to be financed through public bond issues, and for foreign exchange outlays for essential equipment equivalent to 70 million dollars to be financed mostly on a credit basis. By the end of 1950 more than one-third of the planned local expenditures had been made and approximately two-thirds of the estimated foreign requirements had been placed abroad on either a credit or cash basis.

The Bank's credits of up to 7.5 million dollars are designed to assist RENFE in carrying out essential parts of the reconstruction program by providing financing for three types of purchases: rails and accessories up to 1.3 million dollars; signaling equipment up to 1.2 million dollars; and electric locomotives and substations and other related equipment up to 5 million dollars.

The rails and accessories to be financed under the credit are required to meet the most urgent needs, especially to replace worn out or light rails of sections of the railroad track important to international traffic and to the areas where Spain's major mineral production is located. The signaling equipment is required for two of the seven zones of the RENFE system, the other five zones having already been taken care of through previous arrangements. The locomotives, substations, and other minor equipment are needed to carry out the electrification of two important passes in the line stretching from the French border to the Straits of Gibraltar. Two other important passes on this line have already been electrified, one in 1929 and one in 1945. The electrification of the two passes being financed under the credits will enable the RENFE to remove serious present traffic bottlenecks, increase its traction load, and achieve economies in the use of coal, some of which has had to be imported from abroad.

The terms of the RENFE credit are identical with those of the preceding credits authorized in favor of Spain: the credit bears interest at 3 percent per

annum payable semiannually; the principal to be repaid in 20 years following a period of grace of 5 years; the credit is to be unconditionally guaranteed by the Spanish Government.

New York Polish Information Service Closed in Answer to Polish Actions Against U.S.

[Released to the press August 9]

The Polish Foreign Minister called in the American Ambassador Joseph Flack on August 8 and asked that the activities of the United States Information Service, including distribution of the English and Polish language wireless bulletins, film showings, and library functions, should be terminated as of that date. Since the Polish Government insisted that this was final there was no alternative but to comply with this request.

The United States Government regards this action of the Polish Government as an entirely unwarranted interference with the free exchange of information between nations, an exchange which this Government is always ready to foster on a fair and reciprocal basis. It is recalled, moreover, how much the Polish people appreciated, ever since the United States Information Service was established at Warsaw, the services it performed. There is every reason to believe that these activities in the interest of a better understanding between peoples will be missed by the Polish nation.

The Polish Ambassador here has been summoned today and informed that the Polish Research and Information Service at New York must be closed within 24 hours.

Action Requested for Financing Palestine Refugee Program

[Released to the press by the White House July 27]

The President on July 27 sent identical letters to Kenneth McKellar, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate, and Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The text of the letter follows:

I wish to call to your attention a critical situation which now exists with respect to the financing of the Palestine Refugee Program of the United Nations. This program of relief to Arab refugees displaced from Palestine was carried on during the fiscal year 1951 through contributions from participating countries, including a contribution

from the United States of \$25,450,000. The Mutual Security Program now before the Congress includes a request of \$50,000,000 for the United States contribution to this program in the fiscal year 1952.

In the July Joint Resolution making temporary appropriations, no provision was made for the Palestine Refugee Program. The program was carried forward during July, however, through the use of existing stocks and funds from other sources. Available resources are now nearly exhausted.

One of the principal causes of tension in the Near East is the miserable state of the hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees from Palestine. A major step forward was recently made when the Arab League went on record in favor of a massive program of resettlement of Palestinian refugees in the Arab States. Grave damage to this program is likely to result if the present aid program collapses because of a temporary shortage of funds.

I therefore urgently request that the pending continuing resolution provide \$2,000,000 for the month of August and \$3,000,000 for the month of September. Such a contribution is essential to prevent the starvation of many refugees and to avoid a deterioration in the present critical situation in the Near East.

Letter of Credence

Hungary

The newly appointed Minister of Hungary, Dr. Emil Weil, presented his credentials to the President on August 7, 1951. For the text of the Minister's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 706 of August 7.

Tripartite Security Treaty To Be Signed

Released to the press August 8]

The Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America will sign the tripartite security treaty at San Francisco on September 1. The draft of the treaty was initialed by representatives of those Governments at Washington on July 12, 1951, and made public at the same time.¹

This arrangement among the three Governments, as said by President Truman in his statement of April 18, 1951, is one of a series of arrangements toward strengthening the fabric of peace in the Pacific.² It is expected that these will be fol-

lowed in due course by other steps looking toward what the preamble and article VIII of the draft treaty describe as "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area."

As the President announced on July 20, the United States delegation to conclude the tripartite security treaty will be composed of the Secretary of State and Ambassador John Foster Dulles, together with Senator Tom Connally and Senator Alexander Wiley, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all with plenipotentiary powers. Additional delegates with power to act as alternates to those above named will be Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and Representatives Mike Mansfield, and Walter H. Judd, the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Far Eastern Subcommittee.

Financial Convention With Dominican Republic Terminated

[Released to the press August 9]

The Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, Luis Francisco Thomen, on August 9 signed an exchange of notes on behalf of their Governments which recognizes the termination of the convention between the Dominican Republic and the United States, signed at Washington on September 24, 1940, and of the accompanying exchanges of notes signed on the same date.

The exchange of notes signed gives recognition to the fact that the Dominican Republic has redeemed in full its external debts of 1922 and 1926 in accordance with the bond contracts. In fulfilling the commitments assumed in connection with these bonds and with certain private claims, the Dominican Republic has fully discharged the last financial obligation to the United States assumed under the terms of the 1940 financial convention. The note signed by the Secretary states that these developments have been noted with great satisfaction by the Government of the United States.

This marks a highly significant event in the economic history of the Dominican Republic. It will be remembered that this island republic required United States assistance to meet its foreign obligations and that the United States managed the Dominican customs until the Dominican Government assumed full control over national finances in 1940 under the terms of the financial convention signed that year.

¹ BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 147.

² BULLETIN of April 30, 1951, p. 699.

The international financial position of the Dominican Republic has shown in recent years continuing improvement and the notes exchanged evidence the success of the Dominican program to extinguish foreign obligations.

Point Four Agricultural Agreements Signed With Land Grant Colleges

[Released to the press July 10]

Technical Cooperation Administrator Henry G. Bennett today announced that agreements have been signed with four land grant colleges for collaboration in Point Four agricultural projects in Latin American countries. This participation will include advanced instruction of trainees, an agricultural extension and home economics project in Brazil, a program to make scientific agricultural publications available to Latin American institutions, and a biometric survey to show the climatic and geographic adaptability of certain farm products.

The participating colleges are the New Mexico Agricultural and Mechanical College, Purdue University, the University of Minnesota, and North Carolina State College.

The New Mexico Agricultural and Mechanical College will bring 40 Latin American trainees to New Mexico where they will be given a 1-month course in seminars, lectures, and demonstration on modern farm practices. They will then receive another month's training in the field working on the farms of Spanish-speaking New Mexicans. The courses will start August first. The trainees will be selected by the various countries in cooperation with the United States embassies. They will be chosen from the most outstanding candidates. After completing their studies, they are expected to return to their own countries to undertake training programs there.

Dr. Bennett said that these trainees should form a nucleus for training in their own countries which will bring knowledge of the most modern and effective techniques to their people in the best tradition of the American farm extension service.

The contract with Purdue University is to furnish a farm extension and a home economics expert for the Fazenda Ipanema in the State of São Paulo in Brazil. The Government of Brazil requested Point Four cooperation in its program of farm extension and home economics training and Purdue University was asked to furnish the experts. Fazenda Ipanema is also the center of a project in which American experts train Brazilians in mechanized farming.

Minnesota University has agreed to cooperate with Point Four and the Department of Agriculture to make scientific agricultural publications

available to scientists in the countries cooperating under Point Four. Dr. Bennett said:

Progress in improving crops and agricultural methods in countries where the Technical Cooperation Administration has projects in operation requires that institutions there have the scientific literature available for information on the latest advances in the rest of the world. The agreement with Minnesota University provides for a field service consultant to select suitable depositories in co-operating countries through surveys and investigation of agricultural research institutions and to aid them in establishing usable files and catalogues.

The Committee on the distribution of experimental station publications to foreign countries of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges has expressed interest in this project and has promised cooperation.

The Library of the Department of Agriculture will receive the information from the field staff and will indicate the appropriate experiment field stations in the United States to supply the publications to countries with comparable soil and climatic conditions.

North Carolina has contracted with the Department of Agriculture under a Point Four project to furnish biometric surveys in cooperation with the Department in areas to be decided upon as the need arises. These surveys are designed to afford accurate information as to the seeds and plants suitable to certain climatic, soil, and physical conditions. They will show the types and species of plants which can be successfully grown in areas where food crops are insufficient for local needs or to furnish economically sound new products.

Dr. Bennett recalled that the first Point Four agreement with a land grant college was signed with the University of Arkansas last April. It provided for an extensive cooperative agricultural program with the Republic of Panama in which the technicians will be furnished by the University.

Army Mission Agreement With Venezuela

There was signed on August 10 by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Señor Dr. Antonio Martín Araujo, Ambassador of Venezuela to the United States, an agreement providing for the detail of personnel of the United States Army to serve as an advisory mission in Venezuela. The agreement is to continue in force for 4 years from the date of signature, and may be extended beyond that period at the request of the Government of Venezuela.

The agreement is similar to numerous other agreements in force between the United States and certain other American republics providing for the detail of officers and enlisted men of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps to advise the armed forces of those countries.

A Critical Review of Our Economy

Statement by Isador Lubin

*U.S. Representative in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*¹

[Excerpts]

Before the invasion of Korea a year ago, our efforts had been chiefly concentrated on expanding civilian production and on maintaining high levels of employment in order that we might further increase our standards of living at home and assist the free countries of the world to restore and enhance their standards of living. By June 1950 our industrial production had risen to the highest point since 1945, surpassing the previous postwar record, established during 1948.

The healthy state of our economy was also reflected in the employment situation. In June 1950—before the attack on Korea—the number of nonagricultural workers had climbed to nearly 52½ million. This was a new all-time high for that month. Unemployment also had declined. It fell by over a million in 6 months. At midyear, 1950, the economic outlook generally was for further growth in production and employment.

It is worth emphasizing again that this favorable outlook was not dependent upon an accelerated defense program. Before the attack on Korea, our economy had reached the highest levels in its peacetime history. Actually, the necessity for embarking upon substantial diversions of our resources to assure the security of the free world subjected our economy to undesirable strains.

While we were occupied with peaceful pursuits at home, before the attack on Korea, we did not neglect the economic problems of other free nations. We continued our cooperation with the countries of Western Europe in the reconstruction of their war-shattered economies. Through financial and technical assistance we continued to aid the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

¹Made before the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on Aug. 2 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

During the period from July 1950 to July 1951, there was a substantial increase in production from the high levels already attained. The total output of goods and services in real terms, that is, after full allowance for price changes, increased by about 10 percent between the second quarter of 1950 and the second quarter of 1951. In other words, output increased from an annual rate of about 300 billion dollars to about 330 billion dollars at constant prices. This represented the highest level of production ever recorded, exceeding even the peak year of World War II.

Effect of Increased Demand

The sudden increase in demand had an inevitable immediate effect on our price structure. Prices, which had risen only moderately during the first half of 1950, climbed rapidly with the expansion of total demand after the attack on Korea. There were sharp increases during the summer of 1950, followed by a short period of relative stability. A further upward movement occurred between November 1950 and February 1951. Beginning in February the accumulated effects of the various measures taken to restrain inflation began to be felt. The rise in prices was checked. In fact there were some declines in the period between February and June, especially in wholesale prices.

Three major developments, then, have marked the course of the United States economy during the first half of the current year. In chronological order they were: first, a brief renewal of the general upsurge of demand and of prices. Next, the further elaboration of a broad structure of economic controls, followed by an abatement of inflationary pressures. And, finally, there was a significant expansion of total production with a more rapid expansion of defense production. As the President pointed out in his recent midyear

economic report to the Congress, the fact that we have continued to expand output without inflation is a salient fact about economic developments since the early part of this year.

We do not regard these accomplishments, however, as affording us any ground for complacency. As I have stated, during the second quarter of 1951, defense expenditures reached an annual rate of over 35 billion dollars. Present schedules call for an annual rate of over 65 billion dollars by the middle of 1952. The enlargement of the security program, together with the necessary requirements of other free nations, will inevitably place strains on many parts of our economy. During the next year, we cannot increase our total output at the same rate as defense production will have to be increased. In the case of many basic commodities, increased security and related requirements will appreciably reduce the amounts available for our civilian consumption. As a result of our determination to protect ourselves against possible aggression, we were faced in the summer of 1950 with potential shortages and inflationary pressures. To combat these difficulties my Government undertook a comprehensive program for expanding production, for controlling inflation, and for the equitable distribution of materials and production in scarce supply.

To these ends, we have developed a series of closely interrelated economic policies. We have undertaken (1) to increase productivity and total production; (2) to bring spending by consumers and business as nearly as possible into line with available supplies of consumer and producer goods; and (3) to distribute raw materials and productive resources with relation to the essentiality of domestic and international requirements.

From the beginning of the present emergency, the United States Government has emphasized the importance of expanding productive capacity.

Nor have we concentrated solely upon expanding the production of raw materials or industrial commodities. My Government has also taken steps to increase production of agricultural commodities in response to increased demand. The program of the United States Department of Agriculture calls for the highest total production of agricultural commodities in history. The largest increases in output are being sought for such products as cotton, corn, wheat, and rice. In recent months, as the impact of the security program on the economy has become more marked, we have made notable progress in developing a many-sided program for keeping inflationary pressures in check. This many-sided program has included fiscal and credit measures, direct price and wage controls, and allocations of scarce materials to meet essential needs.

In the fiscal field we have taken a number of steps. In September 1950, increases in individual and corporate income taxes were enacted. At the beginning of 1951 an excess profits tax, retroactive

to June 1950, was also enacted. It is estimated that these tax increases will produce 8 to 9 billion dollars a year. A new tax program is now under consideration which is designed to produce another 7 to 10 billion dollars annually. This program calls for higher personal income tax rates, higher corporate income tax rates, and increased excise taxes. In the fiscal year just ended, cash receipts for the Federal Government from these taxes aggregated 48 billion dollars. Eighty percent of this amount came from direct taxes on individuals and corporations. By placing greatest reliance on personal and corporate income taxes we are seeking to distribute the total tax burden equitably.

While expanding defense expenditures, we are mindful of the need to economize in other directions. However, we are determined not to curtail public social services such as education and health which are fundamental to our social well-being and economic strength. That strength, we realize, depends upon our human resources even more than upon our physical plant.

Our price regulations, it should be emphasized, apply to export prices as well as to domestic prices. If the prices which foreign consumers have to pay in their own countries for American products are so far above our controlled export prices as to warrant complaints on their part, the blame must be put where it properly belongs. The responsibility clearly does not rest with the United States.

The inflationary pressure exerted by the course of import prices has given us much concern. The prices of our imports have risen much faster than the prices of our exports. Let me cite a few striking figures. Between the first half of 1950 and March 1951, the average price of all imports into the United States rose by 34 percent; during this same period export prices rose by 16 percent. To put this in other words, in March 1951, a given amount of exports bought, on the average, 14 percent fewer imports than in the first half of 1950. If comparisons are made with the prewar period of 1936-38, the ratio of import and export prices in early 1951 was 46 percent more favorable to the suppliers of imports to the United States than during that prewar period.

The United States is fully aware that the joint strength of the free world requires not only military strength, but also moral strength, economic strength, and above all unity of ultimate purpose and that all of these factors must be taken into account in determining the use of our resources.

In the field of raw materials, the United States in cooperation with other nations, is seeking through the International Materials Conference to deal with the problem of world shortage through common action. The Conference has already agreed upon the establishment of national allocation arrangements for sulphur, molybdenum and tungsten.² This is an encouraging manifesta-

² BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 192.

ion of what can be accomplished through international cooperation and good will. The United States delegation wishes to point out, not without some satisfaction, that of the three commodities concerning which agreement as to allocation has been reached, the United States is the principal producer of two, namely, sulphur and molybdenum. The United States is also the major

source of that portion of the world supply of these commodities that would move in international trade under the allocation plans.

We are convinced that equitable distribution of burdens and sacrifices is of "high importance for the attainment of the over-all objective of economic strength and morale in the free countries."

Twenty-fifth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1-15, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2277
Transmitted August 3, 1951

I herewith submit report number 25 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 July, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiques numbers 931-945, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The preceding report quotes a United Nations Command message broadcast on 30 June to the Commander-in-Chief, Communist forces in Korea, stating that I had been informed that he might desire a meeting to discuss an armistice in Korea. On the first day of July there was broadcast by Peiping radio a joint message from Generals Kim Il Sung of the North Korean Army and Peng Teh-huai of the Chinese Communist Army, that their representatives would meet with mine for the conduct of talks concerning the cessation of military action. Their message proposed 10 July as the date of the meeting, and Kaesong near the 38th parallel as the place.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the acting U.S. representative to the Security Council on August 3. For texts of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operation in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. The reports which have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively will appear hereafter only in the BULLETIN. The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the fifteenth and sixteenth reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the seventeenth report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the eighteenth in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the nineteenth report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the twentieth report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the twenty-first report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the twenty-second in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the twenty-third and twenty-fourth reports in the BULLETIN of August 13, 1951, p. 265.

August 20, 1951

On 3 July, calling attention to the fact that delays in initiating the meeting would prolong the fighting and increase the loss of life, I proposed that liaison officers from my headquarters confer with their liaison officers on 5 July to insure satisfactory arrangements for the first meeting of the accredited representatives. Peiping radio on 4 July broadcast the two Communist commanders' agreement to this proposal except for the date, which they suggested be 8 July. Several further exchanges of messages regarding related details led to the meeting of the liaison officers at Kaesong on 8 July, at which time arrangements were discussed for the first conference of the delegations of both forces to be held 10 July.

At Kaesong on this latter date and again on 11 July, the United Nations Command delegation consisting of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Major General L. C. Craigie, Major General Henry I. Hodes, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke and Major General Paik, Sun Yup met the Communist delegation of General Nam Il, Major General Lee Sang Jo, Major General Chang Pyong-San, Lt. General Tung Hua and Major General Fang Hsieh. The two meetings were devoted to a discussion of the agenda which each group presented subsequent to the opening remarks by the chief delegates of the opposing forces. The opening remarks of Vice Admiral Joy express the intent and spirit of the United Nations Command in engaging in the armistice talks.

The United Nations Command delegation here present represents and speaks for the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. It does so fully and solemnly conscious of the great importance to the peoples of the entire world of the discussions begun here today.

It is understood, of course, that hostilities will continue in all areas except in those neutral zones agreed upon, until such time as there is an agreement on the terms governing the armistice, and until such time as an approved armistice commission is prepared to function.

The United Nations Command delegation is prepared to do its part in trying to work out an armistice agreement with representatives of the Communist forces in Korea for the cessation of hostilities in Korea under con-

ditions which will assure against their resumption. This delegation is here for that sole purpose. It will discuss military matters in Korea relating to that subject.

This delegation will not discuss political or economic matters of any kind. This delegation will not discuss military matters unrelated to Korea.

RIDGWAY

Success or failure of negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of delegations here present. With good faith on both sides there can be created an atmosphere of mutual confidence. In such an atmosphere there is every reason to hope for success. Such an atmosphere can exist where truth prevails.

As the senior United Nations Command delegate and personal representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, I desire to state with utmost earnestness and emphasis and in language so clear that it cannot be misunderstood that the United Nations Command delegation will act in good faith. We must assume that the representatives of the Communist forces in Korea here present will do likewise.

Within the limits of the conference room, although basic differences in view were revealed, an open and formal atmosphere and general harmony prevailed. However, in the area surrounding the conference room, Communist armed guards were constantly in evidence, and, acting obviously under orders of their superiors, presumed to question and restrict the movement of the United Nations Command delegates and couriers to and about the conference site.

At both the meetings Admiral Joy presented a proposal that international newsmen be admitted to the scene of the conference, emphasizing that they would not be admitted to the conference room. General Nam Il postponed answering. Admiral Joy informed him prior to the recessing of the second session that the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, intended that twenty newsmen form an integral part of the United Nations Command delegation to all subsequent sessions of the armistice conferences.

On 12 July Communist armed guards denied the newsmen access to the conference area. The United Nations Command delegation was instructed to continue to recess until such representation as deemed proper by me was admitted to the conference area. Inasmuch as no change in the Communist attitude had been indicated by 13 July, I dispatched to the Communist commanders a review of the proposals that I or my representatives had made which would have produced in the conference area absolutely neutral conditions without restraints being imposed by either party. Though our proposals leading to these ends had been rejected or ignored, our delegation, in the interest of avoiding unnecessary bloodshed, had proceeded to the first two conferences. I informed the Communist commanders that the negotiations could proceed successfully only under conditions guaranteeing equality of treatment to the negotiators, removing the restrictions which had impeded the movement of United Nations delegates and couriers and removing armed personnel from the conference site. My recommended

means for attaining these conditions was the establishment of a neutral zone around Kaesong free of armed personnel and the exclusion of armed personnel from routes to the zone.

To this latter recommendation the Communist leaders agreed on 14 July. The talks were resumed in a two-to-four o'clock meeting the afternoon of 15 July.

Concurrent with the armistice talks, military operations continued. Neither side undertook large-scale operations, but there were numerous small-unit contacts as United Nations reconnaissance patrols sought to gain firm intelligence on enemy dispositions.

On the western part of the front, from Changdan to Kumhwa, United Nations patrols advanced up to six miles before eliciting counteraction. Bitter opposition was consistently encountered in the Otan-Amhyon area, astride the Imjin River where every United Nations approach drew violent reaction from hostile groups of substantial strength, well supported by artillery and mortars. On the fifty mile front from Kumhwa eastward to Changjong, the enemy screening forces remained within one or two miles of the United Nations front, and promptly disputed advance by United Nations patrols. Action was virtually continuous to the north and east of Kumhwa where the enemy undertook persistent probing attacks at rates of two to four per night, usually executed by platoons or companies, relatively well supported by artillery and mortar fire. Farther east, numerous local thrusts and counterthrusts occurred south of Chuk-tong and Hoegok. In the Pia area, there was evidence of increased artillery strength, and to the south of Changjong, small enemy units made several light probing attacks. Front lines remained stable throughout the period, except for a slight southward adjustment on the extreme east flank. The front extended from Munsan northeast to Kumhwa, eastward to Wolsan, and northeast to the vicinity of Pohang.

The most significant military development during the period was continuance of hostile activities which heretofore have presaged a new major offensive. The enemy continued to augment his supply installations, particularly near the central and eastern fronts, and markedly increased the artillery and mortar support to practically all his forward elements as far east as Pia. Vehicle sightings have reached proportions similar to those which preceded earlier major offensives, and once more there are indications through prisoners of war that fresh forces are being readied for action. On the other hand, the extensive system of anti-tank defenses previously noted opposite the western front has been extended more than forty miles eastward to the vicinity of Pia, and now covers all trafficable north-south routes except those along the east coast.

Guerrilla strength in United Nations rear areas increased slightly, but the level of guerrilla activ-

ity remained unchanged. Although the enemy is still striving to increase the strength and effectiveness of these forces, his efforts are largely negated by United Nations security forces and the fact that the guerrilla forces must devote primary attention to defense and survival.

United Nations carrier-based and Marine shore-based aircraft were active in daily close air support of United Nations ground forces and in operations designed to interdict road and rail movement of enemy personnel and supplies throughout North Korea. A day-long strike of carrier-based aircraft on targets in the Wonsan area featured the interdiction program.

A sizeable destroyer and frigate group, concentrated in the Wonsan area, conducted daily naval gunfire interdiction operations against bridges, tunnels, roads, and rail crossings in the vicinity of that important communications hub. Smaller forces conducted similar operations periodically in the Songjin and Chongjin areas with effective results. Enemy shore batteries in these areas continued active, but their efforts failed to interfere seriously with the operations of United Nations surface forces.

Frequent opportunities for naval gunfire support of United Nations ground forces were afforded on the east coast of Korea during the period of this report. Destroyer, cruiser and battleship types were employed in these operations, which achieved gratifying results.

United Nations surface forces and carrier based aircraft on the west coast of Korea directed particular attention to the interdiction of enemy small boat and junk traffic, destroying substantial numbers of enemy small-craft.

Check mine-sweeping operations were continued on both coasts of Korea, primarily for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment and gunfire support. Drifting mines continue to menace shipping in the sea of Japan.

The medium bombers of the United States Far East Air Forces conducted operations against enemy-held airfields, troop and supply concentrations and rail and highway lines of communication. Following the initial heavy damage to the airfields by the B-29's, the task of keeping the fields unserviceable was assumed by the light bombers and fighter bombers, the former operating by night and the latter striking in low-level attacks using bombs, rockets, napalm and machine-gun fire.

During the latter part of the period the medium bombers, while concentrating their effort upon marshalling yards along the enemy's main supply routes, have blasted enemy troops near the front lines with air-bursting bombs using radar techniques.

The interdiction efforts of the United States Fifth Air Force, including the shore-based United States Marines and the South African Squadron, were devoted to effective multiple cuts of railroads

and highways and destroying bridges. Continued emphasis was placed on seeking out and destroying the enemy's rolling stock and vehicles on a round-the-clock basis, flare dropping planes assisting in the night operations. Close support and armed reconnaissance missions decreased over previous periods, due to the somewhat limited nature of ground operations. Sorties made available by this cutback were applied in hostile rear areas to discourage the build-up of supplies and equipment during the armistice negotiations.

The MIG-15s were encountered as far south as Pyongyang and the count of destroyed or damaged MIGs increased by over fourteen during this period with damage sustained by only 2 F-86s.

Transport aircraft including C-47s of the Royal Hellenic Air Force continued their daily efforts despite periods of bad weather. With the decrease in ground action and concomitant build-up of United Nations supply stocks in the forward areas the requirement for airlift lessened.

The continued willingness of the United Nations to arrange discussions leading to the restoration of peace have been fully reported throughout Korea by leaflets, newssheets, loudspeaker and radio broadcasts. To insure wide understanding and recognition of the facts, regular publicity has been given to the actual military situation and to the serious defeats inflicted upon the aggressors prior to their engaging in armistice discussions. Continuing broadcasts and leaflet air-drops are informing civilians and enemy forces daily of the United Nations leadership in efforts to restore peace and to prevent renewal of Communist aggression.

U.N. Commander Praises Work of Civilian Specialists

On August 1 the Secretary-General of the United Nations received the following statement by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, dealing with the work of the civilian specialists provided by certain specialized agencies of the United Nations and the League of Red Cross Societies for service with the U.N. Civil Assistance Command in Korea:

Shortly after the attack on the Republic of Korea by North Korean Communist Forces in June 1950, it became evident that the newly established Republic of Korea would be unable to cope with the momentous problems created by the thousands of civilians fleeing before the advancing enemy forces. Reports began to reflect outbreaks of smallpox, typhoid, dysentery, and cholera, which if unchecked would have not only ravaged the civilian population of South Korea, but also would have seriously endangered the safety of the United Nations military personnel fighting to repel the invading forces.

In response to an appeal by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, those humanitarian organizations devoted to the principles of relieving human suffering, the League of Red Cross Societies, the World Health Organization, and the International Refugee Organization made available to the United Nations Command specialists in public health, welfare, sanitation, and relief to assure that the level of health and welfare of the civilian population was maintained in accordance with humanitarian principles. Around this core of specialists and such military persons as could be spared from combat duty was formed the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea. That the work of this organization has been successful is demonstrated by the facts that there have been no major outbreaks of disease, no widespread starvation, and a minimum of unrest in South Korea, where almost 5 million of the 21 million population are displaced from their former homes.

The civilian specialists in the United Nations Civil Assistance Command represent 13 different nationalities. The World Health Organization and the International Refugee Organization have furnished 36 health and welfare officers and sanitary engineers. The National Red Cross societies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, and Canada have also furnished

3-man units, each consisting of a health officer, a welfare officer, and a sanitary engineer. To cope with the increased problems of employment and labor, the International Labor Organization has recently made available two advisers to assist the Korean Government in this field. The frequently recurring problems among the civil population, arising at widely separated points, have required that these men devote their efforts to assisting the Korean population without regard to the normal inclination to work with one's own countrymen.

The work of the Civil Assistance Command is not only essential to the success of military forces but is also of vital importance to insure the total success of the tasks undertaken by the United Nations in Korea. The success of military operations affects only indirectly the individual Korean civilian. The lasting impression of the United Nations concern for the individual Korean will be made through the efforts of the United Nations organization and other humanitarian groups to provide the minimum necessities of life. The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, is firmly convinced that organizations having representation in the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea can be proud of the accomplishments of their personnel in Korea. Their untiring, impartial efforts have set an example for free people everywhere.

Armistice Negotiations in Korea

Message From the U.N. Commander to the North Korean and Chinese Communist Commanders¹

[AUGUST 7, 1951]

[Excerpts]

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway on August 7 acknowledged receipt of the Communist reply of August 6² with the following message:

You state orders have *again* been issued to your Kaesong area guards to adhere strictly to the regulation that no armed guards would enter the conference area. . . .

I have also noted that you describe such incidents as minor, accidental, and trivial. Such incidents are of fundamental importance as I have before pointed out. Incidents are neither minor nor trivial . . .

The accidental nature [of the incident] is in doubt since mortar and machine-gun squads in violation of your agreement were present with their equipment in a neutral area, whereas the only armed forces in the neutral area were to be those required for military police functions. . . . It must be clearly understood that my acceptance of a resumption of armistice talks is conditional on complete compliance with your guarantees of the neutralization of the Kaesong area.

Any further failure in this regard will be interpreted as a deliberate move on your part to terminate the armistice negotiations . . . I await your acceptance of this condition . . .

¹ The full text of this message was not available as the BULLETIN went to press.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 270.

Message From the Senior North Korean Delegate to the Senior U.N. Delegate

[AUGUST 8, 1951]

At 3 p. m., August 7, a supply truck of our delegation, with white cloth over its hood and carrying a white flag in conformity with agreement, encountered two airplanes of your side six kilometers north of Sibyon, while on its way from Kaesong to Pyongyang. These airplanes of your side circled for a long time above the truck of our delegation and machine-gunned the truck twice consecutively, destroying its engine and incapacitating the truck. We have full proof to substantiate the above fact.

In the preparatory meeting of the liaison officers of both sides on July 8, it was clearly and definitely agreed that airplanes of your side should not attack trucks of our delegation carrying white flags. On July 21 our liaison officer called the attention of your side to the fact that four supply trucks of our delegation carrying white flags had been attacked by airplanes of your side at Hwangju and Sariwon. Your side assured again at that time that thenceforth trucks of our delegation with white flags and white cloth over their hoods would not be attacked.

The above-mentioned fact is obviously a clear violation of the agreement between both sides. It is worth while to point out that this is a further violation of the agreement which followed closely the shooting at Panmunjom neutral zone by your armed personnel. I hereby lodge

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a grave protest on this matter with you and hope that you will guarantee against recurrence of any such violation of the agreement.

GEN. NAM IL.

Message from the Senior U.N. Delegate to the Senior North Korean Delegate

[August 8, 1951]

I have received your letter complaining of an air attack made on one of your vehicles at Sibyon, approximately thirty-five miles northeast of Kaesong. Your complaint is completely without validity. On 8 July your senior liaison officer, Colonel Chang, was told verbally by the senior United Nations Command liaison officer, Colonel Kinney, that vehicles serving your delegation at Kaesong would be exempt from attack if prior notification of their route and time of travel were provided the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and if such vehicles were plainly marked with white. In addition, Colonel Kinney, senior United Nations Command liaison officer, furnished Colonel Chang, senior Communist liaison officer, the foregoing in writing. I quote from the information sheet for the Communist liaison officer, given to Colonel Chang by Colonel Kinney on 8 July:

"A Communist convoy marked with white crosses will not be attacked by United Nations forces in transit to and from Kaesong at such time and over such route as is communicated to Commander in Chief, United Nations Command."

As a result, you did furnish Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, notification of the time and route of transit of your convoy proceeding to Kaesong on 9 July, thus indicating your understanding of the requirement for notification. In addition, on 21 July Colonel Kinney again informed Colonel Chang that notification of the time and route of travel of your vehicles between Pyongyang and Kaesong was a necessary prerequisite to exemption from attack. Again Colonel Chang indicated his understanding of this requirement by complaining that it was difficult to communicate such notification in each instance. Colonel Kinney then informed Colonel Chang for the third time that without such notification, exemption from attack could not be guaranteed. You are, of course, aware that communication between your station at Kaesong and the United Nations Command delegation south of the Imjin is maintained constantly.

I note that the location of the attacks you allege is considerably east of the main road between Pyongyang and Kaesong. This fact raises the question in my mind whether your forces are abusing the use of white markings for purposes other than serving your delegation.

As to the report made by Colonel Chang to Colonel Kinney on 8 August of an incident alleged to have occurred at Punmunjom on 7 August, I note that you delayed more than 24 hours in transmitting this report. This thereby precluded a timely investigation. However, the matter is now being given such consideration as it deserves.

Message From the North Korean and Chinese Communist Commanders to the U.N. Commander

[August 9, 1951]

TO GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Your message of August 7 has been received. We informed you in our reply dated August 6 that "we have again ordered our guards in the Kaesong neutral zone to adhere strictly to the agreement of July 14 and to ensure that incidents violating the agreement shall not occur again."¹ You must be aware that this agreement is the

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 270.

same agreement concerning the neutralization of the Kaesong area referred to in your message of August 7.

As we have seriously ensured the strict adherence to the agreement concerning the neutralization of the Kaesong area, it is inconceivable that there will be any further failure on our part to comply with the agreement, unless you should deliberately fabricate incidents as an excuse to terminate the armistice negotiations.

On our part, we definitely will not terminate the negotiations rashly and irresponsibly without going through the procedural steps of protest, investigation, consultation and settlement, should a similar failure on your part occur.

We continue to hope that you instruct your delegates to come to Kaesong to resume the conference.

KIM IL SUNG,

Supreme Commander of the Korean Peoples Army.

PENG TEH-HUAI,

Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers.

Message from the Senior U.N. Delegate to the Senior North Korean Delegate

[August 10, 1951]

I have been instructed by the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, to resume conference on the basis that it is inconceivable that there will be any failure on your part to comply with the agreement regarding neutralization of Kaesong area as stated in message of 9 August to General Ridgway from General Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai. Accordingly, I suggest we resume the conference at 1:30 p. m. 10 August, Seoul time, if weather permits travel by helicopter.

U.N. Communiqué of August 10

The Communist delegation today refused adamantly to:

1. Discuss the battle line area as a possible location of the line of military demarcation.
2. Discuss any line other than the Thirty-eighth Parallel as a possible line of military demarcation.
3. Discuss any other item of the military armistice conference agenda other than item number two.

The blanket renunciation by the Communists came after an historical, unprecedented two-hour-and-eleven-minute period of silence on the part of General Nam Il, during which he failed to respond to Admiral Joy's reaffirmation of his "complete willingness to discuss: (1) a demilitarized zone located generally in the area of the present battlelines and (2) continued willingness to discuss possible adjustments of the proposed zone which thus far has been defined only in general terms."

Admiral Joy completed this statement at 2:44 p. m. and, from that time until 4:55 p. m., there was utter silence on the part of the senior Communist delegate. When it was abundantly apparent that a deadlock was about to ensue, Admiral Joy, still in hopes of finding possible areas of agreement, made a further proposal that the conference temporarily drop discussions on item number two, which deals with the establishment of a military demarcation line and demilitarized zone, and that the delegates proceed to substantive conversation on item number three, dealing with concrete arrangements for the realization of military armistice and the resultant cease-fire.

For the second time during the afternoon, General Nam Il, without equivocation, refused to discuss any point of view other than the Thirty-eighth Parallel and item number two.

The conference will resume tomorrow morning at 11 a. m. [9 p. m. August 10, Eastern daylight time].

U.N. Communiqué of August 11

Another United Nations Command effort to establish possible areas for productive discussion was brusquely rebuffed today by the Communists in the twenty-first session of the military armistice conference at Kaesong.

General Nam Il brusquely rejected Admiral Joy's invitation during the morning session that the Communists indicate on a map their concept of a demilitarized zone based on the present battle line and the over-all military situation.

The remainder of today's session was devoted largely to another reiteration by General Nam Il of his single and inflexible proposal for solutions to item number two of the agenda.

There was no progress made today toward the conclusion of a mutually acceptable military armistice. The twenty-second session will be held tomorrow at 11 a. m. (Seoul time) [9 p. m. August 11, Eastern daylight time].

U.N. Communiqué of August 12

The relationship to the present battle line of both United Nations Command's generalized area for the location of the military demarcation line, and the Communists' specific proposal of the Thirty-eighth Parallel were presented on a map by General Nam Il this morning during the twenty-second session of the military armistice conference.

Although no tangible progress was made toward a solution to agenda item number two, today's meeting may have uncovered a mutually acceptable area in which further exploratory discussion might be held.

In his concluding statement of the day, Admiral Joy made a formal request that the Communists' concept of a demilitarized zone based on the current battle lines be indicated on a map.

The twenty-third session will be held tomorrow at 11 a. m. [9 p. m. August 12, Eastern daylight time].

WHO World Census Reveals Increase of 826 Million in 50 Years

[Released to the press by the U.N. Department of Public Information July 9]

The world's population has increased by 826,000,000 since the beginning of the present century, according to a statistical study of the World Health Organization. The study shows that the world population has nearly quadrupled in the last three centuries and that two-thirds of this increase has occurred within the last century alone.

The comprehensive WHO study, which appears in the latest issue of WHO's *Epidemiological and Vital Statistics Report* under the title "Growth of Population in the World", gives the world population in 1949 as 2,378,000,000, as compared with 1,552,000,000 in 1900.

The author of the article, Dr. S. Swaroop, chief of WHO Statistical Studies section, states that:

In the last 50 years, the world has added more persons than actually were living in 1900 in the whole world excluding Asia, and the rate for the twentieth century shows world population to be increasing as never before.

The daily net addition to the world's population is estimated to be nearly 60,000 at present.

Of the 52 countries listed, only one—the Republic of Ireland—has actually shown a decrease (7 percent) during the period 1900–1949. There, the population went down from 3,200,000 to 3,000,000. The largest percentage increase among all the countries listed was registered in Argentina, where the population rose from 4,800,000 in 1900 to 16,800,000 in 1949. This represents an increase of 251 percent. Argentina is followed by Cuba (231 percent), Colombia (217 percent), and Brazil (191 percent).

On the whole, the American continents have recorded the greatest relative increase during the past 50 years. The WHO study shows that this rise amounted to about 112 percent, the 1949 population being estimated at 320,800,000 as compared with 151,000,000 in 1900.

The rate of increase has been slower in Europe than anywhere else. The population of Europe rose only 36 percent (not including the U. S. S. R.) during the half century under review. Estimated at 288,000,000 in 1900, Europe's population had grown to approximately 392,000,000 by 1949.

What is today the U.S.S.R. had a population in 1900 which was less than half as large as that of the rest of Europe, but in the past 50 years around 74,000,000 have been added and the U.S.S.R. at present has a population of 200,000,000.

The greatest increase in Europe, outside the U.S.S.R., was recorded in Italy. Its population rose during the period in question from 33,400,000 to 46,000,000.

In Oceania the population rose 100 percent and was up to 12,400,000 in 1949, while in Africa the percentage increase was 41 percent. The African population in 1949 was estimated at 197,900,000 as against 140,700,000 in 1900.

Half of the world's total increase has been contributed by Asian countries alone. Although some of the smaller countries, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, recorded increases of well over 100 percent, the two large countries—China and prepartition India—increased relatively slowly at rates of approximately 30 percent and 49 percent respectively. Yet their contribution to the total world increase is almost one-third, though some of the population estimates are not always reliable.

The WHO study also shows that the world population has nearly quadrupled in the past three centuries, rising from an estimated 545,000,000 in 1650 to approximately 2,378,000,000 in 1949. The most rapid growth has been principally, in the past, among Europeans and their migratory descendants on other continents.

The factors contributing to the increase were presumably the settlement of new lands, scientific and industrial progress, and developments in medical science and technology. But, this study adds, "the latter factors are no doubt at work among the non-European populations. For instance, the

period of accelerated rates in countries such as Egypt, India, Pakistan and Indonesia has occurred much later than in the West."

The report points out in conclusion that before the eighteenth century the force of mortality was, by and large, the major controlling factor in population growth. However, through the extension of the benefits of medical science and public health measures and through other factors mortality is being reduced at varying rates in many parts of the world.

It is therefore necessary increasingly to take into account, apart from mortality, such matters as the age and sex distribution of the population, nuptiality and fecundity, the study points out.

Proper allowance, the study concludes, will also be necessary for the consequences of wars, famines, floods, or other natural calamities, as also for the changes taking place in economic and social conditions, and the extent to which natural resources are likely to be exploited in the context of the existing pressure of population on the soil.

Progress of African Trust Territories Noted

by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre
U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council¹

ADMINISTRATION OF FRENCH TOGOLAND

My delegation has been happy to note indications of progress in Togoland under French Administration in all fields.

Political Advancement

In the political field, the problem of outstanding importance is the question of the reform of the representative assembly. My delegation was most interested in the statements of the special representative and of the delegate of France with regard to the bill now before the French National Assembly which would extend the powers of the territory's representative assembly. This is a potential development of prime importance to the territory and one which has concerned the Council for some time. The Council has recommended that this body be granted legislative powers. The delegate of France has explained certain difficulties; these, however, would seem to rest largely on matters of terminology, the word "legislative" being reserved in official French terminology to acts of the French Parliament. I feel sure that the Council in this matter is concerned with substance and not with form. What it considers of importance is that the new representative assembly shall in fact be clothed with the right to exercise real legislative powers, whether they are formally so called or not, and that among the questions with which it will be empowered to deal will be political matters.

My delegation has been glad to note the progressive increase in the number of registered voters. . . . It is gratifying to note that in the

recent election of Togoland's representative in the National Assembly, the proportion of those who have in fact exercised their voting rights was as high as 82 percent of the number of registered voters. We hope that an ever-increasing proportion of the adult population will be given voting rights and be made aware of the significance of these.

My delegation was pleased to note the growing role of women in the administrative services. The election of a woman to the Municipal Commission of Lome is another noteworthy indication of the improving position of women in the territory. We feel that every encouragement should be given to this trend and hope that future reports will indicate that women are playing a more important role in the life of the territory.

While we recognize that commendable efforts have been made to provide greater educational facilities for the training of indigenous inhabitants for responsible positions in the administration, we would urge that the Administering Authority intensify these efforts, devoting particular attention to specialized training so that an ever-growing number of Africans may take an increasingly responsible part in the various specialized activities of a modern administration.

Economic Advancement

In the economic field my delegation is glad to note further progress under the Ten Year Development Plan. The emphasis which this plan lays on extending and improving the system of railways, highways, and bridges is, in our opinion, very sound. In this territory, as in most African territories, progress in all fields is retarded by

¹ Excerpts from statement made on July 23 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

inadequate communications systems, and we sincerely hope that the administration will succeed in overcoming the many material difficulties and be able to make substantial progress in its communications program.

It is somewhat disappointing that the Administering Authority's efforts to encourage the formation of indigenous cooperatives have met with no success whatsoever. While we recognize that the indigenous provident societies serve some of the same purposes, they would not appear to provide a satisfactory training ground for giving indigenous producers experience in managing their own economic affairs on a modern organized basis. We believe that cooperatives might effectively serve this purpose. We therefore hope that the Administering Authority will intensify its efforts to implement the resolution adopted by the Council at its seventh session recommending the Administering Authority to "encourage the formation of agricultural cooperatives" and to give indigenous inhabitants "real opportunity for responsible participation therein."

Social Advancement

In the social field my delegation was glad to note an extension of medical and health services in the territory. The fact that 20 percent of the regular budget, in addition to considerable allocations from the Ten Year Plan, were devoted to public health is particularly gratifying, and my delegation hopes that it will be possible to push the various construction projects forward rapidly. As in so many other fields of activity in Africa, the most serious shortage is in trained personnel; and in French Togoland, as in other African territories, the only satisfactory long-term solution is in training the inhabitants themselves. The recent decree enabling doctors, pharmacists and African midwives to acquire state diplomas after having passed a special examination and course of study in France, and the opening in 1950 of a full-fledged medical school at Dakar, are forward steps to meet this problem. We hope that the Administering Authority will make such courses and institutions in the field of medicine and health, as also in other fields of advanced training, readily available for Togoland, not only by providing increased basic educational facilities in the territory, but also by expanding the program of scholarships and other financial assistance to qualified Togoland.

Educational Advancement

The Administering Authority should be congratulated upon its general accomplishments in the educational field during the last 2 years.

There has been a steady and substantial increase in the number of children attending primary schools. According to the annual report for 1950, the number of students in primary schools rose from 25,385 at the close of 1948 to 33,390 in 1949, and to 40,833 at the end of 1950. It is interesting, too, that in contrast to the situation in many parts of Africa, the number of girls in school is increasing more rapidly than the number of boys.

My delegation was struck by the reply of the special representative to a question of the representative of New Zealand that the two chief obstacles to the further development of primary education facilities were the procurement of materials for the building of schools and the lack of teachers. We hope and trust that the implementation of the Ten Year Development Plan for the territory will not be held up by the first of these difficulties and that it will be possible to make real progress on the substantial school-building projects envisaged under the plan. . . .

As indicated by my questioning of the special representative, my delegation is somewhat concerned in the decrease in the number of students attending secondary schools in the territory. Since the total number of students attending secondary schools is only 835, a decrease of 45 is substantial. It is the hope of my delegation that the report on the territory for next year will explain the apparent decrease if it be in fact merely fortuitous and that if it indicates a real trend, effective steps will be taken to correct it.

. . . Varying and often conflicting opinions are held by educational experts as to the use of indigenous languages in schools. It is of particular interest therefore that the Administering Authority has requested the representative assembly of French Togoland to establish a commission to give further study to a possible program of teaching in the vernacular. Although the experimental introduction of courses in the indigenous languages at Lome College seemed to indicate little interest on the part of students, my delegation feels that the question of instruction in the indigenous languages should not be permitted to drop until clear evidence is forthcoming that the decided majority of the inhabitants prefer that instruction be given in the metropolitan tongue.

ADMINISTRATION OF BRITISH TOGOLAND²

MR. PRESIDENT: My delegation has been genuinely impressed by the evidence of progress in various aspects of the political, economic, social and educational development of Togoland under British administration, and it feels that the Administering Authority should be commended on the progress that has been made. While it would

² Excerpts from statement made on July 17 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

like on the one hand to call attention to some of these commendable aspects of the territory's development, it would also like to take this occasion to mention certain other aspects which, in its view, give rise to continuing concern and on which the Council might wish to make certain recommendations.

In the political field, the putting into effect of the new constitutional arrangements for the Gold Coast and British Togoland represents an outstanding forward step in political advancement and one for which the Administering Authority should be congratulated. Nevertheless, as certain other delegations have indicated, this overall forward step does pose certain problems regarding the status and advancement of the trust territory itself.

The full participation of Togoland in all phases of Gold Coast progress should be assured. It is not enough to assume that what is advancement for the Gold Coast is advancement for Togoland. The Council will, I am sure, wish to assure itself that the Administering Authority, while using the Gold Coast Government in the discharge of certain of its responsibilities, is not only fully preserving the trusteeship status of Togoland but also particularly concerning itself that, in the formative stage of political development upon which the Gold Coast has just embarked, the voice of Togoland is fully heard and fully heeded.

Another factor which hinders the reaching of a definitive judgment with regard to the new constitutional arrangements is the unsolved problem of the Ewe or Togo unification question. Some inhabitants of the trust territory have, in petitions, protested against the application of the Gold Coast constitution to Togoland on the grounds that it jeopardizes or perhaps conflicts with their aspirations for the unification of the two Togolands in whole or in part. Until further developments have taken place with regard to the unification question, it is impossible to say how far these reservations expressed by certain of the inhabitants of the territory may prove to be justified.

With regard to regional units of government, the Council must withhold its judgment until the report of the Special Commissioner, Sir Sydney Phillipson, and the Administering Authority's decisions based thereon, are published. . . . Unless it can be shown that the inhabitants of the territory prefer some other arrangement, my delegation, in agreement with the delegate of New Zealand, believes careful consideration should be given to the possible desirability of establishing a region under the Gold Coast constitution consisting of Southern Togoland alone.

My delegation was pleased to learn of the creation of the new post of Commissioner of Afri-

canization and the appointment of a qualified African to this post. We trust that he will be given every facility for carrying out his task of ensuring that the maximum number of suitably qualified Africans become available for appointment to the higher grades of the public service. Especially in view of the fact that the trust territory is somewhat less advanced than the Gold Coast, we should like to urge that the Commission on Africanization devote special efforts to promoting the appointment of Togoland to jobs in or directly affecting the territory.

Touching briefly on specific aspects of economic advancement, my delegation believes that the Administering Authority is to be congratulated on the healthy financial status of the Cocoa Marketing Board. . . . My delegation hopes that the Administering Authority will keep constantly in mind the desirability not only of ensuring adequate representation for the people of the trust territory on the new Cocoa Marketing Board, but also of securing the cooperation and support of these people for the policies followed by the Board.

My delegation was impressed by the statement of the special representative that it is the policy of the Administering Authority and of the Gold Coast Government that the people of Togoland will be represented on all boards and committees which affect their interest. It would seem fitting for the Council to endorse this policy.

In the field of social advancement, my delegation has been particularly interested in the information given the Council as to the mass education program in Southern Togoland. . . . We trust that not only will the program continue to be expanded in the South but also that every effort will be made to push its introduction and expansion in the North, where it is perhaps most urgently needed. Mass education must always be a vital factor in social advancement.

My delegation, while appreciating the progress made in the field of health, nevertheless agrees with the view expressed by several delegations that considerable further expansion of facilities and personnel is still needed. We also agree that in such expansion particular attention should be paid to the training of Africans from the trust territory in various aspects of public health work. . . . We also feel a particular concern in the construction of all-weather roads. While this might seem to fall within the field of economic rather than of social concern, nevertheless my delegation would like to emphasize its importance with regard to social development, and to express the hope that the road building and maintenance activities of the Gold Coast Government will be extended on a fully proportionate basis to the trust territory.

President Urges Increased Organizations Appropriations

[Released to the press by the White House August 7]

The President has today sent the following letter to Kenneth McKellar, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the United States Senate:

DEAR KENNETH: I am gravely concerned about an item of very special significance in H. R. 4740, the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary appropriation bill. This item is the appropriation to cover the contributions which we owe this year to the United Nations, the Pan-American Union, and a number of other international organizations in which we hold membership.

Our obligations to these organizations amount to slightly more than thirty million dollars this year. This is a charge, of course, which we are bound to pay as members in good standing.

Yet the House of Representatives, in passing H. R. 4740, cut ten percent from the funds required for this purpose. In addition, the House inserted a proviso—which has the effect of a further cut in funds—requiring that the United States contribution to each organization be no more than precisely one-third of the organization's total budget. These actions by the House, if allowed to stand, would force this Government to default on its obligations to these international agencies.

I want to urge as strongly as I can that the Senate restore the needed funds and eliminate the restrictive proviso added by the House. It is my earnest hope that these vitally important changes will be made in the bill as passed by the Senate and in the final version of the measure which is sent down to me.

We are pledged in this country to support the United Nations and help make it work. This is a pledge which our Government—through the Congress and the Executive Branch alike—has given in the most solemn and binding fashion, with the full support of both major political parties. It is a pledge which the overwhelming majority of our people endorse wholeheartedly—a pledge on which we all depend in great measure for our hopes of peace and security and a decent future for the world.

This is a pledge we have now reaffirmed by the blood and sacrifice and heroic effort of our forces fighting under the United Nations' banner in Korea.

Yet we would violate this pledge—just as surely as if we repudiated it outright—by a failure to pay what we owe for the upkeep of the United Nations and these other organizations.

The General Assembly of the United Nations and the conferences of the other agencies decide their own budgets and assess their membership for contributions to supply the needed funds. We, as a leading member, have a major voice in all decisions both as to total budgets and amounts of individual assessments. Members of the Congress from both parties, and the executive officials who serve on our delegations, have joined in determining and presenting the United States position regarding the budgets of these organizations. And once our position has been considered and a final decision reached within the organizations themselves, we have so far always honored those decisions and paid our full share.

In the United Nations, our assessment is now running a fraction over 38 per cent of total costs. This represents a reduction of about one per cent below our share two years ago—a reduction in line with the United Nations' own policy of gradually cutting down our share to a maximum of 33⅓ per cent. While the charge upon us is still higher than that, we are paying less, on a per capita basis, than several other members.

Our proportion of total expenses for the United Nations will continue to be reduced as time goes on, through cooperative agreement between us and the other members—agreement reached in the proceedings of the organization itself. That is the only way this can be done without breaking the pledges we have given. This is true not only of the United Nations, but also of the other organizations we have joined. We cannot compel reductions in our assessments by imposing arbitrary limits on the payments we can make, or by cutting the funds available to meet our obligations.

What we would accomplish by actions of that sort is a crippling effect on the work of the organizations we have promised to support—work of the greatest importance and value to us. We should keep in mind the vital things these organizations are doing, some of them little known to the general public. Take for example the work of the World

Health Organization and the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau in locating and stamping out epidemics where they occur, before they can spread to the United States or our territories. Surely we must keep this work going. If we do not pay our full share of the expenses of these agencies, so they can continue to do the job, we may eventually be left to do it all ourselves, at far greater cost.

If we fail to pay the United Nations and these other agencies the full amounts we owe, we will jeopardize our leadership, our moral standing, our right to a strong voice in the conduct of their affairs. And that kind of failure on our part will jeopardize the very existence of these organizations and all their work for peace and progress in the world.

In the United Nations and its specialized agencies, no major power has yet failed to pay its full contribution as assessed, save only China, beset as we all know by very special problems. No other member of the Security Council has failed to make its contribution, year by year. I cannot conceive that the Members of the House of Representatives meant us to fail. I cannot conceive that they wanted to take the risk of ruining these organizations and defeating their objectives merely in order to save three million dollars.

If by some chance, that is what any Member of the Congress does intend, it would be far better—and far more direct and honest—if he were to offer legislation which would withdraw this country from its membership in the United Nations, the Pan-American Union, the World Health Organization, and the rest.

But I am quite sure this was not the intention of the Members of the House who voted for these amendments. I am sure we all want the United States to continue to work actively in these organizations. After all, this country has a tremendous stake in their success and continued growth. The sum of thirty million dollars for this year is not a heavy charge upon us. It is only one-twentieth of one per cent of the appropriations for our armed forces. And no amount of military strength, no matter how much we build up our armed forces, can give us the hope for the future that is wrapped up in our work for peaceful cooperation among the nations of this hemisphere and all the world.

When the facts in this case are fully appreciated and understood, I am confident that the Congress will provide the full amount we owe these organizations and will steer clear of any rigid limitation on our share of their expenses. If your Committee desires any further information on this subject, I am sure that Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Austin will be glad to supply it right away.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Budget for International Children's Fund Requested

[Released to the press by the White House August 9]

The President on August 9 sent identical letters to Alben W. Barkley, Vice President of the United States, and Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, as follows:

I am writing to ask that the Congress authorize a contribution of twelve million dollars by the United States to the International Children's Emergency Fund. This sum would be authorized for the current fiscal year.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, on December 1, 1950, extended the operations of the Children's Fund for a period of three years. Since the authorization to make financial contributions to the Fund expired last June 30, we can now make no further contribution without this new authority from the Congress.

The United States has a long tradition of participation in, and financial support for, international children's welfare work. Nothing is more consistent with our basic interests or more representative of our humanitarian ideals.

The Children's Fund has done a most constructive job over the last four years. In Europe, it has helped more than fifteen million children. The main work of the Fund has now shifted from Europe to the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Latin America. Here the Fund will bring supplies and services to help meet urgent needs of children and to strengthen the permanent child welfare programs of the countries themselves.

I know that the Congress is aware of the many past accomplishments of the Children's Fund. I am confident that the people of this country want to continue to support the great work the Fund is doing. There is real need to carry on this work. Millions of children will be helped.

I have asked the Secretary of State to prepare draft legislation to carry out this recommendation. It is my hope that the Congress will find it possible to give early consideration to this measure.

Legislation

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Annex Protocol of Terms of Accession and Annex Schedules of Tariff Concessions. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2100. Pub. 3925. 954 pp. \$4.

Dated at Annecy Oct. 10, 1949; opened for signature at Lake Success: Oct. 10 to Nov. 30, 1949, by present Contracting Parties; Oct. 10, 1949, to Apr. 30, 1950, by Acceding Governments.

Senator McCarthy Makes Further Allegations Against Loyalty of Employees of the Department

STATEMENT BY CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY

[Released to the press August 9]

The Department of State today made public the following statement by Deputy Under Secretary Carlisle H. Humelsine in connection with Senator McCarthy's disclosure of a list of names of persons whose cases he previously alleged were pending before the Department's Loyalty Board:

The previous record of Senator McCarthy's attacks has prepared the Department for his action in disclosing the names of persons he has previously incorrectly lumped together as "cases pending before the State Department's Loyalty Board."

In my letter to Senator McCarthy of July 25,¹ and again in my letter of August 7, I pointed out that the 29 individuals whom he named in his letter of July 23 have all been cited by the Senator in previous lists. As in the case of Senator McCarthy's other lists, this one also includes the names of persons who are not employees of the Department of State, employees who have been cleared by the Department's Loyalty Security Board as well as individuals in process through the loyalty program. Two persons named by Senator McCarthy in his letter of July 23 are not employees of the Department and, in fact, one of these never has been in the Department's employ. Fourteen others named are persons who have been cleared by the Department's Loyalty Security Board, and whose cases are not now pending before that Board. Further, these 14 cases were cleared by the Department's Loyalty Security Board under the new, revised, stricter loyalty standards set out in Executive Order 10241. Thirteen others are cases still in process through the Department's Loyalty Program.

As I previously noted, Senator McCarthy's "indiscriminate lumping together of names and the threat to make them public is tantamount to holding hostage the reputation and rights of those employees who have been or may be cleared of the allegations against them." I am at a loss to under-

stand the motives of a man in Senator McCarthy's position of responsibility who deliberately violates the fundamental tenet of freedom from intimidation—always one of the prime strengths of this great Republic. Yet, Senator McCarthy has chosen to employ his position of responsibility in this indefensible way.

I can only conclude that the callous disclosure of the names of these individuals is a further attempt to make the Department divulge information which it is precluded from furnishing under the President's Directive of March 13, 1948. As I have stated before, the disclosure of such information would be prejudicial both to these people as individuals and to the Government's ability to conduct a sound, just, and honorable loyalty security program.

As an American, I deeply deplore the smear tactics used in making this misleading list of names public. I can only hope that the men and women who have been or may be cleared realize that they have become the victims of a bitter attack not subscribed to by responsible citizens. The onus for this action rests upon Senator McCarthy alone.

REVIEW OF FORMER CHARGES

[Released to the press August 9]

On February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy was making a speech before a Women's Republican Club at Wheeling, W. Va. While he was making the speech, he said:

I have here in my hand a list of 205 . . . a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.

On February 10, 1950, in an interview over a radio station in Salt Lake City, McCarthy stated:

Last night I discussed the Communists in the State Department. I stated that I had the names of 57 card-carrying members of the Communist Party.

He also made a speech on February 11, 1950, at Reno, Nevada. The *Nevada State Journal* described it as follows:

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 6, p. 233.

August 7, 1951

Senator McCarthy who had first typed a total of 205 employees of the State Department who could be considered disloyal to the United States and pro-Communists scratched out that number and mentioned only "57 card-carrying members," whom Acheson should know as well as Members of Congress.

When he got on the floor of the Senate on February 20, Senator McCarthy made a speech in which he claimed that he would back up the charges which he had made against the State Department. In this speech the 205 shrunk to 81. They were not still working in shaping policy in the State Department. Some of the people he mentioned worked in the State Department; some of them used to work in the State Department; some of them had never worked in the State Department.

Then there was another throw of the dice in this game. The number has shrunk to 29. They are not "card-carrying Communists" but people Senator McCarthy says have been formally charged by the State Department, but even this is not correct. The last throw produced only 26.

Since his now famous 29 hostage letter to the Department, Senator McCarthy says two on the list have resigned and one has been cleared. Wrong again. There have been no resignations since his letter, and the man he mentioned as being cleared was cleared by the Department's Board well before the receipt of the hostage letter. All of these were taken from the same old list and an idea of authenticity can be gained by the fact that Ambassador Jessup, strongly endorsed by General Eisenhower, is still on the list. The last time that Senator McCarthy made his charges against Ambassador Jessup, General Eisenhower wrote him a letter which reads as follows:

MY DEAR JESSUP: I am writing to tell you how much your university deprecates the association of your name with the current loyalty investigation in the United States Senate.

Your long and distinguished record as a scholar and a public servant has won for you the respect of your colleagues and of the American people as well. No one who has known you can for a moment question the depth or sincerity of your devotion to the principles of Americanism. Your university associates and I are confident that any impression to the contrary will be quickly dispelled as the facts become known.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

PROCEDURE APPLIED IN OPERATING DEPARTMENT'S LOYALTY PROGRAM

*Letter From Deputy Under Secretary
Humelsine to Senator McCarthy*

[Released to the press August 7]

The Department of State released today a letter from Deputy Under Secretary Carlisle H. Humelsine to Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. The text follows:

MY DEAR SENATOR MCCARTHY: I refer to your most recent letter to the Secretary in regard to certain aspects of the President's Loyalty Program, the loyalty program of the Department of State, and my letter to you of July 25.¹

In spite of the obvious bias with which your questions are phrased, the following information will give you facts upon which to correct your misinformation and a proper understanding of the matters to which you refer.

1. It is clear that you have chosen to predicate your latest letter on the statement contained in my July 25 letter to you that "In the more than four years of operation under this procedure (procedures of the President's Loyalty Program), the Loyalty Review Board has never reversed the Department's adjudication of a case." I call your attention to Regulation 14 of the Loyalty Review Board Regulations and Directives (adopted December 17, 1947 and revised March 1, 1950) which provides as follows:

The Board, or an Executive Committee of the Board, shall, as deemed necessary from time to time, cause post-audits to be made of the files on loyalty cases decided by the employing Department or Agency, or by a Regional Loyalty Board.

The Board, or an Executive Committee of the Board, or a duly constituted panel of the Board, shall have the right, in its discretion, to call up for review any determination or decision made by any Department or Agency Loyalty Board or Regional Loyalty Board, or by any head of an employing Department or Agency, even though no appeal has been taken. Any such review shall be made by a panel of the Board, and the panel, whether or not a hearing has been held in the case, may affirm the determination or decision, or remand the case with appropriate instructions to the Agency or Regional Loyalty Board concerned for hearing or for such further action or procedure as the panel may determine. In exceptional cases, if in the judgment of the panel public interest requires it the panel may hold a new hearing in the case and after such hearing, affirm or reverse the determination or decision. (underscoring supplied)

Regulation 14, as you must be able to see, explicitly confirms my statement, and I say categorically that it is *not* true that the Loyalty Review Board has no power to reverse cases which the Department of State's Loyalty Security Board has cleared. It is true—and the Department has never contended otherwise—that the Loyalty Review Board can and has remanded cases to the Department for rehearing. This is perfectly proper and is completely apart from the question of the Loyalty Review Board's authority to reverse the State Department's Board's decisions.

2. As I pointed out to you in my letter of July 25, the Department of State is operating under a loyalty program laid down by Executive Order 9835, as amended by Executive Order 10241. These executive orders, which anyone interested in our national security safeguards should feel duty-bound to study, describes a loyalty system which

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 6, 1951, p. 233.

even the most critical should endorse. This system assures (1) maximum protection for the Government and (2) due regard for the rights of the individual. Furthermore, the Department of State operating under the authority of the so-called McCarran Security Rider and Public Law 733 carries out a total security program. As I have told you before, in conducting its loyalty and security program, the Department has uncovered some employees who did not meet its high standards and these employees have been separated.

I again call your attention to the fact that the Department of State's Loyalty Security Board is comprised of men of exceptionally high qualifications and unquestioned loyalty.

3. As I also pointed out to you in my letter of July 25, I am precluded from furnishing certain loyalty and security information which you seem determined to have me supply regardless of the President's Directive of March 13, 1948 to the contrary. Let me state once more that the President's Directive of March 13, 1948 precludes me from furnishing any reports, records, or files relative to the loyalty of employees. Disclosure of such information would be prejudicial both to these people as individuals and to the Government's ability to conduct a sound, just, and honorable loyalty security program.

While I have sought to provide this information as clearly and unequivocally as possible, I realize that any statement made by me or any other official of the Department can be intentionally misconstrued. Yet it is far better in my judgment to state the truth and risk its distortion than to permit the instigation or perpetuation of groundless suspicion and distrust.

We do not defend by lies, as you claim, nor do we so accuse. Either course stands in contradiction to the fundamental principles of American morals and ethics.

New Committee Formed on U.S. Information Program

[Released to the press August 6]

The Department of State announced on August 6 the formation and first meeting of a new Press and Publications Advisory Committee to the United States Information Program.

The group, headed by Ben Hibbs, editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, includes the following:

Edwin S. Friendly, vice president, New York *World Telegram and Sun*

Will Burtin, designing consultant (formerly with *Fortune Magazine*)

A. L. Cole, manager, *Readers' Digest*

Hamilton Owens, editor-in-chief, Baltimore *Sun Papers*

Alexander F. Jones, executive director, Syracuse *Herald Tribune*

Roy E. Stryker, director, Pittsburgh University Photographic Library

Milton A. Caniff, cartoonist, Chicago *Sun Syndicate*

Charles Bruce Gould, editor, *Ladies' Home Journal*

Arthur H. Motley, publisher, Parade Publications, Inc.

T. S. Repplier, president, Advertising Council Inc. of America

According to Mr. Hibbs, the new committee will have the following specific purpose:

To review, from time to time, the range of activities of the International Press and Publications Division and related overseas activities—the distribution of features and photographs to foreign publications, publication of original magazines, pamphlets, leaflets, etc., photo displays and posters, filmstrips, institutional advertising—and recommend shifts of emphasis, new techniques, and modifications of existing materials. The committee will suggest additional uses of the existing materials and skills of American private industry and information professions in the program and assist in rallying these private resources to make additional types of materials available to the program.

This committee, and others dealing with labor, business, public relations, radio, and motion pictures, is part of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, designed to bring to the Information Program the experience and knowledge of the best American business, industrial, and labor specialists and leaders. The Advisory Commission is headed by Erwin Canham, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, and former president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Other members of the Commission are Justin Miller, chairman of the board of National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters; Prof. Mark May, director of the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University; Philip Reed, chairman of the board of the General Electric Company; and Mr. Hibbs.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Service Policy Committee Terminated

On July 17, the Department of State announced the termination of the Foreign Service Policy Committee (FSPC).

The Department will continue to rely upon effective working level coordination to bring to light all relevant points of view with regard to matters being discussed in the Staff Board of the Foreign Service or the Board of the Foreign Service. Offices in the Department responsible for preparing papers for STB or BFS will assure that they have effectively determined the points of view of all interested offices.

A summary and discussion of these points of view, together with a draft paper reconciling all divergencies of opinion which are considered appropriate by the drafting office, should be forwarded to the office of the Deputy Under Secretary for administration before being submitted to the Staff Board or the Board of the Foreign Service.

The United States in the United Nations

[August 10-16, 1951]

General Assembly

"Additional Measures To Be Employed To Meet The Aggression in Korea"—The United Nations Secretariat has received additional communications from the Member Governments of Chile, Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Philippines, and the non-Member Government of Japan advising that they were complying fully with the embargo resolution against the Communist aggressors in Korea. A total of 61 replies have been received to date—48 from Member States and 13 from non-Member States.

Collective Measures Committee (CMC)—The Secretary-General has received 25 replies to date from Member Governments with regard to implementation of paragraph 8 of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. In addition to those previously mentioned, affirmative replies were received from Denmark, Haiti, Liberia, Turkey, and the Union of South Africa, either indicating the extent of their present contributions to United Nations forces, or the possibility of future participation in this collective security measure.

The Committee of Twelve (AEC-CCA)—At its meeting on August 10, Frank C. Nash (U.S.) introduced a U.S. draft resolution stating:

... RECOGNIZING that comprehensive and coordinated plans for the international control of all armaments and armed forces, including atomic energy, should be developed by the United Nations,

BELIEVING that such comprehensive and coordinated plans of control should make possible with appropriate safeguards the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, including internal security and police forces, and the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only.

RECALLING that a plan has been developed in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and approved by the General Assembly, for the international control of atomic energy, which would make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons, and that much useful planning work has been accomplished in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. . . .

Recommends to the General Assembly

"1. That it establish a new commission, to be known as the Commission for the control of Armaments and Armed Forces, which should be under and report to the Security Council, in order to carry forward the tasks presently assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments;

2. That the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments should be dissolved by appropriate action upon the establishment of the new Commission.

Mr. Nash stated that the resolution did not endeavor to spell out the proposed commission's terms as the United States Government felt that this should be left for the "full and free" consideration of the General Assembly. The representatives of Canada, China, Ecuador, France, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom expressed support for the resolution. However, as the representatives of Brazil, India, and Yugoslavia advised they were still awaiting final instructions, voting on the resolution was postponed until the following meeting. The U.S.S.R. member made no comments.

Palestine—The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has invited the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel "to discuss with the Commission solutions to the problems outstanding between Israel and the Arab states." The conference will be held in Paris, beginning September 10, 1951, and the Commission plans to submit a report of the results to the next regular session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc)

Among the important events that took place during the past 2 weeks of the thirteenth session are the following:

Plenary—The Council completed debate on the item, World Economic Situation, and adopted 14-0-3 (Soviet bloc) the resolution proposed by the Philippines and amended by Pakistan and the United States, which

(1) *Urges* Member Governments to continue exerting efforts to bring about adequate production and equitable international distribution of capital goods, essential consumers' goods and raw materials, regulate at equitable levels and relationships the prices of such goods moving in international trade and combat inflation;

(2) *Recommends* To the industrialized countries that, in the light of the over-riding needs of defense, they make every possible effort to insure that supply difficulties do not interfere with the development plans of the under-developed countries;

The Council also completed discussion on economic conditions in the Middle East and in Africa and approved (14-0-4) a Swedish resolution requesting the Secretary-General to continue making

economic reports on Africa a part of the Annual World Economic Survey. During the debate Mr. Lubin (U.S.) observed that the Soviets showed irritation that the Middle Eastern peoples are determined to remain free and not be dominated by the U.S.S.R. He said,

Fortunately, the people of the Middle East know too much about the millions who are today suffering and rotting in Soviet slave labor camps and the slave labor camps of some of the so-called people's democracies. Fortunately, the Middle East peoples know only too well of the hundreds of thousands of people who in recent months have been dragged from their homes in Hungary, in Prague and in other parts of the so-called people's democracies, separated from their families and friends and shipped, frequently with but an armful of their personal belongings, to faraway places. And why? Merely because they happen to think differently from the totalitarian dictators who rule them.

Despite the Soviet smoke screen designed to deceive the people of the free world into believing that the Kremlin is interested in world peace and in spite of their propaganda traps, the actions of the U.S.S.R. representative at our meeting yesterday make crystal clear their real intentions, not only as to Africa and the Middle East, but also as to the rest of the free world.

He stressed that the traditional American concern for the welfare of Middle Eastern peoples, as well as free world security considerations, underlie the U.S. attitude toward the Middle East. Mr. Lubin recalled that United States educational and philanthropic groups for over more than a century have financed universities, hospitals, agricultural testing stations, and medical assistance in both urban and rural districts throughout the region, and noted that such private efforts are accelerating. Sympathetic understanding of the region's economic problems gained from that experience has influenced formulation of U.S. Government programs for economic aid. Direct and indirect U.S. economic aid to the Middle East in the last fiscal year was primarily devoted to agriculture, transport, housing, telecommunications, and port and industrial development, such as much needed fertilizer industries. For the current fiscal year, Mr. Lubin stated that President Truman has asked for 536 million dollars to help provide Middle East security and economic development.

Debate is in process on the item, "Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries" and consideration is being given to the report and recommendations of the Economic Committee which met a week prior to the Council.

The Social Committee

UNICEF—The committee noted with satisfaction by a vote of 14-1-2, the report of the International Children's Emergency Fund.

Draft Convention on Freedom of Information—The committee rejected by a vote of 10(US)-7-0 (Pakistan absent) the joint resolution of France, India, and Mexico requesting the Secretary-General to convene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to complete the draft convention and open it for signature.

Mr. Kotschnig (U.S.) stated that the present draft is entirely unacceptable and that the proposed conference of plenipotentiaries would have no basis of agreement on principles to work on. Stressing that freedom of information is basic to all freedoms, he pointed out that article 2 of the draft not only would permit highly objectionable restrictions but even constitutes an open invitation to the addition of further limitations on freedom of information. He stated that the United States is unalterably opposed to any attempt to legitimize such limitations. He noted that the present formulation of the draft makes it almost certain that certain provisions would be abused by governments so inclined and that some provisions would lead straight to censorship or to penalties on purely political grounds, no matter how they were worded. He explained that the U.S. Bill of Rights prohibits Government infringement of press freedom in the United States, and continued "we do not want to see any peoples subjected to such limitations. We have long since learned that our freedom is strengthened to the extent that the freedom of others is protected."

In answering charges made by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Kotschnig declared that the representative had gone beyond the bounds of decency in "deliberate insults" hurled against the U.S. Government. He declared that it was not the United States which resorted to political murders but countries of Eastern Europe where political leaders were such "bad insurance risks" that they found "espionage" in the normal reporting of an American correspondent. He argued that the conception of freedom of information in Eastern Europe was such that now, apart from one or two foreign correspondents in the U.S.S.R. and Poland, there were none at all in other "popular democracies." He spoke at length on the case of the Associated Press reporter, William N. Oatis, who was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment by a Communist court in Prague over a month ago on charges of espionage. Expressing surprise that the Council had remained silent in face of so flagrant a violation of freedom of information as that of the Oatis condemnation which had deeply moved the free world, Mr. Kotschnig introduced a U.S. draft resolution, which, *inter alia*,

Views with extreme concern all governmental action aimed at the systematic exclusion of bona fide correspondents, the imposition of arbitrary personal restraints and the infliction of punishments upon such correspondents solely because of their attempts faithfully to perform their duties in gathering and transmitting news. Urges strongly that personal restraints be removed and sentences imposing arbitrary punishments be revoked. Appeals to governments to do all within their power to safeguard the right of correspondents freely and faithfully to gather and transmit news.

The resolution was adopted 13-3 (Soviet bloc)-0; China and Pakistan were absent. However, China had previously noted its support for the resolution.

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Hungary: A Case History of Soviet Economic Imperialism

by Howard J. Hilton, Jr.

On February 19, 1946, a Soviet official appeared at the offices of the Hungarian Bauxite Mines, Inc., at Budapest and informed the board of directors that he had come to take control of one-third of the company's share capital. These shares had formerly belonged to German investors. His justification of this action was the Soviet interpretation of the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, by which the Western Powers had renounced any claim to German assets in Hungary in settlement of reparations from Germany.¹

At this time, the Hungarian Government was not Communist-controlled, although a militant Communist minority exploited every opportunity to build up its own power. The Soviet Union had discovered that a very effective means of strengthening the Communist minority was to create conditions of poverty and economic chaos. Soviet demands for German assets, reparations, war booty, and occupation costs did much to create such conditions and bring about the collapse of the Hungarian economy in 1946, thus facilitating Communist seizure of the Government in mid-1947.

Even so, the Soviet Union could never have carried out its vast program of economic exploitation without the full support of Communist leaders within the Hungarian Government who were then, and are still, completely subservient to Moscow. Most of them were trained in Moscow; many are even now Soviet citizens.² Faced by Soviet pressure on one side and betrayed on the other by agents of the Kremlin within Hungary, the democratic elements in the Hungarian Govern-

ment were confronted by powerful forces in resisting Soviet demands.

Typical of many valiant but futile attempts at resistance was the stand taken by the Hungarian Bauxite directors. They courageously replied to the Soviet official that in their opinion the Potsdam Agreement entitled the Soviet Union only to *net* German assets in Hungary; since their claims against German debtors, upheld by a court judgment, greatly exceeded the value of the German-owned shares, they could surrender the German shares only after their company's legal claims had been fully settled.

The Soviet representative answered that it was not merely a question of Soviet acquisition of the German-held shares; he was also commissioned to begin negotiations to transform the company into a joint Soviet-Hungarian enterprise. A provision for the establishment of joint companies of this nature was included in an economic collaboration agreement which Erno Gero signed on August 27, 1945, contrary to instructions from the Hungarian Government. The ostensible purpose of such companies was the "reconstruction and development of Hungarian production capacity."

The directors assured the Soviet official that their firm needed neither the capital nor the technical assistance which the Soviet Union offered; Hungarian Bauxite was a vertical trust and possessed all facilities necessary for the mining of bauxite ore and the processing of finished aluminum products.

To these arguments, the Soviet official's reply was that if Hungarian Bauxite Mines were not converted into a joint Soviet-Hungarian company, his Government would dismantle the firm's power plants and rolling mills and ship them to the

¹ See *Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents*, Department of State pub. 3556, 1950, pp. 50-51.

² Among those who are Moscow-trained is Matyas Rakosi, the most powerful figure in Hungary and Secretary General of the Communist-controlled Hungarian Workers Party. He went to Moscow in 1940 and became chief of the Hungarian section of the Comintern. He returned to Hungary with the Red army in 1944. Another influential Moscow-trained official is Zoltan Vas. Like Rakosi, he returned to Hungary in 1944 with the Red

army, serving as political adviser to the Soviet High Command. Later he became Secretary of the Hungarian Supreme Economic Council and virtual economic dictator of the country. Erno Gero, another Moscow-trained official of the present regime, signed many of the economic agreements by which the Soviet Union has exploited the Hungarian economy.

Soviet Union as reparations. Since the directors declined to submit to this threat, Soviet pressure was applied against the Hungarian Government itself, which was compelled to accept the Soviet representative's view that by the terms of the Potsdam Agreement the U.S.S.R. was entitled to the German-owned shares of the Hungarian Bauxite Mines. At a meeting 4 days later, on February 23, officials of the Ministries of Finance and Industry had to inform the directors of this view and advise them that if the company did not reach an agreement with the Soviet representative, the Government would be forced either to nationalize the entire Hungarian bauxite-aluminum industry or to obtain control of the company by converting into shares a large credit which had been advanced to the company by the Hungarian Treasury.

The officials added, significantly, that the Hungarian Government would be "in a very awkward situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Government" unless agreement was reached.

On March 6 at a conference with Soviet officials and a representative of the Hungarian Minister of Industry, the directors presented a counter-proposal, which the Soviet officials rejected. During the meeting, the representative of the Minister of Industry produced one draft decree providing for the nationalization of the bauxite industry and another requiring the conversion of the company's debts to the Treasury into shares.

The Soviet representative requested the directors' final reply not later than March 9. He observed, in passing, that he was in a position to paralyze Hungary's entire bauxite industry by the simple expedient of hindering the importation of essential chemicals.

In view of this heavy pressure placed upon them and their Government by the Soviets, the representatives of the majority stockholders had no alternative but to comply with the Soviet proposals. Joint Soviet-Hungarian bauxite and aluminum companies were formed on April 8, 1946, with the following objectives:

"... the acquisition of mines through purchases or rental agreements and development of mines, the mining of all sorts of useful minerals, especially bauxite, the production of alumina, aluminum hydroxide, aluminum, aluminum alloys, also the manufacture of all products enumerated as well as the organization of all sorts of industrial enterprises."

The Soviet contribution to the joint companies consisted of former German-owned shares in three of Hungary's largest aluminum and bauxite companies, one of them the Hungarian Bauxite Mines, Inc.

The process by which one company was swallowed up illustrates the piratical nature of Soviet operations in Hungary during the 2 years after World War II. Hungarian Bauxite is a particularly significant example, because Hungary before

the war had been Europe's second largest producer of bauxite and had exported approximately two-thirds of her available supply. Although the 1947 production was only 38 percent of the 1938 total, Hungary continued to export about two-thirds of her supply. In that year the Soviet Union received about 90 percent of these exports. Thus less than half of the production of Hungary's bauxite deposits, which are among the largest in existence, was available to the rest of the world.

The case history of the Hungarian Bauxite Mines, Inc., is of particular interest also because it illustrates several of the varied techniques which the Soviets used in their vast program of penetrating Hungarian industry.

Premeditated Exploitation

The basis for this penetration of Hungarian industry and the ultimate domination of all aspects of Hungarian life was achieved by a premeditated policy of exploitation. First, the Red army ravaged the countryside, removing cattle, horses, food, wagons, railroad equipment. Then began the systematic stripping of Hungary's industrial equipment. Whole factories were dismantled and shipped to the Soviet Union as "war booty." No record was kept of most of these removals, and the Hungarian Government was never able to gain credit for them as reparations.³

In carrying out the reparations provisions of the armistice, the Soviet Union was solely concerned with obtaining as much as possible for itself. The commodities most needed in Hungarian reconstruction were shipped to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union drove many hard bargains and always managed to get the most for its reparations dollar. One favorite device was to set a very low dollar price on the goods which it was to receive. Since the value of reparations was expressed in dollars, the lower the price charged for a commodity, the greater the amount of the commodity that would be shipped.

Reparations shipments continued on a large scale, and provided the Soviet Union with its best means for the direct exploitation of Hungary. Reparations also provided an effective instrument for indirect exploitation. From the beginning Soviet authorities participated in the organization and direction of industry engaged in producing reparations goods. In this way, Soviet experts acquired an inside knowledge of Hungarian industrial organization and techniques which stood the Soviet exploitation program in good stead. Also, the presence of Soviet overseers in key in-

³ In one case where records were kept, the Red army removed the machinery for the production of radio tubes and light bulbs from the Tungram Co. The Hungarian Government obtained receipts representing equipment valued at 12 million dollars. When the Hungarian later attempted to receive a credit for this amount, the Soviet Government refused even to discuss the matter.

dustries made much easier the task of extending Communist economic and political doctrine.

Distortion of the Terms of the Potsdam Agreement

By section III of the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, the Western Powers renounced their claim to former German assets in Hungary as one form of reparations from Germany. This provision was designed to satisfy in part legitimate reparations demands against Germany from "appropriate" German external assets. The fact that the agreement specified that German assets in Hungary should be one form of Soviet reparations from Germany did not mean that the Soviet Union was empowered to take over these assets whenever and however it pleased. The Allied Control Council for Germany was made responsible for actually transferring the assets. Law no. 5 of the Council created a German External Property Commission, composed of representatives of the Soviet, American, British, and French Governments. This Commission was given title to property outside of Germany owned or controlled by German nationals. According to Law no. 5, German assets could be disposed of only by directives issued by the Allied Control Council to the External Property Commission.

The Soviet Union disregarded the authority of the Allied Control Council for Germany. It took over whatever assets it desired, without waiting for authorization. Its policy was to avoid any definition of what constituted a German asset. By keeping the concept loose and flexible, Soviet negotiators were able to shift their interpretation to suit the circumstances and thus to confiscate a maximum amount of property. By refusing to acknowledge legitimate claims against German shareholders, as in the case of Hungarian Bauxite Mines, Inc., they managed to acquire net assets without burdening themselves with the liabilities.

Victims of similar tactics include:

(1) The Hungarian Siemens Works, an electrical equipment firm which was a subsidiary of the German Siemens concern. The latter company was not entirely German-controlled, yet the Soviets claimed that its Hungarian subsidiary was German property and hence subject to transfer to the Soviet Union.

(2) The Hungarian General Credit Bank, 16 percent of whose stock was held before World War II by French interests. After the fall of France, the Germans forced the transfer of the French-held stock to the Dresdner Bank in Germany. Despite the fact that the United Nations Declaration of January 5, 1942 (to which the Soviet Union had been a principal signatory) specifically denied transfers of property occurring after German occupation of a country, the Soviets obtained the former French interest in the bank. They also acquired the two percent of the bank's

shares which the Germans had confiscated from Austrian Rothschild interests.

(3) The Danube Navigation Company. This Austrian concern was taken over as a German asset and amalgamated with the joint Soviet-Hungarian Navigation Company. In this case the victims included not only the former shareholders of the company but also the people of the city of Pecs in Hungary. In 1859 the city had sold its coal mines to the company in exchange for a yearly supply of 400 wagons of coal, to be given it at cost price. The new joint company refused to honor the contract with Pecs, whose coal supply was cut off as a result; the pretext was that the joint company, while enjoying the "German" assets, was not responsible for its liabilities.

Soviet-Hungarian Companies in Key Industries

Joint companies established in the fields of aviation, shipping, petroleum, and bauxite and aluminum have proved the most effective of all the methods used by the Soviet Union to penetrate and control the Hungarian economy. The pattern is generally the same for all these companies: ownership, on paper, is divided equally between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary. The Soviet contribution consists of former Hungarian assets acquired through requisition or as reparations, and of former German assets seized under the Potsdam Agreement. The chairman of the board of directors is Hungarian, but the general manager, who has complete responsibility for the actual operations, is always a Soviet national directly appointed by the Soviet Government. The general manager's duties include the conclusion of agreements, the negotiation of banking transactions, and the hiring and firing of employees.

Decrees issued by the Hungarian Government under Soviet pressure on April 12, 1947, exempted the joint companies from many of the taxes imposed on all other Hungarian business concerns. In addition, the crude oil producing company was granted a special exemption from any new taxes which might replace the existing ones, and the joint navigation company, the bauxite and aluminum companies, and the civil air company were given the right to import goods without import licenses or payment of duties.⁴

The establishment of these companies gave the Soviets a strangle hold on key Hungarian industries. The shipping company, for instance, holds leases on the harbor facilities of Csepel, the free port for Budapest, and docking facilities on the Danube in Germany, Austria, and Hungary. Thus, the Soviet Union can in effect deny the use of Hungarian waters to ships of any company or nation.

⁴Decrees No. 7710/1946 M. E., 24,690/1946 M. E., 14/480/1947, Korm., 4210/1947 M. E., 4220/1947 M. E., 4230/1947 M. E., 4240/1947 M. E., 4250/1947 M. E., published in the *Hungarian Official Gazette*.

"An Invaluable Political Gain"

In the same way, the air transport company has given the Soviet Union virtually monopolistic control over the civil airfields of Hungary, over the personnel flying the planes, and over the company's communications system. Only the Soviet Union and its satellites have agreements with the Hungarian Government permitting flights into or over Hungary.

In 1948 when the Hungarian Government proposed that the aviation company's large deficit be shared equally by the two partners to the company, the Soviets refused on the ground that the deficit had been incurred "in the interest of Hungary." The Soviet representative explained "The existence of this company protects Hungary against possible claims by other countries and from annoying interference from abroad, which in itself is an invaluable political gain."

Influencing Hungary's Foreign Trade

As has been pointed out, over half of Hungary's bauxite exports went to the Soviet Union during the year following the formation of the joint company. This trend toward increased export to the Soviet Union, and to its satellites, is typical of Hungary's entire postwar trade situation. In 1937, 13 percent of Hungary's exports went to Eastern Europe; by 1946 the proportion had increased to 58 percent. Owing to surpluses of agricultural products available for export to the West, the percentage dropped to 44 in 1948, but the percentage of exports to the Soviet bloc began to rise again in 1949. According to Andor Berei, then Secretary General of the Communist-dominated Hungarian National Planning Office, the countries of the Danube Valley should transact 65 percent of their foreign trade between themselves and with the Soviet Union.⁵ Indications are that in the case of Hungary this goal will be reached if not exceeded.

Largely as a result of Soviet disruption of the Hungarian economy, exports of bauxite in 1947 were 85 percent below the 1938 tonnage, and other commodities showed a similar decline. Grains and livestock, which accounted for almost half of the value of Hungary's prewar exports, fell to about one-tenth of the total value of exports in 1947. Iron and steel products were almost 75 percent below the 1938 tonnage, and machinery and electrical products were a small fraction of prewar value.

The nature of Hungary's foreign trade also has altered drastically. Industrial products represent a much larger proportion of total exports than before the war, despite Hungary's need for such products in her own reconstruction. In addition to supplying iron and steel, machinery,

⁵ "Planned Foreign Trade in the Danube Valley," *Magyar Kulkereskedelem*, Feb. 28, 1948.

vehicles, and other industrial goods as reparations, she has furnished increasing quantities as exports to the less highly industrialized countries of Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. Hungary's imports have undergone corresponding changes. An increasing percentage has tended to be raw materials for the manufacture of goods to be exported to Eastern Europe: coal and iron ore for the production of iron, steel, and machinery; raw cotton for cotton fabrics; and lumber and paper material.

Tomato Paste and Feathers for the West

The inevitable result of the concentration of trade in the direction of Eastern Europe is that Hungary has nothing left to offer the countries of Western Europe in exchange for the valuable manufactured goods previously obtained from them. With most of her bauxite, petroleum, and iron and steel going to the satellite countries, Hungary can export to the West little more than such items as poultry, paprika, tomato paste, and feathers.

Reliable figures are not available on the price relationships between the goods Hungary exports to the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, and those she buys in exchange. However, Hungarians who once occupied important positions in the Hungarian Government have revealed that the Soviet Union always used its dominant position during the negotiation of trade agreements to obtain Hungarian articles at low prices, while at the same time obtaining the best possible prices for its own products. Communists with important posts in the Hungarian Government played their usual role of forcing the Hungarian Government to agree to Soviet demands.

One agreement, of which the details are known, stipulated that the Soviet Union would furnish Hungary 400,000 metric tons of coke. The Soviets had bought the coke in Poland, paying \$17.50 per ton; they had forced the Poles to pay transportation from the mines to the Polish border, with the result that Poland actually received only \$13.25 per ton. The Soviets then sold the coke to Hungary for \$23 per ton, at a time when high grade coke could be purchased in the U.S.-U.K. zones of Germany for \$19.50 per metric ton. The profit to the Soviet Union from this transaction was more than \$2,000,000.

Besides paying unfair prices, Hungary in some instances purchased at Soviet insistence commodities which were nonessential to her economy. One such case was a 5-year agreement for the purchase of tobacco, which Hungary did not need and only a small quantity of which she was ever able to reexport.

Workshop for the Soviets

The systematic exploitation of Hungary has brought rich rewards to the Soviet Union in the

years since World War II. Hungary has become, in effect, a workshop for the Soviets, supplying them with needed capital equipment, industrial goods, and agricultural products in quantities which make little allowance for Hungary's own needs.

During the period immediately following the end of the war, Hungary's non-Communist leaders, despite the risks involved, frequently put up strong resistance to Soviet pressure tactics and sometimes managed to obstruct, if not completely frustrate, Soviet stratagems.

This situation was not satisfactory to the Soviet economic imperialists, whose future plans required a Hungarian Government completely subservient to Moscow. By exerting pressure through the presence of the Red army, by fomenting inflation and economic chaos, and by aiding the Communist minority, the Soviet Union had created conditions which enabled the Communists to come to power in August 1947. Since that date, the Soviet Union has steadily tightened its grip on all phases of Hungarian life, including of course the economic.

With a Communist-controlled Government in power, the Soviets hastened to complete their domination of the Hungarian economy. By one of three secret agreements signed December 9, 1947, the joint Soviet-Hungarian companies were converted into Soviet monopolies, devoted exclusively to supplying the needs of the Soviet Union and its other satellites. A second agreement forced Hungary to pay the Soviet Union 45 million dollars in settlement of a completely fictitious Soviet claim based on debts of Hungarian nationals to German nationals. Two-thirds of this huge sum was to be invested in approximately 200 Hungarian enterprises in which the Soviet Union had an interest; the remaining 15 million dollars was to be paid in goods shipped to the Soviet Union over a 4-year period. The third secret agreement legalized the Soviet practice of taking over the assets of former German enterprises in Hungary without assuming their liabilities.

The virtual enslavement of Hungary makes her obedient to any pressures which the Soviet Union may choose to exert. Before the Communist coup, Hungary took steps in the direction of participation in postwar international organizations and of expanding her trade relations with the countries of the West, but each time the Soviet Union put insurmountable barriers in the way. By their actions in Hungary, the Soviets have given further evidence of their flagrant disregard for any treaties and agreements which fail to serve their objectives—in this case, the Yalta Agreement. This fact was stated explicitly in a United States note of September 21, 1946, which was sent to the Soviet Government following a series of U. S. notes

of protest dating from October 1945. After referring to the impossibility of obtaining agreement between the two Governments on the Hungarian economic situation, the note concluded with an expression of regret that "the Soviet Government not only has refused to implement the undertaking freely assumed at the Crimea Conference, but moreover has failed to indicate its reason for so refusing."⁶

Against this background, the following Soviet statement of policy on the subject of economic exploitation, issued just before World War II, makes ironic reading:

Capitalist countries as a rule built up their heavy industries with funds obtained from abroad, whether by colonial plunder, or by exacting indemnities from vanquished nations, or else by foreign loans. The Soviet Union could not as a matter of principle resort to such infamous means of obtaining funds as the plunder of colonies or of vanquished nations.⁷

If there ever was an imperialist nation, it is the Soviet Union, and Hungary now is one of its exploited colonies. The process by which Hungary was reduced to this status is one that the Soviet Union may be expected to apply, with appropriate modifications, to any area which may come under its influence. All promises and statements of policy to the contrary are but empty and meaningless words.

The Soviet Union can be counted upon to support indigenous Communist parties and to use every economic and political means, supported in some cases by military force, to establish its puppets in power. The elimination of all opposition and the purges and trials even of Communists and Communist collaborators who no longer effectively serve Soviet objectives represent the final stage, which Hungary has now reached. The present Hungarian leaders willingly obey every order from the Kremlin. The economic arrangements, having served their purpose, are now replaced by this pervasive political control.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed. Hungary affords an example of a process that is now completed also in Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It has begun in China. Perhaps the Chinese people can draw the moral from this story.

⁶ BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1946, p. 638. See also BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1946, p. 229, and BULLETIN of Aug. 11, 1946, p. 263.

⁷ *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Short Course*, edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the C. P. S. U. (B), International Publishers Co., Inc., New York, 1939, p. 281.

• *Mr. Hilton, who is now an international relations officer in the Office of Western European Affairs, served as assistant commercial attaché at Budapest from 1947 to 1949.*

A New Approach to International Security

Statement by Nelson Rockefeller¹

[Excerpts]

During the war I was Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, which worked in Latin America in the field of economic and social cooperation and carried on the information program in that area for the United States Government. That was for 4 years.

The office was an independent agency, reporting to the President, but working closely with the State Department, which naturally has a direct bearing on the problems before the committee now.

Then I was a year in the State Department as Assistant Secretary for Latin-American Affairs, working with the operating agencies outside the State Department.

Thus I had the opportunity of seeing these relationships from the departmental point of view.

Since the war, as Congressman Herter says, my brothers, and I have been doing some experimental work in private development of the production, procuring, and distribution facilities of underdeveloped countries both on a business basis, and also working through two philanthropic organizations we set up in some of the basic service areas.

These provide agricultural and nutrition services in collaboration with two foreign Governments—Brazil and Venezuela. Last fall the President asked me if I would take the chairmanship of the Advisory Board on International Development, which was set up by the Congress in connection with the Act for International Development.

The President also asked if the Board would prepare a report on international development, which we did. There were 13 members of the Board and the report reflects the unanimous conclusion of all, after study with a very competent staff. It has been published under the title, "Partners in Progress."² It was made public by

¹ Made in support of the Mutual Security Program before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 17, 1951. Reprinted from *The Mutual Security Program*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on the Mutual Security Program.

² *Partners in Progress, A Report to the President by the International Development Advisory Board*, March 1951. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 40¢.

the President, and later published by Simon and Schuster as a book.

That briefly, is the background, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to speak first, if I may, on certain specific phases of the Mutual Security Program bill, primarily economic cooperation in the underdeveloped areas, and the economic interdependence between Europe, the United States, and the underdeveloped areas.

Then I would like to speak to the question of money—how much, and the question of organization—how to get the maximum efficiency from the program which is before you.

I think perhaps one of the questions which must be in the minds of everybody here—and I know it is in the minds of a great many people in the country—is, Why should we be worried about the problems of international development at a time when we are so concerned with our own national security. When we have to spend so much money on our own security problems, how can we afford to be concerned about international development?

The Basis of Our National Security

It seems to me that the answer to these questions is really the crux of the problem before us. In order to find the answer, I think one has to examine the question of what is the basis of our national security. Then find the relationship of our national security to international development.

To do that, I have broken down the question of our national security into its two component parts: First, economic and social security—the standard of living, the well-being of our own people—their opportunity for the future; and second, military security of our country—the defense of our freedom.

I should like to speak on the economic and social aspect first, stressing some facts which may throw some light on the problem before us.

As a nation we have 6 percent of the population of the world and 7 percent of the land area of the world. Just before the last war we produced

about 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent, a third of the world's manufactured goods, and we produced about 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent of the raw materials of the world. The two had been in balance. I have an interesting statistical chart showing that growth of production, industrial goods, and raw materials from 1899 to 1940.³

It shows a comparable increase in production of both raw materials and manufacturing capacity from 1899 to 1940. Then the next chart shows a very interesting fact which took place after the war, that is, that the growth of our manufacturing capacity moved ahead of our raw material production. So that today in 1951, we have 50 percent of the world's total manufacturing capacity, while our raw material production has barely kept pace, and is still about a third of the world's total production of raw materials.

Thus there is a gap between our manufacturing and our raw material production. Now we are dependent on foreign countries for those raw materials to supply more than one-third of the raw material requirements for our factories. . . .

I consider it is going to get worse rather than better—that our dependency is going to become greater as time goes on. We will be lucky if we can hold the present rate of raw-material production in the United States.

At the same time the present plans of our Government call for an increase of more than 20 percent in our manufacturing capacity by 1953. Through this expansion we will be able to produce all of the consumer goods, soft and hard goods, which we are consuming at a peak rate, and in addition, produce the guns, tanks, and planes which we and our allies need.

That 20 percent planned increase amounts to more than Great Britain's total current productive capacity for military and civilian goods—a capacity built up over her history as a nation.

So, in 2 years we are increasing our production by an amount greater than England has been able to build up throughout the history of her development. That gives you a little feel of the weight of our economy in the world scene today. . . .

I would like to show you the next chart, which shows the total world production of raw materials and manufactured goods.

You will see that from that same period back in the late 1800's through to the war period, world manufacturing capacity and world raw materials stayed in step.

The next chart will show you that after the war the same split that we have seen in the United States is taking place on a world basis. Manufacturing capacity, including our own, is moving ahead of world raw material production.

The gap now is made up by stockpile use of raw materials and scrap.

Importance of Underdeveloped Areas

That is a temporary thing which we cannot count on permanently. Therefore, we are faced with a very serious problem of getting enough raw materials to supply our expanding production in this country—production which is the basis of our economic strength. The question is from where do we get the raw materials we import. The answer is that 73 percent of our needs for strategic and critical materials come from the underdeveloped areas. Thus we find that our domestic economic strength today depends to an important degree on the underdeveloped areas.

There are a lot of people in this country who do not realize this. Take manganese, for instance, for which we are largely dependent on the underdeveloped areas. There are 13 pounds of manganese in every ton of steel. If we use all we can get in scrap in this country, we could produce half a pound of manganese per ton of steel. Thus we see that the basis of the great strength of our industrial economy, which is steel, is dependent on foreign sources.

There is another important point also in our relations with the underdeveloped areas.

If at some time in the next 5 or 10 years we have a peacetime economy, and our military production goes down, in my mind there is a very real question of what we will do with this additional 20 percent plant capacity.

We cannot just close the doors of those factories and let the labor go unemployed. We have to preserve that production in order to preserve the standard of living of this country, and preserve the security of our people.

We may find ourselves sometimes in the not too distant future—I hope we will—with \$60,000,000,000 of productive capacity built for armament which is no longer needed. Then we may be looking for markets abroad because I do not think our economy can absorb that \$60,000,000,000 of civilian goods overnight.

Europe is not going to take \$60,000,000,000 of manufactured goods from the United States. Europe is also increasing her productive capacity. Therefore, the one area of the free world we can look to is the underdeveloped areas of the world for markets.

If they are increasing their production of raw materials their income will go up, their buying capacity will go up, and our trade with them will go up.

I think we have to look to those areas for our future markets on an even greater basis than in the past. I can give you a very concrete bit of evidence of the possibilities. I remember in 1939 our trade with Latin America was running at the rate of somewhat over \$500,000,000 a year. Now it is just under \$3,000,000,000 a year. In a short period of 10 or 11 years the 150,000,000 people of the Western Hemisphere have moved forward

³ Charts not here printed.

with a dynamic thrust that gives an evidence of the possibilities in other parts of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Our dependence on them is very real. But this dependence for raw materials and markets on other countries and other people is not something that we can take for granted. We cannot take for granted that we will be able to obtain raw materials we need from other countries, nor that they will buy our manufactured goods. It will depend on mutual cooperation.

Today, cooperation with other peoples in other countries depends on the will of the governments and on the will of the people. I think Iran is a good illustration of the serious condition that one of the industrial powers can find themselves in, in this case Great Britain, when overnight there is a threat to her major source of oil being cut off.

The significance of our dependency is highlighted by the situation there.

So much for our economic dependency as a Nation on the underdeveloped areas of the world. Let us take a look for a minute at the military aspect of our national security.

I remember in 1944 General Embick, whom probably many of you knew, who was Chief of War Plans and Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, made a talk to the members of the Board.

He predicted that after the war there would only be two areas of the world that could make war, one the Soviet Union and the other the Western Hemisphere.

He said that in the future, war could only be waged with raw materials, industrial capacity, manpower and land mass, and those two areas were the only ones that would have those things. He said that the balance of power between these two areas would be China. China is at the present time lost to the free world. Therefore, we find ourselves not only dependent on the raw materials and manpower and land mass of the Western Hemisphere, but without China the other Asian countries have become doubly important from a strategic point of view.

So we find ourselves dependent on these areas for our military production and military strength and security. We find ourselves dependent on these areas for material goods, but also for political support. With the Security Council not functioning effectively as a security agent for the world, because of the use of the veto, the General Assembly has become the only body which can take effective action, and the majority of the votes in the General Assembly is in the hands of the underdeveloped areas.

Therefore, we find from a military, economic, and political point of view that these areas are increasingly important to us as a nation, in terms of our own security, or our capacity to preserve our security.

We face the blunt fact that the United States

today no longer finds the base of its own security within its own borders. That is a pretty startling fact in view of our history of complete, as we thought, independence.

With this dependence on other peoples and other governments for the preservation of our national security, the question arises, How can we get their cooperation? What is the basis for getting their cooperation to preserve our own security?

I think the answer is really quite a simple one. This cooperation, must reflect their own military security, from the point of view of freedom, and also their economic security from the point of view of human well-being, as much as it affects yours and mine.

If they feel there is genuine mutuality of interest in cooperation, and they are able to find in it the things which they need for their security they will be anxious to help us in the things we need for ours.

Briefly, I would like to examine some of the basic problems which these areas face in order to determine the nature and form of our cooperation needed to help them meet their security.

Let us look at Europe's problems briefly. I hesitate to speak on that subject following Mr. Paul Hoffman who was here this morning. But, as I see the picture, Europe is faced with the threat of lowered standards of living if she curtails civilian productive capacity to produce armaments. That is a situation that could have serious repercussions as you know better than I.

If they reduce their exports to provide manufacturing capacity for armaments, they cut off the essential supplies to the underdeveloped areas. About 44 percent of the supplies of the underdeveloped areas are for machinery and equipment, spare parts, all of the things which the industrial world makes and the underdeveloped world needs. They are the items which make for the economic strength and the social stability of those countries and they have not the capacity to produce them themselves.

So there would be a very serious problem if Europe cuts off her exports of those items. We cannot provide these supplies because our economy is already strained. Thus, there is a real danger that there could be economic and social chaos in many of the countries of the underdeveloped world if they lost their European sources of essential supplies.

Looking at it from another point of view, if Europe cut off her exports where would she get her foreign exchange? Foreign exchange which she needs to pay for the raw materials and food-stuffs she must import to exist. Europe finds herself right up against it, and her only answer is an expanding world economy with more raw materials coming in and more exports going out, while at the same time she expands her plant capacity and production of military goods.

Let us now look at the underdeveloped areas.

You all know the general conditions there. There are 1,057,000,000 people in the underdeveloped areas of the free world, in Africa, the Near East, Asia, southeast Asia, and the Latin-American countries.

Their standard of living is reflected in their total national income, which is \$80,000,000,000 for the 1,057,000,000 people, or about \$80 per person per year. That ranges from around \$30 in southeast Asia up to \$150, Latin America as compared to Europe's \$450 and the United States \$1,475 per person.

You know the deplorable health conditions. You know the degree of illiteracy. It averages approximately 70 percent. People who are on the verge of starvation, who are riddled with sickness and handicapped by ignorance, are not people who can produce and are not people who can participate effectively in the development of democratic institutions within their own countries.

Thus the very things we look to them for, both from an economic point of view and a political point of view, are almost an impossibility under present conditions.

Therefore, any mutually advantageous cooperation with those people, will only reflect their security needs if it gives them some chance to better their own living conditions.

Skilled vs. Unskilled Labor

Not long ago I was at the home of Sir Benegal Rau, the Indian delegate to the United Nations. His sister-in-law who is very interested in rural problems showed some movies.

One scene showed two Indians sitting on the bare ground. One of them was pulling a rope, revolving a wheel which turned the lathe, and the other was working with a chisel on a copper bowl fastened to the lathe. They represented the rural copper industry.

Sir Benegal Rau's sister-in-law said at the end of the movie that India had lost her copper exports to the United States. I asked how that happened.

She said that the two men that I had seen in the movie used to earn 2 cents an hour, but now due to social improvements in the country they were getting between 40 and 60 cents per day, and their product had been priced out of the United States market. Gentlemen that story gives you a perfect illustration of the problem with which the worker without machinery is faced in trying to produce and sell when he's up against the skilled worker with machinery.

In another country we were making an economic survey of this particular problem. They were particularly concerned as to how to increase their dollar exchange in order to purchase more machinery and equipment needed in the development of their country. The question was what items

they could export for the creation of more dollar exchange.

Rice and wheat seemed to be the two most promising. In that country it took 20 men to produce what one farmer in the United States could produce. But these 20 men earning 21 cents a day, as compared to, say, \$4.80 or higher for the American farmer, produced wheat that cost twice as much in the world market as the American farmer's wheat.

There was a real problem of how they could achieve an export position in wheat. The only solution they could see was to cut the wages from 21 cents to 10½ cents, which, of course, was out of the question.

I cite these two examples because I think we have reached the point where high-priced American labor no longer needs to fear the competition of cheap labor. Rather cheap labor has industrial labor to fear. The worker with \$10,000 or \$12,000 worth of machinery and power at his disposal can produce much more than labor with low wages and low standard of living.

As the disparity between the standard of living of our economy and those of other parts of the world increases, their chances of developing their own countries and increasing their production are becoming less and less.

Some people have advanced an interesting analysis, however, which I am not in a position to confirm. But it has been pointed out that Lenin's original theory was to win over labor in the industrial areas of the world in order to bring about world conquest. But in view of the fact that this tactic has not been as successful as it was hoped, the strategy now may be to cut off the source of raw materials for the industrial world from the underdeveloped areas. In this way it would be possible to cripple the economic strength of the industrial world and make it vulnerable to aggression from without or submissive from within.

However we reach this position: If this mutually beneficial cooperation is basic to our obtaining the things we need for our own security, the question is now, How do we bring it about? What base can we work on?

We have to work together, permanently, as nations and peoples, not just in the emergency. I frankly have been somewhat concerned with the undue emphasis upon emergency in this present bill.

I think we have to be frank with the people of our own country, that our relations with these other countries is not just a matter of the emergency, that it is a permanent thing.

We are dependent on them; they are dependent on us; neither can solve his problems alone. We have to work out mechanisms and relationships which will permit us to work together over a continuing period, and give a sense of stability and confidence to all.

That is why our Board recommended the centralization of all economic activities in a new agency which would bring them together where economic policy could be formulated within the framework of the State Department's over-all policy, and where operations could be effectively and efficiently carried out.

We felt to put the operation temporarily in ECA indicated an emergency duration, that it would perhaps be misleading. The fact is that we can no longer set up emergency agencies and hope within 2 or 3 years the problem will be gone and we can return to our old days of withdrawing within ourselves.

That is why we suggest a permanent new agency. It is not just a problem of government alone. It is not just a problem of giving a few dollars for technical assistance. The flow of capital and management must be encouraged and stimulated. This is not a problem of government alone, but of all public and private groups and organizations.

Business and production in this country is largely private, whether represented by the single man on his farm or the big corporation. All those productive forces must be integrated into the world scene if we are to do a job on a long-term basis if production is to be increased.

No palliatives or program of long-term charity is going to solve the problem. We have given up trying to solve our problem on a charity basis or a dole at home. The thing is to help people to help themselves to become productive free citizens so that they can carry their own weight and be self-respecting citizens in a strong free world. We must strike at the roots of the problem.

Organization and Methods

I now come to the question of organization, the question of money and methods. In this bill I think the problem is well and clearly presented. I think the objectives are clear and sound as far as the emergency is concerned, but perhaps limited as to the long term. I believe too much attention is given to the short term and not enough to how this thing is going to move out on to a long-term basis.

As far as the organization problem is concerned, our Board came to the unanimous conclusion there must be a single independent agency which can deal with these economic problems, that it must report directly to the President and take its policy guidance from the Secretary of State, we found that today 23 United States agencies and 32 international agencies are working in this field. Certainly this is not conducive to clear policy formulation or effective coordination of action.

Under these circumstances the money that is spent cannot bring corresponding results.

As far as methods are concerned, I think the ECA, not only in Europe but also in the underdeveloped areas in which it is working, has done a

magnificent job. However, I believe there has been too little emphasis on private enterprise and the part that private enterprise can play. Nor has there been sufficient stimulation to encourage a larger participation.

Need for Flow of Capital

I think there is too much attention paid to so-called technical assistance and too little attention paid to the problem of financing. I think the flow of capital is of major importance, whether it is loan money or investment money.

I would like to discuss that later, if you would care to have me.

There is too much reliance on technical assistance as a short cut to success. This country did not grow on technical assistance alone; it grew on the flow of capital from European savings, and United States management which had the ability to use the capital and technicians.

To have one without the other is like trying to sit on a three-legged stool which has only one leg.

I think there is too much emphasis on aid and the giving of money without enough emphasis on the active cooperation in an integrated, effective, mutual effort by the individual nations, both through governmental and private channels, as well as through the United Nations.

Now as far as the amount of money for aid is concerned, I have no basis for judgment. However, there is no question about the importance of the armament program in this present world scene. There must be the strength to resist aggression, whether from within or without in these countries.

As far as the European economic program is concerned, there again I think its importance is well documented, and I am in complete accord with the objectives. Again, however, as far as the amount of money necessary for these programs goes, I have not the background for a judgment.

When it comes to the underdeveloped areas, I can say without hesitation that I think the figure of 512 million dollars which is recommended is sound providing it is well handled from an administrative point of view. The money is largely for expenditures of an emergency character and for technical assistance for economic development.

The Gordon Gray report laid the foundation for the present effective approach.⁴ I think that he in his report made a major contribution. It was extremely well presented.

Our Board, on which was represented labor and agriculture, business, voluntary agencies, and academic groups, studied the whole problem, and we came to unanimous conclusions on all major points. As far as the size of Government expenditures, we took the figures which the Gray

⁴ *Report to the President on Foreign Economic Policies*, Washington, No. 10, 1950. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, 40¢.

report had given of 500 million and adopted that.

To be perfectly frank, the problems are so tremendous that it is very hard to say what should be spent.

It is a question of getting started on the basis of a joint effort and of creating a sense of direction, of common purpose with the peoples of other areas, a sense of common objectives which will give them hope and faith in the future. How the money is spent may be more important than the amount of money.

The most important thing, I think is to get an effective organization which can deal with these economic and social problems, see them in their over-all interrelations, see them in relation to the political, military, and psychological factors, integrate them, and then gradually develop programs which will be effective.

They must have money for emergency purposes in many parts of the world. So far as the development programs are concerned, we have had experience in some parts of the world, like Latin America, where we know money has been spent effectively and sensibly. It has been proven.

I would say that the funds called for here for the underdeveloped areas are not out of line, that experience will tell us as we go along what we can do and do intelligently. In my opinion, these moneys should be appropriated, and a single independent organization be set up to use them effectively. This latter is of paramount importance, that can intelligently deal with them. . . .

I will then give you briefly the opinions of the members of the Advisory Board for International Development set forth in our report "Partners In Progress," with which I concur 100 percent.

The first was the essentiality of a single agency. There are new problems to deal with and, therefore, the orientation should not be simply what it has been in the past. There must be a looking forward to a permanent relationship with the other free countries on a sound basis. The administration should be outside the State Department but subject to State Department policy, given on behalf of the President. It should have responsibility for economic policy formulation in the field of international economic cooperation and development.

Integration of Economic Problems

These are the factors which I think are important: First is the integration of the economic problems between the different areas of the world. We have dealt in the past too much with Europe as one separate area. Latin America as another one, Asia as another when, as a matter of fact, they are all interdependent.

Raw materials from China and Korea which Japan has lost, leave Japan today completely dependent on the Western Powers for raw materials. What Japan will do in the way of trade and eco-

nomic development in her relation with southeast Asia is going to influence what we and European countries will have to do.

These economic factors are all interrelated, and they must be seen from an over-all point of view as far as geography is concerned.

Second, it is important that the problems of the individual regions be given consistent attention and that they not be neglected as has been too often the case in the past because of crisis in other areas. In order to equalize treatment we recommended that the work be carried out on a regional basis in which divisions will have direct responsibility for certain areas and stay with those areas despite the crises in other parts of the world.

I think that would give us greater continuity in our dealings with such areas as Latin America and Africa.

Next, it seemed to our Board very important there be real coordination between the economic and the political, military, and psychological phases of our foreign policy. We felt that the economic work could more effectively support those and that they in turn could support the economic. We can have far more effective foreign relations if they are coordinated and support each other. If this is to be achieved the foreign economic operations must be centralized and not spread around in 23 different departments and agencies as at present.

Another important factor we felt was the integration and coordination among the following fields of foreign economic activity because they are all interrelated: The production of raw materials and food, allocation of essential supplies and scarce materials, development of productive and manufacturing facilities, building of public works, long- and short-term financing, and basic services such as health and sanitation.

For instance, you could not get rubber out of the Amazon during the last war because of disease, sickness, and lack of food.

Until you could lick those you could not get the rubber. You find there is an interrelationship between all of these factors, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the world. They cannot be separated from the industrial world because without the flow of machinery and equipment and without markets for their raw materials you cannot get the development. There needs to be a central agency to deal with all these complicated relationships and integrate them. An overseas economic agency that can give effective leadership.

Another point we felt of extreme importance was the participation of private enterprise. The proposed agency could give real leadership in encouraging and facilitating its participation. We recommend that a deputy or an assistant director of the independent agency be appointed to work with private enterprise.

United States trade with the underdeveloped areas has been running at the rate of about \$10 bil-

lion a year, and is pushing up to \$12 billion. That is two-way trade. In contrast let's look at the point 4 program. Last year \$35 million was appropriated for it. Thirty-five million, if intelligently spent, can be very useful. But when you put \$35 million against a background of 12 billion of trade, the preservation of that \$12 billion in trade is more important than the assistance, important as that is. Thus it is essential that the overseas economic agency encourage private trade and have authority to deal with the problems of export controls, essential requirements and procurement and development of strategic and critical materials.

Most important is the question of the flow of private capital. Private capital has been going out at the rate of about \$700 million a year to underdeveloped areas since the war. That is a very small percentage of our national income. If private capital were flowing from this country at the rate of only 1 percent of our national income, it would amount to around \$2.5 billion. That amount intelligently invested in productive facilities could revolutionize the economic base of those countries.

I have mentioned the great productivity of the American worker based on the \$12,000 worth of equipment and machinery that he has at his disposal in this country. Without machinery and equipment, mere technology alone means little to the worker in underdeveloped areas.

But the savings of the people in the underdeveloped areas average only \$5 a year. At \$5 a year per worker it would take them 2,000 years to save enough money to buy the \$10,000 to \$12,000 worth of machinery necessary to put them in the same position from the point of view of productivity as the American worker.

Thus it is clear to see that the encouragement of the flow of capital from the industrial areas to the underdeveloped areas is one of the major problems with which we are faced today, whether it is money on loan or direct investment combined with local capital.

This central agency must take active leadership in solving this problem.

We recommended a special assistant, deputy or director for cooperation with the international and regional economic bodies.

As it studies and sees these problems, the new agency should be in a position to recommend legislation and international agreements which will facilitate their solution.

We recommended specifically legislation to encourage the outflow of private capital, including tax incentives.

Use of Joint Commissions

We also recommended the use of joint commissions with other countries to develop national and regional development programs. There was a

joint commission during the war, with Mexico, on which I had the privilege of serving as the United States representative.

The results of its work are interesting. Under its direction the engineering, the financing and the management was worked out for 22 power, irrigation, and industrial projects in Mexico. Contracts were let for the purchase of necessary machinery and equipment in the United States. The minute the war was over those contracts went into effect.

Those industries are now a vigorous and effective part of Mexico's economy. Because of that joint planning instead of dissipating the foreign exchange which she had built up through the sale of raw materials, Mexico was able to build for the future, and not, as a friend of mine said about another country, "In the immediate postwar, spending all of their wartime dollars for yoyos and plastic suspenders."

Such joint commissions can be very effective. The recently set up United States-Brazilian Commission suffered a great loss the other day when its director, Frank Truslow, died aboard ship on his way to Rio. He was admired and respected in Brazil and had, at personal sacrifice, left his job as head of the Curb Exchange to go down to Brazil.

In such a cooperative approach we can work along with them and help them to work out their programs and the financing of their development to the mutual interest of all.

This can include the development of over-all and specific economic plans, the coordination of operations, and the economic support of the military. I mention the military here because many of these countries are being given military equipment but the impact of the added financial burden on their national resources is not always figured out in advance.

Without some pretty careful planning they may run into serious economic and social problems as a result.

As I said before, I feel very sincerely that not only for the underdeveloped areas but also for Europe and Japan such cooperation, leading to an expanding world economy, in which all of us benefit, can do more than any of us realize.

It can revive the sense of hope and faith where it has lagged, and can create it where it never existed. I think for our own people it will give a sense of purpose the lack of which I think is felt particularly by the young people of this country.

I do not think we can overlook the importance of the impact of such a program on the peoples behind the iron curtain. If they see the free people really moving forward together toward a common goal they will tear the iron curtain to pieces as they come out from behind it to join the free world.

On the other hand if we do not take the leadership in providing a basis for free peoples to work

together in this common interest, there are others in the world who are ready to do so.

In closing may I say, Mr. Chairman, I think that the organization for international development when created, has to give primary consideration to this question of the out-flow of capital.

If we do not see that there is an out-flow of capital for productive use, the problems which will result from the lack of necessary production will have to be dealt with later on an emergency basis through a huge give-away program. This will cost us a great deal more in taxpayers' money than if we had helped the people get on their own feet so that they could deal with their own economic and social problems. . . .

U.S. and Philippines To Sign Mutual Defense Treaty

[Released to the press August 16]

The Governments of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, in connection with their conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, have agreed to execute a mutual defense treaty.

The mutuality of interest of the Philippines and the United States in matters relating to the defense of their respective territories was specifically stated in the Bases agreement of 1947 and the Military Assistance agreement of 1947. The President of the United States and the Secretary of State in public utterances have emphasized that the United States would not tolerate an attack upon the Philippines. It now seems appropriate, as part of the growing treaty fabric of peace in the Pacific, to embody these commitments in a formal treaty of mutual defense. Therefore, the two nations have formally expressed their common determination to defend themselves against armed attack and their joint recognition that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either would be dangerous to the other's peace and safety.

It is planned that the treaty will be signed during the first days of September.

TEXT OF TREATY

The Parties to the treaty, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific Area,

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the United States and the Philippines, Therefore declare and agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE III

The Parties through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of the Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

ARTICLE IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Philippines. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Government of the United States.

Migrant Labor Agreement With Mexico

[Released to the press August 11]

The United States and Mexico exchanged notes today in Mexico City placing into effect the Migrant Labor Agreement of 1951. This supersedes the international executive agreement of August 1949 which was terminated last July 15.¹

The agreement is the product of negotiations held recently in Mexico by officials of both Governments following passage by the U.S. Congress of Public Law 78 which invests the responsibility in the Secretary of Labor to obtain Mexican farm workers in the absence of sufficient domestic agricultural workers.

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House August 16]

I have today approved House Joint Resolution 311, making interim appropriations to the Department of Labor to begin the task of bringing Mexican farm workers into this country under the terms of Public Law 78, approved July 12, and in conformity with the recently concluded agreement between this Government and the Republic of Mexico.

I am glad that in passing this joint resolution the Congress has begun action on those measures which will aid in the development of a well-rounded program dealing with the immigration of Mexican farm workers. I am most hopeful that the Congress will now give expeditious consideration also to the appropriations and the substantive legislative proposals needed to complete action on the recommendations in my message to the Congress of July 13, 1951.

Our present agreement with Mexico will terminate in less than 6 months, and it is vital that the Congress complete action on these recommendations before that time runs out, if we are to negotiate with the Mexican Government for a new agreement to meet our needs for workers in the next crop year.

United States and Iraq Sign Educational Exchange Agreement

[Released to the press August 16]

Iraq and the United States today signed an agreement putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress (the Fulbright Act). The signing took place at Baghdad, with Khalil Kanna, Minister of Education, representing the Government of Iraq and Edward S. Crocker, American

¹ Copies of the new agreement and the work contract which will be signed by the employer and the Mexican worker are available from the Department of Labor.

Ambassador to Iraq, representing the Government of the United States.

The program, as the agreement states, is designed ". . . to promote further mutual understanding between the people of Iraq and the United States of America by a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talents through educational contacts . . ." It provides for an annual expenditure not to exceed the equivalent of approximately 150 thousand dollars in Iraqi currency for the financing of "studies, research, instruction and other educational activities of or for citizens of the United States of America in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Iraq or of Iraqis in United States schools and institutions of higher learning located outside the continental United States . . . including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incident to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for Iraqis who desire to attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental United States . . . whose attendance will not deprive citizens of the United States of America of an opportunity to attend such schools and institutions." The program will be financed from certain funds made available by the United States Government resulting from the sale of surplus property to Iraq.

All recipients of awards under this program are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President of the United States.

Under the terms of the agreement, a United States Educational Foundation in Iraq will be established to assist in the administration of the program. The Board of Directors of the Foundation will consist of six members, three of whom are to be citizens of Iraq, and three to be citizens of the United States. The United States Ambassador to Iraq will serve as honorary chairman of the board.

After the members of the Foundation in Iraq have been appointed and a program formulated, information about specific opportunities for American citizens to pursue study, teaching, or research in that country will be made public. In the meantime inquiries may be addressed to the following agencies:

Graduate study

The Institute of International Education, 2 West Forty-fifth Street, New York 19, New York, or to the Fulbright Program Advisers on the campuses of American colleges and universities.

Teaching in national elementary or secondary schools abroad

The United States Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, Washington 25, D. C.

Teaching in American elementary or secondary schools in other countries

The American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

University teaching, or advanced research

The Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N. W., Washington 25, D. C.

THE RECOVERY OF CULTURAL OBJECTS DISPERSED DURING WORLD WAR II

By *Ardelia R. Hall*

The dispersal of works of art and cultural treasures is one of the chief hazards of war, second only to the irreparable loss through damage and destruction, to which such property is exposed. All valuable collections in every country in time of war are, of necessity, transferred from cities to isolated places of greater safety. Works of art in the most vulnerable of buildings, the modern glass-roofed museum, obviously must be removed from danger. It is, in fact, due to the precautionary measures that were taken and the storage in safe shelters that the large proportion of movable objects in Europe survived World War II unharmed. It was the fixed monuments of architecture and art that suffered the greatest loss and damage. The need for the evacuation of museums, libraries, and archives was anticipated by most institutions and by the International Museums Office of the League of Nations. During the 1930's this Office had prepared and sponsored conservation measures that would be required in such an emergency.¹

The wholesale confiscations of all types of cultural materials by official Nazi organizations in the countries which they occupied in Europe brought about the transfer of an immense amount of valuable properties to Germany. The scope of their plunder of cultural property in Western and Eastern Europe is given in the Nazi decrees and orders published in the volumes on *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*.²

Many public collections of Austria and Germany and the greater proportion of Nazi loot were sent for numerous reasons to the areas which came under United States Government control. Now after 6 years, it is probable that all important war

repositories have been found. The tragic losses of a few storage places through bombardment or fire, as in Berlin, have been ascertained. It would appear that only deliberately well-hidden caches may still remain to be uncovered.

Cultural Restitution in the American Zone of Germany

In the American Zone of Germany more than 1,800 repositories in mines, castles, churches, monasteries, and remote villages were discovered. The objects were taken under United States Government control and transferred from the emergency shelters to central collecting points established by the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS). Under United States Government policies, they have been held in safe custody until they could be restored to their rightful owners in all the war areas of Europe. These policies have become, as the late Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone predicted, "the proclamation to the world, friends and enemies, of our practical concern in protecting these symbols of civilization from injury and spoliation."

The cultural restitution program in the American Zone of Germany has been carried forward by American officers who are art experts in the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section of OMGUS and under the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). The first restitution took place when the Altarpiece of the Mystic Lamb by the Van Eyck brothers was returned to Belgium in August 1945; since then, there has been a constant flow of works of art and other objects of cultural importance back to the countries from which they had been removed. Over a

million art objects and 4 million books have been recovered, identified, and restored from the American Zone. Some of the priceless treasures returned under the American program included the Vienna collections, the crown jewels of the Holy Roman Emperors, and Charlemagne's *Book of the Gospel* to Austria; the Veit Stoss Altarpiece of Cracow to Poland; Michelangelo's *Madonna and Child* of Bruges to Belgium; the stained glass of the Strasbourg Cathedral and the Rothschild collections to France; the treasures of the Budapest National Museum to Hungary; and a collection of antique gold objects from the Naples Museum to Italy. The ownership of the hundreds of thousands of objects was identified through official records, inventories, and documents relating to the Nazi seizures and varied art transactions, which had been assembled by the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, by the Art Looting Investigation Unit of the Office of Strategic Services, and by OMGUS.

The difficult identification of the ownership of objects of obscure origin is continuing at the Wiesbaden and Munich central collecting points under the direction of two former Fine Arts officers, Thomas Carr Howe, Jr., director of the Palace of the Legion of Honor Museum in San Francisco, Calif., and S. Lane Faison, Jr., Lawrence professor of Fine Arts and director of the Museum at Williams College. They are on leave from their respective institutions to deal with the more difficult residual problems of the cultural restitution program for the Department of State.

Works of Art Still Missing

Many works of art, however, have not been recovered. Some are known to have been scattered and lost through the innumerable perils of war, others have disappeared without a trace. Among the thousands of objects and books still missing are many famous masterpieces. Four paintings from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence have never been found since they were evacuated during the war.³ They are a Lorenzo di Credi *Self Portrait* (fig. 1), the Bronzino *Deposition* and the small pictures by Antonio del Pollaiuolo of *Hercules and the Hydra* (fig. 2) and *Hercules and Antaeus* (fig. 3). The Raphael *Portrait of a Youth* belonging to the Museum of Princess Czartoryski in Cracow

(fig. 4) and four panels of the St. John's Altarpiece from the Church of St. Florian, Cracow (fig. 5) disappeared following their removal to Germany in 1944 by the notorious Nazi Governor General of Poland. Twenty-eight paintings which were stolen from the villa in Italy of H.R.H. Prince Felix of Luxembourg have never been traced. They include a *Madonna and Child* by Cima da Conegliano (fig. 6) and a *Portrait of Victoire Louise, Daughter of Louis XV* by an unknown artist (fig. 7). Among the paintings still missing from private collections in France are the Rembrandt *Head of an Old Man* and the Van Dyck *Portrait of Paul Pontius* from the Schloss Collection, a Fragonard *Shepherdess* from the collection of Georges Wildenstein, and a Monet painting of the Seine from the collection of M. Saloman Flavian.

Preliminary lists of missing works of art of cultural importance have been prepared, just as have claims for the restitution of cultural property,⁴ by the government of the country from which the objects were removed during the war. The lists are transmitted to other governments through diplomatic channels. The United States Government does not receive claims from individuals except under limited conditions. The Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers of OMGUS have listed unofficially objects missing from collections and museums in Austria and Germany. These preliminary and unofficial lists will need to be revised and periodically brought up to date.

The British Government publications on *Losses and Survivals in the War* in Italy, Greece, Malta, and the British zones of Austria and Germany⁵ deal mainly with war damage to historic architecture, but they also include information not presently available elsewhere on certain losses of movable objects in those countries. The French Government has published several volumes of missing paintings and sculpture, archives and rare books, objets d'art, and antiques.⁶ A volume on *Paintings, Tapestries, and Sculpture* was received by the Department of State for distribution to museums and art dealers in the United States.

An index of cultural losses in Poland during the German occupation from 1939 to 1944 has been published by the Polish Government in English.⁷ It contains historical facts about the collections of churches, libraries, archives, and museums and information, as known in 1944, on damage, destruction and looting. An illustrated volume on the

foreign paintings missing from Polish collections⁸ has also been printed in English and received for distribution in the United States.

The circulation of the publications on missing works of art helps protect American interests against the danger of purchasing stolen property without a clear title. This information has been welcomed by American institutions and American dealers.

Recovery of Missing Objects of Art Through International Cooperation

The need for international cooperation to prevent the transfer of looted objects from one country to another was recognized in the interallied agreements⁹ and by the international conferences¹⁰ during the war. Practical measures for a continuing recovery program were set forth in the Statement of Policy for the Control of Looted Articles of July 8, 1946. The text of this policy is given below in appendix 1. All European countries have been invited to participate in the program. It is, of course, an undeniable fact that works of art lost through the Nazi depredations of European countries, which shocked the civilized world, will never be saleable.

This recovery program, which has been developed in conformity with international agreements and carried forward by governmental agencies with the cooperation of learned institutions and responsible citizens, makes possible the eventual recovery of irreplaceable cultural objects. It honors the rightful ownership, which has been the basis of Allied policies. It provides for an appropriate continuation of the cultural restitution programs. For the first time in history, restitution may be expected to continue for as long as works of art known to have been plundered during a war continue to be rediscovered.

Recovery of Looted Objects of Art in the United States

The introduction of looted objects into the United States is, furthermore, contrary to the general policy of this Government. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved on January 28, 1947, a policy for the "Return of Looted Objects of Art to Countries of Origin,"¹¹ in which it was stated that it is "the responsibility and desire of this Government to return to their countries of origin those cultural objects which have

been wrongfully taken and brought to the United States during and after the war."

The United States Government as early as 1945 undertook to return to the rightful owners any looted objects should they appear in this country. A circular letter was issued by the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas. The Department of State in 1950 circulated a second letter, given below in appendix 2 to American universities, museums, libraries, art dealers, and book sellers, asking for their continued cooperation in the recovery of dispersed cultural property. This letter was reprinted by the American Federation of Arts in the *Magazine of Art*, 44, 2 (February 1951), page 75, and by the College Art Association of America in the *College Art Journal*, 10, 2 (Winter 1950), page 188.

In this endeavor the Department of State has received the generous support of American institutions and American citizens.

On the receipt of information concerning an object in the United States suspected of having been looted, the Department ascertains all available facts as to its former ownership and the circumstances of its loss during the war. In certain cases the ownership is readily determined. With important works of art, for example, the identity of the objects and the ownership are often recognized by the authorities who bring them to the attention of the Department. If the Department is informed that the holder of such an object is willing to surrender it, the Department will request its transfer to Washington for return to the claimant government, otherwise the case is referred to the appropriate agency of the Government for further action. The Treasury Department, the Department of Justice, and the Department of the Army cooperate with the Department of State in the recovery program.

The restitution procedures of the Department conform with those of OMGUS Military Government Regulations.¹² When an identified, looted, cultural object is recovered, it is released by the Secretary of State to the authorized representative of the claimant nation against a receipt. The form of the receipt is given in appendix 3. The claimant government is responsible for the return of the object to the individual owner.

Of the objects of artistic and historic importance thus far recovered in the United States and returned to Europe,¹³ the greater portion have been

from public or state collections. They include the Mainz Psalter of 1457 from the State Library of Saxony, now exhibited at the Wiesbaden Central Collecting Point; an ivory diptych of the fourteenth century carved with scenes of the Passion from the Kassel Museum; a group of Rajput and Mughal miniatures of the sixteenth and seventeenth century from the Berlin State Library; a tapestry from the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna; four tapestries from the Bayerisches Nationalmuseum; two famous bronze panels of the thirteenth century from the doors of the Benevento Cathedral in Italy; an engraving of the *Knight, Death and the Devil* by Dürer from the Germanisches Nationalmuseum in Nürnberg; two paintings by van Poelenburg and van Brekelenkam from the Lazienki Palace Museum in Warsaw, where they have now been placed on exhibition; several early manuscripts from England; and a painting by Monet of *La Péniches sur la Seine*, which had been confiscated by the Nazis from a member of the Rothschild family in Paris.

APPENDIX 1.

Statement of Policy with Respect to the Control of Looted Articles, Paris, July 8, 1946

Following is the text of an agreement concluded July 8, 1946, among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with respect to the control of looted articles:

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France have agreed to recognize the usefulness of a common demarche to be made to the neutrals recommending that certain measures be taken by them with a view to discovering in their territory cultural property looted by the enemy in countries formerly occupied by it and to control such property and prohibit its exportation abroad (this relates to articles including books, manuscripts, and documents of an artistic, historical, archaeological, scientific, pedagogic or religious character).

With this in view they agree to request the governments of the liberated countries to furnish the governments of neutral countries, as soon as possible, lists of spoliated articles which have not as yet been restituted through the recuperation operations now being made in Germany and Austria (it being understood that, if necessary, these lists might be completed by means of additions thereto and that as recuperated objects are received notification will be given of their deletion).

The three governments will recommend to the governments of the liberated countries that they exchange their respective lists and send copies to the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and all other governments which the countries interested in this procedure may consider useful.

The three governments will invite the neutral governments to seek out immediately looted articles in their territory and instruct the national customs authorities to prohibit the export of any article which may be presumed to have been looted. The governments of the liberated countries will submit as soon as possible to the neutral countries lists of art objects looted within their territory for the purpose of assisting the investigations undertaken by the neutral countries. The customs authorities of the neutral countries should refer doubtful cases to their gov-

ernments, which will make every effort to identify the articles and to verify the good faith of proposed transactions making use of local art experts, police and information services. If any doubts still remain, the neutral governments will submit such cases with details and photographs of the articles in question for the examination of the three governments. Furthermore, the lists should be circulated to art dealers, museum authorities, and specialized people who will be under the same obligation of vigilance as the customs authorities and compelled to refer suspicious cases to the central administrations. The governments of the neutral countries shall, furthermore, alert their public opinion with regard to their interest in looted articles by means of the press and all other kinds of publicity, requesting that all suspicious cases be notified to the police and other governmental services.

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France underline the usefulness which the application of the above indicated measures represent for the liberated countries as well as for themselves and that they are desirous of having the neutral countries adopt them. Each government undertakes to effect all appropriate measures and will request the governments of the liberated countries to do likewise.

APPENDIX 2.

To Universities, Museums, Libraries, Art Dealers, and Booksellers.

It is the responsibility and desire of the Government of the United States to recover and return to owner nations those cultural objects, including works of art, archival material and books, looted, stolen or improperly dispersed from public and private collections in war areas and brought to the United States during and following World War II.

This responsibility has been shared by American institutions and American citizens. The response of museums, libraries, and dealers to a circular letter from the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas requesting information about objects without a clear title has led to the recovery by this Government of a number of items of artistic and historic importance. The continued vigilance of American institutions and individuals in identifying cultural objects improperly dispersed during World War II is needed.

Your cooperation in notifying the Secretary of State, Washington 25, D. C., concerning such objects which may come to your attention will be appreciated.

APPENDIX 3.

Receipt for Cultural Objects

The undersigned, _____, duly accredited by the _____ Government, hereby acknowledges the receipt on behalf of the said government, from the Secretary of State on behalf of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT for the items described in Schedule "A" attached hereto.

The delivery of these items is subject to the following conditions:

1. The receiving government hereby certifies that the items described in Schedule "A" attached were taken out of that country by the enemy.

2. The receiving government undertakes to restore any object which has been delivered to it by mistake:

- a. To the government of the Allied state if the property was removed by the enemy from the territory of that state;

- b. If it had not been removed from the territory of an Allied state, to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany or to the Secretary of State of the United States of America as the Secretary of State may designate.

3. The receiving government agrees that the United States Government and all its agents and representatives shall be saved harmless from any claim for loss, damage or deterioration suffered by any item from the time of



Left: *Self-Portrait or Portrait of a Young Man*,
by Lorenzo di Credi (1456-1537),
Uffizi Gallery, Florence.



Hercules and the Hydra,
by Antonio del Pollaiuolo (1429-1498),
Uffizi Gallery, Florence.



Antonio del Pollaiuolo's *Hercules and An-
taeus*, also missing from the Uffizi Gallery
at Florence.

*Missing Works of
Art from Poland*

Right: *Portrait of a Young Man*,
by Raphael. Wood panel, 75 x 59 cm.
From the Czartoryski Museum, Cracow.



Below: St. John's Altarpiece with scenes
from the life of St. John the Evangelist,
by Hans Suess von Kulmbach (c. 1480-
1522). Church of St. Florian, Cracow.



*Missing Paintings
from Luxembourg*



Madonna and Child,
by Cima da Conegliano (c. 1459-1517),
from the collection of Prince Felix of Luxembourg.

Portrait of Victoire Louise of France, Daughter of Louis XV, by an unknown eighteenth-century artist. Also from the collection of Prince Felix.



its removal from the jurisdiction or custody of the country receiving restitution until its return thereto.

Witness	Signature
Date	Signature typed
Place	Title or Capacity of Signer
	page of pages
SCHEDULE "A"	
Item	Description (Including statement of condition of object)

Footnotes

¹ Office International des Musées, *La protection des monuments et oeuvres d'art en temps de guerre* (Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, 1939, pp. 232; reprinted from *Museion*, Year XIII, vol. 47-48, nos. 3-4); Office International des Musées, *Art et Archéologie: Recueil de législation comparée et de droit international*, published under the direction of Charles De Visscher, editors in chief: E. Foundoukidis and Raymond Weiss, No. 1-1939: "La protection des collections nationales d'art et d'histoire. Essai de réglementation internationale" No. 2-1940: "Les monuments et oeuvres d'art en temps de guerre" (Paris, Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, No. 1-1939, pp. 118; No. 2-1940, pp. 113); *International Protection of Works of Art and Historic Monuments* (Department of State pub. 3590, International Information and Cultural Series 8. Reprinted from *Documents and State Papers* of June 1949), (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp. 821-871), the English translation of the essays of Charles De Visscher contained in *Art et Archéologie* No. 1-1939 and No. 2-1940.

Appendix A contains texts of draft international convention (1938) and draft international declaration (1939) for protection of monuments and works of art in time of war.

² International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, Germany, Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946, 8 vols.), vol. 1, chap. 14, "The plunder of art treasures."

³ Frederick Hartt, *Florentine Art under Fire* (Princeton, Princeton University, 1949, pp. 148) p. 106, "Rossi's minute inventory revealed that the pictures, missing from Montagnana, did not appear at all in the Alto Adige or in any of the German lists. Among them were Lorenzo di Credi's *Self-Portrait*, the Bronzino *Deposition*, from the Uffizi, and the most tragic loss of all, the two little Hercules pictures by Antonio del Pollaiuolo. To this day none of these pictures has been found nor has there been the slightest information as to how they disappeared."

⁴ *Germany 1947-1949. The Story in Documents* (Department of State pub. 3556, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, pp. 631), p. 37, "Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation regarding Military Government of Germany, JCS 1779, July 11, 1947," para. 17 "Restitution"; p. 619 "Military Government Regulations, Title 18, Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives, February 12, 1947," paras. 18-106, 18-110.

⁵ *Works of Art in Italy: Losses and Survivals in the War, Part I: "South of Bologna"*, compiled by the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives, and Other Material in Enemy Hands (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1945, pp. iv, 80, illus. Price 1s. 6d.); *Part II: "North of Bologna, together with regional summaries and a supplement to Part I"* (1946, pp. iv, 209, illus. Price 5s. 0d.); *Works of Art in Greece, the Greek Islands and the Dodecanese. Losses and Survivals in the War*, compiled by the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Sub-Commission of the C.M.F. and issued by the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitu-

tion of Works of Art, Archives, and Other Material in Enemy Hands (1946, pp. ii, 63; illus. Price 2s. 0d.); *Works of Art in Malta. Losses and Survivals in the War*, compiled by Hugh Braun and issued by the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives, and Other Material in Enemy Hands (1946, pp. v, 48; illus. Price 2s. 6d.); *Works of Art in Austria (British Zone). Losses and Survivals in the War*, compiled from reports supplied by the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch of the Control Commission for Austria (British Element) and issued by the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives, and Other Material in Enemy Hands (1946, pp. 61, illus. Price 2s. 6d.); *Works of Art in Germany (British Zone of Occupation). Losses and Survivals in the War*, compiled by the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Branch of the Control Commission for Germany (British Element) and issued by the British Committee on the Preservation and Restitution of Works of Art, Archives, and Other Material in Enemy Hands (1946, pp. v, 66, illus. Price 2s. 6d.).

⁶ French High Command in Germany, French Group of the Control Council; Office of Economics and Finance, Division of Reparations and Restitution, Central Bureau of Restitution (Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, Groupe Française du Conseil de Contrôle, Direction Générale de l'Économie et des Finances, Division des Réparations et Restitutions, Bureau Central des Restitutions), *List of Property removed from France during the War 1939-1945 (Répertoire des Biens spoliés en France durant la Guerre 1939-1945)*, vol. 2, *Paintings, Tapestries, and Sculpture (Tableaux, Tapisseries, Sculptures)*, (Berlin, December 11, 1947, pp. xviii, 491, illus.); vol. 3, *Furniture (Meubles)*, (Berlin, January 21, 1948, pp. xxiii, 585, illus.); vol. 4, *Gold and Silverware, Ceramics, Curios and Supplement to vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Argenteries, Céramique, Objets Précieux et suppléments aux tomes II, III, et IV)* (Berlin, January 15, 1948, pp. xiii, 234, illus.); vol. 7, *Archives, Manuscripts, and Rare Books (Archives, Manuscrits, et Livres rares)* (Berlin, no date, pp. xv, 845, illus.); *Supplement to vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Supplément aux tomes II, III, et IV)* (Berlin, no date, pp. iv, 234, illus.); *Second Supplement to vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Deuxième Supplément aux tomes II, III, et IV)* (Tubingen, no date, pp. 184, illus.); *Third Supplement to vols. 2, 3, 4, and 7: Objets d'Art and Rare Books (Troisième Supplément aux tomes II, III, IV, et VII: Objets d'Art et Livres Rares)* (Tubingen, no date, pp. 241, illus.).

⁷ Charles Estreicher (editor), *Cultural Losses of Poland. Index of Polish Cultural Losses during the German Occupation, 1939-1944* (London, 1944, pp. xvii, 497.)

⁸ Ministry of Culture and Art, *Catalogue of Paintings removed from Poland by the German Occupation Authorities during the Years 1939-1945, I. Foreign Paintings*, compiled by Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz (Publications of the Reparations Section, No. 9) (Warsaw, 1950, pp. 85, illus.).

⁹ "Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control, London, January 3, 1943," Department of State pub. 2630.

¹⁰ *United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, N. H., July 1-July 22, 1944*, Department of State pub. 2187, "Final Act," art. 6; *Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21-March 8, 1945*, Department of State pub. 2497, "Final Act," resolution 19.

¹¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1947, pp. 358-360.

¹² OMGUS, *Military Government Regulations, Title 18. Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives* (Berlin, 12 Feb. 1947) see footnote 4.

¹³ Department of State, *The Record*, vol. 7, no. 3 (May-June 1951), pp. 39-42, "Recovery of Lost European Treasures."

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U.S. Seeks To Replace Cultural Property Displaced During World War II

[Released to the press July 27]

A number of problems involving important collections dispersed during World War II have been the subject of a series of inquiries to the Department of State from the former American Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers who recovered the collections and took the initial steps to safeguard them. Most of the problems which are still outstanding await final determination because inter-Allied agreement is required for their settlement.

The collection of the Kassel Museum in Germany remains under quadripartite control in Austria and is stored in the Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna. The United States Government will continue to press for the return of this important state collection to its original ownership in Kassel, Germany.

The German-owned art libraries in Italy, which were recovered in war repositories by American authorities and returned in 1946 to Italy from Austria and Germany by General E. E. Hume and General Lucius D. Clay, under Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives procedures, have been held under tripartite control. The libraries were placed in the temporary custody of the International Union of Institutes of Archeology, History, and History of Art. A protocol, which alleged that the libraries were economic assets and should be transferred to the Italian Government, on the condition that the Italian Government grant the International Union a perpetual or 99-year lease to the libraries, was published in the *College Art Journal*, vol. VIII, no. 3 (1949). This arrangement was not approved by the Department and does not represent the policies of the United States Government. The libraries are regarded by this Government as cultural property to be excluded from German external assets and to be returned to their rightful owners. Until their final disposition is determined under tripartite agreement, the United States Government is making every effort to keep the libraries open for use.

The Crown of St. Stephen of Hungary, which was surrendered to the United States authorities for safekeeping, is being held in trust by the United States Government. It continues to be treated as property of a special status. The Government of the United States does not regard the present juncture as opportune or appropriate for taking action regarding its disposition.

Restitution in kind or the replacement of cultural property of unique character was given consideration by the Allied Control Council in Berlin in 1946 and early in 1947. A quadripartite agreement for the implementation of such a policy, however, was never concluded. American policy in the 1947 directive to the Commander-in-Chief

of the United States Forces of Occupation (JCS 1779, July 11, 1947) prohibited replacement of cultural property from Germany's cultural heritage. Article 17 of this directive reads:

... You will not consent to any extensive program for replacement of looted or displaced property which has been destroyed or cannot be located whenever such replacement can be accomplished only at the expense of ... the cultural heritage of the German people.

A special resolution opposing the use of works of art as replacement or reparations material was unanimously approved by the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas at its final meeting on June 20, 1946. It was recommended that "cultural objects belonging to any country or individual should not be considered or involved in reparations settlements growing out of World War II."

With regard to the general obligations under international law, a recognition of the inviolability of cultural property as contained in Article 56 of the annex of the Hague convention (IV) of 1907 is regarded as obligatory upon this and other signatory governments. The United Kingdom and France have ratified the Hague convention (IV) of 1907 and the U.S.S.R. recognized the Czarist signature to this convention on November 25, 1941.

The United States Government has an additional international commitment under the treaty between the United States of America and other American republics, entitled "Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments," signed at Washington on April 15, 1935, and ratified on the advice of the United States Senate by the President on July 10, 1935. This treaty was concluded to the end that "the treasures of culture be respected and protected in time of war and in peace". Article II reads:

The neutrality of, and protection and respect due to, the monuments and institutions, mentioned in the preceding article, shall be recognized in the entire expanse of territories subject to the sovereignty of each of the signatory and acceding States, without discrimination as to the State allegiance of said monuments and institutions. The respective Governments agree to adopt the measures of internal legislation necessary to insure said protection and respect.

The policy of the United States Government is one of respect for artistic and historic property of all nations. It has been consistently upheld in all United States Government directives, military government laws and regulations of World War II and fully demonstrated in the magnitude of the accomplishments in the United States zone of Germany where more than 700,000 works of art and over 4,000,000 books have already been recovered and returned to despoiled nations. It is the desire and intent of this Government that, when the final settlement is reached, all cultural property dislocated by the war will be restored to the rightful owners.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

The San Francisco Conference on Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty

BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES
CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY¹

Last Monday was the day which ended 11 months of negotiation regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty. A final text has been circulated by the British and ourselves to over 40 Allied countries, and they have been invited to attend a signing conference to be opened at San Francisco on September 4 by the President.

Russia Accepts

The Soviet Union has now told us that they expect to send a delegation to San Francisco. We are not yet clear as to what this means. We hope that it does not mean that the Russians are sending a wrecking crew to try to demolish a structure of Japanese peace which has been built carefully and soundly until now it is complete save for the formal dedication.

If such tactics should be tried we are confident that they would fail. Responsible nations will not be parties to attempting now to demolish what already *is*, on the theory that some more pleasing structure could quickly be made to take its place. The fact is that there must be peace now on the terms which have been negotiated; otherwise Japan would share the unhappy fate of Germany and Austria where Russia, because it is an occupying power, has been able to impose treaty procedures of futility.

The invitation to the San Francisco conference is an invitation to conclude peace "on the terms" of the present text. We and others intend to stand by that invitation.

The Treaty Origins

The present final text of the Japanese Peace Treaty is the product of a unique cooperative effort. It began last September when the Allies principally concerned were attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York. After the United Nations delegates returned home, there

¹Excerpts from a statement made over Columbia Broadcasting System on Aug. 15 and released to the press on the same date.

were conferences of diplomats at the capitals. A United States presidential mission visited ten of these capitals, including London and Paris and the capitals of six Pacific and Asian countries. The Commonwealth had three conferences which brought together Australia, Canada, Ceylon, England, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and South Africa.

The first round of discussions related to the basic principles to be applied. Then, in January the United States undertook to make the first draft of a text which would translate the agreed principles into treaty words. We took that initiative because all of the Allied Powers had joined in giving us a special duty to direct the occupation which was to prepare Japan for the peace.

The draft we prepared was circulated last March. The United Kingdom shortly afterwards produced a text of its own, in the light of the Commonwealth conferences.

Our March draft was subjected to intensive study by about 20 countries. These included not only the Western members of the Far Eastern Commission—France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom, but particularly Burma, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The draft was largely revised by their suggestions. Then, last June, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly drafted a text to reflect still more fully the different views that had been developed. This text was circulated to Allied Powers and was kept open for further changes until last Monday. During this July-August period, no less than 30 additional changes were made, each of some significance to some nation.

Throughout this period, the Soviet Union took an active, though noncooperative, part. I had several conferences with Yakov Malik and our Governments have exchanged 10 memoranda and drafts. . . .

An Eleven Months' Conference

I emphasize these negotiating processes because Communist propaganda in many countries is vilifying the treaty as arbitrary dictation on the part

of two great powers. Nothing could be further from the fact. The Soviet Union has been persistently trying to get the treaty-making into the Council of Foreign Ministers where four nations alone would draft the treaty with the Soviet Union having a right of veto. Communist propaganda has been conducting a war of nerves against the peace, even suggesting that it may be countered by their violence. While this has been going on from the Soviet side, the other Allied Powers have been conducting what, in effect, is an eleven months' peace conference participated in by so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace treaty in all history.

Because we have been conferring quietly and courteously, as befits free men who respect each other, Communists pretend that we have not been conferring at all. It seems that, to them, no conference rates as such unless violent insults are publicly hurled.

Those who suggest that the United States and United Kingdom have dictated the final text may be challenged to compare that text with the earlier texts. Our March text had 22 articles. Every one of these articles has been substantially rewritten to meet the wishes of others. The 22 articles have grown into 27 articles and two accompanying declarations.

The United States, which for 6 years has been and is the occupying power, could practically do much as it wanted. But we have not used our power in that way. The final treaty is not the treaty of the United States. It is not the treaty of any single nation. No nation is 100 percent satisfied and that applies to the United States and United Kingdom which sponsor the present text. But such dissatisfactions as exist are inherent in the situation. There cannot be squeezed out of it the total of all Allied wants, and irreconcilable wants must be compromised. Those realities cannot be made to vanish by any procedural sleight of hand.

Reparations

As is usually the case with peace treaties, the most difficult problem has been that of reparations. Japan's aggression caused tremendous costs, losses, and suffering. If the treaty validated all of the just claims against Japan, Japan would be submerged by liabilities of more than 100 billion dollars. Under that weight, Japan would sink into hopeless misery; its people would become an easy prey to exploitation, and totalitarian demagogues would no doubt promise relief through renewed aggression with the help of those nearby who are already aggressive. Also, under these conditions, the effort of various creditor nations to get the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of gold would spread dissension and bitterness as between Allies in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Any peace treaty which sets loose these evil

forces would squander the opportunity which many died to give us.

On the other hand, we realized that the treaty could not ignore the principle of reparation for damage and suffering caused by Japan during the war. But Japan cannot pay in dollars or other foreign money. Since the surrender she has been 2 billion dollars short of the money required to pay for the food and raw materials she had to import for survival on a minimum basis. The United States has made good that 2 billion dollars as an occupation responsibility. . . .

Japan does have, however, certain assets which could be put to work to help those who suffered from her wartime acts. Japan has an industrially trained population and industrial equipment, both of which are partly unemployed. If the devastated countries want to send into Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance, the Japanese could process them and by these services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations. The arrangements could cover not merely consumers goods but machinery and capital goods which would enable underdeveloped countries to speed up developing their own industry, so as hereafter to be less dependent on outside industrial power.

This process would not throw foreign exchange burdens upon Japan, or other economic burdens of a kind which would impair her credit or deny her people the opportunity to raise their living standards.

The reparation negotiations, involving particularly the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma, have produced a treaty which gives moral satisfaction to the position of the invaded peoples and, while its terms probably will not produce vast economic benefits, they will make possible some substantial indemnification from Japan.

The Philippine Negotiations

The negotiations on this point, particularly with the Philippines, exhibit the total falsity of the Communist-inspired myth that the United States treats the Philippine Nation as a puppet subservient to its power. When this young Republic voiced criticism of the March draft of the peace treaty, it never occurred to the United States to invoke pressures to stifle that criticism. Nor would that have succeeded as against the independent spirit of the Philippine people. What we did was to pay heed to their criticism. The result is, we think, a better treaty.

The Assurance of Peace

In the ways I have outlined there has been patiently and scrupulously fashioned a pattern of peace for Japan. . . .

Some few nations may denounce the result; some may prefer acquiescence to formal signature; some

may prefer to use article 26 of the proposed treaty which, as a novel, liberalizing feature, authorizes bilateral treaties similar to the main treaty. But so many allies, including the principal contributors to victory, will have signed the treaty, that there will be no doubt in any quarter as to either the fact of peace or as to the terms of peace.

Also, we can be confident that future generations will judge that this peace, both through procedure and through substance, represents the best tradition of those who believe in processes of sovereign equality and in the rule of justice.

SOVIET DELEGATION TO ATTEND CONFERENCE

Soviet Note of August 12, 1951

[Printed from telegraphic text]

Following is an unofficial English translation of a Soviet note which was handed to Admiral Alan G. Kirk, American Ambassador at Moscow, on August 12:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., in connection with the note of the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain of 20 July 1951, in which is contained the invitation to the Soviet Government to the conference on the conclusion and the signing of the peace treaty, which has been called by the Government of the United States of America on 4 September 1951 in San Francisco, upon the instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honor to communicate the following:

The Soviet Government will send its delegation to the conference in San Francisco, to take place 4 September 1951, and will present the proposals of the Soviet Government on the question of the peace treaty with Japan.

The composition of the delegation of the Soviet Union is as follows:

A. A. Gromyko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; A. S. Panyushkin, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in the United States of America; G. N. Zarubin, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain; S. A. Golunsky, member of the collegium of the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R.

U.S. Note of August 16, 1951

[Released to the press August 16]

The Government of the United States acknowledges the note of the Soviet Union in response to the United States invitation of July 20, 1951,¹ whereby the Government of the Soviet Union advises that it will send a delegation to the San Fran-

¹ BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 186.

cisco conference to be convened on September 4, 1951, and will present proposals on the question of the peace treaty with Japan.

The Government of the United States welcomes acceptance of its invitation by the Government of the Soviet Union. In order, however, that there should be no possibility of subsequent misunderstanding, the United States recalls that the invitation set out that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom would "circulate a final text of the peace treaty," which has been done, and the invitation was "to a conference for conclusion and signature of a treaty of peace with Japan on the terms of that text."

The San Francisco conference is not a conference to reopen negotiations on the terms of peace. The terms of the prospective treaty have been arrived at by intensive multipartite negotiations which, in effect, have constituted an 11-month peace conference which began in mid-September 1950 and the final conclusions of which are embodied in the August 13, 1951, text.²

The Soviet Union has participated in this process both through oral exchanges of views and through the exchange between our Governments of not less than 10 drafts or memoranda relating to the terms of the Japanese peace treaty. Thus the Soviet Union has had an equal opportunity with the other allies to shape the various revisions which have now resulted in the final August 13, 1951 text.

The August 13 text is part of a unique cooperative effort. The treaty, both through procedure and through substance, represents the best tradition of those who believe in processes of sovereign equality and the rule of justice.

The United States will welcome the opportunity to explain fully at San Francisco the nature of the treaty, and every nation represented will have opportunity for exposition and statement. In that conference we welcome the participation of the Soviet Union.

² For references to the negotiations, see the following: announcement by the President, BULLETIN of Sept. 25, 1950, p. 513; U.S. memorandum of Nov. 24, 1950, to governments on the Far Eastern Commission, BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1950, p. 881; aide-memoire from U.S.S.R. of Nov. 20, 1950, BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1950, p. 881; U.S. aide-memoire to U.S.S.R. of Dec. 27, 1950, BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 65; Presidential Mission to Japan, BULLETIN of Jan. 29, 1951, p. 185; U.S.S.R. noncooperation on treaty, BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 453; formulation of Japanese peace settlement (exchange of letters between Dulles and MacArthur of Feb. 9 and 10, 1951), BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1951, p. 485; U.S.S.R. remarks of May 7, 1951, on draft treaty, BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 856; U.S. memorandum to U.S.S.R. of May 19, 1951, BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 852; text of draft peace treaty of July 3, 1951, (incorporating revisions of July 20, 1951) and Japanese declarations, BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 132; U.S.S.R. memorandum of June 10, 1951, BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 138; U.S. memorandum to U.S.S.R. of July 9, 1951, BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 143; U.S. invitation of July 20, 1951, to 50 nations to attend conference at San Francisco, Calif., BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 186.

TEXT OF PROPOSED TREATY

[Released to the press August 15]

Following are the revised (from the July 20) texts of the proposed treaty of peace with Japan, two declarations by the Government of Japan, and a protocol. The texts have been revised by the United Kingdom and the United States, the joint sponsors of the treaty draft, in the light of comments received from countries at war with Japan to whom the July 3 and July 20 texts were submitted.¹

The texts attached are those referred to in the second paragraph of the invitation of July 20 to the conference preceding the signature of the treaty of peace with Japan as the final texts to be circulated on August 13. Copies have been transmitted to the countries invited to the conference.

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

CHAPTER I

PEACE

Article 1

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

CHAPTER II

TERRITORY

Article 2

(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the Islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

¹ For the text of the July 3 draft treaty in which the editors of the BULLETIN incorporated revisions announced in Department of State press release 650 of July 20, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 132.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Article 3

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 4

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connecting Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

CHAPTER III

SECURITY

Article 5

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity

or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

Article 6

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 7

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

Article 8

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on September 1, 1939, as well as any other arrangements by the Allied Powers for or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of September 10, 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of July 20, 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of January 20, 1930, and its Annexes including the Trust Agreement, dated May 17, 1930; the Convention of January 20, 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Article 9

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Article 10

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article 11

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on the recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

Article 12

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests—such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participation in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 4 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

Article 13

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

CHAPTER V

CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

Article 14

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question.

Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

- (a) Japan and Japanese nationals,
- (b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and
- (c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals,

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this sub-paragraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belonged to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in sub-paragraph (I) above:

- (i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;
- (ii) all real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;
- (iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;
- (iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to September 2, 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;
- (v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in sub-paragraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and

their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Article 15

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on July 13, 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective September 1, 1949, No. 12 effective January 28, 1950, and No. 9 effective February 1, 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on December 6, 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from December 7, 1941, until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, within an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

Article 16

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14 (a) 2 (II) (ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally

understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

Article 17

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between December 7, 1941, and such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

Article 18

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or represented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

Article 19

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between September 1, 1939, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims

specifically recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since September 2, 1945.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including intergovernmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before September 1, 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after September 2, 1945. Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article 20

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Article 21

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14 (a) 2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

CHAPTER VI

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 22

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated October 15, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

CHAPTER VII

FINAL CLAUSES

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, [here would appear the names of such of the following States as are signatories to the present Treaty] namely Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, France, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into

force for each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Government of Japan and of the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

Article 24

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23.

Article 25

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Article 26

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Article 27

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this _____ day of _____ 1951, in the English, French, Russian [if the Soviet Union is signatory] and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

Revisions to July 20 Text of Treaty

Delete "Draft" in title.

Delete "Preamble".

Article 1: Delete "hereby." Delete comma after "concerned." Add as second paragraph "(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters." Insert "(a)" beginning first paragraph.

Article 2 (f): Revise to read "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands."

Article 4: Insert "Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this article," beginning paragraph (a).

Change "Articles 2 and 3" to "Article 2" in two places. Substitute "such areas" for "the areas referred to above."

Insert new paragraph (b) reading:

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the US Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3. Reletter last paragraph "(c)."

Article 6: Insert new paragraph (b) reading:

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese Military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

Reletter last paragraph "(c)."

Article 7: Insert "or conventions" after "treaties" in two places in the first sentence and "and conventions" after "treaties" in the second and third sentences. Insert "or convention" after "treaty" in paragraph (b).

Article 8: Substitute "it" for "she" in paragraph (b). Insert "first" before "coming into force" in paragraph (c).

Article 11: Insert "to" before "reduce" and before "parole."

Article 12: Insert "first" before "coming into force" in the opening clause of paragraph (b). Eliminate the comma after "rights to property" in subparagraph (ii) and insert "(tangible and intangible)". In paragraph (e) delete "paragraph (b) of" and substitute "this Article" for "that paragraph."

Article 13: In paragraph (b) insert "from the first coming into force of the present Treaty," after "four years" and substitute "date of such coming into force," for "time of coming into force of the present Treaty." Insert "will" before "give" second time that word appears in paragraph (c).

Article 14: Substitute following for opening paragraph:

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

In the first sentence of subparagraph 1 delete after "available" and substitute "the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question."

Insert "Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below," at beginning subparagraph 2 (I).

Delete "which on the coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction, except:" and substitute the following:

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this subparagraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belonged to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in subparagraph (I) above:

Substitute "natural persons" for "nationals" in the first line of subparagraph (i). Delete after "Japan," that subparagraph "except property subjected to restrictions during the war and not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force of the present Treaty;"

Delete subparagraph (iv) and substitute the following:

(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to September 2, 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted

from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

Renumber subparagraphs II, III and IV to be III, IV and V respectively. In renumbered subparagraph III change "(i) to (v)" to "(i) through (v)." In renumbered subparagraph IV delete "Japanese property referred to" and substitute "property as provided in subparagraph (I)." Delete "Japanese" before "owner."

Article 15: In paragraph (a) insert "between Japan and the Allied Power concerned," after "Treaty" near beginning of paragraph. Delete "the owner" in third sentence and substitute "or on behalf of the owner or by his Government." Delete after "injury" in fourth sentence and substitute "or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on July 13, 1951."

In subparagraph (ii) delete comma after "Treaty" and insert "between Japan and the Allied Power concerned."

Delete Note.

Article 16: Insert "to appropriate national agencies," after "resultant fund." In "Article 14 (a) 2 (I) (ii) through (v)" change "(I)" to "(II)." Change period to comma at end of second sentence and add "as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty."

Delete Note.

Article 17: In paragraph (b) insert "between Japan and the Allied Power concerned" after "Treaty" where that word first appears. Delete "and the coming into force of the present Treaty" after "1941," and substitute "and such coming into force."

Article 18: In paragraph (b) substitute "encourage" for "facilitate" and "other" for "private."

Article 19: Change period at the end of paragraph (b) to comma and add "but does not include Japanese claims specifically recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since September 2, 1945." Add at end of paragraph (c) "Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty." Add new paragraph (d) reading:

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article 21: Insert "4," between "2," and "9."

Article 22: Insert "reference to a special claims tribunal or by" after "not settled by"

Article 23: In paragraph (a) substitute square brackets for parentheses.

Article 24: Delete after "deposit" and substitute ", of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23."

Article 25: Delete after "Japan" in first sentence and substitute, "or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty."

Article 26: In first sentence insert "or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23," after "at war with Japan." Insert "first" before "coming into force"

Article 27: Delete after "thereof"

Insert "the city of San Francisco" in first blank. Insert "[if the Soviet Union is signatory]" after "Russian"

DECLARATION

With respect to the Treaty of Peace signed this day, the Government of Japan makes the following Declaration:

1. Except as otherwise provided in the said Treaty of Peace, Japan recognizes the full force of all presently

effective multilateral international instruments to which Japan was a party on September 1, 1939, and declares that it will, on the first coming into force of the said Treaty, resume all its rights and obligations under those instruments. Where, however, participation in any instrument involves membership in an international organization of which Japan ceased to be a member on or after September 1, 1939, the provisions of the present paragraph shall be dependent on Japan's readmission to membership in the organization concerned.

2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government formally to accede to the following international instruments within the shortest practicable time, not to exceed one year from the first coming into force of the Treaty of Peace:

- (1) Protocol opened for signature at Lake Success on December 11, 1946, amending the agreements, conventions and protocols on narcotic drugs of January 23, 1912, February 11, 1925, February 19, 1925, July 13, 1931, November 27, 1931, and June 26, 1936;
- (2) Protocol opened for signature at Paris on November 19, 1948, bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success on December 11, 1946;
- (3) International Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards signed at Geneva on September 26, 1927;
- (4) International Convention relating to Economic Statistics with protocol signed at Geneva on December 14, 1928, and Protocol amending the International Convention of 1928 relating to Economic Statistics signed at Paris on December 9, 1948.
- (5) International Convention relating to the simplification of Customs Formalities, with protocol of signature, signed at Geneva on November 3, 1923.
- (6) Agreement of Madrid of April 14, 1891, for the Prevention of False Indication of Origin of Goods, as revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, and at London on June 2, 1934;
- (7) Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air, and additional protocol, signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929;
- (8) Convention on safety of life at sea opened for signature at London on June 10, 1948;
- (9) Geneva conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of war victims.

3. It is equally the intention of the Japanese Government, within six months of the first coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, to apply for Japan's admission to participation in (a) the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944, and, as soon as Japan is itself a party to that Convention, to accept the International Air Services Transit Agreement also opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944; and (b) the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization opened for signature at Washington on October 11, 1947.

Revisions to July 20 Text of Declaration by Government of Japan²

In paragraph 1 insert "first" before "coming into force."
In paragraph 2 delete after "within" and substitute "the shortest practicable time, not to exceed one year from the first coming into force of the Treaty of Peace":
Revise subparagraph (6) to read:

(6) Agreement of Madrid of April 14, 1891, for the Prevention of False Indications of Origin of Goods, as revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, and at London on June 2, 1934; In paragraph 3 insert "first" before "coming into force". Delete after "Meteorological Organization" and substitute "opened for signature at Washington on October 11, 1947."

DECLARATION

With respect to the Treaty of Peace signed this day, the Government of Japan makes the following Declaration:

Japan will recognize any Commission, Delegation or other Organization authorized by any of the Allied Powers to identify, list, maintain or regulate its war graves, cemeteries and memorials in Japanese territory; will facilitate the work of such Organizations; and will, in respect of the above mentioned war graves, cemeteries and memorials, enter into negotiations for the conclusion of such agreements as may prove necessary with the Allied Power concerned, or with any Commission, Delegation or other Organization authorized by it.

Japan trusts that the Allied Powers will enter into discussions with the Japanese Government with a view to arrangements being made for the maintenance of any Japanese war graves or cemeteries which may exist in the territories of the Allied Powers and which it is desired to preserve.

Revisions to July 20 Text of Second Declaration by Government of Japan³

Add new third paragraph reading:

"Japan trusts that the Allied Powers will enter into discussions with the Japanese Government with a view to arrangements being made for the maintenance of any Japanese war graves or cemeteries which may exist in the territories of the Allied Powers and which it is desired to preserve."

PROTOCOL

The Undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have agreed on the following provisions for regulating the question of Contracts, Periods of Prescription and Negotiable Instruments, and the question of Contracts of Insurance, upon the restoration of peace with Japan:-

CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTION AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

A. CONTRACTS

1. Any contract which required for its execution intercourse between any of the parties thereto having become enemies as defined in part F shall, subject to the exceptions set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 below, be deemed to have been dissolved as from the time when any of the parties thereto became enemies. Such dissolution, however, is without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 15 and 18 of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, nor shall it relieve any party to the contract from the obligation to repay amounts received as advances or as payments on account and in respect of which such party has not rendered performance in return.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 above, there shall be excepted from dissolution and, without prejudice to the rights contained in Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace signed this day, there shall remain in force such parts of any contract as are severable and

² See BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 137.

³ See BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 137.

did not require for their execution intercourse between any of the parties thereto, having become enemies as defined in part F. Where the provisions of any contract are not so severable, the contract shall be deemed to have been dissolved in its entirety. The foregoing shall be subject to the application of domestic laws, orders or regulations made by a signatory hereto which is an Allied Power under the said Treaty of Peace and having jurisdiction over the contract or over any of the parties thereto and shall be subject to the terms of the contract.

3. Nothing in part A shall be deemed to invalidate transactions lawfully carried out in accordance with a contract between enemies if they have been carried out with the authorization of the Government concerned being the Government of a signatory hereto which is an Allied Power under the said Treaty of Peace.

4. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, contracts of insurance and reinsurance shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of parts D and E of the present Protocol.

B. PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION

1. All periods of prescription or limitation of right of action or of the right to take conservatory measures in respect of relations affecting persons or property, involving nationals of the signatories hereto who, by reason of the state of war, were unable to take judicial action or to comply with the formalities necessary to safeguard their rights, irrespective of whether these periods commenced before or after the outbreak of war, shall be regarded as having been suspended, for the duration of the war in Japanese territory on the one hand, and on the other hand in the territory of those signatories which grant to Japan, on a reciprocal basis, the benefit of the provisions of this paragraph. These periods shall begin to run again on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed this day. The provisions of this paragraph shall be applicable in regard to the periods fixed for the presentation of interest or dividend coupons or for the presentation for payment of securities drawn for repayment or repayable on any other ground, provided that in respect of such coupons or securities the period shall begin to run again on the date when money becomes available for payments to the holder of the coupon or security.

2. Where, on account of failure to perform any act or to comply with any formality during the war, measures of execution have been taken in Japanese territory to the prejudice of a national of one of the signatories being an Allied Power under the said Treaty of Peace, the Japanese Government shall restore the rights which have been detrimentally affected. If such restoration is impossible or would be inequitable the Japanese Government shall provide that the national of the signatory concerned shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

C. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

1. As between enemies, no negotiable instrument made before the war shall be deemed to have become invalid by reason only of failure within the required time to present the instrument for acceptance or payment, or to give notice of non-acceptance or non-payment to drawers or endorsers, or to protest the instrument, nor by reason of failure to complete any formality during the war.

2. Where the period within which a negotiable instrument should have been presented for acceptance or for payment, or within which notice of non-acceptance or non-payment should have been given to the drawer or endorser, or within which the instrument should have been protested, has elapsed during the war, and the party who should have presented or protested the instrument or have given notice of non-acceptance or non-payment has failed to do so during the war, a period of not less than three months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed this day shall be allowed within which presentation,

notice of non-acceptance or non-payment, or protest may be made.

3. If a person has, either before or during the war, incurred obligations under a negotiable instrument in consequence of an undertaking given to him by a person who has subsequently become an enemy, the latter shall remain liable to indemnify the former in respect of these obligations, notwithstanding the outbreak of war.

D. INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE CONTRACTS (OTHER THAN LIFE) WHICH HAD NOT TERMINATED BEFORE THE DATE AT WHICH THE PARTIES BECAME ENEMIES

1. Contracts of Insurance shall be deemed not to have been dissolved by the fact of the parties becoming enemies, provided that the risk had attached before the date at which the parties became enemies, and the Insured had paid, before that date, all moneys owed by way of premium or consideration for effecting or keeping effective the Insurance in accordance with the Contract.

2. Contracts of Insurance other than those remaining in force under the preceding clause shall be deemed not to have come into existence, and any moneys paid thereunder shall be returnable.

3. Treaties and other Contracts of Reinsurance, save as hereinafter expressly provided, shall be deemed to have been determined as at the date the parties became enemies, and all cessions thereunder shall be cancelled with effect from that date. Provided that cessions in respect of voyage policies which had attached under a Treaty of Marine Reinsurance shall be deemed to have remained in full effect until their natural expiry in accordance with the terms and conditions on which the risk had been ceded.

4. Contracts of Facultative Reinsurance, where the risk had attached and all moneys owed by way of premium or consideration for effecting or keeping effective the Reinsurance had been paid or set off in the customary manner, shall, unless the reinsurance Contract otherwise provides, be deemed to have remained in full effect until the date at which the parties became enemies and to have been determined on that date.

Provided that such Facultative Reinsurances in respect of voyage policies shall be deemed to have remained in full effect until their natural expiry in accordance with the terms and conditions on which the risk had been ceded.

Provided further that Facultative Reinsurances in respect of a Contract of Insurance remaining in force under clause 1 above shall be deemed to have remained in full effect until the expiry of the original Insurance.

5. Contracts of Facultative Reinsurance other than those dealt with in the preceding clause, and all Contracts of Excess of Loss Reinsurance on an "Excess of Loss Ratio" basis and of Hail Reinsurance (whether facultative or not), shall be deemed not to have come into existence, and any moneys paid thereunder shall be returnable.

6. Unless the Treaty or other Contract of Reinsurance otherwise provides, premiums shall be adjusted on a *pro rata temporis* basis.

7. Contracts of Insurance or Reinsurance (including cessions under Treaties of Reinsurance) shall be deemed not to cover losses or claims caused by belligerent action by either Power of which any of the parties was a national or by the Allies or Associates of such Power.

8. Where an insurance has been transferred during the war from the original to another Insurer, or has been wholly reinsured, the transfer or reinsurance shall, whether effected voluntarily or by administrative or legislative action, be recognized and the liability of the original Insurer shall be deemed to have ceased as from the date of the transfer or reinsurance.

9. Where there was more than one Treaty or other Contract of Reinsurance between the same two parties, there shall be an adjustment of accounts between them, and in order to establish a resulting balance there shall be

brought into the accounts all balances (which shall include an agreed reserve for losses still outstanding) and all moneys which may be due from one party to the other under all such contracts or which may be returnable by virtue of any of the foregoing provisions.

10. No interest shall be payable by any of the parties for any delay which, owing to the parties having become enemies, has occurred or may occur in the settlement of premiums or claims or balances of account.

11. Nothing in this part of the present Protocol shall in any way prejudice or affect the rights given by Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace signed this day.

E. LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACTS

Where an insurance has been transferred during the war from the original to another insurer or has been wholly reinsured, the transfer of reinsurance shall, if effected at the instance of the Japanese administrative or legislative authorities, be recognized, and the liability of the original insurer shall be deemed to have ceased as from the date of the transfer of reinsurance.

F. SPECIAL PROVISION

For the purposes of the present Protocol, natural or juridical persons shall be regarded as enemies from the date when trading between them shall have become unlawful under laws, orders, or regulations to which such persons or the contracts were subject.

FINAL ARTICLE

The present Protocol is open for signature by Japan and any State signatory to the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed this day, and shall, in respect of the matters with which it deals, govern the relations between Japan and each of the other States signatory to the present Protocol as from the date when Japan and that State are both bound by the said Treaty of Peace.

The present Protocol shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this _____ day of _____ 1951, in the English, French, Russian [if the Soviet Union is signatory] and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

Documents Relating to the Armistice Negotiations in Korea

U.N. Communiqué Issued August 13

Unproductive discussions continued today at the twenty-third session of the military armistice conference, with the Communists once again rejecting the United Nations Command suggestion that the problem of the location of the demilitarized zone be tabled temporarily, in order that possible points of agreement within Items 3 or 4 of the agenda might be explored.

General Nam Il also ignored Admiral Joy's invitation that the Communists offer for discussion their views on proposed adjustments to the United Nations Command's suggested demilita-

rized zone based on the present battle line and the over-all military situation.

The United Nations Command opened the morning session with a reply in detail to five questions submitted yesterday by General Nam Il. As Admiral Joy concluded, Nam Il, speaking from a previously prepared and translated paper, described the United Nations Command's answer as "not satisfactory."

The twenty-fourth session will be held tomorrow at 11 a. m. [9 p. m. August 13, eastern daylight time].

U.N. Communiqué Issued August 14

The question of the location of the demilitarized zone was no nearer a solution today at the conclusion of the twenty-fourth session of the Kaesong military conference.

Further efforts on the part of Admiral Joy to clarify through military reasoning the United Nations Command requirement for a sound militarily defensible line on the ground were without tangible results.

The twenty-fifth session will be held tomorrow at 11 a. m. [8 p. m., August 14, eastern standard time].

U.N. Communiqué Issued August 15

Continuing to explore every possible avenue of approach to the solution of Item 2 of the military armistice conference agenda, the United Nations Command today proposed that a joint subcommittee from within the delegates and staff be appointed to "make recommendations to the two delegations as to ways and means of emerging from the present deadlock."

Admiral Joy's suggestion came after another restatement by the Communists on their thus far inflexible stand on the Thirty-eighth Parallel and in which they continued to ignore the United Nations Command's frequently extended invitations to suggest adjustments.

Earlier during today's session both senior delegates expressed their respective but divergent views on the effectiveness of naval and air operations on the present over-all military situation.

Tomorrow's session will meet at 1 p. m.

Text of Statement of August 15 by Vice Admiral Joy, Chief U.N. Delegate

We have hung in a deadlock on Item 2 of our agenda for many days. We show no prospect of progress along present lines of procedure. I, therefore, recommend a new effort to break this deadlock.

One of our difficulties is the formality of the utterances of each delegation regarding the points

at issue. This is necessary in order to preserve order in these meetings involving ten delegates and their various assistants.

We suggest that each delegation appoint one delegate to membership in a joint subcommittee of the delegations. We suggest that these two delegates meet informally, to exchange views on Item 2 of our agenda. We suggest that the two delegations jointly charge this subcommittee to make recommendations to the two delegations as to ways and means of emerging from the present deadlock.

We suggest the two members of the subcommittee, one from each delegation, with a maximum of two assistants each including interpreters, be appointed.

It is our thought that neither delegation be bound by implication or contract to honor the recommendations of the joint subcommittee. Such recommendations would, of course, require ratification by the delegations. It is our thought that this subcommittee meet around, rather than across, a table and seek objectively to work out a solution to our present problem.

I am prepared to nominate my delegate and staff assistants.

If you desire to think this over, you can let us know tomorrow. If you agree in principle, but not in the details, we will consider your alternative proposal.

U.N. Communiqué Issued August 16

A joint subcommittee—composed of two delegates, one staff assistant and one interpreter from each side—will meet tomorrow at 1100 hours [9 a. m. eastern daylight time] in an effort to break the deadlock over the unsolved problem of the demilitarized zone.

Admiral Joy's proposal at yesterday's session of the military armistice conference, that a subcommittee "meet around rather than across a table," was this afternoon accepted by General Nam Il, during the 26th session.

It was mutually agreed today to add another delegate from each side to the subcommittee. Admiral Joy's original suggestion had mentioned only one delegate each.

The plenary sessions of the military armistice conference will be recessed during the joint subcommittee meetings unless a session is mutually deemed desirable or is recommended by the subcommittee.

Final Meeting of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission

The final meeting of the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (Ippc) was convened at Bern, Switzerland, from July 2-7, 1951.

At its twelfth congress held at The Hague in August 1950, the Ippc, a 75-year old international organization for the furtherance of prison reform, voted to dissolve and to turn over its work to the United Nations. The terms of such dissolution were accepted by the United Nations in December 1950.

The purpose of the meeting at Bern was to arrange for the details of the termination of the Ippc and to consider a proposal for setting up a foundation under which the residual assets of the organization could be held to await developments.

As a consequence, the Ippc has sold its real estate to a nearby hospital, and has turned over assets amounting to approximately 600,000 Swiss francs (\$150,000) to the trustees of a foundation, to be known as the Ippc Foundation, to hold for future developments. Of such assets only the income thereof can be used for the expenses of the foundation, which has as its purpose the promotion of studies in the field of the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, especially by scientific research, publications, and teaching.

Thus ended negotiations extending over a 4-year period to transfer this activity to the United Nations, in harmony with the Department of State's policy of concentrating the activities and reducing the number of intergovernmental international organizations.

Tripartite Commission on German Debts

On July 17 the Tripartite Commission on German Debts at London issued the following communiqué:

The preliminary consultations in London between the Tripartite Commission on German Debts, the delegation of the German Federal Republic, representatives of creditor organizations in France, the United States and the United Kingdom, representatives of German debtors and observers from certain countries with major creditor interests, have ended today.

In the 10 days of meetings which have taken place since the consultations began on July 5, the interests represented have had the opportunity for detailed exchanges of views on the many problems involved. These exchanges will facilitate the work of the full conference planned for the autumn. At this conference all the main interested parties, including creditors from countries not so far represented, will seek to reach solutions which could be embodied in an intergovernmental agreement.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Mechanical Wood Technology

The Department of State announced on July 30 that Lorraine J. Markwardt, Assistant Director, Forest Products Laboratory, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, will serve as United States delegate to the second Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology, to be convened by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at Igels, Austria, August 6 to 19, 1951.

The purpose of this meeting is to consider various problems of a mechanical and engineering nature relating to the utilization of wood and wood-base materials and to continue the work started at previous meetings toward world-wide agreement on standard methods for the mechanical testing of timber and other forest products.

The first Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology was held at Geneva, Switzerland, in August and September 1949.

Radio Conference of ITU

On August 13 the Department of State announced that the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), originally scheduled to be held at The Hague last September, will convene at Geneva, Switzerland, on August 16, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Chairman

W. Walton Butterworth, American Ambassador, Stockholm, Sweden

Vice Chairmen

Harvey B. Otterman, Associate Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State
Carl W. Loeber, Consultant to Office of Transport and Communications, Department of State

Special Assistant to Chairman

Arthur L. Lebel, Assistant Chief, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

Members

Mucio F. Delgado, Special Assistant to the Chief, Division of International Broadcasting, Department of State, New York, N. Y.
Richard G. Hall, Maj., U.S.A.F., Chief, Communications Liaison Branch, Directorate of Communications, Department of the Air Force

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Matthew G. Jones, Foreign Affairs Officer, Telecommunications Policy Staff, Department of State

W. M. Lauterbach, Lt. Col., U.S.A., Chief, Communication Liaison Branch, Office, Chief Signal Officer, Department of the Army

Wayne Mason, Attaché (Telecommunications), American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

A. L. McIntosh, Chief, Frequency Allocation and Treaty Division, Federal Communications Commission

W. J. Millsap, Head, Wave Propagation and Frequency Analysis Unit, Division of Naval Communications, Office, Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy

Donald Mitchell, Chief, International Branch, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Christian E. Pfautz, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y.

L. R. Raish, Lt. Comdr., U.S.N., Frequency Section, Naval Communications, Department of the Navy

Earl K. Rhodes, Capt., U.S.C.G., Chief, Communications Division, Office of Operations, Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

John A. Russ, Chief, Services and Facilities Branch, International Division, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission

E. V. Shores, Aeronautical Communications Specialist, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Philip F. Siling, 1625 K Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Lloyd H. Simson, Chief, Radio Liaison Branch, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Richard A. Solomon, Assistant Chief, Litigation and Administration Division, Office of General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission

Seymour Stearns, Maj., U.S.A.F., Communications Liaison Branch, Directorate of Communications, Department of the Air Force

William T. Stone, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State

Walter E. Weaver, 1523 L Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.

Nathaniel White, Chief, Telecommunication Liaison Section, Communication Liaison Branch, Office, Chief Signal Officer, Department of the Army

Robert Wilcox, Commander, U.S.C.G., Chief, Frequency Section, Communications Division, Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

Myron L. Williams, Lt. Col., U.S.A., Assistant Army Attaché, American Legation, Bern, Switzerland

Secretary of Delegation

David Del Jones, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Administrative Officer

William G. Murphy, Office of Conference Affairs, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

In 1947 the Atlantic City radio conference decided to undertake a complete study of the Interna-

tional Radio Frequency List and to adopt a new frequency list based upon sound engineering principles. To this end the conference adopted general principles and provided for future meetings of the Provisional Frequency Board, the High Frequency Broadcasting Conference, the International Administrative Aeronautical Radio Conference, and others, for the purpose of drawing up frequency lists, which taken together would comprise a long-range plan of orderly frequency assignment and use. These meetings have been held during the period since 1947, and frequency lists having varying degrees of international acceptance were drawn up. The Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference is the culmination of these meetings and this work.

The agenda for the forthcoming conference includes (1) consideration of the draft frequency lists prepared by the Provisional Frequency Board and any other lists which appear to afford promise of agreement; (2) consideration of proposals for bringing into force the decisions of Atlantic City, particularly the table of frequency allocations, with respect to those portions of the radio spectrum for which no preagreed lists exist; (3) necessary decisions concerning the procedures and effective dates of implementation of the Atlantic City table of frequency allocations; and (4) necessary measures for the dissolution of the Provisional Frequency Board and to determine what duties shall be assigned to the International Frequency Registration Board in the light of the Atlantic City agreements.

Approximately 65 member countries of the IRTU are expected to participate in the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference.

Inter-American ECOSOC: 2d Special Meeting

On August 17 the Department of State announced that Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, will serve as delegate and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the second special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council which will convene at Panamá on August 20. Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs and acting U.S. representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, will serve as alternate delegate and vice chairman. The other members of the U.S. delegation are:

Advisers

Willis C. Armstrong, Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
James C. Corliss, Adviser, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
Claude Courand, Foreign Service Officer on detail to Department of Commerce
Joseph B. Costanzo, Deputy Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
John S. deBeers, Chief, Latin American Division, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury

Elizabeth S. Enochs, Chief, International Technical Mission, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency
Ethel B. Gilbert, Director, Industry Advisory Committees, Office of Price Stabilization
Ernest C. Jeppsen, Chief, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Educational Field Party, Panama
Huntington T. Morse, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Federal Maritime Board
Charles P. Nolan, Officer-in-Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
Malcolm Slaght, Director, Foreign Division, Policy Coordination Bureau, National Production Authority
Woodlief Thomas, Economic Adviser, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System

Executive Secretary

Henry E. Allen, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Technical Secretary

Robert M. Sayre, Office of Middle American Affairs, Department of State

Technical Assistant

Mary C. Johnston, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Administrative Assistant

Gloria D. Kishpaugh, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Agenda items for this meeting are price and monetary reserves, scarce raw materials and products, transportation, technical cooperation, social cooperation, and study of the working program of the Council for 1951-1952.

The first special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council was held at Washington, D. C., from March 20 to April 10, 1950.

Ninth Congress of Entomology

On August 13 the Department of State announced that the Ninth International Congress of Entomology will convene at Amsterdam, The Netherlands, from August 17-24, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

F. C. Bishopp, Ph.D., assistant chief (Research), Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture
J. Chester Bradley, Ph.D., president, the Entomological Society of America; Professor of Entomology, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
Curtis W. Sabrosky, assistant leader of the Division of Insect Identification, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Department of Agriculture

A number of other American entomologists are planning to attend the meeting.

The principal purpose of this Congress, one in a triennial series which held its last meeting at Stockholm, Sweden, August 9-14, 1948, is to study and develop methods for preventing the spread of noxious insects. This meeting is of significance in view of the importance of insect control in the international food situation and the opportunity offered to appraise recent developments in the field of insect control both in this country and abroad.

Exhibition of Cinematographic Art

The Department of the State announced on August 17 that 30 countries are participating in the International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art which opened at Venice, Italy, on August 8 and which will continue until September 10. The purpose of the exhibition is to give public recognition to those films which demonstrate outstanding progress in the medium of artistic expression and cultural advancement.

Edward Mansfield Gunn, M. D., chief of the Medical Illustration Service, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, is the U.S. representative at the exhibition. Henry L. Pitts, Jr., American consul at Venice, is serving as the alternate U.S. representative, and Joseph D. Ravotto, International Motion Picture Division, Department of State, is serving as adviser to the U.S. representative.

The U.S. exhibit consists of 19 films selected by the Interdepartmental Review Committee on Visual and Audio Materials, which is composed of representatives of all of the motion picture producing agencies of the Government. The films chosen were produced by the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, the Interior, and State, the Federal Security Agency, and the Veterans Administration. The subjects which these films cover are agriculture, culture, health, medicine, natural resources, research, and science.

Edinburgh Film Festival

The Department of State announced on August 17 that Elliot A. Macklow, Chief, Visual Information Presentation Unit, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, will serve as United States delegate to the fifth Edinburgh Film Festival, which will be held at Edinburgh, Scotland, from August 19 to September 9, 1951. Twenty-eight countries, 23 organizations, and 5 press associations will participate in this festival.

This is the fifth of a series of film festivals held at Edinburgh dealing with realistic, documentary, and experimental films on a noncompetitive basis. The fourth festival took place from August 20 to September 10, 1950.

The United States exhibit consists of 17 motion picture films which have been forwarded to Edinburgh for selection by the festival authorities for inclusion in the program of the festival. These films, produced by the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Interior, and State, were selected by the Interdepartmental Review Committee on Visual and Audio Materials, which is composed of representatives of all of the motion picture producing agencies of the Government. Among the varied subjects covered by these film selections are forest conservation, first aid, parachute testing, air evacuation, and scientific research projects.

August 27, 1951

International Materials Conference

Distribution of Tungsten and Molybdenum

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference on August 4 released the text of a recommendation concerning the distribution of primary products of tungsten and molybdenum in the third quarter of 1951. This recommendation has been accepted unanimously by the members of the Committee and will now be implemented. The 11 countries represented on the Committee are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Following upon the recently approved plan of distribution for tungsten and molybdenum ores and concentrates for the third calendar quarter of 1951,¹ the Committee felt it necessary that there should be an understanding in regard to the supply of primary products of these two metals to those countries normally importing tungsten and molybdenum in this form (i.e. ferro-tungsten, tungsten powder, tungstic acid and tungsten salts, and ferro-molybdenum, molybdic acid, and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide).

Following is the text of the adopted recommendation:

The Committee recommends that the consumers of ores and concentrates should continue the policy of exporting a proportion of their consumption as primary products, in accordance with accepted trade patterns. It is recommended that the total quantities of primary products so exported should be approximately proportionate to the provision for the export of primary products included in each country's stated requirements. The proportion should be the same as that to which the country's total civilian requirements are being met in the plan of distribution for the third calendar quarter as finally approved by the governments.

The above policy is recommended as a stopgap measure applying to the third calendar quarter of 1951. The Committee proposed to give further consideration to the problem of the distribution of primary products for subsequent periods.

Action on Kraft Pulp and Dissolving Pulp

The Pulp-Paper Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on August 13 that it has decided to recommend that no immediate action be taken by the Imc on kraft pulp and dissolving pulp. This decision was made on the basis of the information given in the replies to the questionnaires which had been sent out by the committee to all interested governments on May 18 and which were to be returned by June 22. Although questionnaires have not been returned by all of the governments, the information which has been received accounts for over 90 percent of the total production and consumption.

¹ BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 192.

On kraft pulp, the committee found that the estimated deficit for 1951, as calculated from the information submitted by reporting countries in reply to the questionnaires, represents only about 1.3 percent of total expected production estimated at over 8 million tons, or approximately 9 percent of the availabilities of market pulp.

The recent establishment of ceiling prices in the United States, together with other measures taken to regulate the internal distribution of pulp in that country, will, in the opinion of the committee, result in increased supplies of kraft pulp becoming available, during the rest of 1951, to other consumer countries.

In view of these circumstances the committee has recommended to governments that no action need be taken by the Imc on kraft pulp at the present time.

Regarding dissolving pulp, the committee was concerned about the possible effects of the sulphur shortage on the future production of dissolving pulp. The position is not yet sufficiently clear to enable the committee to calculate the effects of this shortage.

Therefore, the committee has decided that no action should be taken by the Imc on dissolving pulp at the present time but that the position be further considered as soon as the effects of the sulphur shortage on dissolving pulp production can be more accurately estimated.

Fourteen countries are represented on the Pulp-Paper Committee. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

It will be recalled that the committee, in planning its work, had decided to consider newsprint first, kraft pulp and dissolving pulp next. In order to prevent any time lag after the newsprint problem will have been resolved, a statistical pulp subcommittee was established to compile data on kraft and dissolving pulps.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2228, July 3; S/2253, July 19; S/2254, July 20; S/2257, July 23; S/2259, July 24; S/2261, July 25; S/2264, July 27; S/2267, July 30; S/2272, August 2; S/2273, August 2; S/2274, August 2; S/2276, August 3; S/2279, August 6; S/2282, August 7; S/2283, August 7; S/2286, August 8; S/2288, August 9; S/2292, August 14.

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- Decisions of the Council at its Tenth and Eleventh Sessions. Background Paper No. 53. Supplement No. 1. UNIES, May 17, 1951. 47 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the Commission on Human Rights (Seventh Session). E/1992, E/CN.4/640, May 24, 1951. 163 pp. mimeo.
- Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Europe (Thirteenth Session). Submitted by the Economic Commission for Europe to the Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council. 16 June 1950—13 June 1951. E/2002, E/ECE/130, June 13, 1951. 73 pp. mimeo.
- Methods of International Financing of European Emigration (Thirteenth Session). Report by the Secretary-General. E/2019, June 18, 1951. 121 pp. mimeo.
- Full Employment. Analysis of Replies from Governments to the Full Employment Questionnaires Covering the Period 1950-51 (Thirteenth Session). Submitted under Resolutions 221 E (IX) and 290 (XI) of the Economic and Social Council. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2035/Add. 1, June 27, 1951. 61 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries (Thirteenth Session). Volume and Distribution of National Income in Under-Developed Countries. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2041, June 28, 1951. 91 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the Committee on the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information (Thirteenth Session). Legal Problems Raised by Certain Amendments to the Draft Convention. Relevant Provisions of National Legislations and Extracts of Judicial Decisions Limiting Freedom of Information. E/2046/Add. 1, July 5, 1951. 41 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

- Information from Nongoverning Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information (Sixth Session). Transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter by the Government of the United States of America. Report of the Secretary-General. A/1823, June 29, 1951. 46 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue, but will be resumed in the issue of September 3.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Offices

According to later information concerning the opening of the combined American consulate and USIE Mission at Bari, Italy, these offices were not opened to the public on April 19, 1951, as announced in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 1018.

Charles Robert Burrows to OAS

The Department of State announced on August 17 the appointment of Charles Robert Burrows as alternate to the U.S. representative on the Council of the Organization of American States.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Army Mission to Liberia. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2171. Pub. 4097. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Liberia—signed at Washington Jan. 11, 1951; entered into force Jan. 11, 1951.

The Philippines: Early Years of the Republic. Far Eastern Series 42. Pub. 4239. 11 pp. 10¢.

A background summary of the Philippines with their struggle for freedom and basic problems.

Understanding the Schuman Plan. European and British Commonwealth Series 26. Pub. 4281. 4 pp. 5¢.

A background summary explaining the Schuman Plan or the European Coal and Steel Community as a basis for a new and peaceful Europe.

Burma: Outlines of a New Nation. Far Eastern Series 46. Pub. 4282. 8 pp. 5¢.

A background summary on Burma and its importance as part of the free world.

List of International Conferences and Meetings, July 1, 1951. International Organization and Conference Series 1, 17. Pub. 4290. 66 pp. 30¢.

The List, issued quarterly, includes international conferences and meetings which are expected to be held during the period ending December 31, 1952.

The Partnership for Freedom. General Foreign Policy Series 61. Pub. 4304. 24 pp. 10¢.

A statement in support of the proposed mutual security program before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, June 26, 1951.

The Defense of Freedom. General Foreign Policy Series 62. Pub. 4305. 9 pp. Free.

Address by President Truman delivered at ceremonies commemorating the 175th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, Washington, D.C., July 4, 1951.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of August 20, 1951, page 313, right-hand column, the head "Legislation" should read "Publications."

Check List of Department Press Releases: Aug. 13-19, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Number	Date	Subject
678	7/27	Looted Art Recovered
719	8/11	Labor Agreement—Mexico
720†	8/13	Acheson: World Youth
721	8/13	ITU: Radio Conf.
722*	8/13	Bennett: Message to Pakistan
723*	8/13	Exchange of Persons
724	8/13	9th Entomology Cong.
725*	8/14	Inter-American Ecosoc
726*	8/14	1st Anniversary of Pakistan
727	8/15	Dulles: Peace Conf. (excerpts)
728*	8/15	Miller: Cuba Day
729*	8/15	3d Anniversary of Korea
730	8/15	Japanese Peace Treaty
731	8/16	U.S., Philippines Treaty
732	8/16	U.S.S.R. to San Francisco Conf.
733	8/16	U.S., Iraq Agreement Signed
734	8/16	U.N. Oatis Resolution (BULL. 8/20)
735*	8/17	1st Anniversary of Indonesia
736	8/17	Inter-American Ecosoc (U.S. del.)
737*	8/17	C. A. Livengood Retires
738	8/17	Edinburgh Film Festival
739	8/17	Cinematographic Art Exhibit
740*	8/17	Exchange of Persons
741*	8/17	Visitors to U.S.
742	8/17	Burrows: U.S. Rep. to OAS (rewrite)
743*	8/17	Dulles: Television of Peace Conf.

*Not printed in BULLETIN.

†Held for future issue of BULLETIN.

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September 3, 1951

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Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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The Soviet Propaganda Machine

By Alan M. G. Little

This article is an analysis of the Soviet propaganda machine. The analysis is concerned with the planned developments by the U.S.S.R., in recent years, to influence people through the radio, newspapers, films, and other conventional mass media. It appraises, at least to a limited extent, the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda both within and without the geographical orbit of that country.

The use of mass media to sway public opinion is inherent in the Soviet theory of how to administer the state. For it was a Lenin doctrine, which his followers have adopted, that to perpetuate itself the Soviet State must maintain a balance between coercion and persuasion.

Following the tenet of persuasion, as well as that of coercion, the Soviet leaders through the years have created a vast propaganda machine. All the strands of internal and external policies are woven by this machine into a series of standard and Party-line messages for direct use in many countries, with different peoples, and with various occupational and income groups.

The machine itself consists of two parts: first, the conventional mass media common to all national propaganda services—which are discussed in this article—and second, a vast network of individuals who act as human transmitters for the propaganda message.

At home, operating behind the protection of censorship and radio jamming of incoming information, the Soviet propaganda machine exerts every conceivable pressure to convince the population of the correctness of the Government's policy. Abroad, this propaganda attempts to confuse and to isolate nations or individuals opposing Soviet policy—and to create and reinforce favorable opinions.

The message delivered by the machine usually finds its strength in quantity rather than quality, and in repetition rather than logic. Outside the U.S.S.R., it is most convincing to people who know least about the U.S.S.R. Inside the U.S.S.R., it misses complete effectiveness in convincing people who live under the Soviet system, because

it is so insistently repetitious and oversimplified and because it disregards or denies the facts of their own existence. All basic Soviet propaganda recognizes only friends or enemies and rules out any accommodation to a middle view.

I. Domestic Propaganda

The propaganda system for domestic purposes in the U.S.S.R., Stalin has said, acts as a "transmission belt" between the Communist Party and the people. It is designed to reach down to all levels of the population and to serve a double purpose by relaying Party instructions downward and by permitting (to some extent) the return to the Party of public reactions to the propaganda. Stalin also has stated that, if the system failed to function, "all state and Party work would languish."

In the Soviet domestic propaganda, two kinds of appeals are generally employed. The first, "agitation," is directed in simple terms to the masses in order to achieve immediate goals. The second, "propaganda" in the narrower sense, is addressed to a more intelligent audience capable of grasping the broad aims of the Soviet state.

Both types of activity are under the control of the Section of Propaganda and Agitation (*Agitprop*) of the Party's Central Committee. This section must implement the decisions of the *Politburo*. *Agitprop* units at lower levels insure a relay throughout the Soviet system. A tight control over all media of information is centered in this section, which determines both the general line and the specific course of action in all matters affecting Soviet opinion. *Agitprop* procedures are based, of course, on the policy determinations of the *Politburo*.

Assistance in securing uniformity of facts and interpretations to be disseminated through the different media is given by the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (*Glavlit*) and by responsible subdivisions of the governmental ministry or the organization concerned.

For example, *Glavlit* insures that all publications, manuscripts, photos, pictures, radio broadcasts, lectures, and exhibits intended for the public are in accord with the Party's political and ideological doctrines. *Glavlit* also makes certain that such media do not divulge any economic or military secrets. The extent of this surveillance is apparent in the fact that *Glavlit* has representatives in local Soviet governmental units (*raions*) as small as American counties. But approval of an individual item by *Glavlit* does not excuse the originating party if a mistake is made.

USE OF THE PRESS IN THE U.S.S.R.

Despite a steady postwar growth, the output of the Soviet press has not reached its prewar levels. Stalin has said that the press is "the only implement which helps the Party to speak daily, hourly, with the working class" and that "no other such flexible tool is to be found in nature." Yet the Soviet Union since World War II has failed to publish as many newspapers, magazines, and books as it did in 1939—the most active prewar year.

Much of this loss in Soviet publishing is accountable to wartime destruction of printing facilities. But in view of the Soviet preference for the press as a medium through which to influence public opinion, there also may have been a failure—or an inability—to direct sufficient resources into printing to match the prewar volume.

Soviet Publication Statistics

	Year	Number
Newspapers	1939	8,780
	1947	7,000
	1948	7,163
	1949	7,200
	1950	7,700
Magazines	1939	1,592
	1946	960
	1948	1,183
	1950	1,400
Books, etc.	1939	43,800
	1946	25,145
	1948	40,000
	1949	42,000

USE OF RADIO IN THE U.S.S.R.

A heavy hand of control is placed in the U.S.S.R. over what is broadcast and over the audience's choice of what it can hear.

Most radio listeners in the Soviet Union can tune in on programs only over a loudspeaker wired to relay stations. In 1950 the ratio of loudspeakers to individual tube radio sets was 8 million to about 4 million. Consequently, a majority of the Soviet people who have access to radio programs can hear only the propaganda which is being broadcast over their wired loudspeakers. At present the Soviet transmitting system reaches about one-eighth of the people.

In accounting for the widespread use of the loudspeaker system in the U.S.S.R., the relative cheapness of a wired loudspeaker compared to a radio set is undoubtedly second in importance to the Kremlin's desire to retain strict supervision over everything the Soviet people listen to.

USE OF FILMS IN THE U.S.S.R.

The Soviet film industry is relatively undeveloped, notwithstanding the importance attached to this medium by Soviet propagandists. This limitation naturally restricts the use of film as propaganda.

Because of the difficulties of meeting the ideological demands of the Party, the record of fulfillment on film schedules in 1950 was the worst in a decade. And, although the Government's first postwar Five Year Plan included intentions to expand facilities for the showing of films, it is not likely that many of these have been realized.

Production and release of 20 full-length feature films were called for in the 1950 schedule laid down by the Kremlin. But only 11 new films were made available to the public during that year, and 5 of the 11 had been in production since 1949. Before the war, on the other hand, from 40 to 45 feature films were produced each year in the U.S.S.R. In the United States, the annual output is about 350 films.

II. Propaganda Directed Abroad

The *Agitprop* section of the Party's Central Committee is also the unit which controls propaganda directed abroad through the mass communication media. For the outside world, in addition to the usual propaganda media, the U.S.S.R. employs its diplomatic and military missions, and national Communist parties in other countries, with their subsidized and controlled publicity operations.

The U.S.S.R. also relies heavily upon various Soviet-dominated and interlocking international organizations, and their affiliates, for propaganda assistance, such as: the Cominform, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Federation of Democratic Women, the World Congress of Partisans of Peace (headed by the World Peace Council).

These and other organizations are manipulated to influence mass opinion abroad in support of the policies of the Soviet Union, through such international agitation drives as the Stockholm Peace Appeal, the Five Power Peace Pact, et cetera.

USE OF THE PRESS ABROAD

In making a choice of propaganda media, the Communist leaders have always preferred the press. Although they show flexibility in adapting each medium to their purposes, the most ef-

fective vehicle they have used abroad is undoubtedly the newspaper. In part, this may result from the fact that the Soviets give more attention to newspapers as a propaganda vehicle.

Many news stories originating in Moscow and conveying Soviet points of view are carried in the Western press, in both Communist and non-Communist papers. One reason why the Western press must necessarily give space to Moscow-inspired news stories, of course, is the near monopoly by the Soviet Union and its agencies on news about Russia.

But the publication of Soviet propaganda in editorials such as those carried recently in *Sheng Hua Pao*, Communist newspaper in Djakarta, and in the daily *Ta Kung Shang Pao* of Surabaya, and in original articles like one which appeared first in *Pravda* and was reprinted in Damascus by *Al-Manar* and *Al-Nasr*, tends to confirm that the product of the Soviet propaganda machine gets direct distribution in many places outside the geographical orbit of the U.S.S.R.

It is noticeable that the volume and direction of Soviet propaganda channeled abroad have changed since the war. Most of the Soviet effort prior to World War II was addressed to French, German, and, above all, to English-speaking audiences, with great stress on an idyllic picture of life in the U.S.S.R. rather than on "world revolution." But every prewar publication for foreign consumption was discontinued either during the war or by 1950. The postwar Soviet foreign-language publications place more stress on the U.S.S.R.'s achievements, cover a wider range of languages, and no longer include newspapers.

Indicative of a more militant propaganda is the hard-hitting tone of *New Times*, a weekly periodical published in English, Polish, French, and German. This weekly deals with Soviet foreign policy and circulates what are frankly propaganda documents to a wide audience.

The Soviet publications in this category are distributed through the International Book Publishing Corporation, a branch of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade with sales outlets in 29 countries. Soviet representatives in other countries also sponsor publications printed locally, including the bulletins of the Soviet embassies.

The foreign Communist press is supplied by the U.S.S.R. with news items through the information agency of the Soviets, the *Sovinformburo*. The Soviet telegraphic agency, TASS, which has a monopoly on collecting foreign news for relay to Russia, is also the ultimate source of most news emanating from the U.S.S.R. The difficulties encountered by foreign correspondents at Moscow inevitably buttress the TASS monopoly on news.

SOVFOTO, a branch of TASS, supplies photographic material on a monopoly basis to foreign purchasers. Outside the countries in the Soviet orbit and the United States, TASS is most active in the Near East and India.

There is no doubt as to the official character of TASS. It is reflected, among many indications, in the use of TASS by the Soviets as an agency for training of Soviet diplomats, and as a vehicle for the dissemination of official statements and for denials of reports deemed injurious to the interests of the U.S.S.R.

USE OF RADIO ABROAD

Foreign broadcasting by the Soviets increased during 1946-50, while broadcasting by both the United Kingdom and the United States was less in 1950 than in 1946. Over that period, the U.S.S.R. almost doubled its number of program hours so that by 1950 the Soviet weekly broadcasts, in combination with those of the European satellites and China, surpassed the combined broadcasts of the United Kingdom and the United States for the first time.

In 1950 the Soviets broadcasted in 32 foreign languages and particularly stressed the languages of the European and oriental satellites. They maintained a steady emphasis on Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, in that order.

Language units in the Soviet system prepare the broadcasts. Each unit has its own editorial staff, headed by a Russian but mainly composed of expatriates. In the English-language unit, there are reported to be white and Negro American expatriates, and British expatriates.

As far back as 1917 the Soviet leaders exploited radio for international propaganda. A comparison of total broadcasting on the international wave-lengths as between the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States clearly shows the effort made by the Soviets in recent years.

Weekly Hours of Foreign Broadcasting ¹

	U.S.S.R.	U.K.	U.S.
1946	276	705	395
1948	334	664	186
1949	434	634	198
1950	516	636	210
1951	670	554	339

¹ These figures are based on rough estimates, subject to special qualifications.

The chief criteria in Soviet allocation of time to any given area appear to be (1) the nearness of the area to the U.S.S.R., (2) its strategic or political importance to Soviet foreign policy, and (3) the capability of reaching the area by other means. The size of the potential audience and the number of receiving sets in an area seem to be less important factors in the Soviet calculations.

USE OF FILMS ABROAD

The Soviets claim that their films are seen annually outside the U.S.S.R. by 400 million people. But their world-wide distribution is still uneven, and, in certain areas, the lack of diplomatic relations or the opposition from church, colonial, or

civil authorities precludes the showing of Soviet films. In some areas, and for a variety of reasons, the films are shown only by embassy personnel.

The chief areas in which Soviet films have found a steady if limited public have been the United States, Britain, and western and northern Europe. These showings, however, have declined since 1946. A smaller number of Soviet films are shown in Israel, Japan, Finland, and in some Latin American countries.

Near Eastern and South Asian countries are the targets of a vigorous film effort by the Soviets, but the fields of the most aggressive film propaganda are in the European satellite countries and in China. These fields are cultivated by political influence insuring that Soviet films will be shown, and by the employment of Soviet film specialists collaborating in the local production of films.

THE CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM

As still another major propaganda effort, the Soviets have developed a cultural exchange program in all possible activities with the countries in its orbit. With the rest of the world, cultural exchange activities are more limited, and with the United States, for example, deliberately discouraged.

VOKS (All-Union Society for Cultural Relations Abroad) maintains contact with a network of foreign Soviet Friendship Societies, exchanges publications, and with the aid of *Intourist* (the State Travel Bureau) supervises the visits of foreigners in the U.S.S.R.

A constant flow of delegations representing sports, the arts, youth, trade unions, and women's activities is maintained to and from the U.S.S.R. On many occasions these delegations will comprise as many as 500 members.

Racial and religious ties, as with the Slavic and Armenian groups outside the U.S.S.R., are also played up for the purpose of promoting Soviet aims.

III. Effectiveness of Soviet Propaganda

Within the geographical confines of the U.S.S.R., the policy guiding Soviet propaganda is extremely simple. The policy is to eliminate any views contradicting the official position on any subject and to create popular support for the Communist Party by repeating a uniform and slogan-like message in as many ways and as many times as possible.

The convictions of people in the U.S.S.R. are believed to be less affected by official propaganda than is usually claimed by the Soviet leaders. The obviously artificial and controlled nature of Soviet propaganda, contradicting the facts of life,

arouses widespread distrust. Nevertheless, the reiterations leave a lasting impression, exclude other facts from public discussion, and show the citizen exactly what he must say if he is to survive—much less “prosper.”

The long-range effect is to reduce openly expressed interest in public affairs and to create an attitude of indifference among those groups whose prime interest is food, clothing, and shelter. The curious seek to read between the lines and listen to rumor. But fear of police repression discourages a serious searching for the truth by the average Russian.

Although from country to country the Soviet line is shaped to conform with local conditions, the main body of propaganda material designed for foreign consumption usually differs but little from that used within the Soviet Union. The principal themes of propaganda are often the same.

The effect of this propaganda abroad varies from area to area. Among the Soviet satellites, where political control might be expected to produce the same results as in the Soviet Union, continued resentment against these controls tends to diminish the impact of both Soviet and local Communist propaganda.

Soviet theorists are always endeavoring to develop a pattern of mass response, a conditioned reflex. One reflex is that the captive audiences in the Soviet sphere are learning to avoid open protests and to conform outwardly. Yet the ultimate effects may be only apathy, plus a sense of frustration, both at home and in the satellite countries.

In other parts of the world, the success of Soviet propaganda may depend chiefly on three things:

(1) The existence of conditions—social injustice and economic hardship—which would dispose an audience to believe the Soviet message.

(2) The great volume and intensity of Soviet propaganda applied to the area.

(3) The absence of a well-informed public opinion, able and ready to distinguish fact from fiction.

Soviet propaganda is undoubtedly most effective in colonial countries or in areas of the world whose recent history has predisposed them to distrust colonial authority. The aim of the U.S.S.R. has been to encourage the populations of these countries or areas to suspect the motives of the English-speaking and other free nations, who are charged with “imperialism.”

In this respect, as in others, Communist propaganda is a weapon of psychological attack which must be met and overcome by similar weapons.

• *Alan M. G. Little is a research analyst in the Department of State.*

Our Wartime Relations With the Soviet Union and the Agreements Reached at Yalta

*Statement by W. Averell Harriman¹
Special Assistant to the President*

[Excerpts]

I am submitting this statement for use in connection with the hearings on the Far Eastern situation. My objective is to clarify the confusion that has arisen regarding the understandings reached at Yalta by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with Premier Stalin.

Much has been said and written about Yalta and its effect on the postwar course of events. Some people have shown a lack of understanding of our objectives in the conduct of the war and our efforts during the war to lay a foundation for a peaceful postwar world. Others appear to have profited from hindsight. Still others—for reasons best known to themselves—have distorted and perverted the facts to a point where their statements have little or no basis in reality. As a result, a myth has grown up that what President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill did at Yalta has led to our postwar difficulties with the Soviet Union. This myth is without foundation in fact.

The discussions at Yalta and the understandings reached there were an integral part of our negotiations with the Soviet Union throughout the war to bring the desperate struggle to a victorious and early conclusion and to find a way in which the United States, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. could live together in peace. The postwar problems have resulted not from the understandings reached at Yalta but from the fact that Stalin failed to carry out those understandings and from aggressive actions by the Kremlin.

In this statement I have attempted to set forth the manner in which President Roosevelt sought to achieve his objectives. In doing so I have drawn heavily on my personal experiences. After being

involved in our rearmament program beginning June 1940, I was sent by President Roosevelt to London in March of 1941 as his special representative for assistance to Great Britain. From October 1943 until January 1946, I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Prior to this appointment President Roosevelt had sent me on several special missions. The first was in September of 1941, when I went to Moscow with Lord Beaverbrook as chairman of the President's Special Mission to the Soviet Union. In August 1942, I represented President Roosevelt at the first meeting of Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin in Moscow. I was with Secretary of State Hull at the Moscow conference in October 1943. I attended all but one of the conferences between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and all of the conferences between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union—Tehran in November 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and Potsdam in July 1945. I also attended the meeting between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October 1944. I was in San Francisco for a few weeks during the United Nations Conference in April and May 1945. Throughout the war I had innumerable personal talks with Churchill and many discussions with Stalin.

The primary objective of the American and British Governments in our relations with the Soviet Union during the war was to keep the Soviet Army as an effective fighting force against Hitler. We sought to do this through the shipment of essential supplies and through the coordination of our military strategy. Supplies began to flow shortly after the discussions Lord Beaverbrook and I had with Stalin in Moscow in September 1941. The principal strategic talks took place when Churchill visited Moscow in August 1942 and at Tehran in November 1943. At this latter conference, Stalin was informed of our plans to land in France, and he undertook to attack shortly after we got ashore in order to prevent the Ger-

¹ Submitted to the Committees on Armed Forces and Foreign Relations of the Senate on Aug. 13, 1951, and released to the press by the Committees on Aug. 17.

mans from diverting divisions from the eastern front to the west.

There are those who now contend that we should not have supported the Soviet armies. They contend that we should have let Germany and the Soviet Union kill each other off. These people forget the real danger was that Hitler would knock Russia out of the war. . . .

These people forget that on June 6, 1944, when the Allies landed on the Normandy beaches, there were about 60 German divisions in France and the Low Countries, whereas there were 199 German divisions and 50 satellite divisions engaged on the eastern front. In accordance with Stalin's agreement at Tehran, the Russian armies launched a major offensive on June 22 and tied down and broke through this formidable Nazi force. . . .

In addition to maintaining the Soviet Union as an effective fighting ally against Hitler, it was our objective to encourage the Soviet Union to join in the war against Japan at the earliest possible date. Because of their ambitions in the East, there was never any doubt in my mind that the Soviets would attack the Japanese in Manchuria in their own due time. The question was whether they could come in early enough to be of any help to us and to save American lives. I raised the subject with Stalin as early as August 1942. He told me then that it was his intention to come into the Pacific war when he was in a position to do so. Stalin was gravely concerned by the possibility of a premature attack by the Japanese. He had weakened his Siberian forces for the defense of Stalingrad. Furthermore, the Japanese Navy alone could have cut off the vital line of our supplies coming through Vladivostok.

The question of Soviet participation in the Pacific war was discussed in some detail at Tehran. Roosevelt proposed to Stalin the basing of American heavy bombers in the Maritime Provinces, north of Vladivostok. This was deemed a necessary requirement by our Air Force in order to cover the Japanese Islands. In addition, Roosevelt suggested the possible use of Soviet ports for our naval forces and requested the immediate exchange of military intelligence concerning Japan. Stalin agreed that these matters should be studied. Shortly thereafter we established exchange of combat intelligence. . . .

Concurrently with our negotiations for the conduct of the war, President Roosevelt sought to come to an understanding regarding postwar problems with the Soviet Union. It was clear that unless these problems were settled we would have difficulties once the war was ended. President Roosevelt attempted to use our relationship as allies to develop a basis on which world peace could be maintained, and to settle in advance differences which we were likely to have over the treatment of territories occupied by the Red army.

In August 1941, before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt and Churchill had met at sea and proclaimed the

Atlantic Charter, a statement of the fundamental principles to which nations must adhere if they are to live together in peace and freedom. In January 1942, at our request, the Soviet Union subscribed to the Atlantic Charter in the declaration by the United Nations. In October 1943, a further step was taken in the Moscow Declaration, which laid the foundation for the United Nations. This declaration was signed by Molotov, Eden and Hull, and the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. It was only after Hull's vigorous insistence that Molotov agreed to the inclusion of the signature of the Chinese. This was in line with Roosevelt's consistent attempts to strengthen the position of the Chinese National Government and to obtain the support of that Government by the Soviet Union.

At Tehran, in addition to the military matters, President Roosevelt attempted to develop further a basis for reaching political understandings with the Soviet Union. Plans for the organization of the United Nations were discussed, and also such matters as the postwar treatment of Germany, the future of Poland, and the independence of Iran. . . .

On Roosevelt's instructions I discussed with Stalin, on a number of occasions throughout 1944, Soviet participation in the war against Japan, the concerting of our military actions in the Pacific, including operations by American bombers from the Maritime Provinces, and the basis of an understanding between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government. In one of these talks, which took place in June, Stalin minimized the Chinese Communists, and stated that Chiang was the only man who could hold China together and that he should be supported.

Molotov reiterated this position when Donald M. Nelson and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley stopped at Moscow in August en route to Chungking.²

Although Stalin had on several occasions mentioned Soviet political objectives in the East, it was not until December 1944 that he outlined these objectives to me in detail. He said that Russia's position in the East should be generally reestablished as it existed before the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. The lower half of Sakhalin should be returned to the Russians, as well as the Kurile Islands, in order to protect Soviet outlets to the Pacific. The Russians wished again to lease the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur and to obtain a lease on those railroads in Manchuria built by the Russians under contract with the Chinese, specifically, the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was the direct line from the Trans-Siberian Railroad through to Vladivostok, and the South Manchurian Railroad making a connection to Dairen. He stated that the Soviet Union would

² See *U.S. Relations with China*, Department of State publication 3573, hereafter referred to as U.S.R.C., pp. 71-72.

not interfere with the sovereignty of China over Manchuria. In addition, Stalin asked for the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. I pointed out to Stalin that the talks at Tehran had envisaged internationalization of the Port of Dairen, rather than a lease. Stalin replied that this could be discussed. I immediately reported Stalin's proposals to President Roosevelt, and they became the basis of the discussions at Yalta.

Yalta Negotiations

It was against this background, which I have briefly sketched, that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with Stalin at Yalta in early February 1945. The question of Roosevelt's physical condition at the time of Yalta has been the subject of considerable discussion. Unquestionably, he was not in good health and the long conferences tired him. Nevertheless, for many months he had given much thought to the matters to be discussed and, in consultation with many officials of the Government, he had blocked out definite objectives which he had clearly in mind. He came to Yalta determined to do his utmost to achieve these objectives and he carried on the negotiations to this end with his usual skill and perception.

The discussions at Yalta covered a wide range of topics, including final plans for the defeat of Hitler, the occupation and control of Germany, reparations, the United Nations Conference to meet at San Francisco on April 25, the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to the liberated peoples of Europe, and the establishment of a free, independent, and democratic Poland through the holding of free and unfettered elections. By the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Roosevelt and Churchill obtained the pledge of Stalin for joint action to secure the fundamental freedoms for the people in territories overrun by the Red army. . . .

[Here follows text of Declaration. See BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1945, p. 215.]

It was agreed that there should be continued collaboration between the three Governments through periodic meetings of the Foreign Secretaries, and the concluding paragraphs of the Yalta communiqué expressed the determination of the three Governments to have "unity for peace as for war." . . .

[Here follows the communiqué. See BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1945, p. 216.]

Had Stalin honored these commitments taken at Yalta, Eastern Europe would be free today and the United Nations would be a truly effective organization for world security.

The last understanding to be reached was that relating to the Far East. The crucial issue was not whether the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War, but whether it would do so in time

to be of help in the carrying out of the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The great danger existed that the Soviet Union would stand by until we had brought Japan to her knees at great cost in American lives, and then the Red army could march into Manchuria and large areas of Northern China. It would then have been a simple matter for the Soviets to give expression to "popular demand" by establishing People's Republics of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. President Roosevelt sought to reduce the general assurances which Stalin had previously given to specific undertakings for the early entry of Russia in the Pacific War, to limit Soviet expansion in the East and to gain Soviet support for the Nationalist Government of China.

It should be recalled that it was only on the second day of the Yalta Conference that General MacArthur entered Manila. The bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa still lay ahead. It was not until more than 5 months later that the first and only experimental explosion of the atomic bomb was successfully concluded at Alamogordo. The military authorities estimated that it would take 18 months after the surrender of Germany to defeat Japan, and that Soviet participation would greatly reduce the heavy American casualties which could otherwise be expected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were planning an invasion of the Japanese home islands, and were anxious for the early entry of Russia in the war to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria and in order that our bombers could operate from bases in Eastern Siberia.

These plans were outlined in two memoranda which were before the President at Yalta.

In a memorandum for the President, dated 23 January 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by the following basic principles in working toward U.S.S.R. entry into the war against Japan:

Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The U.S. will provide maximum support possible without interfering with our main effort against Japan.

The objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with U.S. air forces based in eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of Asia.

In a memorandum dated 22 January 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis for planning in the war against Japan:

The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific

a. Following the Okinawa operation to seize additional positions to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

c. The decisive invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo plain.

3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:—

Objectives	Target Date
Continuation of operations in the Philippines (Luzon, Mindoro, Leyte)	19 February 1945
Iwo Jima	19 February 1945
Okinawa and extension therefrom in the Ryukyus	1 April–August 1945

4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter of 1945–1946.

5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined.

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until well into 1946.

These military considerations had been the subject of careful study by Roosevelt for a long time and they were uppermost in his mind at Yalta. President Roosevelt personally carried on with Stalin the negotiations leading up to the understanding on the Far East. I was present at the meetings when these matters were discussed and, under President Roosevelt's direction, I took up certain details with Stalin and with Molotov. Neither Secretary of State Stettinius nor any of his advisers, except for Charles E. Bohlen, who acted as the President's interpreter, had anything to do with these negotiations. Any suggestion to the contrary is utterly without foundation in fact.

The first conversations took place on February 8, at which time Stalin brought up with Roosevelt the proposals which he had presented to me the previous December in Moscow. Stalin contended that these proposals should be accepted. Roosevelt said that he believed there would be no difficulty in regard to the Kurile Islands and the return

to Russia of the southern half of Sakhalin. He said that, although he could not speak for Chiang Kai-shek, he believed that Dairen might be made a free port under an international commission, and that the Manchurian railroads might be operated jointly. The President and Stalin also discussed internal conditions in China. Stalin reiterated his recognition of the need for a united China under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership.

Stalin suggested that the proposals be put in writing and be agreed to before the conference ended.

Two days later, on February 10, Molotov took up with me the details of the understanding to be reached. I reemphasized President Roosevelt's views that the ports should be free ports and not leased to the Soviet Union, that the Manchurian railroads should not be leased but jointly operated, and that in any event the understanding should specify that the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek was required.

I reported this conversation to Roosevelt, and he instructed me to explain his views again to Molotov, which I did.

Later on in the same day, February 10, Roosevelt and Stalin met again. Stalin agreed to the modifications as proposed by Roosevelt, except that he maintained that a lease on Port Arthur would be required, as it was to be used for a naval base. Stalin accepted the requirement for Chiang Kai-shek's concurrence and said that he wanted his concurrence also to the status quo in Outer Mongolia. President Roosevelt and Stalin concluded that the matter should be discussed with Chiang when Stalin was prepared to have this done, having in mind the need for secrecy and lack of security in Chungking.

On the following day, the text was shown to Churchill, and after his agreement, it was signed on that day, February 11, 1945, by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill. . . .

[Here follows text of agreement. See U.S.R.C., p. 113; BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1946, p. 282.]

Stalin also agreed to joint planning for military operations in the Pacific and to the use by the United States Army Air Force of bases in the Maritime Provinces at Komsomolsk and Nikolaevsk.

President Roosevelt felt that he had achieved his principal objectives. He had obtained the agreement of the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan within 3 months after the defeat of Germany. This was the period required to move Soviet troops from the European front to Siberia. It was considered to be in good time, and conformed to the plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which involved the redeployment of our forces from Europe to the Pacific. Roosevelt had also obtained Stalin's pledge of support for Chiang Kai-shek and recognition of the sovereignty of the Chinese National Government over Manchuria.

Answer to Criticisms Against Yalta Agreement

In recent years several objections have been leveled at the terms of the Yalta understanding on the Far East and the circumstances under which it was concluded.

It has been asserted that the understanding was a mistake because, as it turned out, Russian participation had no influence on the defeat of Japan. To President Roosevelt at Yalta, the lives of American fighting men were at stake. He had been advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the defeat of Japan would take many months after V-E day and that if the Soviet Union came in soon enough countless American lives would be saved. Furthermore, up to that time, Stalin had carried out vital military undertakings. Roosevelt, therefore, considered that a definite commitment from Stalin was of supreme importance and would be of great value.

Another criticism is that Chiang Kai-shek was not consulted before the understanding was signed and that the understanding was kept secret. The question of consulting Chiang was a difficult one. Secrecy was a military necessity. Experience had shown that whatever was known in Chungking got to the Japanese. Stalin was unwilling to risk Japanese knowledge of his plans until he had been able to strengthen his forces in Siberia. At Roosevelt's insistence, however, the understanding specified that Chiang's concurrence was required where China's direct interests were affected and that Chiang should be notified at the appropriate time.

I am sure that Roosevelt would have much preferred to have consulted Chiang in advance, if he had thought it was feasible for him to do so. On the other hand, he had had certain general talks with Chiang on some of the points involved, and knew of Chiang's desire to come to a permanent understanding with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, and also because of the strong support that he had given Chiang in the past, Roosevelt felt that he could work things out with Chiang when the time came.

Because of the prior conversations with Stalin, Roosevelt was convinced that the requirement for Chiang's concurrence qualified the provision that the claims of the Soviet Union "shall be unquestionably fulfilled," and that Stalin so understood. Events proved that Roosevelt was correct. The Yalta understanding provided a framework for negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government in the summer of 1945, looking toward a settlement of the long standing difficulties between the two countries. These negotiations, which I will discuss in greater detail later in this statement, were voluntarily negotiated between the two Governments and culminated in the Sino-Soviet agreements of August 1945. In these agreements, although the Soviet Union obtained certain privileges in the railroads and the ports, it fully recognized the sovereignty

of the National Government over both China and Manchuria and agreed to support that Government and no other. When the Sino-Soviet agreements were made public in August they were welcomed both in China and in the United States. These agreements dispose of the claim that the concessions made at Yalta regarding Manchuria undermined Chiang Kai-shek and ultimately caused him to lose control of the mainland of China. The loss of control over the mainland by the National Government was due not to the Yalta understanding but to the fact that the Soviet Union broke the Sino-Soviet agreements and to the factors which had been discussed in detail before these committees.

Subsequent to the Yalta Conference certain events took place during the late winter and spring of 1945.

The Hurley Mission

At the end of February, Ambassador Hurley, who was then United States Ambassador to China, returned to Washington for consultation. He has testified that he saw President Roosevelt on two occasions in March and that Roosevelt instructed him to go to London and attempt to ameliorate the Yalta understanding. (*Printed Record*, pt. 4, p. 2885). It does not appear that Ambassador Hurley correctly recalls the facts.

I am convinced that President Roosevelt's concern after Yalta was to see to it that friendly relations were developed between the Soviet Union and the National Government of China.

Ambassador Hurley came through Moscow on his way to Chungking in April. He stayed with me during his visit. At no time did he indicate to me that President Roosevelt was disturbed about the understanding reached at Yalta or that he desired that this understanding be ameliorated. On the contrary, the purpose of Ambassador Hurley's visit to Moscow, as he stated it to me and to Stalin, was to find out from Stalin when Chiang could be told about the Yalta understanding and to help further cement the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government.

This is revealed by the report which Ambassador Hurley sent to the Secretary of State on the meeting which he and I had with Stalin and Molotov on the night of April 15. . . .

[Here follows the full paraphrased text of the report, dated Apr. 17. See U.S.R.C., p. 94.]

With regard to the last paragraph of the telegram, Stalin said he preferred to delay discussion of the Yalta understanding with Chiang for about 2 months longer and Hurley agreed.

I returned to the United States to report to President Truman immediately after the conversation with Stalin and before Ambassador

Hurley's report was prepared and dispatched. On April 19 I discussed Ambassador Hurley's report with E. F. Stanton of the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the Department of State. . . .

[Here follows a summary of Mr. Stanton's memorandum of that conversation. See U.S.R.C., p. 97.]

As a result of this conversation, the Secretary of State on April 23 instructed Ambassador Hurley in Chungking not to present his talk with Stalin in too optimistic a light to Chiang Kai-shek.

In a cable to President Truman from Chungking on May 10, 1945, Ambassador Hurley outlined in some detail his conception of the mission which he had been given by President Roosevelt in March. There is nothing in this cable which indicates that Roosevelt had instructed Ambassador Hurley to attempt to ameliorate the Yalta understanding. The paraphrased text of the cable is as follows:

Knowing the great strain under which you must be working I have hesitated to burden you with problems by which we are confronted here. In my last conference with President Roosevelt he entrusted me with two specific missions in addition to my duties as Ambassador to China. The first mission was to bring Churchill and Stalin to an agreement on the policy that the United States has been pursuing in China. Namely (1) to take all necessary action to bring about unification under the National Government of all anti-Japanese armed forces in China. (2) To endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free united Democratic Chinese Government. (3) To continue to insist that China furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions and be responsible for her own policies and thus work out her own destiny in her own way. As you have no doubt been advised by the Secretary of State I obtained concurrence of Churchill and Stalin on the plan outlined. The British claim that the policy to which they now agree has always been British policy. This statement is incorrect. Roosevelt knew it was incorrect and that is why he sent me to London. We have conclusive evidence on this point which it now seems unnecessary to resubmit since agreement has been reached. The policy of all the South-east Asia Imperialist Governments was to keep China divided against herself. This policy would seem to have been altered now that the British and the Soviet have agreed to the Roosevelt policy in China.

The second mission entrusted to me by President Roosevelt in my last conference with him pertains to a decision affecting China reached at the Yalta Conference. Before my last visit to Washington and before I had been informed by the President of the Yalta decision pertaining to China including particularly the all-important prelude, the Generalissimo had discussed with me China's position on the same problems decided upon at Yalta and had given me his attitude relating to them. He gave me, at that time, an *aide mémoire* summarizing his position on some of the problems. Of course, the subject discussed in the prelude to the Yalta decision was not known to him and so far as I am concerned the matter has not yet been presented to him. Since my return we have continued to discuss the problems that would be involved in promoting future friendship and peace with Russia, without referring to the Yalta decision as such. All of the problems decided, except No. 1 in the prelude, have been raised by the Generalissimo and discussed fully with me. I am convinced that he will agree to every one of the requirements but will take exceptions to the use of two words "preeminent" and "lease." These two words

have had connotations in Chinese. They have been involved in the controversies over extra territoriality. These two words seem to impinge on the principles of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China. Both Roosevelt and Stalin advised me that it was agreed between them that I would not open the subject of the Yalta decision with Chiang Kai-shek until the signal was given me by Stalin. Stalin said he would give me carte blanche and let me use my own judgment as to when and how to present the subject. However, both Harriman and I were of the opinion that it would be best to delay the presentation because of the possibility of leakage which in turn might bring undesirable results. I explained this to Stalin and it was finally decided that I am not to present the subject to Chiang Kai-shek until we have advised Stalin that, in our opinion, the time is opportune and until we have received the signal from him. I want to emphasize to you that prior to my recent visit to Washington I had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek all phases of the Chinese-Russian problem before we knew what was contained in the Yalta Agreement, and since coming back to Chungking we have again thoroughly covered the same subjects without alluding to the primary subject. We are therefore in a position to proceed with dispatch on the Yalta Agreement when we are authorized to submit the particulars thereof to the Generalissimo. My purpose in wiring you this report is to give you the foregoing brief and somewhat cryptic outline of the situation and at the same time advise you that the Generalissimo has received telegrams from the Chinese Ambassador at Washington summarizing all of the items decided at Yalta except the primary one. The Chinese Ambassador's recitations of the various items are not all correct although he states that he got the various points in conversation with President Roosevelt. The Chinese Ambassador has indicated that the United States will join as a third party in the agreement between Russia and China on the various instrumentalities described. No such participation is indicated in the Yalta decision. In addition to this the Chinese Government yesterday received a cable from a Chinese representative in Switzerland which reports movements of troops that we know are taking place and which indicate Russia's intent. The Chinese Government also has other information of movements and plans from which they have concluded that the object referred to in the prelude of the Yalta decision is definitely expected to happen. From the reports the Chinese are now receiving and with what they already know it is reasonable to expect them to reach approximately correct conclusions on this subject. It is of utmost importance that the Generalissimo as head of a state vitally concerned should be informed officially and in an appropriate straight forward manner becoming the character of the United States when the time is propitious. This information could and probably would have been given to him some time ago were it not for the lack of security associated with China. It now appears desirable that you discuss this situation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State to determine when you should direct me to ask Stalin for his approval of the time when I am to officially inform Chiang Kai-shek. Telling Chiang Kai-shek and asking him to clamp down secrecy which no doubt he would do to the best of his ability would I believe keep the secret from the enemy longer than it will be kept by letting the Chinese continue to conjecture publicly on the facts that come to their knowledge from other sources. The American Theater Commander is familiar with the contents of this message.

With regard to Ambassador Hurley's comments on the words "preeminent" and "lease" in the Yalta understanding, I can personally state that neither Roosevelt nor Stalin intended that the phrase "preeminent interests" should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports to and imports from the Soviet Union. President

Roosevelt had told me at Yalta that this was his interpretation and, when I took this position with Stalin in August 1945, he agreed. As to the lease on Port Arthur, Roosevelt looked upon this as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States had negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations.

The problem of China and the Soviet intentions in the Far East was also discussed during Mr. Hopkins' special mission to Moscow in May 1945. During a conversation which he and I had with Stalin on May 28 I brought the matter up and Stalin reaffirmed his support of a unified and stable China which would control all of Manchuria. Stalin reiterated that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims against China and stated that he would support the open-door policy. He said he would also welcome representatives of Chiang to be with his troops when they entered Manchuria in order to facilitate the establishment there of administration by the Chinese National Government.

Soviet Role in Invasion of Japan

Soviet participation in the war against Japan was again discussed at the Potsdam Conference which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945. It will be recalled that although the first and only atomic bomb experimental explosion had been successfully concluded on July 16, the bomb had not yet been used against Japan. During the conference, Stalin informed President Truman of peace feelers which he had received from the Japanese Government. These were of such a character as to be unacceptable.

At Potsdam, more than 5 months after Yalta, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still planning an invasion of the Japanese home islands and still considered Soviet participation in the Pacific war essential. On July 24, 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported to the President and the Prime Minister that their over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific was as follows:

In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff also stated:

The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.

They went on to say that our policy should be to:

Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.

On the basis of this over-all plan, extensive discussions were carried on with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff for the attack on Manchuria by the Soviet forces about 2 months prior to landings by U.S. forces on the Japanese home islands.

Efforts Toward Soviet-Chinese Understanding

In the meantime the Chinese Government had been informed of the Yalta understanding. In Washington on June 9, President Truman had discussed with T. V. Soong, Premier of the Chinese National Government, the provisions of the understanding, including the promise of Stalin to conclude a treaty of friendship with the National Government of China. On June 14 President Truman saw Soong again and told him of the renewed assurances Stalin had given Hopkins and myself in Moscow to support the National Government of China under Chiang. Soong expressed his gratification. On June 15 Ambassador Hurley informed Chiang of the Yalta understanding and also communicated to him Stalin's renewal of his assurances regarding China's sovereignty in Manchuria and his support of a unified and stable China and of the open-door policy.

By this time it had been agreed that negotiations would start promptly in Moscow between China and the Soviet Union regarding the matters dealt with in the Yalta understanding. T. V. Soong arrived in Moscow at the end of June 1945. Negotiations were conducted between Stalin and Molotov, on the one hand, and Soong, on the other. They were interrupted by the Potsdam Conference, but were resumed early in August, at which time Soong was joined by Wang Shi-chieh, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese National Government.

Stalin, at the outset, made demands that went substantially beyond the Yalta understanding. While Soong was not prepared to accede to all of these demands, he made it clear to me that his Government was anxious to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union, and to this end he was prepared to make concessions which we considered went beyond the Yalta understanding.

At no time did Soong give me any indication that he felt the Yalta understanding was a handicap in his negotiations. I repeatedly urged him not to give in to Stalin's demands. At the same time, during this period, I had several talks with Stalin and Molotov in which I insisted that the Soviet position was not justified. This action I took on instructions from Washington. Also, on instructions, I informed Soong that the United States would consider that any concessions which went beyond our interpretation of the Yalta understanding, would be made because Soong be-

lieved they would be of value in obtaining Soviet support in other directions. Soong told me that he thoroughly understood and accepted the correctness of this position. The fact is that, in spite of the position I took, Soong gave in on several points in order to achieve his objectives.

Events moved swiftly during the early days of August. On August 6 the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and on August 9 another on Nagasaki. On August 8 the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. On August 10 Japan sued for peace through the Swiss Government and on August 14 an armistice was arranged. On that day a series of agreements between the Soviet Union and China, including a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, were concluded. They were ratified by the Chinese Government on August 24, 1945, and were made public at that time. The texts of these agreements are set forth on pages 585-596 of the volume entitled *United States Relations with China*. . . .

[Here follows a summary of the agreements. See U.S.R.C., p. 117.]

Of prime importance is article V of the Treaty of Friendship which reads as follows:

The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party.

Supplementing this provision an exchange of notes between Molotov and Wang specified:

In accordance with the spirit of the aforementioned Treaty, and in order to put into effect its aims and purposes, the Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be *entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China*. (Italics supplied.)

Soong told me in Moscow he was gratified at the results obtained and expressed his gratitude for the active support the United States had given him in his negotiations. Ambassador Hurley informed the Secretary of State on August 16 from Chungking that Chiang Kai-shek was "generally satisfied with the treaty." Ambassador Hurley went on to state that at his suggestion, Chiang had invited Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist party to a conference in Chungking. His cable concluded by stating that "Chiang Kai-shek will now have an opportunity to show realistic and generous leadership." On September 6, Ambassador Hurley cabled the Department of State that: "The publication of these documents has demonstrated conclusively that the Soviet Government supports the National Government of China and also that the two governments are in agreement regarding Manchuria." . . .

Nothing that was done at Yalta contributed to the loss of control over China by Chiang Kai-shek.

The Yalta understanding was implemented by the Sino-Soviet agreements, which had they been carried out by Stalin, might have saved the Chinese National Government. The inability of the Chinese National Government to maintain control over China was due to the fact that the Sino-Soviet agreements were not honored by Stalin, and to other factors which have been dealt with before these committees in great detail.

I do not believe that it would serve a useful purpose for me to discuss the subsequent course of events in China, as they have been testified to at length in these hearings by others who had direct contact with these matters.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I want to reemphasize the objectives that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill sought to achieve in their relations with the Soviet Union during the war.

Their primary objective was to maintain Russia as an effective fighting ally. This problem in itself gave grave concern, not only as to the military capabilities of the Soviet forces, but also as to whether the Kremlin would make separate arrangements with Hitler and leave the Western Allies stranded. The building of mutual confidence in the conduct of the war was not an easy task. But the fact remains that Russia was an effective fighting ally, and carried out vital military undertakings against Hitler.

In addition, Roosevelt and Churchill sought to lay a foundation during the war for cooperation to maintain world peace by all nations, including the Soviet Union, and to find solutions to specific problems which would result from the war, particularly with regard to the treatment of those countries which would be occupied by the Red army. No one was under any illusions about the difficulties that we would encounter. Nevertheless, step by step, Soviet leaders subscribed to principles which culminated in the formation of the United Nations. They entered into agreements designed to dispose of many specific problems. The carrying out of these commitments would have gone a long way toward achieving Roosevelt's objective of a peaceful world. The postwar difficulties stem from the fact that Stalin did not carry out his commitments and from the fact that the Soviet Union has failed to live up to the Charter of the United Nations.

Some people claim that we "sold out" to the Soviet Union at Yalta. If this were true, it is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union has gone to such lengths to violate the Yalta understandings. The fact is that these violations have been the basis of our protests against Soviet actions since the end of the war. There would have been a sell-out if Roosevelt and Churchill had failed to bend every effort to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and had permitted

the Red army to occupy vast areas, without attempting to protect the interests of people in those areas.

Only by keeping our military forces in being after Germany and Japan surrendered could we have attempted to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw from the territory which it controlled and to live up to its commitments. The people of the United States and the war-weary people of Europe were in no mood to support such an undertaking. This country certainly erred in its rapid demobilization in 1945, but this is an error for which the entire American people must share the responsibility. I cannot believe that anyone seriously thinks that the move to bring the boys home could have been stopped. I still recall my grave concern when I was in Moscow at the cold reception the Congress gave to President Truman's recommendation for universal military training in the fall of 1945.

The most difficult question to answer is why Stalin took so many commitments which he subsequently failed to honor. There can be no clear answer to this question. I believe that the Kremlin had two approaches to their postwar policies and in my many talks with Stalin I felt that he himself was of two minds. One approach emphasized reconstruction and development of Russia, and the other external expansion.

On the one hand they were discussing possible understandings with us which would lead to peaceful relations and result in increased trade and loans from the West for the reconstruction of the terrible devastation left in the wake of the war. If they had carried out this program, they would have had to soft-pedal for the time at least the Communist designs for world domination—much along the lines of the policies they had pursued between the two wars.

On the other hand we had constant difficulties with them throughout the war and they treated us with great suspicion. Moreover, there were indications that they would take advantage of the Red army occupation of neighboring countries to maintain control, and they were supporting Communist Parties in other countries to be in a position to seize control in the postwar turmoil.

The Kremlin chose the second course. It is my belief that Stalin was influenced by the hostile attitude of the peoples of Eastern Europe toward the Red army, and that he recognized that governments established by free elections would not be "friendly" to the Soviet Union. In addition, I believe he became increasingly aware of the great opportunities for Soviet expansion in the postwar economic chaos. After our rapid demobilization, I do not think that he conceived that the United States would take the firm stand against Soviet aggression that we have taken the past 5 years.

The one great thing accomplished by our constant efforts during and since the war to reach a settlement with the Soviet Union is that we have firmly established our moral position before the world. Had these efforts not been made, many people of the free world would still be wondering whether we and not the Kremlin were to blame for the tensions that have developed. The fact that the Soviet Union did not live up to its undertakings made clear the duplicity and the aggressive designs of the Kremlin. This fact has provided the rallying point for the free world in their collective effort to build their defenses and to unite against aggression.

W. A. HARRIMAN.

Subscribed and sworn to this 13th day of July, 1951.

PERCY E. NELSON,
Notary Public.

Continued Efforts Urged Against Soviet Propaganda

Message of the President to the Congress

[Released to the press by the White House August 21]

On June 26, 1951, the Congress passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 11, reaffirming the friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union. On July 7, in accordance with the request of the Congress, I transmitted the resolution to His Excellency Nikolai Mikhailovitch Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together

with a request that the Soviet Government make the contents of this resolution known to the Soviet peoples.

For a month there was no reply to my letter, nor was the resolution made public in the Soviet Union. Then on August 6, I received a letter from President Shvernik, responding to mine and transmitting a resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the nature of a

reply to the concurrent resolution of the Congress. Both communications, of course, were immediately made public in the United States and were widely publicized by newspapers, magazines, and radio not only in this country but throughout the free world. On August 7, the Congressional resolution, together with my letter of transmittal, the reply from Mr. Shvernik and the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet were all printed in the Soviet Government's newspapers and read over the Soviet Government's radio. This belated publication, by the Soviet Government, of the Congressional resolution and my letter of transmittal was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the Voice of America was continuously broadcasting the text of these documents, and their existence could no longer be concealed from the peoples of the Soviet Union.

I am transmitting to the Congress herewith the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, together with the accompanying letter from Mr. Shvernik.¹

The publication of Senate Concurrent Resolution 11 in the Soviet Union, even though it was accompanied by the simultaneous publication of the official Soviet reply, marks a significant step forward in the struggle to penetrate the Iron Curtain with words of truth. Ordinarily, it is the policy of the Soviet Government not to permit its citizens to read anything that is contrary to the official propaganda line. In this case, the adoption of a resolution of friendship by the Congress of the United States, and the efforts of the Voice of America compelled the Soviet Government to modify its customary practices. Although the resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was obviously intended to offset and counteract the effect of the Congressional resolution, it is probable that the publication of the actual text of the latter had real effect on the minds of the Russian people.

It is clear, however, that the Soviet Government has not altered the character of its own propaganda and public statements concerning the United States. In the recent youth meeting in East Berlin,² we have seen a new intensification of the theme of hate for the United States and other members of the United Nations.

The arguments being made by the Soviet Government to justify its present policies are set forth in the text of the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and in Mr. Shvernik's letter to me. The Congress can readily recognize the errors and misrepresentations in these two documents.

I wish that I could report that these documents give substantial evidence that the Soviet Union

is prepared to modify its present policies and to take steps which will relieve present world tensions. Unfortunately, this is not the case. These documents give no assurance that there will be any changes in the hostile and expansionist policies of the Soviet Union, which now threaten world peace.

If the Government of the Soviet Union wants to make progress toward peace, it can stop flouting the authority of the United Nations, it can cease supporting armed aggression in defiance of the verdict of the United Nations, it can make constructive contributions toward establishing conditions of peace with Germany, Austria and Japan, it can refrain from employing force to maintain in other countries regimes which do not command the support of their people, it can cease supporting subversive movements in other countries, it can cease its distortion of the motives and actions of other peoples and governments, it can stop violating fundamental human rights and liberties, and it can join in good faith in the earnest effort to find means for reducing armaments and controlling atomic energy in the interests of peace.

Such acts would do far more than any words to show that the Soviet Union really wants peace.

Until we have concrete evidence that the Soviet Union has in fact changed its policies, I cannot advise the Congress to change the policies of the United States. I believe that the policies on which we are now embarked—to give every support to the constructive actions of the United Nations for peace, in Korea and elsewhere, to build our defenses and to join in building the defenses of the free world, and to contribute in every way we can to the growth and strengthening of free institutions around the world—I believe these are the policies most likely to bring about a change in the aggressive policies of the Soviet Government. Consequently, I urge that the Congress move ahead with the great program for national security and world peace that is now before it.

In particular, I urge the Congress to take all possible steps to open up channels of communications between this country and the peoples of the Soviet Union, and other peoples behind the Iron Curtain.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 11 has opened at least a crack in the Iron Curtain and the Congress deserves the thanks of free people everywhere for this action. We should now make every possible constructive use of this small opening in the barrier which the Soviet Government has raised up against all free communication between its peoples and the outside world. If we do so, we may be able to show the Soviet peoples our real desire for peace and our genuine efforts in that direction. We may be able to dispel, at least in part, the distorted image of ourselves which is conveyed to them by Soviet propaganda.

For my part, I shall answer President Shvernik's letter in the near future. I shall ask that

¹ For text of letter and resolution see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 294.

² For discussion of the East Berlin Festival, see *Communist Festival for Youth*, Department of State publication 4325.

ny reply, like the Congressional resolution, be made public in the Soviet Union.

It is of immense importance to communicate the truth about the purposes and intentions of the United States to the peoples of the Soviet Union, as well as to all other peoples under the domination or the threat of domination of Soviet imperialism. Therefore, in addition to my letter, I intend to explore all other means that will help to make such communication possible.

I urge the Congress to do all it can to contribute to this vital endeavor. Adequate appropriations for the Campaign of Truth, including the Voice of America, are essential. I have requested an appropriation of \$115,000,000 for this purpose in this fiscal year. The House of Representatives has reduced this to \$85,000,000. Such action as this is obviously inconsistent with the purposes of Senate Concurrent Resolution 11. If the Congress expects to be successful in the battle for men's minds, it must support a sustained and consistent campaign for that purpose.

A slash in funds for the Voice of America, coming at this time, would have the effect of severely damaging our efforts to reach the hearts and minds of other peoples. It would mean retreat in the face of the mounting world-wide pressures of communist propaganda. In the light of our present situation, I hope the Congress will restore the full amount needed for our Campaign of Truth.

I trust the Congress will also consider in what other ways it can assist in correcting Soviet distortions of the facts and in furthering our campaign to reach other peoples with true and accurate information.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 20, 1951

Text of Senate Concurrent Resolution 11

WHEREAS the goal of the American people is now, and ever has been, a just and lasting peace; and

WHEREAS the deepest wish of our Nation is to join with all other nations in preserving the dignity of man, and in observing those moral principles which alone lend meaning to his existence; and

WHEREAS, in proof of this, the United States has offered to share all that is good in atomic energy, asking in return only safeguards against the evil in the atom; and

WHEREAS the Congress reaffirms its policy as expressed in law "to continue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter and agreements to achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and evasion"; and

WHEREAS this Nation has likewise given of its substance and resources to help those peoples ravaged by war and poverty; and

WHEREAS terrible danger to all free peoples compels the United States to undertake a vast program of armaments expenditures; and

WHEREAS we rearm only with reluctance and would prefer to devote our energies to peaceful pursuits: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States reaffirms the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, and declares—

That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the people of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples, and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood; and

That the American people believe the Soviet Government could advance the cause of peace immeasurably by removing those artificial barriers, thus permitting the free exchange of information between our peoples; and

That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war; and

That, although they are firmly determined to defend their freedom and security, the American people welcome all honorable efforts to resolve the differences standing between the United States Government and the Soviet Government and invite the peoples of the Soviet Union to cooperate in a spirit of friendship in this endeavor; and

That the Congress request the President of the United States to call upon the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to acquaint the peoples of the Soviet Union with the contents of this resolution.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Providing for the Control by the United States and Cooperating Foreign Nations of Exports to any Nation or Combination of Nations Threatening the Security of the United States Including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the Countries Under Its Domination. H. Rept. 703, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 4550] 17 pp.

Terminating the State of War Between the United States and the Government of Germany. H. Rept. 706, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 289] 13 pp.

Requesting Action to Free William N. Oatis by the Czechoslovak Government. H. Rept. 783, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. Con. Res. 140] 4 pp.

Authorizing Vessels of Canadian Registry to Transport Grain Between United States Ports on the Great Lakes During 1951. H. Rept. 787, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3436] 3 pp.

Suspending the Import Duties on Lead. H. Rept. 802, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 4948] 3 pp.

Authorizing the President to Proclaim Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. H. Rept. 807, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 5013] 8 pp.

Recommendations Supplementing the Provisions of S. 984. Message from the President of the United States transmitting recommendations supplementing the provisions of S. 984, an act relating to the recruitment and employment of agricultural workers from Mexico. H. Doc. 192, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 5 pp.

Continued on p. 402

Great Britain and Iran Suspend Oil Negotiations

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House August 23]

I have been most disappointed to learn of the suspension of the negotiations in Tehran between the British delegation and the Iranian Government which we had hoped would lead to a settlement of the Iranian oil question.

Since these conversations have been suspended rather than completely broken off, it remains my hope that a solution will eventually be found agreeable to both parties. It has been clear during the course of negotiations that both Iran and Great Britain sincerely desire a settlement, and, in view of this fact, I am confident that an arrangement can ultimately be worked out.

Mr. Harriman has worked long and tirelessly in an effort to bring the parties together and to set the stage for a settlement, and his activities have had my complete support. His letter to Prime Minister Mosadeq of August 21 summarizes very clearly the American point of view on the steps which led to the suspension of the conversations and the views that Mr. Harriman put forward reflect my own.

Italian Prime Minister To Visit U.S.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press August 22]

At the invitation of the Government of the United States, Alcide De Gasperi, President of the Council of Ministers and also Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, will visit this country following his attendance at the September meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa. In his dual capacity as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. De Gasperi will meet with the President, with me, and with other officials of this Government to discuss problems of mutual interest.

I look forward with real pleasure to seeing Mr. De Gasperi when he comes to the United States.

Through the difficult years since his rise to the position of Italy's First Minister he has faced many trying problems with a courage, patience, and wisdom that have justified the great esteem in which he is held. He has guided the course of his country's rehabilitation with leadership of the highest order.

U.S., Israel Sign Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation

[Released to the press August 23]

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Israel was signed today at Washington. The Secretary of State signed for this Government and Ambassador Abba Eban for Israel. The treaty is subject to ratification by both Governments before it will become effective.

The treaty establishes a set of advanced principles to govern basic economic relations between the two countries and to serve as a practical means of directing the future development of those relations along mutually beneficial lines. Like other comprehensive modern treaties of this kind, such as those concluded in recent years with Colombia, Ireland, Uruguay, Italy, and Greece, the treaty deals in considerable detail with a wide range of subject matter. In brief, however, each of the two Governments (1) agrees to accord, within its territories to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to most business activities; (2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons and their property and interests which reflect enlightened constitutional and legal principles; (3) affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping; and (4) in broad terms provides for the juridical conditions favorable to private investment designed to promote economic development.

The treaty marks a major step in bringing toward completion with Israel the pattern of formal arrangements through which nations customarily provide for the orderly conduct of economic intercourse with one another. To this end, the United States has already concluded several economic agreements with Israel. In contrast, however, to the broad provisions of the new treaty, these agreements deal primarily with specialized technical subjects, such as the air transport and copyright agreements concluded in 1950 and the general agreement on technical cooperation, which was entered into in February of this year. In addition, representatives of the two Governments are currently engaged in technical discussions looking toward the conclusion of agreements for the avoidance of double taxation.

Copies of the text of the treaty will be made available as soon as possible.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Japanese Peace Treaty

RESPONSES TO INVITATION

Released to the press August 21]

As of August 20 the following countries have accepted the invitation of the United States to attend the conference for the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. They are:

Australia	Japan
Belgium	Liberia
Brazil	Mexico
Ceylon	New Zealand
Colombia	Nicaragua
Costa Rica	Norway
Cuba	Pakistan
Dominican Republic	Panama
Ecuador	Paraguay
El Salvador	Poland
Ethiopia	Turkish Republic
Greece	Union of South Africa
Guatemala	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Haiti	United Kingdom
Honduras	Venezuela
Iran	
Iraq	

In addition to those countries which have formally accepted, 10 others have indicated that they will attend.

The conference will convene on September 4 at 5:45 p. m., p. d. t., in the War Memorial Municipal Opera House in San Francisco's Civic Center. Secretary Acheson, as chairman of the delegation of the host Government, will preside over the opening session as temporary president of the conference until a permanent president is elected by the conference. Following the formal opening, Mayor Elmer Robinson of San Francisco will say a few words of welcome to the visiting delegations followed by a similar greeting on behalf of the State of California by Gov. Earl Warren. Secretary Acheson will then present President Truman who will deliver the principal address. After the appointment of a committee on credentials, the opening session will adjourn.

The Mayor of San Francisco has established

a Citizens Committee under the chairmanship of Michel Weill to take charge of local hospitality on behalf of the city. William J. Losh has been named Executive Secretary of this committee. The city has kindly made available for the use of the conference its fine Opera House and some office space for the conference secretariat in the adjacent Veteran's Building.

As host, the U. S. Government will provide the international secretariat for the conference. Dr. Warren Kelchner, Chief of the Division of International Conferences of the Department of State has been designated Secretary General of the conference.

Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, has been designated Press and Public Relations Officer for the conference and will be responsible for the accreditation of members of the press, both foreign and domestic.

The offices of the secretariat will be located in the Veteran's War Memorial Building which is also in the Civic Center.

JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL RIDGWAY EXCHANGE VIEWS

[Released simultaneously by the Departments of State and Defense, and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers August 21]

The Department of State and the Department of Defense today made public the following exchange of correspondence concerning the Japanese Peace Treaty between Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan and Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo:

JULY 13, 1951

DEAR GENERAL:

On the occasion of the publication of the text of the draft Japanese Peace Treaty I desire to convey to you the profound sense of gratification

September 3, 1951

and gratitude on my part of the Japanese Government.

This is an event that marks a definite advance toward the consummation of a peace settlement for Japan, which has been consistently and vigorously advocated by your headquarters during these years past.

Now that we are nearing our goal, we look to you and your headquarters for continued assistance and guidance, which will be given, I trust, as freely and generously as ever.

Yours sincerely,

SHIGERU YOSHIDA

JULY 19, 1951

DEAR MR. YOSHIDA:

Thank you for your letter of July 13 expressing your gratification and gratitude, and that of the Japanese Government, for the provisions of the draft Japanese Peace Treaty.

The publication of the text of this treaty draft does indeed mark a definite advance toward the consummation of an early and just peace for your country. It brings measurably closer the restoration to Japan of full autonomy and the reassumption by the Japanese nation of their full rights and responsibilities among the free and honorable nations of the world.

I believe I but express the sentiments of my people when I state that I view these provisions with no less gratification, and with the expectation that the proven great talents of the Japanese people and their rich cultural past shall, in the years ahead, make notable contributions to the objectives toward which the free world is so earnestly striving.

The present text is the result of the labors of many distinguished persons, both here and elsewhere, notably among them General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Ambassador John Foster Dulles, the personal representative of the President of the United States.

I should like, with your approval, to feel free to convey your message to those of them whom I can reach, and subject to the pleasure of my government, to the American people.

In conclusion, I wish to assure you that such continued assistance and guidance as my staff and I may be capable of giving will be freely and gladly available to you and to your government.

Sincerely,

M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army

JULY 19, 1951

DEAR GENERAL:

I am in receipt of your note of today's date in reply to my letter of July 13, in which I expressed the gratification and gratitude of my government

and myself on the occasion of the publication of the draft Japanese Peace Treaty.

You say you would like to convey my message to other persons you can reach, and subject to the pleasure of your government, to the American people.

I shall be very happy and grateful if you will do that. In fact, I myself would have addressed a word of appreciation directly to the American Government and people but for the consideration of the question of propriety of such an act on my part.

Yours sincerely,

SHIGERU YOSHIDA

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

[Released to the press August 24]

On July 20, 1951, the White House announced the delegates and alternate delegates named by the President to represent the United States, respectively, at the Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Signing of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and the Signing of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan.¹

Subsequent to the foregoing announcement several of the alternate delegates have found that it will be impossible to attend.-- The President has approved the following substitutions:

CONFERENCE FOR CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF PEACE WITH JAPAN:

Robert B. Chipfield vice John M. Vorys, both members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SIGNING OF THE SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES:

Abraham A. Ribicoff vice Mike Mansfield, both members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SIGNING OF THE SECURITY TREATY WITH JAPAN:

Overton Brooks vice Carl Vinson, both members of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives.

The complete delegation to the Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace with Japan, to be held at San Francisco beginning on September 4, 1951, follows:

Delegates:

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, *Chairman*.
John Foster Dulles
Tom Connally, United States Senate.
Alexander Wiley, United States Senate.

Alternate Delegates:

John J. Sparkman, United States Senate.
H. Alexander Smith, United States Senate.
Walter F. George, United States Senate.

¹ BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 187.

Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senate.
James P. Richards, House of Representatives.
Robert B. Chipfield, House of Representatives.

Advisers

John M. Allison, Deputy to Mr. Dulles, Department of State
C. Stanton Babcock, Colonel, U.S.A., Office of Occupied Areas, Department of the Army
Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State
James H. Burns, Major General, U.S.A. (retired), Department of the Army
Myron Melvin Cowen, Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines
Joseph M. Dodge, Financial Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Financial Adviser to the Secretary of the Army
C. George Doyle, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A.F., Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Policy Division, International Branch, Office of the Director of Plans, Department of Air Force
John C. Dreier, United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States
J. F. Enright, Commander, U.S.N., Head, Far Eastern Affairs Branch, Division of International Affairs, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Department of Navy
Robert A. Fearey, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, *Technical Secretary*
A. L. Hamblen, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Special Assistant for Occupied Areas, Department of the Army
Maxwell M. Hamilton, United States Representative and Chairman, Far Eastern Commission
Donald R. Heath, Minister to the Kingdoms of Cambodia, Laos, and State of Vietnam
Noel Hemmendinger, Officer in Charge for Economic Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
Earl D. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army
U. Alexis Johnson, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
Carter B. Magruder, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, for Program, Department of the Army
Stanley D. Metzger, Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State
Frank Nash, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Edwin Plitt, Adviser on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State
John D. Rockefeller, 3d, Member of Dulles Special Mission to Japan, Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y.
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Livingston Satterthwaite, Deputy Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
William J. Sebald, United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo
Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate
Laurin L. Williams, Brigadier General, U.S.A., Controller, General Headquarters, Far East Command, Tokyo
Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense

Congressional Observers

Richard B. Russell, chairman, subcommittee on agriculture, Member of Appropriations Committee, United States Senate; alternate delegate on the United States delegation to sign the security treaty with Japan
Pat McCarran, chairman, State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations; chairman, Judiciary Committee; United States Senate

Styles Bridges, ranking minority member of the Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services, U.S. Senate; alternate delegate on the United States delegation to sign the security treaty with Japan

Dewey Short, ranking minority member, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives; alternate delegate on the United States delegation to sign the security treaty with Japan

Earl Stefan, ranking minority member, State, Justice, Commerce and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

Overton Brooks, member, Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives; alternate delegate on the United States delegation to sign the security treaty with Japan

Walter H. Judd, member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; alternate delegate on the United States delegation to sign the security treaty with Australia and New Zealand

John J. Rooney, chairman, State, Justice, Commerce and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

Abraham A. Ribicoff, member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives; alternate delegate on the United States delegation to sign the security treaty with Australia and New Zealand

Executive Secretary:

Clarke L. Willard, Associate Chief, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Press and Public Affairs Officers

Lloyd Allen Lehrbas, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State

W. Bradley Connors, Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Special Assistants to the Chairman

Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Philander P. Claxton, Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State

Marshall D. Shulman, Office of the Secretary of State

Assistant Technical Secretary

Melvin L. Manfull, Acting Chief, Policy Reports Staff, Department of State

Administrative Secretary

Ralph J. Ribble, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Documents Officer

Wallace R. Lampshire, Committee Secretariat Staff, Department of State.

INDIA REFUSES TO BE PARTY TO TREATY

Indian Note of August 23

[Released to the press August 25]

I am desired to convey to you the following reply on behalf of the Government of India to your Government's invitation to participate in a conference to conclude a treaty of peace with Japan to be convened on September 4, 1951, in San Francisco.

1. The Government of India have the honour to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the reply of the Government of the United States of America to the representations which they had made on the Japanese Peace Treaty in their communication dated July 30, 1951. They fully appreciate the consideration given to their views by the United States Government and wish to assure them that the present reply is conceived in a spirit of frankness and sincere friendship for Government and people of the United States of America.

2. Throughout the negotiations that have taken place between the two Governments on the subject of the treaty the Government of India have laid emphasis upon two fundamental objectives:

(I) The terms of the Treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality, and contentment among the community of free nations;

(II) They should be so framed as to enable all countries specially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the Treaty sooner or later.

The Government of India have after most careful thought come to the conclusion that the Treaty does not in material respects satisfy either of these two criteria.

3. Condition (I)

(a) It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire the restoration in full of her sovereignty over territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country. The Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands fully satisfy this description. Nevertheless the Treaty proposes that until United States Government seek and obtain trusteeship over these Islands they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the United States. It is apparent to the Government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East.

(b) The Government of India recognise that as a sovereign nation Japan should have the right to make arrangements for her defence as provided in Article 5 of the Treaty. If in exercise of this right Japan should decide to enter into defensive agreements with a friendly power no one could reasonably object to this. But the right should be exercised by the Government of Japan when Japan has become truly sovereign. A provision in the Treaty which suggests that the present occupation force may stay on in Japan as part of such a defensive agreement is bound to give rise to the impression that the agreement does not represent a decision taken by Japan in the full enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation. The effect of this not only on the people of Japan but upon large sections of people in Asia is bound to be most unfortunate.

4. Condition (II)

As already stated the Government of India attach the greatest importance to the Treaty providing that the Island of Formosa should be returned to China. The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations but to leave the future of the Island undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of Japan with all Governments that were engaged in the last war against her does not appear to the Government of India to be either just or expedient. *Mutatis mutandis* the same argument applies to the Kurile Islands and to South Sakhalin.

5. For foregoing reasons, the Government of India have decided, with regret, that they cannot be parties to the Treaty. It is their sincere hope that lasting peace will prevail in the Far East and, to that end, they will continue to cooperate with the United States Government and other Governments in such manner as may be open to them, consistently with the principles on which their foreign policy is based. As a first step, it is their intention, as soon as this may be practicable, to put an end to the state of war between them and Japan, and to establish full diplomatic relations with that country.

6. It has already been announced that the Conference convened at San Francisco to consider the draft Peace Treaty with Japan will not be open to negotiations, though attending Governments will be free to state their views on the Treaty. The Government of India feel that the statement of their views on the Treaty contained in this reply should be adequate to clarify their own position on the Conference. It is their intention, if the United States Government have no objection, to communicate this reply to their own Parliament which is now in session on August 27. Once the document has been published, it will be available for the information of the Conference, and the Government of India will be glad if the Government of the United States, which will act as host to the Conference, will have this reply circulated to its members. As, for reasons already stated, the Government of India will be unable to sign the Treaty, they think that it is not necessary for them to send representatives to it.

The Government of India would be glad to know if the United States Government have any objection to their informing our Parliament of this reply on Monday, August 27, 1951.

With assurances of my highest esteem,

M. K. KIRPALANI,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

The Honourable JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
*Consultant to the Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, D. C.*

U.S. Reply of August 25

[Released to the press August 25]

The Government of the United States has the honor to acknowledge the note of the Government of India of August 23, 1951, in reply to the explanations given by the Government of the United States to the Government of India under date of July 30, 1951, regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty.² The Government of the United States responds in the same spirit of frankness and friendship which, as the Government of India points out, animates its note of August 23.

1. The Government of the United States welcomes the expressed intention of the Government of India to put an end to the state of war between it and Japan and to establish diplomatic relations with that country. The overriding desire of the Government of the United States is peace in Asia. The Government of the United States believes that the peace will be more stable if it is founded on united action, just as victory involved united action and the occupation involved united action. However, the people of the United States will not feel that their efforts and sacrifices for victory in the Pacific have been in vain if they have made it possible for the Government of India to make peace with a Japan which is no longer a militaristic and aggressive threat.

2. The Government of the United States regrets that the Government of India feels that the pending treaty of peace has imperfections such that the Government of India prefers to make a separate peace. There can never be united action for peace unless the nations are willing to accept what, to each, may seem imperfections.

3. In its specification of imperfections the Government of India suggests that the treaty of peace will not provide Japan with a "position of honor, equality, and contentment among the community of free nations." This suggestion greatly surprises the Government of the United States. From the beginning the announced goal of the United States has been to restore Japan to just such a position. It is the belief of the Government of the United States, shared by the Government and people of Japan and of many other states, that the pending treaty to an unprecedented degree achieves that goal.

For example, the Prime Minister of Japan in a letter of July 13, 1951, to John Foster Dulles written on the occasion of calling the San Francisco Conference said:

I am grateful that we have been consulted and given a full opportunity to submit our views and desires, and moreover that these have been in a large measure incorporated in the draft treaty.

The treaty, as it stands, reflects abundantly American fairness, magnanimity and idealism.

The Government of the United States doubts

² Not here printed.

that the Government of India has fully understood and taken into account the views of the Government and people of Japan.

4. The Government of India further suggests that the treaty is not so framed as to enable all countries especially interested in the maintenance of stable peace in the Far East, to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later.

The treaty makes provision for multilateral signature now and obligates Japan to conclude similar treaties with all countries not now signatory who are parties to the U.N. Declaration of January 1, 1942. The Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States, sponsors of the present text, and the many other Allied Powers which have cooperated to produce that text, have gone to great pains to assure that the treaty will be such as to enable all of the Allies to subscribe to it.

5. The Government of India suggests that the treaty should restore in full Japan's sovereignty "over territory of which the inhabitants have an historical affinity with her (Japan's) own people" and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country.

This principle would involve a major departure from the Potsdam surrender terms, which specified categorically that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four home islands and to such minor islands as the parties to the surrender proclamation might determine. The Government of India has never questioned these terms during the 5½ years during which India has served as a member of the Far Eastern Commission, which was established to insure the fulfillment of those terms. The principle now put forward by the Government of India would require the retention by Japan of full sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, and over the Ryukyu Islands. Yet, the Government of India criticizes the treaty provisions with reference to the Kurile Islands because it does not explicitly transfer full sovereignty to the Soviet Union and criticizes the provision with reference to the Ryukyus because, although it leaves sovereignty in Japan, it permits U.N. trusteeship with the United States as administering authority.

The Government of the United States finds it difficult to understand how the Government of India can be confident that future arrangements regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the terms of which are not yet formulated, will hereafter "be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people." Nor does the Government of the United States understand why the Government of India applies such different tests as between the Kuriles and the Ryukyus.

6. The Government of India objects because the treaty gives Japan the right to prevent its becoming an indefensible nation between the date of the coming into force of the treaty of peace and the coming into force of some voluntary collective se-

curity arrangement. The Government of India suggests that the only way to prove that such a security arrangement is in fact voluntary is to subject Japan to the grave risk incident to a period of total defenselessness in close proximity to proved aggressors. There is no reason to believe that this is desired by the people of Japan or that it would promote the welfare of Japan for the treaty of peace to impose that grave hazard upon Japan.

The Government of the United States has gone to great lengths to ascertain that any security agreement which Japan seeks shall, in fact, be responsive to the will of the Japanese people. It would be quite impracticable and totally unwelcome for the United States to help to defend Japan if that were not wanted by the Japanese people. The statements of the Japanese Government and of the political leaders of the Diet, and manifold expressions of public opinion, all demonstrate that the Japanese do not want Japan to become a defenseless nation upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace. No less than 32 of the Allied Powers, all members of the United Nations, have freely made or are making collective security arrangements to which the United States is a party. It would, indeed, be surprising if the sentiment which has animated so many free peoples did not manifest itself also in Japan.

7. The Government of India states that the future of Formosa should not be left "undetermined." It suggests that the treaty should provide for the return of Formosa to China but that "the time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations." It would seem to the United States that a future disposition is "undetermined" if it depends upon future negotiations as to time and manner.

The Government of India must be fully aware that there cannot at the present time be any final agreement among the Allied Powers with respect to the future of Formosa. To insist that a Japanese peace treaty be deferred until there is such agreement is, in fact, to postpone indefinitely the restoration of Japan to "honor, equality and contentment among the community of free nations," which the Government of India agrees is an urgent requirement. Furthermore, the Government of the United States observes that the Government of India apparently does not intend itself to defer ending its state of war with Japan until the future of Formosa has been definitely dealt with.

8. The Government of the United States does not claim that the prospective treaty of peace is in every respect perfect. It involves adjustments such as are the inevitable accompaniment of any concerted human effort. The essential thing is that the treaty is a peace treaty and is drawn in terms which do not contain within themselves the seeds of another war. Delay would cost a price which makes petty all the sacrifices incident to present action. It would perpetuate the surrender terms which subject the Japanese Government to

the military rule of Allied Powers. If that subjection is continued after the occupation has served its legitimate and valid purposes the result is indistinguishable from colonialism and imperialism in vicious form. The United States does not want to be a party to colonialism or imperialism. That is why it strives so earnestly to achieve the best possible peace as promptly as possible. That is why it contributes so liberally to the rehabilitation of our former enemies as well as of our friends.

The Government of the United States regrets that the Government of India is not disposed to join this united effort for peace. However, the Government of the United States welcomes the assurances of the Government of India that, insofar as consistent with the principles on which its foreign policies are based, it will continue to cooperate with the U.S. Government and other governments to the end that lasting peace will prevail in the Far East. The Government of the United States hopes that these principles to which the Government of India alludes will permit of cooperation which is practical and fruitful for peace.

STATEMENT BY JOHN M. ALLISON¹

At some point in every battle report there comes a time to talk of *peace*, for peace is the ultimate objective of *all* battles and *all* wars. We now talk of peace with Japan. The United States has issued invitations to 53 nations to come on September 4 to San Francisco to conclude and sign a peace treaty with Japan. In cooperation with the United Kingdom a draft of a treaty has been forwarded to all of those nations and it will be before the delegates to that conference. It is not the product of any single person or single country. All the nations in the war against Japan have had an opportunity to make suggestions and many of them have done so. Everyone has had his say and now words must be translated into action.

After 6 years of occupation, Japan must be brought back as an equal, sovereign member of the family of nations. It is important to all of us that the 83 million Japanese with their vigor, their willingness to work, and their knowledge of modern industrial techniques be given an opportunity to contribute to the economic recovery and the political stability of Asia. It is important that Japan become a peaceful member of the free world, but this must be on a voluntary basis. The free world does not operate by compulsion. It does not want slaves. Only the free choice of the Japanese people to throw in their lot with the free world will be of importance. We do not want to, in fact we cannot, force them to do so.

¹ Made over the NBC-TV network program, "Battle Report" on Aug. 24 and released to the press on the same date. Mr. Allison is Deputy to John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary.

The treaty therefore which will be before us at San Francisco is a treaty of reconciliation, a treaty of opportunity. We have learned by bitter experience that treaties of vengeance, that treaties which impose upon the vanquished conditions which the victors would not accept themselves, become merely scraps of paper. The treaty we expect to sign at San Francisco is based on reality and on trust.

It is not perfect. Those of us most closely concerned with the development of the treaty know better than anyone else its faults. It is a human document bringing together the ideas of many men and many countries. No one, least of all the United States, will be perfectly satisfied. All nations who participated in drafting the treaty can see evidences of their work. All can agree that if not a perfect treaty, it is a good treaty.

Is Japan ready for a treaty of reconciliation and trust? Is Japan a democratic country, as we understand democracy? Only time can tell. We can point out that after 6 years of occupation, over 80 percent of the farmers of Japan own their own farms, while before the war the figures were

almost reversed; there are 6 million members of trade unions as against some 400,000 before the war; women now vote and take keen interest in politics; there is a free press; the Japanese Parliament is no longer a rubber stamp, but is made up of active representatives of the Japanese people. These are the results of the occupation which will last and make it possible for democracy to grow. Democracy cannot be imposed from without. It must come from within. We must give the Japanese the opportunity to let democracy grow.

The Soviet Union talks loudly and longly of peace, but when the time comes to *make peace* it draws back. It claims to be the champion of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism but when the time comes to make a great Asiatic nation free and through a peace treaty bring to an end the government of one people by another, it holds back. If *peace* is wanted, *here* is an opportunity to get it. The treaty we are inviting the nations to sign will restore peace. It gives Japan back to the Japanese. It threatens no one. We hope nations who *really* want peace will join with us in signing this treaty at San Francisco.

Armistice Negotiations in Korea

COMMUNIST CHARGES ON U.N. NEUTRALITY VIOLATIONS

Statement by Admiral Joy

The text of a letter, dated Aug. 22, by Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, senior United Nations delegate, to Gen. Nam Il, senior North Korean delegate, rejecting charges of neutrality violations, and a summary of enclosures sent with the letter:

[1] I make reference to your letter of 19 August, 1951, concerning an incident which occurred at Song-gang-ni during the morning of 19 August.

[2] An investigation of the incident in question was made immediately by Colonel Murray and Colonel Chang. A further exhaustive investigation has been completed by the commanding general, Eighth Army. These investigations show clearly that no United Nations Command forces were involved in the incident; rather that the attack on a Chinese Communist Forces patrol was carried out by a group of partisan irregulars, some of whom wore civilian clothing. No evidence exists that the irregular force which executed the ambush came to the scene of the clash from without the neutral zone. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that this irregular group were and had been for some time operating within the neutral zone. A summary of the investigation

establishing these points is attached. (Enclosure 1)

[3] As you are aware, your forces have been confronted with continuous partisan activity within the neutral zone.

During recent recorded discussions between our liaison officers, Colonel Chang stated to Colonel Kinnery that personnel within the neutral zone have distributed handbills opposing the armistice conferences and might even lay land mines in roads within the neutral zone.

Your liaison officer stated that your delegation personnel wished to keep personal arms with them at their residence within the neutral zone for their own protection.

It is quite clear, therefore, that partisan activities within the neutral zone have given you cause for concern. The responsibility for control of irregular partisan groups within the neutral zone is entirely yours.

It is for the purpose of maintaining order in the neutral zone that it has been agreed that you retain military police within the zone. The United Nations Command delegation believes, therefore, that the responsibility for any failure to maintain order in the neutral zone is yours alone. It appears that the formation of a joint inspection committee to examine into conditions within

the neutral zone is now even more strongly indicated than it was when I originally proposed such a committee on 14 August.

[4] In reference to the third and fourth paragraphs of your letter, in which you make loose and generalized allegations about previous incidents in the neutral zone and other matters, I have attached as enclosure 2 a summary of the investigation of an incident alleged to have occurred on 16 July. This summary shows that United Nations Command forces in no way violated the neutral zone. I have further appended, as enclosures 3, 4 and 5, copies of my replies to your letters relating to alleged violations occurring on 7 August, allegations which were again found to be without foundation in so far as United Nations Command forces were concerned.

Finally, since you continue to complain that your delegation vehicles are being attacked by United Nations Command aircraft, enclosure 5 shows that you have been previously informed by the United Nations Command delegation that your vehicles cannot be granted immunity lacking your prior notification to the United Nations Command of their time and route of movement. Enclosure 6 tells you this once again, and reminds you that the attitude of the United Nations Command on the question of immunity of your vehicles has been unchanged since the original presentation of it given you by Colonel Kinney through Colonel Chang on 7 July 1951.

SUMMARY OF ENCLOSURES

1. A ten-paragraph summary of the investigation of the Aug. 19 incident, supporting the foregoing letter from Admiral Joy.

2. A seven-paragraph summary of action taken with respect to the July 16 incident—in which the Communists accused the allies of firing into the neutral zone. The summary reviewed the evidence and rejected the charge.

3. A six-paragraph letter to General Nam Il, rejecting a Communist charge that allied patrols violated the neutral zone on Aug. 7.

4. A four-paragraph letter to General Nam Il, dated Aug. 14, suggesting a "standing bilateral Kaesong neutral zone committee" to make periodic inspection of the zones and conduct on-the-spot investigations of alleged incidents. This suggestion grew out of the nature of the Aug. 7 Communist charge. The Communists apparently rejected the suggestion, or else delayed action on it.

5. A two-paragraph letter to General Nam Il, dated Aug. 18, again rejecting the Communists' Aug. 7 charge and rejecting charges of air violations on Aug. 16.

6. A 150-word letter to General Nam Il, dated Aug. 22, reviewing the United Nations Command's insistence that Communist vehicles moving to and from Kaesong have no immunity from air attacks unless their schedules are given to the allies.

SUSPENSION OF PEACE TALKS¹

Statement of U.N. Commander

Following is the text of a statement by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, U.N. Commander, issued at midnight (10 a. m. August 23, eastern daylight time), on the Communist' break-off of the Korean armistice talks:

The report of the alleged bombing attack of the armistice conference site at Kaesong at 2320 hours 22 August, has been thoroughly investigated by the United Nations.

The commanding general, Far East Air Forces, at conclusion of his investigation, has reported as follows:

"No plane under Far East Air Forces control was over Kaesong at the time of the alleged attack."

The command, Naval Forces Far East, was also instructed to conduct investigations as were deemed necessary to insure that no naval aircraft could have participated in the operation allegedly occurring last night at Kaesong. He reported officially to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, as follows:

"Negative aircraft operating under Navy control over Korea night 22 August."

The United Nations Command liaison officers, Cols. A. J. Kenney, U. S. A. F., and J. C. Murray, U. S. M. C., conducted the on-the-spot investigation which failed to disclose any concrete evidence of an actual bombing by a United Nations aircraft. Their investigations revealed no scorched area which normally results from a napalm bomb detonation, nor any visible signs of a bomb crater which would have been caused by the alleged attack.

A flush-riveted piece of metal, which was identified by the Communist liaison officer as a part of the napalm bomb utilized in the attack, is not of the construction used by the United Nations command, as flush riveting is not employed in the manufacture of napalm tanks. They are of rough construction, more economically produced as they are used only once.

The United Nations Command liaison officers could discover but one individual who claimed to have been an eye-witness to the attack. He stated that the airplane he saw had its headlights on throughout the attack, which is not a practice engaged in by any U. N. C. [United Nations Command] aircraft during night operations.

The alleged bombing incident revealed no damage to any building, personnel, or crops in the area. Colonel Kinney, an experienced air officer, was certain that the hole twenty-four inches in diameter and twelve inches deep, pointed out to him by the

¹ This suspension of the peace talks is the second break-off since the peace talks were initiated on July 10, 1951. The first break-off occurred when the Communist North Koreans refused entry to U.N. professional newsmen at the conference area; see BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 151.

Communists as the result of impact, could not have been a bomb crater. Colonel Kinney agreed with Colonel Murray that this hole might have been the result of a hand grenade explosion pre-set in the ground.

As has been brought out before, the decision to declare all meetings "off from this time," which required a decision from a high level of command, could not have been arrived at and transmitted to Colonel Chang, Communist liaison officer, for delivery to United Nations Command liaison officers in the interval from 2320 on 22 August to 0145 on 23 August.

Text of Communist Protest

Following is the text of a protest sent on August 23 to General Ridgway by North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng Teh-huai, Chinese commander in Korea, as broadcast by the Peking radio:

While the blood of our heroic fighter, Yao Ching-hsiang, who fell a victim under the illegal killing by armed personnel of your side, is still warm, a plane of your side invaded over the meeting place in the Kaesong neutral zone at 10:20 p. m. Aug. 22 and carried out bombing and strafing which were aimed at the residence of our delegation.

Although our delegation was filled with indignation, it nevertheless notified your side at 10:35

p. m. to send personnel to investigate in order to make the truth of the events known to the whole world and to prevent any pretext on your side regarding the cause of the event as accidental.

Your liaison officers saw with their own eyes the craters made by bombs dropped by the airplane belonging to your side, bomb splinters and other items of evidence which proved that bombs were dropped a few hours previously and they could not but be silent.

In fact, even without the joint investigation of liaison officers of your side, the witnesses and items of evidence which we possessed already proved the undeniable provocative action by your side.

The reason why you unscrupulously dare to continue the provocations is because you have mistaken our patience in striving for peace as a sign of weakness.

You assumed we would not be willing to break off negotiations on account of these questions, therefore, you even went to the extent first of firing on Panmungol, then to murdering a military patrolman of our side, and lastly attempting to murder our delegation.

We must tell you that such considerations are wrong. We have patience in trying to secure peace but our patience has a limit. Moreover, we know that a one-sided desire for peace on our part can never produce results.

Outside the conference your side is trying to provoke incidents and in the conference you have pushed the demarcation line deep into our lines, trying to delay the peace talks by your fantastic proposal.

Hence we wish to ask: What is your attitude toward the peace talks?

We hope that the peace talks will be smoothly carried out and that both sides will come to a just and reasonable agreement. But your side has, after the murder of our patrol leader, attempted also to murder our delegates by bombing.

Hence our delegation cannot help suspending the peace talks from Aug. 23 so as to wait for your side to settle this serious incident in a responsible manner. Just think, if the neutral zone means nothing to you, and your side can at any time conduct murderous activities within it, how can our delegates, who are not armed, continue the talks?

You must realize that all dealings between us are based on equality. If your side does not indicate by any action that they respect this equality and pose as victors, then you are foiling the foundations of the peace talks, including the neutrality of Kaesong.

Thus you must bear the responsibility of whatever may happen as a result of the breaking off of the talks.

We wish, before all the peoples of the world who uphold justice, to lodge a very strong protest against the bombing of the neutral zone of Kaesong Aug. 22 by your plane attempting to murder our delegates. We are waiting for a satisfactory reply from you.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House August 23]

General Ridgway has reported to me, and has made public, the story of last night's episode in Kaesong. There is, of course, no truth in the Communist claim that a United Nations plane had bombed the Kaesong area. No United Nations aircraft were even in the vicinity at the time the alleged bombing took place. Whether any enemy aircraft were present is not clear, but the flimsy nature of the so-called "evidence" shown to the United Nations liaison officers makes it extremely doubtful that any bombing took place at all.

We do not know the purpose of this new Communist masquerade in Kaesong. The Communist liaison officer last night made certain statements about calling off further meetings in the armistice negotiations, but it is not clear whether he was referring to the meetings planned for today, to meetings for the next several days—or whether it is the Communist intention to back out of the armistice negotiations altogether.

Until this is clarified, we cannot appraise the events of last night—except that they obviously were not calculated to move the negotiations forward toward an armistice.

TEXT OF COMMUNIST PROTEST

Following is the text of a protest by the senior North Korean delegate, Lt. Gen. Nam Il, to Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, senior United Nations delegate, dated August 19 alleging allied violation of the Kaesong neutrality zone:

At 0555 hours [5:55 a. m.] Aug. 19, nine military police of our side, who were carrying out policing functions in the Kaesong neutral zone in conformity with agreement and who were patrolling eastward under Platoon Commander Yao Ching-hsiang along the heights north of Songgang to the southwest of Panmungol, were suddenly attacked by more than thirty armed personnel of your side who had unlawfully intruded into the neutral zone and laid an ambush in the vicinity of Songgang. Platoon Commander Yao Ching-hsiang and Soldier Wang Jen-yuan were seriously wounded on the spot. The personnel of your side further fired two shots at the forehead of the seriously wounded Platoon Commander Yao Ching-hsiang of our military police. Platoon Commander Yao Ching-hsiang was thereby killed.

The liaison officer of our delegation notified your liaison officer at 0830 hours [8:30 a. m.] and asked your side to send personnel to carry out a joint investigation. An investigation on the spot was carried out jointly by the liaison officers of both sides. The local inhabitants and police personnel of our side and material evidence at the spot of the incident all fully confirm the authenticity of the above facts.

Since our two sides agreed upon the Kaesong neutral zone, your side has repeatedly violated the agreement. Your aircraft have continuously invaded the air above the neutral zone and repeatedly strafed supply vehicles of our delegation. Your armed personnel constantly fired at the neutral zone. Our side has raised repeated protests, but your side has never given us any satisfactory reply. On July 17, I called your attention to the incident of shooting at Panmungol in the neutral zone by your armed personnel. On Aug. 7, your armed personnel again fired at Panmungol, and I again called your serious attention to this incident and lodged a protest. But you have deliberately evaded your responsibility again and again, and failed to give us any satisfactory reply.

There has now occurred this serious incident of your armed personnel entering unlawfully the neutral zone and taking advantage of the fact that our military police were carrying out policing functions and entirely unprepared for combat to kill our military police Platoon Commander Yao Ching-hsiang and to inflict a serious wound on Soldier Wang Jen-yuan, who faithfully observed the neutral zone agreement. This is the height of your disregard of the agreement which should be observed by both sides and the culmination of your consistent unlawful violation of the neutral zone agreement.

I must point out the serious nature of this incident violating the neutral zone agreement by your side. We have consistently held that the Kaesong neutral zone agreement should be observed by both sides in order to ensure its implementation. But facts prove that your side has constantly violated this agreement which should have been observed by both sides.

We have consistently held that if there is a violation of the neutral zone agreement by either side, it must be settled by means of protest, investigation and consultation so that the armistice negotiations may proceed. But facts prove that you have throughout rejected all efforts on our part to seek a settlement of the incidents of your violation of the agreement. The incident this time is the inevitable outcome of your policy of constant violation of the agreement and refusal to reach a settlement through reasonable means. This cannot be tolerated.

I hereby lodge a strong protest and firmly demand:

1. That you severely punish the culprits of your side who killed our military police Platoon Commander Yao Ching-hsiang and seriously wounded Soldier Wang Jen-yuan;
2. That you ensure completely against the recurrence of any further incident violating the neutral zone agreement.

NAM IL,
General, senior delegate, delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers.

TEXT OF U.N. STATEMENT

Following is the text of U.N. statement of August 20 on an investigation of charges of a violation of the neutrality of Kaesong:

Members of the Chinese patrol which was ambushed at Songgang-ni at dawn yesterday morning were able only to describe one of the assailants as a "plain clothesman with a white shirt, black trousers and carrying a side arm." Assistant Platoon Commander Li Ching-lin, whose Chinese squad was attacked, told Col. James C. Murray, United Nations liaison officer, yesterday that he did not see any of the attacking group wearing steel helmets, standard equipment for all United Nations regular forces. He could see "but not clearly because I was running away." Li told Colonel Murray, Colonel Chang, North Korean liaison officer, and Lieutenant Colonel Tsai, Chinese liaison officer, who were conducting a simultaneous investigation at the scene.

Other members of the Chinese squad were unable to give any direct evidence of the identity of their assailants. Earlier, Colonels Murray, Chang and Tsai questioned civilians in the vicinity.

ity of the firing which resulted in the death of the platoon commander and the wounding of a soldier without uncovering any pertinent facts.

The possibility exists that the shooting was the work of a politically guided civilian group operating under instructions to create an atmosphere of tension which would tend to support the breaking of the current military armistice conference.

Throughout the Korean conflict, there also have been irregular roving partisan bands of civilians who seek to do damage to the enemy wherever he may be.

Since the establishment of the Kaesong neutral zone the Communists have insisted on retention of exclusive police control within the zone and have opposed the entrance of United Nations Command military police into the zone.

The liaison agreement currently in effect authorized the Communists the weapons and personnel necessary for the police function which includes the disbanding of any lawless civilian elements within the area.

Rigid and detailed instructions were issued to all military organizations by Eighth Army headquarters following the mid-July alleged neutral zone violation. United Nations Command units were ordered to place the outer limits of their patrol activities well beyond the neutral zone so as to avoid any possibility of contact, even on the flank of the five-mile circular area.

Military Armistice Sole U.N. Objective

The idea of forming an armistice subcommittee was advanced by Admiral Joy, senior U.N. delegate at the military armistice talks. Admiral Joy, in a statement, on August 18 (Korean time, or Aug. 19 eastern standard time), emphasized the U.N. conviction that Allied defensive positions must be maintained "until final settlement of the Korean problem seems assured."

Text of Statement by Admiral Joy

The primary mission of every military commander is to insure the security of his forces at all times.

It is a paramount and inescapable obligation of which he must never lose sight.

Some people confuse the ending of World War I and World War II, which saw one side the victor and the other side the vanquished, with the situation existing in Korea today.

Here we have two combat effective military organizations, whose delegations are attempting to reach agreement on a military armistice between these two military forces-in-being.

Both forces are capable of continuing their military action.

International law specifically defines an armistice as a temporary suspension of hostilities, and just as specifically points out that hostilities may be resumed by either side if proper prior notification is given.

Thus it can be seen that it would be definitely foolhardy, and perhaps be disastrous, for either commander to expose his forces along a political demarcation line rather than to place them in a sound militarily defensible position where they can protect themselves in the unfortunate event hostilities should be resumed.

The sole objective of the U.N. Command delegation is a military armistice, based on military realities.

These armistice negotiations are an essential prelude to any eventual long-time solution of the Korean problem.

Three military components of the U.N. Command are being employed effectively in Korea today—the ground forces, air forces, and naval forces.

The enemy has only one of these forces at his disposal, namely his land army.

His other two forces, ineffective even at their peak, have been shot from the skies or driven from the sea.

A military armistice will be applicable to our air and naval forces as well as our ground forces.

The inexorable pressure these two forces are now exerting on the enemy's rear area will be relieved.

He will be able to refurbish his military machine, regroup and resupply his fighting forces, and thus substantially increase his relative overall military effectiveness.

On the other hand, the U.N. Command today is already at peak efficiency, well organized in combat formations and well supplied with all the weapons of war.

The net effect of any armistice will be of greater military advantage to the enemy than it will be to us.

We have a solemn obligation to our fighting men to afford them maximum security during the armistice.

An ever increasing military threat capable of being launched from across a few kilometers of any demilitarized zone which is based on an imaginary parallel of latitude would be intolerable.

We must retain defensive positions.

We must keep our military guard up until final settlement of the Korean problem seems assured.

Calendar of Meetings

This feature which regularly appears in the first issue of each month will appear in the next issue.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

Philippine Security Treaty

The President, on August 24, named the United States delegation to conclude the contemplated Security Treaty with the Republic of the Philippines. President Quirino of the Philippines is arriving by plane to be present with President Truman for the ceremony which will be held on August 30.

The Secretary of State and John Foster Dulles, together with Senator Tom Connally and Senator Alexander Wiley, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will be members of the United States delegation with plenipotentiary powers.

Additional delegates with power to act as alternates to those above-named will be Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, the Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and Representatives Abraham A. Ribicoff and Walter H. Judd, the Majority Member and the Ranking Minority Member of the House Foreign Affairs Far Eastern Subcommittee.

Pure and Applied Chemistry

The Department of State announced on August 23 that the sixteenth conference of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry will convene at New York, N. Y., September 8-9, 1951, and at Washington, D.C., September 14-15, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegates

Ernest H. Volwiler, Ph.D., *Chairman*, Director of Research, Abbott Laboratories, North Chicago, Ill.
Paul D. Bartlett, Ph.D., Professor of Chemistry, Harvard University.
Herbert E. Carter, Ph.D., Professor of Chemistry, University of Illinois.
Guido E. Hilbert, Ph.D., Chief, Bureau of Agricultural and Industrial Chemistry, Department of Agriculture.
Eger Vaughan Murphree, President, Standard Oil Development Company, New York, N. Y.
Kenneth S. Pitzer, Ph.D., Dean of the College of Chemistry, University of California.

Alternate Delegates

Wallace R. Brode, Ph.D., Associate Director, National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce.
Orville E. May, Ph.D., Vice President, Coca Cola Company, Atlanta, Ga.
William J. Sparks, Ph.D., Director, Chemical Division, Standard Oil Development Company, Westfield, N. J.
Walter H. Stockmayer, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Physical Chemistry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Founded in 1919, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry arrives at scientific conclusions on atomic weights, the values of fundamental constants, thermochemistry, methods of analysis, nomenclature and documentation, and on

various other scientific matters of broad international concern and of vital interest to U.S. chemists. It also publishes tables of data and arranges for the publication of compendia which are essential to progress in chemistry. This Union is one of the affiliated bodies of the International Council of Scientific Unions.

The Government of the United States pays an annual contribution toward the administrative expenses of this international union. The National Research Council, through its Division of Chemistry and Chemical Technology, exercises membership in the Union on behalf of the United States.

The Union's biennial conferences afford an opportunity for interchange of ideas among chemists of various countries. At these conferences some 32 member countries coordinate their scientific and technical resources and seek to promote progress in all branches of chemistry.

The fifteenth conference of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry was held at Amsterdam, the Netherlands, September 6-10, 1949.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

Composition of the Economic and Social Council and Subsidiary Organs for 1951. E/INF/45, June 14, 1951. 48 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Trusteeship Council. Seventh session, June 1 to July 21, 1950. Disposition of Agenda Items Prepared by the Document Index Unit. T/INF/20, May 8, 1951. 10 pp. mimeo.

The Ewe Problem. Joint Anglo-French Memorandum. Prepared in Response to Trusteeship Council Resolution 306 (VIII) of March 9, 1951. T/931, July 5, 1951. 18 pp. mimeo.

The Ewe Problem. Annexes to the Joint Anglo-French Memorandum. T/931/Add. 1, July 6, 1951. 35 pp. mimeo.

Outline of Conditions in the Trust Territory of Togoland Under British Administration. Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat. T/L. 192, June 5, 1951. 43 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an *Official Records* series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Publications in the *Official Records* series will not be listed in this department as heretofore, but information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

[August 17-30, 1951]

General Assembly

The Committee of Twelve (AEC-CCA)—The Committee, August 29, adopted 11-1 (U.S.S.R.)-0 the United States draft resolution recommending to the General Assembly that it establish a new commission to replace the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The only change made, at the request of Frank C. Nash (U.S.), was deletion of the proposed title of the commission, "Commission for the control of Armaments and Armed Forces," leaving this to General Assembly determination.

The Committee rejected all four amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R.—the most important of which, deletion of paragraph 4 of the preamble containing reference to the atomic energy control plan approved by the General Assembly on November 4, 1948, was defeated by a vote of 2 (Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R.)-9-1 (India). S. K. Tsarapkin (U.S.S.R.) declared that the "Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson plan cannot serve as the foundation for any solution" to the problem of the control of atomic energy. To retain the paragraph he said, carried "the clearly understood implication" that his plan—which besides being unacceptable was "not realizable"—was being imposed upon the General Assembly once more.

The Committee will next meet to consider its report of the sixth General Assembly.

Collective Measures Committee—The Committee, August 22, unanimously approved, with the exception of two items, the report of its Sub-Committee for the Study of Political Measures. The report includes such possible collective political measures as appeals to the parties concerned; determination and denunciation of the party or parties responsible for aggression; collective diplomatic representations; severance of diplomatic relations, either partially or completely; suspension or expulsion from the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and "non-recognition of changes brought about by the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." The two remaining items of the report—(1) the United States suggestion regarding machinery and procedures for coordination of political measures, and (2) "legal liability under treaties and other international agreements" of states cooperating in collective measures were dis-

cussed at a subsequent meeting, August 28, when, because of the expressed preference of a number of members that the report be left unchanged, Mr. Bancroft (U.S.) withdrew the United States proposal, and the decision on legal liabilities was postponed until the next meeting, September 4.

In this connection, a drafting group composed of Belgium, France, the Philippines, and the United States had worked out the following formulation for inclusion in both the political and economic and financial reports:

The Committee [group] has reached the conclusion that a state has the right to carry out such measures, and that that right can, in conformity with the Charter, be relied upon as against its obligations under other international agreements.

The Committee, August 22, voted 9-1-3 to forward the suggestions of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions regarding financial arrangements for the Panel of Military Experts to the General Assembly, reserving the position the members of the Cmc would take on the matter there. The Advisory Committee stated that "as a matter of principle responsibility for payment of all costs should rest with the requesting Member State."

On August 28 the Committee began discussion of its Sub-Committee report on Economic and Financial Measures, a 48-page document outlining a series of "measures to weaken nations threatening or breaching the peace." Various amendments were suggested to the report by Australia, Mexico, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela, but as other delegations were still awaiting instructions, the Committee postponed until its next meeting a paragraph-by-paragraph study of the report. A drafting group composed of Belgium, Brazil, the Philippines, and the United States was set up to redraft the provision that a United Nations Committee should "arrange, where appropriate, for the observation" of embargo measures taken against an offending state.

Economic and Social Council

The thirteenth session of Ecosoc entered its sixth week September 3 and, owing to the filibustering of the Soviet bloc, will probably run beyond the scheduled 7 weeks. Despite these obstructionist tactics the Council, during the past 2 weeks, accomplished the following:

1. *Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries*: A resolution was adopted, 14 (U.S.)-0-4, on methods of financing economic develop-

ment of underdeveloped countries based on the recommendations of the Council Economic Committee and amendments proposed in plenary. Briefly, among other things, it proposes to the governments of underdeveloped countries that they "review the adequacy of their national institutions and techniques for maximizing the availability of their domestic capital for, and the flow of foreign capital into, essential national development programs;" to take steps to increase their capacity to absorb foreign capital through programs of mass education, specialized training programs, and "meaningful measures of land reform . . ."; and that the United Nations and the specialized agencies concerned consider setting up training schools to help in preparing well-rounded development projects. To countries seeking foreign private capital, the Council recommends removal of legal and administrative deterrents to the inflow of such capital, as well as provide assurances to foreign investors that they will be fairly treated. Recommendations were also made that "Governments of developed countries review the adequacy of their national institutions and techniques for expanding the flow of capital to underdeveloped countries for economic development."

The Council rejected for the present the proposal to set up an international agency to help finance the economies of underdeveloped countries, which would be largely on the basis of grants or low-interest loans.

2. *Financing European Migration*: Adopted a United Kingdom resolution, 8-7-3, which requested (1) the Iro to report on its refugee resettlement experience to the Ilo Migration Conference to be held in Naples beginning October 2, and (2) the Ilo to report to the next session of Ecosoc on the action taken or contemplated as a result of the Naples conference.

3. *Full Employment*: An amended Pakistan-Philippine sponsored resolution was adopted, 14-0-3, which requests the Council to review "once each year" the problems of reducing unemployment and underemployment in underdeveloped countries.

4. *Draft International Convention on Human Rights*: The Council adopted, 11-5-2, a Belgium-India-United Kingdom-United States-Uruguay resolution requesting the General Assembly to reconsider at its sixth session, November 6, the form and implementation of the Human Rights Covenant. It recognizes that the Human Rights Commission has not had sufficient time to complete the draft covenant and asks that the Commission continue its efforts, particularly in revising the first 18 articles of the draft covenant and preparing recommendations "aimed at securing the maximum extension of the covenant to the constituent units of federal states and at meeting constitutional problems of these states." It recommends that the General Assembly express its views on the

present text and "invites the General Assembly to reconsider its decision to include in one covenant articles on economic, social, and cultural rights together with articles on civil and political rights."

5. *Technical Assistance Committee*: The Committee completed its work on August 29 and approved the report to the Council. It also adopted, 10-3-4, a resolution establishing a working party to study how the expanded technical assistance program might be more effectively administered.

6. *Reports*: The Council noted with satisfaction and approval the reports of the ILO, IRO, WHO, UNICEF, UPU, ICAO, UNESCO, Statistical Commission, and Commission on Status of Women.

Security Council

The Council held several additional meetings in August on the question of Israel's complaint about "restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal." Egypt, Israel, and Iraq were invited to participate in the debate without vote as interested parties in the dispute. A joint resolution, sponsored by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, was submitted to the Council whereby the latter:

Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.

Egypt contended that the three sponsoring countries of the resolution, as well as the Netherlands and Turkey, by virtue of their direct representations to the Egyptian Government, were actually parties to the dispute, and should therefore abstain from voting. The five member nations concerned pointed out that the question under consideration involved a complaint against Egypt by Israel involving the status of the armistice agreement between those two states. They also maintained that they are not prevented from voting since it is to be expected that on many questions coming before the Security Council a number of members are more or less concerned, particularly on matters of general interest such as this. The Council should not be paralyzed on such grounds.

On August 29, the Council President, Ambassador Austin (U.S.) endeavored to put the tripartite resolution to a vote. However, the U.S.S.R. representative, S. K. Tsarapkin, requested a 2-day postponement in order that his Government might, for the first time if it so desired, present its views on the matter. The motion for postponement was carried 9-0-2 (Brazil, Ecuador). At the September 1 meeting the U.S.S.R. failed to make a statement, and, as no other representatives wished to speak, the resolution was voted upon and adopted 8-0-3 (China, India, U.S.S.R.).

Memorandum Refuting Allegations Against Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press August 20]

A series of assertions against Secretary Acheson was brought to the attention of the Department of State by John B. Elliott of Los Angeles. These assertions were either entirely incorrect or distortions of the truth, and the following memorandum dealing with the various points was prepared for Mr. Elliott's information.

- (1) a. On December 23, 1949, Mr. Acheson sent out instructions to diplomatic and consular personnel in Asia that Formosa was doomed and expendable.**

The communication of December 23, 1949, on Formosa referred to was in no sense an instruction. It was a guide in the psychological warfare being waged against the Communists in the Far East. Common sense tactics in psychological warfare call for maximizing gains and minimizing losses. At this time, the intelligence branches of the various agencies of the Government agreed that the Nationalist garrison on Formosa was incapable of holding the island against a determined Communist assault which was then being readied. They further stated that the only way the island could be held was by reinforcing its defenses with American troops.

While acknowledging the strategic importance of Formosa, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the Government that it was not sufficiently important to warrant sending enough ground elements of an American army that was already spread dangerously thin to insure a successful defense of the island.

In the light of these facts, Gen. Albert Wedemeyer sent a memorandum on the matter to George V. Allen, then Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. It is quoted here as read by General Wedemeyer when he was a witness at the MacArthur hearings:

In a memorandum for the executive secretary of the National Security Council, the Secretary of State . . . stated that under present circumstances the passage of Formosa under Communist control by external or internal action appears probable . . . since there appears no certain assurance that Formosa can be denied to Communist control by political and economic measures alone.

Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting of 16 August reaffirmed their previous view that overt United States military action to deny Communist domination of Formosa would not be justified. However, I also note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the probabilities of the Formosa situation make it more than ever necessary that every effort be made to forestall any weakening of the overall United States position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. In Department of the Army consideration of this matter, it appears to be particularly desirable that, should Formosa be lost, this event should have a minimum of ill effects on the governments and peoples of Western-oriented nations and particularly those of the Far East. Accordingly, it occurs to me that, if not already instituted, you may desire to consider information measures designed to accomplish this end.

Consequently, the directive was sent to personnel in United States missions to try to minimize the damage to American prestige in the Far East if Formosa should fall. The directive advised the people of the Foreign Service of the details of the situation and urged that in their daily contacts they play down rather than emphasize the strategic importance of Formosa in case the island fell to the Chinese Reds.

The directive related solely to psychological warfare and in no way related to administration policy or intentions toward the island.

The policy of the American Government has unwaveringly maintained that the United States must do everything within its capacities to prevent seizure of Formosa by a hostile force. A variant on the same theme is the allegation which is numbered (5) in Lieutenant Governor Knight's letter of April 24, 1951: "Dean Acheson recommended the abandonment of Formosa after the legitimate government of China had been forced to flee to the island." In this form the allegation appears to be a distorted construction of the speech made by the Secretary of State at the National Press Club in February 1950. In the Press Club talk, the Secretary referred to the American line that was vitally strategic to our Pacific position—which ran (and runs) from Japan through the Ryukyus to the Philippines. The defense of these positions he presented as basically an American responsibility. They must be held at all costs.

Inferentially, an attack on them would be regarded as an overt act of war.

It is noteworthy that the full text of this section of the speech is rarely quoted by those making the above allegation—because the Secretary goes on to say that Formosa is important to the security of the United States and that we must use every means at our disposal to deny it to a hostile force.

For a time, the means at our disposal were confined to political and economic. Now, with an increase of our military forces and in our production of weapons and equipment, we are able to provide the Nationalist garrison on Formosa with material assistance and needed training. Approximately 90 million dollars worth of arms and ordnance has been given the Nationalists, and another 300 million dollars is scheduled for this year. In addition a 600-man military mission is on the island assisting in the reorganization of Chiang's forces.

- (1) b. On June 19, 1947, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Acheson testified there was no danger of a Communist defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.**

The record has been checked and Mr. Acheson did not testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 19, 1947, on China or on any other matters. This allegation would appear to be a distorted version of testimony which Mr. Acheson gave to the same House Committee a year earlier. Mr. Acheson's 1946 testimony was in support of a bill, endorsed also by General Marshall, Secretary of War Patterson, and Admiral Ramsey, of the Navy Department, to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China.

A careful examination of the record of the 1946 hearings discloses no indication of any testimony to the effect of the above quoted allegation.

- (1) c. On July 30, 1949, he wrote a letter to the President of the United States stating that no amount of aid could have saved Chiang.**

In the letter of July 30, 1949, which transmitted the State Department's compilation on United States relations with China to the President, there is no such statement as that attributed to him, namely, "no amount of aid could have saved Chiang." The full text of the letter has of course been a matter of record for some time. This assertion is apparently a twisted construction of the paragraph appearing on the page numbered XV in the volume "United States Relations with China." This reads:

A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention in behalf of a government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. Such intervention would have required the expenditure of even greater sums

than had been fruitlessly spent thus far, the command of national armies by American officers, and the probable participation of American armed forces—land, sea, and air—in the resulting war. Intervention of such a scope and magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been condemned by the American people.

... Nothing that this country did, or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.

- (2) In 1946 against the advice of United States Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane, Mr. Acheson approved a loan of 90 million dollars to Communist Poland. The counsel in this transaction was Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss, and for this loan Dean Acheson's law firm, of which Donald Hiss is a member, received a 50 thousand dollar fee.**

The inferences of this charge are false and are based upon a distortion of the public record. The Polish loan and Mr. Acheson's connection therewith were thoroughly explored by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 13, 1949 when Mr. Acheson was up for confirmation as Secretary of State. When Mr. Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State on February 1, 1941, he severed *all connections* with the law firm of which he had been a partner. The interest which Mr. Acheson had in the firm was computed and paid to him before he entered the Department of State. The loan negotiations with Poland did not begin until more than 4 years later and were completed in 1946.

The firm functioned purely in a legal capacity and handled the contracts and the drawing of the instruments necessary to apply for a loan and to operations under the loan. No member of the firm approached Secretary Acheson in any way during the period that the loan was under consideration.

As Acting Secretary of State and on the instruction of Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Acheson approved the loan after it had been favorably considered by the responsible officers of the Department who were interested in it. These included the responsible officers in the economic offices under Mr. Clayton and in the political offices under Mr. Dunn. The late Senator Vandenberg was informed of the proposed credit, and his suggestion was followed that full publicity be given to the commitments made by the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in connection with the loan. Secretary Acheson subsequently suspended the loan because these commitments were not being met. The loan was reinstated when these objections were satisfied. Subsequently, when the Communist grip on Poland tightened, the unused part of the credit was cut off effective January 31, 1949.

As you know, at the time the loan was made the Polish Government still included democratic

elements, and it was hoped that the loan would assist these elements in fending off full Soviet control. A strong appeal for United States credits to Poland was made by Mr. Mikolajczyk, Vice Premier of the Polish Government and leader of the anti-Communist forces in Poland, when he called on Mr. Truman on December 5, 1945.

Another important reason for making the loan then was the fact that the democratic countries of Western Europe were suffering a severe coal shortage, while Poland had a large surplus of coal which could not be moved for lack of transport at the Polish mines. The major portion of the loan was intended for the purchase of transportation equipment. Equipment purchased under the loan was subsequently used by the Poles in making heavy shipments of coal to Western European countries. This was a substantial factor in the revival of the economies of Western Europe.

- (3) On July 20, 1949, Mr. Acheson stated that there were no Communists in the State Department. This statement has since proved to be completely false and untrue.**

Mr. Acheson stated at that time that he knew of no Communists in the State Department. This statement has *never* been proved false. He can reiterate now that he knows of no Communists, Communist sympathizers, or security risks in the Department of State. Moreover, an experienced, capable, and vigilant security division of more than 100 trained investigators, whose job is everlastingly to check and recheck the loyalty and dependability of the staff of the Department, does not know of any. We have had the benefit of operating with the FBI and either the FBI or the Department has run full field investigations on all our people in sensitive jobs. It can be guaranteed further that if the security and loyalty machinery does turn up a Communist, a sympathizer, a security risk, or a person of whose loyalty and dependability there is a reasonable doubt, his connection with the Department will be brought to an abrupt end.

- (4) Dean Acheson has never repudiated his support of Alger Hiss. Previous to this time Dean Acheson sponsored the Hiss brothers to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, although Whittaker Chambers had denounced them as Soviet agents. Alger Hiss, of course, is in the penitentiary as a perjurer and traitor.**

The several statements about Alger Hiss that Secretary Acheson has made in response to questions have been widely misinterpreted.

He has never in any way condoned the offense of which Alger Hiss has been found guilty. The Supreme Court is the highest court of justice in the Nation. It has acted. As far as he is con-

cerned, the decision of the Court disposes of the matter.

The allegation with respect to sponsoring the Hiss brothers apparently is an interpretation of Mr. Berle's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee when he declared:

I checked on the two Hiss boys. Specifically I checked with Dean Acheson, and later I checked when Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State and Alger Hiss became his executive assistant. . . .

Acheson said that he had known the family and these two boys from childhood and he could vouch for them absolutely.

Mr. Berle's memory is faulty. Mr. Acheson saw Mr. Berle on this matter only once, in March 1941, 2 years after Mr. Berle says Chambers came to see him.

The facts are that Alger Hiss was never Mr. Acheson's assistant nor employed in his office in any capacity whatever, except when Mr. Acheson became Acting Secretary or Under Secretary of State when it could be said that everyone in the Department was under his direction.

When Mr. Acheson became Assistant Secretary of State in 1941, he needed an assistant and arranged for the transfer of Donald Hiss to that position. At the time, Donald Hiss was working for Blackwell Smith in the Office of Production Management. In March of 1941, Mr. Berle came to Mr. Acheson and said that he had information about one of the Hiss brothers which would make his presence embarrassing to Mr. Acheson and to the Department. Mr. Acheson asked him which brother it was and Mr. Berle replied that he could not tell him.

Mr. Acheson thereupon checked with Donald Hiss and satisfied himself that there was no reason why Donald Hiss was not completely fit to act as his assistant. That is still the Secretary's opinion.

When Mr. Berle states that Mr. Acheson told him he had known these boys from childhood and could vouch for them absolutely, his memory plays him false. The Secretary told him that his former senior partner, Judge Covington, had known them since childhood, and that Mr. Acheson had seen Donald and his wife at social gatherings and respected and liked them both.

The foregoing information was provided under oath in his testimony on the hearings on his nomination as Secretary of State before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the first session of the 81st Congress on January 13, 1949. The page numbers are 6, 7, and 8.

- (5) Dean Acheson recommended the abandonment of Formosa after the legitimate government of China had been forced to flee to the island.**

The position of Mr. Acheson and the policy of our Government toward Formosa had been stated in reply to assertion number 1. This statement shows that the above charge is entirely false.

- (6) Dean Acheson and his friends, including Owen Lattimore, encouraged a Communist rebellion in China and they referred in public addresses to the Communists as "agrarian reformers." These "agrarian reformers" are now murdering and torturing American boys in Korea.**

This statement is false—keel to keelson.

United States policy as executed by Secretary Acheson and his predecessors gave Chiang generous and consistent backing—military, monetary, and political. At V-J Day, a United States program to organize and equip 39 Chinese Nationalist divisions was held completed and a similar program to provide Chiang with eight and one-third air groups somewhat less. Both these programs were completed in the postwar period.

Fifty thousand United States Marines were moved into North China to insure a smooth Nationalist takeover. An American sea and air lift shifted nearly a half million Nationalist troops into sensitive areas of North China to enable the Nationalists to take control of the area. These moves made it possible for China's forces to accept the surrender of hundreds of thousands of troops of the Japanese Army which would otherwise have been completely impossible and thereby come into possession of huge quantities of Japanese arms. Moreover, China alone, of all the nations of the globe, continued to receive military lend-lease after V-J Day.

After the foregoing, the United States continued to help Chiang in his struggle with the Communists with grants of economic and military assistance and maintained a military mission with the Nationalist regime to provide military advice. The flow of this aid was interrupted only by the Marshall mission and for good reason. As early as 1937, Chiang is on record as believing that the differences between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Reds could not be settled by military means—but only by political means. He initiated negotiations with the Communists—with Ambassador Hurley as mediator. General Marshall went to China to replace Hurley at Chiang's invitation to assist in the effort to unite China politically (under Chiang's control) and to demobilize all but 10 divisions of the Red Army—ending its existence as a separate military force. The 10 divisions were to become part of a 60-division Republic of China Army—with the remaining 50 divisions Nationalist troops.

General Marshall strove to arrange a truce—believing that negotiations and civil war could not be conducted simultaneously. He temporarily shut off arms aid because truce efforts had no chance of success if the Nation he represented continued to supply munitions to one of the parties to the truce. When General Marshall gave up his attempt to reconcile the contending parties, the supply of aid to Chiang was resumed. A com-

plete breakdown of that aid appears in the appendix of the MacArthur hearings. Since 1941, the United States has provided the Nationalists with 1 billion 800 million dollars worth of military assistance and 1 billion 700 million dollars worth of economic aid.

Secretary Acheson has declared on several occasions that he does not remember ever having met Owen Lattimore—which hardly qualifies the latter as a "friend." Four Secretaries of State, including Mr. Acheson, have stated in writing for the official record that Mr. Lattimore exerted no influence on United States policy—a fact completely obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to compare United States action in the Far East with Lattimore's recommendations. Lattimore was on the rolls of the Department of State for 4 months as a consultant on the Pauley mission on Japanese reparations. He is not in the employ of the Department. He is neither an advisor nor a consultant.

The phrase "agrarian reformer" was not originated by the Secretary of State and as comprehensive a check as was possible of his talks shows that he does not so refer to the Chinese Communists. The record does show that former Ambassador Patrick Hurley in a speech before the National Press Club on November 27, 1945, described the Chinese Reds as reformers. He also declared that "the only difference between Chinese Communists and Oklahoma Republicans is that the Oklahoma Republicans are not armed."

The phrase "agrarian reformer" was also used in 1939 and 1940 by Freda Uteley, a reformed Communist writer (she declares she recanted in 1931), allegedly an expert on the Far East. Miss Uteley's most recent book, *The China Story*, has been employed as a source by Senator Brewster and Senator McCarthy.

- (7) Dean Acheson acted as counsel to Lauchlin Currie when Currie appeared before a Committee of Congress to defend himself against proven charges of aiding the Communists in the espionage network.**

Mr. Acheson was retained by Lauchlin Currie in connection with his appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on the 15th of August 1948. Mr. Currie appeared before the Committee at his own request to testify concerning statements made about him by Miss Elizabeth Bentley. The Committee unanimously observed that no charge of Communist party affiliation was made against Mr. Currie. In contrast to the "proven charges" referred to in the allegation, it is a fact that since Mr. Currie's testimony regarding them no further action has ever been taken.

As for the Committee's reaction to Mr. Currie's appearance and as to the Secretary's professional function as a legal adviser, your attention is directed to a statement by Representative Mundt which appears on page 875 of the Hearings of the

Committee of the 80th Congress, 2d Session. Representative Mundt stated:

I think that is all, Mr. Chairman, although I would like to have the records show that Mr. Currie, in addition to having answered questions in a forthright manner, came here without benefit of counsel to whisper in his ear the answer he should give to the Committee. I think that is very commendable.

- (8) Dean Acheson stated under oath before a Senate Committee before his confirmation as Under Secretary of State that Russia should share in the administration of Japan. It is no defense to now say that that was a long time ago and Russia was our ally. Even the man on the street knew at that time that Russia had been in the war only a few days and had already proven herself a doubtful and dangerous ally.**

At the request of the Department, the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has searched the Committee's records for the period immediately prior to and following the confirmation of Mr. Acheson as Under Secretary of State, August-September 1945, and has been unable to find any statement such as the one referred to. A similar search of the records of the Department shows that on September 26, 1945, Acting Secretary Acheson was asked at a press conference:

Can you tell us when and where the Russians accepted the thesis that the United States would be the deciding voice in Japanese policy? Was that at Potsdam or Crimea?

Ans. I don't think I can comment about that. Of course, as you know, all the Allies have accepted the Supreme Allied Commander who is General MacArthur. He must go forward and do things. It is inherent in that decision. Of course, there is no disposition whatever on the part of the American Government to exclude anybody. What we are trying to do is to go forward with the job and work out the best methods of solution that we can.

The foregoing is the only segment that could be found in a voluminous record which could possibly, by any stretch or twist, be construed as placing Secretary Acheson in the position of advocating a Soviet part in the administration of Japan. The extent to which this allegation is an outright misrepresentation is shown by the facts.

The facts are that the machinery for the administration of Japan completely recognized the major role of the United States in the defeat of that country and the dominant United States interest therein, while at the same time recognizing the interests of other countries who shared in the burdens of the war and obtaining their cooperation and support in the administration.

At the time of the surrender, the agreement of the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union was obtained to the appointment by the United States of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who had sole executive responsibility for the conduct of the occupation. This was confirmed by the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, which also established the Far Eastern Com-

mission, consisting of the 11 nations who had participated in the war against Japan, and the Allied Council for Japan, consisting of the United States, British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China. While the Far East Commission was given the task of formulating policy for the occupation, the position of the United States was fully protected by provisions for the use of the veto and the issuance by the United States of interim directives where the agreement of the Commission could not be obtained. The Allied Council for Japan had an advisory capacity only.

During the period that the basic policies for the occupation were being formulated, a remarkable degree of unanimity and support for the United States policy toward Japan was achieved in the Far Eastern Commission, virtually all of the major decisions being approved by all of the other countries on the Commission, including the Soviet Union.

Thus, without in any way impinging upon United States responsibilities for Japan, a wide and important degree of international support was obtained for our policies toward that country. The record of the Far Eastern Commission is a bright and all-too-little noticed chapter in post-war cooperation and one in which we and the other participating countries can rightfully take pride.

- (9) Mr. Acheson while heading the American delegation in the formation of UNRRA insisted on the veto to please the Soviet Union and supported all Soviet demands, thus leaving the United States impotent to control UNRRA although the United States put up all the money.**

This allegation is false. Mr. Acheson did not support all Soviet demands and did not insist on the veto to please the Soviet Union or leave the United States impotent to control UNRRA. It is a fact that the Soviet Union on drafting the UNRRA agreement sought to require Four-Power unity of all matters in the central committee of UNRRA. As Assistant Secretary of State and responsible for the Department's work on this agreement, with the firm help of British and Chinese representatives, he was successful in resisting this Soviet move. The UNRRA agreement which was signed November 9, 1943, is a matter of record. It does not require unanimity of great powers generally on substantive matters either in its policy determining council, on which all members were represented, or in any of its committees. Save for a few exceptions, such as amendment, nomination of the Director General, UNRRA was governed by majority decisions in fields related to its major function.

This has long been a matter of public knowledge. It can be verified in the testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs December 7, 1943.

(10) Secretary Acheson secured the appointment of Alger Hiss to Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta.

This statement is false and Secretary Acheson has so testified, under oath, before the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee.

In response to a direct question from Senator Knowland, he stated that he made *no recommendations of any kind to anyone* that Hiss be sent on either of these missions. As a routine official duty, Mr. Acheson signed the travel orders for the State Department personnel assigned to go to the Yalta conference just as he would sign routine orders for any delegation. Mr. Hiss was among the group and received his validation for travel in the same manner as the other members.

(11) On December 16, 1945, Under Secretary Dean Acheson received Juan Negrin, head of the Spanish Communists, while he refused at the same time to meet Fernando de los Rios, head of the anti-Communist group in Spain.

Secretary Acheson did receive de los Rios who called at the Department December 21, 1945, on what amounted to an invitation resulting from the answer to a question in a press conference. A newsman asked the Secretary whether or not he would receive de los Rios and the Secretary said he "would be glad to receive him." Both Negrin and de los Rios called in a private capacity. De los Rios saw Secretary Acheson after he had already had a lengthy talk with the chief of the Bureau of Western European Affairs the previous September.

(12) On December 20, 1945, Dean Acheson granted an interview to Milton Wolff, Commander of subversive Abraham Lincoln Brigade and pro-Communist Vito Marcantonio, promising them to intervene with Franco on behalf of two condemned Communists in Spain.

The records of the Department establish that the then Acting Secretary Acheson received a delegation of three members of the House of Representatives, Ned Healy of California, Charles R. Savage of Washington, and Vito Marcantonio of New York, and five others including Mr. Wolff. He made no special promises of intervention to the group. The alleged "condemned Communists," Santiago Alvarez and Sebastian Zaparain, had been seized by the Franco military police and were being held on charges for trial. Secretary Acheson explained that the two men were Argentine and Cuban nationals and that any action to be taken by the Department would necessarily be limited to expressions of interest on humanitarian grounds. During this period members of the Congress and many private individuals had written the Department to appeal for action. The Secretary's explanation described the carefully worked out official position taken by the Department with respect to all such appeals.

Incidentally, this assertion not only indicates the way in which information becomes distorted and, in effect, false, but also bears close resemblance to other similar assertions which admit their source of information is the *Daily Worker*.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Graham R. Hall as deputy U. S. representative on the Advisory Committee for UNKRA and also designated as Special Assistant to the Assistant for United Nations Affairs. Mr. Hall will serve as the coordinator of Korean Relief and Rehabilitation matters within the Department of State and will carry on liaison with other agencies of the Government which have responsibility or interest in these matters.

U.N. Member Named U.S. Representative to UNKRA

On August 21, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Isador Lubin, U.S. representative, Ecosoc as U.S. representative on the Advisory committee to the Agent General of UNKRA.

Legislation—Continued from p. 381

- Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance. Letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting the second report regarding the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Program, pursuant to section 6, Public Law 897 (The Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950) for the period March 16 through June 15, 1951. H. Doc. 191, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 15 pp.
- Providing for the Greater Security and Defense of the United States Against Attack. S. Rept. 549, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. 537] 14 pp.
- Concentration of Defense Contracts. Report of the Select Committee On Small Business. S. Rept. 551, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 6 pp.
- Correcting an Error in Section I of the Act of June 28, 1947, To Stimulate Volunteer Enlistments in the Regular Military Establishment of the United States. S. Rept. 553, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1200] 4 pp.
- Amending Section 4 of the Act of March 2, 1933 (47 Stat. 1423), as Amended, So as To Provide That a Mess Operated Under the Direction of a Supply Corps Officer Can Be Operated Either on a Quantity or on a Monetary Ration Basis. S. Rept. 554, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1201] 3 pp.
- Providing That an Aircraft Carrier Shall Be Named the "Forrestal." S. Rept. 556, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 67] 2 pp.
- Authorizing Advances for Clothing and Equipment to Cadets at the Military Academy and the Coast Guard Academy and to Midshipmen at the Naval Academy, and for Other Purposes. S. Rept. 557, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 2736] 4 pp.
- Trading With the Enemy Act. S. Rept. 572, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. 172] 7 pp.
- Revision of a Proposed Appropriation for the National Security Resources Board. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting re-

vision of a proposed appropriation for the fiscal year 1952, involving a decrease of \$2,400,000, for the National Security Resources Board. H. Doc. 194, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 2 pp.

United States Participation in the United Nations. Report by the President to the Congress for the year 1950. H. Doc. 196, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 429 pp.

Twelfth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration for the quarter ended March 31, 1951. H. Doc. 198, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 156 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for Displaced Persons Commission. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1952, in the amount of \$2,431,000, for the Displaced Persons Commission. H. Doc. 215, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 2 pp.

United States Relations With International Organizations. IV. United States Participation in International Organizations During the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1949. Report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments pursuant to Public Law 601, 79th Congress (Section 102 (1) (g) (2) (D) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946). S. Rept. 1274, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 71 pp.

United States Relations With International Organizations. V. The Internal Operations of the United Nations and Certain International Organizations in Which the United States Participates. Report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments pursuant to Public Law 601, 79th Congress (Section 102 (1) (g) (2) (D) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946). S. Rept. 90, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 114 pp.

Authorizing the Transfer of Certain Naval Vessels. S. Rept. 580, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To Accompany H. R. 3463] 4 pp.

Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Providing for the Election of President and Vice President. S. Rept. 594, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. J. Res. 52] 25 pp.

Amending Section 32 of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as Amended, With Reference to the Designation of Organizations as Successors in Interest to Deceased Persons. S. Rept. 600, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. 1748] 15 pp.

Compromise and Settlement of Japanese Evacuation Claims. S. Rept. 601, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 3142] 4 pp.

Tenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. S. Doc. 49, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 151 pp.

Convention With Switzerland Regarding the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Estates and Inheritances. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the convention between the United States of America and Switzerland, signed at Washington on July 9, 1951, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances. S. Exec. P., 82d Cong., 1st sess. 8 pp.

Urging Advice and Consent to the Ratification of Certain Conventions. S. Exec. Rept. 1, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany Executive O, 80th Cong., 1st sess.; Executive FF, 80th Cong., 1st sess.; Executive J, 80th Cong., 2d sess.; Executive Q, 81st Cong., 1st sess.; Executive R, 81st Cong., 1st sess.; Executive E, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive F, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive K, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive L, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive R, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive S, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive T, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive U, 81st Cong., 2d sess.; Executive N, 82d Cong., 1st sess.] 27 pp.

Emergency Control of Electromagnetic Radiating Devices. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session, on S. 537, a bill to provide for the greater security and defense of the United States against attack. January 24, 1951; February 21 and 22, 1951. 94 pp.

Military Situation in the Far East. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, first session, to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area. June 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, and 27, 1951, iv, 564 pp.

Importation of Foreign Agricultural Workers. H. R. 668, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 984] 8 pp.

Third Semiannual Report to Congress On The Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Third Semiannual Report on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program covering the period from October 6, 1950 to March 31, 1951, pursuant to Public Law 329, 81st Cong. H. Doc. 179, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 50 pp.

International Labor Conventions. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Copies of Conventions Nos. 91, 92, and 93, which were Adopted by the International Labor Conference at its thirty-second session, held at Geneva, from June 8 to July 2, 1949. S. Exec. J, K, and L, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 40 pp.

Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws. Joint Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, Congress of the United States, 82d Cong. 1st sess. on S. 716, H. R. 2379, and H. R. 2816, bills to revise the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality. March 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, and April 9, 1951. 787 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and The Judiciary Appropriations for 1952. Additional Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 82d Cong. 1st sess. 64 pp.

Establishing a Temporary National Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. S. Rept. 544, 82d Cong. 1st sess. [To accompany S. 1146]. 9 pp.

Check List of Department Press Releases: Aug. 20-26, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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744	8/20	Charges Against Acheson Refuted
745*	8/20	For. Ser. Changes
746	8/21	Japanese Peace Treaty
747	8/21	Countries to Attend Peace Conf.
748†	8/22	Acheson: Youth Festival
749	8/22	Visit of De Gasperi
750†	8/23	U.S., Denmark Agreement
751†	8/23	U.S., Israel Treaty
752	8/23	Chemistry Conf.
753	8/23	McCarthy Attack on Jessup
754†	8/23	Treaty of Security, Australia
755*	8/24	Foreign Service Changes
756	8/24	U.S. Note to Czechoslovakia
757†	8/24	Kopper: U.S. Policy in N.E.
758*	8/24	Exchange of Scholars
759*	8/24	Travers: Ambassador to Haiti
760†	8/24	Pakistan Locust Plague
761	8/24	Allison: Peace With Japan
762*	8/24	Exchange of Persons
763	8/24	Philippine Security Treaty
764	8/24	U.S. Del. to Japan Peace Conf.
765	8/26	U.S., India-Japan Treaty

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Two Weeks in August: East German Youth Strays West¹

by Ruth E. McKee

From August 5 to 19, 1951, the Soviet sector of Berlin experienced in three waves the greatest influx of youth that a city—let alone a fractional part of a city—has ever known. By Soviet count the number was 2 million. Western estimates set the total number of visitors for the 2-week period at between 1¼ and 1½ million, with the peak number present at any one time 800,000, on August 12. More than a million were young Germans from the Soviet zone, members of the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), Communist-controlled organization for youth in the Soviet-occupied East zone of Germany and official hosts of the occasion. Approximately 30,000 came in delegations from all over the world, from democratic as well as Communist and Communist satellite countries. An undetermined number, estimated at anywhere from 35,000 to 60,000, came from the Western German Federal Republic.

Known as the Third World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace, the gathering was sponsored jointly by two Communist-front organizations: the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. The participants rallied to the call of "Youth, unite in the struggle for peace against the danger of a new war." The dual purpose of the festival was to impress upon the minds of the participants themselves that Stalinist communism symbolizes peace and to persuade the world at large that Communist aims have won the solid support of the world's youth. Peace doves and Stalin occupied one side of the Soviet propaganda coin minted for the festival, the bird of war and the United States of America the other. International friendship and peace mixed with hatred of the United States compounded the theme song.

Advance Preparations in the East

Providing transportation over a considerable distance for upwards of a million human beings

and arranging for their eating and sleeping accommodations in an area roughly equivalent in size to a third of Chicago were no minor undertakings. Rail, bus, and truck facilities of the East zone of Germany were dedicated to the task of moving youth into Berlin. Passenger trains on hand just sufficed for the transport of Communist Central Committee members from the various countries, foreign delegations, and West Germany's crop of illicit FDJ members who might cross the border at some distance from Berlin. The Soviet Union rushed to completion 100 streamlined coaches for the transport of young uranium-mine workers in token of the special contribution they were making to the peace crusade. East German youth, as hosts of the festival, rated what was left: straw-lined boxcars and trucks.

Billeting hundreds of thousands of additional human beings in a city that was suffering a severe housing shortage presented another knotty problem. A campaign to get every householder and apartment tenant with a spare bed or mattress to take in at least one guest for the duration of the festival produced sleeping accommodations for only 120,000. Members of the central committees of the party in foreign countries were assigned to the presidential guest house of the German Democratic Republic. Hotels, school buildings, and FDJ homes provided enough shelter for the foreign delegations, but the only answer to the problem of accommodations for the masses of East Germany's FDJ was mass billets in hastily thrown-up tent cities.

The problem of feeding so many people was no easy matter either. Even what the puppet East German Government acquired by reducing the food ration of the people failed to bring the total of East Germany's supplies up to the mark. Food supplies in satellite countries and the U.S.S.R. had to be tapped. In spite of careful planning, delays in transportation and warm weather combined to spoil large quantities of food. Accordingly, rations for the FDJ members had to be reduced and the promise of one hot meal a day was withdrawn from this group.

¹ For a more detailed account of the results of the East Berlin festival, see Department of State publication 4363.

In the Soviet sector of Berlin, construction work went on day and night up to the very eve of the festival. An effort was made to clear away the rubble from World War II bombings, at least in the more conspicuous parts of the sector. Building firms and labor brigades of the FdJ from outlying parts of the Soviet zone worked furiously at all hours on the construction of three large stadiums and a swimming pool and on the renovation of 20 older sports halls and fields. To make sure that the zest of the workers should not lapse, armed guards patrolled these projects.

Householders, storekeepers, and building superintendents were responsible for making Soviet Berlin bright with flags and banners. They received orders to make sure that their streets and houses would "decently fit in with the grand picture of the World Festival." What the host city lacked in material comforts, it was to make up for in colorful decorations.

Friendship and Peace by Communist Definition

The festival opened officially on August 5 in the Walter Ulbricht Stadium. The ceremony began with an hour-long march through flag-draped streets by the foreign delegations in their native costumes: Chinese, Korean, Polish, Swedish, and many others. Some American observers counted 10 American delegates; others thought that there were only six. The stadium was gay with the flags of the various nations, slogans, flowers, band music, and singing. The FdJ hosts greeted each incoming foreign delegation with cries of "Freundschaft, Freundschaft" (Friendship) and vigorous clapping of hands above heads.

President Pieck, of the East German Democratic Republic, opened the festival formally "in the name of the German people." His speech stressed the beauties of international solidarity and the importance to the peace crusade of achieving the immediate political goal of the 5-power peace pact. Although he referred to the "extraordinarily serious" world political situation caused by the adherence of American and British warmongers to their war plans, he contented himself for the most part with emphasizing the more positive and idealistic aspects of the festival rather than its counter theme of hate for the West.

For the next few days the festival consisted chiefly of sporting and cultural events held at scattered points throughout the East sector. The International Summer Sports Festival opened on August 6. On August 8, the "Day of Progressive Women," 15,000 girls marched under banners and slogans that proclaimed their pledge to fight American imperialism and to refuse to allow their husbands and sons to die on a new battlefield. On August 9 the first wave of participants from the East zone started homeward and the major wave began to arrive in Berlin. Some overlapping of

waves had been planned for the midperiod of the festival to assure peak attendance at the time of the peace march. However, there was more overlapping than the organizers had intended. FdJ members were not turning up at the station for departure in the expected numbers. In fact, they were not turning up in the expected numbers at the festival's cultural and sporting events, either.

FESTIVAL AUTHORITIES IN A DILEMMA

There was no question but that FdJ members were crossing the sector border in ever increasing numbers. Such excursions had been strictly forbidden. Before their arrival in Berlin, FdJ members had been warned in lurid terms of dangers awaiting them on the other side of the sector line. West Berlin police, the young were told, would put them in jail, beat them, and either starve them or provide them with poisoned food. In the unlikely event that disobedient young survived a prohibited excursion into the West sectors, they were assured of strict disciplinary action at the hands of their own authorities upon their return to the Soviet area. In spite of all warnings the East German young streamed across the sector line into Free Berlin.

This exodus from the Soviet sector posed a delicate problem to the Soviet authorities. They were operating under the eyes of hundreds of thousands of young people who had been brought to East Berlin in the name of peace and international friendship, under the eyes of thousands of foreign delegates, and under the eyes of numerous press correspondents. A cordon of police around the Soviet sector to prevent East Germans from visiting West Germans was scarcely the answer. The Young Pioneers could be kept in hand. They were all in one camp with a high fence around it—and the camp was miles away from the border. Too, in view of the extreme youth of the Young Pioneers, it was feasible to have their camp patrolled by guards and to have guards attend them in their movements to and from camp, thus preventing them from straying. The foreign delegations, except for a few extraordinarily determined individuals, offered little difficulty because they were kept segregated and under guidance—international friendship was to be achieved by means of mass cries of "Freundschaft" from a discreet distance. The carefully regimented FdJ members were the problem children of the Festival. Forceful restraint by armed police would be difficult to maintain along such a long border and would be poor propaganda. As it was, an American news camera man had managed to be on hand to record the matter of an East sector policeman dragging an FdJ member back across the line and beating him. On the other hand, ignoring the visits and such flagrant defiance of authority not only amounted to a confession of weakness but also gave the visitors a golden opportunity to per-

ceive the untruth of much that they had been taught.

First the authorities attempted to solve the border-crossing problem by means of "trusties" among the FbJ, the comparatively small percentage of the huge organization that contains the "true believers." These elect gathered at the sector line to argue the less stable young out of crossing over and, if practicable, to restrain them physically.

It is probable that the Soviet authorities had failed to allow for the powerful appeal as a symbol that Berlin has for Germans. It is more than a city. To the older generation, it is more the hub of the universe. To the young who had never had opportunity to see it, it had become something of a legend. Parents far away at home behind the Iron Curtain had in many instances urged their children to see this or that in Western Berlin. A good many mothers had begged their sons or daughters to buy them homely conveniences in the shops of West Berlin—for instance, rubber rings for fruit jars, not to be found in the East zone, were in great demand. Also, it is possible that the Soviet authorities had underestimated the lure of forbidden fruit. At any event, attempts by sizeable groups of the elite FbJ members to restrain the adventurers by force and efforts to persuade by warnings and pleading were of little avail. In the first instance, if outnumbered by the elite guard in one spot, the recalcitrants merely went on till they found a more likely place of exit from the Soviet sector. In the other instance, predictions of the trouble wanderers would get into over the line and reiterations of "You don't know how dreadful and wretched it is over there" failed to dampen the spirit of adventure that had suddenly descended upon the heretofore well regimented East German young. The response to these arguments can best be summed up in the words of one youngster. "But why can't we go over and see with our own eyes how dreadful and wretched it all is?"

The Soviet authorities sent out sound trucks to cruise along the border, with loud-speakers solemnly warning of the trouble in store for wanderers, but the young continued to cross over; many went back again and again. During the week end of the Peace March, the authorities took additional action to prevent excursions of Festival participants across the line and to insure their presence in the parade: they closed down stations of the U-bahn, or subway, that connect with West Berlin. This measure made it harder for the explorers to get to West Berlin, but failed utterly to check the tide westward. According to counts taken of FbJ visitors at the many points of interest in Free Berlin on the Sunday of the big parade, approximately 250,000 Festival participants managed to get away to the West sectors for at least part of the day. Granting that a good many of the visitors may have been counted twice, Free Berlin

still drew a bumper crowd of young visitors from the East on that Sunday.

On August 15 trucks with Soviet zone or sector license plates carried the chosen among the FbJ to points near the border. Thousands of the faithful sauntered over the line in seemingly blameless fashion, only to start a "peace demonstration," once they were over, that had all the earmarks of a first-class riot. Close on their heels were East zone camera trucks with newsreel photographers to catch shots of the West Berlin police repelling the rioters. Fire hose went into action, and most of the invaders retreated to safety in the Soviet sector. A few suffered minor injuries, and a hundred or more were arrested, though all but about half a dozen, who received light sentences of a few days in jail, were released within a few hours. This was patently a cooked-up riot, intended to force West Berlin police into action against the youth, so providing Soviet propaganda with new ammunition, and also to discourage further visits of the FbJ members to Free Berlin. Understood as such by the people of West Berlin, the riot had no effect upon the welcome extended to genuine sight-seers and seekers after information—or upon the numbers crossing over the line.

West Berlin people and Eastern visitors took it for granted that the Soviets had their undercover observers in the West sectors of the city and that they were making a determined attempt to keep a check on those boys and girls who defied authority to visit Free Berlin. Some returning visitors reported that they had had their ration and Festival participant cards taken away from them when they went back to camp. These unruly members had been threatened with expulsion from the FbJ. The control system, based on an elaborate hierarchy of leaders, with each tier of leaders reporting to the next, broke down when a large number of lower echelon leaders defaulted and went sightseeing with their charges. On the face of the matter, it seemed improbable that such leaders would report their own derelictions from duty—or that certain other leaders would consider it prudent to report inability to keep their charges in hand.

THE PEACE MARCH

The high point of the Festival was the 8-hour Peace March of blue-uniformed German youth before the foreign delegates and the residents of Berlin's Soviet sector. From many points the blue-shirted FbJ members marched along side streets that lead into *Unter den Linden* from either side of *Marx-Engels-Platz*, their forces swelling as they neared their goal. In *Marx-Engels-Platz*, they marched 70 abreast before the reviewing stand from which East German Communist Party officials and dignitaries from Moscow looked down upon the young. The reviewing stand flut-

tered with the flags of all nations interspersed with the blue and white flag of peace and the symbolic dove. The particular dove image chosen for infinite duplication in the Festival's decoration scheme was perhaps the result of hasty selection. The Soviet press itself, speaking from Berlin and indulging momentarily in objectivity, pointed out that the dove was much too fat to fly and was not a very alert-looking bird.

Until they reached *Unter den Linden*, where the formations about to converge on *Marx-Engels-Platz* grew to 35 abreast, the marchers walked along without much show of spirit, doubtless conscious of the weight of the great banners and portraits that they carried. However, once they turned into *Unter den Linden*, they began to hear through loud speakers the tumult within *Marx-Engels-Platz*, where those in the vanguard were being welcomed; the stirring music; the shouts of "Freundschaft" and "Frieden," Friendship and Freedom; and the rhythmic handclapping. The emotional reaction was immediate. By the time they joined the oncoming formation from the other end of *Unter den Linden* to enter the reviewing area, they were, as one American observer put it, "pretty well jazzed up."

Columns of young marchers carried great red flags with Stalin's face on them. Behind them were columns carrying white signs inscribed with "Peace" in as many languages as have taken written form. There were huge banners with Communist slogans. There were effigies of Adenauer, Schuman, Schumacher, Truman, Eisenhower, and McCloy, and caricatures of the same men. There was an extraordinary portrayal of General Eisenhower with a strong resemblance to Mephistopheles and with a large dollar sign set upon his brow, another of President Truman with the left half of Adolf Hitler's face and mustache grafted on. This latter creation was captioned *Truman der Erbe Hitler!*—Truman the heir of Hitler. Slogans of reverence for Stalin and slogans of hatred of Western leaders and the United States, chants of peace, and chants of hatred wove a curious antiphony. Over and over, all day long, pictures and words stamped upon the emotionally stirred minds of the blue-shirted young the identification of Stalin and the Soviet Union with peace and international friendship, the identification of the Western World with war and aggression.

The evening program following the 8-hour parade began with a concert and ended with speeches, the principal one by Moscow-trained Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Minister President of the puppet German Democratic Republic, Secretary General of the SED (East Germany's Communist Party), and member of the SED politburo. In this speech, Ulbricht told young West German "peace fighters" just what forms their resistance to the remilitarization of Western Germany should take, naming strikes, sabotage, and defiance of the Allied authorities and the Federal Republic.

In conclusion, Ulbricht reminded his listeners that West German imperialism is now considered (in Communist circles) the principal partner of American imperialism; recommended that youth realize fully the sources of imperialism and study Stalin and Lenin on the subject of just and unjust war; and wound up with a declaration that the World Festival would encourage West German youth to make bigger and better efforts against American-sponsored German remilitarization and in behalf of peace.

At last, the excitement over for the night, the East German young who had stayed with the program to the end and not slipped away to Free Berlin were free to totter back to their straw beds in the chilly tent cities, to sleep the sleep of exhaustion, and perhaps to dream of Truman and Eisenhower and Adenauer in intimate conclave with the powers of darkness and of Stalin with the plump peace dove nesting in his mustache.

TAPERING OFF

The climax of the Festival was reached August 12 with the tremendous Peace March. The bulk of the FDR "hosts" were scheduled to return to their homes in the Soviet zone, and the third and smallest wave of participants arrived after most of the excitement was over. Highly publicized sports events and cultural exhibitions continued to the end, and there were minor parades and marches. Members of some of the foreign delegations became a bit restive in the sequestered life ordained for foreign delegates and critical of accommodations and entertainment. Some of these young people managed to dodge the watchful eyes of their mentors and get a glimpse of Free Berlin. Among them was one delegate from Moscow, who went back to his quarters in the Soviet sector with his pockets stuffed with uncensored Western newspapers, pamphlets, and pocket-edition books. By the twentieth of August all participants had vanished from Berlin except members of the Central Committees of the Party in foreign countries and local dignitaries. It is probable that even they were rather tired as they met for the summing up.

Escape From Regimentation, Free Berlin's Offering

Months before the actual festival took place, since it was advertised early in the year, the people of West Berlin began to plan for it, too. It seemed probable to them and to other Germans within the Western political climate, as well as to the Allied occupation authorities, that many East zone boys and girls would want to see all of Berlin, if they had opportunity and were sure of a welcome, rather than just one not very typical piece of Berlin.

Free Berlin wasted no time in camouflaging its streets and buildings with flags and slogan-inscribed banners. It got down to the essentials

of planned hospitality for guests: extra food supplies and arrangements for dispensing it; arrangements for the visitors to see art exhibits, exhibits of the progress in the European Recovery Program, outstanding moving pictures, and to hear concerts and see some good plays, all free of charge. It also got together a quantity of reading matter of a factual nature, concerned with world affairs, the kind that visitors from behind the Iron Curtain were not likely to find lying around at home. Since ordinary means of communication between the East and West zones of Germany have become increasingly unreliable in recent years, and since Free Berlin wanted fellow Germans in the East zone to know that the young people would be welcome, the city's mayor, Dr. Ernst Reuter, talked over the radio a few nights before the Festival was to open, and, while his words were addressed to the residents of his own city, they were beamed by powerful transmitters to the Laender, or states, of the Soviet zone, to be picked up in many German homes that were preparing to send a son or a daughter to the Festival. This is the part of his speech that had most significance for those who were able to overhear it in the Eastern zone:

We shall quite certainly during these days [of the Festival] have visitors from the East, despite the attempts of Soviet authorities to prevent it, and we also shall be glad to receive within our walls every visitor who comes to us peacefully, with peaceful intentions. We intend to show them that the difference between the system of totalitarian propaganda and the system of free and peaceful life is manifested in the image of the city, in the behavior of people, and in our whole appearance. We intend to give them an opportunity whenever they come to us to become our guests. We intend to receive them in a friendly manner, and we intend to give them a chance to recover here from the mad exertion to which they will be continuously subjected in the East.

... When visitors come to us, I only ask you, my dear Berlin countrymen, let us show the people from the East what our ideal is! Our ideal is the informal, free, natural life of human beings who do not always have to march, parade, and repeat political slogans, who do not have to march on command to the right, to the left, forwards, and backwards. Our ideal is the free life of natural human beings who know that they can pursue their work and, after their work is done, can relax, and who understand how to enjoy the life of a fine summer day.

From the flag-enshrouded ruins of the Soviet sector, from under the pictured gaze of Stalin and the substantial peace dove, from mass movements, mass billets, mass-entertainment, and mass presentation of slogans, the East German young, who in their entire lives had known only regimentation, first under Hitler, then under the Soviet dictatorship, flocked to Free Berlin.

Free Berlin is a wide and gracious city, a city of variety, of contrasts. Much of its charm lies in those contrasts: between the long-established, substantial residential areas and the stretches of pleasantly rural landscape that permeate these areas, and between the colorful shopping districts with their crowds and heightened tempo of life

and pieces of wooded park that reach into the very heart of the city. Berlin is rich in lakes and streams and woods that invite idle wandering and daydreaming on a summer's day. The one pastime leads to the other in all naturalness; neither has approved status in the Soviet areas of control. West Berlin has been well called the "Island of Freedom behind the Iron Curtain."

To this "island" the young of the Soviet-dominated East zone came, in thousands even the first day of the Festival, then in tens of thousands, then a hundred thousand or more in a single day. At first they came in curiosity and some in fear, but they came, and they came back because they wanted more of what they had found.

They found a city thrown open to them. Once over the border they found ready to their hands a convenient guide called "Tip." This was issued in quantity by the August Committee (of Allied-German composition) to tell the visitors just where they would find entertainment that might appeal to them and how to get there. It showed them where 50 or more youth centers open to all comers, regardless of organizational affiliation, were located, and informed them of the programs in progress at the centers. These houses of hospitality offered small-scale, informal athletics, movies, open forums, puppet shows, folk dancing, and concerts, and light refreshments. It told them of the "Train of Europe," just outside Free Berlin's principal exhibition grounds, containing a variety of mechanized exhibits and posters demonstrating the aims and accomplishments of the European Recovery Program. It directed them to an equally attractive Recovery Program exhibit in the ERP Pavilion, in the downtown area, near the famous *Kurfuerstendamm* shopping district. It directed them to commercial motion picture houses that were offering free admission to visitors from the Soviet sector, and to the capacious Titania Palast, which was offering a free showing of selected American films, among them *City Lights*, *To Live in Peace*, *Our Vines have Tender Grapes*, and *Miracle on 34th Street*. It told them of free concerts being presented for their enjoyment by the Berlin Symphony Orchestra and by the British Military Band, and of television shows both in black and white and in technicolor, that would be coming along in the second week of the festival. It mentioned several helicopter demonstrations that were being scheduled during the 2-week period, and exhibits that they might enjoy at the Marshall House and at America House. They were under no compulsion to go to any of these places. They were free to go where they would, to see what they wanted to see.

By the third day of the festival, more than 50,000 of its East German participants were leaving it to see Free Berlin. About 42,000 of them went to the youth centers; 15,000 passed through the "Train of Europe" and the Marshall House; 11,000 visited the ERP Pavilion; 2,000 dropped in at

the America House. They carried away all the free reading matter that they could stuff in pockets and under their shirts, books, pamphlets, and the special youth supplements put out by Berlin's free press. Some of the girls sewed pamphlets into the hems of their skirts. Their Western friends reminded them that they might get into trouble if they took this reading matter back with them, suggesting that it might be more discreet for them to read it and dispose of it before crossing the border. East German youth preferred to take its chances along with the pamphlets.

With the influx of visitors exceeding the most generous calculations, it became necessary to act quickly if guests of Free Berlin were to be fed—and they required food. The visitors spoke freely and with considerable bitterness of how they had gone without butter and meat for weeks at home to provide food for the festival, only to get short rations of uncooked food after they reached Berlin. The German Red Cross went into action, taking over the facilities of Free Berlin's free school lunch system, to provide for the visitors. The German Federal Republic Government and the Berlin City Government and the Berlin people contributed. So did the American, British, and French authorities. The visitors continued to get simple but nourishing hot meals.

The RIAS Program for East Zone Youth

To the East zone visitors in West Berlin, RIAS (Radio in American sector) is what Radio City is to the young American visitor to New York. Young people in the Soviet zone listen to RIAS programs, Soviet jamming permitting, and they have their favorite news commentators, their favorite dance orchestras, their favorite comedians and stars. The first question asked by a large proportion of the visitors after they had reached the Western sector was "Please, will you direct me to RIAS?"

RIAS, voice of the West's Campaign for Freedom, has a studio that will contain between 200 and 250 people. This studio was set aside for the welcoming of East German youth. It received them all day long, every day of the festival, at 45-minute intervals. Up in front were RIAS staff members and a varying group of volunteer hosts, which, in the course of the 2 weeks, included Bundestag members and our American High Commissioner, John J. McCloy. The youngsters got to see in the flesh a number of their favorite stars, too.

For each group of 200 or more, the routine was the same. Once they had settled down, a RIAS staff member made a brief speech of welcome, saying how glad everybody was that the guests had managed to get there and explaining that the people up in front were there to answer any questions that the boys and girls wanted to ask.

At first, the faces showed tension and distrust of everyone except personal friends, and the ques-

tions came slowly. Gradually the visitors relaxed, and questions came thick and fast, with a good deal of whispering back and forth and those too timid to speak up for themselves supplying bolder companions with questions. The questions were serious ones; they were answered seriously. The askers were chiefly boys of 16 to 19 or 20, of an age to be vitally concerned with military service in the event of war. They wanted to know about the Schuman Plan, Western European Defense, the standard of living of workers in the United States, and one boy asked of Bundestag member Dr. Petev Nellen of the strong coalition party known as the Christian Democratic Union: "What do you think of the Potsdam Agreement?" To that one the West German Bundestag member replied: "Personally, I think it was a mistake—but would you dare to ask that question of one of your East German officials, and if you did, would he dare to give you the answer that I have?"

The counterquestion drew laughter and cries of "No. Never" from the audience.

In most of these sessions there were eventually questions voicing a desire for reassurance that the East Germans had not been forgotten by the free world, for hope that liberation would some day be at hand. These were no light and gay sessions. They were in deadly earnest during the question and answer period. Yet when the master of ceremonies announced that there would be a short closing period of refreshments and American dance music, the mood changed. Applause and cheers greeted the announcement, and while the visitors did away with hot soup and crackers and coffee, their feet tapped happily in rhythm with the American music that their Soviet dictators have tried to teach them to despise.

Unquestionably, the high point in the RIAS hospitality program was reached on August 17, when High Commissioner John J. McCloy, who had just entertained 12 FmJ visitors picked at random from the crowd at his home for luncheon, dropped in to answer questions. He stayed for several hours. He got straight and searching questions, and he answered them without any beating about the bush. One boy asked: "Why did the Americans hand over to the Russians the territories they had originally occupied, for instance, Thuringia?"

"I have heard this question frequently," Mr. McCloy answered. "This step, as it appears today, has been a mistake. However, in those days, we were allies of the Russians, and we did not have any reason to believe that the Russians would not fulfill their obligations."

Another asked: "What about the remilitarization of Western Germany?"

The answer came: "After 1945 the Allies agreed to root out militarism. Yet after the Western Powers had disarmed, it appeared that an equilibrium between East and West had still to be achieved. There was a preponderance of military

strength in the East that resulted in political pressure and aggression. This aggression culminated in the Korean conflict, where the Soviets resorted to force.

"In this phase the Western Allies gave Western Germany and West Berlin certain guaranties and declared that any attack on Western Germany and West Berlin would be identical with an attack on the Western Powers themselves. A parallel can be drawn between Korea and Germany since Germany like Korea consists of two halves. As a counter-measure to the pressure from the East, Western Europe and the Atlantic countries found themselves compelled to form a defense system that would check the Soviets.

"Now the question arises whether or not Germany shall participate in these efforts. An effective defense contribution would be desirable not only from the German and from a practical point of view but also from the moral one, for it is impossible effectively to defend Germany with foreign forces exclusively. I should like to emphasize that it is not the intention of the United States to force Germany to make contribution. The question of German defense contribution can be decided only by the German people themselves. We would agree to a possible German defense contribution only within the framework of international forces. We do not want by any means the revival of German nationalism and militarism. It is clear that to date there has been no West German rearmament."

As Mr. McCloy finished speaking, Dr. Nellen burst out with a question for the audience: "Can you imagine that Chuikov would sit with you at one table just like the American High Commissioner Mr. McCloy? Can you imagine that he would conduct such a discussion on political matters of the highest importance without the most thorough-going preparations?" And his answers came in great volume from the audience of FbJ members: "No. Never."

Postscript

At a conservative estimate, half a million Soviet zone German boys and girls who had been told that West zone Germans were living in want and slavery under Allied policies, saw for themselves that these stories were untrue. They found West Berlin going about its business and taking its pleasures according to its own wishes, with no fear of secret police. They met and talked with and were entertained by German citizens and officials of the West, also some pretty high level officials of the United States, Britain and France as well as run-of-the-mill soldiers and civilians of those countries whose jobs keep them in Western Germany. They met on every hand reassurance that they are not forgotten by their fellow-countrymen and relatives in West Germany or by the free

world in general. They had proof in many places of the technological developments of the West, of the strength and purposefulness of the democratic world. They saw with their own eyes how life goes on and with what advantages to the individual under democratic procedures and principles. They saw on every hand newsstands overflowing with uncensored newspapers and magazines, many of them highly critical of existing political authorities and policies.

Several Americans who observed the festival and its participants closely and talked personally with a number of the visitors to Free Berlin speak of the "thirst for knowledge" these Soviet-dominated German boys and girls display at every opportunity. Mr. McCloy said, in the light of his own experience: "My own impression is that East zone youth is hungry for light and freedom, that it looks to America for eventual salvation, that it is wise and more impervious than we had thought to Communist propaganda. Nevertheless, it is somewhat influenced and made uncertain by Soviet propaganda regarding the United States and its intentions."

It would be ingenuous to assume that each of the half million young people who visited Free Berlin has returned to his home behind the Iron Curtain with the firm intention of joining the underground movement and doing his individual best to upset the Soviet apple cart. However, the half-million or more FbJ members have had a taste of freedom, and there is no question but that they liked it. They are going to compare what they have in the East zone with what they know exists in the West, and it is reasonable that some of them are going to want more of what they enjoyed so briefly so much that they will go to some length to get it.

A few days after the festival had closed, the Executive Committee of its sponsoring organization, the Communist Front World Federation of Democratic Youth, met in East Berlin. In the course of that meeting, the committee decided that instead of organizing another gigantic "world youth festival" in 1952, it would summon a small "international conference for the defense of the rights of youth," probably at Moscow—where the Iron Curtain has proved relatively hole-proof thus far. The committee offered no explanation of its decision. Western observers of the recent festival offer several interpretations of both the festival and decision.

One contingent advances the theory that the Communist organizers, suspecting that they might never again succeed in rallying such a large number of young people—let alone a greater—preferred to avoid a repetition that might well be anti-climactic.

Another group of observers regards the decision as a confession on the part of the Communists of inability to control so many young people at one

time and in one place—inasmuch as approximately half the participants of the August festival got out of hand at one time or another.

A third group, composed largely of trained observers from the Allied High Commission for Germany and from West German official circles, is less concerned with the why behind the recent decision against repeating the recent world festival in another place and time than with the implications of the festival itself. It would be a serious mistake, this third group maintains, to underestimate the Third World Festival, or to write it off as a failure because a good many of its participants took informal leave. Although the young slipped away from the huge Peace March and from other major events in large numbers to explore forbidden territory, the fact remains that they marched first, that they shouted and clapped in involuntary response to Communist words and symbols, caught up in a surge of mass emotion, just as their organizers had intended. This third group grants that it is highly probable that the organizers themselves consider that the festival failed to accomplish its long-range objective of contributing materially to the permanent conquest of the minds of its participants. It is fairly certain that these organizers are disappointed and chagrined that the hypnotic effect of the mass demonstration proved to be of such short duration with many participants—once they had broken away from mass formation.

To this third school of thought, the ability of the Communists to hypnotize such an enormous number of young people into mass response, mass action, even for periods of a few hours, is disturbing. As a demonstration of such power, the festival was no failure. In fact, it surpassed in sheer numbers any of the Nazis' efforts at Nürnberg. The fact that the effect was transient in many cases is no sound reason to underestimate the methods that achieved the effect. No sane person is likely to underestimate the menace of marijuana because the effects of a dose wear off in a matter of hours—especially if there is a seemingly inexhaustible supply of marijuana being doled out.

The Third World Festival for youth has been instructive to the free world. It served to clarify the problem of youth in today's troubled world. The festival's location at Berlin gave the West opportunity to observe at close range the techniques employed by Communist totalitarianism to manipulate the young. Held on the edge of the West's outpost behind the Iron Curtain, the festival demonstrated among other things that Communist domination of youth is not yet complete. No effort will be spared to make it so, we may be sure, but in the meantime the door is open a little way to western influence.

• *Ruth E. McKee, author of the above article, is an information specialist in the Division of Publications.*

Communist World Youth Festival

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press August 22]

The Communist World Youth Festival just concluded in Berlin was supposed to demonstrate the alleged solidarity of the world's youth in backing the Kremlin's spurious "peace" campaign. Like similar Nazi spectacles in the past, it also was designed to instill a feeling of mass enthusiasm and allegiance to the Soviet cause among the thousands of youths transported to East Berlin for the occasion.

Instead, it gave proof to the world that the younger generation behind the Iron Curtain, despite years of Communist indoctrination, is eager to get a glimpse of the free world and to show its contempt for the totalitarian system. Defying Communist-Police controls and the threat of reprisals, hundreds of thousands of festival participants managed to escape from the regimented demonstrations in the Soviet sector to get a breath of free air in western Berlin.

There they could see for themselves the civil liberties and unregimented life enjoyed by western Berlin's courageous population. Amazed, they inspected the variety of goods displayed in western Berlin's stores. Thousands were given warm meals at youth centers especially set up throughout the three western sectors. Many were attracted by special exhibits and motion pictures to which they were admitted free of charge. Others thronged to see RIAS, the United States sponsored radio station in Berlin, where they were entertained and where ranking Allied and German officials, including our High Commissioner, Mr. McCloy, frankly answered their searching questions. But most of all they were impressed by the experience of seeing a free population leading a normal life, so different from their own "police-state" environment. They certainly will carry this impression with them to their homes.

Realizing that their efforts to dissuade the young people from visiting the western sectors were not succeeding, the Communist authorities sent gangs of hooligans—and I use the word hooligan advisedly—across the sector borders to provoke riots, hoping that the resulting violence would act as a deterrent. But the young people responded magnificently by streaming across the boundary line the very next day as boldly as ever to visit the free part of the city.

The youth festival is new evidence, if any were needed, of the efforts the Communists are making to mobilize the young people under their control for their own ulterior purposes. Employing the characteristic totalitarian devices of monolithic youth organizations, mass demonstrations, and appeals to youths' natural desire for world peace and friendship, they seek to submerge individual reason and integrity in mass fanaticism.

It is indeed heartening that such large numbers of these captive youths gave such a bold demonstration of their independence of spirit by visiting the free world's outpost in West Berlin. We must do everything within our power to bolster them in their determination to maintain this spiritual independence, by reinforcing the impressions of the free world which they received in West Berlin.

Defensive Strength of Free World Continuing to Drive Ahead

Address by the President¹

Six years ago, here in San Francisco, the United Nations was formed. It was our purpose then to prevent another world war. That is still our purpose.

The United Nations was established to unite the moral forces of the world for peace, and to organize the strength of many nations to keep the peace.

In these last 6 years, there have been many difficulties and obstructions. But today the United Nations is doing exactly what it was set up to do.

When aggression broke out in Korea, the United Nations took action. It labeled the aggression for what it was, and it branded the North Korean and Chinese Communists as the aggressors. It called upon peace-loving countries to unite and put down the aggression.

That is what we have been doing. Young men from the United States have been fighting heroically, alongside young men from many other countries, to stop aggression in Korea. For they know, and we know, that if aggression were not checked in Korea it would only be a matter of time until a new world war brought destruction and misery to all of us.

For the past several weeks, there have been negotiations in Korea, at the suggestion of the Communist aggressors, for an armistice there as the first step to a peaceful settlement. Recently, the Communists have broken off these negotiations. We do not know whether they intend to resume them. We are ready at any time to reach an honorable settlement in Korea, but we will not give in to aggression.

Whether negotiations in Korea are successful or not, we must continue to drive ahead to build defensive strength for our country and the free world. The plain fact is that the Communists may try to resume the offensive in Korea at any time. Moreover, they are capable of launching new attacks in Europe, in the Middle East, or elsewhere in Asia, wherever it suits them.

That is what makes it so vital that we build our defenses—and build them fast.

¹ Made over the radio at San Francisco on Sept. 3 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

Right now, our defense effort is beginning to roll. We have been tooling up for large-scale production of new airplanes, tanks, and weapons of all types. We have a lot of new developments that we are putting into production—ranging from faster jet planes to lighter equipment for our foot soldiers.

These things take materials and manpower. And they cost money.

That is where this savings bond campaign comes in. All of you, I know, want to help in the defense of our country.

People sometimes say to me, "I want to help in the defense effort, but I don't know what I can do. Can you tell me?"

Tonight, I am telling you about something everybody can do. This is a personal matter with every one of you.

You can help to defend your country by buying United States savings bonds.

At the same time, you will be putting aside money, at a time when goods are becoming scarcer, which will be available later on when goods are more plentiful. It will be a backlog to meet emergencies, to finance the education of your children or to purchase a home, and to provide for a more comfortable old age.

The savings bonds you buy will be bonds for freedom. And they will be bonds for your personal future. I ask each of you to back the defense drive to the limit by buying extra bonds and by helping to sell bonds to others.

Buying defense bonds is a way in which each of us can play a part in the defense of our country and in bringing peace to the world.

U.S., Australia, and New Zealand to Sign Security Treaty

The Treaty of Security between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States will be signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951.

Percy C. Spender, Ambassador of Australia, and Sir Carl Berendsen, Ambassador of New Zealand, will sign for Australia and New Zealand, respectively, and Secretary Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Senator Tom Connally, and Senator Alexander Wiley are empowered to sign for the United States.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmation

On August 21, 1951, the Senate confirmed the nomination of Waldemar J. Gallman to be American Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of South Africa.

Czechoslovakian Ambassador Presents Credentials to the President

[Released to the press August 28]

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR VLADIMIR PROCHAZKA

The following are the remarks made by Ambassador Prochazka on the occasion of his presentation of his credentials to the President on August 28:

I have the honor to present the letters from the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Klement Gottwald, accrediting me as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to your Government, and at the same time to present the letters of recall of my predecessor.

I am in your country for the first time but I am fully conscious of the significance and importance of the mission entrusted to me. I shall endeavor to fulfill it in the spirit of the general policy of our President and our Government, a policy dedicated entirely to peace, a policy the fundamental idea of which, in accordance with the most sincere desires of both the nations of my country, the Czechs and Slovaks, is the preservation of peace.

It is in this spirit that I wish to devote myself to my task during my stay here as the representative of the people and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, and it is in this spirit that I am hoping for cooperation on the part of Your Excellency.

It is in this spirit that I am presenting to you, Mr. President, my credentials as Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic to the United States of America.

REPLY BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN

I have received the letter from the President of the Czechoslovak Republic accrediting you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Government of the United States and note the remarks indicating a purpose to accomplish your mission here in the spirit of a policy of peace.

I assure you, Mr. Ambassador, that since the people of the United States are devoted to the pursuit of peace they will be intensely interested in any genuine steps which you will take toward that goal. In particular they will follow closely the efforts on your part, in the interests of furthering peace, to settle the present serious issues be-

tween our two Governments. I hope that your work in contributing to a solution of these problems may be marked with success.

After the Czechoslovakian Ambassador had presented his credentials to President Truman, Joseph Short, Secretary to the President, held a news conference and gave the press a statement orally, substantially as follows:

In the conversation between the President and the Ambassador, the Ambassador said he hoped to make our relations more cordial. The President replied that the best way he could make our relations more cordial was to send our AP correspondent Oatis home.¹

The President further said that relations between our two countries had deteriorated ever since Jan Masaryk was murdered. Before that time, the President said, the relations between the United States and the Republic of Czechoslovakia had been wonderful. He mentioned the extreme friendliness of our political relations and the back-and-forth trade relations. But now, the President said, it looked as if our relations would not be what they had been unless Czechoslovakia changed its policy.

The Ambassador made no response to his remarks.

On the following day, August 29, Ambassador Prochazka was called to the Department of State for a frank and thorough discussion of the Oatis case and related problems in United States—Czechoslovakian relations.

After this meeting, Carroll Kilpatrick, press officer of the Department of State, gave the following account of the Czechoslovakian Ambassador's discussion with Secretary Acheson:

The Secretary stressed the aroused feelings of the American people and Government at the arbitrary and unjust treatment of Mr. Oatis and other American citizens by the Czechoslovakian Government, and in evidence of this strong reaction, he

¹ For an article on the Czech trial of William N. Oatis, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 283.

handed the Ambassador a copy of the text of the Concurrent Resolution on the Oatis case passed by the House of Representatives on August 14, and by the Senate on August 23.

The Secretary made it emphatically clear he does not understand the attitude of the Czechoslovakian Government during the past few months and that if nothing is done to settle the present problems tension will only continue to mount.

The Secretary repeated the remarks made to the Ambassador by the President yesterday to the effect that if the Ambassador is interested in better relations between his country and the United States, he must understand the need for prompt steps on his part to effect the release of American citizens unjustly imprisoned in Czechoslovakia.

The Ambassador said he would report the Secretary's remarks to his Government.

After his appointment with the Secretary, Ambassador Prochazka asserted to reporters that the case of Mr. Oatis, "from the juridical point of view," was closed so far as his country was concerned and that his Government would not yield to any pressure to obtain the newsman's release.

At his news conference on August 30, President Truman was asked by a reporter what he thought about the Czechoslovakian Ambassador's statement that he regarded the Oatis case as closed. President Truman stated that the Oatis case would never be closed until Oatis gets out of jail—at least not in this country.

House Concurrent Resolution 140

The following is the text of Concurrent Resolution 140 as passed by the House of Representatives on August 14 and by the Senate on August 23:

WHEREAS the arrest and conviction of William N. Oatis, correspondent of the Associated Press in Prague, Czechoslovakia, is a shocking violation of the fundamental human freedoms guaranteed in the United Nations Charter; and

WHEREAS the treatment of William N. Oatis demonstrates that the Czechoslovak Government has willfully repudiated the principle of free information which is so essential to peaceful cooperation and friendly relations among the people of the world; and

WHEREAS the persecution by the Government of Czechoslovakia of other American citizens is condemned and deplored by the people of the United States, and throughout the free world: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress of the United States expresses its profound indignation at the arrest, sham trial and unjust conviction of William N. Oatis; that the executive agencies of the Government be requested to take all possible action to bring about his release; and that the sense of this resolution be conveyed by the proper officials of our Government to the United Nations and to the officials of the Czechoslovakian Government.

Be it further resolved, That it is the sense of the Congress that all commercial relations with Czechoslovakia should be terminated immediately, and should be resumed only if and when the Government of Czechoslovakia restores to William N. Oatis his freedom.

U.S. Reiterates Position on Czechoslovak Protests to Radio Free Europe Programs

U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 24

[Released to the press August 24]

Following is the text of a note delivered today to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Prague in reply to a Czechoslovak note of July 21, 1951. This Czechoslovak note referred to the American Embassy's note of June 19¹ and denied the charges of border violation by Czechoslovakia while at the same time renewing the Czechoslovak Government's protests against the broadcasts of Radio Free Europe in the Czech and Slovak languages.

A study of the Ministry's note fails to reveal how this communication contributes anything new

or substantial to the discussion of the issues in the Ministry's preceding note of May 21 or to the consideration of the points raised in the Embassy's note of June 19 in reply to the latter. The United States Government has already clearly set forth the basic facts and its position on these questions in the Embassy's note of June 19.

The United States Government reiterates that its policy concerning information activities as explained in the Embassy's note of June 19 violates no international agreement binding on Germany or concerning information matters, or any other agreement to which the United States is a party. The United States is unalterably committed to the basic principle of freedom of information. Under the American Constitution there is an inherent right to criticize freely the United States Govern-

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 12.

ment and its policies, as is constantly done by publications such as the Daily Worker. The Czechoslovak Government, however, is apparently unable to allow such criticism by publications under its jurisdiction and is seeking to prevent any criticism from the press or radio of other countries.

From its study of the broadcasts made by the organization established and operated by a group of private citizens under the name of Radio Free Europe, the United States Government does not agree that Radio Free Europe is issuing directives for espionage and inciting Czechoslovak citizens to commit criminal acts. The Czechoslovak Government has repeatedly demonstrated that its conception of espionage and crime is so sweeping that any comment, critical in nature or indeed other than praise or endorsement of the present regime in Czechoslovakia and its acts, might be considered as an incitement to espionage and crime.

The operation of Radio Free Europe is clearly not in violation of any international agreement entered into by the United States or of any accepted principle of international law. In its discussion of this subject the Czechoslovak Government makes no reference to freedom of information, a fundamental principle in all free societies, since no such freedom exists in Czechoslovakia. States which would deny freedom to others are typically those most insistent on claiming freedom and even license for themselves. It was, therefore, not unexpected that the Czechoslovak Government, whose controlled press and radio indulge freely in hostile and vituperative attacks against the United States and other free nations, should protest legitimate criticism of itself by information organs in other countries.

In the matter of border violations the United States Government has carefully endeavored to work for the easement of this problem by the issuance of strict regulations for United States border patrols to exercise utmost care. When in spite of such careful precautions inadvertent violations have occurred, the United States Government, after investigation, has freely acknowledged the facts and taken renewed steps to prevent their recurrence. The unwillingness of the Czechoslovak Government in the present note to acknowledge the facts of Czechoslovak violation mentioned in the United States note of June 19 suggests that its attitude is never to recognize a violation on its part no matter to what extent its representatives are culpable. This attitude is hardly conducive to border tranquility or international amity and is unacceptable to the United States. The United States Government nevertheless will exercise every precaution to prevent any future border violations and if, in spite of such efforts, any inadvertent violation should occur will take appropriate remedial action. The United States Government accordingly has every right to expect the Czechoslovak authorities to deal with such problems in an equally correct manner.

CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF JULY 21

[Printed from telegraphic text]

Following is an unofficial English translation of a Foreign Office note from Praha of July 21:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the American Embassy and has the honor in advising the following with regard to the Embassy's note of June 19:

The Czechoslovak authorities have once more investigated the instance of violation of the Czechoslovak frontiers which took place May 4 between the frontier stones 22 and 23 on the road leading from the Bavarian community of Mahring to the community of Broumov, region Mariánské Lázně, and have ascertained that the case took place exactly in the way described in the Ministry's note of May 12.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has taken note of the fact that that disciplinary action has been taken against the patrol leader of the members of the U. S. Army, as well as of the Embassy's communication that appropriate U. S. authorities are taking all possible steps to prevent recurrence of such an incident. Concerning the communication of the American Embassy, according to which on June 6 three civilians and one member of the uniformed Czechoslovak guard twice penetrated the U. S. zone on the road which was clearly in the U. S. zone, Czechoslovak authorities immediately upon receiving notice of the incident from the Czechoslovak frontier guard, inquired into the matter, and the following was ascertained:

On June 6 Private Josef Koláček, member of the Czechoslovak frontier guard, accompanied a working group of wood cutters who were carting wood along a frontier path in the proximity of the community of Wies, region Cheb, between frontier stones 13/6 and 13/11. Suddenly six armed members of the U. S. armed forces arrived on the spot in a military vehicle on which there was a heavy machine gun, head of which was directed against the Czechoslovak state territory. The members of the American armed forces stopped the tractor with the working group that was accompanied by Private Koláček on the sector between the frontier stones 13/10 and 13/11 of the frontier path and prevented the working group from continuing.

The American occupation authorities, in this way without any justification and moreover with violence, rendered the work of the mentioned group impossible, although both the groups as well as the Czechoslovak frontier guard are entitled to use freely at any time the frontier paths and have also used them until now without any disturbances occurring. The members of the American armed forces moreover violently attacked Private Koláček, hit him in the face with their fists, tore away his automatic, and dragged him along the road in the direction of Hansbach.

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by force. Private Kolacek was kept by force until June 8 on the territory of the U. S. zone of occupation of Germany where he was pressed to divulge military secrets and where civilian and military members of the American occupation authorities attempted to persuade him not to return to Czechoslovakia.

The described facts ascertained by the Czechoslovak authorities and also confirmed by members of the frontier guard serving in the American zone of occupation in Germany show that the U. S. Government, in spite of emphatic protests raised by the Czechoslovak Government, has not taken measures to stop hostile acts of the U. S. armed forces of occupation directed against Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government views this flagrant violation of international law all the more seriously as the attack and the dragging away of a member of the Czechoslovak frontier guard was carried out in a particularly brutal manner, and he was incited to criminal acts.

Instead of the American Government stopping these continually recurring attacks against Czechoslovakia in whatever form, by taking appropriate measures, the American Embassy in its note attempts to describe this case as a violation of border by the Czechoslovak frontier organs.

The case of the alleged violation of the frontiers in the region of River Regnitz, by armed members of the Czechoslovak frontier guard which according to the note of the Embassy took place on May 24 has also been investigated by appropriate Czechoslovak authorities which have ascertained the following:

On May 24, approximately at 9 o'clock, a woman with a child crossed a brook in the region of Cisarsky Hamr and mowed grass. A member of the Czechoslovak frontier guard, who had been watching her from a greater distance, not noticing that just at this point the State frontier is in the shape of a wedge going into Czechoslovakia so that the brook runs only on the Bavarian side and under the impression that the state frontier was being violated, advised appropriate authorities of this event.

Six members of the Czechoslovak frontier guard then came to look for the person who had supposedly violated the border but they did not cross the frontier and from the distance of about 10 meters they asked the woman whether she had not seen somebody crossing the state frontier. Immediately after that a man came from the Bavarian side and called out to the woman "not to talk to the Czechoslovak guards, the Americans might see her." When members of the Czechoslovak frontier guard saw that an error had occurred, they returned to the cars and drove away. Investigations of the appropriate authorities have ascertained that the allegation of the American Embassy that somebody had threatened the woman was incorrect. Members of the frontier guard had their weapons on their backs and at no time

did any one of them even approach the woman. Two members of the Czechoslovak frontier guard, who remained in proximity of the mentioned point, observed how around 11 o'clock four members of the U. S. Army, one member of the German frontier guard, and one civilian came and examined the place. When leaving, one of them aimed his gun at the member of the Czechoslovak frontier guard. At the time when these persons were getting into the cars, several shots were heard coming from the territory of the American zone of occupation. No shot was fired by any of the members of the Czechoslovak frontier guard.

Also, this allegation of the Embassy's note is absolutely contrary to fact.

Investigation of the incident by the appropriate Czechoslovak authorities thus disproves allegations contained in the American Embassy's note in every respect.

As to the hostile activity, carried out through the broadcasting station "Free Europe," the Czechoslovak Government emphatically refutes the conclusions of the Embassy's note. Station "Free Europe" is placed on the territory under the occupation administration and subject to the direct control of the American Government. It is, therefore, inconceivable that this station could operate without agreement and approval of the American Government which bears full responsibility for the station's activity, directed against Czechoslovakia. This is also confirmed by voices of the American radio and press. So for instance the New York *Herald Tribune* of May 21 makes the following comment:

"Radio Free Europe is not technically an American Government operation but it could not function without government approval."

The American Embassy in its note states that it is not possible nor desirable to exercise control over the broadcasting station "Free Europe" because this would represent "violation of the principle of freedom of information." The American Embassy's conception of freedom of information then apparently is that of systematic incitation, and of an activity as carried out by a station which the newspaper the New York *Times* of May 3 specifically qualifies as "beamed at Czechoslovakia."

At the 2d General Assembly of the United Nations on November 3, 1947, the U. S. voted in favor of the unanimously adopted resolution No. 220/88. This resolution condemns all forms of propaganda in whatsoever country it is conducted which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

It further requests the government of each member to take appropriate steps within its constitutional limits to promote by all means of publicity and propaganda friendly relations among nations based upon the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The Embassy's note claims that the policy carried out by the American Government in the matter of broadcasts of the radio station "Free Europe" in no way violates any international agreement concerning Germany or any other international agreement to which the U. S. Government is a party. But in the Potsdam Agreement the United States have taken upon themselves the engagement to carry out the occupation of Germany according to the clearly established directives. They engage themselves to contribute towards absolute elimination of the Nazi and militaristic doctrines towards successful development of democratic ideas and that they would prepare for the reconstruction of German political life on a Democratic basis and for peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany. The activity of radio station "Free Europe," set up on the territory under American occupation administration, proves only once more how the United States misuse their position of an occupying power for objectives which are incompatible with these principles.

According to the fundamental principles of international law, it is one of the basic duties of every state to prevent and stop on its territory any activity that might be directed against the security of another state or which would be hostile to another state. (See for instance Oppenheim, *International Law*, 3d edition, p. 49 L: ". . . . It is the duty of every state to prevent individuals living on its territory from endangering the safety of another state") This principle of recognized international law naturally also covers the activity of radio stations. In concrete form this principle is for instance expressed in the international convention on use of radio in the interests of peace signed at Geneva on September 23, 1936. The article of this convention states:

High contracting parties mutually undertake to prohibit and if occasion arises to stop without delay broadcasting, within their respective territories, of any transmission which is to the detriment of good international understanding, is of such character as to incite population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or security of a territory of a high contracting party.

Besides governmental broadcasting stations the convention also refers to private ones.

The following is said in article 6, paragraph 2: "High contracting parties mutually undertake to include appropriate clauses for guidance of any autonomous broadcasting organizations either in constitutive charter of a national institution or in conditions imposed upon a concessionary company or in rules applicable to other private concerns and to take necessary measures to ensure application of these clauses." The provisions of the convention, signed by members of the League of Nations in September 1936, express general principles and rules of international law, and is in fact only a precise expression applied to radio transmissions of the general principle of international law according to which it is the fundamental duty of

every state to prevent and to prohibit on its territory every activity that might be directed against the security of another state or be hostile against this state.

Even a legal adviser of the State Department, George Heckworth, speaking generally of inadmissible activities carried out by radio, refers to this convention in the *Digest of International Law*, Washington, 1942, vol. IV, par. 353, pages 286-287.

Not even the American Embassy can deny that the broadcasting station "Free Europe" exercises an activity which is directed against the security of Czechoslovakia and incites acts incompatible with the international usage and also to common criminal acts. This station consistently broadcasts secret directives for espionage and diversive activity, and incites Czechoslovak citizens to commit criminal acts.

For instance, in its transmission of July 15, it called upon members of the Czechoslovak frontier guard to escape and violate Czechoslovak laws. That this activity is intentional, carefully planned in advance, is confirmed by voices of American personalities and by the American press. General Clay on May 3, 1951, speaking of "psychological warfare carried on by Radio Free Europe" declared: "We are able to expose informers and quislings behind the Iron Curtain, undermine authority of the local Communist regimes and help those trapped behind the Curtain to prepare for the day of liberation." The *New York Times* of May 4, 1951, in John Crosby's article, "The Worst Possible Light" published in the *New York Herald Tribune* of April 16, 1951, regarding the opening of the station "Free Europe" the following is said:

This information is generally concluded with a casual hint that a perfectly splendid accident might be arranged some dark night for a Communist spy. Radio "Free Europe" is brutally realistic in a lot of ways, one of them being precise advice on how to sabotage Communist industry. The basic message of radio "Free Europe" is to put Communist dictatorship into the worst possible light and to prepare people for the ultimate revolt and liberation.

The U.S. Government is clearly well aware of the fact that it is its fundamental duty to prevent activity exercised by radio "Free Europe" and that is why it intentionally hides behind its "private nature." The Embassy's note hypocritically states that the "matter of whom Radio 'Free Europe' employs is irrelevant and not appropriate for consideration by the Czechoslovak Government as it is not by the U.S. Government." It still remains an undeniable fact that the American Government does not only make possible activity of mercenary Czechoslovak emigres but directly supports them in their activity directed against Czechoslovakia. The American Government in this way reveals insincerity of its declarations on the maintenance of principles of international law which it intentionally violates through its acts.

The Czechoslovak Government finally emphatically refuted the manner in which the U.S. Government attempts to evade the responsibility for

its systematic hostile activity, revealed also by the regulations issued through an intermediary or a puppet government concerning treatment by frontier organs of agents of western occupying powers when these carry out surreptitious crossing of the Czechoslovak border. The Czechoslovak Government expects to be informed of the steps the U.S. Government has taken in all instances described.

CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF MAY 21¹

[Printed from telegraphic text]

Following is an unofficial English translation of a Foreign Office note from Praha of May 21, in which the Czechoslovak Government made various charges against the U.S. with reference to border violations, broadcasts, and other matters:

The Foreign Office of Czechoslovakia has repeatedly been obliged to raise protests with the U.S. Government against various forms of hostile activity directed against Czechoslovakia. In spite of these protests, the foundation of which the U.S. Government has had to admit, this hostile activity has not only not ceased, but on the contrary continues in even greater measure.

While the Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak people—together with other peace-loving states and nations—through its entire policy is endeavoring to maintain and strengthen peace the world over and is for peaceful democratic cooperation among nations, the U.S. Government is continually preparing, organizing, and carrying out various forms of activity hostile to and directed against Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government has repeatedly stated, and that also on an international forum, that the U.S. Government is also utilizing its broadcasting stations for carrying out activity hostile to and directed against Czechoslovakia, by broadcasting false news and reports and propaganda of incitation. Among U.S. broadcasting stations the one that is particularly notorious for inciting against Czechoslovakia is the American shortwave and broadcasting station, hypocritically called "Free Europe." This American broadcasting station, after preceding noisy announcements, began its anti-Czechoslovak broadcasts on May 1 on a new middle-wave transmitter. Violating international obligations, it uses a wavelength that according to the Copenhagen plan, has been allotted broadcasting stations of other countries. The new station has called itself boastfully "One of the strongest European stations" and the newspaper the *New York Times* in its issue of May 2 openly admits that "the powerful transmitter in Munich . . . beamed at Czechoslovakia . . . is sufficiently powerful and sufficiently close to its target."

¹ This note was referred to in the *BULLETIN* of July 2, 1951, p. 12, and is printed here for convenient reference.

All these circumstances clearly show this as a consistently prepared, reinforced campaign within the framework of the anti-Czechoslovakian hostile activity of American broadcasting stations. Corresponding to these intentions the broadcasts are marked by an even greater degree of war-mongering and hostile inciting against Czechoslovakia, against its people, against other sovereign states and nations. The seriousness of this form of hostile activity is increased by the fact that the U.S. Government uses traitors of the Czechoslovak people from the ranks of the mercenary Czechoslovak emigration for broadcasts of its station. Thus, it not only violates its international obligations accepted in valid international agreements concerning Germany, but also the most fundamental principles of international law.

The broadcasting station called "Free Europe" attempts to pass itself off as some sort of "private enterprise;" it stresses that it is not the spokesman of the U.S. Government. The true intention of these acts is again revealed in the already quoted issue of the *New York Times*, when it says the "private nature of this enterprise frees it of many inhibitions which must hamper a government agency such as VOA."

All these transparent manoeuvres prove only one thing that the U.S. Government is well aware that it is violating its international obligations and principles of international law by this activity. No such manoeuvres can free the U.S. Government of international responsibility for activity carried out by this station, set up by the American occupation authorities, placed on territory under the control of the U.S. despite the fact that according to the rules of international law the U.S. Government is responsible for every hostile activity carried out on its territory or on the territory under its control and directed against other sovereign states and nations.

On May 4, six to seven American military persons, armed, crossed Czechoslovak frontiers in two motorcars on the road leading from the Bavarian community of Mähring to Broumov, District Mariánské Lázně, between the frontier stones 22 and 23. They drove around the frontier barriers on both sides of the frontier and moved deeper into Czechoslovak territory with the cars; there they studied frontier installations, observed with field glasses and photographed certain objects. The culprits left Czechoslovak territory in the same way as they had entered.

These facts were ascertained by the Czechoslovak authorities and confirmed by the members of the frontier guard serving the American Occupation Zone.

The described facts are not isolated instances of members of the armed forces of the U.S. violating the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. They are but one link in the entire chain of continual and flagrant violations of a Czechoslovak terri-

torial and aerial order by the U.S. military organs, with the objective of supporting the individual acts of espionage and terrorism of subversive elements on the territory of Czechoslovakia and also for the purpose of direct hostile espionage activity. This proved by the already long series of protests, which the Czechoslovak Government was obliged to make in individual cases. The Czechoslovak Government holds indubitable proof of the fact that all these acts are part of espionage, sabotage, and other hostile activity directed against Czechoslovakia prepared, directed, and organized by the organs of the U.S. military occupation authorities of western Germany. To what extent this hostile activity is being carried out can, for instance, be seen from the fact that the U.S. Government has considered it necessary to order its puppet, so-called Bonn Government, to establish special regulations for the treatment of agents of the western occupation powers by the frontier organs when they illegally cross Czechoslovak frontiers.

Complying with this order the Minister of Finance of the so-called Bonn Government issued notice on February 10, 1951, in which he orders all frontier organs that in case of persons who claim

to be agents of the western occupation powers that they must not subject them to examination, that they must not take away their arms, and that they are to accompany them to a post of the U.S. military authorities on their illegal return from Czechoslovakia. The Minister of Finance of the so-called Bonn Government, in his notice, gives assurance that American military authorities have instructed their agents accordingly. This document clearly confirms the continual espionage and diversive (sic) activity carried out by the U.S. armed forces to such extent that American authorities found it necessary to regulate it by some kind of "legislation."

The Czechoslovak Government views the hostile activity of the United States, confirmed also by the facts described in the present note, very seriously. It protests most strongly against all forms of this hostile activity and expects to be informed of the measures which the U.S. Government has taken.

Correction: Release date of July 20 of article cited in BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 12, should read June 20.

Mutual Defense Treaty With Philippines Signed

[Released to the press by the White House August 30]

The following remarks were made on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Defense with the Republic of the Philippines at Washington on August 30:

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am very glad that it was possible for you to join us here today. We have witnessed the signing of a mutual defense treaty between our two great countries.¹ The signing of this treaty symbolizes the close ties that bind the people of the Philippines and the United States.

Our community of interest was put to the bitter test when our two peoples stood shoulder to shoulder on the battlefield, a few short years ago, to resist aggression. In that struggle, our countries went together through the agony of temporary defeat, and together rose to the heights of victory. In defeat and victory, we were not divided. We showed to all the world that aggressors can defeat free men only temporarily, and divide them never, so long as the fire of freedom burns in their hearts.

¹For text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 335.

In peace as well as in war, our countries have worked together. The half century of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between the Philippines and the United States is proof that both our countries are guided by the same ideals and striving for the same objectives. We have demonstrated that two peoples, however different they may be in background and experience, can work together for their common welfare if they have the same belief in democracy and the same faith in freedom.

The treaty that we are signing here today, therefore, rests on firm foundations. It gives formal expression to something that already exists—to the firm relationship of brotherhood that binds our countries together.

We have already expressed in other agreements our common interest in matters of defense and in economic matters. We have shown our common devotion to the cause of peace in our support of the Charter of the United Nations. Our soldiers are fighting side by side today in Korea just as they fought at Bataan and Corregidor—and for the same purpose—to check aggression and defend the rights of free peoples.

This treaty, therefore, is a natural development springing from the long association of our countries and our common sacrifices for freedom. It is a strong step toward security and peace in the

Pacific. It demonstrates to all nations that we intend to continue our common course and to work together in the future, as we have in the past, for peace for all mankind.

Mr. President, the people of the United States are happy to join with the people of the Philippines in this mutual expression of our united will to go forward in the cause of peace and freedom.

REMARKS BY ELPIDIO QUIRINO, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

We have witnessed today an act that may be described as the end of the beginning. Here we have set the first milestone on the road towards the enduring security of the Pacific area.

I have special reason to rejoice at this moment because it was not so long ago, in this same capital, that I took the liberty of proposing the conclusion of a Pacific security pact under the initiative of the United States. This is the first fruit of that vision.

This is a treaty of mutual defense with unavoidable connotations of military action. Yet it is, in fact, wholly dedicated to peace and to the methods of peace. It means so much to the economic development and happiness of the Filipino people. Here our two countries pledge themselves anew to the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Here we have assumed a formal undertaking to assist each other and to stand together in the face of aggression, in the hope that hereafter we may be able to follow undistracted the fruitful pursuits of peace.

We have no aggressive aims against anyone. Our purpose is rather to give notice that a potential aggressor must henceforth take due account of our common purpose and unified will to act in self-defense. From the history of the Filipino people and of our relations with the United States during the past 50 years, nobody can have the slightest doubt about our devotion to freedom and our readiness to share in its defense.

On this solemn occasion, Mr. President, may I convey to you, and through you to the American people, the deepest sentiments of good will and friendship from the people of the Philippines. This treaty proclaims the sense of unity of our two peoples, and this is a declaration of historic importance. For we have established our unity of purpose, not on any considerations of race, creed or equality of power, but solely on the ground of our common faith in freedom. Though humbled by the great significance of this alliance, we are nevertheless proud that our young Republic has merited this recognition of its faith and its courage. I bring to witness at this signing, Mr. President, the faith in democracy of the Filipino people and the courage to defend it with all our strength.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY ACHESON

We meet here today to sign a treaty of mutual defense between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. The chief executives of both nations are present to honor this occasion.

President Quirino and Secretary Romulo, I extend to you and to the members of the Philippine delegation a most cordial welcome.

The Mutual Defense Treaty is the natural outgrowth of the relationship of over half a century between the Philippines and the United States.

During that time the United States has helped the Filipino people prepare to exercise the supreme political rights and responsibilities of sovereignty.

On July 4, 1946, following the most devastating war in history, and in spite of the appalling effect of that war on Philippine life, the transfer of responsibility was reached.

From then on, the relationship between the two countries was that of two sovereign nations with a common heritage of, and dedication to, democratic ideals.

We have made certain commitments to each other, which led to the present Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Trade Agreement of 1946 recognized that the economic ties which had been developed over a period of 50 years could not without harmful effect be severed overnight.

The Trade Agreement provided for an 8-year period of free trade to be followed by a 20-year period of graduated tariffs, until in 1973 each country would levy upon the products of the other the same tariff as it would upon those of a third country.

Also, because of the many Americans who had made their homes in the Philippines and had invested in the future of the country, it was provided that until 1974 Americans would be given national treatment in the development of Philippine resources.

The Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 was recognition by the American people that the Philippines had borne a disastrous share of the ravages caused by the war in the Pacific, and that assistance was required.

Aid could not restore in full the human and material destruction, but it could provide a strong foundation on which to build.

The accomplishments of the first 5 years were impressive.

But we have yet to realize peace. And we live amid the pressures and disturbances of a sorely troubled world.

It became apparent that Philippine economy would require further help in order to preserve advances already made. President Quirino and President Truman agreed that an economic survey mission should be sent to the Philippines to make a study of conditions and recommendations for their improvement.

The recommendations of that mission resulted in the signing at Baguio on November 27, 1950, of an agreement for a program of long-range economic development.

Under that agreement, President Quirino recommended to the Philippine Congress a program of greatly increased taxation and minimum wage legislation. President Truman recommended to the Congress of the United States a program of economic aid designed to help the Philippines achieve in the shortest possible time a self-supporting economy through increased productivity, with particular attention to the betterment of the lot of the farmer and the worker.

Although only a few months have passed since the beginning of this program, economic conditions in the Philippines have greatly improved, thanks to the vigorous steps which you, President Quirino, and your fellow countrymen have taken. I believe they will continue to improve through our mutual efforts.

The Bases Agreement of 1947 recognized the importance to both nations of the defense of the Philippines and granted the United States the right to maintain and to garrison bases in the Philippines.

The Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 recognized the importance of developing the Philippine armed forces as rapidly as possible to a point where they could effectively maintain internal law and order.

To that end, the treaty provided for a United States Military Advisory Group to assist and advise the Philippines on military and naval matters; for the furnishing to the Philippines of equipment and supplies; for the procurement by the Philippines of military supplies in the United States; and for the training in the United States of Philippine military personnel.

The Philippines has also shared importantly in current programs of military assistance.

The problem of internal security has proven more difficult than it should have because Communist aggression against the Philippines, as elsewhere, operates from the inside as well as the outside.

The Hukbalahap movement, servile to an ideology which is repellent to all Filipino traditions and interests, has been doing everything within its power to destroy the Filipino nation and place it under a foreign and oppressive yoke.

We rejoice that the Philippine armed forces have made impressive progress during recent months in breaking the military strength of this rebellious group.

At the same time the Philippines push resolutely ahead in creating economic and social conditions under which conspiracy cannot disturb domestic tranquility.

Here today, we are most directly concerned with the problem of external aggression.

We are here publicly and formally declaring our sense of unity and our common determination

to resist aggression and external armed attack, whatever its origin.

From the American point of view, we seek through this treaty what we have consistently sought—an independent and democratic Philippines.

We seek peace and security in the Pacific.

The value of any treaty derives from the mutual trust and good will which accompany it.

That trust and good will rests in a common history, a common pledge in blood and faith to a common cause.

Filipinos and Americans fought together at Bataan and Corregidor and are now fighting together in Korea.

There is no need for us merely to reassure each other that we would regard an attack upon the other as an attack upon ourselves.

This treaty was not made for that purpose.

It serves to tell the rest of the world that the Philippines and the United States stand together in the Pacific.

STATEMENT BY CARLOS P. ROMULO, PHILIPPINE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

We have now brought to a happy conclusion a major development in the relations between the United States and the Philippines. With the signing of this Treaty of Mutual Defense, we have set in place the capstone of the structure which stands as a monument to the enduring friendship of the American and the Filipino peoples.

In an important sense, this treaty is the culmination of the preceding half-century of Philippine-American relations. From the status of a dependency enjoying for 4 decades the protection of the sovereign power, the Philippines rose 10 years ago to take its place beside the United States in the war to repel imperialist aggression in the Pacific. The Filipino people, by bearing loyally their share in the great struggle, conclusively proved not only their right to freedom but also their willingness and capacity to defend it.

The Filipino soldiers who fought on Bataan and Corregidor and our guerrillas who resisted the invader have contributed to this happy result. The American soldiers who fought beside them and those who later came ashore in Leyte and Lingayen have helped to make it possible. By their sacrifices in a common cause, the American and Filipino peoples have laid the solid foundation for this Treaty of Mutual Defense.

But, in another sense, this treaty is only the first concrete step in an undertaking of vast historic import. To us in the Philippines it has seemed for some time most urgent that a bold beginning be made, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to forge an effective security system for the Pacific area. His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, foresaw the need for such an arrangement 2 years ago and in the course

of a memorable address before the United States Senate strongly urged the speedy conclusion of a Pacific Security Pact in order to overcome the growing menace of totalitarian aggression.

The fact that aggression has taken place since then merely confirms the wisdom of that original proposal. This is the first of a series of treaties that should ultimately lead to such a pact, and it seems highly fitting that this first step should be taken jointly by the United States and the Philippines. The strong support given by the Philippine Government to the United Nations action in Korea and the presence of Filipino soldiers there can leave no doubt as to our willingness and capacity to assume our share of responsibility under a regional pact of mutual defense or other system of collective security.

By the terms of this treaty, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines have assumed the solemn obligation to assist each other in case of armed attack against either or both of them from any source whatever. This obligation covers any act of aggression, whether proceeding from a new source or arising from a repetition of aggression. The moral imperatives underlying this treaty go much deeper than any formal pledge. They are rooted in our shared experience and ideals and they are nourished by our common hope of the future. Beyond the letter of these commitments, therefore, the warmest sentiments of mutual regard and united purpose stand behind the signatures that have been affixed to this Treaty of Mutual Defense.

International Unity Against Shifting Soviet Tactics

U.N. ACTIONS AGAINST CAUSES OF WAR

by Ambassador Warren R. Austin
*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The age-old problems which cause turbulence among nations and regions are brought to the United Nations for solution. Hardened by time and the failure of nations to practice principles and apply methods which are now agreed upon in the Charter, they naturally involve delays, disappointments, and to some people seem cause for skepticism.

What do those people mean when they say that the United Nations has failed?

Do they mean it is the fault of the United Nations that only a small minority of the people in the world community have had any extensive experience in democratic self-government?

Do they mean it is the fault of the United Nations that two-thirds of the people in the world community have less than enough to eat?

Do they mean it is the fault of the United Nations that over half of the people in the world community can neither read nor write?

Do they mean it is the fault of the United Nations that hunger, disease, and ignorance make hundreds of millions of people the easy prey of the demagogue and the oppressor?

Do they mean it is the fault of the United Nations that the ruling circle of the Soviet Union,

which has isolated itself in the walled streets of the Kremlin, has for years had dreams of world conquest?

The answer, clearly, is no.

Hammer Blows Against Causes of War

All of these dangers to peace predate the United Nations—some, to the Book of Genesis. No reasonable man would expect them to disappear during the 6 years we have had the United Nations. The important fact is that more has been done to meet these threats than ever before in history.

Never has so much been done to remove the cause of war:

The World Health Organization has stopped epidemics, reduced tuberculosis, and is waging successful battles against such enemies of mankind as malaria.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has helped millions of people to produce and greater numbers to enjoy larger supplies of better foods.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is leading the drive against mass illiteracy.

Many agencies are joined in bringing the technical advantages of the twentieth century to millions who, on their farms and in their shops, are still shackled to the instruments and methods of the middle ages.

¹ Excerpt of an address made at the National Encampment Session of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, New York, on August 27 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

Let us be clear about this: These and many similar efforts are not the vagaries of starry-eyed idealists. As in any pioneering effort, waste, duplication, and inefficiency do occur. Recognition of it is the beginning of improvement. But, basically, the activities I speak of are hard-headed, practical hammer blows at the causes of war.

Even if the Kremlin should suddenly become ruled by docile lambs, the removal of the causes of war would remain an urgent task for every American. The relative increase of world population over world agriculture production since 1937 (14 years) is three to one. This fact alone points to the dire necessity for cooperation in a solution. Far from being Operation Rathole, building the foundations of peace is in our direct national interest.

Not only the causes of war, but war itself has been curbed, time and time again, by the United Nations.

In 1946, Soviet troops were caused to withdraw from Iran.

War in Palestine was stopped.

Communist imperialism's drive to make Greece a Soviet satellite was turned back.

In Indonesia, war was ended and a new nation established.

In Kashmir, fighting which threatened the lives of two nations and 500 million people was halted, and the effort to settle the differences between India and Pakistan by peaceful processes goes on.

Above all, there is the United Nations defense of the Republic of Korea, itself a creation of the United Nations—an action that may well have prevented World War III.

Collective Security Becomes a Reality

Since June 25, 1950, the concept of collective security has become a living reality. No longer is it merely a phrase. We are able to recognize it for what it is: the application to the maintenance of peace of one of the oldest forms of human activity—collective action.

Collective action is the basis of the family. The need for it gave rise to the tribe and then to the nation-state. You have recognized its value by banding together in this organization for collective action in pursuit of common goals. Every great general, every great diplomat, every great ruler in history has acted upon this basic premise: the development of power through unity in a common purpose. Sometimes the purpose has been evil and the power misused. But the doctrine of collective action has developed steadily as man has pushed himself up from the burrow of the cave dweller.

Today, the Charter of the United Nations stands as the highest expression of the common purpose of all men of good will.

Whether or not we were prepared to back that common purpose with the power of collective action remained untested until the aggression in Korea and the resolution of June 25, 1950, of the

Security Council. Then, civilization turned a corner. Collective action animated a code of conduct. When 53 nations spontaneously responded to the United Nations recommendation for collective support of the Republic of Korea and for repelling the aggressor, works were joined to faith. If the action in Korea should begin a *system* of collective security, the age-old principle would soon have the means for prompt and certain efficiency in suppressing threats and breaches of international peace.

Korea taught us how to *organize* for collective action. For 5 years, the Soviet veto kept the United Nations from placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council. Korea showed us the way around that road-block; namely, the will to cooperate through the General Assembly and to participate in its recommended action in the field. Since it is not coerced but is voluntary, the action is powerful. When a two-thirds majority wills it, neither veto nor boycott can prevent the United Nations from acting to meet a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. If the Security Council is paralyzed, the veto-free General Assembly can recommend action.

Collective action in the future should find more nations able to contribute to the common effort. To reach that objective is a function of the United Nations. The General Assembly has asked the member states to maintain within their national armed forces elements so trained, organized, and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as United Nations forces. Already 23 nations have made positive and constructive responses in support of this recommendation and others are certain to join.

Here is where coordination of United Nations principles, policies, and practices work for peace. The economic, educational, social, and cultural projects aim at raising all standards so that the separate state will have enough to defend to cause it to build national strength. Possession and enjoyment foster protection and conservation. The coordinated project involves strength of the members, unity through the United Nations, and cooperation in a unified command. In time, and with the natural growth of international wisdom and practice, a United Nations Peace Force will be organized.

Prospect of Organization of U. N. Peace Force

Korea has given us the blueprints for organizing an international force. Within 6 months after the Communist assault on Korea, fighting forces from 14 nations were *in action* under the United Nations Command. Compare this feat of assembling forces from every quarter of the globe, without advance plans, specialized training or scheduled transport, with the fact that it took more than a year for us to get our troops into action in Europe in World War I.

Now, such questions as the designation of a cen-

tralized military agency, the handling of offers of military assistance, the minimum strength of units capable of effective functioning, the organization of logistical support for units from many nations, the integration of various national units into a single command, civilian relief, and countless similar problems can be handled on the basis of practical experience.

A Committee on Collective Measures is at work this very hour building on the lessons of this experience. Its work can point the way to collective action against any future aggressor.

In Korea, the free world has achieved many victories.

United Nations troops are glorifying the great principles of the United Nations and are achieving victories which will uplift the standards, the hopes, and the faith of men who have been striving for the substitution of pacific methods for the use of force in international disputes. Among their hard-won achievements are the following:

Twice they repelled an invader;

They interrupted Communist imperialism in the use of puppet troops of the same blood as their victims;

They served notice that armed aggression can result in terrific losses to the aggressor;

They successfully used self-discipline in confining their military activity to the area in performing a peace function of the United Nations and in preventing the expansion which might start a general war.

So do the sons of the United States fight in Korea—

For the security of the United States;

For the prevention of general war;

For a *system* of collective security in the world;

For the opportunity to maintain and promote freedom and happiness for themselves and for the people of all the world.

The growing strength of the free world, the constant development of our machinery for collective action, and our demonstrated determination to use it if necessary are the hopes to peace.

Soviet Efforts To Divert and Confuse

Peace through preponderance of strength in support of United Nations principles *is* possible. Holding firm to that doctrine will see us through the current Soviet efforts to divert and confuse us through constantly changing and sometimes contradictory tactics.

Those efforts will not succeed. We have learned too much about them and their tactics during our 6 years of association in the United Nations. We know they blow hot and blow cold. We know that the man who is instructed to smile at you today may be instructed to scowl at you tomorrow. We know that what they say today is a lie they may tomorrow proclaim as a truth. And we know that whether we are promised peace or threatened with

war, the wise and safe course is to hold calmly and firmly to what we believe is right and just.

The events of the last few days have recalled for me many of the tactics of the past. Last December, for example, General Wu, the Chinese Communist who appeared before the Security Council, and his Edgar Bergen, Soviet Ambassador Malik, were charging that a cease fire in Korea was American trickery to promote aggression in Korea, on Formosa, and in Japan. They flooded the United Nations with false charges of atrocities by United Nations troops at the very time we were finding the bodies of our boys who had been shot with their hands tied behind their backs. They charged us with mistreating prisoners at the very time they were refusing to let the International Red Cross have access to prisoners as we had done. While accusing us of trickery, they were practicing it.

Just 3 months ago, the propagandists of Moscow, Peiping, and Pyongyang were shouting that the United Nations Forces would be driven into the sea. Then the same man, who for months had denied my charge that a Soviet signal had launched the aggression, proved with his own words that a Soviet signal could bring hostilities to a standstill.

After Mr. Malik's radio broadcast in June, the idea of a cease fire was no longer a piece of American trickery; it suddenly became proof of the peaceful intent of the Soviet Union. The aggression they gave the green light to in Korea backfired. New tactics were required. So, we have had talk of peace. We have had armistice negotiations. Now, as in the beginning, we are watching what they *do* more than what they say.

Our men are alert; they are in good defensive positions; and they are determined to hold them.

The Soviets talk of peace; but peace is achieved through deed. If the Soviets believe in peace, the place to show it is in Kaesong.

In the face of this action in Korea, let us look at some of the other tactics now being employed by the Soviets.

Nations of Free World Change Propaganda Tactics

Once again, Soviet propaganda speaks of co-existence. A magazine has recently appeared in Moscow drooling with protestations of friendship for the West. Of course, it is printed only in English, so the average Russian may have difficulty in reading of this friendship.

A letter from the British Foreign Minister has been printed in the Soviet press—the first expression of the free world's point of view that the Kremlin has permitted to reach the Soviet citizen since 1946.

Then—a month late—the Soviet press printed, with the President's letter of transmittal, the resolution of friendship for the Russian people adopted by the United States Congress.

And now, Mr. Gromyko is en route to our shores to be present at the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco. Instead of walking out, Mr. Gromyko is walking in.

We have every reason to be wary of this new tactic. We would be naïve if we fully trusted it. Yet, I welcome the tactical shift. As in the case of Korea, the outcome may be considerably different than the Soviets now expect.

For example, I believe the free world has scored a net gain in the publication of the messages from the President, the Congress, and the British Foreign Minister. The men in the Kremlin did not publish them without long accompanying rebuttals; nevertheless, a shaft of light has broken through to the Soviet citizen. In the darkness imposed upon the Soviet people, even a small shaft of sunlight must dispel some of the fog of lies. We will not obstruct the light that penetrates that tiny crack in the Iron Curtain. We are eager to have the splendid lights of the Charter illuminate the way to the truth that makes people free.

In his recent letter to President Truman, Nikolai Shvernik, the President of the Presidium of the Soviet Union, asserted that his government "by every means contributes to the intercourse of the Soviet people with the peoples of other countries, placing no barriers in the path."

This statement, at face value implies that the jamming of the Voice of America is merely a technical error which Mr. Shvernik will speedily correct.

The supremacy of the United Nations in all fundamental values and powers is directed toward

Freedom—not slavery
Health—not disease
Prosperity—not poverty
Wisdom—not ignorance
Righteousness—not violence
Peace—not war

The real test of the Soviet Union's desire to support such supremacy will come in the United Nations.

Freedom Shall Prevail

The Collective Measures Committee is one of the major efforts to build a stronger coalition against aggression. The Soviet Union has opposed the Committee, charging that its purpose is to build an anti-Soviet coalition. It rests within the Soviet Union alone whether a coalition against aggression and a coalition against the Soviet Union shall be one and the same thing. We, for our part, hope that it is not. There can be no doubt that the Collective Measures Committee would welcome sincere Soviet cooperation with the efforts to make the United Nations supreme over aggression wherever it may arise.

The United Nations has shown the Soviet Union that it is not willing to be intimidated, obstructed,

or paralyzed by Soviet vetoes, walkouts, and boycotts. The United Nations is moving ahead to establish the system of collective security. The Soviet Union has isolated itself from this operation, thus far, but the door to sincere participation remains open to it.

There are other tests to apply to the new Soviet tactics.

In 1948, the United Nations approved a proposal for taking a census of conventional armaments and armed forces as the first step in the development of a program for the reduction and regulation of armaments and armed forces. Only the opposition of the Soviet Union blocked this step toward peace from being taken. Is the Kremlin ready now to take it?

For nearly 3 years, negotiations have been stalled on the development of controls for atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. An earnest Soviet effort to join in an effective system of controls would be joyously welcomed by all of us.

Meanwhile, we continue to build our national strength. We continue to increase international unity. We continue to devise machinery for international cooperation.

Strength. Unity. Cooperation. Those are the watchwords which today are leading the forces of freedom. Oppression and dictatorship cannot stand before free men united in the determination that freedom shall prevail.

New VOA Program to Japan

The Voice of America today inaugurated a new program of daily broadcasts to Japan in both Japanese and English languages. The initial program, on the eve of the San Francisco peace conference, included a statement of Secretary Acheson and messages from Vice President Alben Barkley, Ambassador John Foster Dulles, and Senator Richard M. Nixon.¹

Today's broadcast was the first of the daily Japanese and English language programs to be transmitted. Subsequent Japanese language programs will be sent out daily at 4:30 a.m. e.d.t. (6:30 p.m. Japanese time) and will include special events, news commentaries, features, and music. The daily English program, 30 minutes in length, will be at 7:45 a.m. e.d.t. (9:45 p.m. Japanese time) and will consist of news, commentaries, editorial roundups, music, and features. Originating in New York, both programs will be carried by west-coast transmitters and relayed by transmitters in Honolulu and Manila.

¹ For texts of these messages, see Department of State press release 794 of Sept. 3, 1951.

Japan Drafts Property Compensation Law

[Released to the press August 31]

The Department of State has received from the Japanese Government a translation of the Draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law which was approved by the Japanese Cabinet on July 13, 1951, but which has not yet been enacted into law. Reference to the draft law is made in article 15 (a) of the treaty of peace with Japan to be signed in San Francisco in September. The following translation has been certified to be authentic by the Chief of the Archives Section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

TEXT OF ALLIED POWERS PROPERTY COMPENSATION LAW

Chapter I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1.

(Purpose)

The purpose of this Law is to compensate, following the restoration of peace with the Allied Powers, for the damage suffered as a result of the war by the property owned in Japan by the Allied Powers and their nationals.

Article 2.

(Definitions)

In this Law, "the Allied Powers" means the states which were at war or in a state of belligerency with Japan and which become parties to the Peace Treaty with Japan.

2. In this Law, "Allied nationals" means the following:

(1) Individual persons who are nationals of Allied Powers;

(2) Corporations and other associations established under the laws and orders of any of the Allied Powers;

(3) In addition to those mentioned in the preceding item, those corporations and other associations in which the individuals or corporations or associations mentioned in the preceding two items or this item hold the whole stock or capital investments apart from qualifying shares.

(4) In addition to those mentioned in item (2), religious juridical persons, non-profit juridical persons and other similar organizations controlled by the persons mentioned in the preceding three items or this item.

3. In this Law, "Japan" means Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku, Kyushu, and other territory, over which the sovereignty of Japan is restored by virtue of the Peace Treaty.

4. In this Law, "the war-time special measures" means the measures toward the enemy, including but not limited to the application of the Enemy Property Custody Law (Law No. 99 of 1941—abolished), which were adopted by way of exercise of official authority by the Japanese Gov-

ernment or its agencies, such as the apprehension, internment or detention, of individual persons of Allied nationality, the disposal or sale of the property of Allied nationals, etc.

5. In this Law "property" means movable or immovable property, the rights to such property, patents, trademarks, debts, shares, and other property rights and interests of a similar nature.

Article 3.

(Principles of Compensation)

If the property owned in Japan by the Allied Powers or their nationals at the time of the commencement of the war has suffered damage as a result of the war, the Japanese Government shall compensate for such damage, provided that, with regard to the properties of Allied nationals, such nationals either (a) were nationals of a country declared by the Japanese Government to be an enemy country in accordance with the provisions of the Enemy Property Custody Law, or (b) were subject to apprehension, internment or detention or to the seizure, disposal or sale of their property during the war.

2. In cases other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, if property owned in Japan at the time of the commencement of the war by Allied individuals who were not physically present in Japan or Allied corporations which were not in operation in Japan during the period of hostilities has suffered the damage mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1, item (1) or (5), the Japanese Government shall compensate for such damage.

3. In cases where a claim for restitution has not been filed for a piece of property in a state capable of restitution within the term fixed in the Peace Treaty, no compensation shall be made for its damage, provided, however, that this shall not apply to cases where this failure in filing a claim is deemed by the Japanese Government as due to unavoidable circumstances.

4. Those, who may claim the compensation mentioned in paragraph 1 or 2 shall be those who had and shall have the status of Allied nationals at the time of the commencement of the war and at the time of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.

5. In cases where the successors in interest of Allied nationals are Allied nationals at the time of the coming into force of the peace treaty, they may claim the compensation mentioned in paragraph 1 or 2.

Article 4.

(Scope of Damage and Location of Property)

The damage suffered as a result of the war mentioned in the preceding Article shall be the damage listed in the following items:

(1) Damage caused by acts of hostility;

(2) Damage caused by the war-time special measures or other measures of the Japanese Government and its agencies;

(3) Damage on account of the administrator or pos-

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essor of the property concerned having neglected the good administrator's care;

(4) Damage suffered owing to the inability of an Allied national to have the property insured in Japan on account of the war;

(5) Damage suffered owing to and while in use of the Occupation Forces.

2. The cargo or baggage which had been loaded on board the Japanese ships navigating the high seas at the time of the commencement of the war and which was unloaded directly in Japan shall be regarded as property which was in Japan at the time of the commencement of the war.

Chapter II CALCULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE

Article 5.

(Damage to Tangible Property)

The amount of damage to restituted tangible property shall be a sum of money required at the time of compensation for the restoration of such property as of the time of restitution to its status as of the time of the commencement of the war, in so far as the damages mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 are concerned; provided that, if such property has been repaired by government expenditure after its restitution, its status upon repair shall be regarded as its status as of the time of restitution.

2. The amount of damage to tangible property which is incapable of restitution on account of its loss, substantial destruction, or its location being unknown, shall be a sum of money required at the time of compensation for the purchase of property of similar condition and value, in so far as the damages mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 are concerned.

3. The amount of damage to tangible property other than that falling under the preceding two paragraphs shall be a sum of money required at the time of compensation for the restoration of such property as of the time of the coming into force of the peace treaty to its status as of the time of the commencement of the war, in so far as the damages mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 1 are concerned.

Article 6.

(Damage to Use and to Lease of Immovable Property)

The amount of damage to the superficies, perpetual tenant-right, servitude, or lease of immovable property, which is incapable of restitution on account of the loss or substantial alteration of the objects of such rights shall be a sum of money required at the time of compensation for the acquisition of the rights of the same substance as such rights.

Article 7.

(Damage to Debts)

The amount of damage to pecuniary debts shall be a sum of money equivalent to the amount of the debts transferred or liquidated by the war-time special measures.

2. The amount of damage to debts in cases where mortgage, pledge, lien, or priority, has been extinguished by the war-time special measures or in cases where the object of these rights has been lost or destroyed as a result of the war shall be a sum of money equivalent to the amount due to the creditor which has been defaulted on account of the extinction of such right or loss or destruction of such object.

Article 8.

(Damage to Public Loans, etc.)

The amount of damage to those public loans, debentures, bonds issued under special laws by juridical persons, or public loans or debentures issued by foreign states or juridical persons (hereinafter referred to as "the public loans, etc.") which have been subjected to the war-time special measures and have not been restituted and for which the time of their redemption has arrived before the time of compensation shall be the total of the amount of the principal and the amount of the interest coupons which accompanied such public loans, etc.

2. The amount of damage to those public loans, etc., whose time of redemption has not arrived by the time of compensation and which are incapable of restitution shall be the total of their current price as of the time of compensation and the amount of the interest coupons up to the time of compensation.

Article 9.

(Damage to Patents)

The amount of damage to a patent which has had the exclusive license established (meaning here and hereinafter the right of persons who have received the license of exclusive use in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Industrial Property Rights War-time Law (Law No. 21 of 1917—abolished)) shall be a sum of money equivalent to the patent working fee payable in cases where the exclusive licenses has worked the patent during the term of the patent, deducted by a sum of money equivalent to the patent fee payable to the Japanese government, unless the Allied owner has waived right to patent working fee and damages for the said term in accordance with the provisions of the Order for Post-war Dispositions of Industrial Property Rights owned by Allied Nations (Cabinet Order No. 309 of 1949) as amended.

2. The amount of damage to patent which has been cancelled or transferred by the war-time special measures or without free consent of the Allied national concerned shall be a sum of money equivalent to the patent working fee payable by the person who has worked it during the term for which it should have continued, deducted by a sum of money equivalent to the patent fee payable to the Japanese government during such term, unless the Allied owner has waived rights to patent working fee and damages for the said term in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Order for Post-war Disposition of Industrial Property Rights Owned by Allied Nationals as amended.

3. The amount of damage to a patent which has become extinct on account of the non-payment of the patent fee or the expiration of its term of continuation shall be a sum of money equivalent to the patent working fee payable by a person who has worked it during the term for which it would have continued if the patent fee had been paid or if the extension of its term of continuation had been applied for, deducted by a sum of money equivalent to the patent fee payable to the Japanese government during such term, unless the Allied owner has waived rights to patent working fee and damages for the said term in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Order for Post-war Dispositions of Industrial Property Rights Owned by Allied Nations as amended.

4. In the case of the preceding three paragraphs, the patent working fee payable by a person who has worked the patent shall be calculated on the basis of the method of calculation of the working fee stipulated in the working contract existing at the time of the commencement of the war in case such working contract existed, and on the basis of the working fee stipulated in a working contract for a patent analogous to the patent concerned existing at the time of the commencement of the war in case there was no working contract for the patent concerned.

5. If stipulation has been made in the working contract mentioned in the preceding paragraph for the obligation to be performed by the patentee to the working-licensee or for the benefit receivable by the working-licensee from the patentee, the loss suffered by the person working the patent on account of the default of such obligation or the impossibility to receive such benefit during the term provided for in paragraphs 1 to 3 inclusive may be taken into consideration in calculating the patent working fee payable by such person.

Article 10.

(Damage to Trade Marks)

The amount of damage to a trade mark which has become extinct on account of the cancellation by the war-time special measures or the expiration of its term of

continuation shall be the total of a sum of money equivalent to the benefit obtained through its use by the person who has used it and a sum of money equivalent to the cost required at the time of compensation for the restoration of its good-will as at the time of the commencement of the war.

Article 11.

(Damage to Shares)

The amount of damage relating to shares of stock other than those of which the issuing company is an Allied national mentioned in the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 2, item (2) or (3) shall be a sum of money, which is the amount of damage to the issuing company calculated in accordance with the provisions of Article 12, multiplied by the ratio of the amount of the paid up shares of the stock which were owned by the Allied national at the time of the commencement of the war to the amount of its paid up capital at the time of the commencement of the war.

2. If, in cases where a company is in the course of liquidation, distribution has been made of its net assets for its shares before restitution, the amount of their damage shall be a sum of money equivalent to the amount of the distribution made before the time of restitution, added to the sum of money mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Article 12.

(Calculation of Amount of Damage to Companies)

The amount of damage to a company shall be a sum of money which is the amount of the damage provided for in Article 4, paragraph 1, calculated in a manner conforming to the provisions of Article 5 to Article 11 inclusive in regard to the property owned in Japan by the company at the time of the commencement of the war, and deducted by the following sums of money:

(1) If, in cases special loss or final loss has occurred to the company in accordance with the Enterprise Reconstruction and Reorganization Law (Law No. 40 of 1946) as amended or the Financial Institutions Reconstruction and Reorganization Law (Law No. 39 of 1946) as amended, such loss has been made up by writing off liabilities, the amount of such writing-off of pre-war liabilities other than the capital;

(2) If, in cases where a company has decreased its capital to make up the loss suffered as a result of the war, its capital has been replenished with the capital increase through the payment by its shareholders other than Allied nationals, the sum of such replenishment;

(3) If the current market value of the property owned by a company at the time of compensation, which was not owned by the company at the commencement of the war, exceeds the acquisition cost of the property, the sum of such excess.

Article 13.

(Damage to Shares of Company which Has Been Merged, etc.)

The calculation of the amount of damages to shares in case where the issuing company has been merged or divided after the commencement of the war shall be made in conformity with the provisions of preceding two Articles.

Chapter III PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION

Article 14.

(Amount of Compensation)

The amount of compensation payable to a person who may claim compensation from the Japanese Government in accordance with the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 4 or 5, (hereinafter referred to as "claimant") shall be a sum of money which is the amount of damage calculated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II deducted by the sums listed in the following items:

(1) A sum of money withdrawn by a claimant or his agent out of the funds which belonged to the Special

Property Administration Account in the custody of the Bank of Japan;

(2) A sum of money equivalent to the amount of the pre-war liabilities satisfied by way of the war-time special measures by property owned by a claimant at the time of the commencement of the war or its fruits;

(3) If improvements have been made to property between the time of the commencement of the war and the time of the restitution of the property, and if the owner does not elect to have the improvements removed, a sum of money equivalent to the value of the improvements at the time of compensation.

Article 15.

(Method and Term of Claiming Compensation)

A claimant shall file a written claim for payment of compensation with the Japanese Government through the Government of the state to which he belongs within eight-months from the time of coming into force of the peace treaty between such state and Japan.

2. The written claim for payment of compensation mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be accompanied with papers which establish the status of the claimant as a person capable of filing claims according to Article 3, paragraph 4 or 5 and the substance of the claim.

3. If a claimant fails to file a written claim for payment of compensation within the term mentioned in paragraph 1, he shall be regarded as having waived the claim for payment of compensation.

Article 16.

(Payment of Compensation)

If a written claim for payment of compensation has been filed by a claimant in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, the Japanese Government shall examine it and, if it has found that the sum of money claimed is payable, shall pay it to him without delay.

2. If the Japanese Government has found, as a result of the examination of a written claim for payment of compensation, that the sum of money claimed differs from that payable to the claimant, it shall notify to him the sum of money which it has found payable.

3. If there is no objection to the sum of money notified in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the claimant may demand its payment to the Japanese Government.

4. If in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph the payment of the sum of money mentioned in the same paragraph has been demanded to the Japanese Government, the Japanese Government shall pay it to the claimant without delay.

Article 17.

(Payment of Compensation in Yen)

The compensation payable in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article shall be paid in Japan in the Yen, and its remittance abroad by recipients shall be subject to laws and orders relating to the foreign exchange.

2. In cases where the amount of money of the debts, loans, etc. or patent working fee stipulated in Articles 7, 8 and 9, has been designated in terms of currencies other than the Yen and should have been paid in foreign currency or, although designated in the Yen, should have been paid in foreign currency at the fixed exchange rate in accordance with the term of contract, the Japanese Government shall recognize its liability to make compensation in foreign currency and make it available to the claimant at the earliest date permitted by the Japanese foreign exchange position and in accordance with the laws and regulations concerning the foreign exchange.

3. If, in the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the claimant accepts payment in the Yen, the Japanese government may make the payment of compensation in the Yen calculated at the exchange rate at the time of compensation.

Article 18.

(Objection to the Amount of Compensation)

If a claimant has an objection to the sum of money notified in accordance with the provisions of Article 16, paragraph 2, he may demand re-examination to the Allied Property Compensation Examination Committee provided for in Article 20 within five weeks after the date of receipt of the notification mentioned in the same paragraph.

2. On request a claimant shall be entitled to a hearing before this Committee and to be represented by counsel if desired.

3. The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall not be applied in cases where there is a special agreement between Japan and any of the Allied Powers.

Article 19.

(Limitation of Payment in a Fiscal Year)

If the total of sums of money payable for compensation exceeds ten billion Yen in one fiscal year, the Japanese Government makes the payments involved in the excess in the following fiscal year.

Chapter IV COMPENSATION EXAMINATION COMMITTEE

Article 20.

The Japanese Government shall establish in the Ministry of Finance an Allied Property Compensation Examination Committee which is to examine the demands for re-examination under the provisions of Article 18.

2. Necessary matters relating to the organization and operation of the Allied Property Compensation Examination Committee shall be provided for by Cabinet Order.

Chapter V MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 21.

(Exception concerning Taxation)

No tax shall be imposed on the compensation to be received by Allied nationals in accordance with this Law.

Article 22.

(Furnishing of Papers)

A claimant may, if necessary for making a claim for compensation, demand the Japanese Government through the Government of the state to which he belongs to furnish papers which are necessary for establishing such claim.

2. If the demand mentioned in the preceding paragraph has been made, the Japanese Government shall furnish the papers so demanded to the claimant free of charge.

Article 23.

(Payment of Cost)

If a claimant has defrayed in Japan necessary cost to establish his claim, he may demand its payment to the Japanese Government through the Government of the state to which he belongs.

2. If, in cases where the demand mentioned in the preceding paragraph has been made, the Japanese Government has found the amount of money reasonable, it shall be paid to the claimant.

Article 24.

(Collection of Reports, etc.)

If the Japanese Government finds it necessary in connection with the investigation of the amount of damage suffered by the property of Allied nationals, it may, within the extent of such necessity, collect reports or data from those persons other than the claimant who had or have a right or an obligation in regard to such property.

Article 25.

(Cabinet Order concerning Enforcement)

Necessary matters in enforcing this Law may be provided for by Cabinet Order.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS

The date of enforcement of this Law shall be the date of first coming into force of the Peace Treaty.

CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, certify that the English text given above is an authentic translation of the Draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law decided upon at a Cabinet meeting of July 13, 1951.

AUGUST 13, 1951.

KIJIRO MIYAKE
Chief, Archives Section,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Educational Exchange Agreements¹

Denmark

The Department of State announced on August 23 that Denmark and the United States signed an agreement on that day putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress (the Fulbright Act). The signing took place at Copenhagen with His Excellency Ole Bjørn Kraft, Foreign Minister, representing the Government of Denmark and Eugenie Anderson, American Ambassador to Denmark, representing the Government of the United States.

Japan

The Department of State announced on August 27 that Japan and the United States on the same date signed a memorandum putting into operation the program of educational exchanges authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress (the Fulbright Act). The signing took place at Tokyo, with Shigeru Yoshida, Foreign Minister, representing the Government of Japan and William J. Sebald, American Ambassador to Japan, representing the Government of the United States.

Commenting on the signing, Ambassador Sebald said:

I consider the signing of this memorandum extremely important in that it is the first official step in what I hope will be a long series of agreements of mutual benefit to Japan and the United States. Preceding the signing of the peace treaty as it does, it is a significant prologue to a historical drama of great import. I feel confident that it will prove to be one of many media of cultural exchange between our countries.

The memorandum provides for a United States Educational Commission in Japan to assist in

¹For information concerning educational exchange agreements and the procedure for making applications see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 336.

the administration of the educational program financed from certain funds resulting from the sale of United States surplus property to that country. For the execution of the program, a sum equivalent to \$4,750,000 will be made available in Japanese currency in 5 years for certain educational purposes. These purposes include the financing of

studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities of or for citizens of the United States of America in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Japan, or of the citizens of Japan in United States schools and institutions of higher learning located outside the continental United States . . . including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incident to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for citizens of Japan who desire to attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental United States . . . whose attendance

will not deprive citizens of the United States of America from an opportunity to attend such schools and institutions.

The Commission in Japan will consist of eight members, four of whom are to be citizens of Japan and four to be citizens of the United States. The American Ambassador to Japan will serve as honorary chairman of the Commission.

The signing of this memorandum with Japan brings to a total of 23 the countries which have entered into such arrangements with the United States. Previous agreements have been signed with the Governments of Austria, Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg, Burma, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Trade Agreement Negotiations With Venezuela

[Released to the press August 29]

U. S. INTENTION TO UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATIONS

The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements today issued formal notice of the intention of the United States Government to negotiate with the Government of Venezuela to supplement and amend the trade agreement with that country which was signed on November 6, 1939. Preliminary announcement of the agreement of the two countries to negotiate for this purpose was made by the Department of State on June 18, 1951.¹ United States participation in the negotiations will be under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 as amended and extended.

The Trade Agreements Committee also published a list of products on which modification of United States tariffs or other import restrictions may be considered during the negotiations.

Also, today the Committee for Reciprocity Information gave notice that public hearings on the proposed negotiations will be held beginning at 10 a. m., October 9, 1951. Likewise, the United States Tariff Commission announced today that it would open public hearings on October 2, 1951, to receive views and information useful in preparing its "peril-point" report to the President, as required by section 3 (a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, on what United

States concessions may be made in the negotiations without causing or threatening serious injury to a domestic industry.

The notice of the Committee for Reciprocity Information states that applications for oral presentation of views and information, as well as written briefs or statements, must be presented to the Committee not later than 12 noon, September 28, 1951. Only those persons will be heard who have presented written briefs or statements and filed applications to be heard, by that date.

The notice of the Trade Agreements Committee points out that United States concessions on articles which are provided for in schedule II of the 1939 agreement, but which are not included in the list of articles published today, will remain unchanged unless such articles are included in any supplemental list which might be published in the future.

In the forthcoming negotiations consideration will be given to possible modifications in, or elimination of, concessions on United States products made by Venezuela in schedule I of 1939 agreement, and also to the addition of new items to that schedule, or additional concessions on items already covered by it. Therefore, persons interested in any export product may wish to make known to the Committee for Reciprocity Information their views with regard to whether existing Venezuelan concessions should be maintained or

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 17.

broadened, and whether new concessions on additional items should be sought from Venezuela.

There will also be considered changes in, deletions from, or additions to the general provisions of the 1939 agreement, including the insertion of a so-called escape clause in accordance with section 6 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.

In the oral presentations before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, views and information will be received from persons interested in either export or import products or in changes in the general provisions of the 1939 agreement. Persons interested in any export product may suggest tariff or other concessions which may be sought from the Government of Venezuela. Those interested in import products may give their views on any article, whether or not it is included in the list published today, but no modifications of United States import restrictions with respect to any article not included in the list published today will be considered unless such article is included in any such list which may be published hereafter. If any United States concessions are considered with respect to any article not included in the list published today, a supplemental list will be published and further hearings held on such items.

Views and information received by the Tariff Commission in its hearings referred to above, except material received in confidence, will be made available to the Committee for Reciprocity Information for consideration by the interdepartmental trade-agreements organization. Consequently, persons whose interests relate only to import products included in the list published today, and who have appeared before the Tariff Commission need not—but may if they wish—appear also before the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

However, persons wishing to present material on United States import concessions other than the material they have presented to the Tariff Commission should appear before the Committee for Reciprocity Information or file written statements or briefs with that Committee. It will be necessary for persons wishing to suggest additional items on which United States import concessions may be considered, and which do not appear in a published list, to present their views to the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

Eleven copies of written briefs or statements are to be supplied to the Committee for Reciprocity Information, either typed, printed, or duplicated. One copy must be sworn to. Such communications should be addressed to "The Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C."

Copies of the notices of the Trade Agreements Committee and the Committee for Reciprocity Information, and of the published lists of products, are attached to this release. Copies of the notice of the Tariff Commission may be obtained from the Commission.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON TRADE AGREEMENTS

Pursuant to section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act, approved June 12, 1934, as amended (48 Stat. 945, ch. 474, Public Law 50, 82d Cong.) and to paragraph 4 of Executive Order 10082 of October 5, 1949 (14 F. R. 6105), notice is hereby given by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements of intention to conduct trade-agreement negotiations with the United States of Venezuela to supplement and amend the trade agreement with that Government signed at Caracas, November 6, 1939 (54 Stat. 2377), and proclaimed by the President on November 16, 1939 (54 Stat. 2375), and November 27, 1940 (54 Stat. 2402).

There is annexed hereto a list of articles imported into the United States² of America to be considered for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or specific continuance of existing customs or excise treatment in the proposed supplementary trade-agreement negotiations with the United States of Venezuela. Included in this list are certain articles now described in Schedule II of the existing agreement. The negotiations will not involve any change in the concessions on articles described in Schedule II of the Agreement which are not contained in the annexed list.

No article will be considered in the negotiations for possible modification of US duties or other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or specific continuance of existing customs or excise treatment unless it is included specifically, or by reference, in the annexed list, or unless it is subsequently included in a supplementary public list. No duty or import tax imposed under a paragraph or section of the Tariff Act or Internal Revenue Code other than the paragraph or section listed with respect to such article will be considered for a possible decrease, although an additional or separate duty on an article included in the annexed list which is imposed under a paragraph or section other than that listed may be bound against increase as an assurance that the concession under the listed paragraph will not be nullified.

In the negotiations consideration will be given to the modification of Schedule I of the existing trade agreement with Venezuela, which contains tariff concessions by Venezuela, through the possible addition thereto of new articles, the deletion therefrom of certain articles, or the reduction or increase of the rates of duty specified in that Schedule. In the negotiations consideration will also be given to inclusion in the trade agreement with Venezuela of a so-called "escape clause" provision in conformity with the policy established in section 6 (a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act.

²Not here printed; available from the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Bldg., Washington 25, D. C.

sion Act of 1951 (Public Law 50, 82d Congress), and perhaps to other additions to or modifications of the general provisions contained in the Agreement.

Pursuant to section 4 of the Trade Agreements Act, as amended by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and paragraph 5 of Executive Order 10082 of October 5, 1949, information and views as to any aspect of the proposal announced in this notice may be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information in accordance with the announcement of this date issued by that Committee.

The articles described in the annexed list will be the subject of an investigation by the United States Tariff Commission under the provisions of Section 3 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which investigation was announced this date by the Commission for the purpose of determining the so-called "peril points" with respect to such articles. The statute requires the Tariff Commission to hold its own hearings, and parties interested who wish to be assured that their information and views in connection with the Commission's investigation will be considered by the Commission should present them to the Commission in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Tariff Commission announcement. However, information and views submitted to the Tariff Commission except for materials accepted by the Commission in confidence, will be made available to the Committee for Reciprocity Information.

By direction of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements this 29th day of August 1951.

Chairman
*Interdepartmental Committee
on Trade Agreements*

COMMITTEE FOR RECIPROCITY INFORMATION

Supplementary Trade-Agreement Negotiations With the United States of Venezuela

Submission of Information to the Committee for Reciprocity Information

Closing Date for Application to be Heard September 28, 1951

Closing Date for Submission of Briefs September 28, 1951

Public Hearings Open October 9, 1951, Room 105, National Archives Building, Washington, D. C.

The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements has issued on this day a notice of intention to conduct trade-agreement negotiations with the United States of Venezuela to supplement and amend the 1939 trade agreement with that Government.

Annexed to the notice by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements is a list of arti-

cles imported into the United States to be considered for possible concessions in these trade-agreement negotiations.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information hereby gives notice that all applications for oral presentation of views in regard to the foregoing proposals, which must indicate the product or products on which the individuals or groups desire to be heard, shall be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information not later than 12:00 noon September 28, 1951, and all information and views in writing in regard to the foregoing proposals shall be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information not later than 12:00 noon September 28, 1951. Such communications shall be addressed to "The Chairman, Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C." Eleven copies of written statements, either typed, printed, or duplicated shall be submitted, of which one copy shall be sworn to.

Public hearings will be held before the Committee for Reciprocity Information, at which oral statements will be heard. The first hearing will be at 10:00 a.m. on October 9, 1951, in room 105, National Archives Building, Seventh Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Witnesses who make application to be heard will be advised regarding the time of their individual appearances. Appearances at hearings before the Committee may be made only by or on behalf of those persons who have filed written statements and who have within the time prescribed made written application for oral presentation of views. Statements made at the public hearings shall be under oath.

Persons or groups interested in import products may present to the Committee their views concerning possible tariff concessions by the United States in negotiations with the United States of Venezuela on any product, whether or not included in the list annexed to the notice of intention to negotiate. However, as indicated in the notice of intention to negotiate, no tariff reduction will be considered on any product which is not included in the list annexed to the public notice by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, unless it is subsequently included in a supplementary public list.

In the negotiations consideration will be given to the modification of Schedule I of the existing trade agreement with Venezuela, which contains tariff concessions by Venezuela, through the possible addition thereto of new items, the deletion therefrom of certain items, or the reduction or increase of the rates of duty specified in that Schedule. In the negotiations consideration also will be given to the inclusion in the trade agreement with Venezuela of a so-called "escape clause" provision in conformity with the policy established in Section 6 (a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (Public Law 50, 82d Con-

gress), and perhaps to other additions to or modifications of the general provisions contained in the Agreement.

Views of interested persons may cover the items listed for consideration of possible tariff concessions by the United States, tariff or other concessions that might be requested of Venezuela, or any other phase of the proposed negotiations as herein outlined. Copies of the list attached and of the notice of intention to negotiate may be obtained from the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D.C. and may be inspected in the Field Offices of the Department of Commerce.

By direction of the Committee for Reciprocity Information this 29th day of August 1951.

EDWARD YARDLEY

Secretary

Committee for Reciprocity Information

Letters of Credence

Argentina

The newly appointed Ambassador of Argentina, Dr. Hipolito J. Paz, presented his credentials to the President on August 28, 1951. For the text of the translation of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 773 of August 28.

Army and Navy Missions Agreements With Cuba

[Released to the press August 29]

There were signed on August 28, 1951, by Secretary Acheson and Luis Machado, Ambassador of Cuba to the United States, two agreements providing for the technical services of advisory missions of the United States Army and of the United States Navy, respectively, to serve in Cuba. The agreements are to continue in force for 2 years from the date of signature, and may be extended beyond that period at the request of the Government of Cuba.

The agreements are similar to numerous other agreements in force between the United States and certain other American Republics providing for advisory missions of personnel of the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force to those countries. The provisions of the agreements pertain to the duties, rank, and compensation of the personnel of the mission, the travel accommodations to be provided for the members of the mission and their families, and other related matters.

Statues From Italy To Be Dedicated

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press August 29]

On August 29 the Department of the Interior announced that President Truman and Prime Minister De Gasperi are expected to attend a ceremony on September 26 to dedicate the four gilded bronze statues at the Arlington Memorial Bridge Plaza.

The statues were designed by the American sculptors, Leo Friedlander and James E. Fraser, and were cast and gilded in Italy by Italian artists as a gift from the Italian people to the people of America.

I should like to say that we in America appreciate this moving expression of Italian good will. It is particularly fitting that the President and the Prime Minister will be present at the ceremony to represent the profound depth of friendship that unites our two countries.

Printing of the German Economic Review To Be Discontinued

The monthly economic review of Germany, which is prepared by the Analytical Reports Branch, Program Division, Office of Economic Affairs, Hicog, has been a regular feature in the BULLETIN, but is now being discontinued as of the issue of August 13, 1951. For future reference for the text of the economic review, the readers of the BULLETIN are referred to the Hicog Information Bulletin.

THE CONGRESS

Senator McCarthy Repeats Charges Against Ambassador Jessup

[Released to the press August 23]

The radio attack on Ambassador Jessup last night was a typical McCarthy mixture of quarter truth, half truth, and untruth. Nothing was said that has not been said and answered before. Almost every one of the charges made was a warmed over rehash of the same charges made and answered in the spring of 1950.¹ In one instance, a charge was lifted almost verbatim out of a letter circulated by Alfred Kohlberg. McCarthy is merely continuing to use the familiar tactic of repeat, repeat, repeat—without any regard for the truth or the facts involved.

¹ See BULLETINS of April 3, 1950, p. 516 and April 17, 1950, p. 623.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned During August 1951

Anthropological Sciences, Conference on	Lima	Aug. 12-18
Building Exhibition, Constructa; the 25th	Hannover	July 3-Aug. 12
Castle Research Work, Third International Congress for	Sargans, Switzerland	Aug. 2-5
Economic and Social Council, 2d Special Meeting of the Inter-American (IA-Ecosoc)	Panamá	Aug. 20-31*
Entomology, 9th International Congress of	Amsterdam	Aug. 17-24
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO):		
Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology	Igels, Austria	Aug. 6-19
Hoof and Mouth Disease, Regional Conference on	Panamá	Aug. 21-25
Léopoldville Trade Fair, 1951	Léopoldville	Aug. 11-19
Poultry Congress, 9th World's	Paris	Aug. 2-9
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):		
International Seminar on Teaching of History	Sèvres	July 11-Aug. 21
Youth, General Assembly of the World Assembly of	Ithaca, N. Y.	Aug. 6-17

In Session as of August 31, 1951

Cinematographic Art, 12th International Exhibition of	Venice	Aug. 8-
Edinburgh Film Festival, Fifth.	Edinburgh	Aug. 19-
Festival of Britain	England	May 3-
Geodesy and Geophysics, International Union of: 9th General Assembly.	Brussels	Aug. 21-
Izmir International Fair.	Izmir, Turkey.	Aug. 20-
Materials Conference, International.	Washington	Feb. 26-
Swiss-Allied Accord, Four Power Conference on	Bern	Mar. 5-
Telecommunication Union, International (ITU):		
Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference	Geneva	Aug. 16-
United Nations:		
General Assembly: Fifth Regular Session	New York	Sept. 19, 1950-
Trusteeship Council: Ninth Session	New York	June 5-
Economic and Social Council: 13th Session	Geneva	July 30-
Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction	Geneva	Aug. 1-

Scheduled September 1-November 30, 1951

Allergists, First International Congress on	Zürich	Sept. 23-29
Anesthesiology, International Congress on	Paris	Sept. 20-22
Architects, Second Congress of the International Union of	Rabat, Morocco	Sept. 25-30
Aviation Organization, International Civil (ICAO):		
Aerodromes, Air Routes and Ground Aids Demonstration	Washington	Oct. 9-12
Aeronautical Charts Division, 5th Session of the	Montreal	Oct. 9-
Air Traffic in Western Europe, Coordination of	Paris	Sept. 4-
Facilitation Division, 3d Session of the	Buenos Aires	Nov. 21-
Legal Committee, 8th Session	Madrid	Sept. 11-
Search and Rescue Division: 3d Session	Montreal	Sept. 4-
South American-South Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting, 2d Session	Buenos Aires	Oct. 30-
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International—and International Monetary Fund		
Sixth Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors	Washington	Sept. 10-15
Bar Association, International Convention of Inter-American, 7th Conference	Montevideo	Nov. 22-Dec. 3
Building Research Congress, First	London	Sept. 11-20
Chemistry, 24th International Congress of Industrial	Paris	Nov. 25-Dec. 1
Chemistry, 12th International Congress of Pure and Applied	New York	Sept. 10-13

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

*Scheduled to adjourn on August 31.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September 1–November 30, 1951—Continued

Chemistry, 16th General Conference of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemists and Chemical Engineers, International Conclave of . . .	{ New York Washington New York and Wash- ton Copenhagen Stockholm	Sept. 8–9 Sept. 14–15 Sept. 3–15 Sept. 24–27 Sept. 10–14
Cooperative Alliance, 18th Congress of the International Cripples, 5th World Congress of International Society for the Welfare of	Mexico City Rome	Sept. 10–25 Sept. 19–23
Cultural Council, First Meeting of the Inter-American Deaf and Dumb, International Conference of the	Rome	Sept. 12–21
Documentation, International Federation for: 18th Conference	Amsterdam United States or Canada	October* September*
Fisheries, International Commission for Northwest Atlantic: Panel 1 Panel 5	Rome Rome Santiago	Nov. 19–Dec. 8 Nov. 12–17 Sept. 26–Dec. 20
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Fao): 6th Session of Conference 13th Session of the Council Agricultural and Allied Plans and Projects, Latin American Training Center on	Italy	Oct. 12–21
Chestnut Trees, Technical Working Party for Continuation of Studies of	Rome Rome	Oct. 29–Nov. 3 Oct. 8–
Fisheries Statistics, Meeting on	Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon	Sept. 17–29
Forestry and Forest Products Commission, Meeting of the European	Harfenden, England Rome New York	Sept. 3–14 Sept. 25–27 Sept. 1
Land Utilization in Tropical Areas of Asia and the Far East, Regional Meeting on	Lyon, France Mexico City	Sept. 23–Oct. 7 Sept. 3–6
Nematology, Training Center on	St. Louis	Sept. 9–14
Plant Quarantine Conference	Hoeilaart, Belgium	Sept. 28–29
Wood Chemistry, Technical Committee on	Lima	Oct. 8–14
Forest and Lumber Exposition, International	Utrecht	Sept. 11–20
Geography and History, Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Pan American Institute of (PAIGH).	Istanbul San Francisco	Sept. 6–11 Sept. 4–8
Gerontology, 2d International Congress on		
Grapes, International Convention on Table		
Highway Congress, 5th Pan American		
Industries Fair, Royal Netherlands		
Interparliamentary Union, XL General Assembly		
Japan, Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace with		
Labor Organization, International (ILO): Asian Advisory Committee Governing Body, 117th Session Migration Conference, 2d Social Policy in Non-metropolitan Territories, Committee of Experts on	Geneva Geneva Naples Geneva	Nov. 10–13 Nov. 14–24 Oct. 2–16 Nov. 26–Dec. 8
Law, Conference on International Civil: 7th Session	The Hague	Oct. 9–30
Levant Fair, XV	Bari, Italy	Sept. 8–25
Medical Association, World, 5th General Assembly	Stockholm	Sept. 15–20
Medicine, 10th International Congress on Industrial	Lisbon	Sept. 9–15
Metallurgical Congress, World: First	Detroit	Oct. 15–19
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato): Preliminary Meeting of the Council Council (Annual Session) Military Committee	Ottawa Rome Europe Copenhagen Mexico City	Sept. 15 Oct. 29* September* Sept. 3–7 Oct. 12–22
Poliomyelitis, 2d International Congress on		
Red Cross Societies, Inter-American Region of the League of		
Refugee Organization, International (IRO): 10th Session of the Executive Committee 8th Session of the General Council	Geneva Geneva	Oct. 10– Oct. 15
Road Congress, 9th International, and International Exhibition of Roadmaking Materials	Lisbon	Sept. 22–Oct. 4
Sanitary Organization, Pan American (Paso): 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee 15th Meeting of the Executive Committee 5th Session of the Directing Council and Regional Committee of the World Health Organization	Washington Washington Washington	Sept. 20–22 Oct. 3–4 Sept. 24–Oct. 2
Scientific Unions, Executive Board of the International Council of	Washington	Oct. 14–20
Sea, International Council for the Exploration of the: 39th Meeting	Amsterdam	Oct. 1–9
Ship Tank Superintendents, 6th International Council of	Washington	Sept. 5–15
Surgery, 14th International Congress of the International Society of	Paris	Sept. 24
Tariffs and Trade, 6th Session of Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on	Geneva	Sept. 17–

*Tentative.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September 1–November 30, 1951—Continued

Tobacco Congress, World	Amsterdam	Sept. 17–24
Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.	Washington	Sept. 10
<i>United Nations:</i>		
<i>General Assembly:</i>		
6th Session	Paris	Nov. 6
Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter.	Geneva	Oct. 2
<i>Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc):</i>		
Regional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations on U.N. Information.	Paris	Oct. 29
<i>Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE):</i>		
Inland Transport Committee	Bangkok	Nov. 26–Dec. 3
Trade Promotion, Conference on	Singapore	Oct. 9–18
<i>Economic Commission for Europe:</i>		
Industry and Materials Committee	Geneva	Sept. 3
Statisticians, European Regional Conference of	Geneva	September*
Timber Committee	Geneva	Sept. 6
Urology, 5th Pan American Congress of	Mexico	Oct. 8–13
Veterinary Medicine, 1st Pan American Congress on	Lima	Oct. 20–26
<i>World Health Organization (WHO):</i>		
Africa, 1st Meeting of the WHO Regional Committee for	Geneva	Sept. 22–30
Americas, Regional Committee for the (together with 5th Session of the Directing Council of the Pan American Sanitary Organization).	Washington	Sept. 22–
Mediterranean Area, 4th Session of the Regional Committee for the Eastern.	Cyprus	Sept. 24–29
West Pacific Regional Committee, 2d Session	Manila	Sept. 18–21
Zagreb International Fair	Zagreb	Sept. 15–30

*Tentative.

Documents Relating To the Armistice Negotiations in Korea

Exchange of Messages Between U.N. Commander and North Korean and Chinese Communist Commanders

[AUGUST 25, 1951]

The following message by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, U.N. Commander, was broadcast at 1130 hours 25 August, to Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai:

Your message of 24 August,¹ pertaining to an alleged United Nations aerial attack on Kaesong on the evening of 22 August has been received.

This most recent addition to alleged incidents by elements of the United Nations Command, so utterly false, so preposterous and so obviously manufactured for your own questionable purposes does not, in its own right, merit a reply. Nor do the other incidents you have cited as intentional violations by the United Nations Command of the neutral zone at Kaesong. When not fabricated by you for your own propaganda needs, these incidents have proven to be the actions of irregular groups without the slightest connection, overtly or covertly, with any forces or agencies under my control.

In spite of this, I have consistently required my senior

delegate and the commanders of the forces under my command to grant you the courtesy of a full inspection and report of every alleged incident regardless of its manifest falsity.

The evidence in this most recent alleged violation was even more palpably compounded for your insidious propaganda purposes than your earlier efforts. In line, however, with our constant adherence to ethics of decency I have in this case as in all others, fully investigated your charges. My senior Army, Navy and Air Force commanders have individually certified to me in writing that none of their elements have violated or could possibly have violated, the Kaesong neutral zone in this or any other instance of alleged violations reported by you.

I have caused the results of the investigation into this most recent allegation to be widely publicized, so that the entire world will be fully cognizant of your quite evident intent to use a "manufactured" incident in order to evade your responsibility for having suspended the negotiations.

The allegations made in your several recent communications concerning the alleged firing on Pan Mun Jom; the alleged ambush of 19 August by U.N. forces; and the alleged bombing and strafing of Wednesday night, 22 August, are rejected without qualification as malicious falsehoods totally without foundation in fact.

When you are prepared to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations, which you declared on 23 August, I will direct my representatives to meet with yours, with a view to seeking a reasonable armistice agreement.

¹Refers to the Chinese declaration of Aug. 23, the text of which was obviously received by the U.N. Commander on Aug. 24. See BULLETIN of Sept. 3, p. 392.

The following is the text of the official Communist reply of August 27 to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway's suggestion for a renewal of the Korean armistice talks as broadcast by the Peiping radio August 28:

Your reply letter dated the twenty-fifth has been received. In this letter, you not only deny the serious provocative action of the illegal penetration by a plane of your side over the Kaesong neutral zone on the night of Aug. 22, which carried out bombing and strafing with the residence of our delegation as the target, but you also unreasonably refused to settle this matter carefully and responsibly. Moreover, you utter the malicious slander that this incident was "manufactured" by our side, thus attempting to evade the heavy responsibility for this incident which should be borne by your side. We regard this reply of yours as entirely unsatisfactory.

Since the Kaesong armistice negotiations began, in settling any event arising from a violation, by either side, of the Kaesong neutral zone agreement, our side has always adopted a careful and responsible attitude and the principle of equality in order that the negotiations may go ahead smoothly. The entire record on these questions during the Kaesong negotiations unshakably bear out this point.

The full texts of documents and messages that have passed between both sides on these questions have been published by our side, so that people may know the entire truth on the events. What, however, is the position of your side? On all questions of breaches and violations of the Kaesong neutral zone agreement by your side, you have either denied or failed to settle them when our side has called your attention to them or lodged protests with your side.

Even after the incident of Aug. 19, when armed men of your side illegally entered the Kaesong neutral zone and attacked our military patrol, Vice Admiral Joy, your chief delegate, still issued a denial, stating that it was a "voluntary" action by so-called "citizens of the Republic of Korea" within our area and that your side was not responsible for it, despite the fact that investigations were carried out on the spot by the liaison officers of both sides and local inhabitants testified that it was an ambush laid by incursive South Korean troops in uniform.

Yet you state in your recent reply that this was "malicious falsehoods totally without foundation in fact." Are you not aware that Admiral Joy admitted the fact of the ambush of Aug. 23 in his reply to our General Nam Il? One may ask whether the South Korean troops can be excluded from the United Nations forces? And if so what is the job of the South Korean delegate, General Paik Sun Yup, in the United Nations delegation?

What is the basic difference between so-called "citizens of the Republic of Korea" who wear uniforms, carry arms and force their way into the neutral zone, and South Korean troops? If the headquarters of the United Nations forces cannot control and bear responsibility for these South Korean troops, then how can your delegation conduct armistice negotiations representing all United Nations forces, including the South Korean forces?

This kind of fact-twisting, peremptory denial, reversing of the truth and self-contradiction by your side reached its highest peak in the incident on the night of Aug. 22. At the very outset of your reply, you make the slanderous assertion that this incident was "manufactured" by our side and "does not, in its own right merit a reply."

This arbitrary attitude of yours is in itself enough to prove that this incident was premeditated by your side, because only so would you adopt a policy of blank refusal and slander to evade your grave and inescapable responsibility in face of the iron facts.

Thus, it is not surprising that your liaison officers, when they first heard of the incident, found pretexts for refusing to come to Kaesong to investigate. And when they eventually came on the scene, they expressed the opinion that the traces of the bombing and the bomb splinters were not

worth looking at, and they wanted to investigate again in daylight, claiming that it was not convenient to investigate in the dark.

However, on Aug. 23, Admiral Joy, your chief delegate, tried to forestall us with a report denying all the facts and making the "fabrication" slander. Moreover, your liaison officers did not come to reinvestigate but, on the contrary, repeatedly alleged that our side refused to allow a reinvestigation.

It is not clear that all this results from the fact that there was premeditation on your side in regard to the incident so that after it occurred, your side hurriedly tries to evade and deny responsibility, fearing to face the reality?

Facts speak louder than eloquence. Your side's airplane intruded into the Kaesong neutral zone.

It bombed and strafed. Although, disregarding the facts, you allege in your reply that it is a "malicious falsehood totally without foundation in fact," the fragments of the bombs dropped by your plane and the craters, the blasted rocks, the scorched earth are still as they were near the residence of our delegation in the Kaesong meeting area, and the citizens of the Kaesong area can also testify to the actual facts of the bombing and strafing by your plane.

Unless your side is determined to break up the negotiations, and prohibit your delegation and liaison officers, and even press correspondents, from coming to Kaesong, how can you evade the test of reality?

As far as our side is concerned, we did not, on the night of the twenty-second, reject your making a re-investigation in daylight and we are still waiting for your side to do so. If one sticks to the facts on the actual spot of the bombed area in Kaesong, it becomes obvious who manufactured this provocative incident and who is arbitrarily telling absurd lies in face of the facts.

Moreover, even according to the distortions of fact in the report of your liaison officers which Vice Admiral Joy of your side has already published, your side cannot deny that the bomb fragments and other evidence of bombing which your liaison officers saw with their own eyes were wrought by aircraft bombing. And the radar report by your Fifth Air Force has well-testified that an aircraft appeared west of Kaesong at 2130 hours on Aug. 22.

Of course, it is difficult to identify aircraft picked up by radar. But on what grounds were Vice Admiral Joy and the liaison officers of your side able to allege arbitrarily that it was not an aircraft of the United Nations forces but our aircraft that attempted to murder our delegation? Such is the astonishing and absurd length to which the denials and slanders have reached.

In your reply, in addition to repeating their opinions, you also allege that the other incidents were either "fabricated" by our side, or "actions of irregular groups without the slightest connection overtly and covertly" with your side.

But, if the South Korean troops in the Aug. 19 incident were not directly connected with the United Nations command, can you deny that they were connected overtly or covertly with the headquarters of the South Korean troops? Is it possible that the aircraft of the night of Aug. 22 was also an irregular aircraft of South Korea?

When the aircraft of the United Nations forces illegally flew over the Kaesong neutral zone and bombed and strafed the area, your side committed an act of provocation which cannot be brushed aside. And your attitude regarding the affair is such a distortion of the facts, such a denial of the truth, such a confusion of right and wrong and such a self-contradiction that it is very hard to make people believe that your aim is not one of manufacturing incidents and undermining the negotiations, while at the same time avoiding the responsibility for breaking off the negotiations.

But the responsibility will never fall upon us, because our attitude has been realistic, fair and reasonable so as to guarantee the carrying on of the armistice negotiations. Only when your military aircraft violated the neutral zone, with our delegation as its target, attempting to

murder them, was our delegation compelled to suspend the meetings and wait for your side to take responsible action about this incident.

We hereby once more propose to you that this grave act of provocation should be dealt with by your side with an attitude of serious responsibility; then the continuation of the negotiations for a just and reasonable armistice agreement can be guaranteed.

At the same time we demand that you order your liaison officers to proceed to Kaesong to carry out a re-investigation jointly with our liaison officers, of the incident which occurred on the night of Aug. 22 when your military aircraft bombed and strafed the vicinity of the residence of our delegation, in order once again to prove the full validity of our protest.

In order to enable people throughout the world to understand the full and true picture of the incident, we demand that the full text of the communications exchanged between both sides be made public following the example of our side and that your news agencies and press everywhere shall be permitted to release and publish them in full.

We await your reply.

KIM IL SUNG,

Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.

PENG TEH-HUAI,

Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

Aug. 27, 1951.

Message from North Korean and Communist Commanders to U. N. Commander

[SEPTEMBER 2, 1951]

Following are the texts of a message of September 2 from Gen. Kim Il Sung, North Korean Premier and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Chinese Gen. Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway charging an attack on the Kaesong neutral zone by an allied plane:

At 0030 hours on Sept. 1, one of your military aircraft again illegally intruded into the air over our Kaesong neutral zone and carried out a bombing. It has now been established that two bombs were dropped on places only 100 to 600 meters from the residence of General Nam Il, our chief delegate. This is a further action of an extremely serious and provocative nature by your military aircraft following the bombing of the residence of our delegation on the night of Aug. 22. We lodge a grave protest with you.

Following the Aug. 22 incident, your side has not only shown utter irresponsibility in dealing on that occasion with that act of provocation, and also in your reply of Aug. 29, rejected our demand for a re-investigation.

Moreover your side continued to send South Korean troops to illegally invade the Kaesong neutral zone and, on Aug. 30, again murdered two of our military police. At the same time, you continued to send military aircraft to intrude incessantly over the Kaesong neutral zone, carrying out twenty-five sorties in the eight days from Aug. 23 to 30, and at 0240 hours on Aug. 29 dropped a flare near the conference site in Kaesong.

Although the series of provocative acts on the part of your side has on each successive occasion been protested against by our chief delegate, General Nam Il, yet your delegation and yourself, on the one hand, have made shameless denials in complete defiance of the facts, while on the other hand, your armed forces have flagrantly and unscrupulously continued the provocations and carried out the bombing of the Kaesong neutral zone for the second time on Sept. 1. Even while your liaison officers were carrying out investigations in Kaesong today [Sept. 1], one of your military aircraft illegally flew over the Kaesong neutral zone. This was witnessed by all per-

sonnel on the scene, including press correspondents of both sides.

The aim of these endless actions on your part in undermining the agreement for the neutralization of Kaesong can certainly not be explained by any pretext, but only by the intention to undermine the Korean armistice negotiation, making it impossible for the Kaesong conference to continue.

Following upon their investigations on the scene in Kaesong today, your liaison officers were unable to deny the actual results of the bombing of the Kaesong neutral zone by your military aircraft at 0030 hours on Sept. 1.

Nevertheless, just as with the Aug. 22 incident, they shamelessly denied that it was an aircraft of the United Nations forces. It is irrefutable that, since this bombing was confirmed by your liaison officers, the previous bombing which your liaison officers had investigated, but dared not return to re-investigate, was obviously also an ironclad fact. Your side shamelessly deny that it was the aircraft of the United Nations forces, but is it conceivable that our aircraft could possibly have bombed our own delegation?

All honest and decent people in the world will not believe such preposterous denials and lies on your part. In fact, immediately after the bombing of the Kaesong neutral zone by one of your military aircraft at 0030 hours on Sept. 1, your military aircraft still carried out reconnaissance over the Kaesong neutral zone.

Is this not the clearest proof of the inescapable implication of the aircraft of the United Nations forces?

We hereby solemnly point out to you: If you are determined to break up the negotiations, you should openly and formally declare your determination to do so, instead of ceaselessly carrying out such scoundrelly provocations.

If you still have the intention of resuming the Kaesong talks in order to seek a just and reasonable armistice agreement, you should agree to the following demands of our side: Namely, your side must conscientiously and responsibly deal with the series of grave, provocative incidents from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1, and must thoroughly guarantee that there will be no recurrence of similar acts which violate the Kaesong neutralization agreement so that the Kaesong armistice meetings can be resumed.

Awaiting your reply.

Replies by Admiral Joy

The following are replies made by Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy, Senior U.N. delegate on September 2 to allegations by Lt. Gen. Nam Il, Senior North Korean delegate of the U.N. attacks on Communist personnel at Chongdam and Panmunjom, and of an allied aerial violation of the Kaesong area:

COMMUNIST CHARGES OF PERSONNEL VIOLATION

1. This acknowledges receipt of your letter of 30 August alleging: (A) An attack on your personnel at Chongdam at 0600 30 August by ten or more armed men and: (B) Firing in the Panmunjom area at 0610 30 August.

2. It is noted that you delayed more than eleven hours in reporting the incidents despite the fact that there is continuous telephone communication between our headquarters.

3. It is noted, too, that you did not request a representative of the United Nations command to be present at any investigation which may have been made of these incidents.

... [several words missing] to be made among all elements of the United Nations command which could under any circumstance have been in a position to participate in these alleged incidents. That investigation has established that no troops of the United Nations command were west of the road running southward from Landang through Oryongpo-Songhyon-Kwangmyong-[word miss-

September 10, 1951

ing] on the day alleged. Thus none were nearer than 2,500 yards from Panmunjom and 5,000 yards from Chongdam.

5. My letter of 22 August made reference to the partisan activity which you have acknowledged exists within the neutral zone. The existence of such activity is not surprising. It is to be expected that residents of the area would be restive under an oppressive occupation. Kaesong is converted into a relative haven for their activities. What is surprising is that you should protest to the United Nations command following every manifestation of minor disturbance in the neutral zone. Surely you recognize that the status of military occupation carries with it the responsibility for the preservation of order within the area. Why then do you file protests with the United Nations command every time a shot is fired in the zone or a group of irregulars attacks one of your police units?

6. If the alleged incidents of 30 August actually occurred, it is reasonable to assume that they were perpetrated by the same group of irregulars that was involved in the incident of 19 August. If so, there is a good possibility that this band has been operating within the zone continuously since about 15 August. The agreement concerning the neutral zone does not deprive you of the capability of dealing effectively with the groups of this size. Why then do you continuously complain to the United Nations command concerning the incidents which transpire within the zone?

7. I can only conclude that your protests are not motivated by a genuine desire to maintain the neutrality of the Kaesong area. This neutral area was supposedly established in order to provide conditions favorable to the armistice talks. As in the case of the fabricated bombing of the conference site on 22 August, you are evidently using your military occupation of the neutral zone to create conditions which tend to prevent resumption of the armistice talks.

COMMUNIST CHARGES OF AERIAL VIOLATION

I have received your letter of 30 August concerning an alleged violation of the Kaesong neutral zone by aircraft of the United Nations command.

This charge is totally false. On receipt of your allegations that at 0240 hours on 29 August a United Nations command aircraft dropped a parachute flare near the Kaesong conference site, the Commander in Chief, United Nations, caused a thorough check to be made of the position of all United Nations command aircraft airborne at that hour. It was found that at the hour of the alleged attack two United Nations command aircraft dropped photographic flash bombs at two points, one twenty, and one twenty-five miles north of Kaesong.

The aircraft which dropped the photographic flash bombs were using the light from these flashes for making photographs. These photographs have been developed, and they prove conclusively that the United Nations command aircraft taking the pictures were at least fifteen miles north of the outer edge of the Kaesong neutral zone.

The completed investigation established that, on the night of Aug. 29, no United Nations command aircraft was over the neutral zone and no United Nations command aircraft dropped a flare or any other mechanism in the neutral zone. You state an aircraft circled low and dropped a parachute flare in the vicinity of the conference site at 0240, 29 August. United Nations command aircraft do not "circle low" while dropping flares. I conclude, therefore, that your personnel have again attempted to fix a false charge upon the United Nations command.

Your careless regard for truth is further illustrated by the recklessness with which you state that an agreement had previously been reached concerning an air space reservation above the Kaesong neutral zone. In your letter you made the following statement, among others:

"After the reaching of the Kaesong neutrality agreement, your aircraft still continued their unlawful in-

vasion of the air above the neutral zone in repeated violation of the agreement."

In many other sentences of your letter, you refer to an alleged agreement between us regarding an air space reservation over the Kaesong neutral zone. As you know well, the initiation of recent discussions between our liaison officers regarding the Kaesong neutral zone was at your instance.

On 11 August, you stated: "I propose that the liaison officers of both sides meet again to discuss this question and to agree upon a draft of detailed provisions of neutralization. This draft may then be ratified by our two delegations as an agreement to be observed by both sides."

You are fully aware that no ratification of any draft provided by our liaison officers has ever occurred. You are fully aware that no agreement concerning an air space reservation over the Kaesong neutral zone has ever been considered, much less ratified by our two delegations.

In fact, on Aug. 18, Colonel Chang [Chan Sun] submitted to Colonel [Andrew J.] Kinney a document setting forth proposed agreements regarding the Kaesong neutral zone, one of which was concerned with an air space [reservation] over the Kaesong zone. The record of this meeting of liaison officers reveals that Colonel Kinney accepted Colonel Chang's document with the statement:

"We will study this paper and give you our comment the day after tomorrow." The liaison officers have not resumed their discussions since that time. Obviously, no agreement could be in effect.

Yet, not less than eight times in your letter of Aug. 30, you made reference to an alleged agreement regarding an air space reservation over the Kaesong neutral zone. Such disregard for facts can serve no purpose other than to delay the resumption of the armistice conference.

U. S. Delegation Departs for Japanese Treaty Conference

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press August 31]

The American delegation believes that free people everywhere will take heart from the conference in San Francisco in which those nations that really want peace join in signing the Japanese Peace Treaty.

We are all satisfied that the treaty which we are going to sign is a good one. It represents 11 months of negotiations in which all the nations in the war against Japan have had the opportunity to shape the final treaty.

The treaty with Japan is generous because only such a treaty could permit her to contribute to the economic recovery and political stability of Asia. It is a treaty of opportunity because it gives Japan the chance to prove to the world the genuineness of her desire to be a peaceful member of the free world community of nations. It is a realistic treaty because it takes into account what Japan can actually do in the interest of world stability.

As we depart for the San Francisco conference, we have in mind the history of many such occasions in the past when victors dictated to the vanquished terms of peace conceived in the spirit of vengeance. We know at tragic and bitter cost the results of such past experiences.

San Francisco, where the United Nations was created to build world peace, and where we will sign the Japanese Peace Treaty which has been drafted in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, will provide a test for those nations that really want peace and those that do not.

I am confident that the vast majority of the nations attending the conference will sign the treaty as a signal demonstration of the desire of all free peoples for peace and freedom.

*Statement by John Foster Dulles,
Consultant to the Secretary*

Released to the press August 31]

For many months, many people, in many countries, have been working for peace in the Pacific. Now at last we are seeing the culmination of those efforts. Yesterday saw the conclusion of a Mutual Assistance Treaty between the United States and the Philippines. Tomorrow will see the conclusion of a similar treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. A few days later we shall see many allied Governments conclude a Treaty of Peace with Japan. The long efforts are bearing fruit. Peace is being reestablished in the Pacific. This new peace is not the old kind of peace, which failed. It is a peace of collective security. It will be solid against anything but a direct frontal attack by some great nation deliberately bent on starting World War III. We do not want to believe that any nation has so evil and reckless a design; therefore, we go to San Francisco in a spirit of hope and confidence.

Washington and Nepal Raised to Embassy Rank

Released to the press August 27]

The Governments of the United States and of Nepal have agreed to raise the status of their respective diplomatic missions at Washington and Katmandu to the rank of Embassy and to exchange ambassadors.

The United States Government extended recognition to the Government of Nepal in 1947, and an agreement of commerce and friendship was signed at Katmandu on April 25, 1947. The first Nepalese and American ministers presented their credentials at Washington and Katmandu respectively in 1948. At present neither Government maintains a chancery in the capital of the other. The American minister, who is also ambassador to India, is resident in New Delhi, while the Nepalese minister is also ambassador to the United Kingdom, resident in London.

It is expected that this step will lead to closer relations between the United States and Nepal.

September 10, 1951

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754	8/23	Treaty of Security, Australia
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767†	8/27	Kennedy: Dir. So. Asian Affairs
768*	8/27	Anniversary of Uruguay
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771	8/27	U.S., Nepal to Embassy Status
772	8/28	Czechoslovak Credentials
773	8/28	Argentine Credentials (rewrite)
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*Omitted.

†Held for future use.

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The Department of State

bulletin

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San Francisco Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan

OPENING ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN¹

I am glad to welcome you to this conference for signing the treaty of peace with Japan. The people of the United States are honored to serve as hosts for this meeting.

Six years ago, the nations represented at this conference were engaged in a bitter and costly war. Nevertheless, these nations and others came together here, in this very hall, to set up the United Nations as the first essential step toward a firm and lasting peace.

Today, we meet here again to take another step along the road to peace. On this occasion, it is our purpose to conclude a treaty of peace with a country we were fighting in 1945. We meet to restore our former enemy to the community of peaceful nations.

The treaty we are gathered here to sign has not been drawn in a spirit of revenge. The treaty reflects the spirit in which we carried on the war. The principles for which we fought were clearly set forth by President Franklin D. Roosevelt right after Pearl Harbor. On December 9, 1941, in a broadcast to the American people, he said:

"When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. . . . We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this nation, and all that this nation represents, will be safe for our children."

That is our purpose here today as we gather to sign the peace treaty. We are trying to build a world in which the children of all nations can live together in peace. We hope we are attaining the ultimate good to which President Roosevelt referred.

Unfortunately, today, the world is faced with new threats of aggression. Many of the countries represented here are now engaged in a hard fight to uphold the United Nations against international lawbreaking. But we have not forgotten that our

goal is peace. We will not let the present conflict deter us from taking every step we can toward peace. We will not let that happen now, any more than we let the existence of war in 1945 hold up our efforts for the United Nations.

The people of all our countries long for one thing above all else, and they are determined to have it. What they want is a world at peace—a world where there is justice and freedom for all men and all nations. Our peoples demand of us that we take every possible measure to reach that goal.

We who stand ready to sign this treaty with Japan believe in peace. We believe in peace based on freedom and international justice. We know that a free and independent people have more vigor and staying power and can do more to help secure the peace than a people held under alien control. We believe that the whole great effort for peace will be strengthened if Japan is now restored to independence and linked to other free nations by ties of mutual friendship and responsibility.

Objective of Occupation Achieved

Since the fighting ended in 1945, Japan has been an occupied country. The occupation was designed by the wartime Allies to prevent future Japanese aggression and to establish Japan as a peaceful and democratic country, prepared to return to the family of nations. The United States, as the principal occupying power, was given a special responsibility to carry out these objectives. It is our judgment that they have been achieved. I wish on this occasion to express the pride that my countrymen and I feel in the way in which the Allied occupation has been carried out. Its success has been due to the devoted efforts of many thousands of people serving under the outstanding leadership of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and his successor General Matthew Ridgway.

I would also like to pay tribute to the impressive effort put forward by the people of Japan in this period. They have fully complied with the surrender terms. They have cooperated fully in

¹ Made at the conference on the Japanese peace treaty at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 4 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

carrying out the purposes of the occupation. The result has been a remarkable and unprecedented period of progress in Japanese history. Japan, today, is a very different country from what it was six years ago. The old militarism has been swept away. This has been done not just by occupation edict but by the overwhelming will of the Japanese people themselves. The secret police and the police-state methods used by the former government have been abolished.

The new Japanese constitution provides a bill of rights for all citizens and establishes a government truly representative of the people. The Japanese people now have universal suffrage, and they are taking a vigorous part in their government. In recent local elections, more than 90 percent of those eligible have voted. Japanese women now vote and take part in the government and enjoy full democratic rights for the first time. Free and independent labor unions have been established, and farm cooperatives have been greatly expanded. The monopolies that used to have such a stranglehold on the Japanese economy have been substantially broken up.

Remarkable progress has been made in land reform. Over 5 million acres of land have been purchased from the old landlords and sold to working farmers. Today, about 90 percent of all cultivated land belongs to those who work on it, as compared with less than 50 percent in 1945. This is a great achievement, full of meaning for all Asia.

Through these and other reforms, the Japanese people have been developing a stable economy and a democratic society. They still have a long way to go, but they are well on the road to building a new Japan—dedicated to the arts of peace and the well-being of the people. Because of these accomplishments, it is possible at this time to restore full sovereignty to the Japanese people.

This does not mean that the slate has been wiped clean. The United States has not forgotten Pearl Harbor or Bataan, and many of the other nations represented here have similar memories that will not easily be erased. The new Japan will not find the world entirely friendly and trusting. It will have to keep on working to win the friendship and trust of other peoples over the years to come. But the foundations for a peaceful future have been laid. It is now time to move ahead with the restoration of normal relations between Japan and the rest of the world.

Treaty Constructed by Cooperative Effort

This conference is the result of a year of cooperative effort toward that end. A year ago this month, at my request, Mr. John Foster Dulles began to consult other governments about a treaty of peace with Japan. Mr. Dulles has performed this task faithfully and well, guided by the highest traditions of statesmanship.

There were, of course, differences of opinion among the nations concerned as to many of the matters covered by this treaty. The text of the treaty now before us is the product of long and patient negotiations, among many nations, which were undertaken to reconcile these differences. I think it is fair to say that it is a good treaty. It takes account of the principal desires and ultimate interests of all the participants. It is fair to both victor and vanquished. But more than that, it is a treaty that will work. It does not contain the seeds of another war. It is a treaty of reconciliation, which looks to the future, not the past.

The treaty reestablishes Japan as a sovereign, independent nation. It provides for the restoration of Japanese trade with other nations, and it imposes no restrictions upon Japan's access to raw materials. The treaty recognizes the principle that Japan should make reparations to the countries which suffered from its aggression. But it does not saddle the Japanese people with a hopeless burden of reparations which would crush their economy in the years to come.

In all these respects, the treaty takes account of the peaceful advances the Japanese people have made in recent years, and seeks to establish the conditions for further progress. However, there is one thing we must all recognize. There can be no progress unless the Japanese people and their neighbors in the Pacific are made secure against the threat of aggression.

At the present time, the Pacific area is gravely affected by outright aggression and by the threat of further armed attack. One of our primary concerns in making peace with Japan, therefore, is to make Japan secure against aggression and to provide that Japan, in its turn, will so conduct itself as not to endanger the security of other nations. To accomplish this, it is important to bring Japan under the principles of the United Nations and within the protection of the mutual obligations of United Nations members. The treaty expresses Japan's intention to apply for membership in the United Nations. The other countries who sign the treaty can be counted on to work for the admission of Japan to membership. But even so, there may be delays before Japan can be admitted.

Under the treaty, therefore, the Japanese people bind themselves to accept immediately the basic obligations of a United Nations member—namely, to refrain from aggression, to settle disputes peacefully, and to support the efforts of the United Nations to maintain the peace. At the same time, the other nations who sign the treaty specifically recognize that Japan is entitled to the protection of the United Nations Charter. In a sense, these provisions are the heart of this treaty. Under them, Japan becomes part of the community of nations pledged to outlaw aggression and to support a world order based on justice. This

tying together of the Japanese peace treaty and the United Nations Charter is a long step toward building security in the Pacific. But more than this is needed.

World Peace Depends on Security Agreements

In the present world situation, it has been necessary to buttress the peaceful principles of the United Nations Charter with regional arrangements for the common defense against aggression. If real security is to be attained in the Pacific, the free nations in that area must find means to work together for the common defense.

The United States recognizes this fact. Our people have suffered from past aggression in the Pacific and are determined that this country shall do its part for peace there. In recent days, we have joined with other Pacific nations in important mutual security agreements.

Last Thursday, the Philippines and the United States signed a treaty of mutual defense. Under this treaty, each country recognizes that an armed attack on the other in the Pacific area would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger.

Last Saturday, a similar security treaty was signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

These treaties are initial steps toward the consolidation of peace in the Pacific. It is vital that Japan be included, as soon as possible, in appropriate security arrangements for keeping peace in the Pacific. This is necessary for her own protection and the protection of other countries. The peace treaty, therefore, recognizes that Japan, as a sovereign nation, must possess the right of self-defense and the right to join in defense arrangements with other countries under the United Nations Charter.

The development of regional arrangements for defense in the Pacific will mean that such Japanese defense forces as may be created would be associated with the defense forces of other nations in the area. Japan's security would not depend exclusively on Japanese forces but on interrelated security arrangements with other countries. The Japanese contribution, by itself, would not constitute an offensive threat. But Japanese forces, together with forces of other nations, would provide mutual security against threats to the independence of the nations of the Pacific, including Japan.

At present, of course, Japan is totally unarmed. In view of the open aggression taking place near Japan, the Japanese Government has requested the United States to enter into a bilateral treaty for Japan's immediate security. Under such a treaty, the United States would maintain armed forces in Japan for the time being as a contribution to international peace and to Japan's defense against attack. Security arrangements are essen-

tial in a world in danger. In the Pacific as in other parts of the world, social and economic progress is impossible unless there is a shield which protects men from the paralysis of fear.

But our great goal, our major purpose, is not just to build bigger and stronger shields. What we want to do is to advance, as rapidly as we can, the great constructive tasks of human progress. We in the United States respect and support the many new free and independent nations in the Pacific area and Asia. We want to see them grow and prosper, as equal partners in the community of independent nations of both East and West. We want to cooperate with them, to help them in their agricultural and industrial development. We wish to see these nations attain in dignity and freedom a better life for their peoples—for that is the road to world peace.

Equality for Japan in Partnership of Peace

These countries have a rich historical and cultural heritage. Today, their people are experiencing great economic and social changes. They are stirred by a new zeal for progress and independence. Already, we have seen some of the progress that can be made—progress in stamping out malaria, in building schools and training teachers, in growing more food, and creating new industries. Immense opportunities lie ahead if these countries can pursue their national destinies in a partnership of peace, free from the fear of aggression. Under this peace treaty, we believe Japan can and will join in this partnership of peace.

We look forward to the contribution which the new Japan, with its rich culture and its dedication to peace, can bring to the community of nations. We expect this contribution to grow over the years, for the signing of a peace treaty is but one part of the process of making peace. When aggression and war have severed relations between nations, many ties which bind one nation to the others are cut. Making peace is like repairing the many strands of an intercontinental cable; each strand must be spliced separately and patiently, until the full flow of communication has been restored. There is no other way to bring lasting peace than this slow and patient process, step by step, of mending and strengthening the cables of communication, of understanding between nations.

In this San Francisco Conference, we have the opportunity to take one vital step toward lasting peace. Our specific task here is to conclude the treaty of peace with Japan. That will be a great step toward general peace in the Pacific. There are other steps which need to be taken. The most important of these is the restoration of peace and security in Korea. With Japan returned to its place in the family of nations, and with the people of Korea secure, free, and united, it should be

possible to find ways to settle other problems in the Pacific which now threaten the peace.

The United States has made clear on many occasions its desire to explore with other governments at the proper time and in the proper forum how this might be accomplished. There are many well established ways in which next steps can be explored, if there is a genuine desire for peace in all quarters. But these are not matters which can be dealt with in our present conference. We have come here to take a single step—but a step of the utmost importance.

The treaty now before us offers more than talk of peace; it offers action for peace. This conference will show, therefore, who seeks to make peace, and who seeks to prevent it; who wishes to put an end to war, and who wishes to continue it.

We believe this treaty will have the support of all those nations that honestly desire to reduce the tensions which now grip the world. I pray that we shall all be united in taking this step to advance us toward greater harmony and understanding.

As we approach the peace table, let us be free of malice and hate, to the end that from here on there shall be neither victors nor vanquished among us, but only equals in the partnership of peace.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON²

The first plenary session of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan is convened.

The first order of business is the organization of the Conference to conclude the adoption of rules of procedure and the election of officers.

Now, before I recognize any delegate, I wish to make a few observations as to the character of this Conference. The delegations of the governments here represented have come in response to an invitation to meet for conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace With Japan with its attendant declarations on the terms of the August 13, 1951, text, which in the invitation was described as a final text.

This is the text which emerged from 11 months of negotiations. It is the text which the delegation of Japan, the delegations of the cosponsors of the text—the United Kingdom and the United States—and the delegations of most of the other Allied nations have come here for the purpose of signing.

The fact that the signing of the Treaty of Peace With Japan is preceded by a conference is

² Made at the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 5, in his capacity as president of the Conference; printed from transcript.

due to the desires expressed by a number of Allied powers that they should have an opportunity prior to the actual signing to make public and official statements regarding the treaty and regarding their aspirations for peace which the treaty is designed to realize.

The fact that the treaty had been negotiated by diplomatic rather than by conference methods made it seem desirable to provide an opportunity to make such an historic record prior to the ceremony of signing. That is the purpose of this Conference.

The purpose of the Conference was clearly set out in the invitation and in the accompanying oral explanations which were given in transmitting the invitations. In addition, where circumstances seem to make it appropriate, diplomatic reminders were given in order to avoid the possibility of future misunderstandings.

Therefore, while serving as your temporary presiding officer I shall conduct these proceedings in such a way as to realize the purpose for which the conference was called—that is for the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace With Japan on the terms of the text before us.

TEXT OF RULES OF PROCEDURE³

Section I

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Article 1. The conference is held pursuant to and will be conducted in accordance with the terms of the invitation extended by the Government of the United States of America, a copy of which is annexed.

Section II

TEMPORARY PRESIDENT

Article 2. The chairman of the delegation of the United States of America shall be the temporary president of the conference and shall preside until the conference elects a permanent president.

Section III

PERMANENT PRESIDENT

Article 3. The permanent president of the conference shall be elected by a simple majority of the plenipotentiary delegations of states represented at the conference. The permanent president shall have authority to preside at all meetings of the conference and to decide all questions of order raised during the debates of the conference.

³ Originally proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States.

Section IV

VICE PRESIDENT

Article 4. The conference shall elect a vice president from among the members of the plenipotentiary delegations, who shall serve at the request of the president and with the powers of the president. Should neither the president nor the vice president be in a position to preside at a session or part of a session of the conference, the president or vice president last presiding may, with the consent of the conference, invite one of the plenipotentiary delegates to serve as a temporary presiding officer with the powers of the president.

Section V

ELECTIONS

Article 5. All elections shall be held by secret ballot. There shall be no nominations.

Section VI

SECRETARY GENERAL

Article 6. The secretary general of the conference shall be appointed by the Government of the United States of America.

The secretary general shall coordinate and supervise the secretariat of the conference and shall place at the disposal of the conference the facilities necessary for the discharge of its work.

The secretary general shall be the intermediary between the delegations or their respective members in matters relating to the organization and functioning of the conference, and between the delegates and the Federal, state, and local governments of the United States.

Section VII

PARTICIPANTS

Article 7. Representation at the conference shall be confined to the plenipotentiary delegations accredited respectively by governments of Allied powers invited by the Government of the United States of America to participate in the conference. The Japanese delegation shall be entitled to be present without vote at all public meetings of the conference and shall be afforded by the presiding officer appropriate opportunity to be heard prior to the ceremony of signing the treaty.

Article 8. Co-signature of the treaty of peace with Japan does not, as between allied powers (as defined in treaty), imply recognition of any state or government to which any signatory has not previously extended recognition.

Article 9. Participants in the conference shall be limited to the following:

(1) Delegates and their alternates accredited by the invited governments to the conference, shall have the right of attending all sessions of the con-

ference; shall have the right of speaking thereat subject to those rules of procedure and the decisions of the conference; shall have the right of voting subject to restrictions herein specified.

(2) Other representatives including technical adviser and staff of the delegations accredited by the invited governments to the conference, shall have the privilege of attending all public sessions of the conference unless otherwise determined by the conference, but they shall not have the right to vote or address the conference except at the request of their plenipotentiary delegates.

(3) Members of the secretariat shall have the privilege of attending all sessions of the conference as necessary to carry out the functions of the secretariat.

Section VIII

LANGUAGES OF THE CONFERENCE

Article 10. The host government will make available simultaneous oral interpreting services as between English, French, Russian and Spanish. Delegates may speak, however in any other language provided they furnish advance interpretations thereof into any one of the foregoing languages.

Article 11. The text of the treaty shall be circulated at the conference in the following languages: English, French, Russian, Spanish and Japanese.

Article 12. Verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions will be issued in the language of the host country, English. In addition, the secretariat will circulate to the delegations oral statements which are made in one of the languages of the treaty other than English, provided the speaker makes available said text to the secretariat.

Section IX

ORDER OF SEATING, ETC.

Article 13. Conference seating, voting and other points of precedence shall be determined by the alphabetic order of names of the accrediting States, in the English language.

Section X

CREDENTIALS

Article 14. The secretary general will examine and report to the conference on (a) the credentials of persons representing the governments invited to participate in the conference, and (b) full powers referred to in the preamble of the August 13 text of the treaty.

Section XI

MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

Article 15. The president will ordinarily ascertain the sense of the meeting in lieu of a formal vote. If a vote is taken, attendance by a majority

of the plenipotentiary delegations shall constitute a quorum and the decision shall be by a majority of the plenipotentiary delegations present and voting at the meeting. Each plenipotentiary delegation shall have but one vote.

Article 16. The sessions of the conference shall be public unless otherwise ordered by a majority vote.

Section XII

CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Article 17. Having regard to the special and limited terms of reference of this conference, its business, after adoption of the rules of procedure, shall be confined to:

- (1) Election of officers.
- (2) Report on credentials.
- (3) Statements on behalf of the two governments jointly sponsoring the treaty text.
- (4) Statements by participating delegations.
- (5) Report of secretary general on conformity of the different language texts of the treaty.
- (6) Ceremony of signing the treaty of peace with Japan.

Article 18. Immediately following the statements on behalf of the two sponsoring governments, which shall not exceed one hour each, each other delegation may make a statement, in no case to exceed one hour, with reference to the August 13, 1951, text of treaty of peace with Japan. When a delegation has made this statement that delegation may not be heard again on the subject until all other delegations as yet not heard shall have had the opportunity to make a statement; provided, however, that if a statement by any delegation puts questions to another delegation, that other delegation, immediately upon the conclusion of the statement, may have not to exceed five minutes to answer. Delegations may at any time submit and circulate relevant written statements which may, with the approval of the presiding officer, be incorporated into the permanent record.

After all the delegations desiring to make statements have been heard, then the conference shall decide as to what, if any, further statements will be permitted and under what conditions.

Delegations shall be called upon in the order in which they have signified to the secretary general their desire to be heard and failing any such timely signification, will be called upon by the presiding officer in accordance with precedence under Article 13, starting with the name of a country to be chosen by lot.

Article 19. No delegate or representative may address the conference without having previously been recognized by the presiding officer. The presiding officer shall have the power to call a speaker to order and if the speaker does not conform, shall terminate his recognition and call upon the next speaker.

Article 20. During the discussion of any matter, a delegate or representative may raise a point of order by calling attention to the rules of procedure believed to be infringed. The point of order shall immediately be decided by the presiding officer in accordance with these rules of procedure. Exception to the ruling of the presiding officer shall be immediately put to a vote without debate, and the ruling of the presiding officer shall stand unless it is overruled by a majority of the plenipotentiary delegations present and voting at the meeting.

Article 21. During the discussion of any matter, a delegate or representative may move the suspension, adjournment of the meeting or the closure of debate. Such motion shall not be debated but shall be immediately put to a vote. The presiding officer may limit the length of statements made with respect to matters raised under Articles 20 and 21.

Article 22. Subject to Article 19, the following motions shall have precedence in the following order over all other proposals or motions before the meeting: (1) to suspend a meeting; (2) to adjourn a meeting; (3) to close the debate.

Section XIII

MINUTES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

Article 23. The secretary general shall cause to be kept verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions of the conference. Any speaker wishing to correct the verbatim minutes for accuracy of translation shall submit his observations in writing to the secretariat within thirty-six hours after the provisional minutes have been circulated.

Article 24. The secretary general shall cause to be prepared for distribution among the participating governments a record of proceedings which shall include the verbatim minutes of the plenary sessions.

Section XIV

Article 25. These rules, having been adopted by a majority of the plenipotentiary delegations voting, shall be effective unless amended in like manner.

STATEMENT BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES⁴

We have met here for a consecrated purpose. We shall here make peace. "Blessed are the peacemakers." But the most blessed of this peace are not those of us who assemble here. The foundation for this peace was laid by the many who gave up their lives in faith that the very magnitude of their sacrifice would compel those who survived to find and take the way to peace.

⁴ Made on behalf of the U.S. delegation at the second plenary session on Sept. 5 and released to the press by the conference on the same date.

We are here to redeem, in some small measure, the vast debt we owe.

That task is not a simple one. Victory usually gives power greater than should be possessed by those who are moved by the passions that war engenders. That is a principal reason why war has become a self-perpetuating institution.

The treaty before us is a step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war—victory—peace—war. The nations will here make a peace of justice, not a peace of vengeance.

The Occupation Prepared the Way

True peace is possible because of what has been accomplished by 6 years of Allied Occupation. That Occupation was calm and purposeful. Japan's war-making power was destroyed. The authority and influence of those who committed Japan to armed conquest was eliminated. Stern justice was meted out to the war criminals, while mercy was shown the innocent. There has come freedom of speech, of religion, of thought; and respect for fundamental human rights. There has been established, by the will of the people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government, which we are happy to welcome here.

The Allied Occupation goals set forth in the Potsdam Surrender Terms have been met, with the loyal cooperation of the Japanese people. It is now time to end that Occupation, and make a peace which will restore Japan as a sovereign equal.

It is possible now to make that kind of a peace, to make this a peace of reconciliation, because the Japan of today is transformed from the Japan of yesterday.

The past is not forgotten or excused. Bitterness and distrust remain the sentiment of many. That is human. Those who have suffered less have no warrant to set themselves up as moral judges of those who have suffered more. But time, and the good use to which it has been put in Japan, have somewhat healed the scars of war. New hopes have gradually displaced old fears. Now, by an effort of self-control which is perhaps unprecedented in history, the Allies present to Japan a treaty which shows no trace of angry passion.

That is not merely an act of generosity toward a vanquished foe, it is an act of enlightened self-interest. For a treaty warped by passion often becomes a boomerang which, thrown against an enemy, returns to strike its authors.

For this treaty we are deeply indebted to the man who led the Allied Powers to victory in the Pacific. After that victory he devoted 5½ years to service in Japan as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. As such he showed not only magnanimity, but strength without which magnanimity is counted weakness. He provided the Occupation with moral leadership which has been the impulsion for the kind of peace we make. The

present generation and generations to come owe much to General MacArthur.

Eleven Months of Conference

In framing the peace, the United States has taken an initiative. That was plainly our duty.

Some now find it expedient to disparage the role played by the United States in the Pacific war. None did so in the hour of victory. Then, by a unanimous Allied act, the United States was given the exclusive power to name the Supreme Commander for all the Allied Powers and to direct the Occupation which would prepare Japan for the peace to come. That Allied act put us in a position uniquely to judge *when* the Japanese were prepared for peace. It surely entitled us, indeed it obligated us, to take timely steps to bring our Occupation responsibilities to their normal predestined end.

We first moved in this matter 4 years ago. In 1947 the United States proposed a preliminary conference of the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to consider plans for a Japanese peace treaty. That proposal was blocked by the insistence of the Soviet Union that the treaty could only be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers where the Soviet Union would have veto power. The Soviet Union continued stubbornly to adhere to that position.

Last year the United States decided to abandon the conference method, which afforded excessive possibilities of obstruction, and to seek peace through diplomatic processes which no single nation could thwart. That has been done with the hearty cooperation of most of the Allies and has resulted in a finished text.

The negotiations began about a year ago when the Allies principally concerned were gathering to attend the U. N. General Assembly in New York. The various delegations principally concerned had frequent consultations at that time. Then came conferences at many capitals and many written exchanges of views. A U. S. Presidential Mission toured the globe, visiting ten capitals of countries especially concerned. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom was exploring the problem within the Commonwealth, and its representative will tell you more of that.

The first round of discussions dealt with the question of whether it was *time* for peace and, if so, what basic *principles* should be applied. In this connection the United States outlined seven principles which it felt ought to govern the framing of the Treaty.

We found complete agreement to the urgency of prompt peace and general agreement as to the basic principles. So, in January of this year, the United States undertook to make the first draft of a text which would translate the agreed principles into treaty words. That draft was circulated last March, and was subjected to in-

tensive study by over 20 countries. These included not only the Far Eastern Commission countries, but others which had expressed interest. The American states were kept informed, as was their due. Mexico had actively participated in the Pacific war, as had Brazil in the European war. All had made important political, economic, and moral contributions.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom produced a text of its own, drafted in the light of the Commonwealth conferences. Then in June, the United States and the United Kingdom combined their parallel efforts and jointly drafted a text to reconcile and reflect still more fully the different views that had been developed. This text was circulated to Allied Powers during the first half of July and was kept open for further changes until mid-August.

Throughout this period, the Soviet Union took an active, though reluctant, part. We had several conferences with Yakov Malik and our Governments have exchanged ten memoranda and drafts.

Every nation which has constructively interested itself in the treaty can claim authorship of important parts of the present text. Also each of these nations can claim the equally honorable distinction of voluntarily subordinating some special interest so that a broad base of unity might be found. The Allied Powers have been conducting what in effect, is an 11-months' peace conference participated in by so many nations as to make this treaty the most broadly based peace treaty in all history.

Any who are interested in studying the evolutionary processes which have been at work can compare our March draft with the present text. To make that comparison easy, a parallel-column document has been prepared for distribution here. It shows how our conference methods have worked.

The treaty remains, as first agreed, a nonpunitive, nondiscriminatory treaty, which will restore Japan to dignity, equality, and opportunity in the family of nations. But it has been found increasingly possible to do justice to particular situations without violating these basic concepts.

I now turn to a consideration of the principal provisions of the text.

The Treaty Terms

(1) *The Preamble* is an important part of the treaty. It affords the Japanese Nation the opportunity to record intentions and aspirations which the whole world welcomes.

Japan declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations; to conform to the principles of the Charter; to adhere to the new ideals of human rights and freedoms which have become implanted in the Constitution and legislation of Japan; and, in public and private trade and commerce, to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.

If Japan's intentions in these respects are sincere, which we believe, and if they are pursued with resolution, they will go far to restore good will between the Japanese and Allied people.

It may be asked why, if that is so, the treaty does not attempt to put the Japanese under legal compulsion in these respects. There are good reasons for not doing so. Japan, when it applies for membership in the United Nations, should do so because it *wants* to be a member, not because the Allies compel it. Eighty million people cannot be compelled from without, to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their fellows. Fair trade practices cannot be made a formal obligation when they have not yet been spelled out in international conventions. In general, treaty obligations should only be such as can be precisely formulated, so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and what are their duties. Where applicable conventions exist, Japan will voluntarily adhere to them, as set out in the declaration appended to the treaty.

(2) *Sovereignty Restored.* Chapter I ends the state of war, with consequent recognition of the full sovereignty of the Japanese people. Let us note that the sovereignty recognized is the "sovereignty of the Japanese people".

(3) *Territory.* What is the territory of Japanese sovereignty? Chapter II deals with that. Japan formally ratifies the territorial provisions of the Potsdam Surrender Terms, provisions which, so far as Japan is concerned, were actually carried into effect 6 years ago.

The Potsdam Surrender Terms constitute the only definition of peace terms to which, and by which, Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole are bound. There have been some private understandings between some Allied Governments; but by these Japan was not bound, nor were other Allies bound. Therefore, the treaty embodies article 8 of the Surrender Terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and some minor islands. The renunciations contained in article 2 of chapter II strictly and scrupulously conform to that surrender term.

Some question has been raised as to whether the geographical name "Kurile Islands" mentioned in article 2 (c) includes the Habomai Islands. It is the view of the United States that it does not. If, however, there were a dispute about this, it could be referred to the International Court of Justice under article 22.

Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly, would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. We had either to give Japan peace on the Potsdam Surrender Terms or deny peace to Japan while the

Allies quarrel about what shall be done with what Japan is prepared, and required, to give up. Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty.

Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the sole administration of the United States.

Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.

In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the U. N. trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contemplates extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" (article 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that "It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security".

A peace which limits Japanese territory according to the Potsdam Surrender Terms, naturally leads one to ask, can a growing population, now numbering over 80 million, survive on the Japanese home islands? A clue to the correct answer is the fact that when Japan had a vast colonial empire into which the Japanese people could freely emigrate, few did so. Formosa, a rich, uncrowded land with temperate climate, attracted, in 55 years, a total Japanese population of about 350,000. Korea, under Japanese control since 1905, attracted a total Japanese population of about 650,000. In South Sakhalin there were 350,000 Japanese and in the Kurile Islands about 11,000. Japan's colonies helped assure Japan access to food and raw materials, but they were no population outlet. Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at home. So far as emigration is concerned, the territorial clauses of the treaty do not establish restraints greater than those which 98 percent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.

Of course growing populations create problems in Japan and elsewhere. The Japanese will need to develop the capacity to perform services which others want, so that in exchange they can buy the food and raw materials they need. This calls for willingness on the part of the Japanese

people to work hard, to work efficiently and to work with creative imagination so that they can anticipate the economic wants of others. Each of the Allied Powers also has a responsibility. The Surrender Terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations". Peoples who are ready and willing to work and to create what others want, should have the means to do so. Under such conditions the present territorial status of Japan is no cause for alarm.

(4) *Security.* Chapter III deals with security, a problem which has not been, and never is, automatically solved by victory. By article 5, Japan undertakes to live peacefully, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. We hope that Japan will promptly become a member of the United Nations. If this were certain, article 5 would be unnecessary. But, in the past, veto power has been used to block the admission of nations qualified for membership. So it is prudent to write into the treaty that, as provided by article 2 (6) of the Charter, Japan will settle its international disputes by peaceful means; will refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force; and will give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.

These provisions completely meet the desire which some nations have expressed that the treaty should bind Japan to peaceful processes and explicitly prohibit Japan from acting forcibly, alone or in coalition, against any other nation. There can be nothing more sweeping than the renunciation of offensive force expressed in article 5 (a) (ii) of the treaty.

In order, however, that this treaty, like the United Nations Charter, should make it perfectly clear that the prohibition against the use of force does not deprive Japan of the right of self-defense, subdivision (c) of article 5 contains a recognition that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses what article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations refers to as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense".

Article 6 of the treaty calls for ending the Occupation not later than 90 days after the treaty comes into force. However, Japan, as contemplated by article 51 of the U. N. Charter, may enter into collective security arrangements, and these might, in part, be implemented by Allied elements which were in Japan when the treaty came into force. Accordingly, it seemed useful to make it clear that, under such circumstances, these elements would not have to be physically removed from Japan before they could serve as collective security forces. This would be a burdensome requirement, and a risky one for it would for a time leave Japan wholly defenseless, in close proximity to proved aggressors possessed of great military strength. To avoid that danger, article 6 pro-

vides that Occupation elements now in Japanese territory may stay on for Japan's defense, if this is wanted by Japan.

These remaining military elements would, of course, have characteristics and powers very different from what they had as occupation forces. They would have only such status in Japan as Japan would voluntarily have given them.

The security provisions which we have reviewed are necessary if the treaty of peace is honestly to restore sovereignty to Japan. It has been suggested that the treaty ought to deny to Japan "the inherent right of collective self-defense" and permit only a token right of "individual self-defense."

That kind of a peace, in this present kind of a world, would be a fraud. To give a sovereignty which cannot be defended, is to give an empty husk. Indefensible sovereignty is not sovereignty at all. An undefended and indefensible Japan would be so subject to the menace of surrounding power that Japan would not in fact be able to lead an independent existence.

It has been suggested that a collective security arrangement with the United States, such as Japan is considering, would not be a free act or what the Japanese people really want.

That is not a suggestion which will command credence here. Nearly two-thirds of the delegations here are from countries which either have, or are about to have, voluntary association in collective security arrangements which include the United States. These delegations will assume, and rightfully assume, that the Japanese people are like their own people, and like most free peoples, in wanting the collective security which may deter aggression.

When I was in Japan last February this topic was discussed with the Japanese for the first time. I then said publicly that Japan, if it wished, could share collective protection against direct aggression. In order, however, to make perfectly clear our Government's position in the matter I had to say:

"That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct . . . We are concerned only with the brave and the free. The choice must be Japan's own choice."

No person in this room, and I mean that literally, honestly believes that Japan seeks collective security with the United States because it is coerced. That is palpably absurd.

As the President of the United States pointed out in his opening address to us, security in the Pacific area is being developed on a *collective* basis which, through combination, enables each nation to get security without making itself into what could be an offensive threat. That is one way to approach the problem. The other way is to prohibit collective security and to follow the policy of "let each country defend itself from aggressors

as it likes or as best it can." That latter way, Generalissimo Stalin said, addressing his Party on March 10, 1939, means "conniving at aggression."

Any nation which seeks to deny to Japan the right to collective security and which insists that Japan must stand alone is, at heart, a conniver at aggression. Those who sign this treaty will not lend themselves to that design.

I have expounded the philosophy of the treaty with reference to security because it is a philosophy which has been challenged. I hope, however, that the time I have given to this subject will not lead any delegations to feel that military matters are our principal preoccupation.

Security from armed aggression is a *negative* asset. Our dedication is to the *positive* side of national life and of individual life. Throughout the Occupation, the effort has been to create a climate conducive to human development. To that end, the United States has made a tremendous moral investment. President Truman, in his opening address to us, emphasized the social revolution which has been taking place in Japan, the sweeping away of militarism, the establishment of universal suffrage, the extensive land reforms and the rapid growth of labor unions. Also, we are not ashamed of the fact that it was under the Occupation that the Japanese people adopted a constitution forever barring war as an instrument of their national policy. If today we are compelled to think in terms of a treaty which will enable Japan to protect its sovereignty and independence it is not because we seek a re-militarized Japan—that we have done everything in our power to prevent—but because social and economic progress cannot be achieved in the cold climate of fear.

(5) *Japanese prisoners.* An outstanding humanitarian feature of the Japanese surrender was the Allied promise to return Japanese prisoners to their homes. However, evidence produced before the United Nations General Assembly last September indicated that large numbers of Japanese soldiers, who had surrendered to the Soviet Union 5 years before, had not yet been repatriated. The United Nations expressed its concern and set up a commission to study this matter. In order to make clear that the Allied undertaking to Japan survives until it has been performed, article 9 of the Potsdam Surrender Terms has been incorporated into the treaty of peace (article 6 (b)). We earnestly hope that it will be fulfilled, and tragic anguish be allayed.

(6) *Economic matters.* Chapter IV deals with trade and commerce. The text is somewhat technical but the words add up to this; Japan is not subjected to any permanent discriminations and disabilities, her economy is unrestricted and no limitations whatever are placed upon her right to trade with each and every country.

The permanent relations between Japan and the Allied Powers, as regards trading, maritime, and other commercial relations (article 12); as

regards high seas fishing (article 9); as regards international air transport (article 13), are to be negotiated between Japan and Allied Powers so desiring. Pending the conclusion of such treaties, and for a 4-year interim period, each Allied Power will be entitled to most-favored-nation treatment as regards customs duties, but only on a basis of reciprocity.

These are liberal treaty clauses. The fulfillment of the hopes placed in them will, however, depend on whether Japan lives up to its intention, proclaimed in the preamble, "to conform to internationally accepted fair practices," and on whether the Allied Powers, by their domestic legislation, extend to Japan trading possibilities which are reasonable, having regard to their own domestic requirements. On these matters, a peace treaty can do no more than point the way to a healthy trade relationship and create the opportunity to go in that way. That this treaty does.

(7) *Reparations* is usually the most controversial aspect of peace making. The present peace is no exception.

On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses, and suffering. Governments represented here have claims which total many billions of dollars and China could plausibly claim as much again. One hundred thousand million dollars would be a modest estimate of the whole.

On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. Since the surrender, Japan has been 2 billion dollars short of the money required to pay for the food and raw materials she had to import for survival on a minimum basis. The United States had made good that 2 billion dollar deficit. We accepted that as one of our occupation responsibilities. But the United States is entitled to look forward to Japan's becoming economically self-sustaining, so as to end dependence on us; and it is not disposed, directly or indirectly, to pay Japan's future reparations.

Under these circumstances, if the treaty validated, or kept contingently alive, monetary reparation claims against Japan, her ordinary commercial credit would vanish, the incentive of her people would be destroyed and they would sink into a misery of body and spirit which would make them an easy prey to exploitation. Totalitarian demagogues would surely rise up to promise relief through renewed aggression with the help of those nearby who, as we have seen in Korea, are already disposed to be the aggressors. The old menace would appear in aggravated form.

Such a treaty, while promoting unity among aggressors would promote disunity among many Allied Powers. There would be bitter competition for the largest possible percentage of an illusory pot of gold. Already, several countries have

approached the United States with suggestions that their particular claims for reparation should be favored at the expense of others.

A treaty which, on the one hand, encouraged division among the nonaggression states and, on the other hand, brought recruits to the side of the aggressive states, would be a treaty which would recklessly squander the opportunity of victory. The parties to such a treaty would expose themselves to new perils greater than those which they have barely survived.

These conflicting considerations were fully discussed, until there emerged a solution which gives moral satisfaction to the claims of justice and which gives material satisfaction to the maximum extent compatible with political and economic health in the Pacific area.

The treaty recognizes, clearly and unambiguously, that Japan *should* pay reparation to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war.

It then goes on to dedicate to the implementation of that principle, certain assets which Japan does have in surplus and which could be put to work to help to compensate those nations which suffered the most from Japan's wartime acts.

Japan has a population not now fully employed, and it has industrial capacity not now fully employed. Both of these aspects of unemployment are caused by lack of raw materials. These, however, are possessed in goodly measure by the countries which were overrun by Japan's armed aggression. If these war-devastated countries send to Japan the raw materials which many of them have in abundance, the Japanese could process them for the creditor countries and by these services, freely given, provide appreciable reparations. The arrangements could cover not merely consumers goods but machinery and capital goods which would enable underdeveloped countries to speed up developing their own industry, so as hereafter to lessen their dependence on outside industrial power.

This is, in essence, the formula expressed in article 14 (a) 1. It results from prolonged exchanges of views, particularly with such countries as the Philippines and Indonesia, which were occupied by Japanese forces and injured in a way which places on the Allied Powers as a whole, and on Japan, a very clear duty to seek all means of reparation which are realistic.

I am frank to say that the treaty is a better, fairer treaty than first drafted. That results from the proper insistence of some governments that all possibilities of reparation should be exhaustively explored. That has been done, and the result is a fresh demonstration of the worth of the free processes of free and equal people. Those processes have here produced a treaty formula which serves the ideal of justice within an economic framework which can benefit all concerned.

In addition to this source of future reparation,

the treaty validates the taking, by Allied Powers, of Japanese property within their jurisdictions.

By article 16, Japanese property in neutral and ex-enemy countries is to be transferred to the International Red Cross for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families, on the basis of equity, to make some compensation for undue hardship suffered, often in violation of the Geneva conventions. The United States, in response to some Allied inquiries, has indicated that, since its own prisoners of war have received some indemnification out of proceeds of Japanese property we seized, we would assume that equity would require first distribution to those who have had no comparable indemnification.

Allied property within Japan is to be returned. Where this cannot be done, because of war damage, there will be compensation in blocked yen in accordance with pending Japanese domestic legislation.

(8) *Korea*. Article 21 makes special provision for Korea. The Republic of Korea will not sign the treaty of peace only because Korea was never at war with Japan. It tragically lost its independence long before this war began, and did not regain independence of Japan until after Japan surrendered. Many individual Koreans steadfastly fought Japan. But they were individuals, not recognized governments.

Nevertheless, Korea has a special claim on Allied consideration, the more so as it has not yet proved possible for the Allies to achieve their goal of a Korea which is free and independent. Korea is, unhappily, only half free and only half independent; and even that fractional freedom and independence has been cruelly mangled and menaced by armed aggression from the North.

Most of the Allied Powers have been seeking to make good their promise of freedom and independence and, as members of the United Nations, to suppress the aggression of which Korea is the victim. By this treaty, the Allies will obtain for Korea Japan's formal recognition of Korea's independence, and Japan's consent to the vesting in the Republic of Korea, of the very considerable Japanese property in Korea. Korea will also be placed on a parity with the Allied Powers as regards postwar trading, maritime, fishing and other commercial arrangements. Thus the treaty, in many ways, treats Korea like an Allied Power.

(9) *China*. The absence of China from this conference is a matter of deep regret. Hostilities between Japan and China first began in 1931 and open warfare began in 1937. China suffered the longest and the deepest from Japanese aggression. It is greatly to be deplored that the Sino-Japanese War cannot be formally terminated at this occasion. Unhappily, civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied Governments have created a situation such that there is not general interna-

tional agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace. Some think that one government meets these tests. Some think another meets them. Some doubt that either meets them. No majority can be found for any present action regarding China. Thus, the Allies were faced with hard choices.

They could defer any peace with Japan until they could agree that there was in China a government possessed of both legitimacy and authority. It would, however, be wrong, cruel and stupid to penalize Japan because there is civil war in China and international disagreement regarding China.

As another approach, each Allied Power could refuse to sign a treaty of peace with Japan unless a Chinese government of its choice was cosigner with it. That, we ascertained, would leave Japan at war with so many Allied Powers that Japan would get only a small measure of the peace she has earned. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that Japan, an essential party, would willingly cooperate in a program leading to that end. To exert compulsion, in this matter, would create resentment in Japan, and it would activate and aggravate Allied division in the face of a grave world-wide menace which requires maximum unity.

The remaining choice was for the Allied Powers generally to proceed to conclude peace without any present Chinese cosignature, leaving China and Japan to make their own peace, on terms, however, which would guarantee full protection of the rights and interests of China.

That is the choice reflected by the present treaty. By article 26, China is given the right to a treaty of peace with Japan, on the same terms as the present treaty. The victorious Allies, which sign the treaty, take nothing for themselves that they do not assure equally to China. Also, by article 21, China, without need of signature, gets the sweeping renunciation by Japan (article 10) of all Japan's special rights and interests in China, in accordance with a formula suggested by the Republic of China. Also, China receives automatically, and without need of signature, the benefit of article 14 (a) 2 which validates the seizure of Japanese property subject to its jurisdiction. The treaty preserves, in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied victors in this war.

(10) *Final Clauses*. Chapter VII contains clauses which are largely matters of protocol. Of these article 23, dealing with ratification, gives those signatories to the treaty which have been actively concerned with the Occupation, a special position, for 9 months, regarding the bringing of the treaty into force. But after 9 months all of the Allied Powers stand on an equal footing as regards bringing the treaty into force as between themselves and Japan.

Good Peace Now or Better Peace Never

Such, in broad outline, are the main aspects of the treaty that awaits our signature.

It contains, no doubt, imperfections. No one is completely satisfied. But it is a good treaty. It does not contain the seeds of another war. It is truly a treaty of peace.

We may hear a suggestion that we should not now complete, by signature, this product of a year's negotiation, but resort to new procedures, with new parties. It may be pretended that thereby we can gain greater unity and more perfection. At first that may sound plausible and tempting. It may seem to offer the partially dissatisfied a chance for great satisfaction.

In some Allied countries there are organized groups which urge that the treaty could be changed merely to benefit them, leaving everything else intact. If all of these proposals were to be brought together, it would be apparent that the cumulative effect would be destructive of any agreed peace.

Fortunately, there are also in most of the Allied countries those who see with truer vision. They know that this treaty is good to the point where it cannot be made better without its becoming worse. Better words might theoretically be found; but to seek these is to let escape what is now within our grasp. There come times when to seek the perfect is to lose the good. This is such a time.

There is greater unity now than we are apt to find if there is renegotiation. The treaty has been painstakingly built by the delicate processes of diplomacy, helped by an unusual display of self-restraint and good will. But it is not wise to assume that those qualities will be ever present and that differences can always be composed.

There is a larger measure of satisfaction now than we can ever get again. Delay will inevitably set in motion corroding forces and contradictory efforts which will block each other and frustrate the possibilities inherent in a common effort of good will.

In terms of Japan's future, delay would cost a price which makes petty all the sacrifices incident to present action. The great goals of victory will have been made unattainable.

It was our common hope that, out of the fiery purge of war, there would rise a new Japan. That was no foolish hope. Japan has great culture and tradition which are capable of producing distinctively, but no less authentically, those virtues which all nations and peoples must possess if there is to be a world-wide commonwealth of peace.

In order, however, that that potentiality shall become actuality, Japan needs free political institutions in a climate conducive to their vigorous growth; social progress; an equal administration of justice; an awareness of human dignity; a sense of self-respect, of respect for others.

Above all, Japan needs the will to live at peace with others as good neighbors.

All of this is possible, if we make peace now. It becomes impossible, or at best improbable, if Japan's long-deferred hopes are now blasted.

There are, in Japan, new born institutions of freedom. But they will not flourish if military rule continues indefinitely to be supreme.

Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien control, however benign.

Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in the world, who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.

Regard for justice rarely animates those who are subjected to such grave injustice as would be the denial of present peace.

Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.

The United States, which since the surrender has directed the Occupation on behalf of all the Allies, says solemnly to each of the Allies: unless you now give Japan peace and freedom on such honorable terms as have been negotiated, the situation will rapidly deteriorate.

The surrender terms have served their every legitimate purpose. Under them "the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." To perpetuate that subjection, which has existed for 6 years, into more years, would be to pervert the Occupation into an instrument of imperialism and colonialism. The United States wants none of that, and we know that most of you want none of that.

It is time to end the subjection of the Japanese Government to Allied command. It is time to end the Occupation and to recognize that, henceforth, it is the Japanese people who exercise complete sovereignty in Japan. It is time to welcome Japan as an equal and honorable member of the family of nations.

That is what the pending treaty will do.

No nation is bound to sign the treaty. This is no conference that wields legal compulsion. The only compulsion is the moral compulsion of grave circumstances. They unite to cry aloud: Let us make peace.

CLOSING STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON⁵

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

We have come to the closing moments of our conference, and it falls to the president to say the

⁵ Made on Sept. 8 after the signing of the peace treaty by delegates of the following countries and of Japan: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,

(footnote continued on page 460)

last words of farewell. May I begin with some words which are very close to my heart, in expressing the deepest appreciation of which I am capable to this conference for the trust which it reposed in me in selecting me to serve as your presiding officer.

I have endeavored to attain your trust. May I also say to this gracious city of San Francisco and to the great State of California, and to those thousands of volunteer workers who worked so steadily and so happily to make our meeting a success, to make our stay in San Francisco so pleasant, and who have contributed so greatly to the happiness and enjoyment of the members of our family, how deeply grateful all of us are to the city, to the State and to the thousands of men and women of San Francisco and California who have worked to make our conference a success.

I know that as you sat here this morning and watched this very moving ceremony, a great crowd of memories came into your minds, not only into the minds of the delegates in this hall and the audience in this hall, but in the vast audience throughout the length and breadth of the United States. A great flood of memories of past days, days which were anxious, days which were full of sorrow, days which were full of grim determination. And I know that many families today were conscious of absences. And many were conscious that those who were absent had given their lives to bring about this day.

And it was fitting—it was very fitting—that all of those memories of all of these people here throughout this country, throughout the world, should culminate today in this act of reconciliation, because what you have seen this morning is something unique in history.

You have seen an act of greatness of spirit, an act, a true act of reconciliation and because it was that, it was an act which, as Mr. Jaywardene [of Ceylon] pointed out, as Zafrullah Khan [of Pakistan] pointed out, as Mr. Dulles pointed out, is in accordance with the fundamental moral principles of the great spiritual teachers and leaders of all nations and of all religions.

And it was for this reason, I think, again as Mr. Dulles suggested to us last night, that we were able to accomplish here what we have accomplished,

(footnote continued from page 459)

Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam. For text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 27, 1951, p. 349, and also Department of State publication 4330.

The following countries were represented at the conference but did not sign: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The following were invited to the conference but did not attend: Burma, India, Yugoslavia.

because all of us, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, all of us doubted something of our infallibility, and all of us worked together, giving up much that was close to our hearts, much that was close to our economic interests, for the purpose of bringing about this peace of reconciliation.

And we were able to do that because we were doing something which lifted our spirits, something of which we were proud. There was nothing mean. There was nothing sordid which lurked in any corner of this treaty. There was nothing hidden, nothing that could not bear the broad great light of day. And we were able to join in that sort of an effort, and we were able to sink our differences because we were going forward in a great effort, making a great new step in history, and hoping from this day forward a new chapter is opening in the history of the world.

And, as Mr. Morrison said to us this morning, this is not an ending; this is a beginning. We signed this great treaty this morning, but we must live this treaty from this day on. And it depends upon each nation, each individual represented here, each individual of each nation, to make this treaty be what it is in words. And by no means, least of all, it rests with our Japanese friends to see that this treaty yields its true fruits.

And I say to them that a great broad highway to a position of equality, of honor, of friendship in the world lies open to you. All the obstacles on that highway have been cleared away so far as governments can clear them away.

The obstacles that remain only you can remove, and you can remove those if you act with other peoples with understanding and with generosity and with kindness. And all those qualities are inherent in the nature of your people, and what we urge you to do is make those qualities, which are so inherent in the Japanese people, the policy of the Japanese Government.

We regret that there are some who were unable or unwilling to join our meeting, and others, we regret, who came here but were unable or unwilling to join in this great constructive effort. But what we have done here, we have done both for ourselves and for those who did not come here, because we have laid a great peace for all peoples, not merely those here, but for all peoples throughout the world.

And those who were unwilling to work with us and those who criticized our efforts, for those people we feel no bitterness, but we urge them now to join in the great effort which lies before all of us.

And may I close this conference with words which, in many languages, in many forms, in many religions, have brought comfort and strength.

"May the peace of God, which passeth all understanding, be amongst us and remain with us always."

Answer to Soviet Charges Against Japanese Treaty

John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary, upon request from the *New York Times*, made on September 3 the following answers to the principal charges that have been made by the Soviet Union concerning the preparation and content of the proposed Japanese treaty:

I

Charge: The treaty was drawn up unilaterally by the United States, without the participation of the U. S. S. R.

Answer: The Soviet Union has actively, but unconstructively, participated in the treaty-making process. A year ago we gave the Soviet Union our statement of proposed treaty principles. I discussed them at length with Mr. Malik, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, on October 26, 1950, November 20, 1950, and January 13, 1951. He put many questions and I answered them on behalf of the United States. Two official aide memoires were exchanged between us.

The first United States draft of treaty (March, 1951) was promptly transmitted to the Soviet Union for its comments. Extensive comments were made by a Soviet note of May 7, 1951, which also at that time set forth the Soviet Union's own "proposals" for a Japanese peace treaty.¹ These were fully and publicly debated. The United States gave its views on May 19, 1951.² The Soviet Union then, on June 10, 1951, submitted another note rearguing its "proposals." The United States, after consulting with some others, replied on July 9, 1951.³ These notes have all been made public.

Meanwhile, we gave the Soviet Union the July 3 draft of treaty with a request for its further observations. The final August 13 draft was given the Soviet Union, as in the case of other Allied Powers. The Soviet Union cannot deny "participation" in the treaty-making process except by reversing the usual sense of words.

II

Charge: This treaty was drafted in violation of a pledge by the United States, in the Potsdam Declaration and other international agreements, to negotiate the peace treaties, first of all, through the Council of Foreign Ministers (United States, Britain, U. S. S. R., France, and China).

Answer: There was never any agreement to negotiate the Japanese peace treaty through the

Council of Foreign Ministers. The council was established on August 2, 1945, to deal with the European treaties. Japan was not mentioned. This was at the desire of the Soviet Union, which was then neutral in the Japanese war. It was provided that the council could deal with "other matters" than those mentioned, but only "by agreement between the member Governments."

The Soviet Union has persistently tried to get agreement that the Japanese peace treaty be put into the Council of Foreign Ministers; but the United States and other members, of the council have consistently refused to agree. They were unwilling to subject Japanese treaty making to the veto which the Soviet Union has in the council and which has, for 5 years, frustrated the possibilities of a German peace treaty and an Austrian treaty.

III

Charge: The treaty violates the 1942 declaration by the United Nations—under which each Government pledged itself "not to make a separate armistice or peace with enemies."

Answer: The expressed purpose of the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, was to assure "complete victory." Each Government pledged itself to employ its "full resources" against those members of the Axis "with which such Government is at war" and "not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies." That language was carefully chosen to leave the Soviet Union free as regards Japan, for the Soviet Union was not "at war" with Japan nor was Japan one of its "enemies."

The Soviet Union now claims retroactively the benefit of that declaration as regards Japan. Even if this claim is valid it does not mean that the Soviet Union can veto the proposed peace as a now prohibited "separate armistice or peace." The purpose of "complete victory" was achieved, 6 years ago. Certainly, the agreement never intended, after victory, to give each of the 47 parties a continuing, perpetual right to prevent all others from ever making peace with Japan.

An overwhelming majority of the adherents to the United Nations declaration, having won the victory over Japan to which they, but not Russia, then pledged their full resources, are about to make peace. They do so on terms which are open to all the others. They seek no special advantage

¹BULLETIN of May 28, 1951, p. 856.

²*Ibid.*, p. 852.

³BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 143.

to themselves. If a few of the many do not care now to make peace, that is their responsibility. It will be those few who fragmentize the peace.

IV

Charge: The treaty was drawn up without the participation of Communist China, although "it is perfectly obvious that without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic in the work of preparing the peace treaty with Japan, a real peace settlement in the Far East is not possible."

Answer: The treaty has been drawn up with careful regard for the interests of China. The Nationalist Government has made many constructive suggestions which have been adopted. The so-called "Central People's Government" has, through the Soviet Union, been supplied with successive treaty drafts and has from time to time made public its views. These, however, have never presented a distinctive Chinese viewpoint. As stated in the note of Chou En-lai of May 22, 1951:

"After careful study of the Soviet Government's views on the United States draft peace treaty with Japan, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China considers that the Soviet Government's views completely correspond with those of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

It is not true that a "real" peace in the Far East is impossible without the participation of the Communists' regime. Some, indeed would doubt that a "real" peace is possible if there is participation by a regime which the United Nations has found to be aggressor. It is true that there cannot be a "total" peace without the participation of a Chinese Government which is peacefully disposed and which has both legitimacy and power to bind all China by its ratification. Since, however, that "total" peace is not now possible, it is better to proceed, conserving every Chinese right, and giving Japan the very large measure of peace which is now possible.

V

Charge: The treaty not only fails to contain any guarantee against a revival of Japanese aggression, but fails to place any limit upon the size of Japan's future armed forces, as was done in the Italian Peace Treaty.

Answer: The Japanese peace treaty solemnly binds Japan not to use force against any other state. If treaty obligations are dependable, this is enough. If they are not dependable, why multiply them? Also, by the new Japanese Constitution "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the Nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes."

Furthermore, it is contemplated that there will be a series of collective security arrangements for the Western Pacific, including Japan, which will as a practical matter, assure that Japan will not possess, for its own national account, armament which could be an offensive threat.

VI

Charge: The treaty says that Formosa and the Pescadores are to be taken from Japan, but does not specifically say that they are to go back to "China," as (according to Moscow) the Cairo Declaration promised they would. Likewise, the treaty states that Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands are to be detached from Japan, but does not state, as previously promised by the United States, that these territories should be handed over to the Soviet Union.

Answer: The treaty does not repeat the Cairo Declaration, which, it should be recalled, dealt not only with Formosa but with the return to China of Manchuria and with the freedom of Korea. The Soviet Union reacted violently to the suggestion that the Manchurian part of the declaration be written into the Japanese peace treaty.

As regards Formosa, the differences of opinion are such that it could not be definitively dealt with by a Japanese peace treaty to which the Allied powers, as a whole, are parties. Therefore, the treaty merely takes Japan formally out of the Formosa picture, leaving the position otherwise unchanged.

As regards South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, the treaty carries out the provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms, the only agreement by which Japan and the Allied powers as a whole are bound. So long as other Governments have rights under the Yalta Agreement which the Soviet Union has not fulfilled, there is at least question as to whether the Soviet Union can, with "clean hands," demand fulfillment of the parts of that agreement it likes.

VII

Charge: The United States, in opposition to its international commitments, is "restoring Japanese militarism," expanding Japan's military bases, recreating a Japanese land army and Japanese naval and air fleets, restoring and expanding the work of former Japanese military arsenals, freeing Japanese war criminals, restoring Japanese military organizations and "more and more promoting propaganda of war."

Answer: The allegations as to restoring militarism in Japan are totally without factual basis. Japan has been so completely disarmed that it does not as yet have an adequate police force or coast guard of its own.

VIII

Charge: Despite United States wartime statements that the United States did not want any territorial acquisitions as a result of the war, the United States is planning to maintain military bases in Japan after the war, in contravention of the Potsdam Agreement, and is, without justification, planning to maintain United States control over the Ryukyu, Bonin, Rozario, Volcano, Pares Vela and Marcus Islands.

Answer: The United States has told Japan that it is prepared provisionally to station some armed forces in Japan at Japan's request so that, on the

coming into force of the peace treaty, Japan will not be a total vacuum of power. The arrangement would, in essence, be comparable to those between other free countries which want to combine forces and facilities for the purposes of collective security. Such arrangements constitute an exercise of sovereignty, not a derogation of sovereignty.

As regards the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands, the treaty establishes substantially the same formula as that adopted for the Japanese mandated islands, namely U. N. trusteeship with the United States as administering authority. The Soviet Union voted for that in the case of the Japanese mandated islands. It did not consider that that involved a violation of Potsdam or "territorial aggrandizement" in violation of the Atlantic Charter. This charge can be made with even less force against the Ryukyus and Bonin treaty formula, for under it residual sovereignty remains in Japan, which was not the case with the mandated islands.

IX

Charge: The treaty deprives Japan of the opportunity of engaging in free and normal trade with Communist China, and denies reparations to states damaged by the Japanese during the war, although the United States has been taking reparations of its own out of Japan for six years.

Answer: The treaty imposes no limitation or disabilities whatever upon Japan's future trade and Japan's economy. Whatever limitations may hereafter result will be due to circumstances which affect world trade generally, not to treaty disabilities. The treaty provides for reparation in kind to states damaged by the Japanese during the war.

As regards the alleged taking of reparations by the United States, the true fact is that, since the surrender, the United States, as occupying power, has put up 2 billion dollars for economic relief of Japan. That amount is the measure of the difference between the cost of Japan's food and raw material imports and the value of Japanese exports during the occupation period.

United States and Japan Sign Security Treaty

[Released to the press by the U.S. delegation to the conference for conclusion and signature of Treaty of Peace with Japan September 8]

The Governments of the United States and Japan signed a bilateral security treaty on September 8 at the presidio in a brief ceremony.

The treaty was signed for Japan by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and for the United States by Secretary Acheson, Ambassador John Foster Dulles, Senator Alexander Wiley, and Senator Styles Bridges.

The United States delegation, in addition to the four members who signed the treaty, included the following alternate delegates: Senators John J. Sparkman and H. Alexander Smith, and Representatives Dewey Short and Overton Brooks.

STATEMENTS MADE AT SIGNING CEREMONY

Secretary Acheson

With regard to the Security Treaty we are gathered here to sign, there are several points I should like to emphasize:

September 17, 1951

First, this treaty of security between the United States and Japan is part of a pattern for defense of peace in the Pacific area. Taken together with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, the Tripartite Security Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, and the Japanese peace treaty which we signed this morning, this action adds another link in the chain of security against aggression in a most important part of the world. These treaties constitute, in the words of President Truman, "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace" in the Pacific area.

The signing of this Security Treaty today marks the conclusion of 10 days of historic importance to free peoples all over the world.

Second, the present treaty takes its place as a part—and an important part—of the system of security which has been developed within the framework of the United Nations Charter. The treaty is not only conceived within the spirit of the charter; it is a fulfillment of the inherent right of

individual and collective self-defense which the charter recognizes as belonging to all sovereign nations.

Third, this Security Treaty is a voluntary arrangement between free peoples. It stems from a freely reached decision on the part of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people to seek protection for an unarmed Japan against the threat of aggression.

Fourth, there should be no misunderstanding of the purpose of this Security Treaty. Its purpose is peace. In a world in which aggression and the threat of aggression are rampant, the maintenance of peace and security requires us to take affirmative steps to bulwark freedom with military strength. Weakness is an invitation to aggression, both external and internal. We are here providing for the defensive strength without which peace would be jeopardized. In building this strength, the present treaty does not create a threat of further aggression. Of importance to all Japan's neighbors in the Pacific is the principle recognized in this treaty that Japan shall avoid any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Fifth, the defense arrangements provided for under this treaty will constitute a shield to protect the progress being made by the Japanese people toward better conditions of life. It will give the Japanese people the opportunity to continue their constructive work of building the new peaceful Japan, free from the paralyzing threat of aggression.

Finally, this treaty expresses the mutual trust and confidence which has been growing between Japan and the United States over the past 6 years. In this time, the people of Japan have had reason to be assured as to the purposes of the United States. And we, in turn, have come to the conviction that the Japanese people want no more of the old militarism, but sincerely desire real peace. The United States believes that Japan, in the spirit of trust and confidence in which this treaty is formulated, will in due course increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against aggression and in so doing make its contribution to the collective defense of the free world.

It is with these thoughts in mind that we welcome the opportunity to sign this Security Treaty on behalf of the Government of the United States.

Prime Minister Yoshida

I am happy that this Japanese-American Security Pact has been concluded this afternoon on the heels of the signing of a Japanese peace treaty this morning.

That treaty gives Japan the key for reentering the community of nations as a sovereign equal.

This pact insures the security of the unarmed and defenseless Japan.

It has always been my conviction that Japan, once she regains liberty and independence, must assume full responsibility of safeguarding that liberty and independence. Unfortunately, we are as yet utterly unprepared for self-defense. We are very glad, therefore, that America, realizing that security of Japan means the security of the Pacific and of the world, consented to provide us the necessary protection by retaining her armed forces in and around Japan temporarily after peace so as to ward off the menace of Communist aggression which is sweeping on at this very moment close to our shores.

Restored to independence, the Japanese people will recover self-confidence as well as pride and patriotism. Our nation is now inspired with fresh vigor and zeal to shoulder their proper share in the responsibilities for the collective security of the Far East. I wish to assure the American delegates here that the Government and people of Japan will cooperate gladly and wholeheartedly in the implementation of this pact.

TEXT OF THE TREATY

Japan has signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the United States of America.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and, further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

Article II

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

Article III

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

Article IV

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan area.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the City of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

NOTES EXCHANGED BY SECRETARY ACHESON AND PRIME MINISTER YOSHIDA

SEPTEMBER 8, 1951

EXCELLENCY: Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of "every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."

As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its members are taking action. There has been established a unified command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the members of the United Nations, the Armed Forces of which are participating in the United Nations action.

Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the member or members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations action; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually

agreed between Japan and the United Nations member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United States expense, as at present.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

His Excellency

SHIGERU YOSHIDA,

Prime Minister of Japan

[SEPTEMBER 8, 1951]

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows:

Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace signed today, Japan will assume the obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of "every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter."

As we know, armed aggression has occurred in Korea, against which the United Nations and its Members are taking action. There has been established a Unified Command of the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and the General Assembly, by Resolution of February 1, 1951, has called upon all states and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action and to refrain from giving any assistance to the aggressor. With the approval of SCAP, Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the Members of the United Nations, the armed forces of which are participating in the United Nations action.

Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in support of the United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations actions; the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services, over and above those provided to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, would be at United States expense, as at present.

With full cognizance of the contents of Your Excellency's Note, I have the honor, on behalf of my Government, to confirm that if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members of the forces engaged in such United Nations action, the expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at present or as otherwise mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations Member concerned. In so far as the United States is concerned the use of facilities and services, over and above those provided to the United States pursuant to the Administrative Agreement which will implement the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States would be at United States expense, as at present.

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

The Honorable

DEAN ACHESON,

Secretary of State

September 17, 1951

Azores Defense Agreement Signed With Portugal

[Released to the press September 6]

Following is an announcement released today at Lisbon by the Portuguese Government:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization having indicated that the Governments of Portugal and the United States of America should enter into an agreement defining the facilities in the Azores which it is within the power of the former to grant for the purposes of the common defense and the preservation of peace and security, the two Governments have concluded a defense agreement defining these facilities, integrating them into the framework of NATO defense plans, and fixing respective obligations.

The facilities granted to the United States may eventually be extended to other members of NATO.

The agreement, which will be made public, was signed today in Lisbon by Paulo Cunha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, and by Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador of the United States of America.

By virtue of this new instrument, the accord of February 2, 1948, which granted certain facilities in the Azores to the United States in relation to a military situation arising from the Second World War, ceases to have effect.

Point Four Assists Pakistan in Locust Plague

[Released to the press August 24]

Three spraying planes, loaded aboard a DC-4 Skymaster, are scheduled to leave Idlewild International Airport, New York, on August 24, for Pakistan where they will help spread insecticide over locust-infested areas. American pilots of the spray planes left New York for Pakistan early this week.

This anti-locust campaign is being carried out under the Point Four program of technical cooperation, at the request of the Pakistan Government. Point Four is already cooperating in Pakistan in developing extension and rural welfare services to increase food production and improve living conditions in rural areas.

The anti-locust spraying operations are being carried out under contract with the Aviation International Delivery Service, a private business organization. The spraying will be directed by David R. Bump, of Springville, N. Y., who took part in exterminating the locust plague in Iran during April and May.

Ambassador Avra M. Warren will appoint a

member of his staff to cooperate with Pakistan officials in supervising the project.

Karl Knaus, agriculture extension expert from Kansas, has been in Pakistan since July 1950 as technical adviser on agriculture projects under Point Four.

According to Mr. Knaus, the locust-control work will take place in three areas of Pakistan, where the plague threatens to destroy rice, sugarcane, cotton, and wheat as well as some feed crops.

The areas where spraying operations will be carried out are in the provinces of Sind, the Punjab, and Baluchistan.

The Government of Pakistan has bought about 20 tons of Aldrin, the powerful insecticide used in similar Point Four projects in Iran and India. Spraying from planes will be supplemented by some ground control such as spreading the poison by hand. Two or three ounces of the poison, diluted in kerosene or Diesel fuel, are sufficient to spray an acre of land. Aldrin is produced by the Julius Hyman & Company of Denver, Colo., and is distributed by the Shell Oil Company.

It is expected that spraying or preliminary ground work will be under way by September first. Operations will continue for 90 days or less if the locusts are under control.

In addition to Aldrin insecticides, the Government of Pakistan is providing diluent (fuel oil), aviation fuel, bulldozers or trucks with blades attached and ground crews, and ground strips for landing small aircraft. Other items provided by Pakistan are trucks equipped with tanks and pumps, and crews for transporting and mixing insecticide and for loading airplanes. The Pakistan Government will provide food and lodging for United States personnel, tents and camp equipment, and flying, landing, hangar, and other fees for United States aircraft in Pakistan.

Under contract with the United States Government. Aviation International Delivery Service is supplying airplanes, crews, and supervisory experts as well as their transportation to Pakistan and return.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2270, July 31; S/2289, August 10; S/2291, August 13; S/2294, August 14; S/2297, August 15; S/2299, August 16; S/2301, August 20; S/2302, August 20; S/2304, August 21; S/2305, August 21; S/2306, August 22; S/2308, August 23; S/2310, August 24.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Land Reform Problem Challenges Free World

*Statement by Isador Lubin, U.S. Representative in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*¹

It is now just about a year since the Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, pointed to the use and ownership of land as an example of the kind of problem to which members of the United Nations should direct their efforts. In his address to the Fifth General Assembly, Mr. Acheson called attention to the efforts of nations in many parts of the world to achieve a better distribution of land ownership and cited recent illustrations of democratic land reform in India, in Japan, and in the Republic of Korea. These examples, he stated, suggest what can be done on a cooperative democratic basis, by processes of peaceful change, which respect the dignity of the individual and his right to self-reliance and a decent livelihood."

The United States gave vigorous support to the resolution on land reform adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1950. This resolution is, in fact, the immediate reason for our discussion of land reform at this session. The United States also advocated the study of land problems in trust territories by a committee of the Trusteeship Council. More recently, on February 16, 1951, our Secretary of Agriculture, in an official statement on the long-term program of the FAO, urged greater attention to the improvement of conditions of land tenure as a vital factor in achieving increased agricultural production. FAO experience, he said, "has convinced us that production is greatest under conditions that promote the dignity and worth of the individual. We have found that in agriculture these conditions are best achieved when the individual can own the land he works, or has a security of tenure, when he can get the

productive facilities he needs, and when he can market his products at a fair return to him."

These statements and actions are not reflections of a new line of thought in the United States, but rather of one which is as old as my country. During much of the 19th Century, we were concerned with the conditions under which our new lands were opened to the public. Since then, we have been actively engaged in insuring a still wider distribution of ownership, in the reduction of tenancy, and in improving the conditions under which farm families live and work in the United States. I shall discuss some of these policies and programs later in my statement.

Need for Land Reform

Mr. President, there are sound and pressing reasons for the practical consideration by the United Nations of problems of land reform at this time. Three-quarters of the world's entire population, and, in many countries, a still higher proportion of the people depend upon the land for their livelihood. This dependence on agriculture for their living means that their hopes for a better life are tied directly to their land problems. Yet, as we review the situation prevailing in many parts of the world, we find that systems of land ownership and other institutions that affect the working of the land are formidable barriers in many countries to higher output and to higher standards of living. In vast areas of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, where upwards of 70 percent of the people live on the land and obtain their livelihood from farming, substantial progress towards greater output and higher standards of living depends upon the de-

¹ Made before the Economic and Social Council at Geneva on Sept. 3 and released to the press by the U. S. Mission to the U. N. on the same date.

velopment of sound and effective rural institutions. This has been emphasized over and over again in the debates of this Council on the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

In some of these areas, small farmers, share croppers, tenants, and farm laborers are held in the bonds of systems of land tenure that deny justice and impede progress. In many countries of these areas, as the Secretary-General's Report shows, interest rates paid by those who work the land are usurious, and even confiscatory, ranging from 20 percent to 100 percent a year. Rental charges range up to 75 percent to 80 percent of the annual crops. Many other types of inequities exist.

Conditions such as these inevitably crush the hopes for economic betterment of those who work the land. If widespread aspirations for economic and social improvement are to be satisfied, if incentives are to be offered for increased output on the part of each individual worker on the land, there must be very real improvement in economic and, often, in social institutions. And, if this improvement is to be effective and lasting, it must spring from the peoples concerned and be accomplished largely by their governments.

Scope of Land Reform

It is clear from the excellent and well-balanced report by the Secretary-General, that the problem of improving agricultural institutions has many facets. It is not simply a matter of transferring land from those who own it and do not work it to those who work the land but do not own it. To be sure, in some areas this is a major aspect of the problem. However, even where conditions of tenure, as such, pose no important problem, there is often need for land reform.

The small farmer who owns his land, but cannot extricate himself from perpetual debt to the money lender is in nearly as precarious a position as the landless farmer. So too is the land owner who is engaged in continuous dispute because the title to his land is unclear. Equally precarious is the lot of the farmer who is unable to obtain credit on reasonable terms or the farmer whose tax burden bears no relation to his ability to pay taxes.

Nor is land reform by any means always a matter of breaking up large estates. Quite as often, it is a problem of consolidating small and uneconomical holdings. The old system of strip farming, which many of us have seen on our travels in parts of Europe, is an example. Here the farmers' plots are so widely scattered that he cannot operate them effectively, but must work them by hand, without the use of machinery, and must waste endless hours in unproductive travel from one to the other.

In some countries, where farm laborers are employed on large holdings, their economic and so-

cial conditions are sometimes so bad as to make the problem of bettering their lot properly part of the broad question of land reform.

Thus, land reform is a multitude of things. Basically, however, land reform comprises improvement in all the social and economic institutions surrounding farm life. It embraces the redistribution or consolidation of holdings into plots of efficient size, the reduction of exorbitant rental charges, security of tenure for the tenant, the improvement of working conditions for farm laborers. It embraces the settlement of title to water and land. It embraces reform of the tax system, measures to assure agricultural credit on reasonable terms, and the establishment of rural industries. It also involves the establishment of cooperative societies for common purchase, marketing and credit. In short, land reform means a positive program for more effective use of the land for the benefit of the agricultural population.

The many-sided approach that is required in dealing with land reform is already brought out by the Secretary-General's Report.² This report makes it evident that a wide and just distribution of land must be accompanied by other closely coordinated programs, often simultaneously effected, for tax reform, adequate credit systems, legislation to further cooperation and technical guidance, as well as by programs of health, sanitation, and education. Conversely, without appropriate changes in land tenure, these other efforts to increase investments and output from the land are often likely to remain ineffective.

Promotes Stability, Peace

But land reform is important not only because of its potential effect on incentives to production. It has a far larger significance. It can mean the difference between explosive tensions and stability, between apathy and hope, between serfdom and citizenship. A nation of farm owners and of tenants who have the opportunity to become farm owners has the basic elements of a stable society. The farmer who owns his land, who retains an equitable share of his production, who is able to combine in voluntary associations with his neighbors to improve their common lot, knows the meaning of human dignity. He has a stake in his community. A nation of insecure tenants and rootless laborers, who see little hope to better their lot, is an unstable society, subject to sporadic violence and easily persuaded to follow false leaders.

For these reasons, in our opinion, land reform should be one of the basic programs of the United Nations. Certainly, it is basic in the thinking of the American people.

We in the United States recognize that the

² Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure as Obstacles to Economic Development. Report by the Secretary-General under General Assembly Resolution 401 (V), U.N. doc. E/2003, June 14, 1951.

tainment of peace and stability depends to a considerable degree on immediate and positive steps to correct systems of land tenure which exploit the workers on the land, steps which will remove inequitable taxes on farm lands and agricultural products, eliminate unreasonably high rents and exorbitant interest rates on farm loans. We are of the firm conviction that peace and stability in many parts of the world will require the elimination of those economic and social practices which work extreme hardship on rural people.

Basic U. S. Attitudes

As I have said, there is nothing new about the adherence of the United States to the principles of economic and social justice in land tenure. It is as old as the American Republic itself. It is a basic part of the fabric out of which our nation was created, a fabric with which the United States has grown and prospered.

In the United States, it has always been our belief that the man who tills the soil should own it. This ideal is part of the American heritage. It has remained embedded in our laws and customs ever since the American Revolution.

What is new is our growing realization of the fundamental importance that such principles should occupy in our foreign policies. What is new is our determination to place increasing emphasis upon international programs which are designed through the attainment of greater economic and social stability to give effect to such principles as positive weapons of peace.

Our conviction that land ownership is important to a stable society has been given expression through positive action from the earliest days of our national existence. Our policy has always been that, in the national interest, the maximum amount of public lands should be opened up for ownership by as many private individuals as possible and that good farm land should not be reserved for a favored few.

With this policy as our guide, the free lands of our great West were settled by hardy pioneers under the Homestead laws. Under these laws, private individuals were enabled to obtain title to a quarter-section of land, that is, to 160 acres, merely by staking a claim, building a house, and living on the land and working it for a year or more. This is, in part, the historical basis for the fact that in the United States over 70 percent of our farms in 1948 were operated by their owners. In many of our States an even larger percentage of our farms were so operated. For example, 89 percent are so operated on the Pacific Coast. In 1945, the most recent year for which complete data are available, over 85 percent of the total farm land in the United States was owned by individuals and only 5.6 percent by corporations. In 34 of our states, over 90 percent of the farm land is owned by individuals.

Once our rural areas were settled, we in the United States were faced with the problem of keeping the farm land in the hands of those who worked it. We were also faced with problems of increasing tenancy, particularly in those areas of our country which had been settled early in our history. To deal with these problems we undertook, particularly after 1920, a variety of measures, including extension of various types of credit and such programs as soil conservation, crop insurance, reclamation, and other aids to farmers.

Experience in the United States

For example, in recent years, my Government has supplied direct long-term, low-interest credit or has insured private loans to nearly two million American farm families who did not otherwise have adequate sources of credit. Many thousands of these loans have been made to tenants and farm laborers, so that they could become farm owners. Production credit is also regularly made available under government auspices through cooperative associations, as well as by private lending organizations, to farm families who want to improve their farms or to buy machinery, as well as to others who are beginning to operate new farms in areas opened up by government reclamation programs.

The United States Government also provides so-called "disaster" loans to enable a farmer whose crop is lost by drought, or freeze or flood to hold his farm through the disaster period. Our Government also shares with the farmer the cost of conserving the soil. It finances agricultural research and extension services so that all farmers, little as well as big, can be well informed on scientific techniques of good farming.

Thus, our goal within the United States remains now, as in the days of Thomas Jefferson, to increase the number of farmer-owners of family-size farms. Our objective also is to enable those farmers to enjoy the advantages of large-scale operation by working with their neighbors in genuine voluntary cooperatives to purchase land and machinery, to market their products, and to secure credit on reasonable terms.

Our progress towards this goal is evidenced in our national experience during the last several decades. According to the 1935 census, 42 percent of the land-operators in the United States were tenants, paying rent or working for a share of the crop. The last complete agricultural census available in the United States was taken in 1945. During the short period of ten years, the national percentage of farm tenancy had been reduced from 42 percent to 31.7 percent. It is estimated that by 1950 a further reduction of some 5 percent took place. As of today, the proportion of farms operated by tenants in the United States is estimated to be about 26 percent. As to share croppers, their number in 1930 amounted to 776,000. By 1945, this number had dropped to 447,000, or less

than 8 percent of all farmers in the United States.

Family-Size Farms

I have referred earlier to our policy of promoting ownerships of family-size farms. May I take a moment to explain what we mean when we speak of the family-size farm. As we use the term in the United States, the family-size farm is a farm of the size necessary to maintain a family at a fair living standard, and which can be operated by the farmer and his family either alone or with the help of one or two "hired men" who are usually regarded as part of the family group. These farms, of course, vary greatly in size. In the rich valleys of California, 5 acres may be large enough for a lettuce grower; in our Pacific Northwest, 10 acres may be sufficient for the producer of strawberries. In Iowa's rich cornland, 160 acres may be a desirable size. To raise beef cattle on the ranges of our Southwest, 1,000 acres is necessary. There is no fixed rule. We recognize, as all students of agriculture must do, that solutions to the problems of land holding and land use will vary with the crop raised, the climate, the availability of water, the existing state of agricultural science, the training of the farmers, and with the social institutions of the country.

It is clear that there is no ready-made and easy formula which will solve all land problems. Our whole experience tends to suggest, instead, that each problem requires its own specific solution. In one way or another, however, we in the United States have faced many of these problems. In countries where there are major land problems, some of our experiences in the United States may prove helpful. We recognize, of course, that the programs developed to answer our needs cannot be automatically applied elsewhere. It is our hope that as a result of discussions in this Council suggestions will come forth which will make constructive contributions towards the solution of the land problem.

But one thing is clear to us from our experience: To be successful, a program of land reform requires a conviction not only among people who live on the land but also among the public officials, and national leaders, of the need both to adopt consistent long-range land policies and to undertake programs necessary to sustain such policies year after year.

Now, if I may turn to the international aspects of the policy of the United States in this field—wherever the United States has had an opportunity to support land reform in other countries, we have done so. I might cite the successful land reform activities in Japan after the war.

Land Reform in Japan

Certain aspects of the land tenure system in Japan prior to World War II were highly un-

democratic and were a source of much social unrest. This unrest was exploited by the Japanese militarists in gaining support for their vast military adventures. Moreover, the prewar Japanese Government's reaction to general agrarian distress was one of evasion, outright neglect, suppression of protest movements and of half-hearted measures to placate the farmers. Consequently, land tenure reform became one of the principal objectives of the Allied Occupation. It was the determined policy of the Allied Occupation to encourage the new Government of Japan to initiate fundamental land reform measures.

The result was that legislation was enacted in October 1946 requiring that virtually all agricultural land in Japan owned by absentee landlords be purchased at fixed prices—not confiscated—by the Government and sold to tenants. Terms of sale were fixed at a level within the means of tenants to purchase land. Landlords residing on the land were permitted to retain small acreages.

Actual operations of the Japanese land reform program began about January 1947. Within two years the transfer of land from landlords to tenants had completely reorganized the pattern of land ownership and of landlord-tenant relations. In a program characterized by orderly progress, almost entirely without violence, about one-third of the total cultivated land of Japan passed into the hands of more than three million working cultivators. The amount of land operated by tenants had shrunk from 46 percent to about 12 percent of the total cultivated area. Absentee landlords as a class disappeared. Land owners who, prior to reform, constituted only 36 percent of the total number of cultivators had increased to 70 percent. Tenants, who before the reform represented 27 percent of all cultivators, now represent less than 6 percent. Such tenant-landlord agreements as are in effect are subject to strict government regulation. These accomplishments, which had materialized by early 1949, mark the end of the land tenure system which existed in Japan since 1868.

Accomplished in Two Years

As I have said, this reform was accomplished in a little more than two years. It was achieved without interrupting farm operations or the lives of farm people.

The Japanese land reform program was neither an adventure in utopian idealism nor a phase of social revolution. It was a hard-headed program designed to relieve farmers of the burden of an oppressive landlord system, a landlord system which had fostered antidemocratic social relations and had been a hindrance to increased agricultural production.

The three million farmers who have acquired land under the land reform program in Japan have a new stake in their communities. The role of the Government was one of over-all guidance and

administration of the transfer program. The Government did not become a land owner, nor did it obtain rights which amounted to ownership. There has been no collectivization of land under which the cultivator is in fact converted into a worker in the employ of the state.

Throughout all phases of the program, stress was placed on the establishment and preservation of the family farm. Over the centuries the aspirations of Japanese farmers have been directed toward acquisition of individual farm units. The land reform program gave effect to these aspirations. Here was a demonstration that thoroughgoing land reform is possible under present day conditions without accompanying widespread violence.

Paraguay's Experience

To cite one more example, in a cooperative venture with the Government of Paraguay we have been able to offer some assistance through our Institute for Inter-American Affairs, in a resettlement project which may eventually affect 100,000 families. The Bank of Paraguay is providing the financing for the project. The Institute, through a cooperative agency known as the Servicio, provides the experts, the demonstration equipment and the necessary training of the colonists. Colonization began in 1946 with 57 families on a pilot colony near Asunción. The Servicio showed the colonists how to lay out their land in cash crops, in pasturage for work animals and a cow or two, and in vegetable gardens to raise their own food.

With the lessons learned at the pilot colony, the Government, 2 years ago, laid out and colonized under Servicio guidance 78,000 acres in the farm region near the country's southern border. With their families, 570 virtually penniless men—chosen by committees of neighbors who could vouch for their character and industry, since none of them had credit ratings—were settled at this colony.

The Bank of Paraguay financed the construction of their houses, the purchase of farm machinery and a cow. It then gave them enough cash to live on until the first harvest. They have 10 years to pay for the land, five years for the machinery and animals. Credit supervisors confer with the colonists at the start of the crop year, help them decide what and how much to plant, and see to it that enough cash crops are set out to take care of the annual payment to the bank and yet leave sufficient cash for family needs. Bank collections are running over 90 percent—a good record in any country. So successful has the colony proved, that Paraguay is laying out two more huge colonies to settle some 100,000 farm families.

Mr. President, where circumstances have enabled the United States to support, encourage, and

assist land reform programs, it has done so. It will, upon request of the country seeking our assistance, continue to do so as part of its programs of technical and economic assistance to other countries. We have provided and will continue to provide technical aid to help meet problems of social and economic organization, as well as problems of a narrower technological nature. We have provided and will continue to provide technical and financial aid for reclamation, irrigation, and drainage projects to enlarge the total area of arable land. We have provided and will continue to provide technical and financial aid to support industrialization and diversification of economic activity so that the surplus rural population pressing on the land can find alternative productive employment. We shall take every opportunity to support and encourage desirable land reform programs through all appropriate international agencies.

Reforms Must Fit Indigenous Cultures

I wish to make it clear, Mr. President, that in standing ready to assist other countries to solve their problems in this field, the United States is not advocating any particular form of land tenure. We are perfectly aware that forms of land holding vary widely in different parts of the world. They are often aspects of the indigenous culture. These cultures must be understood. They must be respected. For this reason, land reform should be considered in terms of its objectives, rather than in terms of any legal framework.

I also want to make one other important point. We do not conceive of land reform in narrow, punitive terms, implying the objective of simply turning out one set of owners in favor of another. Such a concept would, we feel, miss the point entirely, that is, the advancement of the general welfare of rural populations through democratic institutions.

Nor do we conceive of land reform as the cutting up of large estates and even relatively small farms into small tracts and turning them over to new so-called "owners" who are then given crop-delivery quotas which are above their capacity to meet. Such a process gives an excuse for government charges that "since the new proprietors have failed to operate in conformity with the need of the State" the land will have to be taken over by the Government. Under such systems of land reform, which have been all too prevalent in certain countries in recent years, people who thought they had become owners of their own farms have in fact found themselves merely workers on collective or state farms.

Secretary-General's Report

I should now like to return to the Report of the Secretary-General and to comment on some of the questions which it raises. It concludes that,

for many countries, the agrarian structure, and in particular the system of land tenure, prevents a rise in the standard of living of small farmers and agricultural laborers and impedes economic development. While we do not subscribe to all of the observations of the report on land reform or accept it as an adequate treatment of the subject, we certainly endorse its conclusion as to the need for land reform as a means of promoting economic development.

While we believe that ownership is a very desirable objective, we agree with the finding of the Secretary-General that tenants can have security without ownership where rents are not excessive and where security of tenure is safeguarded by legislation. There is need, therefore, for legislation to prevent the charge of exorbitant rentals on agricultural land and to assure the cultivator security of tenure.

There is need, also, for legislation insuring satisfactory working conditions for farm laborers employed on large farm units. For some types of farming, where large capital is required, large ranches or haciendas are desirable and indeed necessary. It should be noted that the ILO is already concerned with the problem of improving the conditions of work of agricultural workers.

As the Report points out, land reform does not merely mean the fragmentation of land holdings. Indeed, in some instances it may mean the reverse. For breaking tracts of land up into very small holdings often prevents rational cultivation, particularly when numerous plots are scattered over a wide area. We are pleased to note that several countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and India, have made effective efforts toward the consolidation of fragmented land holdings.

We note also the importance which the Secretary-General's report places on the problem of insuring clear title to land. The land of such title leads to continuous disputes, perpetuates insecurity, encourages the waste of land, water and manpower. It is frequently a factor in preventing the cultivator from getting access to credit on reasonable terms. To resolve this problem the status of land ownership should be clarified, and procedures and facilities for surveying land and for establishing and registering title to land should be expanded and improved, thereby enabling the cultivator-owner to secure evidence of ownership rights with a minimum of delay.

As the Secretary-General points out, fiscal reform is also an important element in the promotion of land reform, particularly in situations where an inequitable burden of taxation is borne by the cultivator of land. In this connection, it might be mentioned that better tax administration would, by itself, remove some of the inequities of existing tax systems.

Another serious problem closely related to land reform is the lack of adequate credit facilities. All too often, credit is either lacking, or available

only at excessive rates of interest. If land reform is to proceed, credit must be made available to the small farmer at reasonable rates, preferably at the village or local level. Full advantage should, of course, be taken of existing public and private credit facilities. At the same time, the farmer needs guidance as to the best methods of using credit and of marketing his produce.

Toward this end, the promotion of cooperatives is an important element in any program of land reform. Cooperatives, however, should be genuinely voluntary, organized for the purpose of enabling farmer members to benefit from new developments in techniques of production, large-scale purchasing and marketing, and credit facilities. Not only will voluntary cooperatives lead to greater financial returns to farmers, but we believe that, as a result of experience in the democratic process of managing common problems at the local level, they may prove beneficial in developing a social consciousness and responsibility among the participating farmers.

As the Secretary-General's Report indicates, much has already been done to overcome defects in land use and land policy in various parts of the world. And much of the change that has taken place has been accomplished within the framework of orderly democratic processes. However, much still remains to be done.

The Task of the United Nations

Mr. President, we have at hand a very large body of experience in the field of land reform. We have, among our many member countries, expert personnel who have developed great ingenuity in meeting the land problems of their particular areas.

The task of the United Nations is to mobilize these skills and experience.

The task of the United Nations and of this Council is to focus world attention on land practices which keep millions of farmers and farm workers laboring on an economic and social treadmill.

The task of the United Nations is to use the machinery of international organization to speed the removal of obstacles in the path to economic and social well-being.

Our principal tools in resolving this problem are the experienced personnel of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, particularly as they are brought together in a functioning unit under the expanded program for technical assistance.

The extent to which those tools will be used must always depend upon the extent to which the governments of the countries in which land reform is required want to use them. These governments have it within their power to frustrate land reform and perpetuate ancient practices. Or they can choose to utilize the experience which the

United Nations system can provide and hasten the day when the men and women who till the soil can see their daily lot improved in the form of more food, better clothing, greater understanding and better health.

I. S. Resolution

The United States Delegation has submitted a resolution, as a basis for discussion, which we hope will provide for the continuing mobilization of our united efforts.³ It is based on the promise that the major effort in modernizing land practices must spring from governments themselves, and on the further premise that the United Nations system can and must play a major role in assisting governments to achieve these aims.

I will not undertake to describe the resolution in detail at this time. In general, it encourages governments to take such measures as may be required to provide, among other things, security of land tenure for the man who cultivates the fields; to promote, where advantageous, the operation of agriculture on the basis of the family-sized farm; to establish and improve national and local agricultural credit facilities; to prevent exorbitant land rentals and inequitable land taxes; to promote, where feasible and appropriate, cooperative organizations which might aid in farm purchasing, financing, marketing and processing; to encourage rural industries so as to utilize rural manpower more efficiently.

It recommends the extension of such measures to non-self-governing territories.

It recommends also that the specialized agencies, particularly the FAO, ILO and UNESCO, join forces through the technical assistance program to meet the needs of the various governments as they tackle their land problems.

'Matter of Continuous Concern'

It is our hope that the problem of land reform with all its ramifications will be a matter of continuous concern to the Council. To that end the resolution requests the specialized agencies concerned to report to the Council annually, if possible, and at least every two years, on the status of the land problem in their respective fields. It asks the Secretary-General in turn to provide the Council with a summary analysis and synthesis of these reports to assist us in reviewing the problem.

Mr. President, as I have indicated, the people of the United States are concerned with land reform for many reasons. We are concerned with it because it affects immediately and directly the productivity of the farmer, and this productivity has an important effect on economic development. We are concerned with land reform because it

affects immediately and directly the well-being of the farmer, and the farmer is, after all, more than half of the world's working population. We are concerned with land reform because we are concerned with human dignity, with social justice, and with the easing of social and political tensions that spill over into destructive violence.

And, we, in the United States, are concerned with land reform for another and quite simple reason. We have not yet completely solved our own land problems. We have our own problems of tenancy, of land distribution, and of migratory labor. Although the situation is rapidly improving, as I have already indicated, the problem in the United States is by no means yet solved.

"One of Greatest Challenges"

The need for truly democratic solutions of the grave problems in this field, with which the Council and other organs of the United Nations are coming to grips, must be evident to all of us. It is one of the greatest challenges to the free world today. In their broadest aspect, these are not merely problems which relate to the level of agricultural production, or to the terms and conditions of tenancy, important though these questions may be. Rather, they are problems which bear directly and profoundly upon ultimate goals of human welfare, goals that have been adopted by the United Nations as its own objectives. In assisting in the pursuit of these objectives, through the United Nations and otherwise, the well-being of peoples who derive their living from the land will continue to be of major concern to the United States. We shall continue to give encouragement and assistance to land reform programs, whenever and wherever these will substantially contribute to promoting the basic objectives of stability and well-being.

Text of Resolution

[Printed from telegraphic text]

The following resolution was adopted at a plenary session of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva on September 7:

The Economic and Social Council,
HAVING EXAMINED the report prepared in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution 401 (V) by the Secretary-General, prepared in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization on "defects in agrarian structure as obstacles to economic developments," the report of the Economic Employment and Development Commission which points out the need for land reform as an aid to economic development, and the report of the council of FAO; and,

NOTING the work done by the International Labor Organization in the field of agricultural labor and that a study on rural economic development in trust territories has been undertaken by the Trusteeship Council,

BEARING in mind the importance of improving the conditions of agricultural workers, tenants, small and medium farmers to economic development and rising standards of living, human dignity and freedom, and social and political stability;

³ For text of the United States Draft Resolution on Land Reform submitted in the Thirteenth Session of the Economic and Social Council, Geneva, Sept. 3, 1951, see U. N. Doc. US/E/285, Sept. 5, 1951.

FURTHER BEARING in mind the main conclusions of the Secretary-General's report namely,

(I) That in view of the great diversity of conditions in underdeveloped territories in various parts of the world no one special measure or group of measures can be expected to meet all situations,

(II) That any measures taken to improve agrarian conditions should be related to general plans for promoting economic development;

RECOGNIZING that appropriate measures of land reform designed to achieve improvement of the conditions of agricultural populations and an increase in agricultural production must in many countries be regarded as a necessary part of any effective implementation of comprehensive programmes for economic development.

RECOGNIZING, further, that especially in cases where the fundamental problem is that of a surplus rural population as compared with the cultivable area, the problem calls for diversification of activities and the establishment of industries, in conjunction with the measures recommended hereafter.

1. *Urges* all governments confronted with the problem of agrarian structure to study the Secretary-General's report in order to take full account of the experiences of others in carrying out their own plans for economic development.

2. *Recommends* that governments institute appropriate land reform in the interest of landless, small and medium farmers.

3. *Recommends* further that governments take such of the following measures as may be appropriate to the circumstances in their countries to:

A. *Assure* security of tenure to the cultivator of land so that he may have the incentive to improve the productivity of the land and to conserve its resources, and the opportunity to retain an equitable share of his production;

B. *Provide* opportunity for the cultivator to acquire ownership of land;

C. *Promote* the organization of land holdings into farms of an efficient size, either by dividing unduly large holdings or by combining fragmented units, as may be required, wherever this may be economically and socially advantageous to the population;

D. *Establish* on undeveloped and newly reclaimed lands secure and equitable tenure conditions, including opportunity for ownership in family sized holdings;

E. *Establish* or expand national and local institutions for providing agricultural credit at reasonable rates of interest, and take legislative or administrative measures to assist in the reduction of agricultural indebtedness;

F. *Enact* and enforce legislation which will prevent the charge of exorbitant rentals on agricultural land;

G. *Review* their tax structure and administration with a view to eliminating inequitable tax loads and related charges on the cultivator of land;

H. *Promote* cooperative organizations for the cultivation, marketing and processing of agricultural products and for the purchase of farm supplies and equipment;

I. *Encourage* diversification of agricultural production wherever this can help raise the living standards of the farm and nonfarm populations;

J. *Take* steps directed toward rational diversification of their economies so that agricultural developments may proceed as part of an integrated programme of economic developments;

K. *Encourage* the establishment of industries in rural areas, including cooperatives, small scale and cottage industries, and especially industries using indigenous agricultural products as their raw material, and thus assure such industries a place in the economic life of the country;

L. *Establish* or expand, either through cooperative organizations or by other means appropriate to the economy of the country, factories or work shops for the manufacture, maintenance, repair and servicing of the most essential agricultural machinery and the storage of spare parts;

M. *Expand* and develop programmes of literacy and general education in rural areas;

N. *Ensure* that adequate agricultural research, through governmental services or otherwise, is undertaken;

O. *Establish* or expand services for the education of the farmer in the technological and economic aspects of agricultural and rural life through such measures as agricultural extension services and model farms;

P. *Improve* the economic, social and legal status of agricultural wage laborers on plantations and other large estates.

4. *Recommends* that all governments responsible for populations which are not economically advanced, including those governments responsible for the administration of non-self-governing territories, in addition to taking such of the measures described above as may be required, should ensure that the interests of such populations are fully protected in policies and laws relating to the transfer of land.

5. *Recommends* that the specialized agencies, each in its respective field, particularly the FAO, ILO, and UNESCO should in cooperation with the United Nations, keep the subject of land reform under review and give high priority to this problem in their technical assistance programs, bearing in mind the resolution of the Technical Assistance Committee adopted at its 19th meeting, dealing with the provision of supplies and equipment, and specifically:

A. *Focus attention* on the urgent need for land reforms in many areas;

B. *Consider* affording high degree of priority to the recruitment of professional staff competent to advise governments on problems of land reform and draw the attention of member governments to methods of solving such problems which have proved successful in other countries;

C. *Place particular emphasis* on furnishing assistance to governments wishing to adopt domestic measures which would contribute to land reforms particularly:

(1) The development of legislation relating to land tenure, settlement of titles, conditions of tenancy, problems of size and organization of land holdings, settlement of publicly owned land, and financing of the redistribution of land;

(2) The development and extension of agricultural credit;

(3) The development and extension of cooperative organizations for essential agricultural services such as financing, marketing, processing of agricultural products and purchase of farm implements and supplies;

(4) The promotion of agricultural extension services;

(5) The establishment of rural industry;

(6) The development of programmes for improvement of agricultural labor standards and security of employment;

(7) The expansion of programmes for training of teachers and educational leaders in techniques of mass education, especially in rural areas.

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the appropriate specialized agencies, to assist governments, on their request, with respect to activities that fall outside of the field of any specialized agency and, in particular, with respect to measures to improve their fiscal systems, with special reference to measures designed to prevent the imposition of inequitable taxes and other assessments and fees on the cultivator of land;

7. *Requests* the specialized agencies concerned, in their respective fields of responsibility to include in their annual reports to the council information on their activities pursuant to recommendation in paragraph 3 above;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General periodically, but at least once every 3 years, to arrange in cooperation with the specialized agencies concerned, to obtain by means of a single questionnaire addressed to governments information on progress in land reforms including legislation and other measures adopted, on any obstacles to the adoption of such measures and any suggestions that governments may have concerning international action to promote land reforms and to analyse the information received and to present conclusions and recommendations to the council; and

9. *Draws the attention* of the governments concerned to the possibilities offered by the system of free and voluntary cooperation on the part of farmers with a view to meeting the requirements of technical and economic progress in agriculture, while preserving the rights and freedoms of the individual.

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization and the other competent specialized

agencies, to prepare a report for a future session of the council, summarizing the results obtained in various countries through agricultural cooperation and bringing out the possibilities offered from every standpoint by the cooperative system in this field.

11. *Recommends* that the General Assembly consider this subject from time to time in order that all member governments may have an opportunity to take part in the discussion of developments in this field.

ECOSOC Meeting Seeks Solution of Hemisphere Economic Problems

Edward G. Miller, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

The United States delegation is especially grateful for the opportunity which this plenary session affords to comment on the work of the second extraordinary session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council as it has thus far developed. First of all I would like to express my deep gratification over the splendid spirit of cooperation shown by all the delegations present at this meeting and over the conscientious effort that each of them has put forth to find solutions for the problems that have been discussed here and which are of such vital importance to all our economies. The unanimity of purpose shown at this meeting is in keeping with the highest tradition of inter-American friendship and solidarity. This plenary session, in the opinion of the United States delegation, appears especially opportune in view of the fact that the Council is about to begin consideration of its work program for the year 1951-52. The United States delegation believes that the work program is one of the most important items of the agenda because of the decisive role the Council is called upon to play during these critical times. Therefore the United States delegation would like, with your kind indulgence, to set forth at this time its views on this important topic. In doing so, I would also like to make a few comments upon the highly purposeful deliberations that have taken place to date.

Inflation Control

We are now in the midst of a collective defense effort which is bringing, as a consequence, eco-

nomic dislocations of varying degrees of severity to the economies of all the countries of the world. The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Washington this year was called in order to develop a united front before some of the problems arising as a result of the Korean war. That Meeting entrusted to the Council in Resolution XVII certain specific continuing duties with regard to the control of inflation in the defense of the economies of the American nations. Certain aspects of those problems have, since the Meeting of Ministers, been under discussion in the ordinary sessions of the Council as well as in this extraordinary session. We have all learned much from these deliberations. With respect to the problem of inflation control the Council can exercise a dynamic role and I am confident that as a result of the deliberations of this extraordinary session the Council will develop an even more positive program to meet the problem in the emergency and post emergency period.

This session has been characterized by great preoccupation over the problem of maintaining the purchasing power of monetary reserves. The United States delegation is entirely sympathetic with the preoccupations of the other nations of the hemisphere in regard to this problem. We will be glad to participate with complete sincerity in any continuing studies that the Council may pursue. However, in all frankness, we should point out once more that the problem of monetary reserves appears to be only one aspect of the much greater problem which confronts us all, namely, that of the economic and financial disequilibrium which has been forced upon us collectively by the present grave threat to our security. Without wishing to belittle the importance of the problem, I believe that as it has developed thus far in the emergency, it is far more theoretical than real.

¹ Made before plenary session of the Second Meeting of the Inter-American Ecosoc at Panama City, Panama, on Aug. 28 and released to the press on the same date.

This is because of the fact that the United States and other traditional suppliers, particularly Europe, have been able to continue to the other countries of the hemisphere a far greater flow of goods than had been anticipated.

In the second place, it seems to us that any study of this specific aspect of the disequilibrium brought about by the emergency should be carried out in the light of the many other factors created by the present emergency and by the last devastating war which affected all of the nations here present. It seems only fair to the other members here present that I should bring to mind some of the realities of the situation as they might be considered by the people and particularly by the Congress of the United States. These realities include the fact that the United States came out of World War II with a national debt of more than 250 billion dollars and with large continuing financial responsibilities caused by the war, and that the current emergency is requiring very considerable financial and economic sacrifices on the part of the American people as well as the sacrifices of life. These are sacrifices which we believe you will agree are being undertaken not in our own national interest alone but in the interest of the collective cause of peace and security, to which we have all pledged our mutual cooperation. Consequently, without in any sense detracting from the importance which many of the other nations here present attach to the problem of monetary reserves, I reiterate the suggestion that any future consideration of this or any other aspect of emergency inflation and financial problems be carried out in the light of the total emergency situation which we collectively confront.

Supply and Production Problems

One of the most constructive aspects of the work of this Conference has been the full and frank discussion which has transpired of our mutual problems and preoccupations in certain aspects of the supply situation. Those countries which are not individually represented on the International Materials Conference (Imc), and its constituent committees, have had an ample opportunity to express their concern and their views over the work of this organization and its possible impact upon their economies. I believe that a far better understanding has been brought about as a result of the discussions that have taken place here. As a representative of one of the important member nations in the Imc, I reiterate our pledge that in our participation in the work of the Imc our Government will do everything possible to safeguard the interests of each and every nation here represented.

The work of Committee II has also given us an opportunity to examine our bilateral supply relationships, particularly insofar as the United States is concerned as a supplying nation, and I

believe that in the discussions which have taken place the United States delegation has been able to demonstrate that the United States is fully living up to its commitments under Resolution XVI of the Foreign Ministers Meeting. We have welcomed the opportunity as one member of a community of nations to render accounts to the other members, and I can only express the hope that any government which ever entertains a doubt as to the fairness of the treatment of its requirements will feel free at any time to come to us in Washington for a full and frank discussion. In this regard I cannot stress too strongly the need for governments to justify their requirements with complete and specific statistical data.

The work of Committee II has disclosed a great interest in the possible contribution of the study groups in sulphur, tinplate, and newsprint which are being set up by the Council in Washington. It is our view that once these study groups are created, the member nations must contribute effectively to their daily operations so that they make the maximum contribution to solving the difficult problems which resulted in their creation. I trust the member governments will realize the importance of assigning technically qualified representatives to those groups. On our part we intend to support fully the work of these study groups.

In addition to those aspects of our mutual supply problems which have been fully thrashed out at this Conference, there are two other problems in the supply field which occupied an important position in the work of the Foreign Ministers and which perhaps have not received as much attention in the Council as they deserve.

STRATEGIC MATERIALS

Resolution XIII of the meeting adopted all feasible measures for increasing the production of strategic materials. In our view the Council can render an important service in effectuating the purpose of this transcendental resolution. In discussing this question of strategic materials, we do not refer to any single country since this is an indivisible problem and concerted action is required to achieve the desired result. However, it appears to us that in the light of the present emergency and the drastic shortages which occur in regard to many critical materials, the Council might well undertake certain continuing duties during the emergency period to expedite the production and delivery in the most effective manner of these materials. We should like to point out that shortages of these strategic materials in many cases not only hinder the defense program but also limit the ability of the United States to supply important manufactured goods to other countries of the hemisphere. Specific commodities which come to mind as I say this include iron, manganese, tungsten, beryl, copper, petroleum, and many others. Would it not be possible for

the Council to devote itself in cooperation with the member governments to elaborating individual country programs for the purpose of stimulating the production and delivery of strategic materials? We have strongly supported the Bolivian proposal that the Council concern itself with the investigation and exploration of mineral resources. I should point out that the United States under its technical cooperation programs has for the last 10 years been cooperating on a bilateral basis with other countries of the hemisphere in this very field. In our current request to Congress for additional funds under the Point Four Program, we have requested greatly increased funds for this very purpose.

In making these suggestions we are motivated not only by the needs of the collective defense effort, but also by the conviction that a well-conceived program of development of strategic materials will help to realize the often repeated aspirations of the producing countries to achieve higher levels of economic activity.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Naturally the great continuing preoccupation of the nations of Latin America is with regard to the development of their internal economies. At the Foreign Ministers Meeting this year, special attention was paid to this problem, especially as the emergency might limit the progress of their development as a result of shortages of capital equipment. Accordingly, the Foreign Ministers very wisely provided in Resolutions XII and XVI for certain orders of priority to which available capital equipment should be devoted in development projects. It seems to the delegation of the United States that governments might devote increased attention to translating these priority schedules into more specific terms, particularly as they relate to their respective needs and possibilities. It would be helpful if the Council from time to time could be provided with reports indicating the progress they are making.

We all realize that the problem of purchasing power of monetary reserves is closely related to the problem of economic development. To the extent that countries can plan during the period of materials shortages the most effective postemergency utilization of their accumulated reserves, they will be able to make the most effective use of those reserves when they can again convert them without difficulty into capital equipment. Therefore, we believe that the Council should stand ready at any time to study with member governments the best means of projecting their development plans into the postemergency period in conjunction with studies of the most efficient utilization of their accumulated reserves.

Transportation

This Conference has already done most constructive work in regard to the emergency aspects of transportation. Any work program for the ensuing year will, of course, include important continuing duties on the part of the Council in the field of transportation.

While the urgent need at this time is for a technical study of the hemisphere's civil air and maritime transportation requirements, the Council also has an important task to do for its member governments in the long-range field of overland transportation, particularly in regard to the construction of roads, both national and international. For many years the peoples of this hemisphere have had before them the ideal of nations closely interlocked by overland roads. Considerable progress has been made and is being made on the inter-American highway through Central America and on the Pan American Highway in South America. Resolution XIII of the Foreign Ministers Conference refers to the need of improving transportation in regard to the development and delivery of strategic materials. This is a worthy objective during the emergency period which could be translated into broader fields over the long term when the limitations imposed by emergency shortages come to an end. We believe that it might be considered here how the Council could act as a stimulant in working toward the inevitable and essential overland interchange between the nations of the hemisphere.

As this interchange increases there will arise concomitant problems of customs inspection, travel permits for both vehicles and passengers, et cetera. Much work has been done in the last few years in Europe in making studies and recommendations for the facilitation of international travel with the result that vehicles and freight are now able to move internationally in western Europe with a minimum of obstruction at national frontiers. We note with satisfaction that the Pan American Union is already hard at work on a solution of these problems.

Economic and Social Cooperation

This Conference has afforded a constructive opportunity for reviewing and reassessing the technical cooperation program of the Organization of American States which has already become a significant part of our mutual cooperative efforts. Particular attention has been devoted during our deliberations here to the need for governments to contribute with regularity their share of the budget for the program. It is hoped that the emphasis placed upon this subject here will have continuing results. Emphasis has also been placed upon the need of coordination in the administra-

tion of the program. This extends of course to coordination with programs carried on by other agencies than the Organization of American States.

The need of coordination between the work of this and other agencies applies to other fields than technical cooperation. At the recent meeting in Mexico of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the United Nations, considerable attention was given to the need of preventing duplication between the work of this Council and of ECLA. All of the nations here represented are deeply devoted to the work of ECLA and it has proved itself to be an agency which can do great good for the development of the countries of the hemisphere. It is important that the Council coordinate its work with that of ECLA in order to render most effective their complementary activities.

The U.S. delegation has tried in this brief exposition to set forth some ideas as to how not only in the ensuing fiscal year, but in the future years, the Council can play an increasingly constructive role in the strengthening of the economies of the individual countries of the hemisphere and in binding them closer together as friends and neighbors which can make ever greater contributions to the welfare of each other and to the whole community. There is one aspect of the work of the Council which is more intangible but which may be of even greater value than that of any specific solutions of problems which its work may afford. I refer to the opportunity which the existence of the Council affords for representatives of the governments in Washington in permanent session to meet together and discuss their mutual problems. The work of the ordinary sessions is complemented yearly by the extraordinary session where special delegations from each of the countries meet to discuss, on a ministerial level, problems of a mutual importance. The faith of the U.S. Government in the Council and its work has been demonstrated by the fact that we have detached from their duties in Washington some 14 delegates and advisers representing 8 agencies of the Government which constitute all of the agencies concerned with the work of this session.

I am speaking for our entire delegation when I say that all of us have derived particular benefit and pleasure from the opportunities that we have had of discussing informally, without colleagues, not only problems on our agenda here but other problems in our mutual economic relations. It is a source of gratification to us that at the first and second extraordinary sessions of the Council other nations have sent delegations of distinction. The work of the Council, its standing in the inter-American community, and its positive contribution to the welfare of the community of nations will best be served if the governments participate with increasing interest and vigor in the regular

work of the Council in Washington and future extraordinary sessions. In this connection I should like to pay tribute to the devoted work of the two outstanding men who have served as President of the Council since the last extraordinary session, Don Julio Ernesto Heurtematte of Panama and Don Jorge Mejía-Palacio of Colombia, and to the latter's outstanding address at the opening session which did so much to guide our labors.

In conclusion, since I am required to leave before the end of the session and may not again have an opportunity of addressing the Council, I should like to render tribute on behalf of my delegation to the Government of Panama for its magnificent hospitality, to Carmen Miro for the splendid manner in which she is discharging her responsibilities as Secretary General, and especially to Señor Dr. Galileo Solís, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Panama, and president of this extraordinary session, who has so greatly contributed to the work of the session since its inception.

The United States in the United Nations

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue, but will be resumed in the issue of September 24.

Check List of Department Press Releases: Sept. 3-9, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Number	Date	Subject
760	8/24	Pakistan Locust Plague
775†	8/28	German Doc., vol. 4, released
782†		OEEC European Production
783†	8/31	Awards to U.S. Films
792†	8/31	Germany Signs Torquay Protocol
795*	9/4	Foreign Service Changes
796*	9/4	Exchange of Persons
797†	9/5	Telephone Story at Oatis Trial
798*	9/5	Foreign Service Changes
799†	9/5	World Tobacco Conf.
800	9/6	Azores Defense Agreement
801*	9/6	Exchange of Persons
802*	9/7	Congratulations to New King of Jordan
803*	9/7	Anniversary of Brazil
804	9/7	Ethiopia Signs Economic Treaty
805†	9/7	Legal Committee of ICAO
806*	9/7	Exchange of Persons
807†	9/7	Inter-American Cultural Council
808†	9/7	Venezuelan Petroleum Convention

*Not printed in BULLETIN.

†Held for future issue of BULLETIN.

Egypt Asked To End Restrictions on Shipping Through Suez Canal to Israel Ports

Text of Security Council Resolution¹

J.N. doc. S/2322
Adopted Sept. 1, 1951

The Security Council

1. *Recalling* that in its resolution of 11 August 1949, (S/1376) relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these Agreements "against any further acts of hostility between the Parties";

2. *Recalling* further that in its resolution of 17 November 1950 (S/1907) it reminded the States concerned that the Armistice Agreements to which they were parties contemplated "the return of permanent peace in Palestine", and therefore urged them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as would lead to the settlement of the issues between them;

3. *Noting* the report of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Security Council of 12 June 1951 (S/2194);

4. *Further noting* that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13 January 1949, to the effect that his delegation was "inspired with every spirit of co-operation, conciliation and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine", and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff made to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel;

5. *Considering* that since the Armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search, and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence;

6. *Finds* that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in paragraph 4 above is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement;

7. *Finds further* that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;

8. *Further finds* that that practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence;

9. *And further noting* that the restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel;

¹ Adopted by a vote of 8 to 0, with the Soviet Union, China, and India abstaining. This resolution as finally adopted by the Security Council was based on a draft submitted by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom on Aug. 15 (S/2298/Rev. 1).

10. *Calls upon* Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.

Armistice Negotiations in Korea

Message from the U.N. Commander to the Communist Commanders

Following is text of message from Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Allied Supreme Commander, to Gen. Kim Il Song, Supreme Commander of Korean People's Army and Gen. Peng Teh-huai, Commander of Chinese People's Volunteers, broadcast at 12:30 p. m., September 6 [10:30 p. m., September 5, eastern daylight time]

Your message to me, dated 1 September, 1951, and received 2 September, is yet another of your false charges in which, without the slightest basis in fact, you have again impugned the good faith of the United Nations forces. The charges you have levied in these alleged incidents are baseless and intentionally false. I have stated, and will again positively state, that our thorough investigations have indicated no instances where forces under my command have violated any of the agreements made by me or my representatives. Therefore, if the incidents did, in fact, occur, they were presumably initiated and perpetrated by your forces in order to provide spurious evidence for false and malevolent accusations against the United Nations command.

I cannot provide you with guarantees against your own failure to exercise control in an area for which you are responsible. I cannot prevent the occurrence of incidents deliberately and maliciously manufactured by your forces in an area under your control. I previously guaranteed that our forces would not violate the terms of the agreement concerning Kaesong neutral zone. My forces have scrupulously observed the terms of that agreement. My guarantee remains effective.

That you should permit the forces of your side to indulge in their constant deceit and invective is incomprehensible, unless you have the ulterior motive of completely breaking off negotiations with the further scurrilous accusation that the blame therefore rests upon the United Nations command rather than upon you.

In the interest of the millions of people in the United Nations whom I represent as the commander of their forces in the field, I call upon you to cease these despicable practices which have received world-wide condemnation.

These military armistice discussions at Kaesong have been in progress seven weeks. You must share my concern over the lack of progress achieved.

I have repeatedly emphasized that my principal concern is to achieve a just and honorable military armistice. Events of the past weeks have made it plainly evident to me and to the world at large that further use of the present conference site at Kaesong will inevitably result in additional interruptions of our armistice talks and further delays in reaching agreement. When you decide to terminate the suspension of armistice negotiations which you declared on 23 August, I propose that our liaison officers meet immediately at the bridge at Panmunjom to discuss the selection of a new site where negotiations can be continued without interruptions.

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appreciated.

RED YOUTH IN BLUE SHIRTS

by Henry B. Cox

How effective were the Communists in capturing the minds and hearts of the one and a half million youth they assembled at Berlin last month? Did the Communists achieve short-range or long-term impacts? These are questions posed by the Department of State Bulletin to Henry B. Cox, Bureau of German Affairs, upon his return from Berlin where he acted as an unofficial observer of the Communist Festival of Youth for the Department of State.

From August 5 to August 19 about one and a half million young people, most of them between the ages of 15 and 25, milled through the bomb-scarred streets of East Berlin, capital of Stalin's youngest puppet state—the "German Democratic Republic." About 30,000 were non-Germans, having come from the countries of the Soviet bloc, from Western Europe, and from such distant places as Indonesia and Latin America. Another 25,000 had come from Western Germany. But by far the largest number were from the cities and towns of the Soviet zone of Germany.

As members of the German Communist mass organization for youth, the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ) or Free German Youth, they were officially hosts for the third massive Communist world youth festival to be staged by Moscow in recent years. In comparison with this performance, the rallies at Prague in 1947 and at Budapest in 1949 were mere side shows. Sponsoring this latest Soviet propaganda extravaganza, designed to win the allegiance of the world's youth for communism and convince them of the "peaceful" designs of Soviet foreign policy, were two Communist front groups, the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students.

Much could be said concerning the non-German participants at this year's festival. But what of these Free German Youth? The very title of their organization is a mockery, for there are lamentably few aspects of the drab everyday life of these youths to which the adjective "free" could be applied. True, they are "free" to serve Stalin's cause in a variety of ways—in the uranium mines of Aue, in the People's Police, in the Soviet-owned and -controlled East German industrial plants which continue to deliver staggering reparations to the U.S.S.R. They are "free" to choose between membership in the FDJ or the various other affiliates of the *Sozialistisch Einheits Partei Deutschlands* (SED)—the Communist Party of East Germany—which makes them eligible for the benefits of higher education, participation in sports and cultural events, better jobs, and relative security—and the alternative of nonaffiliation with the Communist regime and its "fronts," which spell social ostracism, economic misery, and political persecution for them. These are the "free" German youth who streamed into the Soviet sector of Berlin by car, bus, and train from every corner of East Germany.

Ostensibly they had come to join other "progressive" youth from all parts of the world in the

"Third World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace." These "free" German youth had little choice but to participate in this "puppet show"—the alternatives would have been far too unpleasant. But once they had arrived at East Berlin and discovered the wretched character of their food and lodging, plus the relatively ineffective control maintained by FDR fanatics and East German secret police, they deserted the regimented spectacles which had been prepared for them and poured by the hundreds of thousands into the Western sectors of Berlin at the earliest opportunity.

Tasting the "Forbidden Fruit" of the West

Many of them were simply reacting like normal youngsters who wanted to taste forbidden fruit; they had been warned of Communist reprisals and Western hostility if they dared enter West Berlin. However, the majority of those who came were basically anti-Communist, pro-Western young people who had been caught up in the Communist maelstrom and considered their affiliation with communism merely a matter of convenience or necessity. Only about 10 percent were adjudged by observers to be enthusiastic converts to Stalinism. They came with the inquiring minds of youth, interested in seeing for themselves whether conditions of life in Free Berlin were really all that the U. S.-sponsored radio station RIAS had been saying they were; whether such things as freedom of speech and assembly and movement were realities and not just something people talked about; whether young people were really free to choose their own careers and to pursue them without political interference. They were not disappointed or disillusioned. Many were desirous of obtaining accurate information about the critical political developments affecting Germany. Others requested—and got—a clear statement of Allied policy with regard to such vital issues as German unity, the Oder-Neisse line, the Schuman Plan, and a West German contribution to European defense.

A more important motive than all these, perhaps, was their desperate anxiety to be reassured that the rest of Germany and the free world was aware of their plight and had not forgotten them or written them off. This reassurance came from all sides—from the Berliners who had seen both sides of the Iron Curtain and had chosen freedom;

from the representatives of West Germany, government and opposition alike, who had come to Berlin with words of sympathy and encouragement; and from the many major and minor officials of the three Western Allies who accorded them a sympathetic hearing and contributed generously to feeding and entertaining them. It was not always easy to convince many of these young people that the West was doing all in its power to aid them, although the more intelligent and politically mature among them readily recognized that under present circumstances there are definite limits to the assistance which can be given short of liberation.

Challenges to the Free World

The "Third World Festival of Youth and Students For Peace" is now history. The gaudy Communist banners and slogans, the trappings of the phony Communist "peace offensive," the gigantic pictures of Stalin, Pieck, and other "patrons of youth," which concealed the miserable aspect of Red Berlin, have now been taken down and stored away for another day. It remains for the free world to assess the extent of the damage done and to face the problems and challenges represented by the rally. These problems and challenges can perhaps best be pointed up by an attempt to answer the question, "What was the effect of the Festival on the participants?"

Insofar as the foreign participants are concerned—and we may include the West Germans here—it is reasonable to conclude that they were considerably impressed by their experiences in East Berlin. This is attributable primarily to the fact that these delegates were to a large extent convinced Communists before their arrival. Moreover, in comparison with their East German colleagues they were given preferential treatment with respect to food and lodging. Another contributing factor was the fact that they were systematically isolated from the other delegates, particularly the East Germans, and, with minor exceptions, did not share in the West Berlin experience. Their impressions of the Festival were thus obtained largely at the mass rallies and staged performances where slogans of "peace" and "friendship" were generously interspersed with pictures of Stalin, Pieck, and Mao, and where the Western Powers, particularly the United States, were pictured as warmongers and evil conspirators.

In contrast to the foreign participants, a relatively small percentage of the East German FdJers appeared to be convinced Communists or sympathetic to the Soviet cause. The attitude of those who came to West Berlin ranged from mild disgust to violent antagonism. The miserable food and accommodations which they received served to intensify these feelings. In general the effect of the Festival on this group, at least half of whom were able to visit West Berlin, was a limited one, although it is admittedly not possible to evaluate accurately the countereffect which the mass emotional experiences may have had on them. It is doubtful, however, that the more intelligent among them were deceived by the banners and propaganda.

The fact that around 500,000 of these East German youth came to West Berlin in defiance of Communist threats and in spite of Communist efforts to prevent them is indeed heartening and is in no small degree a tribute to the effectiveness of the Voice of America and RIAS. But we must not allow this momentary success to blind us to the fact that we are dealing here with a long-range problem.

If the Festival has contributed anything to our understanding of Communist tactics, it has certainly accentuated in our minds the degree and scope of emphasis which the Communists have placed on the youth within their control. By word and deed they have indicated the important place which youth is intended to assume in their plans for the future. Moreover, we dare not underestimate the cumulative effect which continuing exposure to Communist propaganda and discipline may have upon the attitude of these young people toward the free world and their will to resist the progressive Sovietization of their environment. As the hope for immediate liberation wanes, the challenge for us becomes increasingly serious.

We must redouble our efforts to penetrate the barriers by which the Soviets seek to isolate the East Germans from contact with the outside world and by which they hope to insulate them against the truth. We must use every conceivable means to bolster their spiritual resistance and justify their faith in the West. For only if we succeed in doing these things will the "West Berlin experience" be truly significant for them and for us.

Foreign Ministers of U.S., U.K., and France Discuss World Problems

[Released to the press September 14]

At the conclusion of their meetings at Washington from September 10 to September 14, Secretary Acheson, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of France, and Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison of the United Kingdom issued the following declaration and communiqué:

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION

The three Foreign Ministers declare that their Governments aim at the inclusion of a democratic Germany, on a basis of equality, in a Continental European Community, which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community.

The three Ministers recognize that the initiative taken by the French Government concerning the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community and a European defense community is a major step towards European unity. They welcome the Schuman Plan as a means of strengthening the economy of Western Europe and look forward to

its early realization. They also welcome the Paris Plan as a very important contribution to the effective Defense of Europe, including Germany.

The participation of Germany in the common defense should naturally be attended by the replacement of the present Occupation Statute by a new relationship between the three Governments and the German Federal Republic.

The Government of the United Kingdom desires to establish the closest possible association with the European continental community at all stages in its development.

The three Ministers reaffirm that this policy, which will be undertaken in concert with the other free nations, is directed to the establishment and the maintenance of a durable peace founded on justice and law. Their aim is to reinforce the security and the prosperity of Europe without changing in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They reaffirm their determination that in no circumstances shall the above arrangements be made use of in furtherance of any aggressive action.

September 24, 1951

COMMUNIQUE

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have held meetings in Washington from September 10 through September 14. The three Foreign Ministers have met frequently in the last few years primarily because of the special and explicit responsibilities of their Governments in regard to Germany and Austria. The meetings equally offer a convenient opportunity for the three Ministers to exchange views on world developments and informally to review problems of mutual concern to their three countries.

The Foreign Ministers have noted with satisfaction the results already achieved by their three countries, together with other free nations of the world, in order to insure their common security and to safeguard the peace. They again recorded the fundamental unity of the policies of their three governments in regard to the many and acute problems facing them today.

The Foreign Ministers have reviewed the relationship of their countries to the German Federal Republic, and have agreed on instructions to the Allied High Commission for negotiation of mutually acceptable agreements with the Federal Government, the effect of which will be to transform that relationship completely.

As a result of the agreement reached by the three Foreign Ministers in Brussels last December, the High Commission has already explored with the Federal Government the way to establish relations between the three Powers and the Federal Republic on as broad a contractual basis as possible, in the light of German participation in Western Defense. The Foreign Ministers have now instructed the High Commission to proceed to negotiations with the Federal Government, which will, it is hoped, culminate in early agreements between the four Governments to enter into effect together with the agreement for German participation in Western Defense through the proposed European Defense Community, whose forces would form part of the joint defense forces under the North Atlantic Supreme Command.

The Foreign Ministers have agreed on certain general principles to guide the High Commission in its negotiations with the Federal Government. As stated in the Tripartite Declaration issued today the guiding principle of their policy continues to be the integration of the Federal Republic on a basis of equality within a European community itself included in a developing Atlantic Community. Such integration would thus be inconsistent with the retention in future of an occupation status or of the power to interfere in the Federal Republic's domestic affairs.

The Ministers believe that the agreements now to be reached with the Federal Government should provide the basis for its relationship to their coun-

tries until a peace settlement with a unified Germany becomes possible. The division of Germany, however, prevents the conclusion of such a settlement at this time. This division and the security problem confronting the Federal Republic obliges the Allies to retain, in the common interest, certain special rights but only in relation to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of the security of those forces, as well as to questions affecting Berlin and Germany as a whole, including the eventual peace settlement and the peaceful reunification of Germany.

The High Commission will proceed to negotiations with the Federal Government as rapidly as possible. The Ministers hope to be able to consider at an early meeting final drafts both of the agreements to be reached by the three Powers and the Federal Republic and of the agreement for the establishment of a European Defense Community including Germany.

The three Foreign Ministers were unanimous in stating that in the view of their Governments there is no justification for any further delay in the conclusion of a treaty for the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria. This has been the constant aim since the conclusion of hostilities. They will not desist in their efforts to bring the Soviet Government to the same view and to that end they have decided to make a new and resolute effort in the meetings of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to fulfill the long over-due pledge to the Austrian people.

The Italian Government has pointed out the contradiction between some provisions of the Italian peace treaty and the present Italian position in the family of free nations. The Ministers studied sympathetically this question which will be the subject of further conversations between the Governments.

Note was taken of the necessity further to examine in collaboration with the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the most effective use of their combined resources taking full account of the social and economic as well as of the military needs of their peoples.

While recognizing the gravity of the world situation, especially in the face of the continued defiance of the United Nations by the forces of aggression in Korea, the Ministers nevertheless found solid grounds for confidence in the growing strength and unity of the free world.

The three Ministers on behalf of their Governments and peoples restate their fidelity to the principle contained in the United Nations Charter that international differences must be resolved by peaceful processes and not by force or threat of force. They therefore express the hope that the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris will afford a real opportunity for contacts and exchanges of views which the three Foreign Ministers are, for their part, prepared fully to use.

EEC Declaration Points Way to Expanded European Production

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

Released to the press August 30]

The declaration which was issued today by the European Ministers meeting together in the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) is both a welcome reaffirmation of the determination and vision of the leaders of Western Europe and a challenge to the peoples of these countries to meet through vigorous action the high goals set forth. This declaration points the way to a great expansion of production which will both further strengthen the defense of Europe and provide the basis for rising standards of living.

I have great faith in the willingness and ability of the people of Europe to respond energetically to this challenge, and, working together, to achieve the objectives which have been outlined by their representatives. I regard these objectives as sound and constructive, and am confident that with bold action they will be attained. American cooperation will not be lacking.

TEXT OF DECLARATION

[Printed from telegraphic text]

At a meeting of the ministers of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on August 29, agreement was reached on the following declaration:

[PART I]

1. We have examined the demands upon the European economy arising from the needs which are uppermost in the minds of our peoples at this time; namely, ensuring the individual or collective security of our countries and developing their economic strength and well-being. We are convinced that these demands can be met through our individual and joint action provided that the governments and peoples make the great productive effort required and that any serious difficulties arising from external economic relations can be overcome by cooperation with other countries. We believe both of these conditions can be fulfilled.

2. The governments agree that the broad objective of their policies will be to expand total production in Western Europe by 25 percent over the next five years. By this large increase in production, improvement in living standards and further social progress can in the course of

this period be achieved while meeting defense requirements. The governments acting in the spirit of the convention for European Economic Cooperation will work together to take such steps in common as are necessary to attain this objective.

3. Conditions from country to country may vary, but an expansion of this size is well within the power of the European economy as a whole through the effective use of its resources. The member countries have met tasks as difficult in the past. By the hard work of their peoples and with the generous help of the US, they realized a 25 percent increase of production in the last three years alone.

4. Europe possesses great national resources, a large industrial potential, a skilled and ample labor force, and a capacity to achieve rapid technical progress. The full mobilization of these resources requires foresight, resolution, a cooperative effort, and the pursuit of policies based on social justice. The governments are convinced that such policies are essential in order to preserve the gains already made and to realize continued progress. Social justice demands a distribution of burdens and benefits that will promote the well-being of the less favored sections of the community.

5. At first in many countries the increase in production will have to be devoted largely to strengthening their defenses as well as to expanding exports to meet the higher cost of imports. But progressively a growing surplus will be available to raise supplies of consumer's goods, build more houses, and increase the contribution of European industrial countries to the equipment of underdeveloped countries and territories.

6. Thus by bold action to expand production, the future can be faced without the fear either that economic betterment must be indefinitely postponed or that a slump will follow the defense expansion. There can be confidence that the present needs for restraint is temporary. Industry can be assured that, after the period of rapidly rising defense expenditure, the needs to be met will be such that no part of the capacity created will be left unused. Workers in industry and agriculture can make their contribution to increasing production with assurance of continuous employment.

7. To achieve general economic expansion at the rate desired, steps must be taken and conditions fulfilled which are described below.

PART II.

8. Governments will, as quickly as possible, take steps with a view to arriving in common at objectives for the production increases to be achieved in the fields of coal, steel, electricity, and agriculture. Steps will also be taken to determine objectives in the field of housing and immigration of workers.

9. Shortages in the supplies of coal, electricity and steel are a threat to general industrial expansion.

Coal production has not increased sufficiently to meet the ever growing needs of industrial and civil consumers at

home and abroad. Europe must find the way to dispense with costly imports of American coal, to safeguard industry against interruptions in production and to supply the coal required for household use. Demands for electric power are rapidly growing. Increased output of coal and power should be supplemented by their more efficient use.

To strengthen their defenses, build more houses, and develop their industrial and agricultural equipment the member countries must have more steel. This requires increased production of coke and ferrous ores.

10. There must also be increases in the output of other scarce materials such, for example, as non-ferrous ores, and a fair distribution of available supplies between countries. To this end, the cooperation of other governments through existing international organizations will be necessary.

11. More food must be grown, primarily by using more efficient methods. In particular, to get more meat and dairy products, the production of animal feeding stuffs must be increased.

12. In housing, the shortages are acute and in some areas appalling. More houses are needed especially where opportunities for work exist for those who are unemployed elsewhere.

13. In a few European countries unemployment has not yet been eliminated and vigorous action is required to remedy the situation. In Western Germany there are still about one million unemployed, in Italy some two million, not counting partial unemployment. This means great hardship and considerable waste. The unemployed in Germany can probably be absorbed through internal economic expansion, but in Italy the dominant role must be played by emigration. The existence of large numbers of refugees in Germany, Turkey and Greece also creates a serious problem. Continued cooperation among member governments is needed for the alleviation of these problems, but the cooperation of other governments is essential for its full solution.

PART III.

14. Increasing productivity is the most essential element in expanding production. Great progress can be made by the maintenance of a high standard of efficiency of labor and management and by a real contribution from all sections of the community. Continued extension and modernization of equipment contributes to this progress, but apart from additional investment, productivity can be increased by appropriate production methods and techniques.

15. Inflationary rises in prices must be curbed since inflation jeopardizes the expansion of production, hampers the defense efforts of the various countries and causes great social injustices. Each government must be responsible for securing a balance between the tools and services available internally and the various demands in the market for them. To achieve this the right fiscal and monetary policies must be pursued; these policies must be inspired by the principle of equitable sharing of burdens. But stability of prices can not be achieved by national action alone. Domestic prices are also influenced by external factors. Cooperation therefore is essential not only among member governments but also with other governments to introduce a greater measure of stability in raw material prices and enable inflation to be held in check.

16. To most member countries their financial reactions with other countries are still a matter of concern and in the case of certain countries the stability of their balance of payments has been gravely threatened by the recent sharp rise in the prices of their imports as compared with exports. It is vital therefore that the efforts being made through international action to introduce a greater measure of stability in raw material prices should succeed. Increasing production by the full use of human and material resources and the control of inflation will bring

nearer the time when all European countries will be in a position to pay their way without outside assistance. To this end it is essential that their export drive should continue, and that like-minded countries should foster conditions which favor its success. In order to assist the expansion of production and to obtain the most effective use of European economic resources, member countries will continue their efforts to reduce obstacles to trade, and to develop their cooperation within the framework of the European Payments Union.

17. The industrial countries of Western Europe have in the past worked with the peoples of under-developed countries where considerable investment is necessary in order to expand their productive capacity; they have continued to do so in the postwar period despite their own recovery needs. It is intended that future economic expansion in Europe will contribute to the further expansion of under-developed areas.

18. The member governments are determined to further the objectives set out in this declaration by their individual as well as their joint efforts. They will be guided by its principles in the other international organizations to which they may belong.

19. In setting new tasks for European cooperation member governments recognize their inter-dependence with countries which share their aspirations and aims. A unity of objectives and a spirit of cooperation with these other countries will continue to be a guide to policy and a condition of success.

20. Confident in the future of Europe and in the capacity of its people to meet the challenging demands of the times, the governments pledge themselves to work together in fulfilling the policies outlined in this declaration and call upon all sections of the community to play their part.

German Republic Celebrates Anniversary

[Released to the press September 12]

Secretary Acheson has sent the following message to President Theodor Heuss on the second anniversary of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany:

On behalf of the President and Government of the United States I wish to send you, on the second anniversary of the establishment of the German Federal Republic, the warmest congratulations and good wishes of the United States. During these 2 years constitutional government in Germany has made real progress, and already the Federal Republic is becoming recognized as one of the community of nations devoted to the concept of freedom and democratic life. I should like also to convey to you my own very sincere personal congratulations on this anniversary.

United States High Commissioner to Germany, John J. McCloy, has also sent the following message:

May I add my personal congratulations to you as the head of the Government on the completion of the second anniversary of the establishment of the Republic. I regret very much my inability to be present at the session of the Bundestag commemorating this event. It will always be a source of deepest satisfaction to me that I have had the opportunity and honor to be associated in these past 2 years with the historic development of the new German Republic.

The Story of the "Secret" Telephone Line

A COMMUNIST TECHNIQUE AT THE OATIS TRIAL

[Released to the press September 5]

During the recent trial of Associated Press correspondent William Oatis¹ by the Czechoslovak Communist Government, one of the principal elements in the charges against him was the story of the secret telephone line into the AP office in Prague. Following is a description of how the Communists constructed the false story of the "secret telephone line" in order to make it look as though the AP had tried to conceal its existence from the police:

One of the tricks which the Czechoslovak Communist regime used in railroading the Associated Press correspondent, Bill Oatis, to prison, and in trying to fool the Czechoslovak people into believing that he was guilty of underhand dealing, was the story of the "secret telephone line." This line was one of the three telephone lines in the Associated Press office. In the trial of Bill Oatis, the regime carefully depicted this line as a mysterious, secret line, cynically exploiting the fact that only a handful of people in or out of Czechoslovakia would know the truth behind this deceitful misrepresentation.

Amazingly enough, almost everything said in the Oatis trial about this telephone line was true—except for the one basic fact that the line was actually not in the least secret. The story of the "secret" telephone line is set down here to illustrate a fundamental technique used by the Communists in the Oatis trial, namely, the construction, from many true facts, of one big lie.

The story of the secret telephone line began during the State Prosecutor's interrogation of Bill Oatis during the first morning of the trial. The dialogue was as follows:

- P. To what conclusion did you come about Hustak? Did you accept him?
O. No, I didn't, but at the same time I asked him for espionage information.
P. Do you have many telephone lines?

- O. I gave him our secret telephone number.
P. How many employees do you have in your office?
O. Six all told.
P. How many telephone lines?
O. Two listed lines and this one line which I spoke of.
P. What is the number of the line?
O. 29-529.
P. Under what name was it listed in the telephone directory?
O. Engineer Knetl, whose office was next to ours.
P. Was this secret telephone line functioning before your arrival in Prague?
O. I gathered from the office files that arrangements for this telephone line were made by Goldberg who requested funds for the line.
P. Did you receive a special allowance for this line?
O. Yes, I did.
P. Why was this a secret line?
O. We had the idea that the official lines were tapped and that this line was not, and we used it for conversations which we didn't want to be heard.

Here the Communist experts in charge of masterminding a phony case against Oatis have introduced the idea of a secret telephone line and a clandestine attempt to evade the vigilance of the security police wire tappers as evidence that Oatis was not a correspondent but a spy. Working to build up this picture, the Communists keep the idea alive in the successive interrogation of other prisoners.

The State Prosecutor next interrogated Thomas Svoboda (his name means "freedom" in Czech). Svoboda, 26 years old, and a translator in the Associated Press office, one of the three Czechoslovak codefendants on trial with Bill Oatis, was asked by the prosecutor:

- P. How many telephone lines were there in the AP office?
S. Two. Oatis thought our lines were tapped.
P. Who was Engineer Knetl?
S. He had an office next to ours?
P. What line did Oatis use with the American Embassy?
S. As far as I remember he used the secret number 29-529.

Next the prosecutor interrogated the second

¹ For an article on the Oatis trial, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 283.

Czechoslovak Associated Press employee, 27-year-old Pavel Wojdinek.

- P. Were there only three of you who worked with Oatis?
W. No, he had other informants, but he did not talk to us about his other contacts.
P. How did they meet?
W. They arranged meetings via telephone.
P. We are interested in the telephone. Who used it and how?
W. It was used by Oatis' predecessors and then later by Oatis himself.

Wojdinek continued, stating that Oatis called the American Embassy on the secret line which was listed in the name of Engineer Knetl.

Next, the witness Helen Kucerova was called to respond to the prosecutor's interrogation. She is a 22-year old clerk who told the court that she gave political information to Oatis. She testified that the first time she and Oatis met, in the cafe of the Hotel Sroubek, he gave her his "secret" telephone number.

Then Engineer Jan Knetl was called to the stand. He is a 63-year old civil engineer in forestry. The dialogue went as follows:

- P. You have a telephone in your office. What is the number of the telephone?
K. 29-529.
P. Do you use this line alone?
K. This line was used by the Associated Press whose offices were next to mine.
P. From what year has this line been there?
K. From 1949.
P. How is this?
K. I was asked by the chief of the Associated Press office, Goldberg, if he could use it. I don't know how many telephone lines they had. My telephone bills were paid by them.
P. How did they use the phone?
K. The phone was connected in such a way that there was a telephone in my office and an extension in theirs. This line was used from 1949. The line was used during my absences from Prague. My work called me away from the office quite a bit.

In the course of further exchanges between Knetl and the State Prosecutor, Knetl stated that it had been agreed that the Associated Press would make arrangements to have the telephone bills for the secret line sent directly to the Associated Press, not to Knetl, and this was done.

The following are the true facts behind the telephone line story. In a real trial, Oatis or his defense counsel would have presented these facts to the court. Not so in the Communist kangaroo court set up for Bill Oatis.

There never was a "secret telephone line extending into the AP office from the adjacent Knetl office" because the AP and Mr. Knetl in fact occupied the same suite of offices. Any resident of Prague can check for himself. He may go to the offices of the Associated Press at Smecky 27, a hundred steps from St. Wenceslaus Square, the heart of the city. Let him walk up one flight of stairs to the first floor, and look at the entrance to the AP office. He will read on the door: ASSOCIATED PRESS—DON'T RING—WALK IN! Below the sign, prominently visible, he will see a large name

plate reading ING. JAN KNETL. The office which the Associated Press and Jan Knetl jointly occupied was one single unit. Knetl, a forestry engineer rarely in Prague, required only one room in the suite, and put his telephone at the disposition of the Associated Press without thinking that he was participating in a clandestine operation. No wonder, as arrangements were openly made to have the bill for the telephone sent by the telephone company to the Associated Press for payment.

By misrepresenting and distorting facts, the Czechoslovak Communists made it appear criminal for the Associated Press to use a telephone listed in the Prague telephone directory under the name of Jan Knetl, although this name was written in large letters on the door to the suite of offices occupied jointly by the Associated Press and Knetl. This is the sort of trickery which the Czechoslovak regime had to use to jail an innocent American citizen.

New Federation Emerges in Europe

*Statement by David K. E. Bruce¹
American Ambassador to France*

In the present critical period, when our attention is concentrated on creating armed forces to resist aggression, we are not perhaps fully aware of a revolutionary development taking place on the Continent of Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which came into being following the initiative of the United States, is the most daring conception in foreign policy to which we have ever subscribed. Within its framework and, in a sense subsidiary to it, there is now emerging in Western Europe the pattern of a novel political, economic, and military federation.

The Schuman Plan, put forward by the French Government, was designed to bring about a common trading area in coal, iron, and steel resources of six Western European nations, especially those of the industrial complex surrounding or near the Ruhr Valley of Germany. It is hoped that this venture will result in making impossible the future use of any part of this vast war-making potential by one partner against another. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg have, through their Governments, subscribed to a treaty on this subject, which now is before their parliaments for ratification.

Another French initiative, the European Defense Force Plan, was designed to make impossible the continuance of national armies in Western Europe. In this manner, Germany, for example,

¹ Made on "Battle Report" over NBC Television Network on Sept. 9 and released to the press on the same date.

would, like the other participating nations, no longer have national military forces, but German soldiers would become European soldiers, wearing European uniforms, directed by an international staff composed of officers of various nationalities. Like other NATO forces these would be under the direction of General Eisenhower. A conference is now in session in Paris attempting to resolve the details of this undertaking.

It seems almost incredible that, only 6 years after the termination of the greatest war in history, the countries occupied and devastated by Germany are now working with her to construct a community in which narrow nationalism will have no place.

Signatures to Torquay Protocol

GERMANY

[Released to the press August 31]

The Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States has informed the Department of State that the Chargé d'Affaires of the mission is expected to sign the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York on September 1. Under the provisions of the protocol the Federal Republic will become a contracting party to the General Agreement on October 1, 30 days following its signature of the protocol. On the same date the tariff and other trade concessions negotiated by the Federal Republic at Torquay with the other contracting parties to the agreement, including the United States, will go into effect.

The President of the United States is expected to notify the Secretary of the Treasury, shortly, that the U.S. concessions initially negotiated with the Federal Republic at Torquay will go into effect on October 1.

The Federal Republic of Germany will thus become the first among the seven "new" countries which negotiated at Torquay for accession to the agreement, to become a contracting party. At Torquay, the Federal Republic negotiated with 20 contracting parties to the agreement and with three of the other acceding governments.¹ Its accession brings the number of contracting parties to 31. The German negotiations with the United States at Torquay were the first commercial negotiations between the two countries since the conclusion of a commercial treaty in 1923.

German concessions negotiated at Torquay cover

If these two proposals, so magnificent in their implications, are translated into effective action, it is possible that consideration may next be given to that dream of many European statesmen—the creation of a political federation in Western Europe to which will be surrendered by its member states significant portions of their national sovereignties.

These stirring ideas and actions on the Continent should be most encouraging to us. They are proofs of a vitality, of an optimism, of a determination on the part of our allies to defend the ideals of human freedom by a joint effort to guarantee peace against all imperialistic threats.

a very wide range of products and German participation in the negotiations constituted another important step in the integration of the Federal Republic into the international community. Federal Republic accession to the General Agreement is expected to be of definite economic advantage to the Federal Republic, as well as beneficial to the many countries for whose goods Germany is an important market, and therefore will contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the European Recovery Program.

All German concessions negotiated at Torquay will apply to goods imported from any country which is a contracting party to the Agreement. Thus many U.S. products exported to Germany will benefit from German tariff reductions initially negotiated with other contracting parties.

In acceding to the General Agreement, the Federal Republic will not only make tariff reductions on specified products but will accept the obligation to conduct its foreign trade in accordance with the general provisions of the agreement covering nondiscrimination, internal taxation, and other matters.

New Tariff Law Coincides With Agreement

German negotiations at Torquay were based upon a draft of an entirely new German tariff law which is to go into effect at the same time that the Federal Republic accedes to the General Agreement. The new tariff is almost entirely on an ad valorem rather than a specific basis and is based to a large extent on the model nomenclature rec-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 701.

ommended in 1949 by the European Customs Union Study Group.

The Allied High Commission for Germany will give up some of its powers over German foreign trade when the Federal Republic becomes a contracting party to the General Agreement. On March 7, 1951, the Council of the High Commission promulgated certain changes in the Occupation Statute affecting the reserved powers of the High Commission governing German foreign-trade matters. Under these changes, such powers are to be exercised to the extent necessary to insure, among other things, "the observance by the Federal Republic of the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade until the Federal Republic has become a party to the agreement and has assumed the obligations thereunder."

As was announced on August 1,² the President on that date notified the Secretary of the Treasury that after the close of business on August 31 trade-agreement concessions made by the United States would no longer be applied to the products of various areas, including the Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin.

Many of the U.S. concessions negotiated with the Federal Republic of Germany at Torquay represent the first reductions in U.S. tariffs on the items concerned since the 1930 rates were established. This is by reason of the fact that Germany has generally been the principal or a major supplier of such items and the United States has not previously negotiated with that country.

The products to which concessions negotiated between the United States and the Federal Republic at Torquay will apply are numerous, and represent a very substantial volume of trade.

Summary of Commodities Covered

At Torquay the United States obtained from the Federal Republic concessions on products which, in 1949, were imported into Western Germany from the United States to the value of \$563,907,000, or almost three-fourths of total imports from the United States in that year. The concessions applied to 147 items in the new German tariff law. The postwar import level has been much higher than the prewar level because of the still abnormal economic conditions in Western Germany.

The new German tariff law provides, in general, for duty-free treatment or very low tariff rates on raw materials and partially processed materials for use in further manufacturing. Consequently, many of the concessions negotiated with the United States are bindings of the new duties against future increases. More than four-fifths of the rates in the new tariff law are below 30 percent ad valorem.

The concessions apply to such important commodities as staple foodstuffs, processed fruits and

vegetables, other agricultural and animal products, chemicals, tires, various kinds of machinery and appliances, motor vehicles, and other items.

The German duty on wheat, the largest single import item in 1949, was bound at 20 percent ad valorem. This duty is suspended at present. Corn, another large item, is duty-free. The draft tariff rates on unrendered pig fat, dried milk, and unrefined lard are reduced. Duties were reduced or bound on dried beans and peas, soya beans, and other miscellaneous agricultural products.

Tariff rates were reduced or bound on carbon black, borate compounds, various alcohols and glues, and a large group of disinfecting and insecticidal chemicals. Moderate rates or duty-free treatment for various petroleum products, lumber products, and naval stores were bound. Rates on rubber tires and tubes were reduced. Low rates or duty-free treatment will apply to certain types of goatskin leather and of furs.

Low rates were fixed for metalworking and woodworking machine tools and for various industrial and other machinery and appliances. The tariff on typewriters was reduced by almost one-fourth and low rates were bound for other types of office machines. The tariff on heavy automobiles and trucks was reduced.

In negotiations with other countries, the Federal Republic made concessions on 1350 tariff classifications of which a number are of interest to U. S. exporters who will benefit by the concessions.

U.S. concessions negotiated with the Federal Republic apply to products imported into this country from Germany in 1949 to the value of \$6,853,000 or about one-sixth of the value of all U.S. imports from Germany in that year. In addition, however, the products of the Federal Republic have benefited, under the most-favored-nation principle, by U.S. concessions initially negotiated with other countries at the two previous tariff conferences—at Geneva in 1947 and at Annecy, France, in 1949. It is estimated that these previous concessions apply to 45 percent of U.S. imports from Germany.

The principal dutiable imports from Germany into the United States on which the United States made concessions to the Federal Republic include certain wool yarns, certain types of cameras, decorated china and porcelain, metal drawing instruments, miscellaneous machinery, coal-tar derivatives, toys, clocks and clock movements, and other miscellaneous items.

On decorated china of specified types, formerly dutiable at 10 cents per dozen pieces plus 45 percent ad valorem, the concession rate will be 10 cents per dozen plus 35 percent ad valorem. On mechanical toys the rate of 70 percent ad valorem was reduced to 50 percent, and on other toys the rate was reduced from 70 percent ad valorem to 35 percent.

The U.S. duty on one type of cameras was reduced from 20 percent ad valorem to 15 percent.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291.

Wool yarn is dutiable at compound rates—various specific rates plus 20 percent ad valorem. The ad valorem portion of the rates was reduced to 15 percent and the specific portion left unchanged. The rate on metal drawing instruments was reduced from 45 percent ad valorem to 22½ percent.

In addition, there were reductions in the U.S. rates on dental burs, clocks and clock movements, printing and other machinery, and harmonicas, as well as concessions on miscellaneous items of less importance in trade.

PERU

[Released to the press September 10]

The Department of State has been informed that the Government of Peru, on September 7, 1951, signed the Torquay protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. Under the provisions of the protocol, Peru will become a contracting party to the General Agreement 30 days after signature of the protocol, or on October 7, 1951. Peru thus becomes the second of the countries which negotiated at Torquay for accession to the agreement to become a contracting party. The Federal Republic of Germany signed the protocol on September 1.

The concessions negotiated between the United States and Peru at Torquay cover a much wider scope than did the 1942 bilateral agreement between the two countries, which will be superseded by the General Agreement upon Peru's accession. Also, under the provisions of the agreement, each country will benefit from concessions made by the other country to still other countries as well as by the concessions initially negotiated between them.

Most of the Peruvian concessions initially negotiated with the United States at Torquay consist of the binding of low or moderate rates of duty, although they include also bindings of duty-free treatment and some substantial reductions in tariff rates. These concessions will become effective on October 7 with the accession of Peru to the General Agreement.

These concessions apply to a very wide range of products including certain fresh, canned, and dried fruits; walnuts in the shell; cereals and vegetable preparations; tobacco; hops; powdered milk; certain forest products and naval stores; various textile products; electrical machinery and equipment of many types; office machinery and equipment; a wide variety of automotive, agricultural, and other machinery and equipment; metallic and non-metallic materials and products; leather and rubber products; medicinal and toilet preparations; paints, plastics, and chemicals; and miscellaneous products.

At Torquay the United States initially negotiated concessions on lead and zinc in various forms, and on sugar, jointly with Peru and with other contracting parties which signed the Torquay protocol on April 21, 1951.² These concessions were made effective by the United States on June 7, 1951. Other United States concessions were initially negotiated with Peru at Torquay on vanadium ores; canned bonito and yellow tail; raw cotton; alpaca, llama, and vicuña hair; certain types of hand-woven blankets, carriage robes, and rugs; cube root; tara; and cochineal. The concessions on these latter products will be put into effect by the United States on October 7.

Consideration of U.S.-Japan Cultural Relations

[Released to the press September 12]

John Foster Dulles, special representative of the President for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, expressed his deep appreciation today for the service rendered by John D. Rockefeller, 3d, who accompanied the Dulles mission to Japan last January and February to advise on ways to promote cultural cooperation between Japan and the United States. Mr. Rockefeller has made available to the Department his thoughtful analysis of the cultural-relations problems, which should prove a definite contribution toward the building of the peace.

The long-range objectives in cultural interchange between the United States and Japan, in Mr. Rockefeller's opinion, would appear to be threefold: to bring the two peoples closer together in their appreciation and understanding of each other and their respective ways of life, to enrich their respective cultures through such interchange, and to assist each other in solving mutual problems. To this end, ways should be found to allow each country to benefit from the experiences and accomplishments of the other through a free and voluntary interchange of ideas and information.

The ways and means to implement these objectives will be significant only if they are based upon and grow out of real needs and desires, actually felt and expressed. Only in this context, Mr. Rockefeller pointed out, can any cultural endeavor be lasting. It should never be allowed to become unilateral but rather should be considered as a "two-way street."

While many of Mr. Rockefeller's observations concerned means and methods whereby the Japanese might draw upon the culture of the United States, he emphasized that at no time should we

² BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 701.

forget the equal importance of enabling the people of our country to draw upon the culture of the Japanese. The initiative of the Japanese in the development of this end of the program will be an important factor, but there should be imaginative thinking and planning in the United States to develop ways and means to achieve this goal.

Similarly, Mr. Rockefeller noted that we should make known to the Japanese the true range and character of our own artistic and intellectual resources, which have been derived in part from our great heritage of western European culture. At present, knowledge among the Japanese of the culture of the United States in its nonmaterial aspects is limited, while materialistic aspects have exerted a disproportionate influence.

Mr. Rockefeller pointed out that many Japanese are concerned about being abandoned by the United States should the world situation become more serious. Hence, he felt that tangible evidence of continuing United States interest in Japan is desirable. In this connection, he suggested that cultural and student centers might have special value.

He suggested that further talks and joint planning with the Japanese should be initiated as promptly as possible, and should reflect the best thinking in both our countries. Success will obviously depend on the closest possible working relationship between Americans and Japanese. Original thinking and flexibility will be required, and in every activity of cultural interchange quality rather than mere quantity should be regarded as paramount. There are a great many possibilities for such interchange, but Mr. Rockefeller noted that there will be definite limitations on the number of qualified persons and the funds available. Such funds and personnel must be expended selectively and in sufficient concentration on those activities which are determined to be of first importance.

Mr. Rockefeller stressed that cultural relations between Japan and the United States should be regarded as an aspect of the broader development of cultural relations among all of the countries of the free world. In his opinion, this will be particularly true from the point of view of the Japanese, who are most anxious to reestablish their country as a member of the family of free nations. We should, therefore, welcome and encourage the fullest possible cultural interchange between Japan and all such nations as well as our own.

Similarly, the cultural relations of the United States with countries other than Japan must also be borne in mind. Interchange with the Japanese should be considered in its relation to similar activities of the United States in other areas. Unusual opportunities exist for developing a substantial interchange with Japan. Mr. Rockefeller hopes that, as this materializes, it will prove to have value in the planning for cultural exchanges

between the United States and other countries, especially in the Pacific area.

Finally, he pointed out that it must be borne in mind that cultural interchange alone will not bring sound and stable relations between Japan and the United States or other nations. It is the sum total of policies and actions in the economic, political, and cultural fields which will determine the long-range relationships between our two countries and between Japan and the rest of the world.

Mr. Rockefeller's specific suggestions in regard to the development of Japan-United States cultural relations are now under study in the Department of State, and steps will be taken in the near future looking forward to the implementation of many of his suggestions in order to insure the development of mutually beneficial cultural-relations activities, based upon maximum cooperation between various interested groups in both the United States and Japan.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2164. Pub. 4085. 38 pp. 15¢.

Protocol, with annex, between the United States and Other Governments. Amending agreement of May 4, 1910. Opened for signature at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States July 6, 1950. Ratified by the President of the United States August 7, 1950. Instrument of Ratification of the United States deposited with the United Nations August 14, 1950; entered into force with respect to the United States August 14, 1950.

Cooperative Agricultural Program in Peru. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2161. Pub. 4084. 21 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Effected by exchange of notes signed at Lima September 15 and 21, 1950; entered into force September 22, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Economic Cooperation with Thailand. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2170. Pub. 4096. 21 pp. 10¢.

Agreement with annex, and exchange of notes between the United States and Thailand—Signed at Bangkok September 19, 1950; entered into force September 19, 1950.

United States Air Force Mission to Cuba. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2166. Pub. 4092. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Signed at Washington December 22, 1950; entered into force December 22, 1950.

(Continued on p. 509)

U. S., Australia, New Zealand Sign Tripartite Security Pact

The following statements were made at the signing of the Tripartite Security Treaty at San Francisco on September 1, 1951.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ACHESON

The treaty which we are signing today¹ is a statement of the intense effort and devotion with which the free peoples of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States maintain their constant guard for freedom. It affirms the well-established principle that the security of an individual nation is inevitably bound to the security of its partners in the free world; that our common desire for peace is coupled with a strong resolve to resist aggression.

The treaty formally binds our peoples together in new ties of friendship and cooperation.

I have said "new" ties. Actually, these ties are not new. They have been created, growing stronger, with each year, over a long period of time. Only this treaty—the Tripartite Security Pact—is new. And it only puts into words strong ties and purposes already in existence.

This pact is in complete conformity with the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Together with the United States-Philippines mutual-defense treaty and the post-treaty arrangements between the United States and Japan we hope to make it the basis for peace in the Pacific.

Toward the day when that peace will be assured, all our hopes are turned.

STATEMENT BY SIR CARL BERENDSEN NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR TO U. S.

I sign this treaty on behalf of my country with a deep sense of the privilege that is mine and with a firm confidence of real and lasting achievement. We in New Zealand are not of those who ask what we are not prepared to give; we are not of those

who demand help which we are not prepared to accord; we are not of those who are content to leave to others burdens which we should ourselves assume. In our short history we have always been ready to give what we have been ready to ask. Man for man we have played, and are playing, our full part—sometimes, in legitimate pride, we think more than our full part—in those great struggles of our time which have called for the cooperation of all right-thinking peoples. And the pact we sign today is one of cooperation, a joint offer and assurance of aid, ready and immediate, should aid be needed. In this treaty the three signatories accept the same, and a common, duty. It is not a guaranty of the security of New Zealand by the United States and Australia, of Australia by the United States and New Zealand, of the United States by Australia and New Zealand. It is a common undertaking to regard a danger to one as a danger to all, a common assumption of a formal duty—the same identical duty—by each of the three parties. It is a reaffirmation that these three countries, which have fought together in two great wars, have established a true and lasting comradeship and good will and a common trust and confidence. And it is more than a pious and friendly expression of such sentiments.

Each of the parties has proved not only its fidelity to its pledged word by its ability and its determination, if and when the dread need arises, to turn from words to acts, and to prove, by its courage and its resolution, its ability to fight, when fight it must, to preserve its liberty and its way of life. In this treaty the three parties serve notice, clear and unequivocal, that, in the words of the treaty itself, "no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific area."

The treaty therefore rests upon the solid basis of common interests and ideals, upon their common desire for peace and upon their common determination to resist aggression. It reflects also the inescapable facts of geography on the one hand and, on the other, the especial perils to which the Pacific may be exposed in the course of this worldwide conflict between liberty and slavery with which the whole of mankind is today oppressed.

¹ The treaty was signed for the United States by John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary, and Senators John J. Sparkman and Alexander Wiley, as well as by Secretary Acheson. For text of the treaty see BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, page 148.

And the reassurance which this treaty affords us enables us to approach, with an easier mind and a fuller confidence, the task that lies before us next week—the completion of a Treaty of Peace With Japan: A treaty of generosity, of forbearance, of reconciliation, and of renewed hope for the future.

Nor is the treaty isolationist in its nature. We in New Zealand have no reason to fear any suggestion, malevolent or ignorant, of selfish or isolationist intentions. Our history—the history of two world wars and New Zealand's armed and active participation all over the world in those causes which we have believed to be just, is the answer. We believe, and our acts and our policies have implemented that belief, that a true democracy must be willing to serve wherever democracy needs to be defended.

And accordingly this treaty does not restrict itself to its parties alone; it contemplates close and constant consultation with others of like interests or in like peril. By creating an area of stability in the Pacific this treaty may be expected to reduce world tension and thus to prove a reinforcement of, and a contribution to, the general system of international security which is today slowly—but we hope surely—being erected. By providing directly a strong measure of defense against attack in the Pacific it does at the same time, in so doing, make it possible for its parties to play their part elsewhere; because the problem that the free world is facing today is a global problem. It is merely the manifestations of that problem which may, from time to time, appear to be local.

And finally the treaty has no effect whatsoever unless and until one of its parties is attacked. It is purely and solely a measure of self-protection against the perils with which today all freedom-loving countries are menaced. It is defensive in purpose and in effect, a threat to no one and no country, the wide world over.

While in its explicit terms it is primarily a reassurance, an affirmation, an undertaking that in case of need none of its parties will stand alone, in its potential effects it might prove of even greater, perhaps of decisive, importance. The notice that is served today upon any evil-doer might, indeed, have the effect of eliminating for all time that very aggression which alone can bring this treaty into practical application. There lies our hope and our belief.

From this and every other point of view the treaty is clearly, demonstrably, and entirely in conformity with the aims and the principles of the United Nations and with the hopes and ideals of people of good will everywhere.

Today we sign this treaty, which offers such great hope to all of us, here in the Presidio, a center of great historical significance, the repository of a wealth of memories, of something which, if God pleases, we will find to be good and prove

to be enduring. Here at the Golden Gate we sign today a beneficial pact which, I believe, may itself open a golden portal to the peace, prosperity, and happiness of the Pacific and of the future that lies before us.

**STATEMENT BY PERCY C. SPENDER
AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO U. S.**

Today's ceremony is an occasion of great historical significance not only for my country and New Zealand, but as well to the United States of America. The treaty about to be signed on behalf of the three countries expresses in formal language the close ties of fellowship, understanding, and comradeship between us. But it does much more than that. It marks the first step in the building of the ramparts of freedom in the vast and increasingly important area of the Pacific Ocean. This day we here and now declare to the world that our three peoples share a common destiny. We publicly proclaim our intention and determination that that destiny shall be that we endure as free peoples and that we with other free peoples shall so labour that liberty shall not perish from the earth.

Let it be said clearly and in unmistakable language that this treaty is directed against no nation. It is conceived not in hostility against anyone but in a devout dedication to the cause of peace. We are saddened by the great disharmony which more and more is dividing the world into two armed camps. We recognize only too well the dangers inherent in that division. We will constantly labour to reduce the unhappy tension which today plagues mankind. We will seek by whatever means are open to us to bring health into international relationships where today there is so much sickness. We fervently believe that, given the will on the part of all nations, there is no barrier which prevents the peoples of the world living in peace together and settling their disputes and differences by peaceful means. But since we shut our eyes to the world realities, only at our peril, we—the nations of the United States of America, New Zealand, and Australia—announce to the world that if any nation, no matter who that nation may be, engages in aggression against any one of us, we will stand fast together and in accordance with our respective constitutional processes act together to repel that aggression. This treaty is accordingly an instrument not of offense but of defense. It is a pact for peace.

Australia is a nation of peace. It has never sought to interfere—nor will it ever—in the affairs of other nations. But it is equally determined that other nations shall not interfere in its affairs. It covets not the possessions of other peoples. But it prizes above all other things the great freedoms for which over many years men and women have struggled to achieve and to hold—freedom to wor-

ship, freedom to work and live together without fear of aggression from without or tyranny from within, freedom to associate peacefully for social progress, remedying of injustices, and, for improving the lot of the underprivileged, freedom to strive for that form of society which will best secure and preserve for them constitutional liberty, social justice, and equality before the law. And such is our dedication to these principles that there is no effort we will spare that they may not be imperiled.

Twice in our short history, twice in less than 40 years, Australians have crossed the oceans of the earth to fight against despotic power seeking to destroy these freedoms and to impose its will upon the rest of the peoples of the world. Twice the men and women of New Zealand, United States of America, and Australia have fought together with our kinsmen within the British Commonwealth and others against the forces of aggression. Twice in that short time we have witnessed the awful toll of human life and terrible devastation of war. Twice in the end we have prevailed after bitter bloodshed, suffering, and sacrifice, but only to find that tyranny like a foul and loathsome disease stopped in one place breaks out in another. What a load would be lifted from the body and spirit of men and women everywhere in the world if we knew with certainty that all nations not only could, but would, work for mankind in peace. But we have learned through bitter experience that freedom and constant vigilance are inseparable companions. We labour for peace, and because we labour for peace we must be prepared to meet aggression no matter whence it may come or wherever it may strike. There is no other way.

The waters of the Pacific Ocean which we may see from here wash the shores of many nations. They spill over on to the shores of the new nations of South and Southeast Asia, with whom it is Australia's special purpose and desire, as is in part evidenced by the Colombo Plan for Economic Aid, to work in sympathy and understanding. Its seas thunder on the golden beaches and the rocky cliffs of my own beloved country. They stretch over a vast area of the surface of the globe.

The history of mankind has been largely determined by the influence of oceans. Modern civilization had its beginnings in a Mediterranean epoch. It developed in an Atlantic period. It is now entering the Pacific era. It is no exaggeration to say that here in this ocean will take place great historical events which will determine not only the destinies of western civilization but of free men and women throughout the world.

This treaty, directed to regional security in the Pacific, fashioned within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, and dedicated to its high and noble purposes, takes the first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening system of peaceful security in the vital area. In this sense particularly Australia welcomes the

conclusion of a similar security treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines.

With a proper sense of the great honor that now falls to my lot and in deep humility asking the blessing of Almighty God upon this undertaking, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Australia and of my countrymen, I attach my signature to this treaty.

Economic Treaty With Ethiopia Signed

[Released to the press September 7]

A treaty of amity and economic relations between the United States and Ethiopia was signed today at Addis Ababa. Ambassador J. Rives Childs signed on behalf of this Government. The treaty is subject to ratification by both Governments before it can become effective.

This is the second treaty dealing chiefly with general economic relations to be concluded by the two Governments. The first, a somewhat less comprehensive treaty of commerce, was signed in 1914.

The new treaty establishes a set of principles to govern basic economic relations between the United States and Ethiopia and to direct the future development of those relations along mutually beneficial lines. In large measure it covers, in condensed form, the same wide range of subject matter as the various other treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation which the United States has entered into in recent years. Like them, it contains provisions relating to basic personal freedom, guarantees for property rights, rights to engage in business, taxation, exchange regulations, the treatment of imports and exports, and other matters affecting the status and activities of citizens and enterprises of one country within the territories of the other. However, provisions setting forth in general terms the treatment to be accorded to diplomatic and consular officers have been added. With the inclusion of these latter provisions, this treaty, while shorter than others recently concluded, actually is broader in scope than any other of this general kind concluded by the United States since the end of World War II.

This treaty affirms the friendly and cooperative spirit that prevails in relations between the two countries and its broad and liberal provisions offer a practical example of how like-minded countries may act in concert for their own and for the general good.

The text of the treaty will be made public as soon as possible.

Export-Import Bank Grants of Credit

STEEL AND NITROGEN PRODUCTION IN SPAIN

[Released to the press by the Export-Import Bank August 10]

A credit of up to 6 million dollars for the development of nitrogenous fertilizer and steel production in Spain has been granted on the basis of the authorization in chapter XI, title I, of the General Appropriation Act of 1951. This brings the total credits to Spain granted by the Export-Import Bank with the approval of the Economic Cooperation Administrator under the authorization to \$42,049,713.

The new credit is established in favor of Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, an entirely private enterprise organized in 1902 and the largest producer of both steel and nitrogenous fertilizer in Spain.

Previous credits have been granted with a view to aiding an increase of agricultural production, so as to render Spain independent of imported foodstuffs and to raise her foreign exchange earnings through additional export of agricultural products. Three separate credits have already been authorized for this purpose: 3.5 million dollars for the importation of nitrogenous fertilizer; 3 million dollars for the purchase of tractors and tractor parts; and 700 thousand dollars for the completion of a nitrogenous fertilizer plant of Sociedad Iberica del Nitrogeno.

A principal factor in the low productivity of Spanish agricultural output has been the lack of nitrogenous fertilizer. Spanish production of such fertilizers is still a fraction of its minimum requirements. It is expected that the credits designed to increase the production of nitrogenous fertilizer in Spain will augment the supply of this indispensable material to Spain and at the same time conserve foreign exchange hitherto used for the purpose of importing fertilizer.

Spain has likewise experienced a shortage of steel and steel products which continue to remain under strict allocation. Spain has a well established though relatively small iron and steel industry. This industry's output of steel ingots in 1950 totaled 775,000 tons, as compared to approximately a million tons in 1929.

The beneficiary of the new credit, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, has both steel and nitrogenous fer-

tilizer plants on the Atlantic Coast on the Bay of Biscay and on the Mediterranean Coast near Valencia. The credit of 6 million dollars is to be used to expand the facilities of the Mediterranean plant, which is Spain's most modern steel plant. It was designed by an American engineer and started operations in 1925. The expansion in the facilities to be financed under the credit is expected to lead to a net increase in the production of ammonium sulphate of some 60 thousand tons, and in steel of approximately 100 thousand tons.

The terms of the present credit are identical with those of the preceding credits authorized in favor of Spain. The credit is to bear interest at 3 percent per annum payable semiannually, the principal to be repaid in 20 years following a period of grace of 5 years and the credit is to be unconditionally guaranteed by the Spanish Government.

ACQUISITION AND TRANSPORTATION OF U.S. MACHINERY TO CHILE

[Released to the press by the Export-Import Bank August 11]

The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington today announced the authorization of a credit of 10 million dollars to the Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion, Chile. The financing is to assist in the acquisition and transportation to Chile of United States machinery, equipment, supplies, and services required in connection with the expansion of the steel mill facilities at Huachipato of the Cia. de Acero del Pacifico. The credit, bearing interest at 4 percent per annum, is to be repaid over a period of 20 years and will carry the guarantee of the Government of Chile.

Under agreements with the Export-Import Bank, a total line of credit of 48 million dollars has previously been extended to Fomento to assist the steel company in connection with purchases in the United States for the construction of the integrated steel mill now in operation near Concepcion, Chile. The mill was completed in August 1950

with the assistance of the Koppers Company, Freyn Engineering, H. A. Brassert, and others, and today has a steel ingot capacity of about 100,000 tons annually. The plant is now operating at capacity.

The expansion program is designed to round out the operation and improve efficiency. It will increase steel ingot capacity to approximately 280,000 tons by the erection of an additional open hearth furnace and the erection of additional rolling and handling facilities to raise the finished steel product potential from 185,000 tons to about 14,000 tons. The completed project will provide a very high proportion of domestic steel requirements and, it is expected, will stimulate the growth of new industries and improve the dollar balance of payments of Chile through savings in foreign exchange and exchange earnings from export markets.

The Board of Directors also authorized a second credit of \$1,150,000 to Fomento. This will be used for the expansion of the ferro-alloy facilities of Fabrica Nacional de Carburo y Metalurgia, S. A. This last company has been producing calcium carbide since 1936 and went into the production of ferro-manganese during the last war. Since 1946 the company has been exporting sizable quantities of ferro-alloys to foreign markets. Due to the establishment of the steel mill at Huachipato, the domestic as well as the foreign market requirements have increased to such an extent as to justify expansion. This credit will bear interest at the rate of 4 percent and will be amortized over a period of 5 years.

REHABILITATION OF MEXICAN RAILWAYS

[Released to the press by the Export-Import Bank August 13]

The Export-Import Bank of Washington announced today the granting of two credits which are expected to contribute a powerful stimulus toward the major rehabilitation of the railways of Mexico. The credits are in favor of Nacional Financiera, S. A., and form a part of an earmark of 150 million dollars authorized by the Bank on August 31, 1950.

The first of the two is for 51 million dollars, to be devoted to the improvement of the National Railways of Mexico, all of the amount to be for materials, equipment, and services which are to be purchased in the United States. The second credit, in the amount of 5 million dollars, is to be utilized in the rehabilitation program of the Ferrocarril Mexicano.

A comprehensive program for the improvement of the railways of Mexico is already under way, having been instituted under the administration of President Aleman. It embraces improvement and broadening of roadbeds, ballasting, laying of

new rail on large sections of the lines, the addition of new machinery to shops and the improvement of shop practice, and the addition of much new motive power and rolling stock.

While the present total of the two credits is 56 million dollars, it is expected that it may be increased as further surveys of the needs of the railways' lines are completed.

The National Railways of Mexico, which is the recipient of the larger of the new credits, that of 51 million dollars, operates trackage of more than 8,000 miles, covering all of Mexico from the United States border on the north to the Guatemalan border on the south. While the National Railways of Mexico operates mainly standard gauge lines, there are many miles of narrow gauge track, a portion of which is to be broadened to standard gauge as part of the improvement program.

The Ferrocarril Mexicano, operating between Mexico City and Vera Cruz, has a total mileage of approximately 560 miles, of which some 113 miles consist of narrow gauge branch lines.

Both credits will bear interest at the rate of 3½ percent per annum payable semiannually and will be amortized in 20 approximately equal semi-annual installments, the first of which is to be due and payable June 22, 1954.

The authorization of these two credits brings the total authorized under the 150 million dollars earmark to 92 million dollars. Previously the Bank had authorized credits designed to assist in financing three projects associated with Mexico's irrigation program and a project for the expansion of a steel mill at Monclova, Mexico.

The execution of the physical rehabilitation program of the National Railways of Mexico is regarded as essential if transportation is not to prove a bottleneck in the general economic development of Mexico. Over and above the Export-Import Bank credit, the National Railways estimated that it will be required to spend the equivalent of approximately 19 million dollars to carry out the rehabilitation program on which the equivalent of about \$67,500,000 has already been spent. Previous Export-Import Bank credits amounting to \$38,900,000 were granted for this purpose. The bulk of the remainder of the investment was provided by the Mexican Government.

Other forms of transportation—particularly that by highway—are assuming an increasing and apparently uneconomic share of the burden of carrying Mexican freight and passengers. Improvement of the railroad system is expected to relieve the highways of a substantial volume of traffic which can be more economically moved by rail and to provide additional traffic capacity to meet an anticipated increase of 25 percent in freight and passenger traffic.

More than half of the new credit is to be devoted to the purchase of rail accessories and track machinery. The remainder will be used for the

purchase in the United States of additional locomotives, passenger coaches, shop and signaling equipment.

The credit to the Ferrocarril Mexicano will be used principally for track materials for the rebuilding of the line between Vera Cruz and Mexico City in anticipation by the railway of a substantial traffic increase due to the rapid development now taking place in southeastern Mexico. In addition to the track materials, a small portion of the credit will be used for shop equipment and supplementary motive power to relieve the bottleneck on the mountainous portion of the railroad near Orizaba.

The finalization of the two credits is the result of the joint study carried on by the Mexican Railway Administration and the Export-Import Bank. Those participating in the study on behalf of the Bank included Edward S. Lynch, economist specializing in transportation problems; Robert L. Moorman, engineer, and two men employed by the Bank from the railway industry of the United States. These were Herman D. Knecht, district engineer, Southeastern Division of the Missouri-Pacific Railroad, and E. Ross Hanna, master mechanic, associated with Mr. Knecht on the M. P., the services of both of whom were made available to the Bank through the cooperation of H. M. Johnson, executive assistant, Missouri-Pacific Railroad.

A part of the plan of the administrators of the Mexican Railways, under President Aleman, is to enlist the cooperation of the railway employees in improving the service on the railroads as better track and equipment make this possible.

United Nations Day, 1951¹

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the Charter of the United Nations, which came into operation on October 24, 1945, was designed as a firm foundation on which men of good will might build a world of peace and security; and

WHEREAS most of the members of the United Nations have cooperated faithfully in the effort to build such a world on the basis of the Charter; and

WHEREAS the United Nations has been engaged in the greatest effort ever made by an international organization to restore peace and security in an area of conflict; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly of the United Nations, by its resolution of October 31, 1947, declared that October 24 of each year, the anniversary of the coming into force of the Charter, should be dedicated to the dissemination of information concerning the aims and accomplishments of the United Nations, with a view to enlisting the interest and cooperation of all humanity:


Now, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby urge the citizens of this Nation to observe Wednesday, October 24, 1951, as United Nations Day, remembering that the anniversary commemorates a landmark in the history of the human race, and that its significance should be cherished in our hearts.

¹ Proc. 2944, 16 *Fed. Reg.* 9295.

I also call upon the officials of the Federal, State, and local Governments, representatives of civic, educational, and religious organizations, and agencies of the press, radio, television, motion pictures, and other media of public information, to cooperate in arranging for ceremonies and programs on United Nations Day, designed to acquaint our citizens with the activities of the United Nations, to the end that we may forward the work of this great international partnership.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set by hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twelfth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and fifty-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.



By the President:
DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Mutual Security Act of 1951. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 5113. A bill to maintain the security and promote the foreign policy and provide for the general welfare of the United States by furnishing assistance to friendly nations in the interest of international peace and security. H. Rept. 872, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 99 pp.

Providing for the Unity of Ireland. H. Rept. 875, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. Res. 82] 2 pp.

Suspension of Deportation of Certain Aliens. H. Rept. 882, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 40] 2 pp.

Improving and Strengthening Foreign Agricultural Relations, Report of the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, first session, pursuant to H. Res. 112 (81st Cong., 1st sess.), H. Res. 99 (82d Cong., 1st sess.) Resolutions authorizing investigations by the Committee on Agriculture, H. Rept. 966, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 7 pp.

Recommendation for a Contribution by the United States to the International Children's Emergency Fund. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting recommendations for a contribution of \$12,000,000 by the United States to the International Children's Emergency Fund. H. Doc. 225, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 2 pp.

Reaffirming the Friendship of the American People for all Other Peoples, Including the Peoples of the Soviet Union. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report relative to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 11, reaffirming the friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union. H. Doc. 229, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 9 pp.

The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1952. Basic data supplied by the Executive Branch. [Committee Print] 82d Cong., 1st sess. 78 pp.

Conveying Hospital Equipment and Making Grants-in-Aid to the Republic of the Philippines for Philippine Scouts. S. Rept. 655, 82d Cong., 1st sess. [To accompany H. R. 1216] 6 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Financial Institutions Geared for Peace

Address by the President¹

I am very happy to welcome you to Washington again. A great deal has happened since your last meeting here in 1949. The free nations of the world have joined together in a great cooperative effort to protect themselves against aggression. I am sorry to say much of our energy must now be given to the task of building up military defenses for the free world.

Nevertheless, the tasks of the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund are as important as they ever were.

World peace and security are not merely matters of military defense. It is just as necessary and just as important to have a firm economic foundation on which the structure of peace can rest.

The two institutions that are meeting here today were created in recognition of that fact. They were started even before the end of World War II, and in fact, before the United Nations was organized in San Francisco.

But these financial institutions are part and parcel of the same great effort as the United Nations—the effort to attain peace in the world. They are responsible for an essential part of the work that many countries must do to secure the peace and to make the world a better place in which to live.

The major purpose of the International Monetary Fund is to help the growth of a vigorous system of world trade. In carrying out this purpose, the Fund tries to reduce restrictions on foreign exchange that stifle world trade.

This job obviously will be more difficult because

of the special economic problems created by the defense programs of the free nations. But all of us now recognize the principle that each member country has a legitimate and vital interest in the exchange rates and policies of every other member country.

I am sure, therefore, that none of the countries which are members of the Fund will use the present difficulties to justify restrictions on trade and exchange which are not actually needed to further the program of mutual defense.

The International Bank has now been in existence for more than 5 years. Last year, in spite of international tension and uncertainty, it loaned almost twice as much money as it had the year before. Virtually all these loans were made to economically underdeveloped countries. They are loans which will help to make these countries stronger and more prosperous.

I am glad to see that nearly half the money loaned by the Bank for developmental purposes has been loaned for the expansion of electric-power production. Cheap electric power is one of the greatest needs of many of the underdeveloped countries. It will do wonders in opening up new opportunities for their people.

The Bank has also made major loans for such basic improvements as new roads, railroads, the construction of port facilities, increasing agricultural production, and the expansion of telephone and telegraph lines. Such projects as these are the foundation stones of a long-range program of economic development. I hope that the Bank will continue to go ahead with projects of this kind.

The defense program of the free nations will create some difficulties. There will be shortages of certain capital goods. But we must not

¹ Made before a joint meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Monetary Fund at Washington on September 10 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

slacken our efforts to create new sources of wealth and thereby to bring about higher standards of living in the economically underdeveloped areas. The cause of freedom to which we are dedicated will not permit us to fall behind in this effort.

The economic resources of the free nations, taken together, are sufficient to provide both military security and economic progress.

As we move forward with our defense effort, we should also do everything possible to increase the prosperity and raise the living standards of the free nations. We should remember that this is

one of the greatest positive goals of the United Nations.

We have not joined together for purely defense purposes. We are not an association for preserving things as they are. Our great objectives are to secure peace and to create better lives for all of the peoples of the world. Our faith is that free men, working together, can attain these objectives.

I sincerely hope that you will have a successful meeting and make great advances in the year ahead.

U.N. Action on Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons

by George L. Warren

In accordance with the General Assembly's resolution 429 (V) of December 14, 1950, a conference of plenipotentiaries convened at Geneva on July 2, 1951. The main item of business was to complete the drafting of and to sign both the convention relating to the status of refugees and the protocol relating to the status of stateless persons. The General Assembly instructed the Secretary-General to invite the governments of all states, both members and nonmembers of the United Nations, to attend the conference.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, established by the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc) under resolution 248 (B) (IX) of August 8, 1949, had prepared drafts of the convention and the protocol which Ecosoc submitted to the General Assembly. In resolution 429 (V), the General Assembly recommended that the governments participating in the conference take into consideration the Ecosoc drafts and the text of the definition of the term "refugee" as set forth in the annex to the Ecosoc resolution.

Of the approximately 80 governments that were invited to participate in the conference, the following 26 governments were represented: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.¹

It is to be noted that the conference membership included governments of countries of initial

and secondary asylum for refugees in Europe and governments of countries of final destination overseas.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart, participated in the conference without the right to vote. The Council of Europe, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the International Refugee Organization (IRO) were represented, as were also the International Federation of Free Trade Unions and a number of nongovernmental organizations.

Knud Larsen, representative of Denmark, who had previously served as chairman at the second session of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, was elected President of the conference. A. Herment of Belgium and Tilas Miras of Turkey were elected Vice Presidents. The United States representative served as chairman of the Style Committee, which edited and prepared the final text of the convention. The meetings of the conference were held in public.

The conference, after dealing with over 100 tabled amendments to the draft convention relating to the status of refugees and many others advanced verbally on the floor, adopted a final text on July 25, 1951, which was opened for signature by governments at the Palais des Nations on July 28, 1951. The document remained open for signature at Geneva until August 31, 1951, and will remain open for signature at the permanent headquarters of the United Nations at New York from September 17, 1951, to December 31, 1952. The following 13 governments had signed the convention *ad referendum* by August 7, 1951: Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Israel, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,

¹ On learning from the representative of the U.N. Secretariat that the Holy See had not previously been invited to participate, the conference unanimously asked the Holy See to send a representative. Cuba and Iran were represented by observers.

Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

Having considered the draft protocol relating to the status of stateless persons, the conference decided that the question of stateless persons required further study and referred the draft protocol to the appropriate organs of the United Nations for later consideration. The final act of the conference included certain recommendations concerning the protection of the unity of the family of refugees and the issue of travel documents, not considered suitable for inclusion in the convention.

The most serious difference of views that developed in the conference arose in connection with the adoption of article 1 of the convention on the definition of refugees. Some governments desired a broad definition without restriction as to places of origin of the refugees or as to the time when persons entered the refugee state. Other governments favored a definition of refugees restricted to those whose status arose out of events in Europe occurring prior to January 1, 1951. The United Kingdom representative took leadership in supporting the broader, so-called universal definition, and he had the support of the Benelux and Scandinavian countries. France gave leadership to those countries which preferred to restrict the obligations to be undertaken under the convention to refugees whose status arose out of political events in Europe prior to January 1, 1951. The United States representative supported the French position on the grounds that governments would need to know precisely for what refugees they were to undertake commitments and that a very general definition would prove confusing and operate eventually to reduce the number of governments which might adhere to the convention.

Both positions were vigorously defended, and the conference, after finding itself equally divided on the issue, was able to resolve the difficulty only by offering the governments considering adherence to the convention a choice at the time of adherence of one or the other definition.

Those governments which supported the adoption of the broader definition expressed the view that the convention should establish standards of treatment for refugees of all categories of whatever origin in time or place to be applied by all governments universally. The opposing view was that governments in undertaking the commitments set down in the convention would need to know precisely for what refugees and in what numbers obligations were to be assumed. It was argued further that the convention in fact was drafted precisely to fit European requirements as distinguished from those of countries of immigration in the Western Hemisphere and countries in Asia and the Far East. To those representatives who supported the limited definition of refugees, it appeared inconsistent to attempt to secure universal coverage in article 1 of the convention while

providing at the same time in later articles for prescriptions of treatment applicable in substance only in European countries where rights and privileges of resident aliens depend upon a system of reciprocity. Representatives of overseas countries made particular efforts to amend different articles of the convention to adapt them more suitably to the laws and practices of those countries. Representatives of European governments who found it necessary to secure in the convention precise texts suited especially to conditions in European countries vigorously opposed such efforts.

The United States representative advised the conference early in its proceedings that the United States would possibly not sign the convention because it was drafted primarily to establish the status of refugees in European countries where rights and privileges accorded to aliens are based on the system of reciprocity. He pointed out that in consequence the convention was not well adapted to United States laws and practices, under which refugees already receive rights shared by all other legally admitted aliens and, except in special instances, are in effect assimilated in status to that of citizens. Little, therefore, would be gained for refugees by United States adherence to the convention. He pointed out, however, that the United States Government had an interest in assisting in every way possible to secure broad adherence to the convention, particularly on the part of European states, because the legal establishment of rights and privileges for refugees under the convention would regularize the position of refugees and thus contribute to peace and order in areas in which large numbers of refugees reside. The convention would provide those minimum rights and privileges for refugees which will enable them to achieve self-maintenance and to lead satisfying lives in countries in which they presently lack a legal status.

Frequently, representatives of European governments expressed the view that overseas countries of immigration are in a favored position with respect to the burdens assumed in the resolution of the refugee problem. Removed by distance from areas where refugees originate, they are in a better position to pursue selective policies in receiving refugees than those countries of initial and secondary asylum which must often receive refugees, because of their geographical position, on humanitarian grounds without regard to compliance with immigration laws and regulations. The refusal by the representatives of overseas countries to accept contractual obligations under the convention to relieve countries of first and secondary asylum of refugees accepted in large numbers under these conditions intensified the sense of unbalance which the European countries were anxious to redress. They were unable, however, to find an acceptable formula for such provisions in the convention.

This sense of uneven distribution of burdens

between European countries and countries of final destination overseas also found expression in the discussions on the adoption of the federal-state clause in the convention. To the European states, the federal-state clause appeared to give federal states, mostly overseas countries, rights of reservation with respect to many articles of the convention not available to European states. This difficulty arose from the fact that obligations under certain articles of the convention fall within the competence of the local states of federal states which may or may not take action in consonance with the provisions of the convention. Consequently the adherence of federal states to the convention was considered to involve lesser obligations than those accepted by adhering unitary states. A lively discussion preceded the adoption of the federal-state clause, in view of the fact that the convention relating to the status of refugees is the first convention opened for signature under the auspices of the United Nations to contain such a clause.

In the main, changes in the original draft of the convention adopted by the conference provided wider latitude and discretion to contracting states in withholding the benefits of the convention from particular refugees whose presence and conduct on their territories raised serious questions of national security and public order. Representatives of the nongovernmental organizations present at the conference opposed these changes vigorously and expressed the view that the final draft of the convention was, in consequence, less liberal than the one that Ecosoc originally recommended. The representatives of governments,

however, were unanimous in their conviction that the contracting states should reserve freedom of action and discretion in withholding benefits of the convention from certain refugees presenting problems involving national security.

On balance, the final text of the convention adopted by the conference is a more finished document than the Ecosoc draft. Many of the articles were redrafted to achieve greater clarity, and in general the text appeared to meet the requirements of the European governments with the exception of France and Italy, whose representatives indicated that their Governments would not be in a position to adhere to the convention. These two Governments have comparatively large numbers of refugees in their territory and, for different reasons, are reluctant to accept the obligations set down in the convention. Nonetheless, the hospitality which France and Italy have accorded to refugees in the past suggests the possibility that the treatment which these Governments will accord unilaterally in the future will approximate the standards set down in the convention. The Governments of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany indicated that eventually they would adhere to the convention. The fact that the Benelux and Scandinavian countries have signed the convention justifies the hope that most European states will eventually adhere.

● *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was United States representative to the conference of plenipotentiaries.*

U.S. Proposes New Convention for Freedom of Information

by Walter M. Kotschnig

U.S. Deputy Representative in ECOSOC¹

Freedom of information is the cornerstone of all freedoms. Without it no enlightened citizenry is possible. Without it, sooner or later, tyranny of the few takes the place of constitutional rule, of the rule of the people, by the people, and for the people. In 1765, William Blackstone in his commentaries on the laws of England wrote "the liberty of the press is essential to the nature of a free state." Some 20 years later, Thomas Jefferson in a letter to James Currie wrote "our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be

limited without being lost." In 1940 Wendell L. Wilkie, in a letter to W. N. Hardy, stated that "freedom of the press is the staff of life for any vital democracy."

Lest the Communist spokesmen in this Council accuse me again of simply being a mouthpiece of "capitalist monopolists," of "war mongers," and "imperialists," I should like to add one further quotation from an unexpected source. In the forties of the last century, Karl Marx published a paper on the freedom of the press, a paper which has retained its validity to this very day. "The free press," and I am now quoting from the 'Holy Script' of our Communist colleagues, "the free press is the embodied confidence of a nation in

¹Made before the Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on Aug. 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

itself, the talking tape that ties the individual to the state and the world. It is the unrestrained confession of a people, and confession, as is well known, has power of redemption." Marx admitted that the free press has its shortcomings. Why, he asks, should the free press be perfect in an imperfect world? But he adds the free press corrects itself through mutual criticism. "The free press," always, according to Marx, "remains good though it may bring forth some bad products," while the state-controlled press remains bad even though it may bring forth some good products. This last quotation proves that the principle of freedom of information is so deeply engrained in Western thought that even the apostle of the dictatorship of the proletariat felt compelled to recognize it.

Free Speech Exemplifies American Tradition

It is not my intention to bore this committee with a learned dissertation. I am offering my quotations only in order to show that freedom of information is not something incidental, something ephemeral, something to make speeches about and then to forget. Freedom of information is basic to our entire way of life, it is at the core of our political thought, it is at the very foundations of our constitutional system.

Yesterday, the distinguished representative of France, M. Kayser, anticipated that in the course of the discussion he would hear the "traditional arguments" of those who were not satisfied with the draft convention on freedom of information, as it has been submitted to us. I would like to say to my distinguished colleague that my arguments against that convention are indeed "traditional." They represent what is best in the American tradition, a tradition of which we are proud, a tradition in which we find ever new strength in the defense of freedom.

Mr. President, on behalf of my Government I must state clearly and unequivocally that we cannot accept the kind of draft convention on freedom of information which we are expected to submit to a conference of plenipotentiaries for final action. We cannot accept this convention in its present form for the reasons set forth in the observations my Government submitted in document E/2031/Add.1. We take special exception to article 2 which would permit objectionable and unnecessary limitations on freedom of expression together with other restrictions which, while perhaps not objectionable in principle, are so formulated as to make it almost certain that they will be abused by governments so inclined. The method of so-called "specific enumeration" of restrictions on freedom of information employed in this article is considered by my government to be completely impractical and an open invitation to the addition of still more objectionable limitations. As stated in the communication of my Government to the Secretary-General, the fact

that this is not merely a theoretical possibility is demonstrated by *Resolution A* of the committee. This resolution, calling for a study of the feasibility of adding to the present set of limitations certain still more objectionable restrictions, indicates the open-ended nature of the formulation adopted by the committee and the dangers implicit in it.

We are unalterably opposed to any attempt to legitimize these proposals for fettering the freedom of the press however they may be worded. For this reason, we cannot accept the suggestions contained in the document entitled "Legal Problems Raised by Certain Amendments to the Draft Convention" (E/2046) prepared by the secretariat, at the request of the committee, although I feel we must commend the secretariat for making the best of an impossible assignment. Unfortunately, the "silk purse" they have presented us still looks very much like the sow's ear they commenced with.

Proposed Restrictions Unconstitutional

No matter how these obnoxious restrictions may be worded, there is no escape from the fact that they will lead straight to censorship or to penalties on purely political grounds. Who is to decide if a printed report would impair the relations of one government with another? Not any self-respecting court, certainly, for there is no problem of law here. Who is to decide if the feelings of the nationals of a state have been injured? Only the administration in power can rule on such matters, and its judgment will be based on purely political considerations. Thus, we should be led to the fantastic state of affairs where it would no longer be permissible to report about a build-up of military forces in a future North Korea; where it would not be permissible to tell the facts about the brutal deportations of law-abiding citizens in Hungary or the slave camps of the U.S.S.R.! We know too well how censorship was forced upon neighboring states by the Hitler regime to stifle criticism emanating from their territories. But we need not go back even to recent history. The same measures have now been enacted by the U.S.S.R. and its followers in Eastern Europe; only now they go by the beguiling name of Laws To Defend the Peace!

In talking about these proposed restrictions, there is one aspect of the position of my Government which I wish to state as clearly and as strongly as I can. When the press and the Government of the United States speak out against these restrictions, it is of course with the intent of protecting and safeguarding our own freedom, which we regard as priceless and indispensable. But, in a sense, we are speaking even more in behalf of the freedom of other peoples. As a matter of fact, under our Constitution the Government of the United States could not impose the

kind of restrictions we are now discussing, even if it were to become a party to a convention which sets them forth as permissible. The prohibition against any law abridging the freedom of the press contained in the Bill of Rights, which is part of the Constitution of the United States, cannot be superseded by a treaty.

U.S. Striving for Free World Press

But my Government would *not* become a party to any such convention because we do not want to see *any* peoples subjected to such limitations. We have long since learned that our freedom is strengthened to the extent that the freedom of others is protected. The press and the people of the United States are convinced on this point.

Can it be that the free press in any free country feels differently from ours? We do not think so. On the contrary, we believe that the profession of journalism shares certain basic principles and ideals in common, irrespective of nationality. We believe that the great majority of editors and journalists, whether in France or the United States, in India or Egypt, would not approve of such restrictions. In fact, we know that this is so because they have had occasion to voice their objections to similar proposals which have been incorporated, or considered for inclusion, in the press laws of certain countries. In short, we are not convinced that these proposals can be said to have the backing of the free press in any free country.

There are numerous other objectionable features in the proposed draft convention which from our point of view make it useless as a basis for further discussions. Since we have already stated our objections to some of these features in our written comments on the draft, I shall not repeat them here. I would, however, draw the attention of the committee to article 10 of the committee text, which provides that "in the case of incompatibility" between the provisions of "the general agreement," i.e., the Covenant on Human Rights, and this convention "the general agreement shall prevail." It seems to my Government that to undertake obligations in a detailed agreement which, by their expressed terms, may be nullified or altered by a second, more general agreement, whose provisions are not yet fixed, is sheer waste of energy and will almost certainly lead to conflicts of interpretation.

Mr. President, in his intervention yesterday, M. Kayser characterized this draft convention as a great step forward on the road to freedom of information. I am profoundly sorry not to be able to agree with him. He suggested that "we have never been so near to success" in formulating an effective and satisfactory convention on freedom of information. The implication was that with some good will on the part of those who did not like all the aspects of the present text, a satisfac-

tory compromise could be reached. Again I must disagree on both counts. While the *Ad Hoc Committee* has succeeded in improving a few articles, the fact remains that no real progress has been made on reaching an understanding on the essentials of freedom of information. The very fact has not been recognized that for us there are certain points on which no compromise is possible. We cannot be asked to add just a few small drops of poison to the cup of wine. This would not be compromise, this would be suicide. To repeat Jefferson again "our liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost."

Unsettled Times Reflected in Confused Ideas

Under these circumstances we have to reject the present draft of the convention and what is more, we cannot support the holding of a conference to complete that draft. We have reached the conclusion that the present unsettled times which reflect a deep seated confusion of ideas and principles is not propitious for attempting such work. Gentlemen: I say this with great reluctance and in real sorrow for I deeply appreciate the great efforts made by such men as my friend and colleague from France, M. Kayser, or by my friend and colleague, Mr. Noriega of Mexico, who have given so much devoted effort to the drafting of the convention. We are at one in our purposes even though we cannot agree on methods.

The distinguished delegate of France, M. Kayser, himself suggested that the conference should not be held unless there were real chances of agreement, and he indicated in the light of votes taken at the *Ad Hoc Committee* that such agreement could be reached. Admittedly, it might be possible to obtain a numerical majority for such a convention, but I would like to draw the attention of the committee to the fact that the countries which are already on record as being against the draft convention and the holding of a conference are such countries as Denmark, Norway and Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, as well as the United States. In other words, almost the entire Anglo-Saxon world and the countries of Northern Europe with their centuries-old record in safeguarding the freedom of their people do not believe that we have an adequate basis for sound discussion in what the *Ad Hoc Committee* has proposed to us. Thus, while a numerical majority might be attained in a conference, it certainly would not be a representative majority.

This should give pause to all those who urge us to go ahead with the conference. Again, I do not have a vestige of doubt that these proponents of a conference are acting in good faith and are inspired by the desire to safeguard the cause of freedom of information. We consider it a real

tragedy that in the fact of the Communist totalitarian onslaught on our freedoms, it was not possible, and evidently is not possible at this stage, to reach agreement with them. All we can hope is that on further thought the proponents of the draft convention and of a conference will agree not to pursue, at this stage, an attempt which is evidently doomed to failure; which contrary to their own desires would, we are convinced, result in ever new restrictions on freedom of information rather than in greater freedom.

U.N. Efforts Result in Impasse

I should like to add at this point that some of the suggestions of the distinguished representative of France regarding the nature of the proposed conference only strengthen our conviction that it would be a mistake to call such a conference. He suggested that the conference should be a small conference composed of government plenipotentiaries which could be held at low cost, possibly at the time when some other United Nations' body, such as the General Assembly, was in session. This proposal again indicates that the representative of France greatly underestimates the difficulties involved. Such a conference, as proposed by him, would exclude representatives of the press whose very liberties are at stake. Held under the conditions proposed by M. Kayser it would hardly be composed of individuals of sufficient stature and vision as to offer it any chance of success. Among them would undoubtedly be many who quite naturally would be more interested in safeguarding the positions of their governments than in freedom of expression that would permit of criticisms of their governments.

Thus, however we look at it, and in spite of the best will on earth, we cannot lend our support to the convocation of such a conference.

Mr. President, it is a sad commentary on our work to note that 4 years of effort on behalf of freedom of information in the United Nations have led us to this impasse. In fact, this debate, stormy at times, has stirred up so much dust that we have even lost sight of our objective. What was it that the United Nations started out to do, when in 1947, it decided to call a special conference on freedom of information? Was it to devise ways and means of curbing alleged abuses in the free reporting of news; or was it, rather, to advance and safeguard freedom of speech and of the press throughout the world in the conviction that the free exercise of this basic human right is indispensable to the attainment and defense of all other freedoms and to the maintenance of peace? Surely there can be no question that the latter was the task we assigned ourselves.

What have we accomplished after 4 years, after scores of meetings and hundreds of speeches devoted to this purpose? Opinions may differ on points of detail, but who on this Council can take

any satisfaction from the results to date? I can think of only three delegations which have any right to be satisfied, not because we have endorsed their totalitarian proposals, but because we have done so little to strengthen the freedom which is the mortal enemy of their oppressive doctrines.

The rest of us must, I believe, agree that the time has come to check our bearings and get back on the course we originally charted for ourselves. We cannot simply go on drifting with the tide, because it is evident that it is pulling us away from freedom.

What are we going to do about it? Are we simply going to sit by and watch the lights of freedom burn lower and lower?

U.S. Suggestions for a New Draft

It is at this stage that I should like to make in broad terms a few positive suggestions which will demonstrate that we do not need to remain bogged down in an inconclusive debate over a convention which is not practical at this time.

1. I would suggest, in the first place, that we attend to some unfinished business. I should like to propose that we recommend to the General Assembly that it open for signature without further delay the completed convention on the international transmission of news and the right of correction, and that we do this irrespective of any decision we may take with regard to the second convention now before the Council. This convention was never intended to be coupled with any other; it is a self-contained instrument evolved after a determined effort to take into account every constructive point of view. It is a building which can stand by itself. Yesterday, the distinguished delegate of France invited us first of all to build another wing to our edifice. We would be delighted if this could be undertaken, but since the architects evidently cannot agree on a plan for that new wing, why should we not seek shelter in that we already have, against the elements of intolerance and persecution and censorship which are sweeping the world.

This world of ours, at this time and period, stands in great need of internationally agreed standards to govern the treatment of foreign correspondents and their copy. We never dreamed when we drafted the convention on the international transmission of news and right of correction that international standards could sink as low as they have sunk in some countries. We never thought that any state, let alone a member of the United Nations, would act as ruthlessly and in such disregard of every accepted standard of decency as did the Czechoslovak authorities when they sent a devoted young journalist trying to do his job honestly and conscientiously to prison after a fake trial. We are still in the stage of general debate and I therefore refrain from going into greater detail of a case which has shaken the

world and which is symptomatic of what is going on everyday in large parts of the world. I reserve for myself, however, the right to come back to this case and to make certain specific proposals.

The Newsgathering Convention would also provide a feasible and constructive "right of reply" on an international plane which is regarded as necessary by many governments. If we are serious about finding a way to counteract false or distorted reports, why do we hesitate to utilize the only feasible proposal which has yet been devised for this purpose?

2. While we are thinking of completed conventions, I would remind you of the two conventions adopted by UNESCO to facilitate the importation of books, periodicals, and other audio-visual materials. Neither has yet come into force; both are deserving of the most serious consideration.

3. Most important there is, of course, the other item of unfinished business of this nature, the draft covenant on human rights, which might be further developed as an instrument for the safeguarding of freedom of information, an instrument more effective than the abortive draft convention on freedom of information.

4. We must also find concrete ways to increase the two-way flow of news. I fully realize that some of our friends, members of the free world, who disagree with us on the freedom of information convention are deeply concerned with this matter, and we appreciate their anxieties. The position of my Government has never been based on the desire to preserve the status quo in the means for reporting or disseminating news internationally. Rather, we are committed to the promotion of a greater flow of news, and by this we mean a greater two-way flow. We are interested in the development of strong, free, and independent press organs and services in other countries. I must add, however, that we are strongly opposed to attempts of utilizing the services of the United Nations to promote increased governmental control over these organs under the guise of promoting their development.

5. One of the urgent problems in this connection is the worldwide shortage of newsprint. This item appears elsewhere on the agenda but I may say here and now that my Government supports international measures to overcome that shortage with the help of the International Materials Conference and through technical research in the use of substitute materials of increased production. Technical assistance funds might be used to promote expanded forestry and newsprint producing operations.

6. Another development which might be encouraged is the sending of expert missions under UNESCO auspices to assist countries to establish or improve radio broadcasting facilities. The 1952 program of UNESCO includes minimum provision for such missions, although it was somewhat discouraging to the United States delegation to the

recent General Conference of UNESCO to find that it had few supporters when it proposed that the amount of money set aside for this activity be increased by a transfer of funds assigned to less significant activities.

7. Ways must also be found to facilitate closer contacts between editors and journalists throughout the world. The fullest possible support should be given to the recently created International Press Institute. That Institute was founded on the premise that personal meetings and associations between editors and other news personnel from all parts of the world would create a broader understanding of their mutual problems and would give a new impetus to the battle for freedom of information. Its basic aim is to promote a fuller flow of information in the interest of better understanding among peoples.

8. Another problem worthy of serious study is that of newspapers which cannot afford to maintain correspondents abroad. Aside from the possibility of help from the International Press Institute in this regard, it would be useful to explore the possibility of securing grants, preferably from private sources, to help defray the expenses of selected reporters for short periods of residence and work abroad. The United States is engaged in large-scale exchange programs of this nature, and similar programs are conducted by our press organizations. But a greater, more permanent, and internationally more comprehensive program is required.

9. Another means of increasing the flow of information and of counteracting distorted and misleading reporting is to promote the greater dissemination of information about the purposes and the work of the United Nations system as a whole. You will recall that the resolution adopted at the last session of the General Assembly condemning the Soviet jamming of foreign broadcasts (so far completely disregarded by the U.S.S.R.) contains a recommendation to the effect that member states facilitate the dissemination of news and information prepared and circulated by the United Nations. Would it not be useful to request a study by the Secretariat of the extent to which its information output is utilized abroad?

10. Finally, the Council itself might well keep under constant review this whole issue of freedom of information with the view to ascertaining, high lighting, and bringing to the attention of the conscience of the world, major violations of that freedom. We may not be able among ourselves to agree on what constitutes minor inroads on that freedom. But it would be sheer bankruptcy of all the standards of the free world if we should be unable to agree on exposing major violations.

Mr. President, beyond this decalogue there are undoubtedly many other constructive proposals which might be made. We have exhausted ourselves in futile attempts to formulate an acceptable convention on freedom of information. This,

however, should be no reason for despondency. On the contrary, it should be a challenge to all of us who believe in freedom. It is in the exercise of our liberties that we and they grow strong. The positive proposals which I have submitted to you offer ample scope for such exercise. As we work on these common tasks we shall grow in mutual understanding and someday the time will come when it may be possible to embody our mutually agreed ideas in an effective convention on freedom of information. My Government and the people of my country will be happy when that day comes.

Joint Statement by Isador Lubin and Walter Kotschnig¹

The action of the council in declining to convene a plenipotentiary conference to pass on the draft of the freedom of information convention is, we are convinced, for the best interests of freedom everywhere. This draft convention which was originally intended to enlarge freedom turned out in fact to be an instrument to restrict freedom.

It is important, however, to remember—and we feel that representatives of the free press and radio and movies, as well as many governments, will agree—that the demands for press restrictions voiced by certain governments in the United Nations are but the evidence of deep-rooted problems.

Their deep roots are embedded in conditions of underdevelopment affecting two-thirds of the people of the globe. Among these people there is hunger for true and accurate information as well as for bread. There is at the same time an immense desire to be understood, to have their stories told to the world, but in their own words, not in the words of others.

The movement which we have seen here in the council, aimed at limiting the freedom of the world-wide news media, springs from these and other conditions. As long as the conditions which underlie the movement to restrict freedom of information in free countries remain as they are, we would be deluding ourselves if we assumed that the vote of the Economic and Social Council has ended the demand for limitations on the free flow of news. We refer in this context not to the Communist states which seek the suppression of all freedom; we refer to governments which in principle support freedom of information as essential to the development and maintenance of all other freedoms.

During the debate in the social committee, the United States delegation submitted a series of constructive proposals, general in nature, but designed to start a trend of thought toward positive ways of meeting some of these basic problems. To resolve these problems and to maintain and expand freedom of information will require, among other things, discovering and developing concrete ways to increase the two-way flow of news, further exploring ways and means of meeting newsprint problems, expanding the use of expert missions to improve broadcasting facilities, giving support to the International Press Institute and other professional organizations, and broadening existing programs for the exchange of journalists.

In addition, we most strongly urge the free, private information media to examine afresh the world information problems threatening freedom everywhere and to determine upon a course of action to meet them.

¹ Made to the press on Sept. 5 and released to the press on the same date by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. Mr. Lubin is U.S. representative to the 13th session of Ecosoc at Geneva.

(Continued from p. 494)

Food Production—Cooperative Program in Costa Rica. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2172. Pub. 4099. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica—Effectuated by exchange of notes at San José September 18 and November 14, 1950; entered into force November 14, 1950; operative retroactively from June 30, 1950.

Emergency Relief Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2174. Pub. 4103. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade January 6, 1951; entered into force January 6, 1951.

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2184. Pub. 4118. 3 pp. 5¢.

Extending and amending agreement of December 20, 1946—Effectuated by exchange of notes dated at Washington December 1 and 19, 1950; entered into force December 20, 1950.

Preparation for Tomorrow. (Reprint.) European and British Commonwealth Series 20. Pub. 4138. 54 pp. 25¢.

A German boy's year in America.

Civil Affairs—Administration and Jurisdiction in Netherlands Territory Liberated by an Allied Expeditionary Force. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2212. Pub. 4168. 9 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands—Signed at London May 16, 1944; entered into force May 16, 1944.

Defense Highways—Rama Roads. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2229. Pub. 4197. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Nicaragua—Effectuated by exchange of notes signed at Washington April 8 and 18, 1942; entered into force April 18, 1942.

Mutual Security for the Free World. (Reprint.) General Foreign Policy Series 49. Pub. 4210. 12 pp. 10¢.

A background summary on the proposed mutual security program.

Brazil: Plans for National Development. Inter-American Series 43. Pub. 4246. 8 pp., maps. 10¢.

A background summary of its economic assets and plans to encourage the expansion of its economy.

Technical Assistance Under the International Agencies. International Organization and Conference Series I, 16. Pub. 4256. 13 pp. Free.

A discussion of the cooperation of the international organizations in providing the services of the United Nations Assistance Program.

Guide to the United States and the United Nations. International Organization and Conference Series III, 68. Pub. 4261. 20 pp. 15¢.

A chronology of the United States and the United Nations.

Guide to the U.N. in Korea. Far Eastern Series 47. Pub. 4299. 31 pp. 15¢.

Discussion of a year of collective action.

The Measure of Today's Emergency. General Foreign Policy Series 63. Pub. 4311. 16 pp. 10¢.

Remarks by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, June 29, 1951.

Twenty-sixth Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FOR THE PERIOD JULY 16-31, 1951¹

U.N. doc. S/2333
Transmitted September 10, 1951

I herewith submit report number 26 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 July, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 946-961, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Progress in the armistice negotiations was marked on 26 July by joint agreement upon subjects to be included on the formal agenda. The armistice conferees, since 15 July, have met each day except 20, 22, 23 and 24 July under the conditions of neutrality in the conference area which I demanded of the Communist leaders and to which their representatives agreed in the meeting of 15 July. Poor flying weather and flash floods on 20 July prevented the procession of United Nations Command Delegates to Kaesong. The conference recessed on 22-24 July at the request of the Communist Chief Delegate, General Nam Il.

The United Nations Command fully appreciates the great consequences which would derive from the early termination of hostilities in Korea. This Command's Delegates are acutely aware of the responsibilities they bear to all those peoples of

the world who, abhorring the lust that led the North Korean leaders to launch and since to sustain their brutal aggression against the Republic of Korea, have elected of their own free will to stop the aggressor through sacrifice of their sons upon the field of battle. To terminate this sacrifice at the earliest possible moment is the paramount aim of the United Nations Command Delegates, qualified solely by their determination that the previous United Nations sacrifices shall not have been in vain. Each day's delay in concluding an armistice is gravely weighed in terms of human lives. That the negotiations have been so unnecessarily drawn out is a source of great concern.

Much time has been wasted in this momentous conference in irrelevant argument on the part of the Communists. Both the United Nations Command and the Communist Delegates had accepted at the initial meetings that their first objective was to adopt an agenda, and that the detailed discussion of any topic should be deferred until after the adoption. Repeatedly, however, the Communist Delegates have discussed the substance of proposed items and have endeavored to draw the United Nations Command Delegates into substantive discussions, many of them of an essentially political nature.

One of the agenda items proposed by the Communists and supported by lengthy discussions was "to establish the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides and the establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea." It is quite evident that the actual location of a line of demarcation between the forces is a proper subject for military armistice negotiations; however, the inclusion of the specific location of that line in the wording of the agenda item inevitably and obviously gave rise to the very type of substantive discussion which both sides had agreed to exclude until the agenda was adopted.

Greater delays were occasioned by the insistence of the Communist Delegates that the armistice agenda include "the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea." This subject unquestionably is of great moment in any future political settlement of

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative in the Security Council, on Sept. 10. For texts of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th reports to the Security Council on U.N. Command operations in Korea, see BULLETIN of Aug. 7, 1950, p. 203; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 323; and Sept. 11, 1950, p. 403; Oct. 2, 1950, p. 534; Oct. 16, 1950, p. 603; Nov. 6, 1950, p. 729; Nov. 13, 1950, p. 759; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 43, and Feb. 19, 1951, p. 304, respectively. Reports nos. 1-11 have been published separately as Department of State publications 3935, 3955, 3962, 3978, 3986, 4006, 4015, and 4108 respectively. The 12th, 13th, and 14th reports appear in the BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, p. 470; the 15th and 16th reports in the BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, p. 625; the 17th report in the BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1951, p. 710; the 18th in the BULLETIN of May 7, 1951, p. 755; a special report by the U.N. Commanding General, in the BULLETIN of May 21, 1951, p. 828; the 19th report in the BULLETIN of June 4, 1951, p. 910; the 20th report in the BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 948; the 21st report in the BULLETIN of July 2, 1951, p. 30; the 22d in the BULLETIN of July 23, 1951, p. 155; the 23d and 24th reports in the BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1951, p. 265, and the 25th report in the BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 303.

the Korean disputes; but, as was forcefully presented many times by Vice Admiral Joy, it is a matter for political settlement upon the highest governmental levels, and discussion of it far exceeds the authority and prerogatives of the CINCUNC.

The agreed agenda is:

Item 1. Adoption of Agenda.

Item 2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea.

Item 3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and armistice.

Item 4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

Item 5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

The substantive discussions began immediately after adoption of the agenda on 26 July. As of 31 July, the Communists had maintained their insistence that the 38th parallel shall be the line of demarcation of forces during an armistice period. Inasmuch as the 38th parallel bears only a coincidental relationship to the present position of the ground forces, and none at all to the operations of Air and Naval forces, the United Nations Command Delegates have refused to accept this view and have made unmistakably clear that a military armistice must be premised upon the prevailing military situation. It is evident that the enemy will attempt by negotiations to recoup the losses that his thwarted military aggression has brought upon him. The United Nations Command Delegation is sparing no effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea in conformance with the high ideals and principles of the United Nations, but the good faith of the Chinese and North Korean Communists remains to be proved.

Hostile reaction to vigorous United Nations patrolling is in the pattern experienced since 15 June. Nearly all contacts consisted of brief clashes between small units of platoon or company size. On the western front from Munsan to Kumhwa, contacts were scattered, some patrols advancing up to 10,000 yards without eliciting hostile response. However, the enemy contested every advance on the Otan-Amhyon front and in the area west of Chorwon. His forward positions in these sectors were well supported with artillery and mortar fire and his reaction suggested substantial strength. Front lines, however, remain essentially unchanged.

On the eastern front from Kumhwa to Pohand, contacts within 1 or 2 miles of the United Nations lines were continuous. Fighting with determination from well organized positions, the enemy bitterly contested all United Nations thrusts and

provided his forces uniformly strong mortar and artillery support. The most intense fighting took place to the east of Pia from 27 to 29 July, where strong battalion strength United Nations probing forces invariably met prompt and stubborn resistance. Contacts were particularly numerous to the south of Haso, Hoegok, and Changjong, where the enemy undertook limited probing action.

The enemy has continued to stockpile supplies in extreme forward areas of the eastern front, generally within 5 miles of United Nations lines. Here, he has also expanded his strong defensive installations including barbed wire obstacles, minefields, and earthworks, in addition to the well organized system of tank traps noted in the preceding report. These defenses are particularly well developed to the south of Hoegok and Pia.

There are continuing indications that the enemy has made good use of the considerable period since his severe defeat in May to prepare for possible further offensive action. On the 18-mile front astride the Changdo-Kumsong axis, he has regrouped forces so as to dispose, in column confronting the X US Corps, 2 Chinese Communist force armies of 6 divisions believed to have been recently reorganized and reequipped. A depleted army which formerly held this sector was moved to the rear to refit. At the same time, in this area there were greatly increased troop activity and a continuing logistic buildup. The enemy has persisted in his determination to permit no penetration of the Otan-Amhyon area and, significantly, towards the close of the period he was filling tank traps on this front.

Additional troops are reportedly moving into northwestern Korea from Manchuria. During the past 6 weeks, the enemy has steadily increased the density and power of his artillery and mortar supply over the whole front. Prisoners of war have repeatedly referred to advanced plans for a 6th phase offensive and have quoted pronouncements of enemy commanders to the effect that they expect to participate in further offensive operations. Concurrent with the Communist-imposed delays in the armistice negotiations have been major efforts by hostile forces to recover from the effects of their last abortive major attack, and they must be considered prepared to attempt offensive action at any time. Such action might well consist initially of limited attacks to obtain local advantages followed by extension of piecemeal efforts into a general offensive.

Guerrillas in United Nations rear areas have made only isolated offensive forays in southeastern Korean apparently without relation to concurrent enemy activities on the front. There has been no marked change in guerrilla strength, and the dissident elements continue to operate in units of 50 to 500 men.

United Nations Naval forces conducted constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations which continued to deny Korean waters to the enemy and

to safeguard the movement of United Nations shipping in those waters.

United Nations carrier-based and Marine land-based aircraft divided their attention between close air support of United Nations ground forces and interdiction operations against enemy lines of communication with excellent results.

United Nations surface units continued to pound enemy railroads, highways and supply concentrations in the Wonsan-Songjin-Chongjin areas. Enemy shore batteries were active in the Wonsan area, but combined efforts of Naval gunfire and rocket ships and of carrier-based aircraft succeeded in silencing the enemy guns without material damage to our forces.

During the period of this report, United Nations surface units were active in providing gunfire support to United Nations ground units on the east coast sector of Korea.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment. Drifting mines in substantial numbers continued to menace shipping in the Sea of Japan.

United Nations aircraft under the operational control of Far East Air Forces placed their major effort upon neutralization of enemy airfields and highly effective interdiction of communication and supply channels in the incessant campaign to reduce the flow of supplies and equipment to Communist forces at the front. Close air support of United Nations ground forces in the battle zone continued.

B-29 medium bombers, B-26 light bombers, and fighter bombers, including those of the South African Air Force and the land-based U.S. Marine Corps, dropped load after load of high explosive bombs and napalm and fired thousands of rockets and rounds of machine gun ammunition on railroads, highways, airfields, bridges, marshalling yards, tunnels, motor vehicles and rail rolling stocks. The interdiction effort continued on a round the clock basis with the night sortie rate maintained at the highest level since the start of the conflict. On the night of 17-18 July a total of 122 effective sorties were flown, a new high for the campaign. During favorable weather, the nightly sorties averaged 106.

The military activities which the enemy has located in Pyongyang have impelled the United Nations Air Forces to undertake numerous attacks upon military objectives therein. An accumulation of facts attests to the importance of Pyongyang as a supply and command center essential to the conduct of the Communist forces operations along the entire front. In addition to the airfields in and around the city, one of which, as previously reported, the Communists have constructed by razing residences and office buildings in the town proper, the targets have been: carefully pinpointed gun positions, supply buildings, troop billets, power and radio stations, motor vehicle parks

and railroad yards and cars. Preliminary damage assessment of a comparatively large attack on 30 July indicates considerable damage to military installations.

The MIG-15's were conspicuous in their limited employment until the last few days of the period and were rarely contacted by sweeping F-86's and the newly operational Meteor jets of the Royal Australian Air Force. The enemy did send a few slow aircraft over United Nations lines during the night to harass our forces. The strafing and bombing of these planes were very inaccurate and their task was made difficult by B-26's and United States Marine Corps night fighters that have provided continuous night cover over vital areas.

C-47's and crews of the Royal Thailand Air Force have added their support to United States Air Forces and Royal Hellenic Air Force efforts in the airlifting of personnel, supplies and equipment to forward to United Nations units. The personnel engaged in the armistice negotiations have been largely moved by air.

Throughout the preliminary armistice discussions at Kaesong, all concrete developments have been reported as rapidly and fully as possible throughout Korea by United Nations leaflets, loudspeaker, and radio broadcasts. The detailed reporting of the discussions in Korea language radio broadcasts designed primarily for civilian listeners has been extensively complemented with leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts to front line enemy troops and with leaflet airdrops to major civilian and military centers throughout northern Korea. The patent desire of the enemy to wring Communist propaganda value from the armistice negotiations has given these United Nations countermeasures unusual importance. In addition to these news reports which constitute the bulk of the information currently being disseminated in Korea by United Nations media, major attention is being given to the United Nations stand on the crucial issues of the armistice discussions.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the United Nations Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/2314, August 27; S/2316, August 28; S/2318, August 29; S/2319, August 29; S/2320, August 30; S/2323, September 4; S/2324, September 4; S/2325, September 4; S/2329, September 6; S/2330, September 7.

Appointment of Officers

James C. Corliss as alternate representative of the United States on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

Documents Relating to the Korean Armistice Negotiations

Messages from Senior North Korean Delegate to Senior U.N. Delegate¹

[SEPTEMBER 7, 1951]

1. Your message dated September 4 concerning the incessant penetration over the Kaesong neutral zone and the dropping of a flare over the neutral zone on August 20 by the military aircraft of your side has been received.

Your side's grave responsibility for these incidents can by no means be turned aside by your message which disregards the facts and denies everything. Moreover, your side must also accept the heavy responsibility for the fact that from August 29 up to the present, your military aircraft have persisted in unscrupulous and incessant penetrations over the Kaesong neutral zone.

Your message is absolutely unsatisfactory.

2. Your letter of September 4 concerning the repeated murders by your South Korean troops of our military patrolmen on August 19 and August 30 has been received.

No denial of facts can free your side from the serious responsibility that you must bear for these two incidents. Our side had adequate witnesses and material evidence to confirm the inescapable responsibility of your side.

Since your letter proves once again that your side has yet no intention whatever to deal with these serious incidents earnestly and responsibly, it is absolutely unsatisfactory.

Statement by United Nations Command

[SEPTEMBER 11, 1951]

[1] At 0330 10 September, the liaison officers at Munsan received from the Communist radio station at Kaesong the following message:

At 1:35 a. m. Sept. 10 an aircraft of your side made machine-gunning over the vicinity of the conference site of the Kaesong neutral zone. We will inform you of the details of the above incident after the results of the investigation. By order of my senior delegate, I hereby first lodge a verbal protest with you.

[2] United Nations Command liaison officers conducted investigation during daylight, 10 September, in area of gunning approximately 1,400 yards south of conference house. Summary of evidence follows:

(a) Holes in houses indicating travel of two bullets generally northeast to southwest.

(b) Several marks on stone walls of building.

(c) Caliber .50 bullets on ground near marks on buildings.

¹On Sept. 9 the U.N. Command announced that there would be no reply sent to these messages.

(d) Testimony of several Koreans living in houses not conclusive but all heard aircraft.

(e) One shell casing found about 2,000 yards northeast of marked buildings.

(f) No casualties, no damage other than as indicated above.

[3] Far East Air Forces reports that what appeared to be a bogie [enemy plane] was detected by radar over Kaesong at 1:41 a. m. Continuing radar plot, including a directed identification turn and subsequent transmission, indicates plane was one from Third Bomb Group. The pilot reports having strafed lights at 0136 10 September in what he believed to be a different area but which in view of the radar plot, must have been Kaesong. Faulty navigation on pilot's part led to error.

[4] Admiral Joy is sending message to Nam Il through the liaison officers at 8 a. m. as follows:

The United Nations Command air commander has reported to the United Nations Command senior delegate that about 0130 10 September there was located by radar an aircraft in the Kaesong area. A continuing radar plot of the flight of the aircraft coupled with normal identification procedures revealed this aircraft to be one of the United Nations Command. Subsequent interrogation of the pilot disclosed that he had made a strafing attack at about 0135 on targets which through faulty navigation he had incorrectly identified.

Based upon this information and the investigation conducted by the United Nations Command liaison officers today the fact that an aircraft of the United Nations Command strafed within the limits of the Kaesong neutral zone on 10 September is accepted.

The United Nations Command regrets this violation of the agreed neutrality which resulted from the pilot's error in navigation. Appropriate disciplinary action is being initiated. It is noted that investigation conducted by the liaison officers established the fact that no damage resulted from the attack.

Message from U.N. Commander to North Korean and Chinese Communist Commanders

[SEPTEMBER 17, 1951]

The following message from General Ridgway, U.N. Commander, to Gen. Kim Il Song, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Gen. Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, was broadcast at 12 noon, September 17, Tokyo time (10 p. m. September 16, eastern daylight time):

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of September 2.² Each of the allegations contained in your letter has

² BULLETIN of Sept. 10, 1951, p. 439.

been thoroughly investigated. These investigations established that the forces of the United Nations Command were not, I repeat not, involved in any violation of the neutral zone except for the one incident occurring on September 10. These thorough investigations, the results of which have been furnished to you previously, demonstrate the objective and responsible attitude of the United Nations Command toward violations of the agreements concerning the neutral zone.

In your message you have inferred a desire that negotiations be resumed. I must remind you that negotiations have been suspended by your direction since August 23. I again emphasize my concern in the achievement of a just and honorable military armistice. If you are now disposed to terminate the suspension of the armistice negotiations which you declared on August 23, I am still prepared to order my liaison officers to a meeting at the bridge at Pan Mun Jom to discuss conditions that will be mutually satisfactory for a resumption of the armistice talks.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

North Atlantic Council: 7th Session

On September 14 the Department of State announced that the United States delegation to the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council which will convene at Ottawa, Canada, September 15, 1951, is as follows:

United States Representatives:

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
William C. Foster, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
Frank H. Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army

Deputy United States Representative:

Charles M. Spofford, Chairman, North Atlantic Council Deputies

Senior Advisers:

General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador-at-Large
William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Thomas A. Cabot, Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State
George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs
George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Stanley Woodward, American Ambassador to Canada
Frank C. Nash, Assistant to Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Advisers:

Theodore C. Achilles
Robert G. Barnes
Lucius D. Battle
Col. R. E. Beebe, U.S.A.
Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr.
Charles E. Bonesteel
Loren Carroll
Col. Chester V. Clifton, U.S.A.
Roger Ernst
Lincoln Gordon
Commander Harold T. Gorenson
Najeeb E. Halaby
William L. Hebbard
John F. Hickman
William Ketcham
Ridgway B. Knight
Melville E. Locker

Harold F. Linder
Douglas MacArthur II
Col. Willis Mathews, U.S.A.
Lt. Col. John Norton
J. Graham Parsons
Walter Schwinn
Charles D. Skippon, Jr.
Capt. Wakeman B. Thorp, U.S.N.
Lewis H. VanDusen, Jr.
Laurence C. Vass
Richard S. Wheeler
George Willis

General Assembly: Sixth Session

On September 13 the White House announced that the President nominated on the same date the following persons to be representatives of the United States to the sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to be held at Paris, France, beginning November 6, 1951:

Warren R. Austin
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
Mike Mansfield
John M. Vorys
Philip C. Jessup

The following were nominated to be alternate representatives:

John Sherman Cooper
Ernest A. Gross
Benjamin V. Cohen
Anna Lord Strauss
Channing H. Tobias

The Secretary of State will serve as chairman of the delegation, and in his absence, Ambassador Austin, as senior representative of the United States, will serve as chairman of the delegation.

In continuation of the practice reestablished last year of having members of Congress participate in the delegation to the General Assembly, Representative Mansfield and Representative Vorys have been selected after consultation with the leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Last year, Senator John J. Sparkman and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., served on the delegation to the fifth regular session of the General Assembly which met in New York in September.

Inter-American Cultural Council

On September 7 the Department of State announced that the first meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council will convene at Mexico City, September 10-25, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

Lewis U. Hanke, Ph. D., Director, Institute of Latin American Studies and Professor of History, University of Texas, Austin, Texas

Advisers

Charles R. Burrows, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
Ambrose Caliver, Ph. D., Assistant to the Commissioner, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency
Francis J. Colligan, Division of Exchange of Persons, Department of State
Muna Lee, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

The Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States at Bogotá in 1948, provided for the establishment of the Cultural Council as one of the organs of the OAS. The purpose of the Council is to promote friendly relations and mutual understanding among the American peoples, in order to strengthen the peaceful sentiments that have characterized the evolution of America, through the promotion of educational, scientific, and cultural exchange.

The first meeting will deal primarily with organizational matters with respect to the Council itself and the program it will seek to advance. In addition it will consider such items as program of technical cooperation in relation to education, science, and culture, and formulation of recommendations thereon, to be submitted to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council; intensification of national literacy campaigns; and study of a program to aid in solving the problems that affect the creation, organization, and extension of libraries.

World Tobacco Congress

On September 5 the Department of State announced that the World Tobacco Congress will convene at Amsterdam, the Netherlands, September 17-24, 1951. The U.S. delegation is as follows:

Delegates

Stephen E. Wrather, Deputy Director, Tobacco Branch, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture
Donald M. Crooks, Chief, Division of Tobacco, Medicinal and Special Crops, Field Crops Group, Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering, Department of Agriculture
George W. Van Dyne, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture
John B. Hutson, President, Tobacco Associates, Inc., Washington, D. C.
Charles E. Gage, Agricultural Consultant to the American Tobacco Company, Inc., Washington, D. C.

September 24, 1951

This Congress, being held under the auspices of the Netherlands Ministries of Economic Affairs and of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food, is designed to cover the whole field of cultivation, science, marketing, and manufacture of tobacco. Its main purpose will be to coordinate the activities of existing government and private trade organizations in the field of tobacco.

An exhibition of tobacco cultivated in the participating countries will also be held concurrently with the Congress.

International Tin Study Group

The Department of State announced on September 14 that the sixth meeting of the International Tin Study Group will convene at Rome, Italy, September 24-29, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegate

Clarence W. Nichols, Acting Special Assistant, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State

Advisers

Harlan P. Bramble, Acting Chief, Metals and Minerals Staff, Department of State
E. Allen Fidel, American Embassy, Rome
Morris Foodim, Federated Metals Division, American Smelting and Refining Company, New York City
Charles Merrill, Chief, Metal Economic Branch, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior
Herbert O. Rogers, Chief, Production and Requirements Branch, Tin, Lead, and Zinc Division, National Production Authority
Spencer S. Shannon, Special Assistant to the Administrator, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Anthony Siragusa, Assistant to the Vice President, United States Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa.
Thomas B. Wilson, Brigadier General, U.S.A.R., Special Consultant to the Administrator, General Services Administration

The International Tin Study Group was formed pursuant to a recommendation of the International Tin Conference, held at London, England, October 8-11, 1946. The basic purpose of the group is to maintain a continuous intergovernmental review of the world supply and demand situation, both present and prospective, with respect to tin in all its forms. The United States is one of 14 governments holding membership in the International Tin Study Group.

The agenda for the sixth meeting includes consideration of matters arising from the fifth study group meeting at Paris in March 1950; the long-term prospects of the tin industry and the program of work of the study group; and reports of committees and discussions thereon.

Correction

In the BULLETIN of September 3, 1951, page 385, right-hand column, the ninth line, should read as follows:

"Karl Stefan, ranking minority member, State, Justice,"

Plant Quarantine Conference

The Department of State announced on September 13 that an international plant quarantine conference will be convened by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at Rome, Italy, September 25-27, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegate

Ernest R. Sasscer, in charge of the Division of Plant Quarantines, Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, Department of Agriculture

Alternate

Frank McKennon, Chief, Division of Plant Industry, State Department of Agriculture of Oregon

The purpose of the Rome meeting is to consider further the draft international plant protection convention which resulted from the International Plant Quarantine Conference held at The Hague, April 26-May 3, 1950. Opportunity will be provided to all member governments to participate in a thorough study of the details and ramifications of the proposed convention and to consider any amendments which have been or may be proposed. The convention will be presented for possible adoption by the sixth session of the conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization to be convened at Rome in November.

Because of the great damage to crops and food caused by insect pests and plant diseases throughout the world, and the importance of preventing the spread of such pests from country to country, the forthcoming plant quarantine conference is of considerable importance and interest.

Legal Committee of ICAO

The Department of State announced on September 7 that the eighth session of the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will convene at Madrid, Spain, on September 11, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Members of the Legal Committee

Emory T. Nunneley, (Chairman), General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board

H. Alberta Colclaser, Foreign Affairs Officer, Aviation Policy Staff, Department of State

G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., Chief, International and Rules Division, Civil Aeronautics Board

The Legal Committee is a permanent committee of the ICAO constituted by the Assembly. Its objectives are to (1) study and prepare draft conventions on international air law; (2) provide, if so requested, advice on legal matters of special importance to ICAO, including public and private air law, and the interpretation and amendment of the convention on International Civil Aviation; and (3) collaborate with other international organizations charged with unification and codification of international law.

The principal agenda item will be consideration of the revision of the Warsaw convention relating to the liability of aircraft operators with regard to passengers and goods carried by them. Other matters to be considered are the rules of procedure and working methods of the Committee, progress report on the legal status of aircraft, and report of the Secretariat.

The seventh session of the Legal Committee was held at Mexico City, January 2-23, 1951.

Venezuelan Petroleum Convention

The Department of State announced on September 7 that the Venezuelan National Petroleum Convention will convene at Caracas, Venezuela, September 8-18, 1951. The United States Observer delegation is as follows:

The Honorable Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum Administrator for Defense

The Honorable Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Bruce K. Brown, Deputy Petroleum Administrator for Defense, Department of the Interior

C. Stribling Snodgrass, Assistant Deputy Petroleum Administrator for Defense in charge of Foreign Operations, Department of the Interior

The Convention, organized by the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons of Venezuela, is for the purpose of portraying the history, development, and achievement of the petroleum industry of Venezuela. To this end, the agenda of the Convention is limited to eight studies on different aspects of the industry: geological, exploration, industry development, production, transportation, refining, taxation, and utilization of natural gas.

International Documentation Conference

The Department of State announced on September 14 that the Eighteenth International Conference on Documentation will convene at Rome, Italy, September 15-21, 1951. The United States delegation is as follows:

Delegates

Milton O. Lee, Ph.D., *Chairman*, Executive Secretary, Division of Biology and Agriculture, National Research Council

Robert E. Huneycutt, Lt. Col., G. S. C., U.S.A., Assistant Director, Central Air Documents Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio

Eugene Power, University Microfilm Company, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Fremont Rider, Ph.D., Librarian, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.

Julian Smith, Ph.D., Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy

William E. Story, Jr., Ph.D., Consultant, Research Branch, Research and Development Division, Department of Defense

This Conference is being convened by the International Federation for Documentation, originally established in 1895 as the "International Institute for Bibliography." The Federation promotes the study, organization, and realization

of documentation in all its branches and forms in order to create an international network of documentation.

The agenda for the Rome conference includes consideration of the general classification of documents; applications of the universal decimal classification, particularly to industrial enterprises and to administration; bibliographies and analyses, particularly the uses of analysis and indexing services in connection with scientific and industrial services; and application of technical means of documentation, such as microfilming and photocopying.

The Seventeenth International Conference on Documentation was held at Bern, Switzerland, August 24-29, 1947.

Land Utilization in Tropical Areas

On September 13, the Department of State announced that the Food and Agriculture Organization regional meeting on land utilization in tropical areas of Asia and the Far East will convene at Nuwara Eliya, Ceylon, September 17-29, 1951. The region to be covered comprises South and East Asia and tropical islands of the Pacific. The United States delegation is as follows:

Chairman

Tom Gill, Society of American Foresters, Washington, D.C.

Advisers

Milton H. Button, Agricultural Administration for Trust Territories of the Pacific, Department of the Interior, Fort Ruger, Oahu, Hawaii

Raymond H. Davis, Chief, Far East Branch, Food and Agricultural Division, Economic Cooperation Administration

H. B. Donaldson, Colonel, U.S.A., Division of Forestry, National Resources Section, Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Tokyo

Robert L. Pendleton, Ph.D., Agricultural Adviser on Soils and Agronomy, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, American Embassy, Bangkok

Roy W. Simonson, Ph.D., Assistant Chief, Division of Soil Survey, Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering, Agricultural Research Administration, Department of Agriculture

The purpose of the meeting is to provide an opportunity for governments to exchange experience and views as to the solution of common problems in the utilization and conservation of soil and water in tropical regions and to arrange for continued cooperation in research and the dissemination of knowledge on this subject.

The provisional agenda includes the following main topics: mapping and classification of tropical land resources; organization, administration, and financial support of land utilization and conservation programs in the tropics, including research, education, and extension of advisory work; need for further research on tropical land utilization problems; and international cooperation in furthering the best use of tropical land resources.

U. S. Documentary Films Win Prizes

Special recognition has been awarded 11 United States Government films at the Venice and Edinburgh International Film Festivals.

The films, all documentary, were selected by the State Department's Review Committee and submitted to the two contests. Of seven pictures sent to Venice, five took first prizes and two were awarded second places. In the case of both second prize entries, no first prize was awarded in their divisions. The winning first prize films include three Veterans' Administration pictures, Seizure, Aphasia, and Bronchogenic Carcinoma, in addition to an Army film on Rodent Control and a Navy Department's surgical film, Complicated Exodontia.

Four films were selected by the Edinburgh Festival for showing and awards of certificates. Although the festival is noncompetitive and no prizes were given, selection for screening is considered an award in itself. The films include the Navy Department's El Centro Story depicting the activities of a Naval air station, and Embryology of Human Behavior which illustrates aviation research on eye and hand coordination.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Sept. 10-16, 1951

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

Number	Date	Subject
760	8/24	Pakistan Locust Plague
775†	9/8	German Doc. vol. 4 released
783	8/31	Awards to Government Films
809	9/8	Bruce: European Defense
810*	9/10	Exchange of Persons
811	9/11	Peru Signs Torquay Protocol
812*	9/12	Foreign Service Changes
813*	9/12	Henderson Appointed to Iran
814*	9/12	Ambassador Grady Retires
815	9/12	German Republic's 2d Anniversary
816*	9/12	Bowles Appointed to India
817*	9/12	Exchange of Persons
818	9/12	Corliss to Ecosoc
819	9/12	Dulles: Cultural Relations with Japan
820*	9/12	Exchange of Persons
821*	9/12	Bowles: Acceptance of Nomination
822*	9/13	Exchange of Students
823	9/13	Plant Quarantine Conference
824	9/13	Land Utilization in Tropics
825*	9/14	Visitors to U.S.
826*	9/14	Roddan: Minister to Uruguay
827*	9/14	Ravndal: Minister to Hungary
828	9/14	Documentation Conference
829	9/14	Foreign Ministers' Declaration
830	9/14	Foreign Ministers' Communiqué
831	9/14	Tin Study Group, 6th Sess.
832	9/14	NAC—7th Sess.
833*	9/15	Itinerary of De Gasperi

The United States in the United Nations

[August 31, 1951–September 20, 1951]

General Assembly

"Additional Measures To Be Employed to Meet The Aggression in Korea"—Cuba and Laos have advised the U.N. Secretariat that they, too, are complying with the embargo resolution against the Communist aggressors in Korea, making a total of 63 replies received to date from Member and non-Member Governments.

Collective Measures Committee—(CMC)—1. Contributions of Armed Forces under General Assembly Resolution "Uniting for Peace." Seven additional replies have been received from the following: *Burma* has been unable to take any measures in implementation, nor is it in a position to contemplate any. However, the matter will be kept under periodic review. *Chile* is prepared, in principle, to fulfill the provisions of the resolution and was giving the matter study. *Ecuador* will "devote special attention, so far as possible and as soon as circumstances allow, to the development and maintenance within its armed forces of elements . . . to be available both for the defence of the continent and to render service under the "Uniting for Peace resolution. . . . *Egypt* has the question under earnest consideration and would communicate its decision later. *Saudi Arabia* does not find itself at this stage in a position to implement the resolution. *Sweden* has instructed "the military authorities to study this question and to present a proposal to the Government. A proposal submitted earlier in the year is at present under revision by the military authorities." *Venezuela* will do everything in its power to give effect to the resolution. To date 32 replies have been received from member governments.

2. *Reports*—The Committee, September 6, unanimously adopted the report of the Subcommittee on Economic and Financial Measures, except for No. 10 of the "guiding principles" covering the cooperation to be sought from "existing bodies . . . in support of the collective economic and financial measures," and the recommendations, which will be considered at the next meeting. The recommendations call for adoption by the General Assembly of the "guiding principles," establishment of a permanent study group, and designation of a separate *ad hoc* coordination committee whenever the Security Council or the General Assembly decides upon or recommends the application of collective measures against an offending state. The chairman, Joao Carlos Muniz (Brazil), appointed a drafting group to incorporate the texts of the reports already approved into the draft of the Committee's final report to the General Assembly. Members of the group are the presiding officers of the three subcommittees—Yugoslavia, Philippines, Brazil—plus France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Economic and Social Council

The thirteenth session of Ecosoc closed on September 21. During the past 2 weeks it adopted, *inter alia*, the following:

Land Reform: After a week's debate the Council adopted, 14-0-4 (Czech., Mexico, Poland, U.S.S.R.), a United States amended resolution on land reform¹ covering: (1) recommendations to governments regarding measures they should take to provide security of tenure, cultivator ownership, agricultural credits and equitable taxation, provision of factory and maintenance services for farm machinery, expansion of rural education facilities and services for technological education of farmers; (2) recommendations to the specialized agencies and the United Nations on measures they should take to assist governments; and (3) special recommendations to governments responsible for populations which are not economically advanced and particularly for non-self-governing territories to ensure the protection of such populations in all policies and laws relating to land.

Technical Assistance: (1) Regular program of Technical Assistance—The Council noted with appreciation the Secretary-General's report containing analysis of technical assistance provided for more than 60 countries and territories, and expressed satisfaction that next year's budget proposes the same allotment of \$1,392,900 from United Nations funds as in 1951. Hugh L. Keenleyside, Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration, informed the Council of his Administration's successful efforts to internationalize the staff, place greater emphasis on social welfare activities and training in public administration, and increase the participation of non-European countries in the U.N. fellowship and scholarship programs.

(2) Expanded program of Technical Assistance—The Council reviewed the reports of the TAB and the Technical Assistance Committee and adopted a joint French-Philippine-United States resolution, 13-0-4 (Soviet bloc), commending the results achieved so far, urging governments to make contributions on the current scale to the program for 1952, and proposing a number of financial arrangements to be made by the General Assembly for the operation of this program. The Technical Assistance Board report stated that agreements have already been signed with 45 governments to provide a total of 741 experts; that over 500 requests for technical assistance had been received by the Board's participating organizations from 64 countries and territories; and that the program is being financed by voluntary contributions by 55 governments which pledged more

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1951, p. 473.

than 20 million dollars, of which 31 countries have paid more than 11 million dollars already.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—The Council noted with satisfaction the FAO report and adopted a joint Chilean-United States resolution, 13-3 (Soviet bloc)-1, which recommends that the FAO keep existing or emerging food shortages in individual countries under continuous surveillance and maintain periodic studies of such problems.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)—The Council unanimously took note of the Commission's report and adopted two related resolutions, one on financial implications of the ECAFE 1951-52 programs and the other on the provision of speeding up technical assistance to countries in Asia and the Far East, and approved the continuation of the Commission.

Economic Commission for the Middle East—The Council decided, 14-0-0, to "postpone to a subsequent session consideration of the question of establishment of an Economic Commission for the Middle East."

Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)—The Council took note of the annual report of the Economic Commission for Latin America, recommended that the necessary funds should be made available to implement fully the 1951-52 work program presented therein, and unanimously approved the continuation of the Commission.

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)—The Council favorably considered the annual report of the Commission and unanimously approved the continuation of the Commission. With the exception of the Soviet bloc, the members agreed with Gunnar Myrdal, Executive Secretary General of ECE, that despite the handicaps offered by the evident political division of Europe, most of the technical committees of the Commission had succeeded in accomplishing constructive work, even though the annual sessions of ECE itself were overloaded with political propaganda.

Restrictive Business Practices—The Council adopted, 12-3 (Soviet bloc)-2 (Chile, Mexico), a United States amended resolution to place under U.N. supervision the practices of international cartels which restrict international trade and production, retard economic development, and affect standards of living. It also sets up a special committee of 10 members (Belgium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay) to draw up and submit proposals to the Council as soon as possible on methods to be adopted by international agreement for preventing restrictive business practices.

Shortage of Newsprint—The Council adopted, 15-0-3, an amended Belgian-French resolution which appeals to the main consumers and producers of paper among member states to adopt voluntarily temporary measures for alleviating

the present shortage of newsprint and printing paper, by slightly reducing consumption, expanding production and endeavoring to meet the overall requirements of the various countries; requests the regional commissions to encourage trade which would provide newsprint and printing paper industries with adequate supplies of raw material; appeals to the International Materials Conference to help relieve the crisis; and, to meet the long-range problem, asks the FAO, the International Bank, the Technical Assistance program, UNESCO, and other U.N. agencies to continue study and research, to make experts available, to advise on financing and to pool their efforts to solve the problem.

Report of the Coordination Committee—The Council adopted the report of the Coordination Committee, under the chairmanship of Walter Kotschnig (U. S.), which had considered and approved the Reports of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Organization and Operation of the Council and its Commissions. The Council, in the future, will hold two regular sessions, April and July. The April session will be devoted to major economic items and any social items ready for discussion. The July session will adjourn and reconvene toward the end of the General Assembly to take care of business arising therefrom and any other administrative matters.

Relief and Rehabilitation of Korea—The Council adopted, 14-0-3 (Soviet bloc), a resolution reaffirming its earnest hope "that all members of the United Nations will find it possible to contribute to the program for the relief and rehabilitation of Korea drawn up by the General Assembly." The Council noted, 14-0-3 (Soviet bloc), the report of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA).

General

1. The Secretary-General's proposed Budget Estimates for 1952 regular United Nations operations, which will be considered at the next General Assembly, total \$46,568,300, representing a decrease of \$1,230,300 from the 1951 budget. The United Nations Advisory Committee on administrative and budgetary questions in its report to the Assembly has proposed a further reduction of \$2,035,400.

The United Nations Committee on Contributions has proposed a reduction in the United States assessment toward these operating expenses from 38.92 to 36.90 percent and that the Soviet Union assessment be increased from 6.98 to 9.85 percent.

2. The Security Council approved, 10-0-1 (U.S.S.R.), the text of its report to the General Assembly covering the period July 16, 1950 to July 15, 1951.

3. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) August 15 unanimously approved its report to the General Assembly.

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
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
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
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
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